

Church & State

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Iraq:
Who Is Responsible?

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Iraq: Who Is Responsible?

The contribution of the Irish State to the Ameranglian war of destruction on Iraq in 2003 was slight. And it was despicable.

It was justified at the time by a combination of cynical idealism and a calculation that a refusal to facilitate the transit of American warplanes would be disadvantageous commercially. The official justifier was Martin Mansergh.

The idealism said that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator and that it was unquestionably a good thing to get rid of him. But the Irish Government had better reasons than most to understand that the evil dictatorship was fostering a liberal, secular, European mode of life in Iraq. There had been extensive Irish trade with Iraq and large numbers of Irish citizens had worked and lived in Iraq; many of them working in its National Health Service.

It required no great political insight to understand that the liberal, secular mode of life which was flourishing under the dictatorship depended on the dictatorship.

Liberalism and Democracy are different things. They are often treated as the same thing in Western political slang just now, but for a couple of centuries they were regarded as being incompatible. The British state was conducted on liberal lines by an aristocratic ruling class two hundred years before it was democratised, and much of the opposition to democratisation was based on the apprehension that it would destroy the liberal way of life.

The liberal system in Iraq was not operated by formal democracy. But elements from all the different social bodies thrown together haphazardly by Britain for an Imperial purpose were drawn into it and a national society was in the course of formation when the invasion ended it.

Formal bourgeois democracy takes a considerable time to construct in a society which lived on very different terms for a thousand years. And it is functional only on the basis of a stable national society. The Iraqi dictatorship was constructing such a society. It was drawing people from all sections of traditional society into the functioning of a modern national State. In the course of time the routines of formal party-political democracy would probably have set in as the national bourgeois society fostered by the dictatorship took root and came to be taken for granted.

The US and the UK invaded Iraq, destroyed the regime of the dictatorship in the name of democratisation, and the secular, liberal national society collapsed quickly in the face of overwhelming "*shock and awe*", and incitements to religious rebellion.

The Irish Government, instead of making a defence of the state with which it had had normal civilised and profitable relations, genuflected before the catch-cry of "*evil dictatorship*", and apologised for having had normal international relations with it. (This was done by Mansergh.)

There was no political movement within Iraqi liberal society

for the overthrow of the dictatorship, and even the traditional communal forces organised by religion were quiescent as they were gradually drawn into the functioning of the State. Democracy was imposed by invasion and incitement to rebellion.

In 2003 the most powerful military force in the world destroyed the liberal regime of state of the dictatorship. (A viable dictatorship acts by means of a regime of state no less than a democratically-elected Government does.) It incited the populace to rebellion. What the democratic rebellion, encouraged by the all-powerful conqueror, brought into action, when the regime of State had been destroyed and disgraced, were the traditional elements that existed spontaneously, independently of the State.

Those elements had been passive under the regime. When called suddenly into action, to take the place of the disgraced regime, they could only be what is called *fundamentalist*.

The big problem was that there was not a single Fundamentalism held in check by the regime, but a number of conflicting ones. They have been unable to form a new national regime of any kind, least of all a liberal, secular one.

An official British Enquiry into British participation in the war on Iraq has finally reported after inordinate delays. Though chaired by somebody who was close to Tony Blair in the handling of Northern Ireland, it damns his war-making in substance, though refusing to do so formally.

The Enquiry was set up by Gordon Brown when his turn finally came to be Prime Minister. It was his way of getting his own back on Blair for breaking their agreement to take turns at being Prime Minister and hanging on to the position too long.

The multi-volume Report, as far as we can gather from media comment, did not deal at all with the nature of the national state that was treated as an object to be destroyed and was unduly concerned with a handful of British military casualties.

When the Report came to be discussed by Parliament, the Labour Party (which had launched the War) had fallen into the hands of a leader who had opposed it at the time, in Parliament and on the streets. Corbyn's leadership was being boycotted by most of the Parliamentary Labour Party. And, when he apologised in the Commons to the people of Iraq for the War which the Party had made on them, he was barracked by his own back-benches, many of whom had been implicated in it. (It was the first British war that was carried out on the authority of the House of Commons, rather than on the Royal Prerogative exercised by the Prime Minister.)

Media comment on the Report threw some interesting light on the way the world has been governed during the quarter century of US dominance.

Paul Bremer, an American businessman who was Governor of Iraq in the first year of the Occupation (2003-4) was interviewed on BBC's *Newsnight* programme on July 6th:

"*BBC*: The de-Baathification process does get criticism in the Chilcot Report. And do you now accept that it was too deep and too ambitious and that it left the country ungovernable?"

"*Bremer*: No. I agree there was a mistake made in the de-Baathification. It wasn't the one the Commission focussed on. It's important to remember how it came about. It was part of the pre-War planning—one part that we actually got right. It was modelled on the de-Nazification programme in Germany in 1945 but much milder. It really was designed, the Decree

that I signed, to hit only one per cent of the Baath Party, which itself was only ten per cent of the people. So we're talking about one tenth of one per cent. About 20,000 people. And all it said about them was they could no longer have roles in the Government. They were perfectly free to go out and set up a newspaper if they wanted to, a radio station, a business, or become farmers.

"The problem, and the mistake I made, was turning the implementation of this narrowly drafted decree over to Iraqi politicians..."

"BBC: What Chilcot said is that the British had thought it should be a much more limited de-Baathification, 5,000, not 20 or 30,000: that the British really had very little say in any of this Coalition Provisional Authority Government... and were very often ignored... And Chilcot says that the British vision was right and your vision was wrong..."

Bremer replied that it was not his vision, but a vision drawn up before he entered the scene by those who undertook the invasion. The British had access to him the whole time and they had not made him aware that they disagreed with what he was doing, and that they wanted something very different to be done.

He ridiculed Chilcot's suggestion that the British-American discussions should have been more formal—did he mean that the discussions should have been over a green baize table in the presence of incoming gunfire! Everything he did was cleared with the British.

Bremer gave the appearance of being an honest man just telling the truth while the other side was engaged in apologetics designed to minimise British responsibility.

There was a memorable scene in the House of Commons in the early days of the invasion: the Minister of 'Defence', Labour's Hoon, loutishly laid back at the Despatch Box, urging on the anarchic plundering of Iraqi public buildings, including hospitals and museums, as an expression of the freedom that Britain had brought to Iraq.

The American administration acted with blundering brutality, guided by authentic simple-mindedness about human affairs. The possibility of such a thing ended in Britain many centuries ago—perhaps under the regime of Elizabeth, and certainly not later than the collapse of the Puritan regime and the establishment of the Restoration regime in 1660.

Labour Party action in the affair was duplicitous—and thirteen years later it is desperate to free itself from the honest man who opposed the War but has now been elected to lead the party.

The de-Nazification of Germany was much invoked in 2003 as the model for Iraq. It was inappropriate to the point of absurdity.

German society was the society of a national state which had constructed itself. The society retained, to a considerable extent, a way of life that was independent of the State. It had for centuries existed in the form of a hundred separate states, all of which were aware of themselves as German and contributed to the achievements of German culture.

The United States had, in 1944-5, a plan to destroy Germany as a national society—to break up its economy and culture and "pastoralise" it into simple local peasant communities, so that the world could be freed for centuries to come from the danger alleged to be inherent in the existence of a German state.

Thirty years later a US General said he would bomb Cambodia back into a state of nature.

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The USA, as a consequence of the way it had established itself through multiple genocide, has a natural liking for that kind of drastic action.

But there was no prospect whatever in 1945 that Germany, when its regime was removed, would undergo internal fragmentation and revert of its own accord to a state of nature.

But that is what happened in Iraq. And it is what Britain should have expected to happen.

When Britain set out to conquer the Ottoman Empire in 1914, it began to govern Mesopotamia as an extension of the Indian Empire. Then, around 1916, in a perverse application of the right of national self-determination for which it purported to be fighting the Great War, it decided to re-arrange Mesopotamia into a system of nation-states. While refusing to concede national government to Ireland, which was demanding it, it set about artificially forming its Middle Eastern conquests into subordinate 'nation-states': even though there was no nationalism in those populations.

Arbitrary lines were drawn on the map of the Middle East and the arbitrariness was increased by the necessity of sharing the region with France. And the various peoples who lived within each arbitrary boundary were told that they were this nationality or that: Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese etc.

The Ottoman culture, like the Byzantine culture that preceded it, had not organised society by nationalism or ethnicity. This may be inconceivable from the viewpoint of the nationalism that became the social form of the Western Roman Empire in its disintegration, but that is how it was in the Middle East.

The miscellaneous peoples of what was made into Iraq by Britain had lived their own communal lives within the Ottoman Empire. They could live harmoniously alongside each other because Iraqi nationalism was unknown to them until it was imposed on them by Britain.

Britain ruled its Iraqi construction by force and fraud between the World Wars. It accorded it nominal independence, but when the Bagdad Government declared neutrality in the 2nd World War, and was judged not to be sufficiently supportive of Britain's invasion of Iran in 1941, it was declared to be in rebellion. It was overthrown and replaced by a British puppet.

It was only when the Iraqi state gained substantive political independence that its internal national development began. That internal national development was necessary to independence. It was made obligatory in the structure imposed on the world by the United Nations. States which failed to achieve it were vulnerable to disruption by other states—and not least by those which claimed to be the guardians of the UN system.

A sense of Iraqi national sentiment, over-riding religious and other particularisms, was developed by the Baath regime. It held firm under the stress of the War against Iran (supported by the West at the time and later listed among Saddam's crimes), with the Shia population playing their part in the War against the Shia state.

During the Cold War, the independence of the Baath regime was an asset to the West. The Cold War ended in 1990. The USA gave the green light to Iraq to act against the puppet state of Kuwait, which had been stealing its oil while Iraq was protecting it by war from the expansion of the Iranian Revolution. But the moment Iraq acted against Kuwait, the West declared that another Hitler had arisen and must be dealt with. The Soviet Union, having been brought to collapse by Gorbachov, allowed the war on Iraq to take the form of a United Nations War.

The Iraqi Army was easily defeated. The defeat, in large part, took the form of a slaughter of the retreating Iraqi Army which had no power of retaliation. But the regime did not fall. Its core remained sound.

The British Prime Minister called on the Kurds to rise. Many Governments have called on the Kurds to rise and they have usually responded. They responded again. But the regime did not fall, and it punished them for rising—in the way that Governments do. Premier Major was asked why he did not go to their aid since he had called on them to rise. He said he could not remember calling on them to rise.

The regime held firm, demonstrating that a substantial force of Iraqi national will had developed. The United Nations warriors did not press on to Bagdad and break up the system of State. It was said that Bush senior was anxious about what would be unleashed if the country was occupied and the State broken up.

What was done instead was that Iraq was put under UN sanctions. The sanctions were applied in such a way that the

only intelligible purpose of them was to destroy the public infrastructure in Iraq of what we call civilised life—the kind of life that had developed under the regime.

The sanctions were supplemented, under Clinton, by bombing. The Iraqi Air Force was banned from the skies. Its only act of defiance was to keep track of the United Nations planes covering its skies. When it was noticed doing this, there was punishment by bombing which shredded what remained of public utilities.

The UN knew very well what it was doing to civilised life in Iraq. It had Inspectors on the ground supervising things.

Systematic UN destruction by sanctions and bombing went on for twelve years. Various attempts were made to stimulate an internal coup within the regime. But still the regime held firm.

Is that a fact that can be explained as the effect of the action of State terrorism against a hostile populace?

It can hardly be doubted that those twelve years of torment inflicted by the UN on the populace brought about an increase in the resentment against the regime of traditional elements that had not been incorporated into the national system and redirected them towards 'fundamentalist' forms of hostility towards it.

Then comes 2003: invasion, Shock and Awe, the removal of 20,000 people from the Government—in fact the abolition of government—and fundamentalist anarchy that hardly deserves to be called civil war. A war launched and fanned by the occupation authorities, which—discommoded by such resistance as there was—fomented Sunni/Shia conflicts by covert means.

The British Ambassador to the United Nations at the time of the invasion, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, was interviewed about Chilcot in the same BBC programme as Bremer.

"BBC: The finding is that the UK undermined the Security Council's authority while taking the guise of being supporters of the UN process. As UN Ambassador at that time were you aware that that was the case?

"Greenstock: It wasn't the case. I think Chilcot is being too categorical. For a start, where's the US in that statement? We were working very closely with the US and Spain and Bulgaria. It wasn't just the UK on its own.

Secondly, you can say that the authority of the Security Council is undermined whenever the Permanent Five are in disagreement with each other. Because it's an inter-Governmental process. And the Security Council can't act if the Members of the Security Council don't agree. It does a huge amount of good when they agree, it falls apart when they don't agree. Thirdly, what was Saddam Hussein doing but undermining the authority of the Security Council for the 12 years up to 2003? And the Security Council were doing nothing about it. So that judgment has to be qualified."

The last point is an obvious absurdity. Saddam had no responsibility for the conduct of the United Nations. He was its victim. It determined to destroy that state of which he was leader and he did his best to hold the state together despite it. He resisted the wanton destruction of the viable state of Iraq by the Great Powers of the world organised as the Security Council.

The United Nations is a Great Power system of world organisation. Insofar as it is meaningful to describe it as a system of international law, it exists only for use against minor states. The Great Powers who operate the system are not themselves subject to its operation. and the system can only be applied against the minor Powers by agreement between the five Great Powers.

The system was set up in 1945 by the two Greatest Powers of the time, Russia and America, and by Britain which had reduced itself to a secondary Power by bungling its second World War of the half century. France and China were awarded Great Power status within the system, though neither had at the time the actual power to merit it.

Neither America nor Russia would have agreed to the establishment of an international system which could assert any degree of authority over it.

Russia had been expelled from the League of Nations in December 1939 by Britain and France because of steps it had taken against Finland to strengthen the defences of Leningrad. Britain and France had declared war on Germany in September but by December it was Russia they were trying to make war on. Russia in 1945, having won the War on Germany that Britain had started, ensured that there could be no repetition by the UN of the League of Nations carry-on against it. And America had long been on record against being part

of any international system which might conceivably assert authority over it. It would recognise no limits to its own sovereignty either at home or abroad.

The United Nations that was established in 1945 was the only possible United Nations. What Greenstock pretends to see as a defect in it is actually its essence.

As the UN was being established in 1945, Germany was being defeated. Britain, after withdrawing from France in June 1940, manoeuvred during the next year to bring about a German/Russian War. That happened in 1941. Britain then bided its time for three years as the German/Russian War worked itself out, only returning to the European battlefield under American pressure in 1944, after the German armies had been defeated in Russia.

The "*Grand Alliance*", proclaimed by Churchill after he got Russia to undertake the task of defeating Germany, had no integrity. It could not outlast the defeat of Germany. Churchill saw Russia as the fundamental enemy of what he considered civilisation, and Germany as an accidental enemy caused by foreign policy bungling.

War between the victors over Germany was therefore implicit in the defeat of Germany, and it was on that assumption that the structure of the UN was formed. That structure ensured that the UN would play no part in the world conflict brought about by the outcome of Britain's decision to make war on Germany over the trivial issue of Danzig, and its strategy of 'spreading the war' after its failure to make good, by its own resources, its declaration of war on Germany.

The World War, for which Russia's defeat of Germany cleared the way, would not have had the United Nations as a participant. That war did not happen, not because the UN kept the peace, but because Russia built nuclear weapons so quickly after the Americans.

Greenstock says that the Security Council does good when its Great Powers act together. It would be closer to the mark to say that something is wrong when they act together.

They acted together in 1991 because the Russian State was in collapse and could not tend to its interests in the world. The result was a David and Goliath war, in which Goliath had the

sling-shot as well as everything else, and twelve years of torment was inflicted on the people of Iraq by Sanctions and Bombings in the hope of getting them to rise against the regime.

The Great Powers acted together against Libya in 2011 and made it a shambles of fundamentalist militias. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Security Council can only act destructively.

In 2003 the French—the stinking cheese-eating surrender monkeys—vetoed Security Council action against Iraq until the UN Weapons Inspectors gave a definite report, so the US and UK acted destructively on their own. If the French had not vetoed Security Council action, there is little reason to suppose that the outcome would have been much different for the Iraqis.

The *Chilcot Report* is relevant to current British politics. It is surprisingly condemnatory of the actions of the Labour Government, within its terms of reference. We recall Chilcot as being associated with Blair in Northern Ireland and we did not expect him to say that Blair's Labour Government had fought an unnecessary war, a war of choice, in breach of the supposed international authority which it pretended to accept, and that it wilfully misrepresented the French position in order to justify itself in doing so.

Greenstock says that he restored UN authority a few months after Blair had flouted it. We assume he is referring to the UN legitimising of the Occupation, after it became an accomplished fact. A lot of good that did for the Iraqis.

When the United Nations acts, it is the United States that acts. The United States can act destructively in the world with or without UN authority and the UN can do nothing about it and, when the UN acts, it acts as the United States.

The United States can act as the United Nations when the other four Vetoist Powers consent. The UK is almost always willing to consent, and France is mostly. Russia only consented when it had fallen into disarray, and, now that it is getting itself together again, it is likely to be more careful in future. China is not part of the Euro-American world and doesn't seem greatly concerned about what it does to itself. It has restored its absolute independence after a century of European destructive activity. It can defend itself. In the

post-1945 world, that means that it has the power to obliterate any state that interferes with it.

Under these circumstances the United Nations is nothing more than a pretentious sham.

*

An article in the *Sunday Independent* of July 3rd has an interesting title and blurb: *Governing Is For Grown-Ups, Democracy Is For Kids*. And: "Voters remain abysmally ignorant of basic facts and many of them behave like children".

It is an attack on Boris Johnson's Brexit campaign, which is described as a series of ridiculous misrepresentations of the EU, but "Many voters lapped it up".

That is the essence of the case against referendums. The people don't understand so they elect people to understand, and act, for them.

But the war on Iraq was not decided on by the people. It was decided by the representatives they elected to take decisions for them.

British decisions to make war used to be taken by the monarch. From the early 18th century until a few years ago they were taken by the Prime Minister, acting with monarchical authority. It was only in 2003 that the decision about making war was transferred down to the elected Parliament. Parliament decided for war. That is now held to have been a bad decision. But responsibility for it is being transferred back to the Prime Minister, who had freed himself of it by giving it to Parliament.

It is said that he misled Parliament. But it is Parliament's business not to be misled. It has authority to do anything it wants and it can only be misled if it is content to be—if it is *childish* enough to be.

Fair play to the *Sunday Independent* writer, Eoin O'Malley. He says that in parliamentary democracies "voters don't themselves get to choose policies directly. The voters pick leaders who then make decisions on our behalf. It's like picking people to be our parents". But he doesn't suggest what might be done about it.

(It must be said that O'Malley's strictures apply far more to British voters than to Irish. There can be little doubt that the Irish democracy is capable of a degree of political acumen which results from having established its own state by blood and tears within living memory.)

Iraq was invaded because it did not

have weapons of mass destruction, although the reason given for the invasion was that it probably had weapons of mass destruction which were deliverable within 45 minutes. Nobody in England waited with bated breath during the 45 minutes after the point of invasion for the weapons of mass destruction to fall on them. The thing was done in the certainty that Iraq had been rendered completely defenceless by twelve years of United Nations destructive activity on it.

The offence that the Iraqi Government gave to Washington and to the British Labour Party in 2003 was that it maintained the national structure of state, and kept up the endless work of repairing the public amenities that the United Nations was continuously destroying—electricity supplies, water supplies etc.

The only purpose for the invasion was to break up the structure of the Iraqi State and reduce the population of Iraq to a state of nature in which primitive social forms would revive.

The Washington Neo-Cons, who inhabit a bizarre ideological wonderland, might have expected something different to happen when the State was destroyed by overwhelming power. But Britain, the Imperial Power that constructed Iraq, must be presumed to have known what it was doing when it destroyed it so recklessly. And that presumption is strengthened by the fact that it was the Progressive party of the British state that did the work of destruction, while the reactionary party had doubts.

The plea that the Labour Party was woefully ignorant, and did not know what it was doing, is not allowable. Certain presumptions must be made about those who perform public functions in powerful states. In domestic law there is a maxim that *ignorance is no excuse*. If everything was excusable by ignorance, there could be no law. Is there less necessity for the maxim in international affairs, especially when a powerful State destroys a weaker state and reduces its society to anarchy?

Tony Blair is being held to account, as a scapegoat, for what the Labour Party did. But it was the Labour Party that did it.

Hilary Benn led the assault by the Parliamentary Labour Party on the new Party Leader who had opposed the war on Iraq. Benn, a Junior Minister in Blair's Government, said, after the invasion had reduced Iraq to a shambles:

We gave them their freedom and it was up to them what they did with it.

The notion that the destruction of a State by overwhelming force from outside confers freedom on the populace is ludicrous. Existential freedom, in this regard, is the hobby of the individual within the security of well-established States.

Democratic Britain decided democratically to destroy the Iraqi State and thereby deprived the Iraqi populace of the freedoms that the State had made available to them.

What punishment can there be for a democracy that wages an aggressive and purely destructive war? A brief, passing consideration was given to this question in connection with the Nuremberg Trials, when the Victors in the World War were pretending that there were laws regarding war which Hitler had broken and which his lieutenants were made to take responsibility for in his absence.

