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90th Anniversary Of . . . What ?

This month sees the ninetieth anniversary of the signing of the 'Treaty' under duress. The Constitution and the Government set up under that Treaty in accordance with British constitutional usage and within Imperial parameters is increasingly being described as the founding of Irish democracy. In this scenario the 1916 Rising, the 1918 Election, the Declaration of Independence are air-brushed out of the Irish constitutional story. The new version of Irish constitutional history takes British law as its source, instead of asserting the beginning of a new law and a new constitutional departure in purely Irish terms.

Micheal Martin, having led historical Fianna Fail to the verge of extinction, made a speech at a 'Civil War' commemoration in which he accused Sinn Fein of "hijacking history" in justification of its campaign of "senseless murders". The event which was being commemorated is the death of anti-Treatyite Denis Barry on hunger-strike in 1923. Martin said that Sinn Fein was "only belatedly recognising the validity of constitutional republicanism" (Irish Times, 21 Nov.)

A few days after Martin's speech, Margaret O'Callaghan, a history lecturer at The Queen's University, told the audience at a conference at Athlone military barracks that was chiefly concerned with counter-insurgency techniques, that De Valera, the founder of Fianna Fail, had "fomented Civil War" in 1922-3. Her audience did not repudiate the charge, which is the standard anti-Fianna Fail charge. It seems that Martin has accepted that charge as valid. But the death by hunger-strike that he was commemorating was an incident in that "fomented Civil War". It was not in support of the Constitution imposed on the country by Britain, on the ruins of the Constitution adopted in 1918-19, that Denis Barry died. And a hunger-strike against the Constitution is not quite a Constitutional event.

There was a time when Fianna Fail knew very well that it had its source in active opposition, by military means as well as non-military, to the Constitution of 1922. After military defeat, in a war "fomented" by the British Government in June 1922, De Valera shaped the defeated Anti-Treatyites into an electoral force, though not quite a Constitutional

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Merkel line in Ireland's interest

NO EURO CRISIS

There is no "Euro crisis" let alone a "collapse of the Euro". The Euro remains the second largest and the strongest currency in the world. Despite the 'crisis', its value on currency markets remains virtually unchanged. In addition, the yield on Germany's 10-year bonds, which reached a historic high of over 9% in 1990 following re-unification, has now hit a record low of just 1.72%, in the midst of the 'Euro crisis'. Poland, the largest new member State, is currently in talks to speed up its entry to the Euro. In other words, there is no "Euro crisis", with the currency as strong as ever. The world 'markets' are currently treating the Euro as synonymous with the Deutschmark.

What there is, is a Eurozone crisis, i.e. a crisis of how the zone is organised and national economies within it aligned. This is a political crisis.

IRELAND'S "ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY"

It has become axiomatic for Ireland's chattering classes (the same people who told us how vital it was for us to adopt the

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Palestine gets full membership of UNESCO

– and twists America's tail


Reports of the private conversation between Presidents Obama and Sarkozy during their bilateral meeting at the G20 summit in Cannes on 3rd November 2011 focussed on their unflattering exchange about Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

"I cannot bear Netanyahu, he's a liar", Sarkozy told Obama, unaware that the microphones in their meeting room had been switched on. "You're fed up with him, but I have to deal with him even more often than you", Obama replied.

Little attention was paid to other, more politically significant parts of the conversation. In these, Obama complained about Sarkozy's unexpected decision to vote in favour of Palestinian membership of UNESCO a few days earlier, telling him:

"I didn't appreciate your way of presenting things over the Palestinian membership of UNESCO. It weakened us. You should have consulted us, but that is now behind us."

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Shakespeare's entire
Collected Works
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force. He led it to electoral parity with the Treatyite Party (now called Fine Gael) in 1927 and to Government in 1932. In Government it repealed the Treaty Oath, which had been the issue in the 'Civil War' and dared Britain to do anything about it. Britain protested.

The possibility of peaceful electoral reform of the Treaty State into an independent republic did not lie in the wording of the Treaty. The wording of the Treaty would have entitled Britain to interfere forcibly in the affairs of the Free State if it considered the terms of the Treaty were being broken. It did so in the case of other imposed Treaties—for example, it overthrew the Government of Iraq in 1941 for trying to implement a neutrality policy in the World War.

What made the peaceful reform of the Free State a practical possibility was not the Treaty, but the drastic decline in British Imperial morale, and a consequent decline in effective military power, that happened as a consequence of defeat in its attempt to

impose an Unequal Treaty on Turkey around the time that the Treaty State in Ireland was getting its finishing touches. The British War Coalition fell as a consequence of defeat by the Turks and a long period of Imperial drift under weak Governments began. It was not until it launched another World War in 1939, in the hope of restoring its fortunes, that Britain was able to throw its weight about as it had been accustomed to do before 1922.

The Treatyite Party might have reformed the Free State so as to make it acceptable to republicans at any time from the mid-1920s onwards. It chose to do the opposite, using the Treaty Oath to keep the rapidly growing body of Anti-Treaty opinion out of its Dail. Its object was to humiliate Anti-Treatyites who wanted to play a part in public life by making them take the Oath, over which the 'Civil War' had been fought, as a pre-condition of doing so. This policy was persisted in until 1927, when it was subverted by the Speaker—who enabled Fianna Fail to enter the Dail by subterfuge and thus made democratic development possible.

The retired Professor of History at UCD, Tom Garvin, wrote a book about the founding of Irish democracy in 1922—that is, by the Treaty. Martin Mansergh, when he was adviser to Taoiseachs, was the Fianna Failer who came to our notice as accepting this view. Our view was that Irish democratic government was established in January 1919 on the basis of the election of December 1918, was broken by the Treaty War "*fomented*" by Britain, and was gradually restored as the Treaty was rejected—though with deformities ingrained by the Treaty War and the refusal of the victorious Treaty Party to amend the system when it became possible to do so. (The Treatyites seemed to forget that they accepted the Treaty only because the Empire threatened a re-conquest, with concentration camps and chains of block-houses to control population movements, if they refused to sign, and that they promised to use the Treaty to get rid of the Treaty.)

The long succession of electoral defeats suffered by the Treaty Party after 1932 was not the result just of having signed the Treaty, but of the authoritarian stupidities of its conduct of government in 1927-32. Though forming occasional Coalitions with Labour after 1948, it took almost 70 years to overtake Fianna Fail in Dail sets. And now that it has recovered the position of being the major party, it has begun to do strange things. In a Dail exchange with Martin Ferris (Sinn Fein), who brought up the Ballyseedy Massacre, Leo Varadkar said that it had to be admitted that the Treatyites committed war-crimes in establishing their State.

Ballyseedy was, as far as we know, organised by Free State troops on the ground, directly engaged in conflict. The Immaculate Conception massacre was, in a sense, a more serious atrocity, because it was conducted at the level of what Margaret O'Callaghan (who must have been to Cambridge!) likes to call "*high politics*". Four men who had been in captivity from the start of the Treaty War were, many months later, taken from prison, following a cold-blooded decision by the Cabinet, and killed as an exemplary act of terror.

Amidst all of this, where does one find a Constitution within which people might be actively but peacefully Constitutional? The 1919 Constitution might have been such if Britain had not made war on it. But after the delegates were presented with the Treaty ultimatum in Whitehall in December 1921 there was no return to Constitutional stability for almost twenty years. The Treatyites responded to loss of

Office in the elections of 1932 and 1933 by becoming Fascist. It was only when the Spanish Civil War ended and Fine Gael supported the Fianna Fail neutrality policy in Britain's Second World War that a routine of electoral politics within a very widely accepted Constitutional framework could begin.

But that was only in the 26 Counties. In the Six there was no real Constitution at all, and the 1937 Irish Constitution asserted *de jure* sovereignty over them.

Jack Lynch, on whom Martin seems to model himself, added fuel to the flames in August 1969 with a mischievous speech, and made things worse in 1970 by bringing criminal prosecutions against people who were carrying out his orders or were taking him seriously. But, even if Lynch had not been frantic, and there had been no sovereignty claim, there would have been trouble in the North because, while being held by the British state, it was excluded from the British Constitution. The Catholic community had no democratic outlets in the political democracy of the state. It was ruled, with aggravating informality, by the Protestant community and its militia, in a bogus Parliamentary system, whose only apparent purpose was to keep them down. We don't know that there are any Constitutional rules for conduct outside the Constitution.

Articles 2 & 3 were repealed in 1998, but Martin still seems to think it is his business to say what is murder and what is resistance struggle in the North. And he regurgitates the decayed fantasy that there would have been unity, if only there had been no resistance to the undemocratic system of British government in the North.

Sinn Fein has not "*hijacked history*". Martin has jettisoned the history through which his own party developed, but Sinn Fein has not picked it up. Unless some element within Fianna Fail picks it up again, we will have to ask: *What is Fianna Fail for?*

(PS: Tom Garvin's successor as History Professor at UCD, pop-historian Diarmaid Ferriter, celebrates the Treaty in the *Irish Times* (3 Dec): *Birth Of The Nation: the treaty that transformed Ireland*. His range of vision is determinedly sub-insular, provincial. What Ireland did for itself in defiance of the Empire is of no Constitutional account with him. All that counts with him as Constitutional is what Britain made Ireland do under threat of reconquest by war and terror. He says that there is a moral obligation to submit to a threat of immediate and terrible war by a

Attitudes To Martin McGuinness

I was surprised and disappointed in Stephen Richards's letter (*Irish Political Review* November, 2011): surprised at the ferocity of it all though it's not an unusual Ulster Protestant viewpoint.

I suppose I expected something different considering his intellectual ability but then again I have heard some pretty base stuff coming from sophisticated Protestants in the past. It's difficult to take his defaming of Martin McGuinness. The British media said something similar a couple of years ago and the Catholic community in Derry reiterated their trust in him by their continuing support. I have relatives living in Derry who are aware of this support. One of his supporters, a Catholic, decided to become a Jehovah Witness but remained his supporter. That is an unusual thing to do for Northern Catholics converting to Protestantism usually take on their political outlook as well.

Of course as a Catholic you can be best friends with Protestants, even when they're in the B'Specials as I was with a mate of mine. We socialised by going to dances on a Saturday night. Unionism was well in control then and Lord Brookborough the Unionist prime minister was able to go on long sea-cruises. The RUC band played Irish jigs in front of the Belfast City Hall during the summer and sectarianism seemed benign in that nobody was losing their life over it. Then it was all over, the personal friendships started to fail when benign sectarianism became malignant because something has been said that went that wee bit too far. My mother, who has survived the viciousness of anti-Catholicism during the forming of the first Unionist government in the 1920s, said it was going to happen again and I knew she was right for I was feeling it. At work the more militant Protestants were discussing what they must do next time, saying they have .22 rifles at home ready and of course Brookborough at the same time was now threatening to fully arm the Protestants. You know then, though you have not done anything wrong, that merely being what you are is unforgiveable to them.

Stephen Richards's outburst reminds me of my own Protestant father's outburst. One day, as a boy, I overheard him say to my Catholic mother: 'Where's all the money gone have you been giving it to the priest?' She said nothing but just gasped in shock. He never apologised or said he was caught off guard for that would be saying he was on guard all those years against saying sectarian things to his nearest and dearest within earshot of his children. He just couldn't help his sudden outburst, being in a socio-political setup like Northern Ireland.

Then when in his eighties he decided the Provos must blow away the more bigoted side of Protestantism if Northern Ireland was to become a more just society. I think he would be quite pleased with the present power-sharing arrangement and with Martin McGuinness.

Wilson John Haire
13th November, 2011

militaristic state which has the means of applying it. He quotes Trinity historian Desmond Lyons as "*suggesting it was legitimate to argue the Irish delegation 'had a moral duty to sign' in face of the threat of renewed war with Britain if they did not*". And he praises his predecessor, Tom Garvin, who "*took Lyons's arguments further*" by ridiculing those who took what Ireland did for itself in 1918-21 as having moral or Constitutional validity as fanciful metaphysicians. Those who submitted to the threat of overwhelming Imperial force acted "*more sensibly*", and more morally and Constitutionally.

The sudden decline of British power in the face of the Turkish refusal to accept an Unequal Treaty is not mentioned as a factor in the working out of the Irish 'Treaty'. The moral is that Power will have its way and must be submitted to. It

is convenient moral at a moment when a disoriented Ireland may be called upon to be a cheer leader for a US/UK war of destruction on Iran—for which assault it has put itself onside by withdrawing its Ambassador from Tehran.

The Great War And The Forced Migration Of Armenians

by

Prof. Dr. Kemal Çiçek.

280pp. Index. Maps.

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Merkel Line

continued

Lisbon Treaty) that we have lost our "economic sovereignty" to a cabal of Merkel and Sarkozy: "Merkozy". Stephen Collins, in a piece reminiscent of Garret FitzGerald's warnings in his latter months, put the kybosh on that one in taking on Fintan O'Toole, Morgan Kelly and the other prophets of the apocalypse:

"A great deal of nonsense has been spread about economic sovereignty since Ireland was forced into the bailout a year ago. How much economic sovereignty did this State have between 1922 and 1979, when we were linked to sterling? The Bank of England did not consult governments in Dublin on monetary policy. Once the Irish government started going to international bond markets to pay for budget deficits in the 1970s, our sovereignty was eroded from another direction, as a dependency on borrowing exposed the country to the vagaries of the bond markets" (*Irish Times*, 3rd Dec.).

NO EU SOLUTION

The EU has been paralysed in the face of the crisis as major powers differ on the direction of a 'solution', with Britain implacably opposed to any greater financial integration, increased Commission powers or curtailments on finance capital. The weakness of EU institutions and their hollowing out since the Lisbon Treaty means that, with the collapse of the communitarian structure created by Jacques Delors, states seeking greater integration have no option now but to act in their interests and negotiate solutions on a bi- and multi-lateral basis.

Merkel has taken a step at a time. Back in September she had to win the German political system to accepting a bailout of Greece that would involve substantial losses to French and German bond holding banks. She made the case for this in political terms. The sensationalist media—in her case *Spiegel* magazine—prophesied a defeat for her proposals in the Bundestag and a heave against her leadership within her own party (CDU). None of this came to pass. Instead, she won around not only her Government parties—with the exception of a handful of free marketeer liberals and Bavarian CSU parochialists—but also the Opposition, the ever patriotic Social Democrats, to vote in favour of her proposals.

THE 'MERKOZY' SOLUTION

The Merkel proposal is to change the Lisbon Treaty to enable integration of the Eurozone. If that is prevented by the

opposition of the Britain, Ireland and other countries opposed to Treaty change, she proposes an "inter-Governmental" solution on the basis of "enhanced cooperation" between states outside the general EU framework on the model of the Schengen Agreement that abolished Border controls between its signatory states. Given that such opposition to Treaty change is implacable, we must assume—and hope—that the Eurozone proposal proceeds instead.

Angela Merkel has been steering Germany on a course of controlling the solution to the crisis, specifically by introducing a system of fiscal control across the Eurozone in alliance with France. A Eurozone solution separate from the EU could also accommodate non-Euro states such as Poland, and include strengthened provisions for states accessing the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility). Sarkozy stated the principle of the Eurozone regime as currency solidarity in return for budget discipline. The Eurozone would have its own governance institutions led by member state Heads of Government rather than their Finance Ministers. Eurozone summits on this basis have already occurred at Sarkozy's initiative. This means that financial power in the EU will effectively transfer to the Eurozone system.

While Merkel claims that her preference is for budget discipline in the Eurozone to be enforced through enhanced powers for the Commission, it is obvious that this will fail due to British resistance to Treaty change. Sarkozy is holding out for just two things before France fully endorses the Merkel plan for an integrated disciplined Eurozone—Eurobonds and a role for the ECB as "lender of last resort".

A year ago, Ireland was precipitated into an IMF-ECB "bail-out" (i.e. a very expensive loan) by the premature declaration by Merkel and Sarkozy of intent to institute changes to control bond holders and limit the freedom of speculative finance to operate in Europe. While this was disastrous for Ireland at the time, the proposal in itself is in Ireland's interests, and will be implemented once the Eurozone is secured.

Deeper integration, halted by British resistance in the EU, is now set to proceed through the Eurozone alone driven by Germany and France.

BRITISH RESISTANCE

The liberation of the Eurozone from the EU has upset Delors, the architect of the communitarian EU that has been systematically dismantled over the last decade. And now, thrashing around for

allies to save his creation, he has turned to the architect of its destruction, the UK, which is why he chose as the medium of his negative thoughts on the 'Merkozy' solution the British *Daily Telegraph* (03.12.2011). David Cameron has been leading the charge against a Eurozone solution to the crisis, as a consolidation of the Eurozone, with its own internal structures, will remove British means of control over the Euro. Cameron attended last month's summit of EU leaders wearing his poppy. He has declared that, although Britain is not a member of the Eurozone, it is affected by it, and therefore demanded that the solution should be the preserve of the 27-member EU Council and not of the countries of the actual currency. Cameron has also ruled out a financial transaction tax (as favoured by the leading EU states) and opposed curbs on speculative banking schemes, as contrary to the interests of the City of London. But Europe's patience with British divide-and-rule tactics is reaching its limit. In a previously unimaginable headline, the German popular *Bild* tabloid demanded "Britain—get out of Europe!"

