

Church & State

An Irish History Magazine

And Cultural Review Of Ireland And The World

Education In Post-Catholic Ireland

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US Future!**

WWI Blockade Myths

**Irish Administrators of India:
Sir Michael O'Dwyer**

Solzhenitsyn & Pogroms

Insidious Propaganda

Education In A Post-Catholic Ireland

Ex-President McAleese has waded into the debate about Catholic School divestment. In a somewhat incoherent rant she complains: "*Rome... is still centre stage in nearly all the lives of our schoolchildren*" and scare-mongers about priests acting with "*impunity*" (see *McAleese Worried About Care Of children In Catholic Schools*, Irish Times 8.4.19). And her views have been endorsed by television journalist, Niamh Sammon (*Church Still Has A Grip On Society And Schooling*, IT 9.4.19: what world is she living in?). Sarah Caden chipped in in the *Sunday Independent* with *Christmas Is Safe* (7.4.19).

The fact is, the days of any clerical sexual abuse of children are long in the past. Priests nowadays are timid creatures, very much on the back foot. And, as a result of democratic changes in School Management Boards, which *Church & State* was instrumental in promoting, parents have a hands-on relationship with National Schools—as is their Constitutional right. So, whilst the Catholic Church controls something like 90% of Irish primary schools, this control is more apparent than real in areas where parents choose to assert themselves.

In 2016 78.3% of Irish people described themselves as Catholic. While that is a drop from 94.9% in 2011, it still shows a vast preponderance over those describing themselves as having No Religion, which rose to 9.8% from 5.9% in the same period.

The majority of parents remain nominally Catholic and want a traditional Irish education for their children. This means continuing practices going back many, many decades, celebrating Christian Feast Days: whether it be Christmas, Easter, St. Brigid's Day, or whatever. Ireland is post-Catholic. Which is to say it retains Catholic culture and community values, whilst taking an *a la carte* attitude to religious practice.

Surely the aspiration has to be to return to a pre-Cardinal Cullen form of Christianity: in which popular Catholic festivals provide the occasion for community celebrations and in which sexual strictures were taken lightly?

The important issue about education is really how to ensure that the schools children go to help to produce an upcoming generation that is culturally Irish and socially aware. Traditional Catholic schools have achieved that purpose. The religion they taught has been taken lightly for a generation, but it has left a commitment to community that is certainly far superior to anything seen in free-thinking liberal England. Atheists and agnostics, even if they are well-meaning, do not have the social structures to deliver community care. They are individualists *per se*.

While the Irish culture transmitted has been deficient since the 1970s, it is still preferable to that is likely to be delivered in the multi-denominational model. This is committed to putting on a par the religion and culture of every country, rather than concentrating on what makes Ireland distinctive. The M-D sector seeks to immunise children against religion by teaching *about* religion. It is hard to see how that model can transmit the national tradition.

According to the Constitution, parents have the right to determine what education their children will have. As a reader to the *Irish Times* recently pointed out:

"...should a system paid for by the taxpayers of Ireland, the overwhelming majority of whom are Catholics, be subject to the anti-religious dictates of a small minority of atheists?" (Murt Ó Séaghdha, letter, *The Catholic Church And Irish Life*, IT 11.4.19).

Fear of causing a backlash has meant that the Department of Education has proceeded cautiously in its project of 'modernising' educational provision. However, it has worked quietly to promote Multi-Denominational and other alternative models of primary education. The Government is committed to providing 400 M-D Schools over the next decade (Caden, Sun. Indep. 7.4.19). Where new schools are built, or changes in management in existing schools have been proposed, there have been token consultation exercises, in which parents are invited to fill in computer surveys about a change in patronage of their local schools. This method of consultation in itself discriminates against those parents who are busy or not particularly computer savvy in order to produce 'progressive' outcomes.

Nevertheless, there has been some kickback amongst a section of parents in Dublin, who are mobilising opinion in Scoil An Duinnígh to resist the transfer of their school from Catholic patronage to a multi-denominational model. Some of these have made it clear that they are not particularly religious. They ask:

"Christmas is marked along with other festivals in multi-denominational schools, but in a Catholic School Christmas is celebrated. The children sing carols, draw and craft religious items, listen to readings from the Bible and so forth.

"Are you guaranteeing that this will continue in school time no matter what patronage body is eventually selected for the divested school?" (*Irish Times*, 6.4.19, *School Patronage Vote Delayed Over 'Confusion'*, Carl O'Brien).

The Dept. of Education dismissed these pertinent parental concerns, talking of "*confusion*". Minister for Education Joe McHugh is continuing the liberalising project started by Labour's Ruairi Quinn and continued by Fine Gael's Richard Bruton. McHugh suggests that the parents have been circulating "*misinformation*".

Of course the parents are right. It is our recollection that the sponsors of Multi-Denominational Education were motivated by a *cunning plan* to place all religions on an equal footing, in order to *relativise* religion—placing it on a par with other subjects 'learned' at school. The idea was to do away with the predominance of the Catholic Church in public life, and probably with religious faith.

This journal recalls an argument it had with the late Bill Hyland, one of the founders of *Educate Together*, in which he strongly advocated not giving children any religious faith. They were to choose what religion they wished to espouse when they were adults.

But that is a nonsense as far as society is concerned. Society has to have a unifying culture, and that culture has to produce people who are there for each other. Religion has been the most effective vehicle for producing a coherent society so far. Religion is not just a matter for individual belief. It is a social good.

As for producing a more tolerant Ireland: that has already happened, while the schools remained under Catholic ownership! The M-D project played little role in that! That project was all very well when Catholic control of social life was oppressive and all-pervading in many parts of the country. It is a different story now.

Regarding the *confusion* of parents, alleged by the Minister for Education, here is the experience of a Northern Ireland teacher, working in a school "that is truly multid denominational and celebrates Hunukkah and Eid as well as Christmas, Easter etc." She continues:

"As for Christmas, of course it won't be cancelled. It will, however, be Christmas without Christ. The much-loved nativity play will be replaced by Santa and his elves. Christmas carols such as Away in a Manger and Silent Night will be replaced by Jingle Bells and I Saw Mommy Kissing Santa Claus, etc." (Ann Kehoe, Dublin, IT letter, 9.4.19).

Do as you would be done by is often put forward as a principle which can replace religious morality teaching. But this is a flawed system, of limited value. It is a kind of conditional morality, which relies on a homogenous society which all want *to be done by* in the same way. A better principle is to *do the right thing*, just because it is the right thing to do. But how do you decide what is right? There has to be a social standard laid down: and that standard must be inherent in the society, taken for granted. Humanists declare that they are just as moral, perhaps even more moral, than religious people. And they may well be right. But they are living off the Christian heritage, as is the rest of society.

"Important to learn the lessons of history"

Breda O'Brien

"...The 2015 framework document for junior cycle reform specifies that the only mandatory subjects are Irish, English, maths and wellbeing. The latter is an amalgam of civic social and political education; physical education; and social, personal and health education. By 2020, wellbeing must be allocated 400 timetable hours over three years. In contrast, Irish, English and maths have a minimum of 240. All other subjects have a minimum of 200 hours

...It is also increasingly clear that competing visions of education are really what is at stake. The downgrading of the invaluable discipline of history is only the most visible symptom of this clash. A utilitarian view of education preaches that its primary purpose is the production of skilled, adaptable and amenable workers for an increasingly precarious "gig" economy based on short-term jobs.

Therefore, science, technology, engineering and maths (Stem) subjects should receive priority as being the most useful to the economy. A second educational viewpoint is more subtle but possibly even more influential. It believes that what is important is "learning how to learn" and that all learning skills are transferable. At its most crude, this viewpoint posits that subjects as academic disciplines do not really matter. All subjects can be dismantled into a number of components and once you know how to use the appropriate learning skills, the idea of diving deeply into subjects like history is seen as somehow outdated...

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Some web addresses for associated sites—

Athol Books:

<http://www.atholbooks.org>

The Heresiarch:

<http://heresiarch.org>

There is a great deal of interesting reading. Go surf and see!

Sales:

<https://www.atholbooks-sales.org>

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The point of history is to become wise about the ways that human beings throughout time have failed, fought, compromised, built and created. It is to become aware of the deep roots of the present, to perceive how events from centuries ago still influence and shape us. People who know their history are far less easy to manipulate and are much less susceptible to propaganda in all its manifestations. The irony is that the new history specification at junior cycle is excellent. It will be a wonderful experience for those lucky enough to experience it being taught by enthusiastic and professional teachers.

But in schools that are under pressure in many ways including allocation of time, resources and staff, the easy option is to provide a short course in history instead of implementing the whole specification. This is already happening. A short course can be as simple as a planned trip to and reflection on a particular historical site. No doubt it will be a valuable experience but it will not be teaching history. Any teacher, qualified or not, can teach a short course. For many Irish learners, being taught history by a professionally qualified teacher will end at the age of 12..."

[Irish Times, 13.4.19]

Manus O'Riordan

A Song For International Women's Day

The Wife Of The Bold Tenant Farmer

This is a song about a strong woman, Minnie Walsh of Ballinascarty, a village on the road linking the West Cork towns of Bandon and Clonakilty, hometown of my mother, Kay Keohane O'Riordan (1910-1991). The song tells the story of the Land War confrontation between Minnie Walsh and the son of the local landlord, William Bence Jones. Decades beforehand, at the time of the Great Famine, Bence Jones had been responsible for the childhood eviction of my mother's maternal grandfather, Michael O'Regan. But it was not until 1999, when chatting with my mother's first cousin, Phyllis O'Regan, did I learn the details.

Lisselane House lies to the north east of Clonakilty and had once been the centre of a 3,800 acre estate owned by William Bence Jones. During the course of the Great Famine this landlord doubled the personal demesne component of his estate from 500 to 1,000 acres by the wholesale eviction of small tenants crushed by that Famine. This was the childhood experience of my great-grandfather Michael, when the O'Regan family was evicted by Bence Jones in 1848 from their holding in the townland of Carrig, which is situated the other side of the Clonakilty-Ballinascarty road from the Croppy's Crossroads, location of the battle waged by Tadhg an Asna and his pikemen in 1798.

Although my great-grandfather's family was mercilessly evicted from Carrig, its presence lived on in the shape of local placename, *Regan's Boreen*. Phyllis O'Regan also told me that on one occasion, when walking past the

well-manicured lawns of Lisselane House a century later with her cousin Máire Keohane-Sheehan (1909-1975), my aunt and godmother sardonically remarked: "*Weren't we awful fools to let Lisselane go!*"

No wonder "*The Wife of the Bold Tenant Farmer*" was a song much loved by my Keohane and O'Regan relatives! It was a song that travelled the length and breadth of the country, with words and melody changing en route. The best known version is that originally recorded by Joe Heaney, which version was further recorded by the Clancy Brothers and Tommy Makem. But in its native Clonakilty it had been sung to the same air as "*The Limerick Rake*".

Phyllis, the last of my mother's O'Regan first cousins, passed away in August 2013. However, she chose not to be buried in her Clonakilty hometown, but in the ancestral O'Regan family grave in Kilmaloda Church of Ireland churchyard, outside Ballinascarty, and close to her grandfather's childhood home prior to Bence Jones's Great Famine eviction of the O'Regan family.

In that churchyard lie the remains of both landlords and tenants, Protestants and Catholics, including both William Bence Jones himself and my great-grandfather, finally accorded an equality in death.

At Phyllis's funeral I inadvertently stepped back from the O'Regan grave and stood on another family grave, something which I generally try my very best not to do in cemeteries, out of

respect for the dead. So, I was initially annoyed with myself, and then surprised and delighted at what next met my eyes. For in addition to a headstone detailing various members of the Walsh family buried in that grave, there was another stone memorial with a simple inscription that said it all: "*Herein lie the remains of the Wife of the Bold Tenant Farmer*".

*Agus fágaimís siúd mar atá sé! **

See www.itma.ie/goilin/song/bold_tenant_farmer_manus_oriordan for my singing of the song to its original Clonakilty air.

See <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WJDjBozavns> for the version popularised by Joe Heaney.

See <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=enROxvdLszg> for the Joe Heaney version, as sung by the Clancy Brothers and Tommy Makem.

* And we'll leave that as it is!

Vox Pat

Seminaries

St Malachy's seminary in Belfast, which trained priests mainly for the Down and Connor diocese, is to close after 185 years.

From September, 2019 its three remaining seminarians will be relocated to other seminaries to continue their priestly formation.

Founded in 1833, four years after Catholic Emancipation, St Malachy's became the local seminary for the diocese of Down and Connor.

Among its better known alumni would be former Catholic Primate of All Ireland Cardinal Cahal Daly, retired Bishop of Down and Connor Patrick Walsh, retired Auxiliary Bishop of Down and Connor Anthony Farquhar, and current Bishop of Derry Donal Mc Keown.

The closure of St Malachy's means there are now just two seminaries left to train diocesan priests for Ireland: the national seminary at Maynooth, where there are currently 35 men in formation; and the Irish College in Rome where a further 13 are being prepared for priesthood.

Other seminaries in Ireland to close in recent years included St Patrick's in Thurles which closed in 2002, Clonliffe in Dublin which closed in 2000, St Peter's Wexford and St John's Waterford closed in 1999, St Kieran's Kilkenny closed in 1994, and St Patrick's Carlow closed in 1993.

All Hallows in Dublin, which trained priests for dioceses abroad, closed in 2015.

John Minahane

The Spanish Polemic on Colonisation

Part 16

The Conclusion of the Indian Wars

The period from about 1860 to 1890 brought America's 'Indian wars' to an end. White America extended its power all the way between the two oceans. It dispossessed the remaining Indians and reduced them to dependency and a life under strict control. This is the story told in Dee Brown's book *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*.

When you look at America in the 1850s, it feels like a century has passed since the 1830s—those distant times when President Andrew Jackson and others were insisting that the Indians living east of the Mississippi needed to be sent west of it. White settlers, of course, wanted their lands. But it was argued that the move would also be good for the Indians. East of the Mississippi the whites were going to make life hell for them, but in the west they could live as they chose, untroubled by white encroachment.

The Cherokees and others were indeed removed to the west in 1838. Eleven years later the Gold Rush began in California, producing a powerful new voluntary migration of whites. And soon it became clear that the space between the east and the far west was going to be organised. Ecologically disruptive roads and railways would be built through the Indian territories. Land would be claimed and occupied wherever significant numbers of whites wanted to settle. Gold would be found in other places (Colorado, Wyoming, South Dakota etc.), and then new cities like Denver would spring up, requiring still more roads and rail tracks. But, in any event, the space would not be ignored. Nor would the Indians be left alone.

Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee tells the story of the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapho, Kiowo, Comance, Apache, Navaho, Nez Percé and other tribes during that hectic thirty years. Dee Brown calls them the most heroic of all Americans. They were, undoubtedly. They tried to stand up to **Manifest Destiny** and live their lives in spite of it. In the end they were crushed, but not

without putting up a fight.

The Indians often showed remarkable skill and toughness in negotiations with the fearsome United States. Brown recounts how Red Cloud, the Sioux leader, won his tribe's first war in the 1860s. When the other side showed an interest in negotiation and there were "talks about talks", Red Cloud refused to discuss anything until US soldiers were withdrawn from his territory. Only after three forts had been evacuated, and he had burned them, did he agree to negotiate. And then, of course, he was cheated: the text of the Treaty he signed, which he believed guaranteed his own group of Sioux their core territory, actually committed them to remove to a reservation far away.

But even then it was difficult to exploit the fraud, because the Government had given up its strongholds. When he met President Ulysses S. Grant, Red Cloud still insisted on the terms he had understood he was signing for.

The military achievements of the Sioux, especially their defeat of General Custer, are famous. Unfortunately, even if they were capable of winning such battles, they were doomed to lose the war. It was extraordinarily difficult to survive on the run with large numbers of women and children. One American Winter could take a terrible toll. After his great victory over Custer at Little Bighorn, Sitting Bull eventually led his Sioux group across the border into Canada. The Canadian authorities did not hunt or harass him, but they also gave him no help and refused to negotiate about anything. However, he lasted four years in Canada and could probably have held out much longer if it hadn't been for homesickness in the tribe. But in the United States it was virtually impossible to hold out for two Winters on the run. Even the toughest ended up submitting, which meant being consigned to reservations.

Dee Brown's story is full of horrors. Nevertheless, the book does not engage in simple type-casting. Not all of the

army officers were genocidal types, though some were precisely that; not all of the Government officials were frauds who tried to deceive and cheat the Indians, though that is exactly what some did. Brown shows something of the moral struggles of individuals caught up in these events.

The famous Kit Carson, for example, had been in friendly communication with Indians all his life. At a certain point he resigned his commission in the US Army rather than be obliged to take part in an anti-Indian campaign. Afterwards, however, he reconsidered his decision. None of the great massacres are attributed to him, but he did become a destructive Indian-hunter, applying a "scorched earth" policy against the Navaho.

On the other hand, at foreseeable cost to himself Lieutenant Royal E. Whitman worked to bring to justice those who massacred a large group of Apaches whom he had been dealing with. Sometimes army officers or Government officials could hold back the bigoted white democracy, or reverse previous decisions to the Indians' benefit. But there were limits. Lieutenant Whitman could ensure that those who massacred the Apaches ended up being tried in court, but he couldn't stop a jury finding them all Not Guilty. One of the factors which immediately set limits to the possible degrees of justice, tolerance or compromise was, of course, gold.