Lord Shawcross, British Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, later found difficulty in defending certain aspects of the Trials when he came to write his memoirs. He referred his readers to Rebecca West, "a brilliant and philosophical writer" for a reply to the criticism..

West was the author of a very famous book, *The Meaning Of Treason* (1949) and *A Train Of Powder* (1955). In the latter she writes, concerning the inadequacy of the *Kellogg Pact* (1928) for the use to which it was put at Nuremberg:

"There was then no country that seemed likely to wage war which was not democratic in its government, since the only totalitarian powers in Europe, the Soviet Union and Italy, were still too weak. It would not be logical to try the leaders of a democracy for their governmental crimes, since they had been elected by the people, who thereby took responsibility for their actions... But the leaders of a totalitarian state seize political power and continually declare that they, and not the people, are responsible for all government acts". (This is quoted from Brendan Clifford's *Appendix* to the 2nd edition of the Aubane Historical Society publication of Elizabeth Bowen's *Notes On Eire*, where the matter is dealt with.)

There is now talk of impeaching Blair for waging an unnecessary and destructive war on Iraq in breach of international authority. On Rebecca West's reasoning—and we know of no other on the subject—that means treating him as a dictator. But, contemptible

creature though he is, he was no dictator.

Angela Eagle, who is trying to oust the democratically-elected leader who opposed the War, does not want Blair disciplined for the War. She has reason for this as being herself a party to the declaration of war. (More recently, she also voted for bombing Syria.)

Blair did not present Parliament with the accomplished fact of war on Iraq. The decision to make war was a Parliamentary decision. But Parliament is essentially a structure of two parties. The proposal to Parliament that it should make war on Iraq was put to it by the Labour Party. If there is to be punishment, the subject of it should be those with the responsibility for it—the Parliamentary Labour Party of the time.

*

Eoin O'Malley's interesting indictment of Democracy is directed at Boris Johnson's Brexit propaganda. But Brexit was an internal British affair. It might be that it "*showed many voters at their most childish*", but if so they were only childish in their own affairs.

It is a wild exaggeration—it is indeed a reversal of the actual relationship of things—to say: "*The EU has led directly to the largest peace time within Western Europe for at least a thousand years...*"

The post-1945 peace in Europe was a consequence of the overthrow of European Fascism—minus Spain and Portugal, which were never in WW2 and which survived it—by two external Powers, Russia and the USA. Communist Russia played by far the greater part in the overthrow. Capitalist USA entered the European conflict only in 1944. When the Communist and Capitalist armies met in Germany in May 1945 the conflict between them as rival world systems began. It took the form of Cold War only because Russia made its own nuclear weapons only a couple of years after the USA nuclear bombed Japan.

Europe was pacified by the fact that it was occupied by the two Great Powers that emerged from the World War started by Britain in 1939 in which Britain itself played a minor part. Britain's main contribution to that War was the starting of it, and its refusal to settle it in June 1940 after it became incapable of waging it with any realistic prospect of winning it.

Europe was not freed from Fascism by Britain. Nor did Europe free itself from Fascism to any perceptible extent. It was content with Fascism. It was freed from Fascism only because Britain

succeeded in bringing about a German/Russian war after it had itself lost all hope of defeating Germany.

The peace of Europe post-1945 was the peace of the hinterlands of the two Great Powers whose front line with one another ran through Central Europe. And it was within that context of peace enforced by the conflict of external Powers that the EEC/EU was formed.

Crucial to the formation and development of the EU was the prevention of Britain from playing the hegemonic role in European affairs that it had played after 1918.

Konrad Adenauer, who had experienced British hegemony in 1919 as Mayor of Cologne, was determined to negate British influence after 1945, and that meant negating the influence of the British Labour Party. He negated British influence by means of American influence, and he quickly brought together the Western Occupation Zones as the Federal Republic under the culture of Christian Democracy—a political force that was baffling to the British.

De Gasperi did likewise in Italy. And they co-operated with Gaullism in France to bring about a European structure with which Britain could no longer play its dangerous balance-of-power games.

Europe lost its sense of history in the outcome of the World War, and has never recovered it. The immediate post-1945 generation of leaders knew the actual history of the preceding thirty years from personal memory and acted out of direct personal knowledge. For the generation that came after them the history of that critical period resembled Central Africa in European maps of the mid 19th century—a blank space named *Terra Incognita*. It was unknown territory surrounded with taboos which it was dangerous to probe. So they knew no better than to admit Britain to membership when it applied for it nicely.

The Brexit British Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, explained frankly a couple of years ago what this journal had been arguing for decades: that Britain entered the EU for the purpose of diverting it from its course, and that it had been particularly successful in diluting it by means of random expansion when the end of the Cold War presented the opportunity.

And, as to peace and the EU—within a year of the ending of the Cold War, by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU

instigated national war in the Balkans for the purpose of destroying a Communist state which had been its *de facto* ally for forty years in the Cold War against the Soviet Union but which it now felt was out of place.

The world seems to be settling back into the structure that was disrupted by Britain's Great War of 1914. Turkey, reduced to nothing by four years of aggressive war against it which ended in 1919, is becoming a strong regional Power again. Russia, reduced to a playground for American capital in the 1990s, is becoming a functional state again, and is being demonised for it. Britain, having disconverted the EU, is striking out on its own again.

The big differences are that China has restored itself as a state capable of defending itself (which nowadays means a state with WMD), and that Germany has no political existence—which means that Europe hasn't.

(The Cold War is over but Europe remains the advance guard of the USA against Russia—of the capitalist USA against capitalist Russia.)

The Irish political landscape has been transformed by the Brexit vote. All over the place, the tail-enders of British economic, political and social trends are reeling. Indeed, there have been some tantrums. No longer is every English misdeed ignored, minimised or dismissed as a foible. The bubble has been pricked, scales have fallen from eyes and new perspectives opened. Whatever happens, it is hard to see that simple faith and admiration of all that is British restored.

The Brexit vote had a shocking effect on the Irish Anglophile *literati*. Many of them gave expression to their pain in the *Irish Times*. Eamear McBride (July 2) begins: "*I've had a horror of provincialism all my life*". But literary Ireland, as it has constructed itself during the last 30 years, is English provincial.

Irish *literati* of the revisionist era may feel that they became cosmopolitan by becoming English provincial. The world is England to them. But England got the feeling that it was becoming provincial European, and wouldn't have it.

Anglophilia is the Siamese twin of Anglophobia—witness Eoghan Harris.

McBride says:

"I am resolutely not one of the "decent people" Nigel Farage praised

for making Brexit happen, and I don't mind at all about that, because I don't think that he, Brois Johnson, Michael Gove or any of the cynical band of reactionary bigots are decent either. I think what they have done to the UK is a disgrace..."

And:

"That the left have stood by while this has been happening, whining about their lack of media coverage and muttering "Vote Remain" through clenched teeth, is to their eternal shame."

Edna O'Brien, pioneer of Irish literature as regional British, brackets Boris Johnson "and his cohort" with *Marine Le Pen (sic)*. And: "Amid the weeping and gnashing I must as a Labour voter, say that the blame also rests with *Jeremy Corbyn*". But:

"The hatches are down, England will be all the poorer, economically, culturally and spiritually, and victory already has a jaundiced tinge".

And Fintan O'Toole—he Finanises as expected.

Their world has been taken away from them, because England insists on being itself, instead of losing itself in the European marsh that it has brought about.

The English spirit is now much the same as in the Fall of 1914. Then, virtually the entire spectrum of English political and cultural life felt that it had come too much under German cultural and economic influence, and England asserted its independence by launching a World War. And the most cultured of its statesmen, Arthur Balfour, had expressed the intention of doing this years before.

There is no Irish history of England as a state, neither of its internal development as a state nor its action as a state in the world. And any attempt at dispassionate description of it sets off the Anglophile reflex cry of "Anglophobia".

Things have been happening in Ireland while these intelligentsia have been Anglicising themselves into a Britain that was being sufficiently European for the purpose of disconverting the EU. They took no heed of these Irish events: a 28 Year War and a basic economic restructuring. They did not make literature out of them. And now their illusory England has been taken away from them.

Ochone, ochone!

Niall Cusack

Address delivered in Belfast on 24th June 2016 on the occasion of Britain's Brexit/Sasanach vote to leave the European Union

Sasamach

"La vraie vie et absente'... Mais nous sommes en monde. La métaphysique surgit et se maintient dans cet alibi"

—Emmanuel Levinas:
Totalité et Infini.

"The true life is absent'. But we are in the world. Metaphysics misses and is maintained in this alibi."

The European Idea arose from a yearning for something that was missing, something once present and was lost, without which life ceased to have inherent meaning.

The origins of the European Union are succinctly outlined by Seán de Fréine as follows:

"Sa bhliain 1945, tar eis an *Dara Cogadh Domhanda* bhí mórún den Euraip ina smionagar den dara huain laistig de ghlúin. Ach an t-am seo bhí an scéal í bhfad níos measa ná mar a bhí í 1918. San ár nua seo maraíodh 55 mhilliún duine ar fad, goineadh 35 mhilliún, bhí 3 mhilliún ar iarraidh. San Euraip feín bhí 30 mhilliún dláithread. Gearmánaigh den chuid ba mhó, a díbríodh as a n-áitreabh dúchais. Bhi tíortha Oirthreas na hEorpa ar fad beagnach faoi smacht Rúiseach, agus an t-aon dá thír nach raibh, an Fhionlainn agus an Ghréig, bhí siad faoi bhagairt.

Tháinig triúr státaireí chun cinn a raibh de aisling acu córas nua a thógáil nach ligfeadh a leithéid de thubaiste tarlú arís. Ar dhuine acu bhí Robert Schuman (1886-1963) na Fraince, a bhain le Páirtí Ghluaiseacht Dhaonlathach an Phobail (MRP). Sa bhliain 1950 d'fhoilsigh sé doiciméad ar a tugadh Plean Schuman Mhol an plean go mbanófaí combhargadh gual, iarainn agus cruach ar feadh croga bliain i measc tíortha Iarthar Eorpa, D'fhailigh beart Daonlathach Críostaí go croiúil roimb an phlean, Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) seansailéir na hIar-gharmáine (fear a d'fhulaing príosún faoi na Naitsithe) agus Alcide de Gasperi (1881-1954), príomh-aire na hIodáile."

(*Ciste Cúrsaí Riaia*, p53-4)

"In the year 1945 after the Second World War much of Europe was in smithereens for the second time within a generation. But this time the story was much worse than it had been in

1918. In this new slaughter 55 million people in all were killed, 35 million were injured, 3 million were missing. In Europe itself there were 30 million displaced persons, Germans for the most part, who had been driven out of their homes. The countries of Eastern Europe were almost all under Russian rule, and the only two countries that were not, Finland and Greece, were under threat.

Three statesmen appeared who had the vision of building a new system that would not allow such a disaster to happen again. One of them was Robert Schuman of France, who was a member of the MRP party. In the year 1950 he published a document. It was called the Schuman Plan. The Plan recommended the foundation of a common market for coal, iron and steel for 50 years among the countries of Western Europe. The plan got a hearty welcome from two Christian Democrats, Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany (a man who had suffered prison under the Nazis) and Alcide de Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy."

"*Ne sluchayno, tovarichchi!*"

"*It is no accident, comrades!*" (as Stalin used to say) that it was Christian Democracy that was the source of the European project. Apart from Christianity, Europe really has no meaning other than a geographical expression.

Outside the Minster in the city of York there is a statue of Constantine lounging on a throne with his back to the Church. He looks thoughtful. He has just been told that he is now Emperor. When Constantine got up off his throne he turned round and entered the Minster.

He found, or rather forged, in Orthodox Catholic Christianity a convenient ideology for the diverse subjects of a cosmopolitan Empire. It wasn't easy to

Elizabeth Bowen: "Notes On Eire".
Espionage Reports To Winston Churchill,
1940-42; With an extended Review of Irish
Neutrality in World War 2 by *Jack Lane*
and *Brendan Clifford*. 296pp.
€24, £20 postfree

impose—accounts of Constantine's antics at the Council of Nicea are reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution in China, including Orthodox Bishops *jet-planing heretical* Bishops. But he achieved it. But, up to the Protestant Reformation, there was a cultural entity called Europe which survived the Dark Ages and enjoyed at least two Renaissances, once in the 12th and 13th century and another in the 15th and 16th. It had an international language, Latin, and Jerome's *Vulgate* translation of the Bible into the international tongue.

When Nietzsche described Luther as "*a bigoted mediaeval monk*" I think he was probably right. But Luther did comparatively little harm. It is Henry VIII's creation of a purely political church—a truly Constantinian creation—that laid the foundation for an English policy in Europe that only really took off after the English had tried and failed to solve their theological differences and had resorted to the Glorious Revolution.

Eighteenth and nineteenth century English Balance of Power interference in Europe culminated in the onslaught of 1914. I mean an onslaught that destroyed European culture because it destroyed the civilisation that was the bearer of that culture. "*The lamps are going out all over Europe*", murmured Sir Edward Grey, "*I fear we shall not see them lit again...*" And they never were lit again.

Both Italian Fascism and German Nazism are essentially English creations, the former being the product of British conduct towards Italy during and after the First World War; the latter the product of an extraordinary love/hate attitude compounded of resentment at the Versailles settlement and goggle-eyed admiration for the genocidal efficiency of the Anglo-Saxon Race—especially in America.

When Britain started the Second World War it ensured that the continent of Europe would be devastated. The survivors had every reason to look askance at British foreign policy: *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*—I fear the British even when they bear gifts.

Samuel Huntington pointed out in his book on the clash of civilisations that during the Second World War Europe simply ceased to exist. And, after the Russian and American inter-

ventions had created the framework for a new Western and a new Eastern Europe, Europeans still found themselves living in a battlefield of warring ideologies representing world-historical choice between Communism and Capitalism. The Alliance of German and Italian Christian Democracy with some sort of secular equivalent in France formed the nucleus of a system which might prove immune to British Balance of Power manoeuvres, while it could not conceivably be impermeable to American Great Power hegemony.

When Heath succeeded where Macmillan had failed, and gained entry to Europe for the UK, it was on the basis of the Napoleonic maxim: "*On s'engage et puis on voit!*"—"You make contact, and then we'll see!" There has to be engagement with the enemy, and Europe has been the enemy since the French Revolution. It is the home of dangerous heresies but also dangerously seductive delights, a sort of cross between the Land of Murder [murrdderrr] and the Costa del Fish 'n' Chips.

For 40 years now the British have been carefully managing the affairs of Europe to no-one's mutual advantage. They had made themselves indispensable, central; they have created a *de facto* hegemonic role for themselves despite the far greater weight of France and Germany by all rational calculations. They can only have done it by sleight of hand, and today there is no Adenauer or Gasperi to draw attention to the shortcomings of the European costume. It has been a truly remarkable achievement.

And now it is over. For the English people have spoken. The real England—not Middle England either in its geographic or social sense, but the real England. They have reverted with exultation to being what it was once their proudest boast to be: the Protestant Island!

Nowadays, of course, that has no theological overtones, since none are needed, as they were when it was found expedient to invent the Church of England. Today, it simply means that England can bask in splendid isolation and go on living off the rest of the world without indulging in the gross hypocrisy of pretending to be anything other than what it is: insular, chauvinistic, xenophobic, deferential and docile. And old lion gone in the teeth, probably wagging its mangy tail.

But there is a problem for the Protestant Island: it has land borders with Scotland and Ireland. In Northern Ireland only the Protestant heartland of Antrim and Down produced a majority for Brexit; the Foyle constituency voted 78% to remain and the poor BBC news-reader had to explain to viewers that it was a Northern Ireland constituency—without, however, mentioning Stroke City! In Scotland 68% voted for the European Union, and preparations are already underway for the next referendum on Independence.

The Foreign Office must be furious that some idiot actually let the people have their say.

Just before the Falklands War, at a meeting of the Conservative Philosophy Group, Edward Norman (then Dean of Peterhouse) attempted to mount a Christian argument for nuclear weapons. The discussion moved on to "*Western values*". Margaret Thatcher said in effect that Norman had shown that the Bomb was necessary for the defence of our values.

Enoch Powell replied:

"No, we do not fight for values. I would fight for this country even if it had a communist government."

Thatcher said: "Nonsense, Enoch. If I send British troops abroad, it will be to defend our values."

"No Prime Minister", said Powell, "values exist in a transcendental realm, beyond space and time. They can neither be fought for, nor destroyed."

Mrs. Thatcher looked utterly baffled. She had just been presented with the difference between Toryism and American Republicanism. (John Casey.)

It is tempting to close with Enoch's most famous utterance: "*As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood.*"

However, I prefer the slightly more upbeat Heine:

*"O lasst uns endlich Taten sehn
Verbrechen, blutig, Kolossal,
Nur diese satte Tugend nicht
Und zahlungsfähige Moral."*

"O let us see deeds at last, crimes bloody and colossal, but not any more of this bland virtue and solvent morality."

Editorial

We are reprinting an Editorial of ten years ago,
which is certainly not less relevant now than it was then.
(*Church & State*, No. 83, Winter 2006)

Patrick Pearse: A Comment

R. Dudley Edwards in *Irish Times*, 3rd July 2004:

"I pointed out the bleeding obvious—that Pearse, although almost certainly chaste, was turned on exclusively by young male beauty."

It is the current revisionist fashion to present Patrick Pearse as a homosexual pederast.

Here is an extract from the entry on Pearse in the new edition of the *British Dictionary Of National Biography*:

"like many children of his time he fantasised about becoming a hero, but his was a morbid preoccupation with suffering and dying for his country or his religion: his heroes had died painful deaths and his main religious devotion was to the crucified Christ.

"Two Christian Brothers at his secondary school in Westland Row, Dublin, helped to spark in Pearse an uncritical passion for the Irish language and its literature: his view of Ireland past, present, and future was always to have mystical overtones. To him the reputed feats of mythological heroes were real, and the dead whom he admired had mystical overtones. To him, the reputed feats of mythological heroes were real, and the dead whom he admired had mythological status...

"Able and industrious rather than brilliant... he took a good second class BA from UCD in English, French and Irish...

"None of the siblings married; Pearse himself seems to have been unconsciously homosexual. His mother, Willie and his two sisters were all emotionally dependent on him...

"Yeats thought him 'a dangerous man: he has the vertigo of self-sacrifice'..."

Politically he was a Home Ruler. He joined the Home Rule Volunteers. Then he went to America to raise funds for St. Enda's:

"Mixing with hardline Irish-Americans who wanted only to hear that insurrection was nigh, set him single mindedly on a revolutionary course. In 1916 he published several revolutionary pamphlets justifying an uprising. As a consequence of the fight between the

rebels and the British army about 250 uninvolved civilians were killed..."

"...the author of memorable verse and prose in which militarism was equated with heroic self-sacrifice, Pearse became the most famous of the fifteen executed rebels and the centre of a powerful mythology: each generation of irredentist republicans has cited his uncompromising words in justification of their terror campaign..."

This is a propaganda statement as was only to be expected, the author being Ruth Dudley Edwards. There is no attempt at the objectivity appropriate to a standard reference work designed to last for a century. But that, unfortunately, makes it all too suitable for the second edition of the DNB.

The first edition, in 1900, was produced out of the self-confidence of the late Victorian era, when the English intelligentsia felt equal to dealing with the world without subterfuge or evasion or equivocation. That self-confidence became hubris in the Edwardian era and led England to commit the Empire to the most destructive war there has ever been. England emerged from that war with its Empire substantially expanded, but with its ability to govern it undermined and its self-confidence broken. And this was immediately evident in the ten-yearly *Supplement* to the DNB for the years 1911-20. Neither Pearse nor Connolly had an entry in it, even though they were the leaders of the biggest event within the British state during that period.

The battle in Ireland in 1916 was of course a minuscule affair compared with British military action in France and the Middle East. But it was normal for the British state to be making war on others. The extraordinary event was the war within the state. But the post-war compilers of the DNB did not feel up to dealing with it.

Three-quarters of a century later a *Missing Persons* volume of the DNB was brought out. Pearse and Connolly were in it. The entries on both were written by Ruth Dudley Edwards. She wrote that Pearse was "*almost certainly unconsciously homosexual*". A dozen years after that,

in the new DNB, this "*almost certainly*" becomes "*seems to have been*".

This was a theme she had touched on in her biography, *Patrick Pearse: Triumph Of Failure* (1977). Here she dismissed the suggestion of a love interest with Eveleen Nicholls, suggested in 1932 by Louis Le Roux, Pearse's first "*hagiographer*" (as she puts it) and continues:

"...he tended to put women on a pedestal. He knew nothing of homosexuality. When he wrote of beauty, he was inspired by... characters in the old Irish sagas... Pearse... had shown... his delight in physical beauty was wholly reserved for his own sex, for boys or boyish young men..."

"Pearse was an innocent, but there can be little doubt about his unconscious inclinations. His prose and poetry sing when he speaks of young male beauty..." (p126-7).