A Eurozone solution of the 17 Euro currency states creating their own institutions outside the EU institutions is a nightmare scenario for Britain, but the best option for Ireland.

IRISH CONFUSION

The latest stages of the crisis have been met in the Irish media by a barrage of anti-German commentary and 'jokes' echoing the worst of British anti-German war propaganda. Sinn Féin joined in the chorus, with Gerry Adams taunting the Taoiseach in the Dáil with a "cúpla focal" in awful German. The Government has more or less said it will engage with the Eurozone plan, while maintaining as its bottom line the ring-fencing of the indefensible 12.5% Irish Corporation Tax rate.

The flavour of much press commentary in Ireland on the crisis over the last three years has been utopian, blaming the previous Government for the sins of capitalism and floating unrealistic notions of salvation through the burning of Bond Holders and possibly extraction from the Euro. In his final months, Garret FitzGerald used his column in *The Irish Times* to attack the apocalyptic scenarios of the celebrity economists (Brian Lucy, Morgan Kelly etc.), who had the run of the media, for undermining Ireland's international reputation.

This campaign of negativity had a purpose and a task in hand—the replacement of the FF-Green Government

with an FG/Labour one, and the destruction of FF. In February 2011 it seemed that the task had been achieved, and the propaganda campaign was wound down. But some ideologists just couldn't let go. Morgan Kelly returned to his theme, now demanding that Ireland realise who its true "friends" were, effectively advocating Ireland's return to the Sterling zone. Although Fintan O'Toole cannot yet bring himself to advocate that, he has announced himself a Euro sceptic and called for us to "end the charade before EU chiefs get more powers" (IT, 29.11.2011).

The *Irish Times* is now rowing back. Stephen Collins, in a riposte to Kelly/

O'Toole, has pointed to the nonsense that Ireland was financially sovereign between 1922 and 1979 when it was under the control of the Bank of England, warned of the consequences of a return to the status of a "satellite of the UK" ("quickly drift[ing] back to real poverty, on the scale of the 1950s") and advocated negotiating our way through the Merkel solution, accepting the "disciplines agreed at EU level" (IT, 03.12.2011).

But Collins is wrong. It is precisely at the Eurozone level, negotiated by the states actually involved in the currency, and not the EU level, where hostile currencies are represented, that the solution is to be found.

Philip O'Connor

Lisbon III ?

The prospect of a proposed change to the Lisbon Treaty needing a referendum here in Ireland strikes terror into our EUophiles. It is a nightmare scenario for them. However, it is a nightmare that could be avoided if they gave serious thought to the matter and put the case to their peers in the Eurozone. The Lisbon Treaty is ignored at the moment. It is effectively redundant. Why not let it wither on the vine? It is making a fetish of it to want to amend it. There are plenty redundant bits of legalisms all over the place. Apart from anything else, by making an issue of amending it, the Eurozone countries are giving Britain a stick to beat them and the Euro with—as the proposal gives Britain a veto on a matter that should be no concern to it as it is not part of the single currency. Would the Eurozone countries be allowed to have a veto over sterling?

There is a Euro crisis. That is what needs solving. That can be done via another EU process—it's called "enhanced co-operation". That is accepted as a totally correct, valid and legitimate way to do things, i.e., a number of Members States doing what they can to improve co-operation among themselves in a chosen area. Moreover, it is already practised for other matters, such as Schengen and in the military sphere. France and Britain engaged in it with their attack on Libya.

So there is no reason why there cannot be a 'coalition of the willing' in the currency sphere and it can be formalised by an inter-Governmental agreement that need not mean a referendum at all.

Ireland's EUophiles do nothing but accept *mantras* and regurgitate them *ad*

nauseam. They have lost, if they ever had, any critical faculties about the substantial issues concerning the European project. Insofar as they have contributed anything, they have done untold harm via Pat Cox's destruction of the Commission's authority. It is now dawning on some of them that this has happened, with the obvious consequences, but it's about a decade too late.

It was that fact plus the rejection of the first Nice Treaty that created an existential crisis for the European project. That was when the nonsense that led to the Lisbon Treaty originated. Our EUophiles went along and were cheerleaders for every twist and turn of the subsequent saga.

It began with Valery Giscard d'Estaing's novel idea of a Constitution to give the project focus and direction. Up until then the process was to solve problems on their own merits in the context of "the ever closer union among the people of Europe", as spelt out in line 1, Article 1 of the Treaty of Rome. It was dealing with the realities of situations as they arose by the "community method". This was replaced by the Constitution concept. This was a flawed idea from Day One. Constitutions in themselves create and solve nothing. They only give the impression that they do. Constitutions are nice laudable statements that describe accomplished facts, but the fact of an integrated European Union did not exist and was not likely to exist for a long time. Constitutions are accepted rules and norms based on what exists, the icing on the cake. The European Constitution concept reversed this process. Years and years of talk and waffle displaced any realistic thinking about other issues and

the EU project foundered. The Constitution was a misguided project and its author deserves to have his name changed to Valery Giscard D'isaster.

A compatriot of his, the reactionary philosopher/politician Joseph de Maistre, described this type of fantasy very well, in another context, over two hundred years ago when he wrote of: "the profound imbecility of those poor men who imagine that nations can be constructed with ink".

After many barrels of ink were used up, the Constitution idea had to be abandoned when rejected by France and the Netherlands. Then the authors came up with the brilliant notion of changing some words and calling it a Treaty!

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was rejected in Ireland but the authors did not even bother to change any words but browbeat, cajoled, threatened, and promised the earth until the Irish changed their mind. The little problem being that those who changed their minds hated themselves for doing so. And now the Government contemplates another referendum and their only hope is that it can be delayed for as long as possible. That is also the position of Fianna Fail in opposition. This is the sum total of the Irish contribution to the issue! But there is no concept by either of them of proposing another way to deal with this. They have taken no initiative whatever to avoid a potential disaster for them.

It is absurd that something that has been so blatantly discredited and so fraudulent should now be made an issue again—it is a petard for the government to be hoisted on once again.

Like every crisis the Euro crisis presents a great opportunity—to diminish and eliminate British influence in Europe. Britain is clearly worried that the Euro can survive and thrive. It stays out of it but claims a right to determine its future because it might affect sterling! To Britain the EU was always to be strictly a collection of nation states in a free trade relationship, and no more, an association within which they could play games. It is sometimes described in Britain as being 'constructively ambiguous', but is clearly the very opposite. Now that the Eurozone group might get their political act together to sort out the Euro problem Britain rightly sees this as real threat to the kind of Europe they want and their role in it. The so-called *ambiguity* might have to end. Britain tries to use the EU institutions to counter this development. It has the necessary audacity to be able to pursue this with a straight face. However the

tactic may not work this time. There are indications that the crisis is concentrating minds at last about Britain in Europe and it is happening in the right place—Germany.

"Close Merkel ally says: Britain will not *"get away with"* looking after its own interests at the expense of Europe;

Le Monde: 'On Europe, London must make a choice...or shut up.'

Speaking on the second day of the CDU's party congress in Leipzig yesterday, Volker Kauder, leader of the party's parliamentary faction and close ally of Chancellor Angela Merkel, criticised the UK for seeking to only further its own interests and singled out the UK's opposition to the proposed financial transaction tax (FTT) in particular. He said, 'I can understand that the British don't want [the FTT] when they generate almost 30% of their gross domestic product from financial-market business in the City of London. But Britain also carries responsibility for making Europe a success. Only going after their own benefit and refusing to contribute is not the message we're letting the British get away with.' Following Merkel's call for greater budgetary discipline in her speech on Monday, Kauder praised her efforts, saying, 'All of a sudden, Europe is speaking German. Not as a language, but in its acceptance of the instruments for which Angela Merkel has fought so hard, and was ultimately successful in the end'..." (Open Europe, 16 Nov.)

This could be the sound of a worm turning. And we are told that Ms Merkel has a very useful characteristic *"She never ceases to learn"*, says Ms. Heckel. *"That is why people continue to underestimate her. Once you have formulated an opinion on her, she has already changed"* (Financial Times, 18 Nov.).

Keep on learning, Angela!

Jack Lane

UNESCO

continued

On 31st October 2011, Palestine was admitted to full membership of UNESCO with the unexpected backing of France. And, under legislation dating from the 1990s, the US was compelled to halt its funding of UNESCO, as a result of which it could lose its voting rights in two years time.

Obama told Sarkozy that he was worried about the impact if the US had to pull funding from other UN bodies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear watchdog if the Palestinians gained membership there,

saying:

"You have to pass the message along to the Palestinians that they must stop this immediately."

STUNNING DEFEAT

The 194-member General Conference of UNESCO voted 107 to 14 (with 52 abstentions) to admit Palestine to full membership. It previously enjoyed observer status. Since Palestine is not a full UN member, the UNESCO constitution required the proposition to have the support of at least two-thirds of the members of the General Conference present and voting (excluding abstentions), that is, 81 votes, whereas it received 107.

This was a stunning defeat for the US and Israel, only 12 out of the other 192 members of UNESCO siding with them. The announcement of the result was greeted with sustained applause in the conference hall.

In addition to the US and Israel, the votes against came from Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Panama and Sweden and 4 small states in the South Pacific—Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu—which regularly vote with the US and Israel in UN bodies.

The EU states split three ways, 11 voting for (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Spain), 5 against (Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden) and 11 abstaining (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and UK).

US FUNDING MUST BE WITHDRAWN

A side effect of Palestine being admitted to full membership of UN-related bodies—there are about 20 of them—is that existing US legislation compels the US to cease funding these bodies. This applies both to membership dues and to any other voluntary contributions. And non-payment of dues may eventually lead to the withdrawal of voting rights and a diminution of influence for the US in these bodies.

Two pieces of legislation are relevant. The first of these pieces passed in 1989 forbids US tax dollars being paid to

"the United Nations or any specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation Organization the same standing as member states" (US Public Law 101-246).

The second dating from 1994 says:

"The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed contribution: (1) to any affiliated organization of the United Nations which grants full membership as

a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a state in the United Nations to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood, during any period in which such membership is effective." (US Public Law 103-236).

Under (2), it looks as if the US would have to withdraw funding to the UN if Palestine was admitted to full membership. Happily for the US, it has a veto in the Security Council and can prevent that.

However, it is not in a position to prevent Palestine becoming a full member of around 20 international bodies that are associated with the UN, for example, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In that event, unless other states make up the loss, the functioning of these organisations will be impaired since the US usually contributes a significant amount of their total funding, around 22% in the case of UNESCO. That contribution has now been halted. After two years of non-payment the US will lose its voting rights in UNESCO and with that its ability to get its way in the organisation. Similar restrictions on voting rights obtain in other bodies.

OBAMA WORRIED

No wonder Obama is worried. The US has got itself into a fine mess—if Palestine applies successfully to join UN related bodies (which the US is powerless to prevent) the possibility arises of the US being deprived of voting rights, and therefore political clout, in these bodies, because of existing US legislation. On this issue, the most powerful state the world has ever seen was at the mercy of powerless Palestinians that haven't even got a proper state of their own.

Commenting on the UNESCO result on 31 October 2011, State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, acknowledged the difficult position that the US was in and said that "we will consult with Congress to ensure that US interests and influence are preserved".

Will the present Congress amend the legislation to end this farcical situation? Remember this is a Congress that gave Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu 29 standing ovations, when he addressed them last May. The Senate, which is controlled by Democrats, may be inclined to do so. But the Republican-controlled House of Representatives is a different matter. In election year, they are in no mood to help Obama out about anything.

David Morrison

30 November 2011

The following article by **Mark Langhammer** appeared in the *Belfast Telegraph* on 29th November

Tomorrow's strike—Public versus private?

On the eve of the first major strike in a generation, Trade Unions are pilloried for the narrow defence of public sector interests. Were that true, it would fail. It is a measure of the presentational skills of David Cameron that the collapse in revenues since the 2008 financial crash has been deftly used as an opportunity to shrink the State. "*Private good, Public bad*," is working as well for the Coalition, as did "*Four legs good, Two legs bad*," as Orwell's Animal Farm pigs.

Investment in nurses or teachers hardly caused the collapse! Were Council street cleaners or binmen responsible for the £850 billion bank bail-out? Yet it's nurses, teachers, street cleaners and binmen that are paying!

The public versus private dichotomy is false. The truth is that good public services are essential for innovation and productive growth in the private sector. The UK boasts competitive global companies in the bio-medicine and armaments industries, but only off the back of consistent investment in the National Health Service and in Defence and war spending. One begets the other.

Similarly, we're told that "*gold plated*" public sector pensions are unsustainable. Few realise that annual taxpayer subsidies for private pensions, at £37.6 billion, far outstrip the £27 billion spent on public sector pensions. The difference is that Government supports private pensions by way of tax relief, most extravagantly milked by top tax-band earners.

Just a generation ago we had index-linked, universal state pensions as the foundation to encourage individual saving. Then, either State Earnings Related Pensions—a trusted second tier pension—or an regulated occupational scheme, left everyone covered. Deliberate vandalism of this architecture, at the behest of 'Big Finance', left us at the mercy of mis-sold, poor performing, commission-driven, private pension products. The Union movement on the streets tomorrow will argue for "*Decent pensions for all*" not a "*beggar my neighbour*" race to the bottom.

In truth, the strike is not merely a rejection of counter-productive austerity.

It's about creating a better, fairer, way. Not just about "our" jobs, but about investing in new, productive, useful, private jobs.

Austerity disproportionately affects regions like Northern Ireland, the North East, Glasgow and Merseyside precisely because our private sector manufacturing has collapsed. The public sector is not "*crowding out*" the private sector. The private sector is simply too small—too often creating low-skilled, service-orientated "*McJobs*". Austerity cuts on public infrastructure—schools, roads, housing and hospital building—has crippled our private construction sector. That's why mere redistribution between the private and public sectors is inconsistent with the aim of growing the economy as a whole.

Our public majority shareholding in Banks should enable us to direct investment—using the current cheap money environment—to tackle over-reliance on the socially useless activities of 'Big Finance' and investing instead in armies of jobs producing green energy technologies, renewables, even labour-intensive insulation. The *Green New Deal* is where we should be at!

Nor do public sector cuts work. Sacking a £25,000 public servant—after calculating lost tax, national insurance, adding benefit costs—saves a mere £2000! That's before estimating the wider social costs of the loss of their services. So classroom assistants, youth workers, MOT testers, care visitors, all doing useful things, are pushed to demoralising dole queues for what? To satisfy an unproven, ideological whim. This '*Chicago school*', Von-Hayek style gamble famously didn't work in Chile, or anywhere else. Why would it work here?

Re-balancing the economy is vital to our interests, but the issue is not private versus public. An economy over-dependent the City of London and its spider's web of tax havenry has been disastrous for our regions. All political parties, Tory, Liberal, even Miliband's "Next Labour" cling desperately to the imperial Square Mile project as the "*goose that lays the*

golden eggs". Not for the regions, it doesn't!

The UK has a profoundly dysfunctional financial system—yet timid banking reform can wait luxuriously until 2019! Bank nationalisation has socialised vast losses, privatised obscene gains and choked investment in real, productive businesses. Stephen Hester, the RBS CEO, is effectively the highest paid public servant in the UK with an annual package of some £9.6 million. Amidst shocking and savage welfare cuts, this sort of banker welfare has to cease, period.

Which brings us to the biggest elephant in the room—tax fairness. Total cuts across this 5 year Parliament are projected at £130 billion. This is dwarfed by the annual tax-gap of £123 billion, made up of £70 billion in tax avoidance, £25 billion in tax evasion and £28 billion in uncollected tax. Here is the real black hole, facilitated by 'Big Finance', without which there would be no need for any austerity measures. .

Collecting tax—ducked, dodged, avoided and evaded by a super-wealthy elite and global conglomerates—provides the answer to how we kick start productive growth. Instead of laying off 12,000 staff at HMRC, an additional 20,000 tax collectors would transform the UK's financial position.

Locally, our Stormont Executive has fewer levers. Those they have chosen demonstrate that the DUP and Sinn Fein alike are 'captured' by Big Finance. Cross-party consensus will turn Northern Ireland into a clandestine tax haven, starting with reduced corporate taxation for big firms. It won't finish there.

The Coalition has used the 'TINA' (There Is No Alternative) argument for austerity. Ordinary workers at tomorrow's rally argue that there is an alternative. Collect the taxes, invest in people, their education, health and productive capacity; civilise banking, de-financialize the economy, and invest instead in socially useful jobs, in the Green New Deal, paying down the deficit from a position of secure growth.

The ICTU's focus is not defending public against private. It's about promoting the futures of the many, over the sectional interests of the few.

It's the shape of things to come, and time to pick a side.

Mark Langhammer is an elected member of the NI Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions

The Stormont Assembly has a very strong aversion to passing laws. But after six months of pestering by the press and others, it has come up with a Programme For Government. Not exactly laws—but a programme for a twelve week consultation. These include: creating 25,000 jobs in a new economy; a 50,000 pounds loan for small firms; investing 2 Bn, pounds in the health service; an authority for skills and education and one year's nursery education for every child; regeneration of Long Kesh with the Royal Agricultural Society moving in there in 2013 and a reconciliation group going into one of the H-Blocks two years later; advanced shared education; double-glazing for all Housing Executive homes; a major international golf tournament by 2013; and a single electricity market to include the South). Not a bad shopping list when compared to the misery coming out of the South and Britain.