President Grant comes across fairly well in Brown's book—reflecting, I presume, how the Indians generally saw him. In 1874, after General Custer had led an army surveying mission to the Black Hills of Dakota, Red Cloud sent a protest to the President: by the terms of the signed treaty, this territory was reserved for the Sioux. Grant responded with a public declaration that the Black Hills were exclusively for the Indians and that he was resolved to stop all intruders. However, the news had got around that there were gold deposits. White prospectors began flocking in. The Indians hoped that Grant would live up to his pledged word, but of course he didn't. A year later he despatched a commission to the Sioux, to negotiate with them about terms on which the Black Hills could be surrendered.

Similarly, the chief of the Nez Percés in Washington (Rocky Mountains) asked Grant to exclude a core area of theirs, the Wallowa Valley, from white settlement. In June 1873 Grant issued an order

to this effect. But then gold was found in the nearby mountains. Prospectors flooded in, local white politicians put pressure on the President, and within two years he reversed his order, reopening the valley to the whites. No American President was going to stand in the way of a gold rush.

In the early 1860s the whites took to fighting among themselves, and the Indians hoped that this would work to their own advantage. That did not happen. The consolidated federal state, following the Union victory, was a more terrible enemy than ever. The leaders of the state were committed to the policy of reservations, and they were resolved to carry that policy quickly through to completion.

"One does not sell the earth that the people walk on", said Crazy Horse of the Oglala Sioux. How could such attitudes be tolerated? There was an alien freedom in them, and the United States hated that freedom. The United States ended up wanting to police all Indians all the time, to know their locations and keep them under surveillance and never be surprised by them. In theory, Indians were supposed to become farmers; in practice, they never had either means of self-subsistence or a reasonable chance to 'make a living' in the commercial world. They were dependent on rations handed out by the authorities, which naturally enhanced the authorities' powers of control. The reservations they were confined to were appalling places, with a reputation that did much to stir resistance to Government policy. However, Government policy won out in the end.

Dee Brown's book ends with the murder of Sitting Bull, who, though no longer living in free conditions, remained a free spirit and a symbol of Indian freedom, and the final exemplary massacre of the Sioux at Wounded Knee in 1890. One can say that this rounds off a certain period of the history of the United States.

Frederick Jackson Turner and the Frontier

In July 1893 a paper by Frederick Jackson Turner was presented to the American Historical Association, and shortly after published: *"The Significance of the Frontier in American History"*. This essay of 10,000 words or so has been described as the most influential work ever written on American history. Charles Beard, one of the leading American historians in the 20th

century, said this in so many words: Turner's essay had *"a more profound influence on thought about American history than any other essay or volume ever written about the subject"*.

What Turner said was that the Americans were special. They were not just offshore Europeans, though that is how historians had hitherto regarded them. The ever-repeated experience of Frontier life, and the repeated evolution of civilisation from primitive Frontier conditions, had given America a special stamp. It was from western energies that American democracy had developed.

New England and the slave-owning South were more English regions, but the (ever-westwards-moving) West was a great European mix, and something essentially new. The heart of America was there. And the experience which gave it its special character was now at an end.

Turner began by quoting an interesting recent statement by the Superintendent of the Census. The Superintendent remarked that the United States no longer had anything one could call a frontier of settlement. Up to and including 1880, such a frontier had existed. But by 1890 there were so many isolated bodies of settlement in the unsettled area that one could hardly speak of a frontier line, and so the census reports would no longer try to define one.

"This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement. Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development ..."

All peoples show development, Turner said. It's easy to find similarities in the rise of Representative Government, or the progress from primitive economies to modern manufacturing. But America shows something extra.

"American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society,

furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West...

The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American. At first, the frontier was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of Europe in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American. As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics. Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines..."

Turner notes that the shifting frontier sometimes took great leaps. In particular, in the mid-19th century the distinctive frontier was to be found in California of the Gold Rush, and in parts of Oregon and Utah. But the need to keep in touch with these areas ultimately brought in train—

"the settlement of the Great Plains and the development of still another kind of frontier life. Railroads, fostered by land grants, sent an increasing tide of immigrants into the Far West. The United States Army fought a series of Indian wars in Minnesota, Dakota, and the Indian Territory..."

He then notes the rough location of the frontier in different historical periods. (The *"fall line"* which he refers to is the line of division between the upland region and the Atlantic coastal plain,

running through Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia etc.)

"In these successive frontiers we find natural boundary lines which have served to mark and to affect the characteristics of the frontiers, namely: "fall line"; the Alleghany Mountains; the Mississippi; the Missouri where its direction approximates north and south; the line of the arid lands, approximately the ninety-ninth meridian; and the Rocky Mountains. The fall line marked the frontier of the seventeenth century; the Alleghanies that of the eighteenth; the Mississippi that of the first quarter of the nineteenth; the Missouri that of the middle of this century (omitting the California movement); and the belt of the Rocky Mountains and the arid tract, the present frontier. Each was won by a series of Indian wars..."

The frontier, at any given time, was a kind of composite of the movements of fisherman, fur-trader, miner, cattle-raiser, and farmer. All of these, with the sole exception of the fisherman, were on the march westward, in successive waves. If you stood at certain key points at particular moments in history, you might literally have seen the frontier go by. Of course, the pioneers did not all keep the same pace. *"The unequal rate of advance compels us to distinguish the frontier into the trader's frontier, the rancher's frontier, or the miner's frontier, and the farmer's frontier."*

The fastest mover was the trader, who was able to gain quick acceptance among the Indians by selling them guns. In doing so he greatly increased the power of his customers; he also introduced a disintegrating element in Indian society. The farmer, who came afterwards, was not at all so welcome among the Indians as the trader. Furthermore, what the trader was selling them increased their power to resist him. The Indians whom the farmers met had guns . . .

"And yet, in spite of this opposition of the interests of the trader and the farmer, the Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The buffalo trail became the Indian trail, and this became the trader's "trace"; the trails widened into roads, and the roads into turnpikes, and these in turn were transformed into railroads.... The trading posts reached by these trails were on the sites of Indian villages which had been placed in positions suggested by nature; and these trading posts, situated so as to command the water systems of the country, have grown into such cities as Albany, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Council Bluffs, and Kansas City. Thus

civilization in America has followed the arteries made by geology, pouring an ever richer tide through them, until at last the slender paths of aboriginal intercourse have been broadened and interwoven into the complex mazes of modern commercial lines; the wilderness has been interpenetrated by lines of civilization growing ever more numerous. It is like the steady growth of a complex nervous system for the originally simple, inert continent. If one would understand why we are to-day one nation, rather than a collection of isolated states, he must study this economic and social consolidation of the country..."

The mobility of the frontier was influenced, for example, by the availability of salt. Without salt you could not live a comfortable life. Hence, originally, those who lived inland would make a yearly pilgrimage to the coast for salt stocks. This was also important for keeping people in touch.

"But when discovery was made of the salt springs of the Kanawha, and the Holston, and Kentucky, and central New York, the West began to be freed from dependence on the coast. It was in part the effect of finding these salt springs that enabled settlement to cross the mountains.

From the time the mountains rose between the pioneer and the seaboard, a new order of Americanism arose. The West and the East began to get out of touch of each other. The settlements from the sea to the mountains kept connection with the rear and had a certain solidarity. But the over-mountain men grew more and more independent. The East took a narrow view of American advance, and nearly lost these men..."

The mid-Atlantic region, taking in New York, Pennsylvania, etc., was a kind of mediating element. There was an important Scotch-Irish and German element in the population there, changing it from something purely English. This middle region was a supplier to the West, and it was more similar in character to the west than were either of the other two regions of old colonial settlement.

"The Middle region, entered by New York harbor, was an open door to all Europe. The tide-water part of the South represented typical Englishmen, modified by a warm climate and servile labor, and living in baronial fashion on great plantations; New England stood for a special English movement—Puritanism. The Middle region was less English than the other sections. It had a wide mixture of nationalities, a varied society, the mixed town and county system

of local government, a varied economic life, many religious sects. In short, it was a region mediating between New England and the South, and the East and the West. It represented that composite nationality which the contemporary United States exhibits, that juxtaposition of non-English groups, occupying a valley or a little settlement, and presenting reflections of the map of Europe in their variety. It was democratic and nonsectional, if not national; "easy, tolerant, and contented; rooted strongly in material prosperity. It was typical of the modern United States..."

But it was the west that really made America a democracy and a nation.

"It was this nationalizing tendency of the West that transformed the democracy of Jefferson into the national republicanism of Monroe and the democracy of Andrew Jackson. The West of the War of 1812, the West of Clay, and Benton and Harrison, and Andrew Jackson, shut off by the Middle States and the mountains from the coast sections, had a solidarity of its own with national tendencies. On the tide of the Father of Waters, North and South met and mingled into a nation. Interstate migration went steadily on—a process of cross-fertilization of ideas and institutions. The fierce struggle of the sections over slavery on the western frontier does not diminish the truth of this statement; it proves the truth of it. Slavery was a sectional trait that would not down, but in the West it could not remain sectional. It was the greatest of frontiersmen who declared: "I believe this Government can not endure permanently half slave and half free. It will become all of one thing or all of the other." Nothing works for nationalism like intercourse within the nation. Mobility of population is death to localism, and the western frontier worked irresistibly in unsettling population. The effect reached back from the frontier and affected profoundly the Atlantic coast and even the Old World..."

The rise of democracy as an effective force in the nation came in with western preponderance under Jackson and William Henry Harrison, and it meant the triumph of the frontier—with all of its good and with all of its evil elements..."

And what now? Is American expansion finished? From here is it all downhill?

"Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for opportunity, and the people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion

which has not only been open but has even been forced upon them. He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise. But never again will such gifts of free land offer themselves. For a moment, at the frontier, the bonds of custom are broken and unrestraint is triumphant. There is *not tabula rasa*. The stubborn American environment is there with its imperious summons to accept its conditions; the inherited ways of doing things are also there; and yet, in spite of environment, and in spite of custom, each frontier did indeed furnish a new field of opportunity, a gate of escape from the bondage of the past; and freshness, and confidence, and scorn of older society, impatience of its restraints and its ideas, and indifference to its lessons, have accompanied the frontier. What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe more remotely. And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history."

Turner brought the *Westerner* centre-stage (against all the snobby prejudices of East coast academics), presenting him as a restless, dynamic, Indian-fighting, space-transforming being. . . and remarked that, in the great advance pursued over centuries, America had run out of road.

In the 1960s, if not later, surveys of American history-writing were still being produced which were dominated by Turner (e.g. Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians*, 1968). Of course, he came in for an amount of criticism. In the first half of the 20th century there was a strong Marxist current in American universities, and Turner was accused of diverting attention from America's development as a Capitalist and Imperialist Power, on parallel lines to the capitalist and imperialist powers of Europe. From another viewpoint, Benjamin F. Wright pointed out that the western states of the Union had never developed any distinctive institutions: everywhere they had simply copied the institutions of the original colonies,

which were taken from European models and thinking.

In the 1940s some critics worried that Turner's idea would foster "*isolationism*", encouraging Americans to stay out of wars that they should get into and reject world policing duties that they ought to take up. But this particular charge is not plausible. One of Turner's early supporters was a Princeton professor called Woodrow Wilson, who cannot be accused of a lack of appetite for world policing. Wilson, I think, found a different implication in Turner's thought: *we're special*. We have tasks to perform that no other power can do. . . once we work out what those are.

Alfred Mahan and the Twentieth Century's Great Task

Where to go next? One obvious answer to the question was right next door. The British could be kicked out of Canada, removed from the American continent. In the 1890s this was being talked about, and for a time at least the idea was supported by Theodore Roosevelt (he criticised President Cleveland for not taking a good opportunity to do it).

Apart from the Indians and Mexicans, the American experience of war was mainly with the British. A new US/British war was a possibility; there were two or three disputes during the 1890s from which it might have developed. Captain Alfred Mahan of the US Navy was one of those involved in drafting a secret plan for a war against Great Britain. In his very influential public writings, however, Mahan viewed these matters in a wider perspective. He was absolutely clear about what had to be done now. While "*winning the west*", America had forgotten something extremely important: the fact that it had a sea-coast. America needed a powerful navy.

Mahan explained that the original colonies had been coastal, and they had kept shipping up to requirements. Afterwards, however, the focus was on the interior and the coast was neglected. Admittedly, during the Civil War, the US Navy had effectively blockaded the South, but this was because the Confederates, with no sea-faring tradition and insufficient population reserves, were still more hopelessly inadequate in naval matters. If the Southerners had possessed a powerful navy, able to break the blockade, the Union State might now be

little more than one among equals with Canada, Mexico and the Confederacy:

"Never did sea power play a greater or more decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of the world's history would be modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival states, in the North American continent."

The present priority for America was to dominate the Caribbean and to control the new Panama Canal. For this purpose it would be necessary to develop a much stronger navy. The great example and model for the development of sea power was, of course, Great Britain. In a series of readable historical studies Mahan set out to show how the British had done it: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* in two volumes, covering the period from 1660 to the early 19th century, and a two-volume *Life of Lord Nelson*.

In 1890, when the first volume of *The Influence of Sea Power* was published, Mahan did not foresee the United States being a colonial power like Britain or France. "*Such colonies the United States has not and is not likely to have.*" The priority was defence, and—

"a careful consideration of the force that Great Britain or France could probably spare for operations against our coasts, if the latter were suitably defended, without weakening their European position or unduly exposing their colonies and commerce"

—was the starting point: the US Navy simply needed to have greater force than that. But Mahan, urged on by admirers like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, became more ambitious in his thinking in the course of a few years. "*A Twentieth Century Outlook*" was the title of a magazine article published in May 1897, where he looked forward to the coming century.

Mahan observed that the American Revolution, and the French Revolution, with the large-scale wars which followed, had brought the huge colonising movement of the eighteenth century to a halt. Afterwards the 19th century became preoccupied with industrial revolution, applying science and technology to increase production. However, the home market couldn't take all this production. Europe had to turn outward again. Now, when Mahan was writing (1897), the outward movement was strong, in Europe if not in America, and it involved a renewed movement of colonisation.

"How far is it now a practicable object, among the nations of the European family, to continue indefinitely the present realization of peace and plenty,—in themselves good things, but which are advocated largely on the ground that man lives by bread alone,—in view of the changed conditions of the world which the departing nineteenth century leaves with us as its bequest? Is the outlook such that our present civilization, with its benefits, is most likely to be insured by universal disarmament, the clamor for which rises ominously—the word is used advisedly—among our latter-day cries? None shares more heartily than the writer the aspiration for the day when nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; but is European civilization, including America, so situated that it can afford to relax into an artificial peace, resting not upon the working of national consciences, as questions arise, but upon a Permanent Tribunal,—an external, if self-imposed authority,—the realization in modern policy of the ideal of the mediæval Papacy?"

Bound and swathed in the traditions of our own eighteenth century, when we were as truly external to the European world as we are now a part of it, we, under the specious plea of peace and plenty—fulness of bread—hug an ideal of isolation, and refuse to recognize the solidarity of interest with which the world of European civilization must not only look forward to, but go out to meet, the future that, whether near or remote, seems to await it. I say we do so; I should more surely express my thought by saying that the outward impulse already is in the majority of the nation, as shown when particular occasions arouse their attention, but that it is as yet retarded, and may be retarded perilously long, by those whose views of national policy are governed by maxims framed in the infancy of the Republic."

Mahan wasn't sure what to think about the future of Christianity in the so-called Christian countries. It was said that Christian faith had declined and was bound to decline still more. But there was, at any rate, a Christian stamp on society in Europe and America; and conversely, there were other great civilisations which would not turn Christian any time soon. It was possible to deal with these civilisations successfully on the material level, including with the judicious use of force:

"If, as many now say, faith has departed from among ourselves, and still more will depart in the coming years; if we have no higher sanction to

propose for self-restraint and righteousness than enlightened self-interest and the absurdity of war, war—violence—will be absurd just so long as the balance of interest is on that side, and no longer. Those who want will take, if they can, not merely from motives of high policy and as legal opportunity offers, but for the simple reasons that they have not, that they desire, and that they are able. The European world has known that stage already; it has escaped from it only partially by the gradual hallowing of public opinion and its growing weight in the political scale. The Eastern world knows not the same motives, but it is rapidly appreciating the material advantages and the political traditions which have united to confer power upon the West; and with the appreciation desire has arisen."

Mahan then suddenly proposes an immensely ambitious historic task for Euro-America in the 20th century.

"The great task now before the world of civilized Christianity, its great mission, which it must fulfil or perish, is to receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and different civilizations by which it is surrounded and outnumbered,—the civilizations at the head of which stand China, India, and Japan. This, to cite the most striking of the many forms in which it is presented to us, is surely the mission which Great Britain, sword ever at hand, has been discharging towards India; but that stands not alone. The history of the present century has been that of a constant increasing pressure of our own civilization upon these older ones, till now, as we cast our eyes in any direction, there is everywhere a stirring, a rousing from sleep, drowsy for the most part, but real, unorganized as yet, but conscious that that which rudely interrupts their dream of centuries possesses over them at least two advantages,—power and material prosperity,—the things which unspiritual humanity, the world over, most craves."