As illustration, Ms Edwards quotes from *Little Lad Of Tricks*, even though it does not read as a panegyric to male beauty, but deals with the theme of childhood innocence. She then comments that, when the English language version of the poem was published—

"MacDonagh, and his great friend the young poet, Joseph Plunkett, were appalled. They explained to him [Pearse] the ignoble construction with [which ?] might be placed on the poem, and the harm it could do to his school. Pearse was bewildered and hurt: his lifetime quest for purity, chastity, and perfection had blinded him to the instance reflected in his poetry" (p127-8, the source for this story is hearsay: Geraldine Dillon).

English literary culture had for many generations a compulsion to deny sex. Sex was French: Stendahl, Balzac, Zola. England was Dickens. In Dickens sex was the unspeakable thing that only ever reared its ugly head off stage, when somebody was to be ruined. Of course the heroine and the hero always got married in the end, but it was the marriage of two dolls in a doll's house, and the children of the marriage were the product of immaculate conception.

When the compulsion to deny sex broke down, it was replaced by a compulsion to assert it everywhere—but somehow the assertion was of a kind with the denial. It was equally doctrinaire. The dolls were told to go and do it.

The sequence of English sexual culture might be described as Puritan, Prudish and Prurient.

When the new DNB began to be

produced ten or fifteen years ago, the editors sent out instructions to the contributors listing what must be included. One of the requirements was sexual orientation.

Homosexuality had been a major criminal offence in England until about 1960. Since then there has been an increasing cultural pressure to find it everywhere, and failure to find it becomes the new offence of homophobia. (Well-meaning Christians have in recent months been cautioned by the police for distributing literature on Scriptural themes in the proximity of Gay Pride exhibitions, and been told that, if they do it again, they will be charged with inciting hatred.)

Edwards's first statement (repeating the position in her book) that "*Patrick was almost certainly unconsciously homosexual*", is not identical with her second statement, that he "*seems to have been unconsciously homosexual*". "*Was*" and "*seems to be*" are not the same verb. In Edwards, the first is an assertion of fact ("*almost*!"). The second says what appears to have been the case from Edwards' viewpoint. Fact is scaled down to appearance in the reference work. Yet, at the same time, Edwards, in sensational newspaper mode, builds up from her first statement to an assertion that Pearse was a pederast, not "*unconscious*", but inactive in the sense that he did not actually do anything to young boys but wished to. Being "*turned on*" and being "*unconscious*" are different states of mind—if one takes unconsciousness to be a state of mind. "*Turned on*" is a colloquial term with its colloquial meaning, and that meaning is incompatible with unconsciousness—unless it be that the body is turned on without the mind noticing it. And maybe that is possible, though if it was the case with Pearse, we do not see how Edwards could possibly know it. If he didn't know what was going on in his trousers, how could she?

Her various assertions amount to something like this: From all that she knows about Pearse, it appears to her that he must have been homosexual by inclination, even though he did nothing and didn't even know it.

But appearance and expectation are closely related. A set of possibilities are laid out for the understanding and the world is apprehended by means of them. One understands what one sees in terms of the range of expectations with which one approaches it. What 'seems' is produced by an encounter between the preconceptions of understanding and something

which is out there. The mind is not a mirror which reflects what is before it. It is an active force grasping what is before it largely by means of preconceptions, so that it can accomplish its purpose. That is the routine of life. Changes occur in the structure of understanding—and that structure differs greatly between cultures—but it can never be the case that one's idea of the world is made up afresh from the flux of raw data at every turn.

Reflecting on this condition of things, Thoreau remarked that most men lead lives of quiet desperation. That may not be generally true, though it might have been in the New England of his time. But it seems that the Anglicising Irish middle class intellectuals of the past generation live lives of noisy exhibitionist desperation.

They cannot be English. They lack the ballast, the matter-of-factness with which the English participants in the affairs of the British state go about their business. Perhaps some of them do have it and simply disappear into English life. But the function of the Dudley Edwardses for the English state is not to become merely English. It is to destroy the culture from which they emerged. And, in assimilating English culture for the purpose of subverting Irish culture, what they take in is what is most fashionable and superficial at the moment. If England was no more than is found in the reflection of it in them, it would not have made much of a stir in the world.

The fashion of today is doctrinaire sexualisation of life, disconnected from reproduction, and with homosexuality put on a par with heterosexuality, and perhaps preferable to it because the lack of difference is conducive to equality.

What people become in this culture is then taken to be what they really are—what they have always been essentially, but have somehow been prevented from becoming in practice until now.

This is England in recoil from its Victorianism. And the recoil sees itself as absolute. But it denies the variety of human impulse no less than Victorianism did.

It is perhaps impossible for anybody living in England now—and in Ireland following it—to be without sexual inclination, because understanding is dominated by the overwhelming public culture of sex in doctrinaire propaganda form. People are no less imitative and suggestible today than they ever were. And if, in the recent past, there were people who did not know they were homosexual

because of the force of culture acting on them, there must be people today who do not know that they are asexual for the same reason.

It is probable that there were millions of people who lived contentedly within the Victorian ideal and felt it was perfect: and that there were other millions who had life made difficult for them by the established morality which did not fit them. The least likely thing is that Victorian morality became such a powerful force while suiting nobody. But that is how it has become obligatory to understand it.

If the Victorians applied their doll's house morality universally, forcing it on cultures that had developed on very different lines, so do the new globalists with their anti-Victorian morality. There has been a sexual revolution in the doll's house which is located at the centre of the military/industrial complex that dominates the world, and the new mode is imposed on the world as imperialistically as the old was. Victorian sexual morality is now simply not allowed. And a simulacrum of it is only possible as the product of great originality and force of character which rejects the way of the world.

It appears to us that the thing about Pearse's sexuality is that there wasn't any: that he lived on the asexual fringe of the Victorian mode, accepting its ideals in the most superficial way, and making no more than empty gestures towards living them—gestures that were not driven by what used to be called libido.

That is the picture of Pearse drawn by his first biographer, Louis Le Roux, a Frenchman, over seventy years ago:

"Social life had no attraction for Pearse... Ordinary social intercourse with women he avoided... he took no pleasure in the salacious jests and the double meanings which so commonly pass for conversational small change among "men of the world". When he went to the theatre it was usually to some performance of a Shakespearean play and rarely to a music-hall..."

"Once, indeed, [Thomas] Mac Donagh lured Pearse to a music hall performance, and repeatedly broke in on Pearse's reveries with enthusiastic compliments on the physical attractiveness of the ladies on the stage.

"Begad, Pat, that's a fine leg!"

"Yes, like the limb of an angel", answered Pearse, half-coming to earth.

"What fine eyes, Pat."

"Yes, the eyes of an angel", replied Pearse still in his dreams.

"Beautiful lassies", persisted Mac Donagh, a merry twinkle in his eye.

"Angels, angels, every one!"

agreed Pearse reverently" (Roux, *Life Of Patrick Henry Pearse* p30-1).

An understanding shaped by the Anglo-Saxon culture of the present moment is not allowed to accept this at face value. It must be understood as homosexual repression because it is not a heterosexual response to chorus girls. Freud's dogma that everything is sexual, and that things which do not appear to be sexual are sublimated forms of sex, has displaced the other dogmas for the time being. The possibility of innocence is not allowed—innocence having the meaning of asexual. (Other forms of innocence do not enter the discourse of the Anglo-Saxon recoil from its Victorian phase.)

Edwards is hostile to Pearse for political reasons that in essence have nothing to do with Pearse. She denies that she is attached to British Military Intelligence, but one does not become a literary collaborator with the favourite murderer of the British Establishment by running into him in the Common Room at a cocktail party. He is a secret asset of the British state.

She blames the Provos on Pearse, and she is followed in this by the other revisionists including Ryle Dwyer. This magazine originated in West Belfast in the early 1970s. It was concerned to establish an understanding of Irish affairs which led people away from Republican military activity on the Border issue. We opposed the Provos at their point of origin, and got little sympathy from Dublin 4 in doing so. And we can say that the war had little to do with Pearse. The Provos arose out of the thoroughly abnormal conditions of the British State in its Northern Ireland variant. The anti-Treaty Republicans of the South had little to do with it, though linking up with it briefly. It was through its relevance to the actual conditions of life in the North that Provo Sinn Fein became the force that it is. It was not a reading of Pearse that did it.

Our alternative course of action, which we persisted in for twenty years, came to nothing because of the intransigent resistance of Ulster Unionism to democratisation within the political structures of the British State. Edwards held aloof from that campaign. A few years ago she became a kind of groupie of the Orange Order, which is able to do nothing but intensify communal antagonism. (It was a moderating influence thirty years ago, but is so no longer.)

The Provos are not "irredentist republi-

cans" as we understand the term. If the term *irredentist* is appropriate to the situation, it applies to the upholders of the Constitution of the 26 Co. State until the Constitutional amendment of 1998. The French State went to war on the basis of an irredentist claim on Alsace-Lorraine in 1914. The Italian State went to war for the Irredenta of the Trentino in 1915. An irredentist claim properly belongs to a State claiming what it considers its national territory, though it lies beyond its borders. The Provos came into being *outside* the State, through a defensive insurrection into which the Northern Catholic community was forced by the local form of the British State.

One might perhaps describe the 1956 Campaign as irredentist. It was an invasion of the North by a Republican force from the South. But it is absurd to describe as irredentist the defensive response of the Northern Catholic community to an assault by the State on its Civil Rights movement demanding British Rights For British Citizens.

That defensive insurrection subsequently became an anti-Partitionist war waged *outside* the national territory. The condition of its development was the exclusion of the Catholic community from the political life of the state which held it—a condition which did not apply in either Alsace or the Trentino.

We must refrain from reasons of space from comment on other features of Edwards' biographies of Pearse. But as a test of her lack of critical objectivity we draw attention to her writings on Connolly. She seems to have been inclined to counterpose Connolly, as the sensible socialist, to Pearse as the weird mystic. But it was Connolly who was in military command when "250 *uninvolved civilians were killed*". And in both her biography and her DNB entry she completely misrepresents Connolly's position on the World War. From September 1914 to April 1916 he supported Germany as the more socialist of the belligerents and as a victim of British aggression. She says: "*Appalled by the outbreak of war in 1914 Connolly launched a massive anti-recruitment drive. Its failure, combined with the dreadful suffering of the Dublin poor, drove him to join forces with the revolutionary IRB.*"

That's Connolly disembowelled and emasculated and reduced to a harmless icon.

✱

Wilson John Haire

Own Goal

Mock attacks and litres of
artificial blood
stretchers by the score
mock cries, mock
tears flood
streets taped off
in malls mock shoppers
scream and mock-cough
to dry-ice vapour
amid the well-armed
copper capers
then ambition grows
Manchester United Old
Trafford football stadium
in a possible semtex glow
75,000 evacuated
fan the flames of ethnic hate
scare the Irish to expect
a campaign of bombing
with raiding parties
on their homes foresworn
to a maelstrom
tear the niqab off
that Muslim girl
somebody's daughter
somebody's pearl
but it was only a fake
left behind by mistake
(I solemnly swear I believe
in the Lough Ness Monster
says the news-huckster)
and in its wake
watch the khaki hit
the streets
enjoy the roaring armoured
fleet
as it rushes to trouble-spots
when you hit football
you hit all
an own goal shot
was it done to reassure
or our patriotism
to allure
do we watch our neighbour
now
and to police and military
kowitz.

Wilson John Haire

20 May 2016

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Neglected Correspondence!

The following is the text of a solicitors' letter received by *Church & State* ten years ago:

Letter From McInerney, Solicitors

"Our Ref: 3235.IB. Date: 04/04/06
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Re: Our Client: Ruth Dudley Edwards

Dear Sir,

We act for Ruth Dudley Edwards, the distinguished historian and author. On page 15 of your edition, number 83, Winter 2006, you print and publish an editorial headed "Patrick Pearse: A Comment", which discusses, inter alia, Dr. Ruth Dudley Edwards's entry in the new edition of the British Dictionary of National Biography on Patrick Pearse.

We are well aware that you do not share the views of Dr. Dudley Edwards on Patrick Pearse and on many other subjects. Nor are you required to. She has disagreed with many people from many different standpoints over the years and has expressed her own disagreement with them in print.

Your editorial, however, goes much further on page 15 where you state:

"Edwards is hostile to Pearse for political reasons that in essence have nothing to do with Pearse. She denies that she is attached to British Military Intelligence, but one does not become a literary collaborator with the favourite murderer of the British Establishment, Sean O'Callaghan, by running into him in the Common Room or at a cocktail party. He is a secret asset of the British state."

Your direct suggestion is that Dr. Dudley Edwards is not an honest historian expressing her views on historical figures as she evaluates them. On the contrary she is a propagandist expressing opinions which are dictated by the fact that she is attached to British military intelligence.

This represents a gross libel against Dr. Dudley Edwards and attacks the very essence of her genuineness, independence and standing as a historian.

We hereby call upon you to print the enclosed apology on page 3 of the next edition of your magazine, to make appropriate recompense to Dr. Dudley Edwards for the damage which you have done her and to discharge her reasonable legal costs. If we do not hear from you indicating that you will comply with these requirements within seven days from the date hereof, we will take legal proceedings against you in respect of the publication without further notice.

Yours faithfully

McInerney Solicitors

APOLOGY

DR. RUTH DUDLEY EDWARDS

On page 13 of *Church & State*, Winter, 2006, we published an editorial under the heading "Patrick Pearse: A Comment" in the course of which the magazine permitted a gross libel against Dr. Ruth Dudley Edwards by stating that was attached to British Military Intelligence. We accept that the statement meant that she was hypocritical in posing as a genuine historian, when in fact she was a paid propagandist prepared to express whatever view was suitable to her alleged employers, British Intelligence, whether she believed it or not. We accept that it carried the implication that she had been flying under false colours and deceiving the public over many years by masquerading as an independent commentator.

We wish to acknowledge that all of our suggestions are entirely false and without foundation. Dr. Dudley Edwards is and has for many years been a historian of the highest excellence and repute and has been responsible for many distinguished contributions to historical study and debate.

We are happy to take this opportunity to apologise to Dr. Dudley Edwards for the grave affront which our comments represented and for the damage which they have done her."

Reply

Church & State limps along financially from issue to issue without subsidy, public or private. Not being able to purchase law, it had no choice but to conduct its own defence. It replied to Ms Edwards' solicitor's letter with a request for information about how Ms Edwards became acquainted with Mr. O'Callaghan, but received no response:

Dear Mr. McInerney
Re Ruth Dudley Edwards

Thank you for your letter of April 4, 2006, which has, due to an extended absence, only just reached me.

My first reaction is that your client has misunderstood the paragraph of which she complains. It does not say or imply that her opinions are, in your words, "dictated by the fact that she is attached to British military intelligence". On the contrary, it records her denial that she is attached to British Military Intelligence.

That said, it may be that we can accede to your request to clarify the reference in the next issue which will not be appearing for about three months. Perhaps Ms Edwards would like to write an article for our publication explaining the circumstances of her becoming involved with Sean O'Callaghan, the people whose opinions she values etc.

Please bear with us while we consider the matter. I will need to consult with the author of the article and with some students of law.

The issue of paying anything is out of the question—the magazine has no money.

P. Maloney,
Editor.

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Displaced Persons

The number of people displaced by conflict is at the highest level ever recorded, the UN refugee agency has said.

It estimates that 65.3 million people were either refugees, asylum seekers or internally displaced at the end of 2015, an increase of five million in a year.

This represents one in every 113 people on the planet, according to the UN agency.

The influx of people, the biggest since World War Two, has led to greater support for far-right groups and controversial anti-immigration policies.

In its annual report marking World Refugee Day, 20th June 2016, the UN said it was the first time the number of refugees worldwide had passed the 60 million mark. More than half—54%—of the total number are people from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia.

According to the report, 65.3 million people are refugees, asylum seekers or displaced, with 12.4 million of those newly displaced by conflict or persecution in 2015. It also revealed that 24 people a minute were forced to flee in 2015, and that half of all refugees are children under 18.

Despite the focus on Europe's migrant crisis, the UN said that 86% of the world's refugees were being sheltered in low and middle-income countries.

Turkey is the biggest host country for refugees worldwide, with 2.5 million people, followed by Pakistan and Lebanon.

More than 1,011,700 migrants arrived in Europe by sea last year, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), although other agencies put that number much higher. Some 35,000 arrived by land, the IOM said. The preferred destinations for most were richer northern countries such as Germany and Sweden.

This is reflected in the UN's figures for new asylum applications in 2015, which show Germany was the largest recipient.

Benign Capitalism?

"The irony is these 'champions of the poor', in their condemnations of capitalism, are actually condemning the greatest destroyer of poverty the world has ever known. This fact is totally lost on them." (David Quinn, *Irish Independent*, 8.4.2016, former Editor of the *Irish Catholic*).

Meanwhile the *Daily Express*, London wants to bring back the Empire, don't scoff, its not impossible! Wouldn't Dublin once again be the second city of the Empire—it was in the old Empire. We even had a Republican Lord Mayor in Cork for the last 12 months. Poor ould Boris Johnson was a mere Mayor of London!

Fr. O'Flynn

Father James Christopher O'Flynn (Seamus O Floinn) became internationally known for the methods he developed for overcoming speech defects after he had been featured by the BBC in the edition of "*It Happened to Me*", which was televised on 17th January 1961.

Every Sunday morning—from 1924 onwards, he held a school of drama in a loft above a sweet factory in the Shandon area of Cork City.

This loft was for 30 years the domain of Fr. O'Flynn, who had been trained by a friend and pupil of Sir Henry Irving, a training which laid the foundations for his great love of Shakespeare. Ireland's greatest Shakespearean actors came to the "Loft" and sat at the feet of the priest.

He took children with bad stammers and turned them into actors and actresses. Under his guidance sensitive children played full-blooded Shakespearean parts in the Cork Opera House.

"His enthusiasm for things Gaelic caused him to clash with the Lord Mayor of Cork and the Corporation as the following incident shows.

'On 8 January, 1915, under the Lord Mayor's privilege, the following motion was passed at a meeting of the Cork Corporation:

'That the resolution passed by the Council conferring the Freedom of the City on Professor Kuno Meyer be rescinded, and that his name be erased from the Roll of Honorary Freeman of the Corporation of Cork, on account of his action and recent speech in New York, fomenting in the United States a movement amongst the Germans and an irresponsible section of the Irish population against the Empire.

'The Lord Mayor then proceeded to strike out the name of Kuno Meyer from the Roll of Honorary Freeman.

"The people of Cork accepted in silence the decision of their public representatives; all except Father O'Flynn. Alone, he appeared before the Corporation, and protested passionately against this piece of 'fashionable humbug', as he called it.

"Because he had not waited to collect the signatures of twenty responsible citizens he could not, under the rules, be listened to.

"But his protest was justified by subsequent events.

"On 14 May, 1920, the name of Kuno Meyer was restored to the Roll of Honorary Freeman of the City of Cork when Terence MacSwiney was Lord Mayor." p.49/50. (*Like a Tree Planted*, Richard O'Donoghue, Gill & Son, Dublin and Sydney, 1967.)

Blair Preaches

"We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure" (British Prime Minister Tony Blair, addressing the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April 1999.)

Readers, Check Google for the full address, it is educational!

Dead Statutes

On 19th January 2016, the then Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, Mr Brendan Howlin T.D., approved the publication of the *Statute Law Revision Bill 2016*. This Bill is the culmination of the first comprehensive review of Acts enacted by the Oireachtas and will repeal almost 300 Public General Acts enacted between 1922 and 1950 which are now spent or obsolete.

The Minister said:

"Statute law revision is the process by which spent or obsolete legislation

is removed from the statute book. The legislation of this period shows a nation in its infancy developing its own legislative framework. It is appropriate that we are removing some of the earliest legislation of the Oireachtas that has long since served its purpose, and in doing so we pave the way for future legislative growth".

The obsolete Acts listed for repeal include:

- o The Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act, 1923, enacted during the Irish Civil War, granted far reaching powers and additional offences and penalties aimed at ensuring public safety. It included the imposition of a death penalty or penal servitude for anyone found guilty of an armed revolt against the Government of Saorstát Éireann or certain associated offences.

- o The Emergency Powers Act 1939, which granted wide ranging powers at the outbreak of World War II including the power to suspend the operation of any law.

- o Griffith Settlement Act 1923, which granted pensions to members of Arthur Griffith's immediate family following his death.

- o A number of Acts which amended the 1922 Constitution.

- o The Telephone Capital Acts 1924 to 1938 which authorised the expenditure of funds to develop the telephonic system of Saorstát Éireann.

This Bill follows on from the Statute Law Revision Acts of 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015 which completed the review of all pre-independence primary legislation and secondary legislation up to and including 1820.

In total 1,124 Acts were examined during the preparation of this Bill and of the 707 identified as remaining in force in whole or in part, 294 were identified as suitable for repeal and have been listed for repeal in this Bill.

Further examples of Acts for repeal:

- o Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act 1933 which repealed Article 22 of the Free State Constitution which required members of the Oireachtas to take an oath declaring their faithfulness to His Majesty King George V and his heirs and successors.

- o Spanish Civil War (Non-Intervention) Act 1937 which carries into execution the international obligations of Saorstát Éireann in relation to the civil war waged in Spain, and to prohibit citizens of Saorstát Éireann from participating in that war.