Integrated schools. For some time now, the Ulster Protestant press, and Peter Robinson in particular, have been demanding some form of integrated education in the North. On 15th September *The Belfast Telegraph* ran a banner headline: *'The teenager set to make stand at Stormont for integrated education'*. The teenager in question was one Jake Proctor, aged 11 from Strangford Integrated School—a well known "integrated" area! The paper pictured Proctor and most of his school-mates proudly sporting their poppies. Below we reprint the school children displaying their British Imperialist emblems. For some time now we have emphasised that most of the "integrated" sector was merely nominal, aiming to displace the Catholic sector. .



Health Minister, Edwin Poots of the DUP has his proposals. He has proposed the banning of smoking in private cars. So far his proposals have been watered down to banning smoking to cars with children, however they might be defined. But we can be assured that he will eventually be allowed to go the whole way. Next it will be in private houses. And still there is no scientific evidence for damage resulting from what is called 'secondary' smoking.

The Year Of Disappearances

I suppose I should be grateful to Manus O'Riordan for rallying to my defence for the 'savaging' I got from David Fitzpatrick (*Letter to Irish Political Review*, August 2011). However, I want to clarify one or two things.

I stayed out of the ethnic cleansing debate because I believe that the use of the term is inappropriate in the context of Cork city in 1921-22. As I pointed out, the Protestants who left the south eastern suburbs of the city were for the most part replaced by other Protestants. So the term is meaningless, which does not stop it being used to raise a hare to get people's tempers up and their pulses racing.

The reason I was interested in the fate of Simon Spiro, a Cork Jew and JP who lived in Cork during the revolutionary period, was because I came across a missing persons file on him in Department of Justice records. I was also aware, from postal directories and valuation records that he had vacated his home on the Western Road in 1921-22. Initially, I thought the file was closed. I suspected something nasty may have happened to him—after all, three Cork JPs were assassinated by the IRA and another half dozen or so were kidnapped. I contacted Manus O'Riordan who had written about the ill-treatment of Cork Jews at the hands of the Black and Tans. I also contacted several others on this matter. There was no trace of Spiro in subsequent Birth, Marriages and Deaths records for Cork, nor was there any record of him emigrating to Palestine. A few weeks later I was back in Dublin where I discovered that the Spiro file was in fact open and that the Civic Guard had checked up on his whereabouts and found that he was living over his shop in Bridge Street in 1924. I also found his name on a passenger list of a liner bound for the US in the late 1920s and that he was also an officer of residence at UCC until the mid-1920s. I contacted Manus O'Riordan out of courtesy to let him know that I had found my man. I tell this story merely to show that my search for Spiro had nothing to do with Peter Hart. I have never come across any evidence, from Peter Hart or from anyone else, that Cork Jews were targeted by the IRA. Of course, Manus is correct in one thing: if Spiro had disappeared he would of course have been included in *The Year Of Disappearances*. But he didn't, so he wasn't. This is another canard, like the ethnic cleansing issue.

I am surprised to learn that Manus would not have tried to help me if he had known I had an 'agenda'. I would have thought that the fate of disappeared persons from a conflict almost 100 years in the past would be a legitimate historical subject. Would he object to a study on disappeared persons from the Spanish Civil War for instance? It is ironic that in a book of over 300 pages in which a lot of controversial material is uncovered that Manus should focus instead on a couple of (private) emails sent to him on a subject (Simon Spiro) and a topic (Cork Jews) that do not even come up in the book. Extraordinary! But this is the level at which much of Irish historical debate operates. This is a place where, to quote the cop shows, 'anything you say, can and will be taken down and used against you', a point neatly proven by Manus O'Riordan's letter. As for Prof Fitzpatrick, I will be responding to his article in due course. In the meantime, perhaps Manus can assure the good professor that I do actually carry out some research. Hey, I even 'dip into' Births, Marriages and Deaths records from time to time.

Gerard Murphy

The police are not all that happy either, as they will have to enforce it. One can only speculate that puritanism is more the issue than health. It is a fact, though, that cars themselves are a million times more lethal than fags. But banning cars, especially in cities, children or no children, are hardly likely to be on Poots' agenda—especially in a place as car-mad as Belfast. Nevertheless, the Catholic puritan paper, the *Irish News*, devoted three pages, including an editorial, on 15th November, to supporting Poots. And these are people who we see daily not even strapping their children into the back seats of their cars. And they never strap them into buses—though most are now fitted with straps. They don't even remove them from their push chairs.

Don't burn the poppy! Two 17 year-olds and a boy of 16 have been charged at Coleraine Magistrates Court with showing themselves on one of these silly internet sites burning a poppy! They were charged with incitement to hatred. The police were informed by some po-faced British Legion member. They were accused as members of something called Muslims Against Crusades. It has now reached that! By the way, It happened a year ago!

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Shorts

from
the Long Fellow

EURO CRISIS

The Long Fellow always remains optimistic and is confident that the Euro zone will emerge from the crisis. When Mitterrand, Kohl, Andreotti and Delors devised the Euro they must have known that they were presenting a political challenge to a future generation of European politicians. Mitterrand, in particular, was sanguine about political problems. He once told his biographer and long-time political associate Jacques Attali that it was sometimes necessary to have a crisis in order to arrive at a political solution.

At the very least it can be said that the era of European expansion is at an end. The EU, or more accurately, the Euro zone will have to focus on internal consolidation. That represents progress. The Euro zone trade balance with the rest of the world is not a problem. The crisis is caused by internal imbalances and is soluble. At the time of writing the Euro has not depreciated much against the dollar. About a month ago it was at just over 1.4, it is now at 1.35. When the Euro was launched it was close to parity with the dollar.

FINANCIAL STABILITY

It is desirable that there is financial stability. The uncertainty has resulted in capital flows gravitating towards Germany which has reduced her borrowing costs by about 9 billion euro. The opposite has happened to the weaker countries, which have seen their borrowing costs escalate as a result of a flight of capital. The Euro zone must establish interest rate stability whether by the issue of Euro Bonds or some other means. This, of course will not solve the fundamental problem which is trade imbalances between countries. This can only be solved by enhanced political cooperation.

IRISH POLITICAL STABILITY

Ireland has been severely affected by the crisis. But its political system has weathered the storm. Unlike in Greece and Italy she has not had to resort to an undemocratic, technocratic government to cope with her economic problems. An impending election did not prevent the previous Government from making important decisions on the economy.

Perhaps with the passage of time the Cowen Government will be viewed in a kinder light than the recent very superficial RTE documentary which concerned itself with 'optics'. The Long Fellow was parti-

cularly impressed with the down-to-earth manner of ex Fianna Fáil TD John Moloney. On the collapse of the Government Moloney said that he couldn't see the problem with appointing Ministers to replace the Green resignations. Should those leaving Government be allowed veto the prerogatives of the Taoiseach while wishing the Government to remain in place for the passing of an important budget? The Green Party's behaviour was purely media-driven.

HOW WELL DID SINN FÉIN DO?

It is not easy to assess Sinn Féin's performance in the Presidential election on a like for like basis with previous elections. The *Sunday Independent's* comparison of the Party's Presidential vote with the number of votes it received in the General Election does not make much sense since the total number of votes cast in the Presidential Election was less. On the other hand, comparing percentages (9.9% in the General Election versus 13.7% in the Presidential Election) is also a little disingenuous because SF did not stand in all constituencies in the General Election.

The closest recent comparison to the Presidential Election is the European Elections of 2009. In both cases the electorate was not electing a government and every voter in the country had an opportunity to vote for SF (unlike the General Election).

The 13.7% SF received in the Presidential Election compares to 11.2% in the 2009 European elections. But in 2009 Joe Higgins stood in Dublin and obtained 2.7% of the national vote. In the Presidential Election there was no United Left Alliance candidate. Just over a quarter of United Left Alliance votes transfer to SF. So the absence of a ULA candidate in the Presidential Election was of considerable benefit to SF. When the collapse of FF in recent years is also taken into account, the SF vote in 2011 represents a very modest improvement on its 2009 European election performance.

However, SF might consider that Mc Guinness's Northern background as well as his participation in the armed struggle will have drawn the sting from anti-republican tendencies in the South. In future it will not be as easy to reproduce such venom against the party. It also succeeded in bringing the experience of Northern Nationalists to the electorate of the 26 Counties.

NORTHERN VOTES

During the Presidential Election Martin McGuinness raised the issue of votes for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland. The standard argument against this is that those who don't pay taxes and don't have an economic stake in the State should not have an influence in the formation of the

Government. However this objection has less force when applied to the Presidential Election since this office has a largely ceremonial function.

It would be understandable if the Southern parties, particularly Fianna Fáil, were reluctant to countenance such a move: Sinn Féin is far stronger in the North. However, maybe Fianna Fáil should reconsider. It is very difficult for that Party to make inroads in the North because the Assembly Elections are based on a Nationalist/Unionist headcount. It can hardly claim to be more republican than Sinn Féin and the "*republican party*" is unlikely to win Unionist votes. Also, for Westminster elections a Fianna Fáil presence in the North would just split the Nationalist vote. But in a 32 County Presidential Election these obstacles would not apply. It would give a strong reason for a Fianna Fáil organisation north of the border which in time could compete with Sinn Féin.

FATHER REYNOLDS

The case of Father Kevin Reynolds is a shocking illustration of media irresponsibility. RTE accused Reynolds of sexually abusing a teenage girl in Kenya and fathering her child. There was absolutely no substance to the allegation. Last month this column reproduced RTE's abject apology which was issued when it became clear that the matter would be pursued through the courts.

Reynolds at all times denied the allegations and even offered to submit to a paternity test. The national broadcaster blithely ignored his protestations of innocence and went ahead with the broadcast. RTE allowed the journalist involved to respond directly to Reynolds's solicitor, which indicates the contempt (as well as lack of professionalism) of that organisation.

The rumoured High Court settlement (2 million euro) will ultimately be borne by the tax payer. The Long Fellow is not aware of any sanction imposed on the journalists or management in RTE. Indeed Vincent Browne on TV3 claimed that the journalist involved was one of the best in the country; that it wasn't really her fault ("we all make mistakes") and that RTE should have had the checks and balances to prevent this kind of thing from happening.

The laws of libel are the only protection that a citizen has against a media organisation with malicious intent. But recourse to the law is not always available because of the expense involved. Reynolds was lucky that a firm of solicitors was prepared to take the case on a "*pro bono*" basis.

MEDIA SALARIES

RTE presenters have relentlessly targeted "*excessive*" public sector salaries. The total earnings of the top ten RTE presenters in 2009 was €3.95m, a reduction

of 11.2% on the 2008 total of €4.45m. Below are the reduced 2009 figures:

Pat Kenny	€729,604
Gerry Ryan	€585,944
Ryan Tubridy	€519,667
Marian Finucane	€513,270
Joe Duffy	€389,314
Miriam O'Callaghan	€290,625
Derek Mooney	€268,985
Eamon Dunphy	€225,485
Sean O'Rourke	€214,084
Colm Caffrey	€213,954

It was recently revealed that Eamon Dunphy earned an extra 100k euro with Newstalk for a slot of a few hours on a Saturday morning which he occasionally turned up for. This was recently reduced to 50k by Denis O'Brien in an "anti journalist" move.

The Long Fellow is, of course, outraged by these salaries. *The Irish Political Review* only pays him a mere 200k euro a year. How can anyone work under these "slum conditions"? But readers can be assured that he will resist the "anti journalism" cutbacks of this magazine; not for himself, but to show solidarity with his fellow workers (if only he could remember their names); some of whom are on less than the average industrial wage! He empathises with their pain. Their struggle is his struggle!

Quota: A Correction

On page 11 of the November issue of *Irish Political Review* it is said that there is no quota for Presidential Elections or By-Elections.

In the single transferable vote system the quota is calculated by the following formula: $1 + (\text{Total valid poll}) / (\text{no. of seats} + 1)$. This applies regardless of the number of seats in the electoral contest. So for 1 seat the quota is 50% of the valid poll plus 1; for 3 seats it is 25% + 1; and for 4 seats it is 20% + 1.

It is unusual for a candidate in a By-Election or Presidential Election to reach the quota on the first count if there are more than two candidates. But it does happen. For example in the recent Dublin South election George Lee received more than 50% of First Preferences. The fact that he reached the quota made it unnecessary to have any subsequent counts. The quota also has another practical function. As was pointed out on page 10 candidates who have less than a quarter of the quota on elimination are not eligible for recoupment of expenses. In the recent Presidential Election only Michael D. Higgins, Sean Gallagher and Martin McGuinness were eligible for the State subsidy of Euro 200,000.

The Palestinian UN initiative

On 23rd September 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas made a formal application for UN membership for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, that is, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip—the Palestinian territories which have been under Israeli military occupation since June 1967.

APPLICATION CERTAIN TO FAIL

To be successful, the application required:

(1) a positive recommendation by the Security Council to the General Assembly, and

(2) a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (that is, two-thirds of the members present and voting, excluding abstentions).

The application has fallen at the first hurdle and won't reach the General Assembly. It fell without a formal vote being taken in the Security Council—and therefore the US didn't have to use its veto to block the application. Palestinians didn't press the matter to the vote because it was clear that the application wasn't going to receive the 9 votes necessary for a resolution to be carried in the Security Council (in the absence of a veto from a permanent member).

Only 8 Security Council members—Brazil, China, Gabon, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa—were prepared to vote in favour of Palestinian membership. Britain and France had announced that they would abstain, along with Bosnia and Portugal. Germany and Colombia were expected to either abstain or vote against alongside the US. The voting could have been as much as 8:1 in favour, but that isn't sufficient to carry a resolution in the Security Council.

(At the beginning of 2012, 5 of the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council—Bosnia, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria—will be replaced by 5 others recently elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. These are Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan and Togo. Only 3 of these, Azerbaijan, Morocco and Pakistan can be relied upon to support UN membership for Palestine, compared with 4 of the states they replaced. In other words, in 2012 the Security Council is likely to be less favourable to UN membership for Palestine.)

OBSERVER RIGHTS: "NON-MEMBER STATE"

Having failed, at least for now, to obtain

full UN membership via the Security Council, the Palestinian leadership is now going to seek observer rights at the UN as a "non-member state", a status currently enjoyed only by The Holy See. This merely requires a simple majority in the General Assembly, which will be easily achieved. It cannot be blocked by the US.

Around 130 UN member states have recognised a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and granted it full diplomatic relations. Most if not all of them would have voted for full UN membership for Palestine, had the opportunity arisen, and they will certainly vote for this lesser status. A further 30 or so states, including Ireland, while not going as far as recognition, have established some form of diplomatic relations with it. Some at least of these will also vote for this status.

Ireland will almost certainly be one of them. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26th September 2011, Minister for Foreign Affairs Eamon Gilmore said:

"The decision of President Abbas to seek Palestine's membership of the United Nations is entirely legitimate and understandable. Palestine has the same right to membership of the United Nations as Ireland or any other Member of this Organisation. Some would seek to argue that Palestine cannot be recognised as a State because its borders remain to be agreed. But if the borders of Palestine are still a matter for negotiation, then so, by definition, are those of Israel which is rightly a full member of the UN.

"Membership of the UN of itself, however, would not change the unstable and unacceptable situation on the ground. ... What recognition of Palestinian statehood would do, however, would be to give dignity and support to the Palestinian people who have suffered for too long. ...

"The day will come, not too far off, when the General Assembly will be asked to vote on a proposal to admit Palestine as a member of this Organisation or perhaps, as an interim step towards the achievement of that goal, to accord Palestine non-member observer state status. Provided that the resolution is drafted in terms that are reasonable and balanced, I expect Ireland to give its full support."

WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN PRACTICE?

What will observer rights at the UN as a "non-member state" mean in practice for Palestinians? At the UN itself, there will be very little change.

As far back as 1974, the UN General Assembly recognised the Palestine

Liberation Organisation (PLO) as "*the representative of the Palestinian people*" and granted it observer rights at the UN. At present, Palestine has a permanent mission at the UN with observer rights, but as a liberation movement, not as a state.

Becoming a "*non-member state*" recognised by the UN means that Palestinians will continue to have observer status but now as a state, with a territory—the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip—recognised by the UN. It will be a firm statement from the nations of the world that there should be a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967—and that Israel should withdraw to allow one to be established.

Being a "*non-member state*" will also allow Palestine to apply for membership of a wide variety of international bodies. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been widely mentioned in this context, with the possibility that Israelis could be prosecuted by the ICC for actions in the occupied territories, in particular, for planting Jewish settlers which is a war crime under Article 8.2(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the Court.

An article in the Wall Street Journal on 17th September 2011, entitled *Palestinian Options at UN Lead to Legal Threat to Israel's Military*, identified other possibilities for Palestinians to use membership of international bodies to put pressure on Israel:

"If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in winning even an incremental upgrade of its status at the UN, it could subject Israel's military to international courts for actions in Palestinian territory—as well as allow Palestinian control of its Israeli-patrolled air space and national waters off Gaza. ...