This huge task will take a great deal of time to complete. How to ensure that we have the time to do it?

"Time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by that rude and imperfect, but not ignoble, arbiter, force,—force potential and force organized,—which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered history of mankind."

It would be a long time, Mahan thought, before the Chinese/Indians/Japanese actually adopt Christian spiri-

tual values, though they would want to imitate Christian material successes soon enough. The differences between the two ways of thinking might produce disturbance, and force must be available to put such disturbances down.

Facing this immense 20th century task, Mahan commits himself to one of the fashionable ideas of the late 1890s: an Anglo-American Imperialist solidarity (maybe Euro-American in time):

"(There is an) undeniable disposition of the British people and of British, statesmen to cultivate the good-will of the United States, and to draw closer the relations between the two countries. For the disposition underlying such a tendency Mr. Balfour has used an expression, "race patriotism",—a phrase which finds its first approximation, doubtless, in the English-speaking family, but which may well extend its embrace, in a time yet distant, to all those who have drawn their present civilization from the same remote sources. The phrase is so pregnant of solution for the problems of the future, as conceived by the writer, that he hopes to see it obtain the currency due to the value of the idea which it formulates... That there is lukewarm response in the United States is due to that narrow conception which grew up with the middle of the century, whose analogue in Great Britain is the Little England party, and which in our own country would turn all eyes inward, and see no duty save to ourselves... When we begin really to look abroad, and to busy ourselves with our duties to the world at large in our generation—and not before—we shall stretch out our hands to Great Britain, realizing that in unity of heart among the English-speaking races lies the best hope of humanity in the doubtful days ahead."

Within a year of all this being written the United States had made a start on its "duties to the world", imposing its own colonial government on the Spanish colonies of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico, and effectively also on Cuba (which formally became a protectorate). It was then that Rudyard Kipling produced his ballad of Imperial solidarity, *The White Man's Burden* (subtitled "*The United States and the Philippine Islands*"):

Take up the white man's burden,
Send forth the best ye breed –
Go bind your sons to exile,
To serve your captives' need.
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild –
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

Theodore Roosevelt sent a copy of this poem to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, commenting that it was "*poor poetry, but good sense from the expansionist viewpoint*". Roosevelt's literary taste, at least, cannot be faulted. Like all the verse that Kipling ever wrote, it was very poor poetry, but timely and powerful propaganda.

In a further article I will say some more about America's turn to Imperialism.

NOTES:

Books used: Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (New York 1970); Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York 1962); Alfred Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (Boston 1890); Alfred Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (London 1897), which contains the essay "A Twentieth Century Outlook". Theodore Roosevelt's comment on Kipling's poem is cited by Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore 1987) p. 21.

Martin Tyrrell

British policy in World War I

The Blockade As Myth

I reviewed the first volume of Eamon Dyas' excellent *Blockading the Germans* in the last *Church & State*. While working on that review, I came across a 2014 paper, *Myths of the Great War* by Professor Mark Harrison, an economist at the University of Warwick. *Myth Number 3* is the blockade. (It is a myth in the sociological sense of a received opinion rather than in the everyday sense of a made up story.)

Professor Harrison does not deny that there was mass hunger in Germany, or that many Germans died as a result. Unlike some recent commentators, he accepts that the increase in German mortality over the war years was of the order of 760,000. What he challenges is the idea that the Blockade was the main reason for it. It is, he says, a "*leap*" to make a causal connection between the blockade and the increase in German mortality. Not only is this view of the blockade a myth, he claims, it is a pernicious one since, in the inter-war years, it was used to argue that Germany had not been defeated militarily and as rationale for Nazi *Lebensraum*.

One reason Harrison considers the Blockade a myth is because Germany, pre-1914, was significantly less dependent on imported food than the UK. In the immediate pre-war period, more than half the calories consumed in Britain were due to imports, compared with only a quarter in Germany. If someone in 1912 or 1913 had looked at these figures, says Harrison, they would have concluded that Britain, not Germany, was at greater risk of being starved into sub-

mission in the event of war since Britain had more to lose.

But war does not of itself close down trade. Trade can continue, even when wars are raging. Or some trade can. In the end, it was irrelevant what proportion of its calories Britain imported—fifty per cent, a hundred per cent. What mattered was that Britain and its Allies could mount a Blockade and Germany couldn't. The German submarine campaign was a small thing compared with the Blockade, to which it was a response. The submarine campaign was damaging only for those brief periods, late in the war, when it was waged in earnest. But the Blockade was waged in earnest for virtually the entire period of active, armed conflict and for some six months after, and was destructive that entire time.

Several times during the war, the Germans indicated that they would be willing to stand it down on condition their food imports were allowed to resume. But these offers were rebuffed.

Something else Professor Harrison notes in his paper is that, not only did a quarter of the Germans' calories come from imports, up until the outbreak of war, a great many of those calories came from goods imported from the Allies. Germany blundered, Harrison argues, when it 'chose' to go to war with its main trading partners, and, building on this, he seems favourable to the idea that there was not so much a Blockade as a *withdrawal* of this Allied trade once the war began.

The idea that Germany chose to go to war is well-established, *mythic* even. The choice is usually dated to the start of the German naval programme, roughly two decades before the war began. But, if Germany had been truly planning to go to war all the time that it was building up its fleet, it would surely have tried to wean itself off its economic dependency on the prospective enemy (not to mention hold fire until its navy was at least as big as the Royal Navy, not half the size). All that military planning, all that outlay, and yet the Germans didn't notice what must, with hindsight, have been obvious—how reliant they were upon the prospective enemy. As it was, it was only when the war was underway that the German Government gave serious consideration to what it might mean for imports and, thereby, for the nutrition and general well-being of the civilian population. The research was quickly undertaken by a team headed by author and academic lawyer, Paul Eltzbacher.

The Eltzbacher research was the first to quantify the potential impact of the Blockade on Germany with regard to calories and essential nutrients, including protein. Its report concluded that, in the absence of imports, things would be touch and go but maybe manageable. In the UK, however, where Eltzbacher's report was fast-tracked into print as *Germany's Food and England's Plan to Starve Her Out* (December 1914), this conclusion was judged over-optimistic, if understandably so. ("*What better course could the authors have taken?*" asked zoologist Edward Bagnall Poulton. "*They had to frighten the people into economy, and yet dared not frighten them too much*".) To Poulton, the principal value of the Eltzbacher research was the amount of detail it gave on Germany's food supplies, including the main areas of vulnerability. That made it a kind of handbook for economic warfare.

Dismissing the likes of Lord Cecil, who had had qualms about the Blockade—both the feasibility and the morality of it—Poulton said such a strategy was not only possible but ethical as well:

"The cutting off of supplies is one of the oldest methods of war, and... one of the least inhumane. The pressure is gradual, the inevitable can be foreseen afar off. In this, starvation contrasts favourably with every other method of war."

That was in December 1915. Poulton, looking forward, envisages the potential impact and strategic value of the Blockade. But Professor Harrison, looking back, considers its impact over-stated.

The Blockade, he argues, cannot have been the principal factor in the rise in German civilian mortality because the Blockade affected, at best, only that quarter of German calories that was imported. If most of Germany's calories—three-quarters of them—were home-sourced, then any explanation for the spike in civilian deaths after 1914 needs to look less at the imports lost to the Blockade and more at the way that that home produce was managed. Harrison alleges that it was managed badly, and on two counts—inept rationing and a prioritisation of military over civilian needs. That, in his view, is the principal reason German civilians did without. And the main reason so many died.

There seems to be an attempt here to uncouple the Blockade from its achievements. On the one hand, there was a Blockade of Germany, a Blockade that was intended to cause widespread hunger. And, as it happened, there was, in Germany, widespread hunger that resulted in significant loss of life. But the Blockade did not cause the hunger, or it did not cause particularly much of it, since it could only ever have affected a quarter of what people ate. The other three-quarters were produced domestically, out of reach of the Allies. "*Is it reasonable*", asks Harrison, "*to suppose that the loss associated with the one quarter was larger than the loss associated with the three quarters?*"

If only the Germans had got their act together and set up a proper system of rationing and distribution, they would have better managed their domestic production and toughed out the Blockade. And if only they'd had the wit to allocate less of what they had to their army and more to their civilian population, well, they'd have toughed out the Blockade. Wouldn't they?

Why was there a Blockade of Germany and its allies? What was it for? Going by Professor Harrison's paper, it's not so obvious. If all it was ever going to achieve was to reduce Germany's total supply of calories by a quarter, and if a deficit of that scale could be got around through some tight rationing, why bother? The best it was ever going to do was slow Germany up a little.

An alternative take on the Blockade

—one that everything I have ever read on the subject inclines me to believe—is that the Blockade was implemented, not in the expectation that the Germans would quickly counter it with efficient rationing, but that its impact could *never* be countered. In this respect, it was indeed effective. But for it, Germany's lost pre-war trade with the Allies would have quickly been made good. Market forces would have kicked in. Foreign, mainly American, firms would have made rich profits supplying Germany with food the same way foreign, mainly American, firms made rich profits supplying Britain with munitions (and with the wherewithal to pay for them). The Blockade was intended to stop that. And it did. It closed the market down. Or it closed it down for Germany anyway.

None of this came free. There were costs, and there were opportunity costs, and there were risks. Ships, for example, had to be deployed to patrol the Blockade and a minefield established to strengthen it and, over the course of the war, the number and quality of both ships and mines were increased. Extensive, and generally covert, monitoring was undertaken to ensure that the Blockade was having the desired effect with any under-performance noted and improvements implemented.

An elaborate carrot and stick diplomacy (mainly stick) was undertaken to enlist the northern neutrals (the Netherlands and Scandinavia), a diplomacy so at odds with the rights of small neutral nations pretext that had been used to justify going to war in the first place, and so unflattering to those involved, that it was kept as far off the radar as possible.

(American historian Marion Siney has said the main reason the official British history of the Blockade, by A.C. Bell, was suppressed for nearly twenty-five years was that it went into great detail on this questionable diplomacy.)

As for risks, the Blockade, especially in its early days, might have alienated the United States, thereby jeopardising Britain's munitions imports and the lines of credit needed to pay for them. Or it might have pushed small but strategically significant states, like Sweden or the Netherlands, to ally themselves with Germany. None of this suggests that the Blockade was an initiative undertaken in the expectation that any of the privations it created might be mitigated by rationing.

German wartime rationing had its problems—the type of thing that might happen anywhere, such as farmers hoarding food, the development of a black market, rural areas being better fed than urban areas, the rich better fed than the poor. Few at the time thought that the food shortages in Germany, and the destructive effects of those shortages, were down to anything other than the Blockade. Without the Blockade, there would have been no need, or little need, for Germany to ration. Nonetheless, the idea that German rationing was particularly inefficient and that this inefficiency was a factor in the eventual mortality has lately become prominent.

Imagine the Germans had been superb at rationing; that they had managed the distribution of their home produce so expertly that, during the War, with its Blockade, everyone in the country received an appropriate share of the total calories produced domestically—approximately a quarter less than what they had had pre-War. Would that have been enough to maintain pre-War standards of health and well-being?

A quarter is a substantial proportion, and a quarter less is a significant deficit. If someone who currently consumes the recommended amount of calories needed to maintain their health decides (or is compelled) to reduce their daily calorie intake by a fourth, they would lose a pound or so in body weight for every week that that privation lasted. Such a level of weight loss over a prolonged period of time would have significant, negative health implications. And if the missing quarter included a disproportionate share of particular nutrients—protein or fat, for example—the result would be all the more destructive.

Harrison surely understates the potential impact of a 25% decrease in the calorific content of the average person's diet. He implies, for instance, that the decrease in calories was sudden and one-off, the type of thing that might hurt initially but in time be coped with. Going back to the Eltzbacher research of 1914, it found that Germany's pre-war imports did not simply contribute food, they also supplied the means of producing food. Fertiliser was generally imported, for example, and animal feed. Consequently, any blockade of German imports would cut food supplies directly, by eliminating imported food, and indirectly, by cutting out goods essential for agricultural productivity. This loss

of productivity ensured that the impact of the Blockade would be dynamic, not static—there would be increasingly poorer yields, each year, as land was overworked and livestock undernourished.

Consequently, there might be a 20-25% decrease in calories and nutrients and so on in year one of the Blockade, but a progressively larger decrease in each successive year as productivity began to deteriorate. Many visitors to Germany in the years following the Armistice noted the poor state of the country's cultivated land and speculated that it might take a decade or so for it to return to its pre-war standard.

And so it turned out. The physiologist Ernest Starling, in his February 1920 address to the Royal Statistical Society, said that it had been recognised early on that the Blockade would reduce Germany's supplies of protein and fat to dangerous levels. However, the actual shortages turned out greater than envisaged "*so that, for the last two years of the war... the greater part of the civilian population... were in a state of chronic starvation*" (p232).

By 1916, German industrial workers were doing well if they managed 2,000 calories a day (half what their British counterparts could expect) and their protein and fat intake was less than half the ideal. As for other German civilians—people who weren't industrial workers—some 1,500 calories per day was the norm. Things improved slightly in 1917, when average calorie intake increased to around 2,000, but this, Starling says,

"could not do more than keep alive the individuals in a state of semi-starvation. Throughout the war it was never again possible to make up by a sufficiency of food the great loss in the physiological capital of the nation which occurred during the winter of 1916-17" (p238).

He concludes:

"Five years on a diet insufficient as to quantity and quality... had a marked influence on the vitality and efficiency of the great bulk of the urban population, which finally resulted in that changed mentality which rendered impossible any further efforts of attack or even resistance... Food filled their thoughts by day and their dreams by night and the only desire was to end the war by any possible means that might lead to a slackening of the blockade and the free entry of food into the

country. No means could have been more effective in breaking the spirit of a nation which had been regarded as a danger to European civilisation... It will be long before this nation will be in any condition to be regarded again as a menace to the peace of Europe."

What of Harrison's other argument—that Germany resourced its army in preference to its people? As Eamon Dyas notes, such an idea was already doing the rounds, via James Wycliffe Headlam's pamphlet *The Starvation of Germany* (1917), before the War had even ended. Headlam wrote that the blockade had forced Germany to choose—feed its army or feed its people and "*sue for terms to make peace*" (p8).

Such wartime balancing of military and civilian needs is nothing unusual. All countries at war have had to do it to some extent, and to make some hard choices. Britain did it. And Germany. About thirty years ago, the American historian Jay M. Winter looked at the well-being of the civilian populations in a number of European states during the years of the First World War. He compared actual civilian mortality data with his estimates of the counterfactual civilian mortality, had there been no war. In Germany, actual civilian deaths were several hundred times more than they would have been if there had been no war. No surprise there. In Britain, however, for some age groups, actual wartime civilian mortality was *lower* than the estimated peacetime figure—*some people's life expectancy was better during the war than in the counterfactual peace*.

Winter attributed this marked British/German difference less to the Blockade and more to the economic policies the two States adopted in response to the war. Britain, he says, made a policy decision to safeguard civilian living standards. Germany didn't. In Winter's opinion, wartime Germany was a kind of proto-military industrial complex with all of the inefficiency and instability that that brought.

And yet analysis of the actual conduct of the war by people like John Mosier suggests that the German side was the more efficient. They fought better, and for longer than their relative military strength might have suggested. All the same, there is little evidence that the German army lived high on the hog while civilians starved. A British soldier's daily ration delivered around 4,000

calories a day, a German's, around 2,000. In the closing months of the War, the Americans were able to induce Germans to surrender with the promise of food. The German army was underfed, much the same as the German people were underfed. And the reason was the Blockade. If there had been no Blockade, there'd have been no need, or *less* need, to ration, efficiently or otherwise.

Mark Harrison, Jay Winter—they seem keen to talk down the Blockade's contribution to the eventual Allied victory. In contrast, the main criticism of the Blockade, at the time, when it was current policy, was not that it was going too far but that it was not going far enough. And when the War was over and won, there was little doubt that the Blockade had helped win it. So decisive had it been that it was left in place for the best part of a year after the Armistice. Writing in 1924, Maurice Parmelee, an American official involved in the administration of the Blockade, thought blockades were the way of the future, a means by which the coming League of Nations might bring rogue states to heel.

But guilt and embarrassment seem to have descended fairly quickly. Three accounts by insiders closely involved in the operation of the Blockade—William Arnold Forster, H.W.C. Davis, and A.C. Bell, its official historian—were suppressed. (Arnold Forster, however, did get to publish a pamphlet on the Blockade in 1939, part of the series, *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs*. Its main purpose is to split hairs regarding whether or not there was relief of the Blockade after the Armistice but it offers an interesting take on the Blockade in general: "Italy", he writes, "*after a brief taste in April 1915 of what Britain's stranglehold on the gateways of the Mediterranean might mean to her... joined the Allies*".)

In the 1930s, Marion Siney, then a graduate student, came to London and met with Bell and the others to discuss their books, which she could not officially see. These conversations informed her thesis and, later, her 1957 monograph *The Allied Blockade of Germany*, which took the story up to 1916. It is broadly favourable to the Blockade, less so to American diplomacy:

"If one examines American policy in 1914 to 1917 solely from the point of view of its ability to maintain without

limitation neutral rights of trade, then that policy was a failure and one must conclude that American representatives at home and in London often acted like dolts" (p25).