- o Public Servants (Continuity of Service) Act 1938 which provided for the continuity, notwithstanding the coming into operation of the Constitution, of the service of public servants and the conditions of their employment.

Posthumous Pardon!

The family of the very first man ever to receive a posthumous pardon in the history of the state have said it has "*been tarnished*" by the Government's inability to get his name correct on the official documentation. (*Irish Independent*, 14.1.2016)

Henry 'Harry' Gleeson was wrongly convicted of the 1940 murder of Mary 'Moll' McCarthy. He was sentenced to death and was executed a year later for the slaying of Ms. McCarthy, a single mother of seven, who had been found with gunshot wounds to her face.

Throughout the course of his incarceration, Mr Gleeson maintained his innocence. His legal representation also remained convinced of his innocence.

Following a submission from the Innocence Project Ireland and the Justice for Harry Gleeson group, the Attorney General ordered a review of the case.

It was undertaken by Shane Murphy who uncovered serious deficiencies in the conviction, including a lack of substantial evidence.

President Michael D Higgins officially signed a posthumous pardon for Mr Gleeson on December 19. However, his family have expressed their outrage that the document prepared by the Department of the Justice and the Office of the Attorney General bears his nickname 'Harry' rather than his correct name 'Henry'.

"I just found absolutely unacceptable that after 75 years of campaigning to clear his name, the Government can not even get it correct," said Mr Gleeson's great-nephew Vincent Phelan.

"This was prepared by the foremost legal minds in this land, and it is the first of its kind. What does it say for our country that they can't get it right?" he asked.

"This is a legal document, and a nickname appears on it. If you gave a guard a nickname instead of your real name that wouldn't be good enough.

"If you appeared in court for a simple TV licence charge and the wrong name appeared it would be thrown out."

"Mr Phelan complained to the President's Office and was told in an email seen by this newspaper that the matter had been referred to the Department of the Taoiseach" (*Irish Independent*, 14.1.2016)

Social Policy!

The Poor Law Commissioners' report of 1861 indicated—

"that able bodied female pauperism was ... in proportion of more than three to one in comparison with able bodied male pauperism and no inconsiderable number of them are single females rendered destitute by pregnancy, or as mothers of illegitimate children."

A Select Committee was set up in 1861 to consider the situation. Among the contributors was Cardinal Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Dublin, who post the Famine, had been sent by the Vatican to shape modern Irish Catholicism. His contribution was to suggest that unmarried mothers be put in separate wards and kept away from young girls in the workhouse as "*the presence and mixture of women with illegitimate children among young girls must tend to lower their ideas of female modesty and purity*".

The Cardinal continued his attack on Poor Law institutions and, in a letter to the Rector of the Irish College in Rome, Father Tobias Kirby, who acted as the conduit to the Vatican, he wrote as follows:

"In Dublin alone the expenses of the Poor House have amounted to £60,000 and all the good done amounts to this: that some hundreds of women with illegitimate children and prostitutes and bastards are supported and some 400 old women and men are helped to die before their day."

Fast-forward to the first Constitution of the Republic Of Ireland, established at the first meeting of the Dail on 21st January 1919, in the Mansion House. Among the clauses agreed were:

"To encourage the proper physical development of the children of the nation by the provision of meals, the introduction of free medical and dental examination in schools and the organisation of pastimes."

At a Cumann na nGaedheal (now Fine Gael)-dominated Dail meeting, post-'Treaty', the new post-independence Constitution was drawn up. It came into effect on 27th April 1923, The Mansion House clause regarding children's rights was withdrawn for reasons which were not recorded.

Hell was paved, even then, with good intentions! (*Irish Independent* Letters page-16.6.2014 from Hugh Duffy, Co. Galway.)

Shavian Self-Indulgence And Caudwell & Donnelly Critique

Brendan Clifford's article on "*Shaw, Casement, Connolly and the Great War*" in the Second Quarter 2016 issue was very much to the point, particularly his critique of Fintan O'Toole's article in the 1916 Centenary edition of the *Irish Times*, extolling G.B. Shaw's attempt to script Roger Casement's defence. I myself attended its performance on March 30th, as part of the Easter Week "*Imagining Home*" series in the National Concert Hall, which had the following programme note penned by O'Toole:

"World Premiere. 'Treason on Trial' by George Bernard Shaw. Performed by Owen Roe. In the summer of 1916, after the execution of the 1916 leaders, the most famous playwright in the world, George Bernard Shaw, sat down to write an extraordinary dramatic monologue. It was a speech he hoped to persuade Roger Casement, facing the death sentence for treason, to deliver at his trial and Shaw believed it would persuade the jury to spare Casement's life. It has never been heard in public—until now."

Owen Roe undoubtedly put in a talented performance. He is one of Ireland's foremost actors, whose performances I have witnessed and admired for over two decades—most notably, as John Proctor in Arthur Miller's *The Crucible* (1995), the O'Casey characters of Shamus Sheils in *The Shadow of a Gunman* (1996) and Fluther Good in *The Plough and the Stars* (2003), and—in his most outstanding performance to date—the lead role in Shakespeare's *King Lear* (2013). So Roe played his character well, including the provision of a pregnant pause to enable the audience to take note of a joke and respond with the intended laughter. Did I say joke? Well, yes. O'Toole might have fooled himself into imagining the speech being delivered by Casement, but Roe knew he was playing Shaw, with the customary inclusion of Shavian witticisms. Should one not conclude from that alone how inappropriate a script it was for Casement?

Brendan Clifford's provision of correspondence between Shaw and his former secretary Mabel McConnell came as an eye opener for me, for I had not realised

how deep was Shaw's contempt for 'ordinary' Irish humanity, co-existing alongside his undoubtedly powerful rhetoric in writing of the 1916 Rising. But then I remembered how insufferable was his sense of superiority over humanity at large, and I decided to check out a book I had not opened in over four decades.

Christopher St. John Sprigg was born an English Catholic in 1907. Educated by the Benedictines, family economic circumstances forced him to quit school at 15, and to begin earning a living in journalism. During the 1920s he began writing poetry as Christopher Caudwell, his mother's family name, and this is the name by which he is best known. He went on to join the Communist Party of Great Britain's Poplar Branch in London. In December 1936 he volunteered to join the International Brigades in the Spanish Anti-Fascist War. Christopher Caudwell, while fighting in the ranks of the British Battalion, was killed in action on 12th February 1937, as the battle of Jarama commenced.

The following years saw the post-humous publication of his prose works of literary and scientific criticism. *Studies in a Dying Culture*, published in 1938, included an essay entitled "*George Bernard Shaw: A Study of the Bourgeois Superman*". Caudwell provided a minimum of biographical detail on Shaw:

"Born into a middle-class family that had fallen from affluence and social position to embarrassment, the ambitious young Shaw, impressed from childhood with the necessity for retrieving the former Shavian status, came to London to gain success. Here he existed for a time by writing, as poor as any worker. But thanks to the possession of a dress-suit and a gift for playing on the piano, he was still able to mix in refined Kensington circles. Faced with proletarianisation, he clung to the bourgeois class. In the same way, faced with the problem of ideological proletarianisation in his reading of Marx, he resisted it, and adhered to Fabianism, with its bourgeois traditions and its social respectability." (1971 edition, p 14).

Caudwell's ideological critique of Shaw was even more scathing:

"Shaw in his life acquired general recognition among the ordinary

members of the 'middle class' both here and in America, as representative of Socialist thought... Shaw is an ex-anarchist, a vegetarian, a Fabian, and, of late years, a Social Fascist: he is inevitably a Utopian socialist. His idea of Utopia was expounded in *Back to Methuselah*, a paradise of Ancients who spend their days in thought and despise the butterfly young who engage in the active work of artistic creation and science. Shaw ... represents the primacy of pure contemplation. In pure contemplation man is alone, is apparently exempt from co-operation, is wrapped in a private world; and he is then believed, by bourgeois thought, to be wholly free... This is a familiar spectacle: the intellectual attempting to dominate hostile reality by pure thought. It is a human weakness to believe that by retiring into his imagination man can elicit categories or magical spells which will enable him to subjugate reality contemplatively. It is the error of the 'theoretical' man, of the prophet, of the mystic, of the metaphysician, in its pathological form the error of the neurotic. It is the trace of the primitive believer in magic that remains in us all... Shaw still believes that out of his Platonic soul man can extract pure wisdom in the form of world-dominating Ideas... It is notable that the real artist, like the real scientist, never makes this mistake. Both find themselves repeatedly pushed into contact with reality; they desire and seek reality outside them. Reality is a large, tough, and—as man gets to know it—increasingly complex substance... Now Shaw with his bourgeois individualism is impatient at the restriction science sets on the domination of reality by one acute intellect... Shaw puts forward ideas drawn purely from his desires like those of any Hindoo mystic theorising about the world... Shavian cosmology is barbarous; it is idealistic. Shaw dominates this tough, distressing, gritty environment by the familiar neurotic method, by imposing on it a series of fictional delusions of a wish-fulfilment type. This is not because Shaw is foolish but precisely because he is possessed of a naturally acute intellect. Its very acuteness has given him a pride which makes him feel he ought to be able to dominate all knowledge without social aid, by pure cerebration. He will not recognise, except cursorily, the social nature of knowledge. So we get in his cosmology an effect like that of an exceptionally brilliant medicine man theorising about life. Since the average intellectual is still infected with similarly barbaric theorising, it is not surprising that he does not detect the essential crudity of all Shaw's philosophy. Bourgeois speaks to bourgeois" (pp 1-4).

"Shaw's Fabianism ... pervade(s) all his work, robbing it of artistic as well as of political value. Believing in the solitary primacy of thought, all his plays are devoid of humanity, because they represent human beings as walking intellects. Fortunately they are not, or the human race would long ago have perished in some dream-fantasy of logic and metaphysics. Human beings are mountains of unconscious being, walking the old grooves of instinct and simple life, with a kind of occasional phosphorescence of consciousness at the summit. And this conscious phosphorescence derives its value and its power from the emotions, from the instincts; only its form is derived from the intellectual shapes of thought. Age by age man strives to make this consciousness more intense, the artist by subtilising and intensifying the emotions, the scientist by making fuller and more real the thought form, and in both cases this is done by burning more being in the thin flame. Shaw, however, is obsessed with the pure flame, phosphorescence separate from being. The ideas thus abstracted become empty and petty and strike with a remote tinkling sound in the ears. Shaw's plays become an 'unearthly ballet of bloodless categories'... " (pp 5-6).

"The source of all happiness and woe is the disparity between man's being and man's consciousness, which drives on society and makes life vital. Now all this tension, everything below the dead intellectual sphere, is blotted out in Shaw. The Life Love, which is his crude theological substitute for this real active being, is itself intellectually conceived. Thus his characters are inhuman; all their conflicts occur on the rational plane, and none of their conflicts are ever resolved—for how can logic ever resolve its eternal antinomies, which can only be synthesised in action? This tension creates heroes like Cæsar and Joan of Arc, who, in response to the unformulated guidance of experience, call into existence tremendous talent forces of whose nature they can know nothing, yet history itself seems to obey them. Such heroes are inconceivable to Shaw. He is bound to suppose that all they brought about they consciously willed. Hence these heroes appear to him as the neat little figures of a bourgeois history book, quite inhuman, and regarding their lives as calmly as if they were examination papers on the currents of social change. These plays are not dramas. This is not art, it is mere debate and just as unresolved, just as lacking in tragic finality, temporal progress or artistic unity as is all debate" (p 7).

"For this reason too, Shaw is a kind

of intellectual aristocrat, and no one who is not capable of declaring his motives rationally and with the utmost acuity on instant demand appears in his plays, except as a ludicrous or second-rate figure. The actors are nothing; the thinkers are everything. Even a man who in real life would be powerful, formidable and quite brainless—the 'armourer' of 'Major Barbara'—has to be transformed into a brilliant theoretician before (as Shaw thinks) he can be made impressive on the stage. But we all know and admire characters devoid of the ability for intellectual formulation, who yet seem in their influence upon reality nobler, grander, more powerful and effective than any of our intellectual friends. We know well enough in life at all events, that thought alone does not suffice to drive on the world, and recognise this in our homage to 'illusory' 'irrational' art, art that speaks to the mere experience of us, stirring it into a fleeting and purely emotional consciousness? None of these characters, who in war, art, statesmanship and ethics have been of significance in the world's history, appear in Shaw's plays. He is incapable of drawing a character who is impressive without being a good arguer in bourgeois dialectic. This weakness naturally shows itself in his proletarians. Like the proletarians in the Army hostel of *Major Barbara*, they are simply caricatures. Only by being 'educated' like the chauffeur in *Man and Superman*, can they become respectable..." (p 8).

"But here Shaw is faced with a dilemma. He is to impose his absolute truths on the world by the process of logical debate. But the world of non-thinkers or half-thinkers on which he imposes it are necessarily an inferior race of creatures—the mere labourers, the nit-wit aggregation of the non-intellectuals, the plastic amorphous mass whom the intellectual lords of creation save from disaster by their god-like commands. How can one drill sense into these creatures? What will appeal to their infantile frivolous minds? One must of course treat them as one treats children, one must sugar the pill of reason with paradox, humour, with lively and preposterous incident. Thus Shaw, whom a belief in the primacy of intellectual consciousness prevented from becoming an artist, was by this same belief prevented from becoming a serious thinker or a real force in contemporary consciousness. He became the world's buffoon; because his messages were always wrapped in the sugar of humour, they were taken as always laughable. The British bourgeois, who ignored Marx, vilified Lenin and threw its Tom Manns into prison, regarded Shaw with a tolerant good-

humour as a kind of court jester. The people he had depreciated depreciated him. The sugar he put on his pill prevented the pill from acting..." (p 12).

"Faced with the problem of ideological proletarianisation in his reading of Marx, he resisted it, and adhered to Fabianism, with its bourgeois traditions and its social respectability. This problem and his answer to it, decided his ideology and also his art. His knowledge of Marx enabled him to attack destructively all bourgeois institutions. But he was never able to give any answer to the question: *What shall we do here and now to improve them besides talking?* This problem, in the veiled form of tainted money comes up in his work repeatedly—in *Widower's Houses*, *Major Barbara*, *Mrs. Warren's Profession*—and always it is *patched up*. We must accept things as they are until the system is changed. But no immediate steps besides talking, are ever to be taken to change the system. Major Barbara, horrified at first by finding the Christ she believes in has sold out to capital, ends all the same by marrying the manager of the armament factory whose proprietor has bought Him. Shaw himself, who discovered the ruling class was rotten to the core, and built on the exploitation of the workers, yet ends by marrying ideologically money, respectability, fame, peaceful reformism and ultimately even Mussolini. He who takes no active steps to change the system, helps to maintain the system"(p 15).

Such, then, was the Christopher Caudwell critique of Shaw. The Dublin-born poet Leslie Daiken was to write of the deaths of some more of his fellow poets in that Spanish War:

My voice a reedy note in Arcady,
I too have heard companion voices die—
O Splendid fledglings they, in fiery fettle,
Caudwell and Cornford and Cathal
Donnelly
Stormcocks atune with Lorca, shot
down in battle!
Young Charlie, our blackbird-sgul, no
Lycid lies.
His cenotaph—Jarama's olive trees.

In 1935-36 Daiken and the Tyrone-born poet Charlie Donnelly roomed together in London, co-editing *Irish Front*, newspaper of the London Branch of the Republican Congress. Donnelly also wrote for *International Press Correspondence*, journal of the Communist International, and for *Left Review*. In December 1936 Donnelly also set out to join the International Brigades, arriving in Spain in January 1937. Charlie Donnelly was killed

in action during the battle of Jarama on 12th February 1937, while fighting in the ranks of the James Connolly Unit of the Abraham Lincoln Battalion.

Before he left for Spain, Donnelly had published an article in the April 1936 issue of *Left Review*, in which he also took issue with Shaw. There is no reason to believe that Donnelly was aware of the as yet unpublished overall ideological critique of Shaw written by Caudwell, his fellow International Brigade volunteer. But there is every reason to wonder why Fintan O'Toole has failed to notice Donnelly's article, since Joseph O'Connor, whom O'Toole places among the best of modern day Irish writers, had quoted significant excerpts from that article in his biography, *Even the Olives Are Bleeding: The Life and Times of Charles Donnelly*, (1992, pp 83-85).

When O'Toole arrived on stage on March 30th, he elicited the desired degree of laughter from the Concert Hall audience, when he joked that Casement should never have listened to a solicitor who would advise him to turn down Shaw.

Donnelly's article had not, however, been a general ideological critique of Shaw, but a specific critique of his proposed script for Casement, showing that it was Casement himself who had rejected that script. Announcing "*a discarded defence of Sir Roger Casement which George Bernard Shaw wrote and Casement commented on*", the preface to the *Left Review* article explained the format that followed:

"In the following paragraphs, Shaw's and Casement's names precede the paragraphs of the 'discarded defence' and the commentary, for which they were responsible. Part of the time, Shaw is writing in direct speech, as if he were the prisoner."

On March 30th, Fintan O'Toole swelled with pride as he announced the World Premiere of "*an extraordinary dramatic monologue*", and identified himself completely with Shaw. But would not the following dialogue, as edited by Charlie Donnelly and his *Left Review* colleague Montague Slater, have provided greater dramatic effect, not to mention greater integrity?

SHAW (for the defence): "The line taken by the prisoner should be as follows: First, that his plea of Not Guilty must not be taken as implying any denial of the essential facts relied on by the Crown, but simply a denial that any guilt applies to them except the guilt that attaches under the higher law of God to all who draw the sword against their fellows even for their country: a

guilt which attaches to all present in the court equally with the prisoner himself. That he heartily wished that the court might have been spared the tedium of calling witnesses to prove facts which he did not dispute. He was in no way ashamed of his conduct, and was quite willing to add and to amplify if the Attorney-General cared to call him."

CASEMENT: "Just what I said at Scotland Yard."

SHAW (for the defence): "As far as the facts are concerned he embraces the Crown case instead of repudiating it. He had made up his mind (After the shelving of the Home Rule Act) that his country ought to achieve her independence of English rule by force of arms. He had hoped that in a very humble way he might do for his country what Garibaldi had been honoured in England for doing for *his* country."

CASEMENT: "The Crown and the Press call me filthy names, not because I am an Irish rebel, but because I tried to seduce the Irish soldiers from their allegiance. They say *that* was a vile, base and treacherous act, etc. My reply is: 'You admire Garibaldi and say he was the noblest and most chivalrous of men. But Garibaldi deliberately went into the Navy at Piedmont to seduce the sailors from their allegiance, and was condemned to death as a traitor for that act.' The English Press, etc., say that in his case *all* was patriotic and noble. How about this act of his in Genoa? This is the only comparison I institute between my case and Garibaldi's. When an act does not hurt them the English ignore and condone. When it hurts them they find it 'dastardly'."

SHAW (for the defence): "It was no more possible, in the prisoner's opinion, for Ireland to free herself without foreign alliances than it had been possible for Italy to free herself without the help of France, or than France, Belgium and Russia could not withstand the Central Powers single-handed. He therefore naturally and properly sought to obtain, and to a certain extent did obtain, the assistance of the German Empire in his enterprise. He had no apology whatever for that. It was his plain duty to his country... *The prisoner might proceed as follows*: I did not want German troops in Ireland. I have just the same objection to a German occupation of Ireland that this country has to a Russian, French or Italian occupation of England, however friendly. I did not want to have any soldiers in Ireland except Irish soldiers. What I wanted from Germany was money, munitions, and Irish soldiers, and this was all I accepted."

CASEMENT (*scoring out the word 'money' heavily*): "I did want a German army in Ireland for the very reason that Wolfe Tone, Lord Edward Fitzgerald

and every sensible Irish rebel wanted French—or Hugh O'Neill Spanish—troops, because it is not possible for Ireland without effective foreign help to cut the connection. The Irish Brigade was to be the justification for Germany sending her men—quite rightly, too. Germany said to me, 'Prove that Irishmen will fight as well as talk for their liberty and we will help,' and I said, 'I'll try and prove it with the only material to hand, and if I do, will you help?' And Germany said, 'Yes', and signed, sealed and delivered it."

SHAW (for the defence): "The fact that I served England well enough to have my services publicly acknowledged and specially awarded shows that I have no quarrel with England except the political quarrel which England respects and applauds in Poland, Italy, Belgium, in short, in every country except those conquered and denationalised by England herself."

CASEMENT: "Yes, I have. I deny 'England's' claim to India and Egypt even as I deny her claim to Ireland—on the very ground that what I claim for one country I should never withhold from others, and not aid them, too, to obtain. I am not only an Irish Nationalist, but an anti-Imperialist."

SHAW (for the defence): "If you persist in treating me as an Englishman you bind yourselves to hang me as a traitor before the eyes of the world. Now, as a simple matter of fact, I'm neither an Englishman nor a traitor: I am an Irishman captured in a fair attempt to achieve the independence of my country, and you can no more deprive me of the honours of the position than the abominable cruelties inflicted 600 years ago on William Wallace in this city when he met a precisely similar indictment with a precisely similar reply, have prevented that brave and honourable Scot from becoming the national hero of his country... Will you credit me when I say that those three days of splendid fighting against desperate odds in the streets of Dublin have given back Ireland her self respect?... And now, gentlemen, you may hang me if you like. I will not add 'and be damned to you', because I feel no more ill-will to you than I did when you were glad enough to claim my public work as the work of an English Consul... My neck is at your service if it amuses you to break it: my honour and reputation are beyond your reach... I ask for no mercy, no pardon, no pity. I sincerely and humbly beg your pardon if at any moment during this trial my inextinguishable pride in being an Irishman and my exultation in the bravery and devotion of my countrymen has betrayed me into an exhibition of vanity. Gentlemen, I have done my duty: now it is your turn."