"Such an upgrade could be more than symbolic, potentially altering the political equation between the Palestinians and Israel.

"As an observer state, Palestine could participate in Assembly debates, but couldn't vote, sponsor resolutions or field candidates for Assembly committees. But it could accede to treaties and join specialized UN agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the International Criminal Court, officials said. Switzerland joined the ICAO in 1947 when it was still an observer state before becoming a UN member in 2002.

"Denis Chagnon, an ICAO spokesman, said the treaty gives members full sovereign rights over air space, a contentious issue with Israel, which currently controls the air space above the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians could bring claims of violation of its air space to the International Court of Justice.

"If the Palestinians accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty, they would gain legal control of national waters off Gaza—where they are currently under an Israeli naval blockade. Under the treaty, the Palestinians could challenge the blockade at the International Court of Justice. They could also claim rights to an offshore natural-gas field now claimed by Israel.

"Even more troubling for Israel and the US would be Palestinian membership in the International Criminal Court. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, president of the ICC Assembly of State Parties, said in an interview that a Palestinian observer state could join the ICC and ask the court to investigate any alleged war crimes and other charges against Israel committed on Palestinian territory after July 2002 including Israel's 2008-09 assault on the Gaza Strip."

The Rome Statute came into force on 1st July 2002. Ambassador Wenaweser asserts that Israeli activity after that date could be subject to investigation by the ICC. This is doubtful since Article 11.2 of the Rome Statute states that "if a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State".

That seems to rule out investigation of the events during Israel's assault on Gaza which began on 27th December 2008. However, it should mean that Israeli activity after Palestine becoming a party to the Statute would be open to ICC investigation.

NEGOTIATIONS MANTRA

In opposing, and promising to veto, UN membership for Palestine, the US kept repeating the mantra that the only way for Palestinians to get a state is by entering into negotiations with Israel. Addressing the UN General Assembly on 21st September 2011, President Obama said:

"Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations—if it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now. Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians who must live side by side. Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians—not us—who must reach agreement on the issues that divide them: on borders and on security, on refugees and Jerusalem. Ultimately, peace depends upon compromise among people who must live together long after our speeches are over, long after our votes have been tallied."

There was much more in the same vein. One would never guess from this that Palestinians are an occupied people living

under Israeli military occupation for over 44 years. That being so, it is impossible for Palestinians to achieve their objective of ending Israeli military occupation on their own by negotiation, if Israel doesn't want to end it.

And the present Israeli Government certainly has no intention of ending it, even partially. Prime Minister Netanyahu said so explicitly during the February 2009 election campaign, as a result of which he became Prime Minister, telling *The Times* on 8th February 2009:

"We will not withdraw from one inch. Every inch we leave would go to Iran"

Of course, Netanyahu keeps on saying that he is prepared to enter into negotiations with Palestinians without pre-conditions. But, in his speech to the US Congress on 24 May 2011, he laid down a whole host of them: NO to a return to the 1967 borders, NO to military withdrawal from the Jordan River (so a future Palestinian state would be completely encircled by Israeli armed forces), NO to a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, and NO to even a symbolic return of some refugees, pre-conditions that he knows are unacceptable to Palestinians. So, it can be safely said that his real policy is "not an inch".

The negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, as proposed by the US (and the EU) are equivalent to allowing a thief to negotiate with his victim about the amount of stolen goods, if any, he is going to give back, while he keeps his boot on his victim's throat. Without outside pressure being brought to bear on the Israeli thief, the Palestinian victim is not going to get any of its stolen goods back.

Of course, if the Security Council was doing its job, Israel would be convicted of theft and sanctions imposed on it, until such times as it returned all the stolen goods and paid reparations for all the damage it did to them while they were in its possession. After all, that's what was done to Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990.

CAIRO AND NOW

Two years ago, in his Cairo speech on 4th June 2009, President Obama said:

"... it is ... undeniable that the Palestinian people—Muslims and Christians—have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. For more than 60 years they've endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the daily humiliations—large and small—that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: The situation for the Palestinian

people is intolerable. And America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own."

In stark contrast, in his speech to the UN General Assembly this year, the word "*occupation*" did not pass his lips and he said nothing about the conditions of life Palestinians have had to endure for decades as a consequence of the Zionist project, backed by the West. Instead, listening to the speech, one could have been forgiven for thinking that Israel was the helpless victim of ongoing Palestinian and other Arab violence and threats of violence.

Another word that was missing from his speech was "*settlements*". Back in June 2009, he declared:

"The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop."

Two years later, Israel is still building settlements and, by so doing, is still violating previous agreements. But, now he has not a word of rebuke for Israel about this matter.

The agreement Obama had in mind in his Cairo speech was the Road Map, the internationally approved framework for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, which was drawn up by the Quartet in 2003 and endorsed by the Security Council. Israel accepted the Road Map in May 2003, when Ariel Sharon was Prime Minister. Under the Road Map, prior to the start of negotiations, Israel is supposed to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth, amongst other things (see Sadaka briefing).

Obama has now chosen to forget about Israel's continuing violation of a previous agreement. He has done so, because in September 2009 a few months after his Cairo speech, in the face of opposition from Prime Minister Netanyahu, he backed down ignominiously, and, instead of demanding that Israel halt settlement building prior to negotiations, he set about pressurising the Palestinians to enter into negotiations without Israel halting settlement building as required by the Road Map.

COLONISE AND CLAIM

It was utterly disgraceful that Obama has tried to pressurise Palestinians into negotiations without a settlement freeze. After all, why should Palestinians attempt to negotiate a new agreement with Israel when it is in violation of a previous one? Particularly, when the settlement building in violation of the previous agreement is the basis on which Israel claims that ever more Palestinian territory east of the 1967 borders be annexed to Israel in a final settlement.

At the White House on 20 May 2011, Netanyahu declared:

"I think for there to be peace, the Palestinians will have to accept some basic realities. The first is that while Israel is prepared to make generous compromises for peace, it cannot go back to the 1967 lines—because these lines are indefensible; because they don't take into account certain changes that have taken place on the ground, demographic changes that have taken place over the last 44 years."

There, Netanyahu asserts that by planting Jewish settlers on occupied territory east of the 1967 Border (in violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in violation of Security Council resolutions 446, 452 and 465 and, since 2003, also in violation of the Road Map) Israel has acquired permanent rights to the territory it has colonised. It follows that the more land Israel colonises, the more land it acquires permanent rights to, according to the Israeli Prime Minister.

No state in the world other than Israel would dare to argue openly in the 21st century that permanent rights can be acquired to territory not its own by planting settlers on it.

NO SETTLEMENT FREEZE, NO NEGOTIATIONS

In the face of the Israeli refusal to cease this colonisation and Obama's abandonment of any attempt to make them cease, Palestinians have refused to enter into negotiations with Israel. Instead, they have focused attention on bringing international pressure to bear on Israel, first by a international campaign for recognition (which has been very successful amongst the states of Latin America, because the US no longer holds sway there), and second by taking this UN initiative.

Negotiations with Israel have not been ruled out but firm conditions have been placed on entering into them. President Abbas told the General Assembly on 23rd September:

"We adhere to the option of negotiating a lasting solution to the conflict in accordance with resolutions of international legitimacy. Here, I declare that the Palestine Liberation Organization is ready to return immediately to the negotiating table on the basis of the adopted terms of reference based on international legitimacy and a complete cessation of settlement activities. ...

"Negotiations will be meaningless as long as the occupation army on the ground continues to entrench its occupation, instead of rolling it back, and continues to change the demography of our country in order to create a new basis on which to alter the borders."

The Quartet (US, EU, Russia and the UN Secretary General) laboured for months during the summer to agree a statement about restarting negotiations. It finally published one, which doesn't mention settlement activity, after Abbas made his speech. Negotiations are not going to resume any time soon.

LIFE LESS COMFORTABLE

Life is going to get less comfortable for Israel in the wake of the popular upheavals in neighbouring Arab states. It has had to suffer the indignity of having its embassy in Cairo stormed and its ambassador and his staff sent packing and of having to evacuate its embassy in Amman lest the same happen there. And it has had to endure all this quietly, knowing that its usual bullying tactics in the region would stir up further popular antagonism in Egypt and Jordan and make matters worse. The end result of the popular upheavals in the Middle East will be regimes that are more sympathetic to Palestinians in their struggle against Israel.

Against this background, Israel's refusal to apologise to Turkey for the killing of 9 Turkish nationals aboard the Mavi Marmara last year was crazy. The inevitable result was the rupture of diplomatic relations with Turkey, formerly its closest ally in the region and now, as a member of NATO, in a position to disrupt Israel's strategic ambition to develop ever closer relations with that organisation.

It was against this background that the Palestinian UN initiative has taken place. It has drawn attention to the reality of Palestine—Israeli military occupation, never ending settlement building, the sham of negotiations, etc—in a way that nothing else has done in recent years. In addition, it carries with it the possibility of some constraints being put on Israeli behaviour in the occupied territories via the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.

IRELAND'S POSITION

In response to the Palestinian UN initiative, Foreign Minister, Eamon Gilmore, has dispensed with the usual 'balanced' statements on the Palestinian issue and singled out Israel's military occupation and colonisation of Palestinian territories as the root of the problem.

Here's what he said in answer to a question in Dáil Éireann on 13th July 2011:

"The continuing Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian territories is at the heart of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The issues which have been critical for Israel for most of its history—the existence of the state of Israel and its right to live in peace and security—have for many years been accepted in principle by most Arab and Palestinian opinion. It is the continuing occupation, and the creation and growth of illegal settlements on the occupied lands, which are now the major obstacles to peace."

No Irish foreign minister has gone that far before.

Unfortunately, he goes on to call for the resumption of negotiations, as if Israel was going to abandon its military occupation and colonisation voluntarily. It is obvious that negotiations are a pointless exercise without a great deal of outside pressure being applied to Israel to end its military occupation and colonisation.

David Morrison

30 November 2011

Who's Afraid Of William Shakespeare?

A few years ago Aubane published a well-argued case that William Shakespeare of Stratford did not write the plays and poems attributed to him. It got the strangest reactions. Though sent to our literacy gurus none reviewed it apart from a few lines in *Books Ireland* to the effect that it was not a new idea. Otherwise silence. Par for the course. But the strangest, and repeated, reaction was that of people who happened to look at the blurb at bookstalls, book fairs, etc. There would be a physical reaction of shock and anger at such an idea. It was like nursery children being told Santa may not exist.

There has been a similar reaction to the recent film "Anonymous" which claims that the plays and poems were written by the Earl of Oxford. I am not convinced that he wrote them but that has nothing to do with proving that Shakespeare did so. The *Irish Times* to date has published no less than four diatribes against the film and against the notion that our Will may not be the author. In response to the first item I submitted a letter on 30th October as follows:

"Shakespeare's authorship

Writing about the new film, 'Anonymous', James Shapiro says that "*Not a shred of documentary evidence has been found that connects de Vere to any of the plays or poems.*" (29 October). But more importantly, what documentary evidence is there that connects William Shakespeare of Stratford with any of the plays or poems attributed to him? I would be grateful if Mr. Shapiro, or any of your readers, could direct me to a manuscript by him of any of the plays or poems. Or indeed, to any document or letter by him to anybody or any letter to him from anybody. Surely the question of the authorship cannot be established without this kind of essential evidence."







The letter was not published so I am as wise as ever. Some days later Fintan O' Toole assured readers that: "*This is not really a biographical question. Much is made of the paucity of documentary evidence about the man, but actually, by 16th- and 17th-century standards, he is a reasonably well-attested figure.*" (5 Nov.).

This is puerile. Nobody doubts the existence of a William Shakespeare but what is doubted is his authorship of the works attributed to him. That is what is most certainly not "attested". Fintan is just being slippery but I suspect not consciously so. That's just the way his mind works.

THE COLLECTED WORKS

Here, at enormous expense, for your cogitation and delectation, we reproduce

the collected works of William Shakespeare of Stratford, the sum total of all the actual writings attributable to him:

	11th May 1612
	10th March 1613
	11th March 1613
	25th March 1616
	ditto
	ditto

These are all signatures to legal documents. Apart from the 'paucity'—putting it mildly—there are other problems. Are these the works of a literate person? There are some immediate problems that indicate this is not so. Could you, dear reader, in all honesty deduce that all these are the signatures of one William Shakespeare if you did not know the name you were looking for? I suggest you would find it difficult as none of them actually spell the surname correctly and the first name varies in very peculiar ways as do all the letters. Just look at the various versions of the initial letter S! All signatures differ but do you know of anybody whose signatures differ so much? And so differently written just a day apart in the case of two of them, and so differently in one single document on the same date as the last three all taken from his will?

In some cases the writer puts his signature on two lines rather than one. Why? Did he not know you write words in single lines?

However, there is one clear and telling feature to them, they improve over time. As we know practice makes perfect—almost? All the indications are that what we have here is a person being instructed and *trying* to write. There is a plausible theory that he never wrote any of these and that being legal documents they were all signed on his behalf by legal clerks which was a common practice at the time with so many illiterate people. But I think

we should be generous and concede that Will probably did at least try to spell his own name towards the end of his life!

It is fully "attested" that his father, wife and children were not literate. There is no evidence that he sought to make any of them otherwise. Was it not for the fairly obvious reason that he simply could not do so? Could this be the same person who is acclaimed as the greatest writer in the English language?

There are of course other documents 'attesting' to Will's existence, not by him, and one is too amusing not to mention. It is his marriage record to Anne some months into her pregnancy. His surname is recorded therein as Shagspere. Did the recorder, knowing his Will, and confident that neither he nor Anne could read, have a little joke at their expense!

You could not make it up. Or could you?

Being the month that's in it, Happy Xmas to Fintan and all the true believers and I hope Santa also keeps calling.

Jack Lane

The Shakespeare Conspiracies,
untangling a 400-year old web of
myth and deceit,

by *Brian McClinton*

Index. Bibliography 516 pp. ISBN 978-1-903497-36-4. Aubane Historical Society. 2007.

€25, £18.99.

An Academic Views The Treaty War In Cork

About half of this book is about responses to the 'Treaty' of December 1921, and the other half is about the short battle for Cork City in early August 1922. The battle for the City was short and bloodless because the military leader in the War of Independence decided not to contest the conquest by the Treatyite leaders of the part of the country allocated to them by the 'Treaty', despite the fact that the 'Treaty' was granted on the condition of disestablishing the Republic of 1919-21 and replacing it with a new State under the authority of the Crown.

That military leader was Sean O'Hegarty. O'Hegarty was closely associated in war and politics with Florrie O'Donoghue, who handled Intelligence during the War of Independence. O'Hegarty and O'Donoghue, who both rejected the 'Treaty', tried during the first half of 1922 to negotiate a compromise with the Treatyites by which the Republican Army would remain intact under a political arrangement which left the Treatyites free to go ahead with the amendment of the Dail Eireann Government into a Government which acknowledged the sovereignty of the Crown. The Treatyite Defence Minister, Richard Mulcahy, also said that it was his intention to maintain the unity of the IRA as the 'Treaty' was implemented, but at critical points he did not follow through on agreements.

O'Hegarty said he did not care what name the state had, as long as the substance of independence was maintained. He worked industriously and imaginatively on arrangements which enabled the Treatyites to go ahead with implementation of the 'Treaty', while preserving the Army whose proven fighting power was the only reason why Britain had offered the 'Treaty' terms.

When it became evident that the Treatyite leadership was driven by a will to war, and that no political expedient would divert it from the object of crushing the Republican Army, O'Hegarty and O'Donoghue resigned from the IRA. The replacement leadership then offered no effective resistance to the Treatyite invasion of early August.

The real story of the *Battle for Cork* is why there was nothing deserving the name of a battle. And that is the story of O'Hegarty and O'Donoghue, of which the reader could get no adequate idea from Borgonovo's cursory remarks.

There is a biography of O'Hegarty which goes into his actions in those crucial six or seven months after the 'Treaty'—Kevin Girvin's *Sean O'Hegarty, O/C First Cork Brigade, Irish Republican Army*, published by *Aubane*. Borgonovo does not refer to it, or even list it in his Bibliography, even though it is the only book on O'Hegarty, and O'Hegarty was indisputably the central figure in the Battle for Cork.

Borgonovo quotes a paragraph from O'Donoghue on the position of the Army in the State established in accordance with the electoral mandate of 1918:

"IRA officers in Munster remained incredulous that they were not consulted before the Treaty was submitted for ratification. Writing in 1929, Florrie O'Donoghue expressed this militarist view:

"The Army created Sinn Fein in the country: the Army created and controlled every national activity from 1916 to the truce of 1921. The Army was the deciding factor in the 1918 elections; it made and largely manned the Dail and the Government of the Republic. The Army put the Dail in power and kept it there; it directed and controlled every department of that government. The Army policy was the policy of the government. Everything else was subservient to it; it was the driving force of the whole movement for independence. To misunderstand this would be to misunderstand the whole position of the Army"..." (p28).