But Siney's Volume One turned out to be Volume One and Only. It ends just before the United States' direct participation in the War and, thereby, in the Blockade, suggesting there might have been some retrospective American discomfort too. After that there was C. Paul Vincent's *The Politics of Hunger* (1985)

and Eric Osborne's 2004 account. Most recently, there has been Eamon Dyas' work, which looks set to be definitive.

Seven books in the hundred years since the First World War ended, three of them suppressed! Hardly the stuff of received opinion. The First World War Blockade must be the only myth whose refutation has had higher profile than the myth itself. And, as myths go, it has turned out resilient. It is the refutations that fall flat.

and after 1857 these were set at between 17 and 23 years of age.

Although the context of these changes introduced by Wood was the growing emphasis on merit in a professional civil service, they had the unforeseen effect of presenting new opportunities for the Irish middle-class:-

"Contrary to Wood's intentions, the Irish turned out to be the real beneficiaries of the reforms. Where less than 5% of Haileybury appointees between 1809 and 1850 had been born in Ireland, no less than 24% of those recruited between 1855 and 1863 had been educated at an Irish university. In contrast, the corresponding numbers of Scots had fallen from 13% to 10% while the English element slipped from 54% to 51% (the remainder were born outside the United Kingdom, most of them in India).

In 1857 Ireland's population was 20% of the United Kingdom, Irish universities supplied no less than 33% of the ICS recruits selected that year. Wood's reforms had an immediate and pronounced impact on the prospects of Irishmen to win posts in the administration of India. For the first time in its history, Ireland had sent a disproportionate number to govern Britain's principle and most valued possession. (*The Irish Raj: Social Origins and Careers of Irishmen in the Indian Civil Service, 1855-1914* by Scott B. Cook. Pub. in *Journal of Social History*, Spring 1987, p.510)

However, this development would not have been possible if the Irish universities had not responded quickly and appropriately to the new scenario. It is not surprising that Trinity College, Dublin led the way, as it traditionally supplied the educational requirements of the Protestant Ascendancy, many of whom went on to serve the British Empire.

Within a few years of the introduction of the new ICS, the university established chairs in Sanskrit and Arabic and introduced courses in zoology—all subjects that were part of the ICS exam. Even earlier it had changed its curriculum to enable medical students to compete for positions in the Indian Medical Service (IMS), a sister organisation of the ICS. Because of this, TCD, besides London University, was among the first in the UK to equip its students for the competitive exam requirements of the ICS.

The Queen's University, composed of Colleges in Cork, Belfast and Galway, did not lag far behind. Its constituent Colleges provided courses geared to the ICS open competition examination. This is not surprising either, as, unlike Trinity which was heavily endowed, Queens

Eamon Dyas

Profile of an
Infamous Servant of the British State

Part 1: Irish Administrators Of India

Sir Michael O'Dwyer:

an Irish Catholic in the service of the British Empire

Administering India

Like their British equivalents, Irish universities, by the second half of the 19th century were consciously designing their curricula to provide their students with the necessary skills for Empire-building through their response to the requirements of the Indian Civil Service.

The establishment of the *Civil Service Commission* by Order in Council on 21st May 1855 brought in its wake the modernisation of the British Home Civil Service. Shortly before this however, and in advance of the British Government assuming formal control over India in 1858, the British establishment decided to remove responsibility for conducting the Indian Civil Service from the East India Company and establish a new arrangement over which Parliament would have more control.

Until the middle of the century the directors of the East India Company more or less ran India through their system of patronage to what was called 'writerships'. Individuals nominated through the patronage system had to pass a simple examination before being admitted to the Company's training college at Haileybury where they spent two years studying law, political economy and Indian languages. The nominees then went to India where they had to undertake more tests in Indian languages before being allocated a position in what effectively constituted the British civil service of India.

Until the changes brought about by the *Government of India Act* of 1853

this was the system by which the majority of the civil administrators in India were appointed.

The *Government of India Act* of 1853 abolished this arrangement and stipulated that it should be replaced by a system of appointments through open competitive examination. In 1854 a Committee, chaired by Thomas Babington Macaulay, was established to draw up a scheme to put the necessary changes into effect and the man charged with implementing the new arrangements was Sir Charles Wood (later the first Viscount Halifax and at this time President of the Board of Control).

It is worth noting that less than a decade earlier, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Charles Wood had been a leading opponent of spending Relief during the Irish Famine, believing that direct intervention by the British Government would do little to promote the structural changes needed in Irish society—it should also be pointed out that Wood was no friend of the Anglo-Irish landlords either, as he believed they were a culpable element in the whole disaster.

In his capacity as President of the Board of Control, Sir Charles Wood oversaw the first open competition to the Indian Civil Service in 1855 and by 1856 the last group of East India Company-nominated entrants began their courses at Haileybury. The changes he introduced also involved the setting of age limits for taking the new competitive exam

was a secular non-denominational Government-funded institution and, with the exception of Belfast, none of its Colleges possessed any significant endowment underpinning.

As the recipient of direct Government funding the Queen's University would be more sensitive to official education requirements. Belfast soon came close to emulating the oriental languages programme offered by TCD, and then Cork began to offer courses in Indian history and geography as well as Hindu and Muslim law, while Galway offered courses in the history and geography of India.

However, the success of the Irish Universities became a cause of concern among those who oversaw the new system of ICS recruitment. While one of the objects of the new arrangements was to introduce an element of meritocracy into the service, the arrival of significant numbers of Irish recruits was not necessarily viewed as a welcome development:-

"Even in the earliest years of competition (1855-58), the success of seventeen Irish students, including young men from Dublin, Belfast, Cork, and Galway universities, was regarded as a dangerous omen" (Fourth Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1859, p.339. Quoted in *The Problem of Recruitment for the Indian Civil Service During the Late Nineteenth Century* by Bradford Spangenberg. Pub. in The Journal of Asian Studies, Feb. 1971, p.345)

Despite the hope of those with anti-Irish attitudes that this might be a temporary phenomenon, the Irish Universities continued to supply successful candidates for the ICS exam. By 1867 the numbers graduating to the ICS from Irish Universities equalled those graduating from the combined Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and by 1870 even surpassed the intake from those Universities, none of this pleasing the man in charge of the overall process:-

"The products of Irish universities were Wood's especial *betes noires*. Irishmen showed a fairly constant interest in the competition. The proportion of candidates educated at Irish universities declined but not to anything like the extent of the Oxford and Cambridge decline. Between 1855-9, 18.2% of all candidates were from Irish universities; between 1860-5, 16.8% and between 1866-74, only 8.6%. This decline appears to have coincided with the lowering of the age limit. The Irish rate of success followed an entirely different pattern to that of men from

Oxford and Cambridge. Nearly a quarter of the selected candidates in the first five years came from Irish universities. Between 1860 and 1865, 22.1% were Irish university men. Between 1866 and 1874 the proportion fell to 12.4%." (*Open Competition and the Indian Civil Service, 1854-1876*, by J.M. Compton. Pub. in The English Historical Review, April 1968, p.278).

Within a few years of the new arrangements the system of recruitment was proving to be unsatisfactory to its architects because of the type of recruits that were coming their way. Wood became Secretary of State for India in 1859 and his response was to reduce the upper age limit from 23 to 22, made effective from 1860.

"Two objectives lay behind the reduction of the maximum limit in 1859 from 23 to 22: first, men in their 23rd year who had already graduated would not likely 'be much tempted by the prospect of an appointment which will withdraw him at once from the distinction... he looks for at home. By lowering the limit, it might be possible to lure men into the ICS just prior to or immediately after graduation before they were drawn away by more attractive careers at home. Second, the year subtracted from the maximum age limit would allow time for the special acquisition of relevant Indian knowledge not provided in the usual university curriculum" (Spangenberg, op cit. p.342).

The 1860 changes did not cause a dramatic reduction in the Irish candidates. Between 1855 and 1859, 18.2% of all candidates came from Irish universities and after the changes the figures from 1860 to 1865 shows a marginal decline to 16.8%. The second phase of changes to the recruitment exams did however make a significant impact. In 1866 the eligible age was further reduced from 22 to 21 and this, together with changes in the points system, had an impact which the earlier change did not have.

"The most important cause of the decline in the number of Irish recruits, however, was adjustments in the recruiting process itself. The main architect of the first instalments of adjustments was Wood. In 1864 [this appears to be incorrect as the year in which the change was introduced was 1866—see "*The Indian Civil Service List for 1880*" by Alfred Cotterell Tupp, Madras, 1880, pp.46-47—ED] he lowered the maximum age at which candidates could compete, from 22 to 21, and redistributed the number of points attached to various exam subjects. Both measures were clearly intended to reverse a

disturbing trend that appeared in the statistics of the social profiles of many recruits. Instead of drawing the Oxbridge scholar-gentleman, the exams seemed to have enticed men from '...obscure corners of society, boorish, contemptible and disgusting', that is to say, those sent up by the London crammers and the Irish universities. The latter were fast acquiring a reputation for swamping the ICS with their student-candidates. *The Saturday Review*, that weekly conscience of popular Toryism, grew alarmed at the potential Hibernization of the ICS and speculated on the likely implications of Irishmen governing Indians... It concluded that the Irish were 'unfit to govern a strange country' and pressed for reform of the recruitment system" (Scott B. Cook, op cit. pp.512-513).

Wood manipulated the points system, which underpinned the exam assessment procedure, to ensure that the prospects of English public schools were enhanced by allocating a greater numerical weight to those subjects in which they traditionally excelled. Part of the purpose of this was to restrict the numbers of Irish, although he admitted:-

"It is difficult to say this in public, for I should have half a dozen wild Irishmen on my shoulders and as many middle class examination students, but that makes all the more reason for not giving in to anything which might lead to similar results" (quoted in Scott B. Cook, op. cit. p.513).

The reduced exam age did not adversely affect the numbers of Irish candidates, mainly because Irish students matriculated at the earlier age. However, the alteration to the points system had a significant impact on the number of those who passed the exam. Wood reduced the points allotted to Arabic and Sanskrit by a quarter. As these were subjects in which the Irish universities excelled, it is not surprising the change would have a disproportionate impact on the rate of success among Irish candidates.

The actual impact of the change is reflected in the fact that, between 1856 and 1864, the percentage of Irish candidates passing the exam was never less than 33%. After 1865 this figure never exceeded 26% and, for most of the late 1880s, it hovered around 20%. Even allowing for the increase in the overall number of candidates between 1856 and 1870, and the fact that the ratio of passes to overall candidates fell absolutely, it was nonetheless the case that the Irish success rate fell more significantly than

was the case generally.

A further decline in the 1880s was more probably the result of the later changes to the recruitment examination introduced by Lord Salisbury, who reduced the upper age limit for taking the exam to 19. As Irish university students rarely completed their degrees before they were 20 and could not afford, or had not the will, to undertake the journey to England to attend the cram-mers that specialised in grooming candidates for the exam, the Salisbury changes effectively discriminated against potential Irish recruits.

Thus the 1880s was the worst decade for Irish recruitment with the share falling to 5%. However, a slight improvement occurred in the 1890s, probably because of an easing of the competition for university candidates. From then until 1914 the percentage of Irish recruits hovered around the 5-10% rate.

What kind of Irishmen joined the Indian Civil Service? Despite the decline in overall numbers of Irish recruited to the ICS, the figures for Irish Catholics actually went against the trend and showed an increase. This has been used by certain historians to show that in the twenty years prior to the First World War the Irish Catholic population was becoming a willing and active agent of Empire.

Irish Catholics in Indian Service

Scott B. Cook's study, *"The Irish Raj: Social Origins and Careers of Irishmen in the Indian Civil Service, 1855-1914"* (op. cit) is the most exhaustive study of the relationship between Ireland and the Imperial administration of India and provides much useful information about Irish recruitment to the ICS. Cook sets his analysis in the context of the 'modernisation' of Irish historiography, which elevates areas like sociology, economics, demographics and social studies as having been long neglected mere appendages of political history. In the course of his study, he claims that his uncovering of the extent of Irish involvement with Imperial administration of India constitutes a hidden and previously unacknowledged level of support for the British connection among the Irish people:

"One of the more persistent distortions of modern Irish history has arisen from a preoccupation with political themes of resistance, struggle and confrontation. Not only has 'so much historical talent and energy' been lavished on political history, but much of the best of it—including works by

Lyons, Tierney and McCaffrey—has contributed to the portrayal of Irish history as a chronology of resistance and reaction to British dominion, punctuated by a number of momentous flash-points of conflict: the repeal movement, land wars, aborted rebellions and the like.² Admittedly, reliance on this format has diminished in recent decades, but it is unlikely to disappear. In fact, the paradigm of confrontation has worked so well for political history that it has frequently been imposed on studies whose focus is not avowedly or even primarily political...

Between 1800 and 1922 Ireland was formally though imperfectly integrated into the United Kingdom. Like Scotland and Wales, it enjoyed Parliamentary representation but unlike the other Celtic regions, Ireland had its own police and civil administrations headed by a viceroy. This constitutional patchwork recognised to some degree the wide array of religions, cultures and ethnic groups in Ireland, each of which offered a different view on the link with Britain. Of the various Irish responses, the most common, contrary to what most of the historical literature has stressed, was that of support: a broad category encompassing conscious and active collaboration as well as acquiescence in laws, values and social structures that were partly shaped by British hegemony. Yet the dynamics, circumstances and limitations of Irish support and the social conditions which sustained it have received little attention from historians. Perhaps this is because support is of less intrinsic interest than resistance, or because the writing of Irish history has been obsessively crisis-oriented. Or, possibly, it is because for the majority of Irish men and women, support for the British connection did not survive the dislocating events of 1916-21" (Scott B. Cook, op cit. pp.507-508).

To sustain this position, Scott is compelled to adopt a very peculiar

methodology which seems to face two ways at the same time. While he provides some interesting statistics, the conclusions he draws from them are based on subsuming the distinctions between Anglo-Irish and Protestant and Irish and Catholic under the generic description of "Irish", which—in the context of exploring levels of Empire loyalty among the general population—becomes somewhat meaningless.

Although loyalism was normally a characteristic of the Protestant population, there is no doubt that there was also an element within the Catholic community which identified with Empire. However, the extent of this cannot be ascertained by the provision of statistics based on the Irish population as a whole. If one uses statistics which blend both the Protestant and Catholic populations to indicate levels of loyalty, the effect is to disguise the extent to which loyalism permeated one community and exaggerates the commitment to empire of the other. All of this sits very uncomfortably with the one critical table that he does provide (of which more below). Instead of basing his analysis on the, very relevant, statistics provided in this table, Cook struggles with a conclusion that is based on statistics that instead are based on the vague (in this context) category of "Irish" in almost all of the other tables he supplies.

There can be no real surprise at the level of Anglo-Irish and Protestant support for Empire as all this is historically known. What is central to Cook's theses however is that significant levels of support also applied to the Catholic community. In this sense the most important statistics in his study is his Table II (below), which provides the relative numbers of Protestants and Catholics who joined the ICS between 1855 and 1914:-

Year Recruited	Protestants no. %	Catholics no. %	Total no.
1855-64	49 92%	4 8%	53
1865-74	59 89%	7 11%	66
1875-84	25 80%	6 20%	31
1885-94	22 73%	8 27%	30
1895-1904	44 75%	15 25%	59
1905-14	32 71%	13 29%	45

1855-1914	231 81%	53 19%	284*

*One civilian in the ICS in 1886, Lord Henry Ulick Browne, had been appointed in 1851. He was a member of the Church of Ireland.

[Scott B. Cook, op cit. p.516]

Leaving aside the uncomfortable lack of an explanation as to why these particular chronological segments are used (beyond the fact that they divide into equal spans of years—9 years in each case but then why not 5 year spans?), the statistics are interesting if not ground-shattering. Presumably Cook uses the 9 year span because it provides the best examples for confirming his central theses. Despite this, and although the numbers of Catholics recruited to the Indian Civil Service shows an increase over time, the figures do not bear out any claim that this was to any extent significant. A mere 53 Catholics joined the ICS between 1855 and 1914. Seen in the context of the numbers of Catholics in Ireland, this is far from justifying its description as evidence of anything substantial in the community. Despite this, however, Cook does raise the interesting issue of Catholic support for Empire—a fact that nobody would deny existed. Where differences do arise is in establishing the extent of this support, why it existed, and what it represented.

When Cook reveals the undoubted discrimination against the Irish generally among the English architects of the ICS, he fails to identify the source of that discrimination properly—and he does this because of his reluctance to give due importance to the political dimension. His 'model' appears to set the British Empire as a static entity, without any interactive dynamic with the world in which it finds itself. Issues like loyalism, unionism, careerism, nationalism, etc. orbit around this static entity like planets around the sun. Occasionally these planets may collide, occasionally they may travel alongside each other on the same trajectory, but the one element in all of this—which remains central in its immovable regency is the British Empire. This does not do justice either to the British Empire or enhance his central theses.