CASEMENT: "Shaw's version is all right: but he does not understand one-tenth of the issue the Crown had in view. They are not after me—except insofar as they have to keep in with public feeling. They are out to befoul Germany first of all: to show up the 'German plot' and 'Clan-na-Gail' (sic) plot, and then to belittle me personally and point to the trio as fine guides and helpers of the Irish people. The reaction is to have this effect—glorification of good will of the Irish *fighters* who

fought and died in Ireland—misled and deceived by Germany and by me—but contempt and scorn for those who misled them and later (the aftermath of a hopeless delusion) to get all the Irish Nationalists into the war on England's side, and satisfy 'legal Irish Nationality' by some promise and pretext of Home Rule—that nauseous fraud—when the common enemy, Germany, is beaten."

And that, for Casement, was the key issue, as Donnelly readily understood.

Desmond Fennell

A Morality that Does Not Make Sense

It's about being good, we were told, when teachers in the mass media urged us to endorse contraception, casual sex, abortion and same-sex marriage; to write Ms instead of Mrs or Miss, first-name everyone and avoid new evil *isms* with American names. Add these practices of compassion and equality, we were told, to the OK elements of the old European morality and you will be enlightened, liberal, progressive, in short, good people. Such was and is the new hybrid morality that we have been adopting since the 1970s when American left-liberalism spread its wings, imperially, across the West.

Those left-liberal idealists (they were to become neo-liberals and to call themselves plain "liberals") were animated, like their Russian communist counterparts, by moral disapproval of European civilisation and a vision of its just amendment and replacement. They were also countering with the support of small minorities of citizens—using the mass media, parliaments and supreme courts—the similarly godless and hybrid communist morality that was being imposed on Eastern Europe and evangelising westwards.

The American state and business corporations, mass media included, had noted the profit that could be made from these new rules of behaviour, thought and language. So the new 'liberal agenda' obtained their backing, and automatically that of the states and big business of Western Europe. Thus this neo-liberalism (the classical kind that partly shapes the Irish Constitution buried) supplied the ethic of the consumerist decades leading up to the Crash. That same alliance of social idealism with money-making by states and business is trying now, led by the mass media, to revive those halcyon days.

Human beings inherit from their millennia of experience an intuitive ability to assess the presence or absence of sense in the morality—the framework for life—that is prescribed for them by their rulers. This is not a matter of assessing the justice or correctness of the morality. It is an assessment, rather, of the coherence of its rules with each other, and with human needs and the felt general nature of things. Such coherence is one necessary characteristic for the morality to make sense. Another is suggested by those historical societies that we call 'civilisations'.

That these perceived and felt sense in their respective moralities is attested by the fact that, unless destroyed by outside force, they lasted for hundreds or more of years. And we note that in each instance—the morality's coherence being a given—it also had a venerated source, supernatural or human (seer, lawgiver, holy man or the ancestors).

So it seems reasonable to conclude that, for a morality to make sense to people as a framework for life, it needs to have both coherence and a venerated source, supernatural or human. If it lacks these characteristics, it presents, rather than a framework that makes sense, senselessness.

The American neo-liberal morality, while advancing over the past 50 years, has lacked those characteristics: basic coherence by being a hybrid of old and new; a venerated source, quite obviously. And the signs are that those to whom the corrective zeal of the neo-liberal idealists has been principally directed—white Westerners—have been finding, consciously or subconsciously, the resulting life senseless. Most fundamentally, their desire to reproduce such a life

has flagged. The white populations of Western Europe face steep falls in the next ten years. Among the ethnic groups in the US, the only fertility rate lower than that of white people is that of the Native Americans.

The plight of the Native Americans is instructive. It mirrors the well-known phenomenon of all so-called 'primitive tribes' after European colonisers had made them insert elements of European morality into their systems of moral rules derived from some venerated source. The result for the consequently hybrid system was the absence of such a source and an incoherence that by way of senselessness produced anomie or normlessness: spreading alcoholism, sexual licence, suicides and falling fertility.

Small wonder, then, that the West's senseless reigning morality has had effects on Westerners similar to those which European colonialism had on those 'primitive tribes'.

Witness the more sensitive of us, particularly if young, feeling a pain of soul that issues in recurrent attempts to annihilate consciousness: temporarily by binge-drinking or drugs or—at a rising rate in the last 50 years—permanently; the sharp-eyed types who, reading the senselessness as normlessness, have grown rich by supplying the drugs or, if bankers, by cutting corners; if statesmen by spying on citizens or if angry by making murder, once a rare occurrence here in Ireland, something that seems to happen every week or fortnight.

In two key respects, the consumerist-liberal morality has been particularly bad for Western women. Since the 1970s the spaces and times in which a woman can move safely alone have been diminishing. Only in the aftermaths of great wars have so many mothers had to rear their children alone.

That a society of human beings faced with senselessness cannot last stands to reason. After a few decades, disintegration sets in and ultimately—as the fate of the Russian communist experiment shows—completes itself. When the West's turn comes, and signs of it are there, it will be time for Ameropeans to get serious. Indeed, that time is already here and advance thinking about what we will do then is in order. This time round, no anti-human utopia, but—with an eye to how China transits culturally from old to new—a new civilisation. Our European ancestors began to build an enduring one a thousand years ago.

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Cathy Winch

Book Review:

The Vichy Government as seen by a Gaullist in 1942

In May-June 1940 France suffered a catastrophic military defeat. The Armistice of 22nd June divided France in two parts: the Occupied Zone, in which the conquering forces controlled the Channel and Atlantic coasts and hinterland, plus the Paris region and Alsace-Lorraine. The remainder, the so-called Free Zone, had its own Government, in Vichy. That Government administered all of France (except the North and Alsace-Lorraine), and dealt with the problems thrown up by the defeat: the two million prisoners, the millions of refugees, the disorganisation of food supplies, and longer-term problems such as unemployment.

Not knowing how long the situation would last, the Vichy Government dealt with the urgent problems but also embarked on a programme of total reorganisation of the country. Some results of this reorganisation were kept on after the War because they were plainly fair and useful, for example, pay as you go State Old Age Pensions, regrouping of farm plots, the Paris transport system, and legislation against alcoholism.

Robert Paxton, in his authoritative book *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*, showed that useful work was done under Vichy. The latest passing acknowledgment comes from the historian Antony Beevor:

"On 2 January 1946, just before his departure, De Gaulle appointed Monnet to head the *Commissariat Général du Plan*. This was to provide centralised planning writ large. Monnet brought in almost the whole team from the *Délégation Générale à l'Équipement National*, even though it had been created by the collaborationist Vichy regime. These bright young "technocrats" from the top schools of the French administration had worked on projects to modernise France within the "new European order" of the Third Reich. After the war they were the very same people who were to run the European Coal and Steel Community, headed of course by Monnet, and then in 1958, the European Economic Community."

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/20/brexit-make-britain-worlds-most-hated-nation>

None of that is generally remembered.

In January 1944 the General Council of the Resistance issued a Programme for victory and reconstruction that was also in large part a punitive revenge programme targeting all those who had worked for Vichy. Everyone in France today, from Sarkozy to the Communist Party, invokes the Resistance Programme as the basis for modern, socially fair France. But this Programme erased from memory the experience of almost all Resistants, who had supported Vichy in 1940, and of all those who worked throughout the war to liberate prisoners and to organize food and transport, as well as set the foundations for modern France. It tars all supporters of Pétain as 'traitors'. From then on only the repressive side of Vichy was ever mentioned.

In 1945 people were asked to believe that apart from a bunch of traitors Frenchmen and women had supported De Gaulle and the Resistance, and that they owed their liberation to them. They were also asked to believe that all who supported Pétain had been traitors, and therefore they themselves had been traitors. The best way to deal with this contradiction was to opt for the first myth. But the French gained nothing by this, as the English and the Americans play on the second myth when it suits them. For example, the head of SNCF, the State Railway company, had to apologise publicly for the role played by the SNCF during the war, decades later when he wanted to negotiate a contract in California in 2010. The English media hark on about 'the dark years', and at the time of French opposition to the Iraq war, the French were branded as the "surrender monkeys".

This denial of the reality of Vichy has left France open to this sort of humiliation.

A well respected Gaullist wrote about Vichy half way through the War, before either myth had taken root. He was Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Tissier, the Comptroller of the Free French. His four books '*The Government of Vichy*', '*The Nazification of Vichy France*', '*I worked with Laval*' and '*The Riom Trial*' were published by Harrap, (the firm that

later published Churchill's Memoirs).

De Gaulle wrote a foreword to '*The Riom Trial*'.

These books by Tissier were advertised and favourably reviewed in the *Times Literary Supplement* of 1942 and 1943. In particular '*The Government of Vichy*' was reviewed on 20th June 1942 by Professor Sir Denis William Brogan, who also reviewed '*I worked with Laval*' (22 August 1942), and '*The Riom Trial*' (20 February 1943).

Wikipedia tells us:

"Sir Denis William Brogan (born 11 August 1900 in Glasgow; died 5 January 1974), Scottish author and historian. He studied in Glasgow, Oxford, and Harvard. From 1939 to 1968, he was a fellow of Peterhouse and professor of political science in Cambridge. He became known for broadcast radio talks, chiefly on historical themes, and as a panellist on BBC radio's Round Britain Quiz, when he affected a testy, hyperacademic persona. In 1963, he received a knighthood. He was the brother of journalist Colm Brogan and the father of historian Hugh Brogan."

One TLS advertisement read:

"A former Councillor of State and Principal Private Secretary to Laval when he was Premier of France discusses the problems and examines the work of the Vichy Government, in agriculture, industry, finance, social reform etc; and shows the results that must arise from the unsatisfactory situation at the Armistice combined with present policy."

Tissier described Vichy achievements objectively. As a De Gaulle supporter, Tissier was hostile to Vichy, because it negotiated the Armistice, and that to him was a betrayal of France and of Great Britain; the men of Vichy were in his eyes treacherous, cunning, hypocritical and without honour. Nevertheless, as he claimed himself, he gave "*a plain and objective analysis of the legislative work of Marshal Pétain and his Government*".

He acknowledged that Vichy's actions, given wartime constraints, could not be other than they were. He thought that Vichy had to deal not just with problems brought up by war, occupation and blockade, but also problems that dated from before the war. These included: weakness of executive power, depopulation, destruction of the family, and the Jewish question. Tissier was himself thinking about what should be done post-war to address these questions. His answers were sometimes much more drastic than Vichy's answers, as we will see.

The Government of Vichy

Tissier used information from the press and radio, and the Official Gazette (*le Journal Officiel*) which listed all laws, decrees and orders emitted, and modified, by Vichy; there were an enormous number daily, governing every aspect of life including production and use of commodities, down to the last grape pip (literally: "A law of August 20, 1940, ordered vine-growers to collect the pips from the marc {by-product of wine making} for oil used in soap, paints and varnish" (p. 300).

I might note here that Tissier stated wrongly that the *Journal Officiel de la République Française* was renamed *Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, because of the desire of Pétain and Laval to abolish the Republic; in fact the change of name only occurred after 1940; getting rid of the Republic as such was not a priority. As Tissier himself said, decisions in war time could not be taken in a republican manner, after leisurely parliamentary and party debate, but had to be taken quickly and without discussion, and, besides, Vichy's great preoccupation was to make do with available resources, and I imagine that they used up the existing stationery before changing the name.

After a long introduction analysing the wrongs of the Armistice, Tissier set out the position of France as Occupation began: she had to pay an enormous levy to the Occupying Power; she lost her principal resources in minerals and phosphates with the joining of the northern and eastern regions to Belgium or to the Reich; she lost 1,200,000 agricultural workers made prisoners; she could not bring her total resources into one unified whole after the creation of a rigid internal frontier; and she had used up her grain surplus to feed the millions of 1940 refugees from the North-East.

Then there was the Blockade set up by Britain which prevented imports on which the French economy and food supplies depended.

After setting out the difficulties facing the Pétain's Government, Tissier set out its five trump cards:

First, Pétain's own prestige, which was considerable, and which Tissier himself felt. Then—

"A desire for a general clean up', that is 'the intense desire felt by France for a purge of all its administration and of the leaders at the head of affairs'.

The disappearance of all supervision, that is, of parliament and of a free press: "everything the government does is outside discussion".

The fourth trump card was the ability to print money:

"Money no longer costs the Government anything, and it can proceed to all the reforms previously held up for financial reasons. It can reduce taxes and increase expenditure. It can create old age pensions, multiply grants and reliefs, lend money, carry out endless public works."

And finally, the last trump card was the absence of a programme:

"Lenin, Mussolini, or Hitler, when they reached power, were no longer free. They were the slaves of their party and of their programme. Pétain, the Chief of the State, is entirely free. {...} In June 1940 Pétain had no party and seemed not to belong to any party. He had no programme, no engagements to respect, no promises to keep. He could therefore make decisions solely in the interests of France, with no need to compromise with anyone whomsoever in any matter whatsoever. And that is a source of incalculable strength."

Tissier stressed that the Armistice was thought, both by France and Germany, to last only for a short time, until peace was signed: "*The armistice had not been intended to govern a durable situation.*" The situation was meant to be temporary, until Britain agreed to peace.

Tissier pointed out that the continuation of the British blockade made it impossible for France to ensure supplies for the population, and forced her to greater collaboration with the enemy than had been envisaged by the Armistice:

"Administration implies daily contacts with the occupying authority and daily concessions on both sides. And the problem of supplies involves a still more active collaboration."

Tissier noted that Pétain never mentioned the British blockade as one of the causes of French distress. "*Direct attacks on the blockade are found only the mouths of the men who are deliberately playing the German game {...} and the Paris traitors.*"

Tissier made the important distinction here that was blurred after 1945, between Paris and Vichy collaborators.

Insight Into Vichy France

Tissier explained that Pétain was not bound by a pre-existing party-based programme, but that he still was not free to do what he wanted, because his collaborators made demands on him, and because he was not master of the circumstances: lack of food and resources,

unemployment; and inflation. He added:

"To obtain the co-operation of the peasantry he must needs multiply concessions to agriculture; to win the co-operation of the great industrialists he must needs grant them excessive and unconscionable powers; to obtain a few necessary concessions from the Reich he was driven to plunge into a violent racial policy; to pacify public opinion he had to hunt about for traitors at any price."

Tissier spent the last 200 of his 340 pages describing Vichy actions in minute detail, under the following headings: *the Strengthening of the State, the Renovation of the Population, Work and Unemployment, the Return to the Land, Planned Economy, Money and the Budget, Supplies and Prices*. What is striking is how much Tissier took it for granted that there was need for reform, and how seriously he took Vichy initiatives, and how, in his judgement of them, he took into consideration the narrow margin of manoeuvre that Vichy had.

The Strengthening of the State

Tissier thought that the State imperatively needed strengthening. Pre-War, Government authority was weak and dispersed. What France needed was a system on the model of America or Great Britain, with "*a small number of great parties representing the essential shades of public opinion*".

To cope with its situation, Vichy instituted an authoritarian regime; Tissier thought this was not necessarily a bad thing, since "*it allows of swifter action on the part of the Government and the administration*". His criticism was that this wasn't done properly: the personnel lacked authority and competence. In fact, Ministers changed as often as under the previous regime and real power could not be exercised in a divided country where the most burning problems—food and unemployment—were not tractable anyway.

The Renovation of the Population

This was crucial according to Tissier, and here he was thinking in pre- and post-War terms, since France did not have enough population to produce more than it consumed; on the contrary, it had to import to meet its needs and would eventually lose its independence in the world because of this.

Vichy encouraged bigger families by giving generous family allowances, but went wrong, according to Tissier, in not paying attention to the quality of the children produced and not embracing

eugenics, sterilisation and selective abortion.

This is what Tissier thought and was able to write in wartime London in 1942:

"There remains the more delicate question of selection with regard to babies. Here again it would be foolish to put one's head in blinkers. France should not have children at any cost and of any and every kind. She must turn to eugenics and—it is no use to shrink from the words—to the practice of properly controlled sterilisation.

"This amounts to saying that marriage must be permitted only between individuals who are completely healthy and capable of producing healthy children; those who do not satisfy this condition should only be allowed to contract a marriage after sterilisation."

Sterilisation should also be carried out on individuals susceptible of passing on incurable disease or infirmity "*especially on the occasion of medical inspections for recruits, and the periodical medical inspections that ought to be made compulsory*".

None of these drastic measures were ever envisaged by Vichy.

Tissier thought that post-War France would need to import foreign workers, but must do so without losing its homogeneity: the foreigners necessary for the national economy must be incorporated within the national community. This is to be done by assimilation:

"In the first place, all foreigners, whether Jews or not, must be deprived of everything that links them to their original nationality. This means that they must be prohibited from using their own language, at least in public, from buying publications in a foreign language, from grouping themselves into autonomous communities with their own schoolmasters and priests. They must as far as possible be scattered throughout the territory."

Not only must foreigners learn French, one must "press them to marry French men or French women". He added:

"It is legitimate that certain Frenchmen regarded as insufficiently assimilated should be deprived of certain rights."

Regarding Jews, Tissier said:

"The Jewish problem exists, even in France. It is an undeniable fact, and no realistic policy can be blind to it."

He described Jews as an international group without ties to the land, with "*an*

absolute unity of language, of traditions, of intellectual and moral education". Tissier made the same distinction that Vichy made, between assimilated French Jews and recent immigrants. For Tissier,

"the Jewish problem cannot be disassociated from the problem of foreigners. Jews {...} who are unassimilated must be subjected to the same measures of restriction as French subjects of recently acquired nationality who are unassimilated".

That is, some occupations must be denied them.

Tissier went much further than Vichy in his attitude to Jews: in his view they "*must be deprived of everything that links them to their original nationality*", by which he means they must be cut off from a separate language, Jewish education, religious association, and from the possibility of mixing with other Jews. In other words, they must become indistinguishable from non-Jewish French people.

Tissier's London publisher (Harrap), the *Times Literary Supplement* which reviewed his book, and his leader, de Gaulle, must have found nothing objectionable in these views.

Work and Pensions

Tissier criticised Vichy for not abolishing the reforms made by the 1936 Popular Front. These reforms reduced hours of work (the 40 hour week), and introduced paid holidays and collective bargaining for workers. Tissier also criticised the introduction of Old Age Pensions, which "*excluded 'old workers' from the labour market*". All these measures "*limited the amount of work that could be done*".

Tissier was strongly against the creation of pensions, more especially because a Pay-As-You-Go system of distribution was used, with the money collected being immediately used to pay pensions, instead of capitalisation: all the money collected was being used immediately instead of being collected into a Fund.

National Insurance, with defined Benefits, was made compulsory for all wage or salary earners. A law on maternity welfare is also worth noting, and Tissier quoted it without comment:

"Law No. 3763 of September 2, 1941, on maternity welfare, provided, in the first place, that every woman was entitled to be received in a hospital for one month before the birth of a child and for one month after, without disclosing her identity; and, in the

second place, that the interruption in her work could not be a ground for breaking her contract. Infringement of these provisions entails heavy penalties of imprisonment and fines."

Agriculture

Throughout the book Tissier entered into the way of thinking of Vichy, and nowhere is this clearer than in the Chapter of the *Return to the Land*, a policy which he discussed on its merits. He devoted several chapters to agriculture, in which he agreed that Vichy had the right policies for the improvement of farm production: both by "*the regrouping of farms*" and by mechanisation. The regrouping of farms led to fields lying in a single block, easier to work than the previous situation of farm property in small separated lots. (This regrouping was eventually one of the lasting legacies of Vichy.)

To make sure that land was not divided between children on the death of the owner, Vichy altered inheritance law to permit one heir to inherit the whole, with the State helping him to compensate the other heirs.

Industry

The Vichy State controlled all aspects of industry. This system was installed, Tissier said, "*by men most of whom were only yesterday convinced theorists holding to economic liberalism*". The paradox was explained by the pressure of distress and famine; by France being at the time a closed economy due to the blockade; and by the inflation related to levies.

Transport

As with each aspect of economic life, Tissier began by describing the situation: In this case, railways were damaged by war and hampered by lack of materials and coal, while road transport was affected by lack of petrol, and maritime transport was injured by the blockade.

He then detailed Government measures to improve the situation. In the case of the railways, he congratulated the State company SNCF for getting back to almost 1939 level of freight activity. Tissier mentions the Paris Transport Board, a single State-supported organisation, which still exists today and continues under the same name, RATP (and, in 2016, runs some London buses as well).

Money and the Budget

The State was able to collect much less in tax than pre-War: tax relief was given in many cases, some taxes had been lowered—and 2 million prisoners held in Germany were not paying any

tax. Yet the Government had a massive public works programme and had increased social expenditure and subsidies. It solved its cash problem by printing money: its currency was no longer related to gold reserves.