The reference for this is "*notes... on The American Commission..., papers of Terence MacSwiney's biographers, UCD*"—private notes written seven years after 1922, and therefore not a militarist view expressed in 1922 and influencing developments then.

But, (leaving aside the time warp), in what way is this view militarist? All I can see in it is a factual description of the part played by the military element in the development of the Independence movement as a consequence of the well-established British position that it would never concede Irish independence to a mere vote.

The Army was formed late in 1913, in support of Home Rule, in response to the formation of a Unionist Army to prevent the implementation of Home Rule, even if enacted by Parliament. It was in the first instance a Home Rule Army. It was formed independently of Redmond, but he demanded, and gained, control of it in

1914. When he urged enlistment in the British Army in September 1914, a small group split off and began to prepare for insurrection. The bulk of the Volunteers stayed with Redmond, and he held a great Review of them in 1915, at which belligerent speeches were made against the Unionist Volunteers, even though they were allies in the war on Germany and Turkey. (See Pat Walsh: *The Rise And Fall Of Imperial Ireland*.)

The Government, perhaps realistically, did not treat the split in the Volunteers as a substantial fact, and did not suppress the Volunteers who were preparing an insurrection, lest this should upset the Volunteers who were supporting it in the War. Thus Redmond's Volunteers provided cover for the 1916 Rising. After the Rising, it was around the survivals of the insurrectionary Volunteers that Sinn Fein was constructed into a viable political party as the Home Rule Party was undermined by the Conscription Act.

The new Sinn Fein party then won the Election and sent delegates to Paris to get Irish Independence recognised by the Powers that had just won the Great War for democracy and the rights of small nations. Britain vetoed Irish Independence at the Peace Conference and continued governing the country in defiance of the Election. And that, of course, made everything depend on the Volunteers once more.

That is the situation described by O'Donoghue seven years after he retired from the Army rather than engage in a war of resistance to the new Army authorised, financed and armed by Britain.

Neither that description, nor O'Donoghue's actions in 1922, could be described as "*militarist*" without a gross perversion of language. Perhaps Borgonovo has evidence which he does not present that O'Donoghue was militarist, but to the best of my knowledge O'Donoghue's attitude, especially in 1922, was the opposite of militarist. It was not even military.

Militarism—a preference for military action as a means of dealing with a problem when other means are available—was, however, strongly present in the Treatyite approach.

(I use the term "*militarism*" as I have seen it used over many decades, but I looked up some dictionaries to assure myself that I had not picked it up wrong. (I am uneducated after all.) Here is what I found. *Shorter Oxford*: "the attachment of (undue) importance to military values and military strength". *New Oxford*: "the belief or desire of a government or people

that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote national interests". *New Penguin*: "a policy of aggressive military preparedness; the glorification of military virtues and ideals".)

A better case might be made that O'Hegarty sometimes tended towards militarism. It would be superficial, but the case with regard to O'Donoghue is not even that.

O'Hegarty made his views on the 'Treaty' known to Cork TDs during the weeks between the signing of the document at the orders of Lloyd George and Dail discussion of it. Cathal Brugha, who was still Minister for Defence at the time, instructed the Chief of Staff, Mulcahy, to censure him:

"This officer requires some enlightening as to the scope of his duties. You will now kindly define those duties for him and inform him that sending reminders to public representatives pointing out what he, or those under him, consider those representatives should do in crises like the present in not one of them..."

But O'Hegarty would not accept censure on the point. He wrote to the Divisional Adjutant on 19th December 1921:

"The circumstances cannot be judged as the ordinary political variations of a settled country. Here is no ordinary change. What is contemplated in these proposals is more than that. It is the upsetting of the constitution—the betrayal of the Republic. Who better than those who fought to maintain it have a right in this crisis to uphold the Republic; to make clear to those who have the decisions in this matter what their duty is..." (see Kevin Girvin, *Sean O'Hegarty*, p92-3).

Girvin comments:

"In the past, the IRA had distanced itself from... politics in general. However, the signing of the Treaty saw the Volunteers becoming actively involved in the issue... There was military interference on behalf of both sides with resolutions—either pro- or anti-Treaty—being passed throughout the country..." (p95).

In May 1922 this was O'Hegarty's view of the conduct of the Dail:

"For six months they have indulged themselves in bitter verbal attacks against each other, while failing to achieve anything constructive... The country was heading towards war and, if a solution was to be found, it would come from the Army and not from the politicians..." (p95).

This was said while O'Hegarty was engaged in an Army initiative that almost

brought the Dail together in defence of its Constitution, but which failed because the will to war prevailed in the Treatyite leadership.

Can all this be reasonably described as "militarism" on O'Hegarty's part—a preference for military action over political action? Is it not the duty of the soldier, as Brugha said, to be an obedient instrument of the Government of the day, and to act in response to orders without questioning the reason why?

That is certainly what is said in *kindergarten* textbooks on Constitutional government, but it is not the way of the world. And it is not the way of the actual British Constitution, even though the *kindergarten* textbooks are usually drawn from propagandist ideological versions of that Constitution.

Seven years before O'Hegarty asserted the right of the Army to play an active part in the Constitutional crisis precipitated by the signing of the dictated 'Treaty' by the negotiating team without the authority of the Government and in defiance of Government instructions, the British Army killed Home Rule by indicating that it would not obey Government orders in the implementation of a Home Rule Act. That was the Curragh Mutiny. Open mutiny was warded off by negotiation behind the scenes. The War Minister sacrificed his political career by giving the Army officers an undertaking that was at variance with declared Government policy and then he resigned. The guarantee he gave the Army averted an Army crisis, and his resignation excused the Government from formal responsibility for the guarantee though nobody doubted that the guarantee would hold. The appearance of mutiny was averted by pre-emptive appeasement, but everybody knew that there had been a successful mutiny by means of which the Army exerted a critical influence on the Constitution.

The matter was debated in Parliament. The Liberal (Government) backbenches were outraged and recited the *kindergarten* view of the soldiers' duty of blind obedience. The Opposition (Unionist) upheld the citizen rights of the soldier in matters which affected the Constitutional integrity of the State. And the foremost Constitutional authority of the era, Dicey (whose writings are not yet obsolete), published a pamphlet upholding a right of rebellion against a Government which, on the basis of its fleeting authority, was subverting the Constitution.

A little over two years later the Unionist rebels became the Government under

stress of the war on Germany launched by the Liberal Government with active Home Rule support, and the Liberal Party began to disintegrate. In 1918 a Home Rule MP, J.J. Horgan, published a selection of statements made by Unionist leaders in the course of this 1914 rebellion calling it *The Grammar Of Anarchy*. (I reprinted it as an issue of *A Belfast Magazine* some years ago.) The *Grammar* was suppressed by the Government which was led by the 1914 rebels. Home Rule MPs asked why Government Ministers were now suppressing a collection of their own words as seditious. The question was treated as a pettifogging debating point.

The Unionist case in 1914 for raising an extra-Parliamentary force to defy the will of Parliament was that the Parliamentary majority that was changing the Constitution was not a majority based within the Constitution. The Government Party was equal in size to the Opposition. It got the Parliamentary majority, that enabled it to enact drastic Constitutional changes, from the 80 MPs of the Home Rule Party, which was not a Constitutional Party—a party which participated in the politics of the Constitution with the aim of governing the state. The aim of the Home Rule Party lay outside the British Constitution, and it was manipulating the Parliamentary situation for that purpose. The changes which Parliament made to the Constitution at the behest of, or with the support of, that force from outside the Constitution, were therefore unconstitutional and should be opposed by extra-Parliamentary force. (The main changes were the Parliament Act and the Home Rule Bill.)

When I wrote about that affair in the 1970s I concluded that, within the terms of the British Constitution, the Unionists had made their case. British opinion shifted towards them in the course of the conflict (1912-14). And William O'Brien, who had broken the Home Rule Party in Cork (City and County) in the 1910 Elections had a realistic (as distinct from a debating-point) understanding of the British Constitution, and warned that playing the British parties against each other by an Irish party would not succeed, and he refused to take part in it.

Since I concluded that the Unionists had a Constitutional case for anti-Parliamentary action in the matter of the Curragh Mutiny, I can hardly deny that O'Hegarty had a case when he asserted the right of the Army to have a say in the matter of the 'Treaty' and the Dail Constitution.

The Army is the basic institution of the state—of any state, other than pretend

states like Liechtenstein. And, because of what the Army does, it is necessary that it should feel secure of its position in the State, and know what State it is that it serves.

The Army crisis in Britain in 1914—taking the Army to refer only to land forces—was something very unusual, because the main military force of the British State was the Navy. Navy personnel were over many generations closely interwoven with the functioning of the State. A conflict between the Government and the Navy could scarcely be imagined.

(I have tried, without success, to interest what there is of an Irish intelligentsia in Maurice Hankey, the Navy man who had spied out the Ottoman Empire for war before becoming Secretary of the most sensitive Government committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence, through which preparations for the Great War were made. He then became Secretary of the War Cabinet. And, after the War, he became the first ever Cabinet Secretary.)

The Army had exceptional importance in 1914 because of the detailed preparations that had been made in secret to place it alongside the French Army for war with Germany. The officers at the Curragh were indispensable to the war plans of the Government. When the apparent determination of the minority Liberal Government to press ahead with Irish Home Rule made them feel uncertain about the State they served, there was nothing for it but to appease them so that they might become happy Jingoës once again.

The existence of the British state was not at stake in 1914. All that was at stake was further expansion of the Empire. If the Army had not been appeased, and the Government was unable to launch the war that it had planned, Britain would still have remained one of the most powerful states in the world—in fact the most powerful—and it would possibly have had a longer innings as a Great Power if it had been unable to launch the Great War.

What was at stake in Ireland following the signing of the Treaty by Collins was the existence of the State which the Republican Army served, and which could not have been established, when the British democracy decided to take no heed of the Irish vote, but for the prior existence of the Republican Army.

When Brugha ordered O'Hegarty to be censured he acted within a structure of formal authority whose basis had been put under question by the 'Treaty'. Six months later he died fighting the 'Treaty' authorities, while O'Hegarty, having seen those

six months wasted by the politicians, declared neutrality in the Treaty War in order to preserve something Republican from destruction.

Mulcahy, who replaced Brugha as Defence Minister, said it was his object to keep the Republican Army in being. At first he supported the calling of an Army Convention for this purpose, but then he banned the Convention. The Convention was held regardless (late March). Borgonovo comments: "*In defying the government ban, they had essentially repudiated their fealty to the civilian authority*" (p17).

"*Civilian authority*" was in utter confusion at that juncture. The elected Government of a Republic, whose actual existence had been made possible by the Republican Army, had been replaced by a "*Provisional Government*", functioning on British authority within the sovereignty of the Crown. British authority was conferred when the small majority which supported the 'Treaty' in the Dail met under Crown authority as the *Parliament of Southern Ireland*, which was also attended by a number of Unionists elected by the elite electorate of Trinity College.

The Provisional Government claimed a kind of double mandate, Irish as well as British. It had got its small majority in the Dail before meeting, along with others, as the Parliament of Southern Ireland, to ratify the 'Treaty'. (The Dail, not being recognised by Britain, could not have ratified the "*Treaty*", although Borgonovo says that it did, page 34.)

While saying that the Army repudiated "*fealty*" to the civilian authority by meeting without the approval of that authority, Borgonovo also concedes that "*the state's constitutional status was open to question*" (p34). So what the Army refused "*fealty*" to was a questionable civilian authority.

Now the 'Treaty' leaders did gain a majority in the Dail before going on to have British authority conferred on them in another assembly, and that fact has been presented as the founding act of democratic legitimacy by many recent writers, headed by Professor Garvin. On the other hand, Professor Garvin had ridiculed the idea that the Dail elected in 1918 was a democratic assembly at all. As far as I recall, he described it as a facade on the Army, largely constructed by election rigging. It had no democratic legitimacy from January 1919 to December 1921, when it acted by consensus in the construction of Republican government, but it acquired morally binding legitimacy in January 1922 when a small majority agreed, under threat of British reconquest,

to replace the Republic with a new Government under the authority of the Crown. (And this suddenly legitimised democratic assembly had been renewed in the 1921 Election without a single vote having been cast for it, none of the seats having been contested against the Republicans.)

Going beyond Constitutional formalities to Constitutional substance: this Crown Government—with which a Dail majority agreed to replace the Republic—did not have the means of governing by its own resources. It did not have an Army. The Army which had made it possible to give effect to the electoral decision to establish a Republic was not available for the replacement of the Republic by a Crown Government.

We are told that Collins was the practical man of action who saw the substance of things. He had taken the affairs of state into his own hands in early December 1921 with his decision to sign the 'Treaty' without submitting it to his Government, and to browbeat his colleagues in London to do likewise. It has been suggested that he was right to do this as the Irish Government was only make-believe. And yet it turned out very quickly that Collins, the strong leader who had no patience with constitutional quibbles, had lost the Army—because the Army took itself in earnest as the servant and protector of the Republican Constitution. All Collins could retrieve from the Volunteer Army was a cadre around which to construct a paid Army (with British support), whose only obvious purpose was to break the Volunteer Army that had fought the war against Britain. And he gained that cadre by persuading some Volunteers that he was accepting the Treaty only in order to acquire the means of breaking it before too long.

And so, in the Summer of 1922, Collins had to use the Army, that Britain enabled him to form, to conquer the country from the Army that had fought Britain and obliged it to negotiate. In June Britain insisted that he should do this, and he was in no position to refuse.

Midway through the development from the "*Treaty of Peace*" to "*Civil War*", De Valera said that the majority has no right to be wrong, and "*there are rights which a minority may justly uphold, even by arms, against a majority*". In recent times this has been held to be a disgraceful statement, despite the many instances in which the truth of it is not questioned. The British Unionist Party acted on that principle and was proved right in the only way

in which such a thing is ever proved. Within three years it had got the better of the majority that it said was doing wrong.

France declared war on Germany in 1939 and lost it in 1940. When it lost, it made a settlement with Germany and the Parliament elected a new Government to operate this settlement. This was done by a Parliament whose electoral credentials are unquestionable, and there is no serious doubt that it accorded with the will of the populace. Britain took no account of the will of the French in the matter. It denounced it as wrong, scorning the notion that head counting determined right and wrong.

As the Treaty dispute dragged on, and as Free State power was built up, there is little doubt that the majority became willing to settle for the Treaty. But it never became an overwhelming majority, a consensus majority, such as the majority for the Republic had been in 1919-21. And De Valera proved himself right by overturning the Treaty majority within ten years, and challenging it from a position of equality within five, causing Treatyism to undermine itself by the means to which it clung to office in the last five years.

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Borgonovo finds it necessary to speculate about the killing of a number of Protestants in Dunmanway in April 1922:

"Though Cork Protestants largely escaped the 1920-21 conflict intact, the spectre of religious war hovered over Munster in 1922. In the first half of that year, savage sectarian violence struck Ulster, and it seemed possible that the province's Catholic population might be expelled. This left Cork Protestants vulnerable to possible IRA retaliation. In April, Cork's leading Protestant merchants publicly denounced anti-Catholic violence in Northern Ireland, but were careful to point out,

"We have not been subjected to any form of oppression or injustice by our Catholic fellow citizens..." [*Cork Constitution*, 5 April 1922.]

"Fear increased at the end of April, following the brutal assassination of ten Protestants in the Bandon Valley. Over three consecutive nights, unknown IRA gunmen visited at least a dozen homes on their own list of Unionist enemies. The unauthorised killings drove out at least 100 Cork Protestants... Public bodies... condemned the killings, as did Catholic and Protestant clerics. The situation eased only after IRA leaders vowed to protect local Protestants... Tom Hales... threatened publicly to execute any IRA Volunteers involved in new attacks. City Unionists were further frightened in June, when a delegation of homeless Belfast Catholics asked Cork Corporation to seize Protestant homes to provide accommod-

ation for the scores of refugees in the city. In these months, sectarian anxiety peaked in Cork, as the county peered into the abyss of religious warfare before slowly backing away.

"Gerard Murphy's recent book... argues that Cork Protestants were the target of an IRA killing spree in March, April and May 1922. Murphy's charges of IRA mass murder are unproven and unconvincing. It should be emphasised that these supposed killings are not mentioned in British government, Irish government, Northern Ireland government, IRA, Free State Army, Catholic or Protestant records; the families of those so-called 'disappeared' did not protest or make inquiries... nor did they apply for compensation for their deaths. Dozens of people do not disappear without any mention in the public record. As such, Murphy's claims must be discounted without written proof..." (p36-7).

The notion conveyed by these paragraphs is that the mass killing of Protestants was contemplated by Cork Republicans or Nationalists or Catholics during the Spring and early Summer of 1922, but the thought was not put into effect, except for the killing of ten Protestants by IRA men in Dunmanway. After that initial action, the campaign of killing was stopped in its tracks when the leader of Cork No. 3 Brigade, Tom Hales, threatened to execute IRA men "*involved in new attacks*". Gerard Murphy's contention, in *The Year Of Disappearances*, that many more Protestants were killed during those months of "*sectarian anxiety*", on the verge of "*the abyss of religious warfare*", must be discounted because of the lack of bodies or written proof. The thought of genocide was not followed by the deed—or at least the deed did not continue after Tom Hales threatened to kill any future killers. (Hales is not quoted, and I don't know if Borgonovo's paraphrase, which suggests that Hales took it that the killing already done was by the IRA, is accurate.)