While some elements of the English Establishment did indeed look down their noses at the Anglo-Irish, it is more likely that the discrimination in the ICS recruitment policy had more to do with the overflow of the anti-Catholic prejudice which was endemic in Victorian English society. Consequently, Irish Protestants suffered from guilt by association, as those charged with managing the recruitment policy of the ICS operated on the basis that *Irish* was synonymous with *Catholic*.

What then explains the rise in Catholic numbers in the ICS? To explore

this question, it is necessary to view British Imperialism as a pragmatic entity—something that Cook fails to do. His exploration of the levels of Irish loyalty freezes the phenomenon of the British Empire into an abstract concept which fails to acknowledge it as a dynamic power structure, requiring an ability to adopt to changing conditions and circumstances. Because of this, the actual way that the Irish population accommodated itself to life under British rule is not viewed as the outcome of the political dynamics between them.

Despite the evidence of anti-Irish prejudice among the architects of the ICS in Britain, Cook shows that Catholics in particular had a better time, once they passed the exam and took up their appointments in India.

"The Irish experience in India reveals two features of the larger imperial system. First, whatever unofficial resentment there may have been towards Irishmen, the ICS was a fair employer; if it was not exactly unconscious of, or wholly indifferent to a civilian's (the members of the ICS were known as 'civilians'—ED) background, at least it was not prepared to penalise him for it. This situation may well have been dictated by the imperatives of governing a large area with an insufficient number of administrators. The Government of India was obsessed with other considerations: lulling Indians into quiescence, maintaining their own positions and improving some material aspects of rural life...

Still, there was an important difference between the Company and the Crown systems of administration. Over time, the administrative machine had become more equitable and responsive, if only from the narrow perspective of the colonisers. With the reforms of the 1850s, the Irish were formally invited to participate as partners in governing India. This offer was soon trimmed by Wood and Salisbury but it was never entirely revoked and even—with TCD's right to train new ICS recruits which it maintained until 1937—outlasted the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland.

The second fact revealed by the experience of those late 19th century Irishmen is that the Irish middle classes were not irretrievably hostile to the British connection or to the imperial system. As the competition figures show, Irish interest in empire prior to the First World War was genuine if ultimately conditional. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that among the Catholic and less well to do sections of the Irish population, such interest remained into the 20th century, even as the

employment opportunities for them increased at home" (Cook, op cit, pp.520-522).

Although the anti-Irish prejudice persisted in India, it did not translate itself into any widespread discrimination. While there were individual cases of discrimination, the task of governing such a huge country did not allow for the luxury of systematic discrimination on the part of the Government of India. Thus, the evidence of significant numbers of Irish rising to high positions in the ICS is testimony to the absence of such discrimination, even against the background of persistent prejudice. The British knew that they needed the Irish (Catholic as well as Protestant) to run India and were quite capable of overcoming their natural instincts if this meant that their Imperial interests were served.

What was the Indian Civil Service?

Although they came into existence at around the same time, the modern Indian Civil Service was a much different animal than the modern Home Civil Service. A good account of how the two Civil Services operated was provided by Vincent Arthur Smith in a lecture he gave at Trinity College, Dublin, on 10th June 1903. Smith had been himself a member of the Indian Civil Service and went on to become Reader in Indian History and Hindustani at Trinity. His lecture was entitled, "*The Indian Civil Service as a Profession*" and this is his explanation of how the ICS differed from the Home Civil Service:-

"The Indian Civil Service is very different [from Home Civil Service—ED]. It is a compact, organised body consisting of about nine hundred specially selected and highly-trained officers, with duties and privileges defined by statute. The highest official in India, the Viceroy, is not ordinarily a member of the Service, nor, on the other hand, is a single clerk included in its ranks. The Indian 'civilian,' the man lawfully entitled to write the letters C.S. or I.C.S. after his name, may in the course of his service be many things successively, or all at once, but, whatever he may be or become, he can never, even in his most junior and 'griffin' days, be a clerk.

The young man, therefore, who thinks of entering the narrow gate which leads to the Indian Civil Service, and feels a distaste for the kind of employment ordinarily associated with the idea of the Home Civil Service, need not fear that, if he goes to India, he will ever be called upon to do the work of a clerk. The call of duty may summon

him to hunt down a gang of brigands, defend a fort, lay out a cholera camp, frame the Imperial budget, or do many other things not specially provided for in his early education; but, whatever may befall him, he will never be asked to perform the routines of an office clerk.

The moment he arrives in India, the young 'civilian,' to use the current Anglo-Indian term, will find himself figuring in the Gazette as an Assistant Magistrate and Collector, lawfully empowered to inflict a month's hard labour and fifty rupees fine upon his erring fellow creatures... [after the first year or two—ED]. In his magisterial capacity, he is empowered and required to try, sitting by himself, all offences except those of the most heinous kinds, and may sentence an offender to two years hard labour and a fine of a thousand rupees. He investigates the most heinous crimes which he is not empowered to try, and, if necessary, commits the accused persons to a higher Court. As a revenue officer, he deals with many intricate matters concerning the land, such as boundary disputes, the determination of fair rents, and so forth, as may be required by the law prevailing in the province where he serves. As an executive officer, he soon discovers that *nihil humani a se est alienum*. Everything connected with the general administration concerns his immediate chief, the District Magistrate; and the young assistant may be called upon to aid his chief in any of the branches of the multifarious duties imposed upon the head of the District.

After some years of this sort of work—more or less according to luck—he will probably be asked to elect between the judicial and executive lines of employment. The man who likes a quiet life probably will prefer the dignified, if monotonous duties of the Bench, and, as a matter of course, will become a District and Sessions Judge, with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction, subject to the control of the High Court of his province. If he is exceptionally able or lucky, or, still better, is both, he will himself obtain a seat in a High Court, have a good time, and ultimately retire with an extra pension.

But the young officer who is active, energetic, and ambitious will generally incline to choose the more exacting tasks of the executive line. He will then by virtue of seniority, sooner or later, become the chief magistrate of a District, and the local representative of His Majesty and the Government of India for all purposes. The 'District,' I must explain, is the unit of administration in India, and means a big tract of country, fifty or a hundred miles across, inhabited by a vast population, numbering generally from a million to three mil-

lions. The post of District Magistrate, although one attainable in the ordinary course by the rank and file of the Service, is, perhaps the most interesting appointment which an officer holds in the course of his career; but it usually implies hard work and much wear and tear. A successful District Officer may expect to be selected for the high post of Commissioner of Division. The Commissioner stands between the District Officer and the provincial government, and exercises a general supervision over the affairs of several districts constituting a 'Division.' In the province where I served, the average population of a division was about seven millions. The most fortunate of the officers in the executive branch of the Service may look forward to attaining one or more of the high dignities of Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant-Governor of a province, Resident at the Court of a great feudatory, or member of the Viceroy's Cabinet.

Among the miscellaneous appointments open to members of the Indian Civil Service, and in some cases reserved to them by law, may be mentioned the office of Inspector General of Police, Director of Public Prosecution, Accountant-General, and Secretary in either the Government of India or a provincial government.

The brief outline which has been given will, I hope, suffice to indicate in a general way the nature of the various and multifarious duties entrusted to the Indian Civil Service, and to show how widely they differ from those ordinarily performed by members of the Home Civil Service" (*The Indian Civil Service as a Profession, A Lecture delivered at Trinity College, Dublin, on June 10th, 1903* by Vincent A. Smith, Indian Civil Service (retired); Reader in Indian History and Hindustani in the University of Dublin, pub. Hodges, Figgis, & Co., Ltd., Dublin 1903, pp.5-9).

The Indian Civil Service was not a simple bureaucracy in the British domestic sense, where its function is to facilitate the work of Government. (The Irish civil service was something that came somewhere between the two.) The ICS, through its control over budgets, local administration, police and judiciary, was in effect the government, with its personnel having, more or less, the power of life and death over the populace. Also, it had a very close relationship with the army, with many military men holding positions in the service. This then was the organisation which those few Irish Catholics joined when they successfully sat the open competitive exam.

Next issue:

Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Amritsar

State Religion?

Catholicism was never part of the Irish Constitution, which merely recognised the fact that most of the population regarded the Roman Catholic Church as the guardian of their faith and morals—not as the guardian of the faith and morals of the State.

Article 44 was largely drafted by the Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin, Dr Gregg, and a Presbyterian Minister was also consulted. Both the Vatican and Dr McQuaid wanted the Constitution to declare the Roman Catholic Church was the one true Church.

Whilst both Dev and all believing Roman Catholics believed that it was, the Constitution was framed to guarantee freedom for believers and unbelievers equally.

The passing of the Constitution was facilitated by the Abdication of King Edward VIII, when Britain and the White Commonwealth (excluding the Irish Free State) could not stomach a Head of State marrying a divorced woman.

(*Donal Kennedy, 7.2.1019*)

WW1: Female & Child Labour v. Irish!

"Mr. Stephen Hurst (M.P. for Aughton, West Lancashire) said he had been in the habit of engaging between 14 and 16 Irish labourers during harvest, but he must confess that he would have to be very hard pressed indeed if in the present year he engaged a single Irish labourer of military age. On his farm, which was purely arable, he had now three girls and three boys, who were making themselves very useful, and he was making arrangements to employ from four to six women in the next two or three weeks. He urged farmers to ask young Irish labourers of military age who might come over to seek work why they were not working in the trenches. If they could manage to get through the business of the farm with the aid of women and young people, by all means let them do so"

(*Preston Herald, 1 April, 1916*, reporting on the annual dinner of the Lancashire Farmers' Association.)

President Coolidge!

"Here comes Coolidge and does nothing and retires a hero, not only because he hadn't done anything, but because he had done it better than anyone"

(Will Rogers, American Humorist.)

Peter Brooke

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Dugin And The Russian Question
Part 11

Solzhenitsyn's *Two Centuries Together*—Continued

The Pogroms

part one

*'Pogrom—after "Tsar"
probably the Russian word
most commonly found in other
languages ...'*

Hans Rogger:
*The Question of Jewish emancipation
in Russia in the mirror of Europe*

The Pale Of Settlement

Pogroms are almost universally regarded as a typically Russian phenomenon even though nearly all the 'Russian' pogroms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries occurred outside Russia, in Ukraine or Bessarabia (modern Moldova).¹ These, together with Byelorussia (apparently not so badly affected), made up the *'Pale of Settlement'*, which, as we've seen in earlier articles, covered the areas of Poland that were incorporated into the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century.

Jews had been excluded from Russia proper ('Great Russia') since the sixteenth century, though by the late nineteenth century exceptions were made for certain legally defined categories of the wealthier or more educated Jews.

The 'Jewish problem', however, endlessly discussed by Russian Government officials throughout the nineteenth century, had turned on the relations between Jews and peasants in the Pale. On the one hand, Jews were blamed for exploiting the peasants and contributing to their misery (as argued in the Derzhavin Memorandum, discussed in the last article in this series). On the other hand, Jews—as traders, craftsmen, estate managers, not just as distillers and tavern-keepers—were regarded as providing services that were essential to the wellbeing of the peasantry.

The Russian Empire had inherited from Poland an extraordinary system in which the three main rural classes consisted of three different and fairly well defined religious/racial groups—Polish Catholic landlords; Ukrainian,

Byelorussian, Bessarabian Orthodox peasants; Jewish middlemen. For all the vagaries of the constantly changing restrictions put on their activities, the Jews were granted, relative to the peasant serfs, an element of freedom: able to move more freely and freer to choose their own economic activity. Thus Solzhenitsyn can say, talking about the very early days of their incorporation into the Empire:

"It should be pointed out that the Jews were thus given equal rights not only in contrast to Poland, but also earlier than in France or the German states. (Under Frederick the Great the Jews suffered great limitations.) Indeed Jews in Russia had from the beginning the freedom that Russian peasants were only granted 80 years later. Paradoxically, the Jews gained greater freedom than even the Russian merchants and tradesmen. The latter had to live exclusively in the cities, while in contrast the Jewish population could 'live in colonisations in the country and distill liquor'."

"Although the Jews dwelt in clusters not only in the city but also in the villages, they were counted as part of the city contingent—inclusive of merchant and townsmen classes'..."²

But, for very large numbers of Jews, the peasantry was the main source of their possibility of making a living. They had to extract from a poor and downtrodden peasantry as much money as they possibly could. Under these circumstances, one could be surprised that—leaving aside the seventeenth century Khelmnitsky rising which resulted in Ukraine East of the Dnieper being incorporated into the Russian Empire—pogroms did not occur earlier.

When they did occur—the first of the series was in 1881—they caused great alarm as a first manifestation of mass political action. In all the previous discussions the peasantry in the Pale of Settlement had been regarded as helpless and inert victims. The pogroms could be (and were, both in government circles

and among the radicals) regarded as a first spontaneous initiative of the newly emancipated peasantry.³

Great Russia Without Jews

But if the role of the Jews as tradesmen and craftsmen in a rural economy was problematical in the Pale of Settlement, how were these obviously necessary roles fulfilled in 'Great Russia' itself? Solzhenitsyn does not discuss the question but we might get some idea from his old enemy, Richard Pipes. Describing the consequences of reforms introduced in the eighteenth century under Peter III and in the early years of Catherine II, he writes:

"Peasants throughout Russia began to trade on an unprecedented scale, cornering much of the market in food-stuffs (cereals, garden produce and cattle) and implements for the home and farm... By the beginning of the nineteenth century the bulk of the trade in Russia was controlled by peasants who could trade openly without paying the onerous annual certificate fee imposed by the government on merchants belonging to the urban guilds..."

In industry too the law [regulating the merchant class, in particular forbidding them from using serf labour—PB] produced dramatic results. Dvoriane (the landlord class) now proceeded to take away from the merchants some of the most profitable branches of manufacture and mining in which the latter had established a strong presence between 1730 and 1762... Statistics compiled in 1813-14 indicate that, in addition to all the distilleries, they owned 64 per cent of the mines, 78 per cent of the woollen mills, 60 per cent of the paper mills, 66 per cent of the glass and crystal manufactures and 80 per cent of the potash works. The merchants now had to watch helplessly as some of the most profitable branches of industry were taken over by classes based in the countryside and rooted in agriculture...

No less serious competition came from peasants. A remarkable by-product of Catherine's economic legislation was the emergence of large-scale serf industry. Although not unique to Russia—a similar phenomenon has been observed in eighteenth century Silesia—in no other country has it attained comparative economic importance...

Peasant entrepreneurs from the beginning concentrated on the mass consumer market which state and dvoriane manufacturers largely ignored. Cotton textiles were their most important product, but they also played a leading role in the manufacture of

pottery, linen cloth, hardware, leather goods and furniture."

However—

"Peasant entrepreneurs living on private properties remained serfs even after having amassed vast fortunes. Such bonded magnates paid rents running into thousands of rubles a year. If the landlord consented to give them their freedom—which, for obvious reasons, he was loth to do—they were required to pay enormous sums. The serfs of Sheremetev paid for their redemption 17,000-20,000 rubles; on occasion the price could rise as high as 160,000 rubles. Some had serfs of their own, and lived in truly seigneurial style" (pp.212-3).⁴

So where in Ukraine we had three classes—Polish landlords, Ukrainian peasants and Jewish middlemen—in Russia, if we accept Pipes's view, the landlords and the peasants, both of them Russian and Orthodox, divided up the middleman function between themselves.

Pipes' central argument about the development of Russia and its intrinsic inferiority to Western Europe, is summed up in the title of one of the chapters of *Russia Under The Old régime*—"The missing bourgeoisie". The term 'bourgeoisie' of course implies a city- or town-dweller, but in Russia—

"the centre of trade and manufacture lay not in the city but in the country; the commercial and industrial classes did not constitute the bulk of the urban population; and residence in the city guaranteed neither security nor freedom, even in the limited sense in which these terms were applicable to Russia ...

Moscow could not tolerate privileged sanctuaries from which a genuine urban civilisation might have developed because they violated the kingdom's patrimonial constitution. Moscow deprived Novgorod and Pskov of their liberties as soon as it had conquered them, and it promptly curtailed the guarantees of the burghers of Poland-Lithuania when this area fell under Russian control..."

Traders and artisans were formed into legally defined communities called *posads*:

"The status of a person belonging to a *posad* was hereditary and he and his descendants were forbidden to leave it. As noted, the land on which urban residences stood belonged to the Tsar and could not be sold. Except that they plied trades and crafts as their vocation

and agriculture as their avocation, whereas the black peasants did the opposite, the two groups were barely distinguishable."

But the *posads* had to pay a tax—the *tiaglo*—for the privilege of living in their designated areas belonging to the crown and they had to compete with other groups who were free of the tax. These included some categories of full-time military personnel in between campaigns but also—

"Peasants living on 'white' properties of lay and clerical landlords set up in most cities and in many rural localities regular markets known as *slobody* (a corruption of *svoboda*, meaning freedom) where they traded without bearing their share of *tiaglo*."

As a result—

"*posad* people in droves fled their communities. The best chance of making good their escape lay in finding a landlord or a monastery willing to take them under its wings and thus enable them to trade without bearing *tiaglo*" (pp.198-202).

"Under such conditions", Pipes continues, "capitalism could hardly take root. And indeed Russian commerce tended towards natural forms of exchange. In terms of money and credit, it remained until the middle of the nineteenth century at a level which western Europe had left behind in the late Middle Ages. Trade in Muscovite Russia and in considerable measure in Russia of the imperial period was mainly carried out by barter; money was employed mostly for small-scale cash-and-carry transactions..."