Any foreign trade was conducted through barter, and differences paid in gold or foreign currency.

Internally, the imperative was to keep the franc to a stable value, that of September 1939. Therefore the State had to do everything possible to maintain this stability, such as fixing prices, and making an enormous number of regulations—such as forcing people to pay by cheque in transactions above a certain sum etc.

The banking system was reorganised, and the system of stocks and shares altered. Shares appreciating in value were subjected to a heavy tax.

Supplies and prices

A vast number of regulations and prohibitions attempted to govern the sale and consumption of various foods, at home and in restaurants (e.g., in restaurants, as a first course, "*only snails may be served hot*").

The maximum utilisation of products, in areas hitherto neglected, was ordered, e.g. the grape pips (see previous review), but it was also ordered that there should be no eating of rhubarb leaves (which are poisonous: radio announcement 14 June 1941), etc, etc.

There was price regulation and control, rationing and oversight of the market, as well as rent control: increases in rent were forbidden, unless the landlord had made improvements of direct benefit to the tenant. Decrees also reduced rent payable on housing left vacant through tenants being prisoners or war, or refugees not allowed to return to a prohibited zone.

Tissier's conclusion

Tissier's conclusion is both positive and damning. On the plus side he says:

"We have given a plain and objective analysis of the legislative work of Marshal Pétain and his Government.

"Can we form a final judgment on this work without the perspective of time? It contains excellent things that will deserve to be retained, particularly with regard to the protection of the family. In other points it answers to ideas excellent in themselves and only faulty in the application. Where political considerations did not have to be brought into play it cannot be doubted that desirable reforms have been effected or attempted.

"And furthermore, it must be said

that France felt an undeniable need for a renewal. The institutions existing in June 1940 were no longer adapted to actual conditions; and indeed they had nothing truly democratic about them but their outward appearance, the mere shell. It was absolutely essential therefore to begin again from zero and build completely anew."

However, against this, Tissier thought the whole enterprise was a complete failure.

He ended his book with a condemnation of Vichy.

Was this on account of its attitude to Jews? Jews don't get a mention in the concluding words of the book.

Was it because Vichy was not taking part in the struggle against Fascism and for Democracy? There is no mention of Fascism or Democracy.

No, the fault was that collaboration with Germany did not bring enough positive results.

Tissier wrote like Robert Paxton, the

current authority on Vichy; both writers describe in great detail how the actions of Vichy were undeniably useful in many ways, not just in coping with war circumstances, but in creating elements of modern France.

Both conclude their books with a condemnation of Vichy which does not follow from what they have written in the preceding hundreds of pages. In the case of Paxton, only his conclusion is taken notice of in France.

At the end of the war a political decision was made to pretend the real Vichy never happened. A dark blanket was spread over the period, which is now referred to as "*the black years*" {*les années noires*}. This mystery, this refusal to look at what actually happened, has helped to create a permanent weakness in the view France is able to form of herself. Since the factual description of Vichy is ignored, there is no defence against distorted versions. France is not in charge of its own history.

Cathy Winch

Review of '*The Riom Trial*'

By Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Tissier
Maître des Requêtes au Conseil d'Etat
Author of "*The Government of Vichy*"
George Harrap and Co. London 1942

Tissier And The Riom Trial

In February 1942 Vichy gave the world a strange spectacle, that of a country discussing in public the reasons for its occupation by a foreign power. And the world listened, over a hundred and fifty journalists attended, including from the United States and Chile. Two years later the same regime was execrated as a regime of terror conducted by traitors who must be eliminated.

In 1940 the scale and speed of the military defeat left the country in shock. Pétain decided to give the population an explanation by putting on trial those responsible.

The personnel of the several Governments of the years leading up to the War were put on trial, accused of the defeat. Pétain announced the trial as early as July 1940. It would take place in the little town of Riom which had a large courtroom, and the trial became known as the *Riom Trial*. At the time it was followed by the world's press, and the British Labour Party published the transcript of

the speeches of Léon Blum, one of the accused. The Trial took two years to prepare, since the judges were investigative judges and accumulated masses of documents before the Trial could start. 100,000 pages of documents were gathered. The accused also prepared, with the help of teams of lawyers.

In 1945 Pétain was put on trial with hardly any preparation and was made responsible for the defeat of France; he was found guilty of "*intelligence with the enemy*", the implication being that he had handed over the country to Germany voluntarily. There was no discussion of the military disaster which had led to the 1940 Armistice. In terms of fairness and respect for the truth, the Riom Trial was vastly superior.

The Vichy Government judges did not find it a simple matter getting to the bottom of why France was beaten. France had actually started the War, along with Britain. So the first question to answer was: why did France declare war?

England declared war on Germany on the 3rd September 1939 in the morning. France followed a few hours later.

They declared war because they had promised Poland that they would come to her assistance if she was attacked. Hitler attacked Poland on 1st September. The reason for the attack was that the Polish refusal to accept the reunification of the German city of Danzig with adjoining East Prussia, along with the construction of rail and road communications between West and East Prussia, through the Polish Corridor.

These facts could not be gone into publicly at the Riom Trial, since Britain and France had declared War on Germany on 3rd September, but had done nothing to help Poland militarily. Poland was crushed.

France could not admit that it was co-responsible for starting the War. Admitting war guilt would put France in a weak position if there were to be a peace settlement between France and Britain and Germany—which might take Alsace-Lorraine.

Besides, Britain was still in the War. Britain was still theoretically an ally; at least Vichy France was not at war with it, it had only committed itself, at the Armistice, not to give military assistance to the enemies of Germany. If France admitted war guilt, that would implicate Britain, which had declared war at the same time.

These topics were a source of embarrassment. More generally opinions towards the War with Germany were divided.

Before 1939, politicians were calling for war with Germany, and were opposed by others who did not want war. The Vichy Government was composed of elements on both sides of the argument, which had been for and against declaring war.

Then there was the attitude to adopt towards England after the Armistice. Some in Vichy accused Britain of dragging France into war and then abandoning her in her defeat. When Britain destroyed the French fleet anchored at Mers-el-Kebir in North Africa, anti-British feeling was reinforced.

The United States, ally of France, and ally to Britain, was present at Vichy in the shape of Ambassador Admiral Leahy.

Finally, Nazi Germany was watching the Trial with even more interest than the rest of the world. Recognition by France that she and Britain had started

the War would have been welcome. Some in Vichy wanted to give Germany that satisfaction, but most did not.

Those who wanted to avoid the question of the declaration of war won the day, and it was decided not to make the question of the declaration of war part of the Trial. A secret session of the Trial discussed the high level Government /Army meeting of 26th August 1939 which had debated whether France was ready militarily to go to war over Poland, but that was all.

The decision to exclude the declaration of war from the Trial influenced the choice of who to prosecute. Georges Mandel had been Minister for the Colonies (1938-39) and had been an advocate for war with Nazi Germany. He was arrested by Vichy but not put on trial with the other politicians, because he was seen as a representative of the 'warmongers' and war mongering was not to be mentioned. Daladier, who had signed the Munich Agreement, was chosen instead as a culprit.

There was henceforth no public mention of the declaration of war.

Pierre Tissier, who had been a higher civil servant in the Conseil d'Etat and was in 1942 a collaborator of De Gaulle in London as Comptroller of the Free French, wrote a contemporary account of the Trial. He obviously had connections with people in Riom, since he had in his possession the full shorthand verbatim transcript of the Trial, including that of the secret session mentioned above. None of that was supposed to be available to anyone outside the court and the Vichy Government. This seems to show that there were direct links between people in Vichy and people in London.

He noted the exclusion "*from the proceedings of the men who had exercised a decisive influence on the position of the French Government in August 1939, Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel*". He noted also that the indictment omitted "*everything relating to the outbreak of the war*", and stressed that the court would only investigate the defeat and the men responsible for it, and not the question of declaring war. In his first speech to the Tribunal Leon Blum congratulated the judges in their patriotism in not discussing the declaration of war.

Tissier noted the secret session discussing the 26th August 1939 meeting, where the Minister for foreign Affairs, and the Ministers of National

Defence and the principal military chiefs met to determine "*whether France ought to fulfil her pledges to Poland and was in a position to do so*".

Vichy did not want to put the army in an uncomfortable position by saying that the Army was responsible for the defeat, and the only military man on trial, General Gamelin, helpfully refused to answer any question or speak at all. That left, as an indictment, inadequate preparation for war since 1936 by Ministers, in particular by Léon Blum, Prime Minister in the 1936-37 Popular Front, and Edouard Daladier. The Popular Front reduced the amount of time worked by factory workers (40 hour week, 2 weeks paid holidays), allowed strikes and factory occupations, nationalised war manufactures and thus caused France to be unprepared. That was the scenario envisaged for the Trial.

In the court room Blum and Daladier were allowed to make four-hour speeches, which were admired for their eloquence. They made short work of the witnesses. They were able to show that they had ordered more war materials, and had made military service longer than had Ministers before 1936, including Marshal Pétain, Minister for war in 1934, who presided over cuts in the military budget and shortening of military service.

The Trial made Pétain and Vichy look ridiculous, and it was 'suspended pending a complete of information'. It had lasted from February to April 1942.

The defeat of France

Since he was in London supporting de Gaulle, Tissier used his reporting of the Trial to give his own explanation for the French defeat. For him the cause of the defeat was the refusal of High Command to adopt the methods recommended by General De Gaulle, the name never mentioned at Riom, who as Colonel De Gaulle had put forward the war doctrine that would have saved France.

The General Command, responsible for ordering war materials, ordered the wrong sort of war materials because of their outdated notions of war. Tissier said:

"The Command only cared to see the German Army in the image of what it had made of the French Army. It had never believed in dive-bombers, in large formations of tanks plunging forward alone and independently, in the close co-ordination of the action of planes and that of armoured machines. It had only one dogma—fortifications; only one doctrine—the defensive."

So they didn't order the right material. Also they weren't informed about how the German Army was armed.

And the existing material was not used properly, it was left in depots, scattered instead of concentrated. Etc.

Tissier explained why new ideas were not considered: natural mental laziness prevents "9 men out of 10" to consider problems "otherwise than according to a certain routine".

Also it is easier to get funding for tried and trusted machines, rather than new-fangled ones.

All members of the War Council had been officers in 14-18. With age they had ceased to be soldiers and become intellectually slothful bureaucrats.

Tanks and planes, according to Tissier, never became fully part of the French Army. Crews of tanks and planes in 14-18 "had been to a great extent drawn from all the dare-devil elements in the French nation, the common folk being in the tanks and the aristocracy in the planes".

After the War, tank officers were considered as mechanics "with whom one didn't mix". Aviation remained "the sphere of individual sporting exploits".

The great unmentioned name throughout the Trial was that of De Gaulle, who had recommended the use of tanks and planes in the way that they turned out to be used by the Germans.

Tissier summarised the main points of De Gaulle's 1934 book, *Vers une armée de métier* ['Towards a professional army', published in English as *The Army of the Future* Hutchinson & Company London (1941)] as follows:

The arguments of De Gaulle for a professional army were several. What was needed was no longer cannon fodder. Technical advances required specialist training by specialists. The land army must become a real profession, like the Navy and the Air Force.

There were political reasons also. France would in future need to make war when the population did not feel that its survival is at stake:

"The interconnexion between all world problems, again, makes it possible for France to become involved in a war in which the people will not feel that its own existence is directly threatened. Thus it will not have the high faith that inspired the soldiers of the Revolution, or those of 1914" (Tissier summarising De Gaulle).

Besides, France has a smaller population and smaller industrial resources than Germany, and therefore must have "an

army of quality adapted to present-day mechanisation".

Tissier then quoted De Gaulle's Memorandum of 26th January 1940. After four months of the French and German armies "buried in their respective fortified lines", De Gaulle sent a report to the President of the Council and to the Commander-in-Chief regarding the morale of the army. It was certainly worsening with inaction, but would also necessarily be inadequate in a modern war:

"The maintaining of almost the whole active population of the country under arms may be accepted by the citizens when they fully realize the necessity for it... But in the present war, no proof of this sort—and for good reason—is being given them... In its very essence and principle, the mass levy corresponds to great shocks, to imminent menace, to dire necessity."

This passage is repeated later in the book, with some words added:

"Maintaining almost the whole active population of the country under arms may be accepted by the citizens when they realize the necessity for it. It was so under the Revolution, against which Europe was in coalition, or during the last war when the Germans were at Noyon. The masses knew that they were indispensable for their country's preservation, a fact of which the operations gave them constant and bloody proof. But in the present war no such proof—and for good reasons—is being given them..."

Tissier continued:

"The French Army was crushed by the superiority of the German armaments, particularly in aircraft and tanks: the German Panzer divisions, working in close collaboration with the Stukas, met with no serious resistance, as the French army had neither tanks, nor aeroplanes, nor anti-tank weapons, nor anti-aircraft guns."

Why was there such a lack of that sort of armament?

"It became apparent that if there were not more tanks, nor more aeroplanes, nor weapons to fight tanks and aeroplanes, it was because the Command, clinging to its purely defensive theory of the continuous front, had not considered it indispensable to have more of them. Similarly it had rejected the principle of dive-bombers and offensive aircraft. And similarly it had decided that anti-aircraft guns were ineffective."

Colonel De Gaulle called from 1934 to 1940 for preparation for a war of machines.

"For six years the French Command called his scheme madness, refused to order the necessary machines, refused to create independent armoured divisions, clung stubbornly to the view that tanks were auxiliaries to the infantry and the use of aeroplanes was to bomb rear areas, and declared its faith in the inviolability of continuous fronts. And Marshal Pétain himself made a point of publishing a refutation of the system of Colonel De Gaulle.

"And at the end of these six years, the Command that had created only a defensive army destined to remain buried in concrete launched it into an offensive operation in flat open country without having provided it with the absolutely indispensable equipment it required."

Then that army was incapable of reacting when the Panzer divisions and the Stukas "foreseen by General De Gaulle" pierced the Front Line at a spot that Marshal Pétain had declared to be "impassable", and which was defended consequently only by reserves.

"Marshal Pétain had opposed its being fortified, and had declared, with an authority that on one would have dreamed of disputing, that the Ardennes were impassable".

"From 1935 to 1939 the Marshal never asked the Army council, of which he was the illustrious and most influential member, for the smallest increase in armaments."

So there were two causes for military defeat:

Marshal Pétain's blindness to the fundamental problems of modern warfare:

"his refusal and the systematic refusal of the General Staff to adopt the doctrine of the young colonel of tanks who was to become General Charles de Gaulle. This refusal had its repercussions on the training of the troops and their morale, as well as on armament and on the conception of operations."

So—

"The allied armies were crushed in May 1940 by the Panzer divisions supported by the German dive-bombers. This fact is beyond discussion."

Tissier gave a complete account of the proceedings of the Trial, which went into enormous detail about army equipment, when ordered, by whom, in what quantities, what sort etc. He entered entirely into the spirit of the Trial, and the necessity to make known all these details. He explained the defeat as a failure of the High Command, and of Pétain as the most influential member

of the War Council, to understand modern warfare.

In his Foreword, De Gaulle had encouraging words for the people involved in the Riom Trial. He said:

"Finally, it is a remarkable and striking circumstance that not one of all the Frenchmen whose voices were heard at Riom, whether for the occasion they were defendants or witnesses or even judges, ever at any moment adopted a tone of despair. It was as though they were discussing a temporary national disaster that each one felt to be out of key with the true fighting worth of France. Now this war is not ended, and France, France too continues..."

This was the situation and the state of mind of De Gaulle and his supporters in 1942. There is no mention of betrayal and treachery.

Pétain, according to Tissier, instead of asking for an Armistice, should have transferred the Government to the colonies of North Africa, along with what remained of the army, air force and navy. Tissier speculates that failure to do so might be due to treachery, but hopes that that was not the case.

In 1942 Gaullists had a coherent account of the military defeat, one that stuck to the facts. They saw that Vichy leaders were careful to spare Britain any embarrassment, and eager not to give Germany the satisfaction of acknowledging France and Britain had started the War. By 1945 myth had replaced fact. Pétain was on trial, accused of "*intelligence with the enemy undertaken in order to facilitate the enemy's objectives*", and the story was spread that the country was handed over to Nazi Germany deliberately by traitors motivated by fear of Bolshevism, with the cry '*Rather Hitler than the Popular Front*'. The question of the actual declaration of war was buried ever deeper. The reason for war, if anyone dared ask, was answered retrospectively by invoking the events that happened two years after War was declared.

The Riom Trial showed that Vichy at that time was at worst ineffective, and at best patriotic; the Trial did not fit the myth and so it was forgotten.

In 2016, however, I found a thousand -page volume of the proceedings of the Riom Trial on sale in a French motorway service station. Published in 2012 by Omnibus, it was edited by Julia Bracher, journalist and historian. Apart from the Trial report it contained extracts from

the diaries of Blum and Daladier. Tissier appears in the bibliography. Bracher concluded her introduction by mentioning the trial of Pétain in 1945. She ended with a non-committal reference to: "*Strange mirror effect between two Frances who put each other on trial in the vain hope of healing too great a wound.*"

However, the two Trials are not mirror images of each other. One had to be abandoned because the accused ridiculed the prosecution. The subsequent safety of the accused was secured throughout the War. The truth was spoken. The other Trial sentenced Pétain to death, and turned a lie into the founding myth of post-war France.

John Minahane

The Spanish Polemic on Colonisation

Part 10

John Locke on the American Indians

In a previous article I mentioned the American connection of John Locke and his *Two Treatises on Government*. Locke's patron was the Earl of Shaftesbury, leader of the extreme anti-Papist faction of the English aristocracy. For decades Shaftesbury strove with all his great political skill to have James, King Charles II's Catholic younger brother, excluded from the royal succession. Unable to achieve this, in desperation he involved himself in a conspiracy to kill both Charles and James, after which he died in exile in Holland in 1683.

Though the *Two Treatises* were published only in the 1690s, they were evidently written in the early 1680s, at the critical moment of the Exclusion campaign/ conspiracy. Their Editor Peter Laslett describes them as "*an Exclusion Tract, not a Revolution Pamphlet*". That is to say, they were written in the heat of the campaign against James and were meant to contribute to it.

The *First Treatise* is about what the Bible says and does not say about political power. Some prominent writers had claimed that the Divine Right of Kings found support in the Old Testament. Locke knew his Bible very well and he was able to show that it doesn't offer any kind of political model. Adam, as presented in the Book of Genesis, was not an absolute monarch; his heirs did not inherit monarchical rights; even if they had, it would be impossible to work out the rule of monarchical succession; and even if such a rule could be established in principle, it could never be sorted out in practice. As for the political example given by the Chosen People, sometimes they had Kings but mostly they didn't: the Jews had hereditary kingly government for less than one-

third of the time period covered (*Treatise I*, 169). So the proponents of absolute monarchy have no support in the Bible.

That is the argument of the *First Treatise*. It's a good example of the effective use of the Bible in English political controversy. Locke then goes on in the *Second Treatise* "*to set down what I take to be political power*" (*II*, 2). The basic principle is that man is naturally free and equal, and "*he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him...*" (*II*, 17). That's what slavery is, in fact, a kind of permanent waging of war by one man against another: the point is that you would be able to kill him, but instead you opt to use him (*II*, 24).

An absolute monarch (such as, by implication, King Charles is or King Charles's brother James would be) makes slaves of everyone else. On the other hand, in the free political society which conforms to man's free nature, there must be limited powers. Locke makes it clear that anyone who tries to establish an unlimited power is an enemy of the people, and the people have the right to rebel against him.

"Whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are therefore absolved from any further obedience and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence... By this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty ..." (*II*, 222).

So then, slaves or potential slaves have the right to rebel? And rebelling slaves have the support of the author of the *Second Treatise* (previously author of the *Fundamental Constitutions* of the slave-holding state of Carolina)? No, indeed they do not, that's a gross misinterpretation! The misunderstanding comes from taking the expression **all men** too literally and supposing that it means what it says. But in practice men are divided into different categories, to which different standards are applied. Locke is a great progressive, and it seems that the most fundamental distinction for him is between those developed men who are in political society and the primitive, supposedly pre-political, men who are in what he likes to call "*the State of Nature*".

And that's where the American Indians come in. They're the example used again and again in the *Second Treatise* to make this crucial contrast. One might say that this famous document is built around them, or over them.

After 300 years some of Locke's academic champions began to notice this fact, which they had not noticed previously. *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts* by James Tully, published in Cambridge in 1993, has a chapter '*Rediscovering America: the Two Treatises and aboriginal rights*'. Tully points out that the famous chapter '*On Property*' in the *Second Treatise* justifies taking American Indians' lands without their consent. In fact, this is the core of the chapter:

"Appropriation without consent is the main argument... The sections are carefully organised to prove and substantiate it... The problem is to show how appropriation can take place given the background premise that everyone has a natural right to the means of preservation... In some of the secondary literature the background premise is overlooked and it is then mistaken as solely a problem of justifying the division of English and European societies into propertied and propertyless classes. The fact that the chapter is organised around a contrast between Europe, where appropriation without consent is not permitted because political societies exist, and America, where appropriation without consent is permitted because it is a state of nature, is rarely mentioned. That the argument justifies European settlement in America without the consent of the native people, one of the most contentious and important events of the seventeenth century and one of the formative events of the modern

world, is normally passed over in silence."