Now, if that actually was the situation in Cork between the Treaty and the 'Civil War', I think Murphy should be congratulated for focussing attention on it, even if he exaggerated by assuming that the impulse to genocide led to actual genocide and was not careful enough in his search for bodies. A genocidal impulse that generated a public atmosphere of sectarian anxiety on the brink of an abyss of action would have been a serious element in the situation, even though there were only ten killings.

But I did not gather, either from what I heard when I was young or from what I could find out later, that the situation in Cork in 1922 was characterised by a suppressed genocidal impulse.

The Protestants who remained, the residue of the ruling caste of three centuries, were certainly anxious. When they were courted ten years earlier (after the Land Act) by the All-For-Ireland League, and it was put to them that there was a place for them as country gentlemen in the national movement, they did not respond. A couple of years later they were confronted with the raw Redmondism of the Home Rule Party that had gained the balance-of-power at Westminster, but were saved by the Unionist Party and the Great War. They came home from the Great War, only to be confronted by Sinn Fein. But, with the experience of centuries to guide them, they were confident that England would find a way of seeing off Sinn Fein—as it had seen off many threatening movements in the past. When the Republican movement held firm and the Irish showed an unprecedented capacity for sustained warfare, they went into shock.

But, in the end, England did save them from a fate worse than death. The terms of the Treaty, which would have appalled them two years earlier, came as a relief to them. The *Church Of Ireland Gazette*, a very political publication, became an ardent supporter of the Dail the moment it subordinated itself to the 'Treaty' and it became a player in the Irish game on the basis of the aspect of the Treaty that seemed to guarantee a British future. But I do not know that this fact generated anti-Protestantism amongst the Irish. The Treaty split was very much a split amongst the Irish, with the Protestants who remained Unionist becoming a small, though wealthy, attachment to the Treatyite cause. And Moylan's fearsome threat, grossly misrepresented by Peter Hart, was a threat that no mercy would be shown towards Unionists who supported a British attempt at re-conquest. It was not directed at Protestants, many of whom were onside with Moylan.

The Protestants who remained Unionists, even as they seized upon the Treaty as a lifeline, were faced with the end of their world, and that was naturally a matter of great anxiety for one of the great historic ruling classes of the Western world. And, if they anticipated genocidal action against themselves by the natives, that would have been a reasonable expectation on the assumption that the natives would act as they themselves had acted during the centuries since the Williamite Conquest and the enactment of the Penal Laws.

It is not an easy thing to have been bred to rule, with a lineage stretching back over three centuries, only to be subjected to the

rule of those whom it was your destiny to rule over and guide into the ways of civilisation. And for this to happen while Bolshevism was showing the masses how they should deal with the classes naturally gave rise to dire anticipations. (The *Church Of Ireland Gazette* was predisposed by its own mode of understanding to see Sinn Fein as a kind of Bolshevism.) But that there was something in the political conduct of the native population, as it shrugged off this distinguished ruling caste, which gave positive grounds for the sectarian anxiety of that caste, is something that remains to be shown. Borgonovo does not show it.

The ten killings in Dunmanway, which he asserts as evidence of it, is mere assertion—as unsupported by “*written proof*” as anything asserted by Murphy.

He says that the killings were done by “*unknown IRA gunmen*”. So this is an unknown known in Donald Rumsfeld’s categories—or is it a known unknown? He gives no clue as to how he knows that it was *unknown IRA gunmen* that did it. In a reference note he says that there are “*two different interpretations*” of the killings but does not say what they are—he just mentions publications by Peter Hart, Meda Ryan and Jasper Ungood-Thomas, telling us that the latter “*argues that the killings were political rather than sectarian*”. Does this imply that Hart and Ryan were in agreement that they were sectarian? and that all three agree that “*unknown IRA men*” were responsible and present evidence that proves it?

Then there is the list that the ‘unknown IRA gunmen’ had—a known list held by unknown gunmen.

Consider these three sentences:

“Fear increased at the end of April, following the brutal assassination of ten Protestants in the Bandon Valley. Over three consecutive nights, unknown IRA gunmen visited at least a dozen homes on their own list of Unionist enemies. The unauthorised killings drove out at least 100 Cork Protestants...”

Do all three sentences refer to the same event? Not necessarily so according to the grammar, but they will be read as doing so.

Was it Protestants or Unionists who were killed? It is no answer to say that they were both. If they were killed as Protestants, that is one thing, if as Unionists that is another.

In the War of Independence a great many Catholics were killed by the IRA. They were not killed because they were Catholics. They were killed because they acted as agents of the Union state, after

that state had been democratically delegitimised. They were not exempted on sectarian grounds from punishment as armed enemies of the democratic Government, nor were Protestant agents of the Union state killed because they were Protestants. Catholics and Protestants were required to observe the democratic legitimacy of the Irish Government and were punished indiscriminately if they made war on it.

The appalling thing about the party elected to govern Ireland in 1918, from the viewpoint of the British Protestant caste which had ruled in Ireland for three centuries, was not that it killed Protestants, but that it took itself seriously as a state and punished those who acted against it in the service of the British state, whether they were Protestants or Catholics; and that the best efforts of the British State during three years of intense effort failed to break it down into a Catholic *Jacquerie*.

Sectarian propaganda during those years came from the British side. The sectarian fact that so many of the police who were being killed as active enemies of the Republic were Catholics was stressed as if it was relevant to the political issue, and that fact has also been given currency in the revisionist propaganda of recent years. That sectarian approach, which had little effect on the course of politics then, has had more effect in the debasement of history in its revival. The War of Independence is now widely depicted as a Catholic *Jacquerie* by historians trained in Professor Fitzpatrick’s Trinity Workshop, and there is a desperate search for facts, or at least something remotely like facts, to support it. But, if it had been a Catholic *Jacquerie* it would have been the kind of thing that Britain knew how to handle—and it would not have targeted that solid body of good Catholics that Britain had shaped to its service in Ireland: the RIC.

Borgonovo’s statement that unknown IRA gunmen with a known list of Unionist enemies brutally assassinated ten Protestants in the Bandon Valley is made in the same paragraph in which he says that Cork, in a condition of sectarian anxiety, peered into the abyss of religious warfare.

The “*Bandon Valley*” is an imprecise location, suggesting that the killings were dispersed over an area. In fact they were done within a small radius, more informatively described as Dunmanway.

These killings were done on April 27th-28th. On April 27th three British officers on Intelligence duty were arrested in Macroom which, like Dunmanway, is in West

Cork. They were taken to Macroom Castle and shot. A British Army company, commanded by the future General Montgomery, came to Macroom Castle, demanding their release. There was a stand-off between the British Army and the IRA, which ended with Montgomery backing off. There were heated exchanges in the House of Commons about the affair but the Government cooled it down.

In the course of describing some of this, Borgonovo makes that statement, which I find puzzling, that the arrest of the British spies—soldiers not in uniform gathering information—was “*a clear violation of the Truce*” (p38). I would have thought that the Truce had been superseded by the ‘Treaty’. Britain made an Agreement with a section of Sinn Fein—which up to that point it had never regarded as anything but a bunch of rebels—and was actively building it up to be an Irish Government under the Crown. The purpose of the Truce was to suspend hostilities while negotiations were undertaken. After the Dail complied with the ‘Treaty’ in January, the British concern was to establish a new Army in Ireland which was dependent on it and whose only practical purpose was to break up the Republican Army. But, whatever may have been the formality of the matter, the section of the IRA which was forming a new Army under the terms of the ‘Treaty’ was no longer in a relationship of Truce with Britain, but was in active political and military collaboration with it.

And it is surely a matter of relevance to the Dunmanway affair that on the day of the killings the British Intelligence Service and the British army were active not many miles away in Macroom?

Borgonovo’s reference note says there were “*two different interpretations*” of the Dunmanway killings. He does not say that they are, but apparently suggests that they were put by Peter Hart and Meda Ryan on the one hand and Jasper Ungood-Thomas on the other. But surely he must know that there is a third “*interpretation*”: the suggestion put by Owen Sheridan that the killings might have been the work of British Intelligence, with the purpose of provoking religious war and justifying a revocation of the ‘Treaty’ concessions, which certain elements—*militarists*—saw as a first retreat from Imperial power which could only encourage disintegration.

However “*interpretation*” is not the word for suggestions about responsibility for the Dunmanway killings. “*Speculation*” is the word. There is no evidence to interpret. In fact the distinctive thing

about that event, as compared with any other event, is the entire absence of evidence. All that is known is the bare fact of the killings. And the speculation that they were the work of British Intelligence is, with regard to the entire absence of evidence, even the evidence of local rumour, certainly not less plausible than Borgonovo's speculation (which he presents as a known fact) that the killings were done by unknown IRA men with a known list of Protestants—or was it Unionists?

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The British presence is missing from Borgonovo's account of the War, apart from an incidental reference to action by the Royal Navy (which continued to be based in Cobh) in support of the Treatyites. But the development from "Treaty" to "Civil War" is not comprehensible if the conflict is taken to have come about through disagreement between Irish parties acting autonomously.

A couple of years ago I commented on a statement by Borgonovo that the 'Treaty' conflict was foreshadowed by divisions within Sinn Fein during the War of Independence. I had been able to find no such divisions in 1919-21 and concluded that the 1922 division as brought about by the partial British concession backed by a ferocious ultimatum. I looked in this book for some argument that the 'Treaty' division was the working out of a division that had been suppressed in 1919-21, but there isn't any.

If independence had been achieved, differences would no doubt have arisen over how the State should be conducted, but independence had not been achieved, and the difference that arose had to do entirely with the British threat of barbaric war on the lines of the war in South Africa twenty years earlier. Redmondite and West British remnants attached themselves to the Treatyites. But these elements, though wealthy, had little or no influence on Sinn Fein politics before the 'Treaty'. They jumped on the 'Treaty' bandwagon, but they had not set it rolling.

Borgonovo writes that, in the Spring of 1922:

"Only three options lay open to Cork Republicans: to secure a compromise with their pro-Treaty opponents that satisfied their principles; to re-launch the war with the British to unify the country; or to physically resist the Free State" (p33).

But it was not on the issue of unification that the British ultimatum was active. It was on the issue of the relationship of the 26 Counties with Britain. Partition figured marginally in the Treaty Debates. It was

an accomplished fact, which all accepted with a degree of *de facto* resignation. And the ending of it was not something that might simply be conceded by Westminster. British policy over the centuries had brought about a situation which the British Government could not simply conjure away in the early 20th century.

And Partition was not the issue on which the 26 Counties was driven to 'Civil War'. Lest we forget, the issue was the Oath to the Crown. And that was something that Britain might have abolished with the stroke of a pen.

The Cork Republicans tried their best to "secure a compromise with their pro-Treaty opponents that satisfied their principles". And their pro-Treaty opponents tried their best to arrange that compromise. But every compromise initiative was thwarted by the inflexible will to war in Whitehall, which at every critical juncture determined the action of the Treatyites in Dublin. And when Collins fired the first shot, it was under threat that, if he did not do so, the British Army—which had not gone away—would take

command of Dublin immediately. Such was our 'Civil War'.

Britain was not going to have in the Irish State, however Oath-bound, the Army that had fought it and driven it to the negotiating table.

Brendan Clifford

Seán O'Hegarty, O/C First Cork Brigade, Irish Republican Army by *Kevin Girvin*. 248pp. €20, £15

The Grammar Of Anarchy: Force Or Law—Which? by *J.J. Horgan*. **Unionism, 1910-1914**. Introduction by *B. Clifford*. €6, £4.

Propaganda as Anti-History: Peter Hart's 'The IRA and its enemies' examined. *Owen Sheridan*. €15, £10.

Troubled History: A 10th Anniversary Critique Of *The IRA & Its Enemies* by Brian Murphy and Niall Meehan. Introduction Ruan O'Donnell. 48pp. €10, £7.

The Rise And Fall Of Imperial Ireland. Redmondism In The Context Of Britain's War Of Conquest Of South Africa And Its Great War On Germany, 1899-1916 by *Pat Walsh*. 594pp. €18.99.

Northern Ireland What Is It? Professor Mansergh Changes His Mind by *Brendan Clifford*. 278pp. €18, £15.

Part 2

From Sing Sing To Sing And Sing

—The 1934 Larkin Affidavit

If an affidavit had been secured by John McCloy from Big Jim Larkin in 1934 in order to complete the pursuit of a case against Germany in 1936, why should this not be seen as the pursuit of some sort of anti-Nazi agenda? I might have addressed this issue far earlier, had I not forgotten that McCloy's name should have rung a bell with me from what I had previously known of how he himself had dealt with the Nazi German war criminals of the Second World War.

But what of Franz von Papen—the best-known of those 'fingered' by Larkin for McCloy's benefit? What indeed? Von Papen had been the German military attaché in New York from December 1913. While the USA did not formally enter the First World War until 1917, it would be grossly misleading to say that the USA had been neutral beforehand. By shipping munitions wholesale to Britain from the word go, the USA had been effectively waging war on Germany from August 1914 itself. Acts of sabotage on Germany's part were hardly an immoral response, if undoubtedly an undiplomatic one. Von Papen was to be recalled to Germany in December 1915, having been accused by the US Government of complicity in a

plan to blow up US railroad lines that were conveying munitions destined for Britain. He therefore had no hand in the July 1916 explosion on "Black Tom" Island in New York Harbour which destroyed over 1,000 tons of TNT destined for Britain, but which also resulted in the deaths of several people and damaged property to the extent of \$20 million (equivalent to \$350 million today). Nor was von Papen ever to be accused of complicity in that act.

Yet von Papen did appear as a defendant before the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal subsequent to World War Two. But why? While a political argument can be made that von Papen's counter-productive political machinations had facilitated Hitler's ultimate triumph, he himself was neither a Nazi nor a war criminal of any sort. He was a leader of the Catholic Centre Party and Chancellor of Germany from June to November 1932. Believing that Hitler could be 'tamed', he recommended that he be appointed Chancellor by President von Hindenburg in January 1933, while von Papen himself would hold the office of Vice-Chancellor. To those who warned against this move, von Papen arrogantly and naively responded: "You are mistaken. We've hired

him. *Within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak.*" A year later, and one far too late, von Papen realised how mistaken he had been. On 17th June 1934 he spoke out against Nazi excesses. Two weeks later, in the *"Night of the long Knives"*, von Papen's office was ransacked by the SS, and his three closest collaborators, who had helped draft that latest speech of his, were murdered. But von Papen himself was spared. He was, however, forced to resign as Vice-Chancellor a month later. Thereafter, he was relocated back into the diplomatic service, as Ambassador to Austria 1934-38 and Ambassador to Turkey 1939-44.

While von Papen did indeed initially feature as a defendant at the main Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, he was, however, unequivocally acquitted because, in the Court's own words, while he had committed a number of *"political immoralities"*, he had not committed anything deemed punishable under the charge of which he had been indicted, *"conspiracy to commit crimes against peace"*. Nor can any amount of either foresight or hindsight justify Larkin 'fingering' von Papen in 1934 for conspiracy to commit murder in the USA. Such a conclusion on my part does not imply the slightest sympathy for von Papen himself, who never seemed to have had the moral courage to accept responsibility for his own actions and who was all too ready to foist that responsibility onto others. Even in 1952 von Papen claimed that it was not he, but Roger Casement *"then in Berlin, who put forward to disrupt as much as possible America's supplies to our enemies with acts of sabotage"* (Jerome aan de Wiel, *"Sabotage in the USA: Imperial Germany and Irish-American Contacts"*, *History Ireland*, January-February 2010).

Nor was Larkin's affidavit obtained by John McCloy in any anti-Nazi context. The claim which it supported had been initiated against the Weimar Republic in 1922. And, as far as McCloy himself was concerned, this was a purely mercenary operation on the part of a smart lawyer on the make. As his *New York Times* obituary put it on 12th March 1989:

"Recognised as bright and persevering, he was put in charge of the 'Black Tom' case for Bethlehem Steel, one of the firm's clients. The case involved damages incurred in a 1916 explosion at a Hoboken munitions factory. Mr. McCloy carried the case along for nine years, hunting down clues in Baltimore, Vienna, Warsaw and Dublin and proving that German agents had caused the explosion. The

case was settled when the Mixed Claims Commission at The Hague found Germany responsible for the blast."

2006 saw publication of a book on the "Black Tom" case by Chad Millman, entitled *The Detonators*. In a review for the *New York Observer* on 16th July 2006, Professor Glenn Altschuler of Cornell University wrote:

"In 1934, Dame Fortune smiled on America again. John J. McCloy, a lawyer for the Lehigh Valley and the hero of *The Detonators*, persuaded the Irish labour leader James Larkin to prepare an affidavit about German initiatives to disrupt the flow of supplies from the United States to the Allies, including the 'Black Tom' plot. With Larkin ready to name names, the Nazis agreed to settle. They later reneged, but in 1939, US Supreme Court Justice Roberts—the umpire for the Mixed Claims Commission—found for the plaintiffs: \$21 million in damages and \$29 million in interest. Better late than never, justice had been meted out—but the biggest beneficiary, Mr. Millman suggests, was John McCloy: The young lawyer for whom 'Black Tom' had once been a black hole went on to become an Assistant Secretary of War, President of the World Bank and U.S. High Commissioner to Germany; in the latter stages of his career, he was widely known as 'Head of the Establishment' in the United States."