The primitive, pre-capitalist character of Russian commerce is demonstrated by the importance of fairs... Nizhnii Novgorod's was the largest fair in the world; but beside it there were in the middle of the nineteenth century several thousand fairs of medium and small size scattered throughout Russia. Their decline set in only in the 1880s with the spread of railways [meaning presumably ease of transfer of goods—PB].

Given the extreme scarcity of money in circulation, it is not surprising that until modern times Russia had virtually no commercial credit or banking. Nothing so dispels the deceptive panoramas of a flourishing Russian capitalism painted by communist historians... than the fact that the first successful commercial banks in Russia were founded only in the 1860s; until then, the country got along with two banks owned and operated by the state. Capitalism without credit is a contra-

diction in terms; and business ignorant of credit is no more capitalist than urban inhabitants without self government are bourgeois.

"The Russian merchant... usually had no idea how to keep account books, preferring to rely on memory. Ignorance of book-keeping was a major cause of business failures in Russia... Risk capital, the sinew of capitalist development, was absent; what there was of it came either from the state treasury or from foreign investors. As late as the early twentieth century, the Russian middle class regarded the investor as the lowest species of businessman, far below the manufacturer and merchant in prestige" (pp.206-7).

The position in the Pale of Settlement on the other hand could be described as a collapsed capitalism. Capitalism had been much more highly developed in Poland than in Russia prior to the seventeenth century, mainly through the activities of Jews. In a previous article in this series, '*A Polish prologue*', I said, following Léon Poliakov's *History of Antisemitism*, that Poland had been like a promised land to Jews escaping persecution in Germany. The Polish nobility were primarily concerned with being noble and were happy to leave the Jews free to develop the sordid necessities of trade and manufacture. To quote Poliakov:

"In general, then, it is quite correct to say that in Poland they formed a whole social class—that urban middle class that, in this country, had for so long failed to take shape" (p.392). "The lot of the Polish Jews was at that time considered so favourable that, in the spirit of those alphabet games of which they had the habit, 'Polonia' could be read as Po-lan-ia (God lives here)" (p.395).

But, as we have seen, this had been wrecked by the Khelmnitsky Rising, which had largely destroyed the sources of Jewish wealth while leaving the landed wealth of the great Polish Catholic monasteries intact, so that the Jewish Kahal, trying to restore their financial position, had to turn to the monasteries for credit.

The area East of the Dnieper, including Kiev, was soon incorporated into the Russian Empire, followed at the end of the eighteenth century, by the rest of what became the Pale of Settlement. By the nineteenth century the situation of most Jews had become desperate. To quote Hans Rogger:

"According to a report published in 1850 in the Journal of the Ministry of the Interior only three out of a hundred Jews disposed of a more or less substantial capital and were not public charges upon their brethren, while the majority were doomed to a life of destitution and beggary. A relative scarcity of capital among Jews was one reason for seeing them more often as claimants upon the country's resources than as contributors to their growth. Another was an occupational structure with a preponderance of non-specialised general services, unspecified trading activities and a huge supply of unskilled labour. Since the bulk of Jewish employment was concentrated in the production and distribution of consumer goods, the slow growth of the internal market did little to reduce the high rate of underemployment or to improve the incomes of the majority..."⁵

In another essay, Rogger says, referring to two of Alexander II's ministers in 1861, the year of the emancipation of the serfs:

"Reports from the Pale had convinced the two ministers that if the Jews were sunk in poverty and prejudice and given to sharp or shady practices, this was because of factors over which they had little control. The chief barrier to their ethical and economic regeneration, which the government had so far pursued in vain, was that the number of traders among them was abnormally large in relation to the number of peasants in whose midst the Jews had to gain their livelihood. With the Christian peasant as destitute as the Jewish trader, it was unavoidable that the latter victimised the former, the more so since intense competition among the Jews made it nearly impossible for them to remain within the bounds of legality and survive..."

They went on to recommend, unsuccessfully, that the situation in the Pale would be relieved if these poorer Jew were allowed to spread out into neighbouring Russia.

The Jews And Modern Capitalism

All this poses the question whether the failure (if that's the right word) to develop capitalism in Russia and the exclusion of the Jews might be related. Which brings us into the territory of Werner Sombart's book *The Jews and modern capitalism*. Although this was to prove useful to the Nazis and has therefore fallen out of favour, it was not written with antisemitic intent.⁶ Sombart

saw it as a development of the argument developed in Max Weber's book, *The Protestant Ethic And The Spirit Of Capitalism*. Weber was a friend and colleague:

"Max Weber's study of the importance of Puritanism for the capitalistic system was the impetus that sent me to consider the importance of the Jew, especially as I felt that the dominating ideas of Puritanism which were so powerful in capitalism were more perfectly developed in Judaism, and were also of course of much earlier date."

Whether one sees the argument as antisemitic or not depends rather on one's attitude to capitalism, or to liberalism as its political complement. Sombart, admittedly, is less than enthusiastic:

"He [the Jew] is the born representative of a 'liberal' view of life in which there are no living men and women of flesh and blood with distinct personalities, but only citizens with rights and duties. And these do not differ in different nations, but form part of mankind, which is but the sum-total of an immense number of amorphous units."

He quotes numerous complaints from rivals of the Jews that the Jews cheat in their business dealings but he distinguishes between practices (theft, false balances etc) that both Christian and Jew would regard as immoral and certain competitive practices that pre-capitalist Christians would regard as immoral, but Jews would not—advertising, price-cutting, wholesaling (selling a wide variety of goods rather than a single speciality).

In broad historical terms he argues that the transference of economic power from Spain to Northern Europe was a consequence of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain:

"Israel passes over Europe like the Sun; at its coming new life bursts forth; at its going, all falls into decay":

"The first event to be recalled, an event of world-wide import, is the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492) and from Portugal (1495 and 1497)..."

"Numerous Jews remained behind as pseudo-Christians (Marannos), and it was only as the Inquisition, from the days of Philip II onwards, became more and more relentless that these Jews were forced to leave the land of their birth. During the centuries that followed, and especially towards the end of the 16th, the Spanish and Portuguese Jews settled

in other countries. It was during this period that the doom of the economic prosperity of the Pyrenean Peninsula was sealed. With the 15th century came the expulsion of the Jews from the German commercial cities—from Cologne (1424–5), from Augsburg (1439–40), from Strassburg (1438), from Erfurt (1458), from Nuremberg (1498–9), from Ulm (1499), and from Ratisbon (1519). The same fate overtook them in the 16th century in a number of Italian cities. They were driven from Sicily (1492), from Naples (1540–1), from Genoa and from Venice (1550). Here also economic decline and Jewish emigration coincided in point of time. On the other hand, the rise to economic importance, in some cases quite unexpectedly, of the countries and towns whither the refugees fled, must be dated from the first appearance of the Spanish Jews. A good example is that of Leghorn, one of the few Italian cities which enjoyed economic prosperity in the 16th century. Now Leghorn was the goal of most of the exiles who made for Italy. In Germany it was Hamburg and Frankfort that admitted the Jewish settlers. And remarkable to relate, a keen-eyed traveller in the 18th century wandering all over Germany found everywhere that the old commercial cities of the Empire, Ulm, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Mayence and Cologne, had fallen into decay, and that the only two that were able to maintain their former splendour, and indeed to add to it from day to day, were Frankfort and Hamburg. In France in the 17th and 18th centuries the rising towns were Marseilles, Bordeaux, Rouen—again the havens of refuge of the Jewish exiles. As for Holland, it is well-known that at the end of the 16th century a sudden upward development (in the capitalistic sense) took place there. The first Portuguese Marannos settled in Amsterdam in 1593, and very soon their numbers increased."

Unfortunately, he has little to say about Poland, but he does observe that "*For every 500 Christian merchants in the Polish towns of the period there were to be found 3200 Jewish merchants*", and the picture Poliakov draws of the activities of the Jews in Poland fits into his thesis.

Sombart attaches particular importance to money-lending:

"...modern capitalism is the child of money-lending. Money-lending contains the root idea of capitalism; from moneylending it received many of its distinguishing features. In money-lending all conception of quality vanishes and only the quantitative aspect matters. In money-lending the

contract becomes the principal element of business; the agreement about the *quid pro quo*, the promise for the future, the notion of delivery are its component parts. In money-lending there is no thought of producing only for one's needs. In money-lending there is nothing corporeal (i.e., technical), the whole is a purely intellectual act. In money-lending economic activity as such has no meaning; it is no longer a question of exercising body or mind; it is all a question of success. Success, therefore, is the only thing that has a meaning...

"But historically, too, modern capitalism owes its being to money-lending. This was the case wherever it was necessary to lay out money for initial expenses, or where a business was started as a limited company. For essentially a limited company is in principle nothing but a matter of money-lending with the prospect of immediate profit."

The peculiar economic strength of the Jews, he argues, was that money-lending, and consequently an understanding of credit, came naturally to them:

"The time has really arrived when the myth that the Jews were forced to have recourse to money-lending in mediaeval Europe, chiefly after the Crusades, because they were debarred from any other means of livelihood, should be finally disposed of. The history of Jewish moneylending in the two thousand years before the Crusades ought surely to set this fable at rest once and for all. The official version that Jews could not devote themselves to anything but money-lending, even if they would, is incorrect. The door was by no means always shut in their faces; the fact is they preferred to engage in money-lending."

We might be reminded of Pipes's observations on the state of Russia:

"Capitalism without credit is a contradiction in terms; and business ignorant of credit is no more capitalist than urban inhabitants without self government are bourgeois... Risk capital, the sinew of capitalist development, was absent; what there was of it came either from the state treasury or from foreign investors. As late as the early twentieth century, the Russian middle class regarded the investor as the lowest species of businessman, far below the manufacturer and merchant in prestige."

Great Russia With Jews

Developments in late nineteenth

century Russia, especially in Saint Petersburg, could almost serve as a textbook illustration of Sombart's thesis. Solzhenitsyn describes how, as part of the general liberalisation under Alexander II, the Russian interior was opened to certain limited categories of Jews:

"In 1859 Jewish merchants of the First Guild were granted the right of residency in all of Russia (and the Second Guild in Kiev from 1861; and also for all three guilds in Nikolayev, Sevastopol, and Yalta) with the right of arranging manufacturing businesses, contracts, and acquiring real estate. Earlier, doctors and holders of masters degrees in science had already enjoyed the right of universal residency... From 1861 this right was granted to 'candidates of universities', university graduates, and also 'to persons of free professions'." ⁷

The effect was almost immediate. In 1859, Evzel' Gintzburg founded a private bank in Saint Petersburg which, according to the YIVO (Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe)⁸ entry on 'Banking' "*quickly assumed a leading role and represented the major European banks in Russia*". Gintzburg (also transliterated as Ginzburg, or Günsburg) was a first-guild merchant from Vitebsk, in Byelorussia. The YIVO entry on the Gintzburg family says that their fortune "*derived from profits generated by farming the lucrative state monopoly on the production and sale of distilled spirits and from provisioning the Russian army during the 1840s and 1850s*". The article on Banking continues:

"He also founded the Private Commercial Bank in Kiev, a discount bank in Odessa, and a discount and credit bank in Saint Petersburg. Without investing in the railroad, Gintzburg's credit institutions, as well as their Russian and Western European investors, made available a considerable share of the capital required for this enterprise. His son Goratsii ['Horace'—PB] succeeded Gintzburg as the head of the I. E. Gintzburg private bank.

Ya'akov Poliakov, the oldest of the Poliakov brothers, who had amassed a fortune through leaseholding, which he had then successfully invested in the railroad, went on to found two leading banks in southern Russia (the Azov-Don Commercial Bank and the Don Mortgage Bank) together with his brother Shemu'el. Shemu'el also founded the Moscow Mortgage Bank. In addition to his involvement in the latter bank, Eli'ezer Poliakov founded the first of his own banking houses in

1873. Under the leadership of Avraam Zak, the Saint Petersburg Discount and Credit Bank developed into one of Russia's foremost credit institutions. Zak also played a prominent role as a government adviser on finance, economic, and railroad-related questions."

All this is presumably what Pipes is referring to when he says: "*the first successful commercial banks in Russia were founded only in the 1860s*".

The impact on St Petersburg society is described by Benjamin Nathans (Associate Professor of History in the University of Pennsylvania and author of *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter With Late Imperial Russia*):

"In a remarkably short period of time, Petersburg Jewry gave rise in Russia to a new image of the Jew as modern, cosmopolitan, and strikingly successful in urban professions such as banking, law, and journalism that were emerging in the wake of the Great Reforms. This new profile did not supplant, but rather coexisted uneasily with the enduring figure of the Russian Jew as backward, fanatically separatist and frequently impoverished.

Despite the numerical predominance of artisans and petty traders among the city's Jewish population, it was, not surprisingly, the merchants, bankers, and financiers who caught the public eye. In no other Jewish community in Russia was there such extraordinary and visible affluence. Petersburg quickly became the address of choice for the Russian-Jewish plutocracy, many of whom played a major role in the burgeoning fields of private banking, speculation, and railroads. A Jewish resident of the capital was perhaps only slightly exaggerating when she wrote of the 1860s and 1870s, 'never before or since did the Jews in Petersburg live so richly, for the institutions of finance lay to a large extent in their hands'.

[...]

In the words of a former employee of the Gintzburg bank, 'A complete metamorphosis could be observed in those who left the Pale of Settlement. The tax-farmer was transformed into a banker, the contractor into a high-flying entrepreneur, and their employees into Petersburg dandies. A lot of crows got dressed up in peacock feathers. Bigshots from Balta and Konotop quickly came to consider themselves 'aristocrats' and would laugh at the 'provincials'." ⁹

He quotes the memoirs of Pauline Wengeroff, the wife of a successful tax-farmer, herself a traditionally minded Jew who arrived in St Petersburg in the 1870s:

"Jewish banking houses were founded, as were joint-stock companies led by Jews. The stock exchange and banking took on unexpected dimensions. At the stock exchange the Jew felt in his element; there people often became rich overnight, but others were toppled just as quickly. This sort of occupation was something new in Russia. But it was taken up in a positively brilliant manner by the Jews, even by those whose only training had been in Talmud."

This success within Great Russia, outside the Pale, was not confined to financial affairs. Solzhenitsyn again:

"Intensive growth of the Jewish timber trade began in the 1860-1870s, when as a result of the abolition of serfdom, landowners unloaded a great number of estates and forests on the market... The 1870s were the years of the first massive surge of Jews into industries such as manufacturing, flax, foodstuff, leather, cabinetry, and furniture industries, while the tobacco industry had long since been concentrated in the hands of Jews. In the words of Jewish authors: 'In the epoch of Alexander II, the wealthy Jewish bourgeoisie was... completely loyal... to the monarchy. The great wealth of the Gintsburgs, the Polyakovs, the Bradskys, the Zaitsevs, the Balakhovskys, and the Ashkenazis was amassed exactly at that time... Samuil Polyakov had built six railway lines; the three Polyakov brothers were granted hereditary nobility titles. Thanks to railway construction, which was guaranteed and to a large extent subsidized by the government, the prominent capital of the Polyakovs, I. Bliokh, A. Varshavsky and others were created'..." (pp.175-60).

Power of capital and railways, two of the most important motor powers of the modernisation so many people in the nineteenth century—notably, in Russia, the Slavophiles—detested. Both in fact promoted by elements in the State anxious to bring Russia up to date and able to compete, commercially and militarily, with Europe but both closely associated with Jewish entrepreneurs only recently permitted to live and work in Russia proper.

Dostoyevsky's essay, *The Jewish Question*, was written in March 1877, less than twenty years after St Petersburg had been opened to Jewish "merchants of the first guild". He is essentially identifying the Jews with what he sees as the distinguishing quality of capitalism—that selfishness, a universal human characteristic but universally regarded as

a vice, was now regarded as a virtue. (This is a charge that could equally—perhaps better—be launched against the theories of political economy developed in Britain, associated, justly or not, with the name of Adam Smith.) Dostoyevsky wrote:

"we are approaching materialism, a blind, carnivorous craving for personal material welfare, a craving for personal accumulation of money by any means—this is all that has been proclaimed as the supreme aim, as the reasonable thing, as liberty, in lieu of the Christian idea of salvation only through the closest moral and brotherly fellowship of men."¹⁰

Dostoyevsky's friend, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, wrote to him in 1879, on the eve of the 1881 pogroms:

"What you write about the Yids is quite correct. They fill everything up, they undermine everything, and they embody the spirit of the century. They are at the root of the revolutionary-social movement and regicide. They control the periodical press, the financial markets are in their hands, the popular masses fall into financial slavery to them, they guide the principles of present-day science, seeking to place it outside Christianity. And besides this, no sooner does a question about them arise than a chorus of voices speaks out for them in the name of 'civilisation' or 'toleration' (by which is meant indifference to faith). As in Romania and Serbia, as with us—nobody dares say a word about the Jews taking over everything. Even our press is become Jewish. *Russkaya pravda*, *Moskva*, *Golos*, if you please—are all Jewish organs..."¹¹

Pobedonostsev was tutor to Alexander III and to Nicholas II and was soon to become the very powerful, severe, and unpopular Procurator of the Holy Synod, a layman in charge of the Government Department that ran the Russian Church. As such he had considerable influence on the Government reaction to the pogroms, which largely consisted of withdrawing some of the freedoms given the Jews under Alexander II and imposing new restrictions.