Locke: A Borrower from Papists?

The notice now taken of the American Indians must be welcomed, of course. (As late as the 1960s a major new edition of the *Two Treatises*, by Peter Laslett of Cambridge, ignored these issues.) However, one can't help seeing some things that continue not to be noticed. In another part of his book Tully claims that Locke was the first writer who saw political power as having its basis in the people:

"Political power is conceptualised as the property of a constituted political body or ruler in the natural freedom tradition prior to Locke. Although the people is or are naturally free, this natural freedom is non-political. Politically, the individual is naturally subject to the community and the community to its natural representative bodies... No one was willing to grant that the people either individually or collectively had the capacity to exercise political power themselves. In positing individual popular sovereignty Locke thus repudiates 500 years of elite political holism and reconceptualises the origins of political power in a radically populist way. And this in turn is ground work, as we shall see, for reconceptualising rebellion as a political activity of the people."

All of this is nonsense. The evidence can be found in my introduction to *An Argument Defending the Right of the Kingdom of Ireland* by Conor O' Mahony. In fact, the idea that political power was derived from the people, not directly from God, and that the people retained the right to overthrow any ruler who governed them tyrannically, had been expressed in Spanish, Portuguese and Irish political thought half a century and more before Locke. Introducing the *Argument*, I quote Francisco Suarez:

"If the king turns his just power into tyranny, abusing it to the manifest ruin of the state, the people can use their natural power to defend themselves, which they have never surrendered" (*Defensio Fidei Contra Errores Sectae Anglicanae*, Coimbra 1613, lib. 3, cap. 3, sec. 3).

This is so close to the language of the *Second Treatise* (par. 222, quoted above) that Locke's formulation might even be taken for a paraphrase.

Again, there is something odd about Locke's concept of '*just war*'. One of the major achievements of 17th century

political thought, according to Carl Schmitt, was abandoning the notion of '*just war*' and replacing it with the idea of '*legitimate enemies*'. Admittedly, even Hugo Grotius, the clever lawyer who managed to make general principles out of all the particular interests of Dutch colonialism (his first book was a justification of a Dutch act of piracy) and thereby invented what some people call modern International Law—even Grotius gives conditions whereby war can be waged "*justly*" or "*lawfully*". (He argues that these conditions can be met not only by states but by **private companies**—not, however, by subject peoples who desire their freedom: that would be "*an unjust cause*"!)

Locke's idea of "*just war*" is not very clear but, when he uses it to justify slavery, his reasoning is similar to that of Francisco de Vitoria, if not quite so brutally thorough. Vitoria, writing in the 1530s, said that captors were entitled to enslave the captives they took in a just war. And furthermore, getting round the inconvenience posed by the actual nature of the slave trade, he said that buyers were entitled to be trusting: the Portuguese were not obliged to enquire into the justice of the African wars ("*wars among barbarians*") in which the slaves they were buying had been captured!

All of this suggests that Locke borrowed more from the thinking of Spanish papists, directly or indirectly, than he might have cared to acknowledge. The '*just war*' issue, one would imagine, should be interesting to a historian of ideas. But I can't find anything about '*just war*' in Tully's book.

The State of Nature, the State of War, and Slavery

Locke wants to describe political power, which he defines as—

"a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the country in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth for foreign injury, and all this only for the public good" (*II*, 3).

There is an original condition of man where no such political power exists, Locke says. He calls this condition "*the State of Nature*". But he does not think of the State of Nature in the same way as Hobbes, who sees it as everyone being at war with everyone else.

As seen by Locke it can be peaceful and reasonable. In fact, the State of Nature has its own fundamental natural

law, though it is without any humanly constructed laws. The natural law, corresponding to human reason, says that no one should harm anyone else. If a member of political society finds himself in the State of Nature (as may easily happen, for example when travelling abroad, since he does not belong to the political society of that particular land), he should try to get on with everybody peacefully and reasonably.

However, the State of Nature is hazardous, and first of all because of criminals (those who break the natural law). In the State of Nature everyone has the individual right to punish such people within reason (II, 8). Others may join forces with the injured person in order to inflict due punishment on the criminal. And anyone at all may kill a murderer, who has—

"by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or tiger, one of those savage wild beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security" (II, 11).

The State of Nature has severe disadvantages. An obvious one is that the injured individual and his friends may not have the power to punish the criminal, or no one may be able to kill the murderer: he may be the strongest of all. This is one very good reason for leaving the State of Nature and becoming members of political society, where the individual person can have the benefits of civil government (II, 13-15).

Distinct from the State of Nature is the State of War,

"a state of enmity and destruction... One may destroy a man who makes war on him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey" (II, 16).

It is not only foreigners who might confront me in a State of War. Anyone who tries to enslave me—or anyone who tries to get absolute power over me, which in effect means to make me a slave—puts himself in a State of War with me. Of course, I should try to avoid this and to keep my natural status as a free man. My principal means of ensuring this is to join with others in political society.

But this does not mean it is il-

legitimate to make a slave of somebody else. Slaves can be the spoils of just or lawful war. A man who has "*by his fault, forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death*" can be deliberately preserved as a slave by his captor. The captor can delay the captive's death and use him for his service, "*and he does him no injury by it*", Locke says with great cynicism (II, 23): because if the slave ever feels that his slavery is a fate worse than death, he can draw upon himself the death he prefers to slavery simply by resisting his master's will!

Slavery, in short, "*is nothing else but the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive*" (II, 24). But remarkably, Locke insists more than once that the slave's capital crime—resisting those waging just war—does not compromise his wife and children. They should not be enslaved, nor should they be deprived of the use of the slave's original property: the captor has total right to the slave's person, but should only seize as much of his property as amounts to compensation (II, 180-5, 196)!

Which European slave trader had ever given the slightest thought to such principles, or wouldn't laugh at them? Locke sweeps aside all the difficulties with the casual remark that "*the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right*" (II, 180). But in case anyone should misunderstand him, he is quick to clarify that the slave's wife and children have no right to any "waste" land: "*Where there being more land than the inhabitants possess, and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste*" (II, 184), and so the conqueror may seize any land that is uncultivated. In this way Locke brings his theory of conquest into harmony with his theory of property.

As for the repeated references to people who may be treated as wild beasts, lions, tigers etc., Tully observes:

"The very terms Locke uses to describe the offenders who may be 'destroyed' are the terms used to describe, and so dehumanise, Amerindians in the books in Locke's library".

Property and No Property

In his theory of property Locke begins, as usual, with the Bible: God has given the earth to the children of men (Psalm 95, 16). This means that everything was originally given to mankind in common. So how can there be property?

The reason is that God intended men to use what he had given (and to this end equipped them with reason). Now in fact, nothing can be used unless some person actually takes it. This applies not only to the cultivation of fenced-off land but even to picking berries and killing deer.

"The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no inclosure and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life" (II, 26).

It is by labour that man removes things from the state in which nature provided them and makes them his property. Therefore gatherers own what they gather. They do not need to get the consent of all the others, which would be impossible. Nothing could be done if the explicit consent of the community was required for all appropriation.

"Thus the law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of everyone" (II, 30).

Common ownership of the world, in fact, is purely the starting-point. It cannot be supposed that God intended the world "*should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and Labour was to be his title to it)*" (II, 34). There are common lands in England, of course, which private persons are not allowed to appropriate, but that is a different matter: those lands are the common property of the country or the parish, not of all mankind.

Does this mean that everyone can take as much as he likes? No, because God has given us things for use, not to waste or to spoil. "*As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in*" (II, 31). Anything in excess of this belongs to others. This goes for land also. "*As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product of, so much is his property*" (II, 32). And by appropriating this much land he did no injury to anyone else, because "*there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use*" (II, 33).—Locke swoops suddenly between present and past tenses; the reason seems to be that some statements are meant to apply generally, while

others have to be drastically qualified in context. There is a crucial complicating factor which he has left aside thus far, and which changes everything. (We will come to this factor shortly.)

One could perfectly well use the same principle of appropriation by labour, Locke says, even in his own day,

"without prejudice to anybody, as full as the world seems. For supposing a man, or family, in the state they were, at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or of Noah: let him plant in some in-land, vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, to give them reason to complain, though the race of men have now spread to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number (which) was at the beginning" (II, 36).

Locke reckons that an acre of enclosed and cultivated land will provide ten times more for the support of human life than an acre of equally rich land "*lying waste in common*". But then immediately he feels he's done the cultivators an injustice:

"I have rated the improved land very low in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one. For I ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America left to Nature, without any improvement, tilling or husbandry, a thousand acres will yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten acres of equally fertile land in Devonshire where they are well cultivated?" (II, 37).

For some time he is content with the proportion of a hundred to one. When considering "*several nations of the Americans... who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life*", he reflects that for want of improving their lands by labour, they—

"*have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds, lodges and is clad worse than a day labourer in England*" (II, 41).

But then ultimately he pushes the disparity, European versus American, up to a thousand.

"An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are without doubt, of the same natural, intrinsic value. But yet the benefit mankind

receives from the one, in a year, is worth five pounds and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth" (II, 43).

And with this much Locke remains content. He stops multiplying by ten; he doesn't bother to go up to ten thousand. By then his contempt for American Indians, or anyone like them, and their way of life is sufficiently manifest. The implications of the principle that "*God gave the world to the use of the industrious and rational (and Labour was to be his title to it)*" would be spelt out by American Lockean down to the time of Thomas Jefferson and beyond. And it wouldn't matter that in reality the first Anglo-Saxon settlers had to be taught how to cultivate the most important crop, corn, (and taught much else besides) by the Indians, and in the meantime they would have starved if they hadn't been able to draw on stocks of corn which the Indians had laid up; that they relied on Indian hunters' labour to develop their overseas markets in furs etc., and they couldn't have done it otherwise; and so on. Locke's final comparison is the crux. Ultimately, whichever way you looked at it, those Indians were an obstacle to profit.

The Dynamism of Money

The original principle, that a man had a right only to as much as he could personally use without spoiling (including the products of his land) was in fact no longer valid. It was still true that people could not legitimately hoard meat or corn, because those things rotted. But there were other things that did not rot, and society had agreed that they could be hoarded. And this had changed many things, including the availability of land.

"There is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants had not the *invention of money*, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them... This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than men needed, had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or men had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great deal of flesh or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others,

where the same plenty was still left, to those who would use the same industry" (II, 36-37).

Money, though, will prejudice others. Money puts a squeeze on people. But if you complained to Locke that you were being squeezed by money he'd have said that you ought to stop being a savage and engage properly with money, and soon you would find you were living much better than before. On the other hand, one finds that the great noblemen of England keep enormous parklands which are no more cultivated than the Indians' hunting grounds, as Roger Williams had pointed out to the Puritan elders of Boston half a century previously. Yet one has to respect those parklands as properties because they are lodged within the culture of money, whereas Indian hunting grounds are not, and so they need not be respected and may be appropriated.

Locke, anyhow, is a great enthusiast for money, as it takes us beyond simply using useful things. He describes the primitive evolution of money, always with America in mind:

"The greatest part of *things really useful* to the life of man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americas now, are generally *things of short duration*: such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves".

Those first commoners had no right and no reason to keep a surplus of perishables for themselves, since the surplus would spoil. But if they gave part of what they had to others who would use it, or if they bartered, say, quick-rotting plums for longer-lasting nuts, that too was legitimate, since nothing was spoiled or wasted.

"And again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased... And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life" (II, 46-7).

It was money that gave people the incentive to enlarge their possessions and to seek great estates, and not least in America.

"For I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or a hundred thousand acres of excellent *land*, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the in-land parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw *money* to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of Nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life for him and his family" (II, 48).

Locke explicitly says that America is an image of the primitive condition of mankind. "*In the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now: for no such thing as money was anywhere known*" (II, 48). The only concession made here is that the world originally was more America than America is America now: it was an extreme version. Today's America at least has the *wampum* currency, which Locke mentions in II, 184, though he rightly doesn't regard it as mature, dynamic, world-changing money.

The last point to make about money is that it promotes inequality: inequality by implicit consensus, Locke insists. Although earlier people's different degrees of industry had produced some difference in possessions, on the whole there was a rough equality among those who simply sought to acquire the needs of life.

"But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment and carriage, has its *value* only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the *measure*, it is plain that men have agreed the disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone, these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of money" (II, 50).

Governments and laws come afterwards, merely to regulate.

"A Pattern of the First Ages"

What I have summarised here is the foundation of the *Second Treatise*. A great

deal more is built on that base: descriptions of the various kinds of power, including parental power in the family and the power of despots; the beginnings and the purposes of political society; the divisions and limitations of power in political society; conquest, usurpation and tyranny, and the people's right to resist Kings.

The references to American Indians are less frequent, but where they occur they are in harmony with what has been said earlier. Locke actually describes American Indian government in much the same terms as Roger Williams:

"The kings of the Indians in America ... are little more than Generals of their Armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people or a council. Though the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority" (II, 108).

An example of the ideal political society as described by Locke himself, one might think! But the point he is making here is that the Indians do not have absolute monarchy. Therefore their example refutes the idea that there is a primitive tradition of this form of government. Because the whole point about the Indians is that they are *primitive*. They are—

"America, which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of ground..."

In the previous section he has pointed out that in "*the equality of a simple poor way of living*" crimes are few and there isn't much need for laws (II, 107).

These quotations are from Locke's chapter '*Of the Beginning of Political Societies*'. It would seem, then, that the American Indians are not absolutely in the '*State of Nature*', but they're just getting out of it. Or we might say with his Editor Laslett that such passages give "*a most interesting exposition of Locke's views on the state of nature, or of such a state mixed with a state of society*".— We hardly need to be pedantically precise, do we? Suffice it to say that such people conduct their government in a primitive fashion and we don't respect their way of doing it.

"Nature Does Next to Nothing"

The Indians, by contrast, were prepared to allow a coexistence of cultures and make reasonable space for the newcomers. (And if they'd felt differently, the European colonies could not have survived.) They were ready to modify their own way of life in certain respects, both to facilitate the colonists and to improve some things for themselves. In this spirit they allowed the expansion of *wampum* trade. The Indians also did more fur-trapping; urged on by the colonists: they might even kill animals in such numbers as to disrupt the ecological balance. Nonetheless, there was no sign of them wanting to enter the full-blown money economy. They made agreements of land sale with the colonists, but they understood this as meaning that those lands were being freed for the colonists' use. (People used land, they did not appropriate it. Or "*one cannot sell the earth any more than the sky or the four great directions*", as an Indian leader said long afterwards when gold-prospecting colonists wanted to buy the Black Hills of Dakota.)

Coexistence of cultures is emphasised in some major treaties between Indians and Europeans. The following is from a treaty made by the Iroquois Confederation:

"The Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways... the white people and their laws, their customs and their ways... shall travel together, side by side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel."

No doubt the insistent language reflects the Iroquois' sense of the white people's inclinations.

Of the various European colonists, it was the French who came closest to a policy of live-and-let-live. Unlike the Anglo-Saxons, they did not establish large colonies of farmers but contented themselves with trading. To a great extent they conformed to American Indian customs, and French traders were welcomed in the Indian villages, just as Indian traders were welcomed at the markets in Quebec.

Also, whereas racial segregation was the rule for the Anglo-Saxons, the French intermarried. According to Francis Jennings, Louis XIV himself encouraged intermarriage so as to increase the numbers of his subjects. Overall, "*not surprisingly*", Jennings says, "*the French thus acquired much more influence with*

Indians than the English could hope for".

However, in the mid-18th century the English defeated the French in two major battles and drove them back to Canada. And this actually left the way clear for the Anglo-Saxon colonies to declare independence less than twenty years later, and the whole expanse of North America was doomed to be overrun by people who thought like John Locke.

Tully has some valid things to say about what Locke did not see, or would not see, in the government, economy and culture of the Indians. To begin with, it was false to say that the Indians wasted the land: they simply used it in different ways, ecologically less destructive ways. They did not see themselves as superior to the rest of Nature, and they tried to make the best possible adjustment to a natural world that was of infinite worth. By contrast, the colonists,

"with their Christian voluntarism, saw themselves above the rest of Nature and under an injunction to subdue and improve it for human purposes. The ethic of improvement underwrites an exploitive stance towards Nature in the name of greater 'conveniences for mankind' and stigmatises any other stance as wasteful."

When Miantonomo, the *sachem* of the Narragansetts, complained in 1642 that the natural habitat of the deer and the turkeys was being destroyed, and fishing was being disrupted, because "*these English having gotten the land, they with scythes cut down the grass, and with axes fell the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass, and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved*", he raised a tangle of issues involving labour and property claims and the survival of a complex way of life. But John Locke, Gentleman, will not admit such issues into the zone where he does his earnest thinking. His response to Miantonomo would presumably be: *America's big, go somewhere! . . . Pity about your clams . . .*

Where Locke is novel and world-shaking can be seen in a passage like paragraph 42 of the *Second Treatise*:

"Whatever Bread is more worth than Acorns, Wine than Water, and Cloth or Silk than Leaves, Skins or Moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry... (From this we see) how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at

most, but a very small, part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is wholly left to Nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing."

In native America a man who could seriously argue that Nature did next to nothing in producing the useful things of life would have been regarded as stark raving mad. And not only in America but in Ireland too, or virtually anywhere in the world except the Anglo-Saxon parts. Yet, under Anglo-American pressure, in subsequent centuries this is the direction that the world has taken.

"Locke's view is all the more important because it was the classical expression of bourgeois society's ideas of right as against feudal society", was how Marx put it—though here it's more the bourgeois idea against anything else that ever had been or might be thought. In this sense Marx himself was bourgeois and the production-obsessed and progress-besotted Marxist culture of Russia was the most extreme bourgeois culture ever, even though ultimately it lost the Nature-improving contest to America.

Locke's Influence

Tully says: "*It is now well known that Locke's immediate audience received his work predominantly in silence and, when noted, with abuse*". He makes the amazing claim that Locke's thinking had no importance in any English political movement until the early 19th century, when first of all there was a 'socialist Locke': literally he was presented as the father of English socialism. After that came the more durable Locke, the ideologist of liberalism.—But surely the three English editions of the *Two Treatises* during the 1690s, and the twenty English editions during the 18th century, prove that the man must have had a reputation? Someone was reading him! Such a well-sustained publishing history suggests that he had influence, even if it can't be neatly labelled. The English economists, for example, though not a political movement as such, were highly influential thinkers; Karl Marx, who knew a thing or two about them, said of Locke that "*his philosophy served as the basis for all the ideas of subsequent English political economy*".

But there's no doubt about Locke's early influence in America. Actually, the

'Property' chapter of the *Second Treatise* is a highly developed version of arguments that had been circulated more crudely by colonists in the 1620s, '30s and '40s: men like Samuel Purchas, John White of Virginia, Robert Cushman, John Cotton, Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts, and the lawyers for Connecticut opposing the appeal by the Mohegan tribe to the Privy Council. "*The arguments and the very terms used in the pamphlets are strikingly similar to chapter five of the Two Treatises*", though less sophisticated, Tully says. Even some of the same biblical references were used.

In turn, Locke's sophisticated arguments were used for propagandist purposes in America within forty years of their first publication in England. (Tully gives the example of Rev. John Bulkley, writing in 1726.) They would continue to be used well into the 19th century, including in the courts, by people who were arguing against Indian rights to lands.

Locke and the Creation of America

Locke had the perfect philosophy for the kind of society described by Francis Jennings in *The Creation of America*. Jennings tries to hammer home one simple point: the development of colonial America cannot truly be seen as in any sense anti-imperial. Because empire is about conquering other peoples and controlling or seizing their lands. And that's what America was about, right from the beginning.

"From their day of first arrival, every single colonial desired and worked to expand English rule over more territory and more people. When the colonists determined to secede, they wanted to rule those territories and peoples themselves instead of acting as agents for Great Britain... (There were) repeated rejoicings of Revolutionary leaders over their achievement of *empire*. They used that precise, explicit word again and again, and they meant it.

"Examined from that viewpoint, the American Revolution appears to be evolutionary rather than a break with tradition..."

The English migrants insisted on "*the rights of Englishmen*" for themselves, but they took a different view of others:

"For Amerindians and Africans, English tradition was not that of freemen... To Indians and Africans, those uplifting phrases (of the American Revolution) were nonsensical hot air. They were war propaganda."

Africans were not regarded as colonists: they were work animals.

"From earliest beginnings, the colonies were agencies of conquest... During the days when neighbouring Indians greatly outnumbered Englishmen, the colonists pretended to recognise tribal rights as a practical necessity for negotiation, but all the while they kept in reserve their king's claims to sovereignty and the colonists' derivative claims to jurisdiction over those same Indians. Every colony thus became an empire in embryo."

(Thomas Paine's thinking ran in these same Lockean grooves. In *Common Sense* he wrote of "unoccupied land" that could become "the constant support of government". "For Paine, liberties were the property of Europeans... Bluntly, Paine was racist.")

During the Revolution Indians were fighting on both sides from 1776 onwards, but in the event they were the great losers. "The American Revolution was a disaster for most American Indians... The new America had no room for Indians and their world."