In 1927 McCloy had been sent by his law firm to establish a branch in Milan becoming, according to Anton Chaitkin (*George Bush: The Unauthorised Biography*) an advisor to Mussolini's fascist Government. And, while he secured the Larkin Affidavit on behalf of Bethlehem Steel in 1934, he also worked on behalf of the German firm IG Farben and in 1936 shared a box with Hitler and Mussolini at the Berlin Olympics. As US Assistant Secretary for War, McCloy had been the architect of the internment of the Japanese-American population. It was also McCloy who would first raise the prospect of threatening Japan with the A-bomb, although subsequently rather lamely maintaining that the actual bombing of Hiroshima would have proved unnecessary if the threat to do so had been made more explicit.

There was, however, one bombing mission that McCloy had consistently vetoed. He was to refuse repeated requests made during the course of 1944 to disrupt the Holocaust by bombing what had already been proven to be an extermination camp at Auschwitz. Rudolf Vrba was a Czechoslovak Jew imprisoned in Auschwitz since 1942 who, with his friend Alfred

Wetzler, escaped from that camp on 9th April 1944. After eleven days of walking and hiding, they made it back to Slovakia and linked up with both the anti-fascist partisans and the Jewish Council. They prepared a detailed 32-page report on the unfolding Holocaust, estimating from their own eyewitness observations that between June 1942 and April 1944 as many as 1.75 million Jews had already been exterminated in Auschwitz. Their report was forwarded to McCloy on 29th June, accompanied by a request to disrupt the Holocaust by bombing Auschwitz facilities. He refused, as he would refuse all such requests, including one made personally to him in a face-to-face meeting with the President of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldman. When, on 8th November 1944, the Executive Director of the US War Refugee Board made one further appeal, McCloy replied on 18th November:

"I refer to your letter in which you forwarded the report of two eye-witnesses on the notorious concentration and extermination camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau in Upper Silesia. The Operation Staff of the War Department has given careful consideration to your suggestion that the bombing of these camps be undertaken... At the present critical stage of the war in Europe, our strategic air forces are engaged in the destruction of industrial target systems vital to the dwindling war potential of the enemy, from which they should not be diverted... I know that you have been reluctant to press this activity on the War Department. We have been pressed strongly from other quarters, however, and have taken the best military opinion on its feasibility, and we believe the above conclusion is a sound one."

But how did the post-War John McCloy deal with Nazi war criminals who had been convicted at Nuremberg? I had forgotten that in book reviews published during the course of 1981, in the British & Irish Communist Organisation's theoretical journal *The Irish Communist*, I had in fact quoted two references to one of those war criminals, with whose post-War life of freedom McCloy—in his capacity as US Military Governor and High Commissioner for Allied Forces in West Germany—had been intimately connected:

"The degree of Nazi interest in Ireland was shown in the appointment by the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, in 1940 of Dr. Edmund Veessenmayer as his Special Representative for Ireland. It was Veessenmayer who interviewed Frank Ryan on the first day he was brought from Spain, via Paris, to Berlin. Veessenmayer had the reputation of a shrewd and dangerous man. In 1944 he was appointed

Nazi ambassador to Hungary. On April 14, 1949 he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a US military court in Nuremberg for war crimes, including the brutal and inhuman deportation of 150,000 Hungarian Jews. In December 1951 the US authorities pardoned and released hi." (Michael O'Riordan, *The Connolly Column*, 1979, p158 in the 2005 edition).

"Described in Norman Rich's *Hitler War Aims* as 'the German Foreign Office trouble shooter', Dr Veessenmayer was the Third Reich's expert on small nationalities. An Austrian by birth, Veessenmayer was well fitted to negotiate with Croatian political leaders in April 1941 with the object of setting up an independent state ... Veessenmayer started talks with the Ustashi movement, a nationalist terror group ... On April 14, the leader of the Ustashi, Ante Pavelic, arrived in Zagreb from his Rome exile and took over the government ... Veessenmayer was in Belgrade in July 1941 and on September 8, reported to Berlin 'that it was absolutely essential to take steps immediately to seize at least all male Jews in Serbia, probably about 8,000 all', to curb Communist activity. By June 6, 1942, the Chief of the German security service could report that there was no longer a 'Jewish problem' in Serbia. In December 1943, Veessenmayer was pressuring the clerical-fascist ruler of Slovakia, Monsignor Tiso, to put the Jews in concentration camps. After the insurrection of August 1944, the SS rounded up 14,000 Jews and sent them to Auschwitz. By the end of the war, 80,000 of Slovakia's pre-war 87,000 Jews appear to have perished'. Veessenmayer was in Hungary in the autumn of 1943 negotiating with Pro-German groups and Admiral Horthy, the country's right-wing dictator, demanded his expulsion. On March 19, 1944, German troops marched into Hungary and Veessenmayer was named Minister Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich in Budapest, a post that gave him practical political and economic control of the state. Veessenmayer named Ferenc Szalasi, head of the Arrow Cross, Premier. When Horthy resisted, his son was threatened with death and he himself was sent to Germany. The Red Army captured Budapest after a two-month siege on February 13, 1945. By then hundreds of thousands of Jews had been deported or died during the siege. According to Rich, 576,000 of Hungary's 825,000 Jews had died during the German occupation. If Rich's report is accurate it is just as well that Veessenmayer got no opportunity to put into effect whatever plans he had for Ireland" (Seán Cronin, *Frank Ryan*, pp252-3).

See www.leopoldhkerney.com and www.irelandscw.com/docs-KerneyReview.htm and www.irelandscw.com/docs-Ryan2.htm for Veessenmayer's role in Irish affairs.

Veessenmayer's 1949 trial had been

presided over by Judge Robert Maguire, while the US Prosecutor had been the German-Jewish refugee Robert Kempner. But on 16th December 1951 it had been none other than John J. McCloy who would set Veessenmayer free. In 2000, Judge Maguire's great-grandson, Peter Maguire, authored a book, entitled *Law and War: An American Story*, which addressed the cynical *realpolitik* that had been involved. In a July 2001 internet review, Jonathan Lurie of Rutgers University pointed out:

"Maguire argues that the lessons of Nuremberg 'remain unclear' in part because what that name represents is really a series of contradictory trials that lead to no single, simple conclusion' (p5). They represent a telling example of 'the storm where war, law and politics swirl and oscillate in a constant state of flux'. As with much of our history, the Nuremberg Trials reflected a real 'tension between America's much-vaunted ethical and legal principles and its practical policy interests'. (pp5-6)... The best part of Maguire's study is his persuasive narrative of and explanation for the ultimate fate of the vast majority of Nuremberg defendants—release from confinement and pardon. He shows how American policy vacillated from the righteous rhetoric of Robert H. Jackson to the ultimate embrace and rearming of West Germany, all because of Cold War fears that dominated American foreign policy from 1948 to 1958. Indeed, he implies, little is left of the IMT war crimes Nuremberg trials but nostalgia. By the late 1950s the Allies released their last convicted war criminals. A High Commissioner to Germany such as John J. McCloy—another Wall-Street-trained attorney—well reflected the new Cold War mentality. In 1942, at the time of the disgraceful internment of Japanese Americans, McCloy had dismissed the U.S. Constitution as 'just a scrap of paper' (p224). He later recalled that 'I never considered myself a politician, but rather a lawyer, so the question I asked myself in the various jobs I had was 'What should we do to solve the problem at hand?' (pp380-381). If the problem was how to rearm and realign West Germany with the United States, the continued imprisonment of German war criminals had to cease. And it did... Ultimately, Maguire writes, 'the time has come to reconsider the legacy of the Nuremberg trials as more of an anomaly than a paradigm' (p 289)".

Peter Maguire observed how the US and Allied clemencies of the 1950s had undermined the West German Government's own trials in the 1960s. In a 1988 interview with Peter Maguire, the Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert Kempner offered the following telling anecdote about the man who had been sentenced to 20 years

imprisonment by Maguire's great-grandfather in 1949, only to be let loose by McCloy two years later:

"I was sitting with the German Chief Justice during the (1960s) Auschwitz case as a spectator. Veessenmayer was a witness for the defence and he was a free man ... This judge next to me asked, 'Who is this man?' and I said, 'This is a very nice acquaintance of mine; he was only responsible for 400,000 Jews.' 'Why is he running around?' I said 'Because he is a defence witness for the Auschwitz case.' Veessenmayer came back when he was through and he stopped at me and said, 'How are you?' and I said, 'We have both grown older.' Later I talked with a reserve judge and he said, 'It is very bad for us, Veessenmayer is running free and we should judge about the little SS men who killed only two.'

Although Veessenmayer was sentenced to 20 years in the Ministries case, he was released in December 1951."

This, then, was to be the legacy of the John J. McCloy whom Larkin had unconscionably assisted in 1934. Larkin had specifically accused the German Minister to Mexico in 1917, H. von Eckhardt, of boasting that the "Black Tom" explosion had been Germany's "*greatest success*", forcing von Eckhardt into a position where he had to directly refute Larkin's charge on 16th April 1934. Yet Larkin had remained rather coy about himself. While truthfully stating that he had refused the offer of German money to engage in sabotage, he concealed the fact—as had been revealed in the letter by the Clan-na-Gael leader John Devoy to Frank Robbins of the ITGWU on 14 June 1923—that he had accepted more than \$10,000 from the Germans to fund strikes and other forms of industrial action.

It is in such a context that the Larkin Affidavit moved beyond the unconscionable to the reprehensible—not this time regarding any accused German, but in respect of a decades-long imprisoned American labour hero who had only been saved from Death Row by the skin of his teeth. In July 1916 an anarchist bomb in San Francisco had killed ten people and seriously injured forty others. Irish-American labour leader Tom Mooney was falsely charged and sentenced to death. It was 1918 before the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Mooney would have to wait a further two decades before the US Supreme Court agreed to hear his writ of *habeas corpus* in 1937, in which he maintained that he had been convicted on perjured testimony, while favourable evidence had been suppressed. But the Supreme Court dismissed his writ on a technicality—he should first have

processed it through a state court. Tom Mooney was not finally pardoned until 1938, although ill health resulting from 22 years of imprisonment would contribute towards his premature death in 1942. In this respect, Larkin's 1934 affidavit, by implicating Mooney as a German-sponsored strike activist, could only have had the effect of delaying Mooney's final receipt of justice. Larkin informed McCloy:

"I went back to San Francisco and stopped at the Fresno Hotel, where a German met me and arranged for me to cross to Berkeley to meet, as he said, an important German official. As I did not want to make my visit public in San Francisco, owing to my associations with Thomas Mooney, who was then in serious jeopardy, I kept under cover. They sent a car for me. Von Bopp met me somewhere near the University of California. He expressed his sympathy with Tom Mooney and made a lot of condemnatory statements regarding those who had, as he said, railroaded Mooney. I asked him if Mooney had anything to do with him. He stated that he had had something to do with strikes and Mooney has assisted them to that extent" (Donal Nevin, *James Larkin—Lion of the Fold*, 1998, p396).

There was no material gain for Larkin from such behaviour. But if—as I have had no other alternative but to conclude—the 1934 Larkin Affidavit was an unconscionable act on his part, was there any way in which it might be rendered comprehensible? The only possible explanation I can think of is that Larkin may have been mentally ill, suffering from severe depression, if not the aftermath of an actual nervous breakdown. It is ironic that I should have hitherto failed to consider such a possibility in this case, notwithstanding the fact that, in my own contribution to *Lion Of The Fold*, I had explored hints of such possibilities in other periods. As I suggested in my 1997 radio lecture:

"It was in late October 1914 that Big Jim Larkin, general secretary of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union, had set sail for the United States on the St. Louis. In the aftermath of the epic struggle of 1913 he had reached the edge of nervous and physical exhaustion. James Connolly had seen more clearly than most how much Larkin required a change of environment" (p64).

Fast forward now to the period of his America imprisonment, concerning which I went on to observe:

"How did Larkin respond to the prospect of prolonged incarceration? There is a vivid image of his old self and his fighting spirit on St. Patrick's Day, 1921. With a naïve sense of judgement, the prison warders—many of whom were themselves Irish—momentarily softened

towards the famed Irish orator in their charge and invited him to relate the story of St. Patrick to the assembled prison population. Larkin's version was conventional enough until he reached the legend of how St. Patrick had driven all the snakes out of Ireland. '*And where did they go?*' he enquired rhetorically before providing his own conclusion. '*They came to America, to become politicians, policemen, and prison guards.*'

"The uproarious applause that Larkin thus provoked among his fellow-prisoners was the exception that proved the rule. Oscar Wilde's biographer, Frank Harris discovered on a visit to Sing Sing that the prisoners generally regarded Larkin as a damned fool in going to jail for standing up for others. There is indeed an image of a different Larkin, diffident and defensive, if not yet despondent. It was provided by none other than Charlie Chaplin, as great a humanitarian as he was a comedian. Having accompanied Harris on that same visit, Chaplin later recalled:

'Prisons have a strange atmosphere, as if the human spirit was suspended. At Sing Sing the old cell blocks were grimly mediaeval: small, narrow stone chambers crowded with four to six inmates sleeping in each cell. What fiendish brain could conceive of building such horrors! Larkin was in the shoe factory, and here he greeted us, a tall handsome man, about six foot four, with piercing blue eyes but a gentle smile. Although happy to see Frank, he was nervous and disturbed and was anxious to get back to his bench. Even the warden's assurance would not allay his uneasiness. It's bad morally for the other prisoners if I'm privileged to see visitors during working hours', said Larkin ... He said he was treated reasonably well, but he was worried about his wife and family in Ireland whom he had not heard from since his confinement. Frank promised to help him. After we left Frank said it depressed him to see a courageous, flamboyant character like Larkin reduced to prison discipline.'..." (p72).

Professor Emmet Larkin's 1965 biography of his namesake confined his examination and use of Big Jim's 1934 Affidavit to the 1914-17 period itself, on which, of course, it certainly shed considerable light, with the proviso that it should also be corrected by Devoy's 1923 letter to Robbins. That 1914-17 account ended on page 218. But Larkin's biographer had no comment to make on the circumstances in which that Affidavit had been offered in the first place. And yet Big Jim's moral collapse in 1934 may well have sprung from an actual collapse in morale itself that mirrored his earlier near-breakdowns of 1914 and 1921. For it had also been Emmet Larkin—at a much later stage in his narrative, and under the chapter heading of "*Decline*"—who wrote as follows of Big Jim's collapse during the early to mid 1930s:

"To chronicle nearly twenty years of

decline is depressing. That so rich, so active, and so fruitful a life should come to such an end is nothing less than anticlimactic. In 1928, however, at the age of fifty-two, Larkin had no idea that he was at the beginning of his end... The years between 1928 and 1935 were a sad testimonial to a man who lived to serve ... By 1933 the situation was desperate for both Larkin and the Irish Labour Movement. The *Irish Worker* had collapsed the previous year from want of funds, and the membership of the Workers' Union was shrinking. The Depression had made a shambles of the entire Irish trade union movement and destroyed any hope of economic action on the part of the workers. Now the victory of Fianna Fail at the polls effectively limited the political alternative for at least five years, since the Labour Party had only eight seats in the Dáil. Larkin was himself further humiliated some months later in the local elections when he lost his seat on the Dublin Municipal Council... When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, the Republican and Socialist left in Ireland were more hard-pressed than ever. The pro-Franco pressure became so great that the Executive Committee of the Workers' Union, with Larkin's tacit approval, passed a resolution forbidding any official of the Union from appearing on any but a trade union platform. This was directed against those officials, and Jack Carney in particular, who spoke from Irish Republican platforms in support of the Republican Government in Spain. Carney immediately protested the resolution as an insupportable infringement on his personal liberty, and, receiving no satisfaction from Larkin, resigned his position in the Union and left for England. Larkin had achieved greatness because he never counted cost, either to himself or his followers, when he deemed a question of principle to be at stake. That he failed to distinguish principle in this case can hardly be mitigated by the fact that circumstances made such distinctions more difficult." (pp294-8).

It is only when set in the context of such a collapse in morale on Larkin's part that any sense can be made of the moral collapse represented by his 1934 Affidavit. Larkin did recover. He was re-elected to Dublin City Council in 1936. On a public platform during the 1937 General Election campaign, Larkin made a point of yielding up his place as speaker to Frank Ryan—wounded in battle and briefly home on leave before returning to the Spanish inferno. Big Jim would once again be elected to Dáil Éireann for 1937-38, where he remained in bitter conflict with Blueshirts. He would be elected to the Dáil for his final term of 1943-44, and was the only TD prepared to interrupt and confront head-on the anti-Semitic diatribes of the militantly pro-Nazi TD, Oliver J.