In the next article in this series I hope to return to consideration of the position of the Jews in the Pale of Settlement, which had become steadily more difficult throughout the century, to the pogroms themselves, to the large scale emigration that followed and the dramatic change that occurred in Jewish politics—the emergence both of Socialism and of Zionism.

NOTES

¹ Up to the twentieth century Ukraine was often referred to as 'Little Russia'.

² Pp 43-4 of the French edition. Translation in the English version available on Kindle. Passages in inverted commas are quotations. Solzhenitsyn gives his sources but I haven't bothered with them.

³ There were earlier pogroms in Odessa, in 1821, 1856 and 1871. Odessa was however something of a place apart as a territory taken from the Tatars with an essentially new population made up of many different nationalities. The 1821 and 1856 pogroms were products of tensions between Jews and Greeks. The 1871 pogrom started with a Jewish/Greek confrontation but, unlike the previous ones, the Greeks were joined by Russians. 6 people were killed, 21 wounded, 863 houses and 532 businesses damaged or destroyed. This, and the sympathy shown to the pogromists by government and intelligentsia, came as a profound shock to a Jewish community that thought itself more than usually well integrated. See Steve J. Zipperstein; 'Jewish enlightenment in Odessa: cultural characteristics, 1794-1871', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol 44, No 1, Winter 1982, pp.19-36. Solzhenitsyn, it should be said, presents the 1871 pogrom as just another Greek/Jew confrontation and claims that there were no victims (pp.205-6 of the French edition).

⁴ Richard Pipes: *Russia under the old régime*, Penguin 1995 (first published 1974).

⁵ Hans Rogger: 'The Question of Jewish emancipation in Russia in the mirror of Europe' in *ibid: Jewish policies and right-wing politics in imperial Russia*, University of California Press, 1986, p.17.

⁶ *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*, originally published in 1911. My quotations are from a badly transcribed Kindle edition, using a translation by 'M.Epstein' published in 1913. Sombart died in 1941. According to his Wikipedia entry: "In 1934 he published *Deutscher Sozialismus* where he claimed a 'new spirit' was beginning to 'rule mankind'. The age of capitalism and proletarian socialism was over, with 'German socialism' (National-Socialism) taking over... The antithesis of the German spirit is the Jewish spirit, which is not a matter of being born Jewish or believing in Judaism but is a capitalistic spirit. The English people possess the Jewish spirit and the 'chief task' of the German people and National Socialism is to destroy the Jewish spirit. However, his 1938 anthropology book, *Vom Menschen*, is clearly anti-Nazi..." The source given is Abram L. Harris: '*Sombart and German (National) Socialism*', *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Dec., 1942), pp. 805-835.

⁷ Thus the English Kindle version. The French translation (p.157) gives 1861 as the date when merchants of the First Guild were allowed to live outside the pale. Nathans's account (see later footnote) confirms that the

date was 1859.

⁸ Available online - <http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org>

⁹ Benjamin Nathans: 'Conflict, community and the Jews of late nineteenth century St Petersburg', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, Bd.44, H.2 (1996), pp.178-216.

¹⁰ English translation at <http://mailstar.net/>

[dostoievsky.html](#)

¹¹ Quoted in Antony Polonsky: 'The Position of the Jews in the Tsarist Empire, 1881-1905' which I think—it isn't obvious from the text I obtained off the internet—is a chapter of Polonsky's book *The Jews in Poland and Russia*, Oxford and Portland, Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010, Volume 2: 1881-1914.

Washington DC District Court of Appeals.

Steyn obviously got fed up waiting for Godot with this one, and decided in the meantime to bring out a book of short essays on Mann by scientists from different disciplines, entitled *A Disgrace to the Profession*. To do that, while in the middle of being sued by Mann, tends to indicate a certain *chutzpah*. Another journalist was sued by Mann for suggesting rather wittily that, instead of being ensconced at Penn State, he should be in the state pen.

Stephen Richards

Insidious Propaganda

The Narrow Ground

It may be that Richard Baxter and I have delighted you enough for the time being. I'm very keen to re-engage with him though and hope that some collateral benefit may be the by-product. But I need to get my thoughts together about why he failed; and, secondarily, about why such an influential Puritan should have ended up on the wrong side of the tracks, not just in relation to the restored Church of England but also in relation to some of his co-belligerents, and what might be termed Reformed orthodoxy.

Steynland

Anyway, for now I'd like to take a turn in bypath meadow, inspired not by A.T.Q. Stewart but by a casual and (I think) profound comment of Mark Steyn's. Do I need to explain who Mark Steyn is? At one level I could say he's the thinking man's shock jock, but I believe he's a bit more than that. By birth and nationality Canadian, by education English (though he left King Edward VI school in Birmingham aged 16 to seek his fortune), by ethnicity Belgian (on his mother's side), American by residence (northern New Hampshire), Episcopalian by religion, aged 59 or so, and a regular on *Fox News*. He's an authority on the golden age of the Broadway musical, and a cat lover, which makes him an all round good guy.

He has some Irish connections too: his great-uncle was apparently Arthur Griffiths's counsel, and he had a great-aunt who was a noted sculptor in Cork. He writes somewhat knowingly about Portstewart and Warrenpoint as if to suggest he's more than a tourist in those towns.

He started off his mainstream journalistic career quite respectably, as film or theatre critic for the English *Inde-*

pendent, then the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Spectator*, probably in the Conrad Black era. Then there was *The Atlantic*, *National Review*, the Canadian magazine *McClellan's* and so on. I recall that eight or nine years ago his column even appeared in the *Irish Times*, whether in house or syndicated I'm not sure. His marvellous obituaries in *The Atlantic* were subsequently harvested into a volume called *Mark Steyn's Passing Parade*. He always gave the impression of being able to straddle the cultural divides between Britain and the United States, and between the US and Canada.

But he ended up being driven from his journalistic safe havens one by one. Izaak Walton notes of George Herbert that his wit was too sharp for his body. In Steyn's case it was too sharp for his own career good, but he let rip anyway, and hang the consequences. Whenever Steyn comes under pressure to fall into line he counts it a point of honour to be even more provocative than before. I presume he's now living on the royalties from his books, his appearance fees from *Fox News*, and the proceeds of the Mark Steyn club, which you can join for an annual subscription of \$280.00 or so and gain the right to comment on his articles, and to go on the annual Mark Steyn cruise.

Unlike some journalists he really does put his money where his mouth is. A dismissive comment of Steyn's some years ago about the Hockey Stick graph of the climate change guru Michael Mann (Steyn called it "*fraudulent*") led to a huge defamation action by Mann which, after about eight years, is—in Steyn's words—still rumbling on in ever more complex form in the bowels of the

Along the way Steyn ran into trouble with the Ontario and British Columbia Human Rights Commissions over supposedly anti-Islamic comments. He fought that one too and won, with the result that the relevant Canadian statute on "*hate speech*" was repealed. For all his wit and sparkle, I get the feeling that Steyn could be a dangerous guy to get on the wrong side of.

And the comment that caught my eye was to the effect that these days, for what one might call the Liberal Left, everything is political. There is no area that can be simply left to itself. It's the secular equivalent of Abraham Kuyper's absolutist view that Christ claims all culture as his own. The more I have thought about it, the more I've been convinced by what Steyn is saying. In fact one hardly knows where to begin. It's not simply a free speech controversy either, though that comes into it.

The Outline Of Sanity

Before I do begin I'd like to consider briefly what is the point of politics. In answer to Max Muller's assertion that mythology is a disease of language, J.R.R. Tolkien speculated if it wasn't perhaps the other way round (see *On Fairy Tales*). Politics is a disease that comes of being human, of being fallen creatures in a fallen world. We need politics as we need clothes. The idea is not to stir up the hot passions of our blood but to assuage and moderate them, so that we can co-exist in civil society, and in day-to-day contexts be protected from the cold.

The supreme aim of all political strategy is to arrange that these seething masses of people will be enabled to get on with their lives under no necessity to be inordinately preoccupied with that network of rights, freedoms, responsibilities and liabilities that enmesh them. If our political grievances are burning like

a fever, that is a sign that there has been political failure along the line.

Of course that doesn't mean that all our politicians have to be bland technocrats. They will often need to be cussed, cantankerous and 'thran' and to fight in the last ditch for causes that may seem quixotic. But that's all part of the Hegelian dialectic, which, like Adam Smith's *invisible hand*, will ultimately ensure that reasonable and equitable outcomes will emerge from the mix. That will in turn help to ensure that the rest of us can get on with those employments and pursuits that happen to appeal to us. I would imagine that, during the 1950s and 1960s, most of the English—middle class and working class—didn't trouble themselves too much about politics in between General Election campaigns.

I wonder if this is why John Buchan in his twentieth century novels and stories so often emphasises the extra-curricular interests, the hinterland, of his politicians. We have these Labour, Liberal and Tory Members of Parliament who, at their weekend house parties, are ready to cast aside all that rot and confess that their real interests lie elsewhere, in field sports or the Classics.

Buchan had been in his prime at the time of the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-14, a period which was notable for the fracturing of the social and familial structures within which, up to then, civilised relations between the parties had been maintained. To live through that time must have been upsetting, and hence perhaps Buchan's eagerness to re-imagine this pre-lapsarian world.

The Ulster Crisis has its more recent manifestation in the Brexit Crisis. Once again families have fallen out and friendships have come asunder. I attended a college reunion dinner in Cambridge at the end of March, and it was interesting to note how gingerly, even shamefacedly, people approached the topic, as if frightened of offending. This was especially so among the Leave-supporting *alumni*. That we have arrived at such a state of affairs indicates to me that the politics of Brexit has been spectacularly mismanaged.

In a sense, even for politicians, let alone the rest of us, other things are or should be more important. Political antennae can be developed only by those who have some experience of what life is like on the outside. Points that may seem obvious to politicians often don't seem at all obvious to normal people,

and *vice versa*. That explains why Prime Ministers tend to get worse the longer they stay in Office, and we start hearing the awful verdict, "*out of touch*"; which is even more the case for leaders like Theresa May who never got to the initial stage of being in touch.

We, the general public, yearn to graze in those verdant pastures that are uncontaminated by the muddy feet of our politicians. All too easily, especially in the young, and I speak from experience, a healthy interest in politics can become pathological. Far better to spend the best years of your life playing rugby, chasing girls, or studying the Scriptures, or maybe all three. Maybe then by middle age you'll have something useful to contribute.

Concerted Propaganda

I'll start by telling a story. Last Autumn I was at the Lyric Theatre in Belfast for a concert by Gretchen Peters, a singer-songwriter on the country/folk end of the spectrum. She does a tremendous cover version of a song by Tom Russell, called *Guadeloupe* but, apart from that, I don't think she's particularly noteworthy. What I found was that her songs were interspersed with laments about the intolerable state of affairs in America following the election of Donald Trump. The cool dudes in the audience lapped it all up.

Now, I don't mind what Gretchen thinks of Donald, and I don't suppose Donald cares much either. But, when I'm going to hear an artist perform, I object to being force-fed that artist's politics. And why her opinions should be more important than those of my dentist or binman is a mystery to me. I remarked to the lady on my right that I hadn't paid good money to listen to a political diatribe, and anyway, I quite liked Trump. I'm sorry to say that my neighbour gave me a worried look and edged away.

It may be that Gretchen isn't greatly tormented by the spectre of Donald Trump haunting her waking moments. My hunch is that there are many who feel pressurised to come out as being responsible thoughtful citizens, the type who lose sleep over Climate Change, Russian Collusion, the treatment of undocumented migrants, and so on. And it must be terribly embarrassing to have as your head of state and head of government a buffoon who, by all accounts, is barely houstrained. So, if you don't express that embarrassment, you might be suspected of being an alt-right person

and you wouldn't sell out your gigs. Just to be on the safe side, therefore, it's good to get your credentials out there. But it's a problem for those of us who just want to listen to the music.

Chicks And Chaps

Another interesting example is or are the Dixie Chicks, a photogenic country-pop ensemble from Texas. Now, I don't mind them feeling a certain antipathy towards George W. Bush and all his works, an antipathy which I share. When they gave vent to that antipathy, they had to run the gauntlet of a lot of angry rednecks who up till then had been part of their fan base. But they certainly got some compensation. Their brave stand was lauded by CNN and the other national news channels, giving them an *entrée* into a constituency which up to then had ignored them.

My next exhibit is Jackson Browne, whom I've always admired, despite his membership of what has been called the Laurel Canyon set, and his closeness at one point to the Eagles. Incidentally, I have deliberately steered clear of the several books purporting to lift the lid on Laurel Canyon. Barney Hoskyns, in his study of the West Coast music scene, has told us more about it than we really want to know.

Browne's first three or four albums were stupendously good, peaking with *Late for the Sky* (1973, Asylum Records). He then progressively developed a political engagement and became boring, a prime example of G.K. Chesterton's brilliant summing up of H.G. Wells: "*he sold his birthright for a pot of message*".

Neil Young was blessed with a wonderful voice, but was a less gifted songwriter than Browne. His trajectory was more interesting still. Starting off as a vaguely counter-cultural leftover from the hippy era, a pose which didn't rile me at all, he then converted to Reaganism in the early 1980s, only to renounce his heresy and lend his support to every leftist cause he could. The spectacle of singers parading their consciences is extremely irksome.

I'm sorry that I keep going back to C. S. Lewis but, in his early autobiographical allegory *The Pilgrim's Regress* (1933), the Everyman character gets a rough ride at the hands of the edgy figures in the arts and literature world of the 1920s. When he gathers his wits together he is calmly informed that all the land round those parts belongs to

Mr. Mammon. That is to say, even the "transgressive" artists were, or are, just one component of the vast globalist network of money and power.

And I haven't even got on to the leading British and Irish figures on this wall of shame: the actors and actresses, the likes of Emma Thompson and Benedict Cumberbatch, Lily Allen, musicians like Billy Bragg and Dick Gaughan (a fine guitarist but a political whinger of the first degree); and then of course there are Bono and Geldof. The licensed comedians are the politically committed BBC sort, whose adolescent sneering is directed exclusively at the last decrepit elements of what they sweetly believe to be the British Establishment, not realising that they themselves are the new Establishment.

I believe there have been some honourable exceptions, who to some extent have managed to preserve their integrity. John Finnemore is surely the comedic swan among the ghastly geese who make up the BBC comedy team. The Redgraves may be as mad as the proverbial box of frogs, but I don't think their political views have been in any way moulded by a craving for acceptance: quite the reverse.

In Praise Of Dylan

If I may revert to the American music scene, I would judge that, by about 1964, Dylan had seen through the whole political charade and had decided he was not going to be anybody's pet protest singer. Over the intervening decades he has managed to enhance his aura as the source of gnomic wisdom by making no obviously partisan political comments at all. It may not be subterranean home-sick blues, but it's fair to say that his whole political, social and religious outlook has disappeared underground like some culverted stream.

Even in some of the early interviews, incorporated in the Martin Scorsese movie *No Direction Home*, the strongest impression conveyed is the determination not to be put in a box. The spikiness of his answers, which are often counter-questions, is somehow evocative of the greatest Jewish teacher of all time, Jesus of Nazareth, while his actual concrete offerings are more reminiscent of the words of wisdom uttered by Forrest Gump as he runs across America.

Joan Baez kept the torch of protest burning for a while longer, but in such a decent, thoughtful and obviously sincere way that it's hard to fault her.

Consistent Folk

Moving back in time, we come up against Woody Guthrie, one of the inspirations of the early Dylan, and Pete Seeger, one of Dylan's mentors. Guthrie, one of whose badass landlords was, unbelievably, Fred Trump, father of Donald, certainly walked the walk. The protest was part of the music and *vice versa*, down to the famous sticker on his guitar: "*this machine kills Fascists*". But there were real Fascists around in those days, who were shaping the future, not like now, when a Fascist is simply someone who disagrees with you. Times were frighteningly bad in most of those Flyover states in the 1930s, with very little of a welfare cushion.

Pete Seeger, who died just five years ago, came of age in that era too. Allan Lomax was the American Cecil Sharp, and Seeger was an early collaborator with Lomax. The folk music revival and socialism seem to have gone hand in hand on both sides of the Atlantic. Seeger, having been a member for most of his twenties, left the Communist Party in 1949, disillusioned with what he saw as the travesty that Stalin had made of the Revolution. In fact he later went off the idea of revolutions altogether, stressing the importance of reformist, incremental change.

But he didn't make life easy for himself, refusing (possibly alone among the accused) to plead the Fifth Amendment before the House of Un-American Activities Committee, and condemning himself to a hand to mouth existence for most of the 1950s. A misguided character in some ways possibly, always prepared to see the best in everybody, with the virtues of humility and courage combined in his person, I would feel it impertinent of me to critique him, or to put him in the same category as the *faux* revolutionaries and anti-Fascists who are constantly preening and pirouetting before us, and getting rich in the process.