No sooner had the original thirteen colonies shaken off the British than they were planning their expansion westwards. There were new colonial settlements in the western areas called territories. How would they be governed?

"A new species of empire was required and was invented. The western colonies were to be nurtured until they reached maturity, defined as "sixty thousand free inhabitants thereof", whereupon they should be admitted "into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever"... On these terms, the original Western states thrust forth their empire, by sharing it, eventually across the North American continent to the Pacific coast and beyond to the Hawaiian islands. They have become fifty states, with no end in sight. Not since the ancient Roman empire had anything of the sort been tried."

The Revolution's grand phrases have been referred to already. Some of those phrases come directly from Locke. The *Declaration of Independence* has that philosopher's stamp: it was written by one of Locke's great admirers, Thomas Jefferson. Its ringing affirmations, e.g. that "all men are created equal", need to be properly qualified:

"Notoriously, that utterance included no blacks among men. So also in the Ordinance, no Indians were included

among the legal persons or inhabitants of the law."

Remarkably enough, slaves do appear as persons in the Constitution of 1787 (though in disguise, as Jennings remarks). In the count of population three-fifths of a slave was enumerated (slaves being "other persons" besides free persons)—all for the purpose of giving weighted representation to the Southern states! As Article 1, Section 2 puts it:

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states... according to their respective numbers which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons."

Jennings sums up his argument as follows:

"The United States was formed by partnership of thirteen colonies cloned from the British empire. All of them had been founded on enterprises to conquer the people previously occupying North American land, and all were intended to seize and repopulate the land. Part of the new population was brought in duress as slaves from Africa...

The Revolution wanted to reduce Indians and slaves permanently below human status."

That last statement goes too far, perhaps, if we take it literally. America, and the spirit of John Locke, has got little to do with permanence. But Locke's philosophy was the perfect inspiration for a revolution that had such notions of freedom: freedom based on dispossession of some and enslavement of others. In a future article I hope to say something about America's greatest Lockean, Thomas Jefferson.

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"Notoriously, that utterance...": *ibid.*

"Representatives and direct taxes...": *ibid.*, 301.

"The United States...": *ibid.*, 313, 316.

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Wilson John Haire

Review:

The Fifth Column, a play by Ernest Hemingway
at the Southwark Playhouse,
77-85 Newington Causeway, London SE1 6BD.
24th March-16th April, 2016

A Hemmingway Play

So it's down to the bleak Elephant & Castle area with its new traffic-control area seemingly not much better than its original huge mystifying round-about which I remember from 1954 when I arrived there from Lough-side Holywood, County Down, to a location still showing its war wounds of bombed out streets. Ten days of that was enough and a delightful coincidence of moving on to the middle-class untouched Hampstead through a *Daily Worker* advert for two bedsits that would suit two young comrades at a reasonable rent. That fitted the bill for a friend of mine Declan Mulholland, from teenage days, and me.

I mention this because, on entering the theatre, there was my past—90% of the audience sitting there at this 3pm matinee must have been in their eighties and a few even older, some on sticks, some being helped by their equally elderly wives up the raked seating area in poor light. I guessed the most of them were the politically homeless from the now defunct CPGB which gave up its children when their elite parents ran for cover. Many were also possibly leftists Trade Unionists: for some still had, in their lapels, Trade Union badges of equally defunct Trade Unions like the *The Society of Woodworkers* and some small engineering unions of the past. I expected to see Jack Jones suddenly appear out of their midst. They seemed to be mostly working-class with a taste for culture which was one of the strong points of the CPGB. I don't know whether they came by coach or individually for they congregated around the bar after the play ended or sat outside smoking. Their presence in this theatre, this oasis in the face of bleakness, was to me the best part of an England's past. Longevity of the Left lives in these grand old people.

So to the play. It was the only play written by Hemingway; in 1937. I thought I would get to the nitty-gritty of it by looking up *The Hemingway Review*, Volume 27, Number 2, published in the Spring of 2008 where it was reviewed by Verna Kale, all of which I found on

the Internet. Hemingway was not a playwright so it was difficult to get the gist of the story from the torrent of words coming from the two main characters, Simon Darwen and Alix Dunmore, the leading actors, playing Philip Rawlings and Dorothy Bridges. They both have my admiration for their memories in collecting this great tsunami of words and delivering all of it without a fault. Absolutely amazing.

It was thoroughly well acted by the large cast and you could see the hard work put into rehearsals by the Director, plus, the hard work put into the construction of the set.

The play was dismissed by the mainstream press, maybe for some good reasons I agree with, but it has to have some positive facts like it was Hemingway's only play and he did have some sympathy for the Lincoln Brigade, and, as a result, was put under FBI surveillance during the anti-Communist witch-hunt of the late 1940s/1950s. The *Hemingway Review* says:

"The play concerns the activities of counter-espionage agent Philip Rawlings, a hard-drinking man's man and Communist party operative posing as a war correspondent. He works out of the Florida Hotel, tracking down members of the 'fifth column', fascist sympathisers working from within against Loyalist-defended Madrid. The other journalists in Philip's hotel, Dorothy Bridges and Robert Preston, think Philip is a 'playboy' and a brawler, but Dorothy falls for him and dreams of a happy future in St Tropez, or some place like St Tropez. Philip captures a fifth column member whose confession under torture leads to the discovery of three hundred more fifth columnists. (We are spared a torture scene thankfully. WJH) The violence takes its toll on Philip and he questions the value of his work, ultimately deciding to break with Dorothy, and continues his mission."

The programme of the play says:

"The play takes place in Madrid in the autumn of 1937, mainly in the Hotel

Florida, Plaza Callao; also in the Seguridad Headquarters, the Bar Chicote, Gran Via, and the artillery observation post on Extremadura Road."

The programme also gives a time-gauge account of the struggle between the International Brigade and Franco's fascist force. Both described as Republican and Nationalist, rather than it being the democratically-elected Government of Spain and its army with the help of the International Brigade against the fascism of Franco's forces and his allies Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

It starts with the boom of artillery and the flash of exploding shells. This is followed by long conversations between Philip and Dorothy, spoken at the rate of knots, mainly I think because a slower rendering could have added considerably to the length of the play which runs at 150 minutes., including a 20 minute interval.

At the interval my wife asked me when the war would begin, for it seemed to her like the war was incidental to the love affair between the two. Mistaken I am to think she would lap up the romance of the couple, rather than the logistics of the war. She isn't much into politics but she has heard vaguely of the Spanish Civil War and wanted to know more about it, wanted to see more military action spread throughout the play rather than the sounds of war and the odd soldier running around to remind us there was a war on.

There is some simulated sex, fully clothed of course, which wasn't necessary because the audience of a combined age of thousands of years would have seen it all before in their great-grandpa, great-grandma voyage.

Now and then there is some stirring music like the Valley of Jarama, El Himno de Reigo, the Italian Bandiera Rossa, the Soviet Partisan's Song and the Internationale.

Plenty of mention of the Lincoln Brigade and the German Thaelmann Brigade. Philip seemed quite cynical about one 20 year old member of the Lincoln Brigade joining on principle only. This I couldn't understand. Maybe the play was a preamble to his novel *For Whom The Bell Tolls* in which the Communist leader Pablo, with his mules and safe sanctuary in the mountains, wants things just to stay like that rather than provoking the fascists. Obviously it takes all kinds to fight a war and that

image probably outraged the Communists of the time. When my father took me, as a young teenager, to see the film of the book he wasn't comfortable with Pablo's image, and kept saying Pablo was only a "bloody drunk". He was also annoyed when my mother went to the greengrocer to buy some Spanish onions and being told, the words which I remember well from 1937: "There aren't any because of the war". My father liked them raw in a sandwich. A Spanish hairstyle for women was popular in the Belfast of the 1930s. My mother had one. Spanish court shoes, whatever they were, for women who could afford them, seemed to be the latest thing in footwear.

Dorothy is supposed to be a war correspondent but we see nothing of her work. There are no notebooks, pens, pencils, cameras, absolutely nothing. She seems to spend her days waiting for Philip to return. At one point she tells us that Philip doesn't go to the Front, he only writes about it. But we don't even see him doing that. She wails at one point about him being out all day as if she is a dutiful wife and has cooked his dinner for which he is late. He does seem surprised she can cook for she has passed off a pot of stew as her own, though it was sent up by the hotel kitchen. He then asks her why she put kippers in the stew and decides she can't cook after all.

Hemingway was shackled up with Martha Gellhorn in Spain in 1937 and, maybe in order to rescue the play, which didn't do very well in New York, she was rumoured to be Dorothy in the play. Hemingway had met her sometime in 1936-1937 and they decided to go off to Spain and report on the war. Gellhorn was a brave and extremely good journalist who plunged into the most dangerous situations from Chiang Kai-shek's China, to the D-Day landings, to the Vietnam War, and up to 1995, investigating poverty in Brazil until a few years before her death at the age of 91, and that was through suicide on going blind. The Dorothy in the play could never be that woman.

In the end Philip sees Dorothy as a mere commodity for sex only and tells her so.

He might say the word "love" in loving her but it looks like he is incapable of love.

A very abrupt cruel ending to the play. But there was still a lot of applause at the end. Maybe half a glass of sangria is better than no sangria.

3 April 2016

Seán McGouran

FAITH—and bombs...

The *Irish News* (Belfast) carries, every Thursday, a page, sometimes more entitled *FAITHmatters*. That for 7th July 2016 had a picture element on the Icon of Our Lady of Perpetual Help. This icon belongs to the Redemptorist monastery church ('chapel' in local parlance) in the Clonard area off the Falls Road—and rather (uncomfortably, sometimes) closer to the 'heel'n'ankle' / Shankill Road. People from the Shankill—now a shadow of what it was—are proud of the fact that it is a Gaelic name: sean cill / 'old church'. They can't help smirking when Falls Road people claim it is the Gaelic 'road of the hedgerows', and not named after some Planter, or Undertaker. The latter undertook to 'plant' stolen O'Neill *et cetera* property with land-hungry people from Scotland and the north of England. The Planters were the, often desperate, people who took up the offer of land in early seventeenth century Ulster.

The photographs in question are of 'icons' produced by pupils of Saint Louise's girls' school on the Falls Road. They were in emulation of the above icon's visit to Redemptorist venues in Ireland in May. The Redemptorists were founded in the late 18th century as a preaching order, at roughly the same time the Methodists were trying to rejuvenate Anglicanism by going out in the world to preach. Like the Methodists the Redemptorists in Ireland (Limerick and Belfast) took an interest in working class life. The origins of the icon, a devotional aid identified with Orthodox Christianity is not explained; it "was presented to the Redemptorists for veneration by Blessed Pope Pius IX in 1865 in their newly built church in Rome".

That was a time, when Ireland and its 'diaspora', usefully spreading all over the Anglosphere, must have seemed the Pope's last hope. The home-made icons range from the near adult-professional to two that look nearly Cubist in inspiration. They may actually be Cubist, the 'brown bombers'—the alumni of Saint Louise's—are not noticeably slow off the mark intellectually. It is interesting that this exercise drew such a big and thoughtful response, the 'Child Jesus' figure in the icons range from the unfeasibly teeny to quite enormous.

European Parliament self-satires?

According to the same *Irish News* article the European Parliament in its "annual Report on Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) considered 53 countries in detail". This Report is the work of the European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance. Some of these places were characterised as "failed states". These include Somalia, Central African Republic, Libya and Syria.

A reason why some of these are genuinely 'failed states' is because the EU, sometimes in cahoots with the USA, and sometimes in the form of individual member-states acting together, mercilessly bombed them with 'state of the art' fighter-bombers (costing hundreds of thousands, if not millions of \$US, French francs, pounds Sterling, Deutschmarks, and / or Euro). The Report claims "...warlords and armed groups determine everyday life...", and Christians are persecuted in Somalia, and Muslims in the CAR (that half a century after alleged independence this place still has an off-the-peg colonialist designation, dreamed-up in an office in Paris in the 1880s or '90s, tends to show it was barely a 'state' in the first place).

VOX PAT continued

Cork Priests

The beautiful Cork Church of St. Vincent's in Sunday's Well closed on 30th June 2016, becoming the first Catholic church in the city to be forced to close due to a lack of vocations.

St Vincent's Church, which opened 1856 belongs to the Vincentian Order.

Fr Tom Deenihan of the Cork and Ross Diocese said St Vincent's was not a Diocesan Church and the Vincentians had always provided a priest but did not have any available now. He added that the diocese did not have a "great surplus" either. Fr Deenihan said the community affected is very small and is hemmed by other parishes.

"This is the first time in Cork City that a church has been faced with the reality of the decline in vocations. This is going to become a more common story."

Nine ordinations will take place in the Irish Catholic Church this year with only one priest ordained for the Munster region.

Cork and Ross has three men studying to minister as priests in diocese. Their studies are spread across a seven-year programme, so that between now and 2022 the diocese will have, at most, four new priests.

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A Bhean Lán de Stuaim/O Woman Of Guile

A Bhean Lán de Stuaim

A bhean lán de stuaim,
Cuinnigh uaim do lámh;
Ní fear gníomha sinn,
Cé taoi tinn dár ngrádh.

Féach ar liath dom fholt,
Féach mo chorp gan lúth,
Féach ar thraoch dom fhuil,—
Créad re bhfuil do thnúth?

Ná saoil mé go saobh,
Arís ná claon do cheann;
Bíodh ár ngrádh gan ghníomh
Go bráth, a shíodh sheang.

Druid do bhéal óm bhéal,—
Doiligh an sgéal do chor;
Ná bíom cneas re cneas,
Tig ón dteas an tol.

Do chúl craobhach cas,
Do rosg glas mar dhrúcht,
Do chíoch chruinn-gheal bhláith,
Thairngeas mian gach súl.

Gach gníomh acht gníomh cuirp,
Is luighe id chuilt shuain,
Do-dhéanainn tréd ghrádh,
A bhean lán do stuaim.

A fhinne-bhean tséimh shéaghanta shár-chaoin
tsuairc
Na muirear-fholt réidh raon-fholtach fá a ndíol
gcuach,
Is iongna an ghné thaomach fhásaíos uait;
Cé doiligh an scéal, tréig me agus tág dhíom suas.

Do-bheirim-se fém bhréithir, dá mbáití an slua
San tuile do léig Vénus 'na táclaí anuas,
A bhurraiceach bhé mhéar-lag na mbán-chíoch
gcruidh,

Is tusa mar aon chéid-bhean do fágfaí im chuan.

O Woman Full of Guile

O woman full of guile,/ Keep your hand away from me;/ I am
not a man of action/ Though you are lovesick for me.

See how grey my hair is,/ See how inactive my body is,/ See
how feeble my blood is,/ What do you expect of me?

Do not think me perverse,/ Also do not bow your head;/ Let
our love be not acted on/ Ever, O slender angel.

Take your lips from my lips,/ Your case is difficult;/ Let us
not be skin against skin,/ From passion comes penetration.

Your branching twisting tresses,/ Your eyes clear as dew,/ Your
blossoming bright round breast,/ Which satisfies the
desire of every eye.

Every action except physical action,/ - And lying in your bed
to sleep, - /I would do for love of you,/ O woman full of
guile.

O beautiful woman - slender, blessed, of supremely gentle
eye,/ Of smooth massed tresses, flowing curling hair,/ It is a
wonder how you cause derangement of the soul;/ Though
painful to say, leave me and give me up.

I swear upon my word, if a host were to drown/ In the flood in
which Venus shook out her hair,/ O best of women, of the
slender fingers and firm fair breasts,/ You are the one woman
who would be sheltered by me.

VOX PAT continued

Communion Parties

"Irish parents are spending a whopping €836 on their child's
First Holy Communion - most of which is being spent on food
and drinks, according to new figures" (*Irish Independent*
20.6.2016).

The outlay by families for 2016 easily trumps recorded
figures from last year by a significant 12%.

The Ulster Bank survey of 205 parents in May and June
found that, on average, they spent €370 on a party and food
and drink.

They also spent an average of €176 on their child's
Communion outfit and another €212 on outfits for other family
members. They also splashed out €149 on children's
entertainment, up by a quarter on last year.

Speaking to the *Irish Independent*, Dermott Jewell of the
Consumer Association of Ireland said "We seem to have missed
the Celtic Tiger terribly and are keen to get it back and that's
not necessarily the right way to go", Mr Jewell said.

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Tichborne
McCann Peroration
Statesmanship
Censorship

P
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Tichborne

In the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, (1558-1603) a section of the English Catholic aristocracy was constantly planning her assassination. There were often as many as 10 hangings for treason in a day.

Among those hanged was Chidiok {Charles} Tichborne, who wrote one of the finest poems in the English language explaining why he had engaged in the plot to remove his monarch. Tichborne was no newcomer. His right to act as he did, he claimed, derived from his ancestry: *"I am descendent from a House from two hundred years before the Norman Conquest."*

On the eve of his execution (at the age of 28), he sent a letter to his wife containing this wonderful poem now held to be among the finest of that poetic age.

SPRING IS PAST

My prime of youth is but a frost of cares,
My feast of joy is but a dish of pain,
My crop of corn is but a field of tares,
And all my good is but vain hope of gain;
The day is past, and yet I saw no sun,
And now I live, and now my life is done.

My tale was heard and yet it was not told,
My fruit is fallen, and yet my leaves are green,

My youth is spent and yet I am not old,
I saw the world and yet I was not seen;
My thread is cut and yet it is not spun,
And now I live, and now my life is done.

I sought my death and found it in my womb,

I looked for life and saw it was a shade,
I trod the earth and knew it was my tomb,

And now I die, and now I was but made;
My glass is full, and now my glass is run,

And now I live, and now my life is done.

Chidiok {Charles} Tichborne
1558-1586

McCann Peroration

"Ireland is in an ecstasy of remembered glory. The hands of every poet, priest and politician are raised in valediction... Another whited sepulchre is being erected to the men of 1916. Presiding over it all will be the last surviving Commander of the rising, Eamon de Valera, the old Fagin of the political pickpockets. But he will only be a decoration. Mr. Lemass is the man who will lead the nation in its homage... He will tell of Ireland and its history and glory, of gentlemen and heroes; of Caitlin ni Houlihan Free and unfettered.

"But the beautiful legendary Caitlin ni Houlihan was a degenerated whore by the time political pimps like Sean Lemass had dragged her screaming into the murky territory where profit is the only law giver. The Republic of Pearse and Connolly does not exist. The miserable miscarriage of a republic which the back street abortionists in Leinster House have procured represents the triumph of Toryism, not the victory of the revolution" (Eamonn McCann, Editor of the London Irish Workers' Group paper, the *Irish Militant*, First Edition, April 1966, and recently elected MLA for the Foyle constituency (Derry) as a People Before Profit candidate.)

Statesmanship

"The luxury of self-respect." It is a wise phrase. To make Ireland and Irishmen self-respectful is the task of statesmen" (Augustine Birrell: *Self-Selected Essays* (A Second Series) 1916: Thomas Nelson & Sons).

Kuno Meyer

"Kuno Meyer, a German, was thought by many scholars to be the finest translator of Gaelic poetry into the English language. Snooty George Moore, the novelist, could bring himself to say of Meyer's translations that they were so good that: 'You could see them as in a mirror'...". (Ulick O'Connor, *Irish Independent*, 27.12.2015)

Meyer had acquired a brilliant

reputation for Celtic Studies at the University of Leipzig before he came to Dublin in 1903 where he founded the School of Irish Learning. The Great War blighted his achievements. Incredibly, despite his contribution to Irish culture, Kuno Meyer was removed from the Roll of Honour in Dublin City Hall in 1915 because England had gone to war against his native country.

In similar fashion, his name was expunged from the roll of honorary freemen by the Burgesses of Cork in January, 1915.

Sadly, he died in 1919 before the Irish people had chance to make up to him in his lifetime.

What is remarkable about Kuno Meyer's translation is that he has managed to recreate in English the sound and rhythm of Gaelic verse. In the translation here for instance, he can achieve an exquisite intimacy when he talks to the figure on the cross: *"They began to crucify Thee, O cheek like a swan"*.

That Kuno Meyer could have provided a window to Irish poetry of over a thousand years old, tells us of the debt we owe to this magnificent Hamburg scholar.

THE CRUCIFIXION

At the cry of the first bird
They began to crucify Thee, O cheek like a swan!

It were not right ever to cease lamenting—
It was like the parting of day from night.

Ah! though sore the suffering
Put upon the body of Mary's Son—
Sorer to Him was the grief
That was upon her for His sake.

Kuno Meyer 1858-1919.

Censorship

The State's Censorship of Publications Board has banned a book for the first time in 18 years.

The book, *The Raped Little Run-away*, by Jean Martin was deemed *"indecent or obscene"* by the board.

The decision prohibits the sale and distribution of the book in the State.

The Board voted to prohibit the book at a meeting on March 1, 2016.

The ban came into effect on 11th March 2016, when it was published in *Iris Oifigiúil*, the official State gazette.

The Board is an independent body that oversees all books and periodicals on sale in the State.

The last book it banned was *The Base Guide to London* by Base Shoes, a volume exploring "the seedy side" of the English capital, in 1998.