Imaginative Elbow Room

When it comes to the arts, I think there's a lot to be said for the Emily Dickinson *dictum*, that we should tell the truth but tell it slant. The shouty brand of musical activism, *a la* Billy Bragg, doesn't exactly inspire, like some of the preachers I listened to in my youth, who made a full-frontal assault on the emotions, by way of a short cut to the desired result, bypassing the regions of reason and imagination.

That is why Orwell's *Animal Farm* was so much more devastating than any ordinary anti-Stalinist political tract. The genius of the book is that, while it's an allegory, even a precise allegory, the characters have a life beyond their allegorical purpose. When we think of Boxer, we don't so much think of the oppressed workers in the fields and factories of Soviet Russia: we just think of Boxer, the big honest harmless horse. In this respect Orwell comes closest to Bunyan in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, with the allegory coming to life. The characters walk around, and create elbow room for the reader.

Arthur Miller achieved something similar with *The Crucible*, not such an exact allegory to be sure, but a wonderful historical and imaginative juxtaposition, provoking all kinds of questions about what was really going on in both periods, and why. This is the exact opposite of what happens with the plays of George Bernard Shaw, which have the effect of enclosing you in a straitjacket.

At a much more modest level, I've been greatly impressed by a song called *Springfield Mountain Coal Miner*, which I used to listen to on Youtube, as performed by the late great Kate Wolf, but am not now able to locate. It's ostensibly a lament about a mining disaster somewhere in the Appalachians, but is trying to say something about the Viet Nam war. As with Miller, it encourages us to hold more than one thing in our heads at the same time. There's a lot of subtlety in American 'popular' musical culture, largely absent from American literary culture.

The State Broadcaster

In saying all this, I'm trying to raise two cheers for the tradition of political protest and general ideological and philosophical commitment in the arts. Long may it continue. My own protest is against the irresistible tidal wave of virtually enforced political and social conformity which is surging all around us, promoted by the State and its organs, particularly by the BBC, which in recent decades has been increasingly of a mind to educate the rest of us (through drama, news output, documentary, and historical, political and arts programming) about the joys of multiculturalism and "*diversity*", the freedom of the age of infanticide and creeping euthanasia, the wonders of the benign EU dictatorship under which we live, the horrors of Trump, and our apocalyptic future due

to anthropogenic global warming (AGW).

As Steyn has pointed out, the only diversity which is not celebrated is diversity of opinion. At Belfast International Airport there was until recently a sort of mural, an advertisement for a leading Belfast law firm. It depicted a whole series of heads looking in the same direction, and then another head, of a different colour, looking in the opposite direction, which was supposed to represent our counter-intuitively-minded heroes in that firm.

This has echoes of the *Sage of Omaha*, whose recipe for financial success is that, *when everybody is piling in you should pile out*, and of course the converse is true. I have commented in these pages before on the singular achievement of Hugh Trevor-Roper in overturning the Marxist determinist stranglehold in English Civil War studies. In recent years too the critics, Yeats's "bald heads", have been rocked back on their heels somewhat in the field of textual criticism, so much so that it's even being postulated that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* may have been largely the products of one hand, possibly even the hand of a guy called Homer.

All over the arts and sciences, throughout literary and historical studies, there is a continual ferment of debate, just as indeed in the legal system and in medicine. But there are some topics that are not open to debate, some things we're not allowed to say, and (as in the case of the hapless Tim Farron, ex-Leader of the UK Lib Dems), some things we're not allowed even to think!

Frederick the Great boasted that his subjects could say what they liked, but that he could do as he liked, without reference to them. We have regressed to a less enlightened state of affairs. Contrarians are not welcome and, when they stick their heads over the parapet, they are swiftly decapitated, as with Sir Roger Scruton lately, to a chorus from the sheep of *Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad*.

Some readers may remember the once-ubiquitous David Bellamy, the BBC's favourite botanist. He was never off our screens, but was frozen out over twenty years ago, following appearances on children's television in which he questioned the scientific basis of AGW and the utility of wind turbines. This heterodoxy was obviously endangering young impressionable minds.

It's interesting to note too how the BBC turned on Cliff Richard, who used

to have his own prime time show. The BBC lost to Cliff in court and was severely criticised by the judge, but has yet to issue a proper apology for its treatment of him.

David Attenborough by contrast has attained the BBC equivalent of canonisation, recipient of the dreaded accolade of national treasure. Having started out as a reasonably competent natural history broadcaster, he has morphed into a rabid propagandist for AGW. It seems he was recently caught out when footage was shown of walrus apparently jumping from cliffs to their deaths. This was portrayed as a despairing nihilistic reaction to loss of habitat caused by climate change. It turned out to be nothing of the kind, and the truth was uncovered by Paul Homewood in his blog, *Not a Lot of People Know That*. No admissions from anyone. I'm embarrassed to admit that Attenborough is an *alumnus* of my old Cambridge college. I don't think he has any buildings named after him yet, but it's only a matter of time.

Compulsory Commitment

Increasingly we live in a society where it's not sufficient if we refrain from being unenthusiastic about the new orthodoxies. We are now being obliged to support them. If anyone in public life, or even employed in the public sector, so much as hints that in their view the homosexual and indeed the transgender lifestyle may be sub-optimal, or that there may be some valid questions to be raised about Islamic doctrines and practice, they tend to lose their jobs, or if they are a celebrity, their sources of income, unless they swiftly recant. Sometimes they still get burned in the fire even if, like Cranmer, they do recant.

The most powerful argument in the Ashers case, over the so-called 'gay cake', was on the issue of compelled speech. Should someone simply by virtue of being in a trade or business, be compelled to produce messages with which he or she is not in sympathy? The only answer in a free society has to be *no*, which was confirmed unanimously by the Supreme Court, but the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal had decided the other way, and at one stage the idea of a further appeal looked like a bit of a gamble.

The National Trust for England and Wales (NT) doesn't seem to have got the message. I am friends with a couple who live near Anglesea Abbey in the

English Fenlands, a well-known Trust property, where one of the couple was a volunteer (unpaid) guide. I think it was on one of the *Pride* days that all NT staff were instructed to wear lanyards emblazoned with the Rainbow logo for *Gay Pride*. Some of the volunteers, including my friend, declined to do so. They were told that in that case they would have to restrict themselves to working behind the scenes, out of public view. Several, including my friend, took the view that, as they were unpaid, the Trust should treat them with a bit more respect than that, and they resigned rather than be forced to advertise ideologies with which they disagreed.

Of course, even if people agree with the message, or are indifferent, they still might have a valid objection to being used as walking advertisements. The whole thing puts one in mind of Mao's China, or North Korea, with slogans about the Party being plastered over the hillsides.

Sex And Lies

One of the joys of NT membership is, or was, to be able to wander round, admiring the furnishings and finding out about the dates and families, the collections and their provenance, and so on. But the NT now seems to be on a mission to "out" as homosexuals several of their benefactors, speculating even, where there is no evidence, about their sexual orientation, much to the annoyance of the friends and families of those individuals. I've been to the Derek Hill house in Churchill, Donegal a few times. Even though in his case there may be some evidence to go on, the guides are blessedly unfocussed on such things. Most of us really don't want to know.

In this regard the NT and the BBC are like peas in a pod. I don't watch BBC drama (apart from their quite good recent adaptation of Wilkie Collins's *The Woman in White*), but I believe there was some recent drama about a female Victorian geologist. This lady lived for a long time with a female companion, as was common in those days among middle class single women, but this was immediately converted into a story about a lesbian relationship, for which there is no evidence.

The same thing happened with the movie based supposedly on the relationships involving Queen Anne, Sarah Churchill and Abigail Hill/Masham, *The Favourite*, which was turned into a lesbian love triangle. The

idea that Anne might have had a favourite who wasn't sleeping with her was incomprehensible to the imaginatively-challenged scriptwriters. I don't think any reputable historian has concluded that the *dramatis personae* were all lesbians or bisexual. Queen Victoria, whose heterosexual credentials have not been questioned, had her favourite ladies in waiting too, and it was apparently due to her influence that lesbianism wasn't criminalised, as she simply couldn't believe it was a real phenomenon.

These days at the Belfast *Gay Pride* (sorry, "*Pride*") Festival, I'm reliably informed, that there is official involvement on the part of the Police Service of N. Ireland. It's getting a bit like the old joke about Switzerland, where everything that's not forbidden is compulsory. It's not enough that alternative lifestyles be tolerated, they have to be endorsed and "*celebrated*". I don't think that extends to the PSNI taking part in the alternative lifestyle processions organised by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland! The Orange remnant is not an approved minority, though no doubt the Orangemen will soon be in as parlous a state as the Bushmen of the Kalahari.

The Sports Gurus

When I turn to the sports pages I get no relief, not even in the hitherto reassuringly square *Daily Telegraph*. A recent column compared Trump unfavourably with Kim Jung Un because at least Kim doesn't lie about his golf scores. Kim may well be a shining example of Corinthianism on the sports field, but I come to the sports pages to get away from Trump and Brexit.

To be sure, there are wonderful in-depth articles from time to time, and sport, like everything else, undoubtedly exists in a context, but I'm beginning to sense an agenda. Women's sport is being highlighted at every opportunity and is given far more space than its following would justify. Issues involving race and LGBT are discussed with depressing regularity. The point about sport is that in one sense it doesn't matter at all, yet in another sense it matters profoundly. We need to read about sport as we need to read P.G. Wodehouse, as balm for the soul, as an alternative universe for us to stretch our legs in.

But our sportswriters have recently excelled themselves with their sound and fury over the Folau/Vunipola incident,

which some readers may have come across. Very briefly, Folau, of Tongan heritage, is, or was, the full-back in the Australian Rugby Union side, while Vunipola, of Fijian heritage I believe, is one of two heavyweight brothers who are mainstays of the England rugby team. Australia and New Zealand have a history of adopting the most gifted of the young players from the South Pacific islands, and no doubt the financial inducements are hard to resist. The English have followed suit.

But it becomes embarrassing when the protégés don't play by the rules. Folau, who was converted after a bit of a wild youth, got into trouble a few months ago in connection with an alleged homophobic tweet. He then 'doubled down', as the Americans say, by some tweet or other social media communication in which he indicated quite bluntly, referencing Scripture, that homosexuals, as well as liars, adulterers, drunkards and so on would be condemned to Hell unless they repented.

He then refused to engage with the disciplinary process and was banned from playing for Australia again. The rugby league people joined in the condemnation for good measure, so his livelihood is gone.

Billy Vunipola then jumped in by "liking" the post, and adding some gloss of his own. He has now been admonished by his club, Saracens. If he steps out of line again he could be looking at the same fate.

The reaction of the sports writers (on the *Daily* and *Sunday Telegraph*) has been extraordinary. Sir Ian McGeechan, former coach of the British and Irish Lions was the least bad. After repeating that he is not going to get involved in the rights or wrongs of what was actually tweeted, and that he was (quite reasonably) concerned only with discipline in the use of social media, he goes on to say in the same breath, "*suffice to say that I don't share [Folau's] view at all*". Obviously a sub-editor took fright.

Next we have Brian Moore, rugby's Renaissance Man and homespun theologian:

"Vunipola and Folau are in trouble trying to maintain that posting of the words in that meme was nothing more than a good friend would do—point out the consequences of aberrant behaviour. The major difficulty is that at least two thirds of the world is not Christian, so most people will not accept

their basic moral and ethical claims about how is or is not a sinner or the repercussions therefrom.

There is also the problem of the source of their beliefs. The Bible is the foundation of all Christianity, and that is problematic. This is a work in which there is immaculate conception, snakes speak, and people live to the age of 969. It was translated from Hebrew and Aramaic into Latin, then into numerous languages. It has had major revisions, and its contents and exact words are highly debatable. Whether you take the words literally or figuratively is something you must decide and make plain..."

And so on. Without wishing to be unduly disparaging of Brian, I would suggest that the cobbler should stick to his last.

But the worst of all was Paul Hayward in the *Telegraph* of 17th April. This is how he begins:

"When the Israel Folau and Billy Vunipola story blew up, it was fair to point out that players from their part of the world are partly reciting Christian views imposed upon them by colonialism. Equally those nations have had plenty of time to change their minds since European missionaries arrived with such proselytising zeal. All the blame cannot fall on peripatetic English vicars."

This can mean only that these stupid and gullible South Sea Islanders were initially the unwitting dupes of the dastardly European missionaries but, if they weren't to be blamed then, they are certainly to be blamed now. Why don't they get with the programme? They have had plenty of time. Why do they persist in embarrassing us with views which were once commonplace here too (up to the 1980s I would guess) but have now become *passé*? They must be even stupider than we thought. Ethnic minorities aren't so easy to patronise when they declare they have views of their own. It's then necessary to get the gloves off and show these uppity coloured folks who's boss.

Hayward closes with a warning that the two "*are free to think what they like, but are not at liberty to express views which might endanger or demean others*". If democracy died at the roadside with the ignoring of the result of the UK referendum on EU membership, it seems that freedom of speech has now joined it.

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VOX

Kennedy And Lemass

African Wit

Welfare

The Wit Of Chairman Mao

PAT

Kennedy And Lemass

Following the tremendous success of his tour of Ireland in May 1963, President Kennedy invited Taoiseach Sean Lemass to visit him in Washington DC the same year. Lemass arrived in Philadelphia on 11th October 1963. Luckily, there was no need to worry about transportation to Washington as President Kennedy broke precedent and provided Air Force One (the Presidential jet) for his use.

On October 15th, Lemass was welcomed at the White House, and Kennedy was determined that Lemass's reception be as impressive and enthusiastic as his own had been in Ireland.

In a later interview, Lemass recalled the circumstances of the motorcade Kennedy took him on:

"He was, I think, a little bit worried that I wouldn't get in Washington anything like the same turnout of people along the street for the ceremony there that he got in Dublin, and no doubt that this would have been so. But he apparently gave orders that all the Civil Service staffs in Washington were to take the morning off on the condition that they be there."

Lemass remarked of Kennedy in Ireland:

"He was continuously asking questions about everything he saw, inquiring about the people who, he'd been introduced to, allowing no statement which interested him to pass without requiring an elaboration of it."

Lemass was very much put at ease by the President's company in Washington, as Kennedy constantly found the humour in any situation. Lemass noted. *"On that occasion, he proceeded, 'By the way, have you seen Lincoln's bedroom?'"* The door to the bedroom was opened, but what he hadn't known was that his sister had been using the bed-

room, and her underclothes all were scattered over the floor.

Lemass's visit served, not only as a platform to promote Irish-American cooperation, but also to strengthen the friendship between the two heads of State. He spent the remainder of his time in Washington speaking to the public, in discussions with the President himself, and as a guest of honour at a State Dinner at the White House.

While Lemass's visit in many ways mirrored Kennedy's in Ireland, there was one clear deviation—Lemass spoke openly about the partition of Northern Ireland and Ireland, and of his hopes for reunification. He brought up the topic twice—This drew criticism from Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O'Neill. In their discussions, Kennedy and Lemass spoke of increasing Irish-American cooperation, and Kennedy proposed a joint project to further the development of fisheries in the North Atlantic. While no tangible project materialised following Kennedy's assassination the next month, a team of American experts did perform a survey of Irish fisheries in 1966, which was *"quite useful to us"*, according to Lemass.

The Taoiseach departed from Boston to Dublin on 20th October 1963, [Kennedy died a month later, 22nd November 1963], wrapping up his tour of the US. The respect afforded to him during his visit by President Kennedy speaks to both Kennedy's personal relationship with Lemass, and also the President's intention to establish Ireland as an important ally to the United States. Although the young President did not live long after Lemass visit, his interest in Ireland cemented the familial bond between the two countries.

(De Burca Rare Books, Catalogue 135, Summer 2018)

African Wit

"An English bishop was making a tour of some schools in a rural district in Africa. He asked a little black boy whether he liked being at school.

"'Yes, sir', answered the boy, 'because if you haven't got education you've sure got to use your brains'..." (Professor Owen Hood Phillips, QC.)

Welfare

"People May Have to die in this country and may have to die through starvation."

Minister Paddy McGilligan

(*Dáil Record*, 30 October 1924).

In response to a request from Labour Party Leader, Tom Johnson for increases in welfare to avoid people starving in the coming Winter, Free State Minister Paddy McGilligan replied: *"People May Have to die in this country and may have to die through starvation"* (*Dáil Record*, 30 October 1924).

On 27th April 1923, Mr. Cosgrave had discarded the President Higgins' quoted clause in the Constitution that had been adopted by the First Dáil because *"the clause threatened to push the new party on the treacherous ground of State-sponsored medicine and welfarism"*. (*Dáil Report*)

Minister Ernest Blythe introduced the *Old Age Pension Act 1924*, cutting the OAP by a shilling a week. The pension was withdrawn entirely if the recipients or their family had any means of supporting their parents.

(Letters to the Editor: *'Fine Gael should be embarrassed by its record a century after the first Dáil'* *Irish Independent*, 24 January 2019.

The Wit Of Chairman Mao

"A British diplomat was asking Mao Tse-tung some questions after having been granted a rare interview.

"What do you think would have happened if Mr. Khrushchev had been assassinated instead of President Kennedy?"

"Chairman Mao thought and then said:

"I don't think Mr. Onassis would have married Mrs. Khrushchev" (John Eardley-Wilmot).