Flanagan. (This was the self-same, unapologetic Flanagan who, in 1976, would be elevated to the office of Minister for Defence by the Fine Gael-Labour "*Government of the talents*", and alongside whom the Labour Party's Conor Cruise O'Brien, ironically elected to Big Jim's old Dáil seat, would be quite happy to sit in Cabinet.) Big Jim Larkin would also once again provided inspirational leadership to the mass campaign of opposition to the 1941 Trade Union Bill.

Larkin rightly remains one of the great heroes of the Irish Labour movement. But he was also a seriously flawed hero. My conclusion, therefore, from this examination of the record, is that Irish labour history would remain very much ill-served indeed if Larkin's Affidavit were only to be viewed as a valuable source for studies of the 1914-17 period, and not be further recognised as the sorry exhibit it represents in respect of Larkin's behaviour during 1934 itself.

Manus O'Riordan

Naval Warfare

How did the Great War become such a departure from the traditional mode of warfare engaged in by England—involving, for the first time, the subordination of its maritime power to the pursuit of continental warfare? Captain Russell Grenfell of the Royal Navy set out to understand this just as a new British war on Germany was getting underway in 1940.

Captain Grenfell was an opponent of catastrophic, unlimited, Continental wars waged on Messianic principle and favoured limited strategic interventions based on the old model. He believed that the Great War was waged incoherently because a new innovation had been introduced to replace the traditional strategy and, when it failed, a mish-mash had resulted that was neither here nor there:

"The pre-ordained use of the British Army on the Continent, as in the last war, throws away all the military value of superior sea power. Instead of the 'Army being a shot to be fired by the Navy' at the enemy's weakest point, as Sir Edward Grey is understood to have described it, it becomes, under these latter conditions, merely a ferry service to transport the Army to where the enemy's strength is greatest.

"There was a tardy but only partial realization some little time after the war had started that our sea power was not being made proper use of to increase our offensive military strength. The Dardanelles expedition was a return to the eccentric attack based on sea power.

"Unhappily we were already committed to frontal attack on the Continent, and the adoption of amphibious warfare in the Mediterranean did but set up the two rival methods of using military power into active competition with each other. Thereafter, during the war, there was the 'eastern' school, advocating an amphibious warfare in eccentric attack, and the 'western' school which insisted that the Western Front was the decisive theatre. Whatever the relative merits of these

competing policies, certain it is that to run them concurrently was ruinous to both. For instance, to conduct offensives in France and Gallipoli at one and the same time was fatally ill-judged.

"Reinforcements which might have turned the scale at Gallipoli were denied to that theatre till after the Loos offensive in France. That offensive, however, ate up all the reserves for Gallipoli, so that the army out there went short in any case. It cannot be doubted that to pursue a continental and an amphibious military strategy simultaneously is to invite the failure of both of them" (*Sea Power*, pp153-4).

Grenfell came from an old English naval family and served in a number of important engagements in the Great War, including at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. During the Second World War he directed the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich. He published many books on naval matters including, *Sea Power In The Next War* (1938); *Sea Power* (1940); *The Bismarck Episode* (1948); *Nelson The Sailor* (1949); *Main Fleet To Singapore* (1951); and *Unconditional Hatred* (1953). He also apparently had in preparation a book on the Norwegian Campaign 1940 before his untimely death.

Grenfell became *persona non grata* after writing *Unconditional Hatred* in 1953. No English publisher would touch his critique of Britain's wars on Germany that Grenfell had developed after being a first-hand observer of them.

Grenfell wrote *Unconditional Hatred* after Germany had been thoroughly destroyed by an alliance of Powers in 1945 forcing it into unconditional surrender. It seems that by this stage he had had his fill of the oratorical British crusades against enemies that had led to disaster and catastrophe for Europe (especially as new enemies seemed to spring up every time 'wars to end all wars' and destroy 'evil' had

been won). And, in dissenting from the Churchillian narrative of the War, and in calling a spade a spade, he became an outcast.

In *Unconditional Hatred* Captain Grenfell traced the disaster of 1939-45 back to Britain's decision to intervene in a European War in 1914. He saw this intervention, which led to the British Empire committing its resources to fighting an unlimited Continental war, for the first time in its history, as being wholly unnecessary. He saw the intervention as originating with the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey and then with the efforts of the Secretary of State for War, Haldane, and his reorganisation of the British Army for Continental warfare:

"The basic assumption on which Haldane's whole outlook towards a European upheaval rested was itself false. This was that if the Germans were able to push the French back and occupy the Channel coast of France, Britain's security would be gravely and even fatally imperilled. Holding this view, Mr. Haldane could plausibly believe that it was essential to use the British Army to keep the Channel coast of France out of German hands. This was a view also held by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, which accounts—or which at least he advances in his own post-war autobiography as accounting—for his ready acquiescence in the French request for military conversations and for his personal conviction that the British Army should go to France.

"That men of the mental calibre of Cabinet Ministers, and more especially when laying claim to a scientific outlook, could possibly have harboured so peculiar an idea is another illustration of how extraordinarily difficult it seems to be for landsmen, however intelligent, to hold sound views about sea power. There was no historical evidence at this time to suggest that an enemy occupation of the opposite coast of the English Channel would be lethal or even particularly dangerous to Britain. How could this be thought true, when that coast had in fact been in the hands of England's hereditary enemy, France, for centuries past? If the presence of an enemy on the coast between the Low Countries and Brest spelt disaster to England, why had that disaster never come from the hands of Napoleon I or the French Jacobins or Louis XIV, XV, or XIV, all of whom had held the south shore of the Channel while at war with England? The 'scientific' answer, which surely should have appealed to Mr. Haldane if not to Sir Edward Grey, is that if these earlier enemies could not use the south coast of the Channel to overthrow the English, there was no real reason why Kaiser William II's Germany should have done it.

"And if not, what was the need, not merely for the dispatch of an Expeditionary Force to France or even to the

Baltic, but to anywhere at all? If the Fleet could be relied upon to keep England safe from attack, as history showed it could, was it not therefore better if there was any doubt about Britain's security, to strengthen the Fleet until that security was put beyond question, instead of indulging in the unpredictable cost in men and money of Continental warfare on land? For long years during the Napoleonic wars, England had been kept safe by this means. Why not again? These were scientific questions which Mr. Haldane and Sir Edward Grey might have asked themselves as preliminaries to coming to a decision about the French conversations. But such questions clearly never occurred to them. They jumped straight to a superficial assumption which happened to be wrong.

"That the two Ministers made this fundamental error of strategy was not their fault. They were not trained for war. But the question arises why they did not seek the advice of those who had been. Admiral Fisher's letters to Lord Esher during this period show that he entirely discounted the likelihood of invasion in the face of superior sea power. Either, therefore, Grey and Haldane did not ask the department most concerned, the Admiralty, for its expert opinion on invasion, or else they chose to ignore it and to blunder forward in pursuit of their own amateur view" (*Unconditional Hatred*, pp12-4).

What Grenfell described was extraordinary—how a cabal of Liberal Imperialists managed to sideline the primary exponent of British power in the world, the Royal Navy, in their pursuit of a Continental war on Germany.

The view that Captain Grenfell put forward in *Unconditional Hatred* was developed in the pages of another book which he wrote during the second War on Germany, which was called *Sea Power*. Grenfell did not publish this book under his own name but under the pseudonym of 'T124' (probably due to the sensitivity of his position as Director of the Naval College at Greenwich).

Grenfell's belief was that the *Entente* England signed with France in 1904 had enormously important strategic consequences for Britain. He saw that *Entente* as, itself, a consequence, of the Kaiser's reading of Mahan's *Influence Of Sea Power On History*. Mahan's book was the first real understanding of the true meaning of sea power, its characteristics and possibilities. The American had argued that the war which England waged against revolutionary France were fundamentally a contest between the predominant land power and the predominant sea power—which left the sea power victorious and in control of the world. And, according to

Grenfell, the Kaiser, who believed he had discovered England's great secret of success, determined that Germany must have 'a future on the water', if it was to be anything worthwhile in the world.

Grenfell noted that, before the *Entente*, political sentiment in England had been wholly isolationist—against foreign entanglements—and maritime in orientation. The *Entente*, however, propelled England toward entanglements and Continental warfare, in which England was destined to pay a heavy price.

Before 1904 the British Army was regarded as a secondary weapon, Grenfell noted, and mainly functioned as a keeper of order at home and in the colonies and for defence, in an emergency. This role had been defined and laid down in public as late as 1888 by the Secretary of State for War.

The policy of aloofness from Continental struggles was regarded as a matter of course and no Army existed for such eventualities. In 1902, when the War Office first considered the possibility of war with Germany, it had only envisaged the British Army in action in conjunction with the Royal Navy in the seizing of the small number of German colonies abroad. The idea of Continental warfare did not enter its head.

Grenfell noted that on paper the 1904 *Entente* was an open agreement with France to merely provide diplomatic support in certain circumstances against Germany and as such did not bring about the catastrophe in 1914 in itself. But it led to the secret military understandings initiated in less than a week during January 1906 between Grey, Haldane and Cambon (the French Ambassador in London*) that changed the course of British and European history. That led Sir Henry Wilson to get on his bicycle to review with his French comrades the battlefields where the Germans would be fought and plans and arrangements made that were not so easy to abandon when the hour came.

Grenfell thought the sheer rapidity of the secret transactions that led to the momentous decision to join a European war was odd, to say the least:

"A noteworthy feature of these transactions is the speed, indeed the precipitation, with which they were conducted. The decisions reached were of an importance that cannot be exaggerated. They brought about a revolution in Britain's method of waging war, leading, as they eventually did, to the adoption of conscription and the raising of national armies on a scale that had never before been dreamed of. Yet

those epoch-making decisions, that were to have such a tremendous effect on British national life, were hurried through in six short days.

"That the Foreign Secretary was primarily responsible for these momentous decisions cannot be doubted. The unhesitating readiness with which he agreed to Cambon's suggestion for Staff consultations invites the supposition that Grey had previously discussed with his Cabinet colleagues the possibility of some such proposal being put forward by the French and had obtained their concurrence to the reply which he purposed to give. We know, however, that this had not been done. The majority of the Cabinet knew nothing of the Staff talks either beforehand or for a long time afterwards. Five years later, when the Agadir crisis brought the subject out into the open, most of them were still unaware that the talks had been taking place" (*Sea Power*, pp30-1).

The secrecy adopted by those Liberals planning a war on Germany was not only maintained against their own backbenchers but also, apparently, against the chief instrument of British warfare up until then, the Admiralty. Captain Grenfell describes how the First Sea Lord was aghast when he was let in on what was happening and what was being planned by the Liberal Imperialists and the War Office:

"When these suggestions were brought to the notice of Sir John Fisher, the powerful and volcanic First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, he opposed them with characteristic vehemence. Subordinate participation in another nation's continental campaigning did not appeal to him at all. His idea for the proper utilization of the British Army was that the Navy should throw it ashore at some unexpected part of the enemy's coast whence it could take the enemy army in flank or rear. By this means, the important element of surprise to be conferred by the high mobility of the fleet could be taken advantage of, and the benefit of superior sea power utilized to the full. Nor was Fisher by any means alone in this conception of our proper strategy. There existed a strong school of thought favouring this 'Admiralty' policy, which included among others, Colonel Sir George Clarke, the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The conclusion, in fact, cannot be avoided that when Grey gave his consent to the commencement of the Staff talks, he was doing so nearly, if not entirely, on his own responsibility.

"That he should have staked so much on his own judgment must be regarded as surprising. In Britain, governed as she is, certain questions cannot legitimately be decided by individuals, however eminent. One of these questions is the vitally important problem of the general strategy to be pursued in war. Such a problem should unquestionably go before a Coun-

cil of State, not necessarily of the whole Cabinet, but at the least consisting of a suitable and properly constituted Cabinet Committee, where the necessarily grave issues involved could be examined and weighed up in the light of the expert views expressed by both (or now all three) of the Service Departments.

"That this is the right and proper procedure in such circumstances is indisputable. It was the procedure evidently followed by the responsible authorities in 1888, even before the introduction of special co-ordinating machinery such as came into existence later. By 1906, Grey had this machinery at his disposal in the shape of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He did not, however, make any use of it. The question did not go officially before that Committee until another five years had passed, by which time a number of assurances had been given which it would have been difficult to withdraw and lines of co-operation established with the French which it would have been hard to break. Meanwhile, Grey himself was the principal deciding factor in these all-important matters. Whether he decided well or ill is for the moment beside the point. The interesting thing is that, in viewing these arbitrary personal decisions on matters of supreme national consequence, we are presumed to be examining the workings of the Cabinet system under a representative democratic Government" (*Sea Power*, pp33-4).

Having outlined how close Grey kept his cards to his chest, Grenfell then describes how it was the appearance of Sir Henry Wilson on the scene, working on the minute details of the military plans in France that made the Continental war a *fait accompli* for the Admiralty (and everyone else):

"With intense energy, Wilson set to work to ensure that all should be in readiness to send the British Army where he intended it should go. Examining the situation as he found it, he discovered that the transport and other Staff arrangements for moving a force quickly to the Continent were in a rudimentary state. This probably was explicable by the fact that there was still official uncertainty in Britain as to what it was proposed to do. Although the military conversations had been in progress, off and on, for several years, the British Government had always been careful to insist on their non-committal nature. Moreover, it was still by no means decided whether the Expeditionary Force should go to France or to Belgium, if indeed it went to either. And even that was not wholly certain. There still remained in the background, hostile and unsubdued, the Admiralty with its conceptions of 'amphibious warfare'.

"Wilson did not waste time attacking strongholds of doctrinal principle. He

proceeded to plan and organize on the assumption that his own views would be put into practice. He made frequent visits to France, during which he strengthened and enlarged his contacts with the French military authorities, and discussed with them the burning question of the participation of the British Army in continental warfare in alignment with the French. On one such visit, as Wilson records in his diary, Foch impressed upon him the necessity of an intimate Anglo-French understanding and that 'all our plans must be worked out in the minutest detail so that we may be quite clear of the action and the line to take'.

"This was what Wilson had already set himself to do. To further his endeavours, he could count on certainly two members of the Cabinet: Haldane, his own chief, and Grey...

"The Wilson-Haldane-Grey combination was soon to show its strength. In March 1911, the French were informed that, in case of British intervention in a war against Germany, all six divisions of the Expeditionary Force would be sent to the Continent at once. A month later, Foch, possibly at Wilson's suggestion, had a conversation with the British military attaché in Paris, in which he urged the necessity for a definite agreement between the French and British Governments for as large a British force as possible to be sent immediately on the outbreak of war to fight alongside the French Army. The report of this proposal for a clear-cut military alliance seems to have been received at the British Foreign Office with favourable comment; but in view of the immense importance of the issue raised it was recommended that the matter should go before the Committee of Imperial Defence. This was unquestionably the correct course to have taken. The proposition was one which must obviously have the most profound bearing on Britain's basic war policy, and was therefore an entirely proper subject to go before the Committee, where the views of both the Service Departments could be expressed upon it. Grey, however, intervened; with the result that the only Ministers who received knowledge of the French proposals were the Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council (Mr. Morley), Mr. Haldane, and Grey himself. The First Lord of the Admiralty, it will be observed, was not informed" (*Sea Power*, pp39-40).

Something of a showdown occurred at a full meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held in August 1911 at the time of the Agadir Incident (when Britain feared the Germans might acquire a refuelling station in North Africa and thought about this as an excuse to start a European war.) With this the cat had to be let out of the bag as everyone in the Cabinet had to then know what was to be done if the 'worse came to the worse'. Henry Wilson revealed how he had been working with the French

over the previous few years and the detailed plans he had put in place with them for a Continental war on Germany, waged by the British Expeditionary Force on the left-flank of the French Army.

In the afternoon of the meeting the Admiralty gave its view and proposed the traditional maritime strategy, with the Army used for coastal raids and flank attacks. Grenfell noted the reaction of those who had planned for a Continental war on Germany in conjunction with the French:

"It is not surprising that the naval proposals were violently assailed by the opposing party. For five years, Haldane had been labouring to reorganize the Army with a view to its going to the Continent, and Henry Wilson had been working and manoeuvring for as long a period to the same end. The naval conception of strategy threatened to destroy all their work. Besides, they knew, as the sailors did not, to what extent they were already committed to go to the aid of the French. Had not an agreement been signed only a month before? They fell upon the naval proposals with vigour... Mr. Haldane seized the occasion to carry the war into the enemy's camp. Declaring that the outrageous views uttered by the First Sea Lord were indicative of the urgent need for the establishment of a naval staff at the Admiralty on something approximating to Army lines, he announced to the Prime Minister that he would no longer be responsible for the War Office unless this was done.

"These tactics were completely successful. The Government accepted the War Office standpoint, and Mr. Churchill was sent to the Admiralty charged with the twofold task of introducing a naval staff system and of exorcizing from the minds of the naval Lords their heretical views on military operations and thus ensuring that no further opposition would be raised by the Navy to the Army's continental aspirations.

"Henry Wilson had won a great victory, and the way now seemed clear for the realization of his design to get the Expeditionary Force across at the earliest possible moment into alignment with the French Army" (*Sea Power*, pp43-4).

Apparently, at the last minute senior military commanders who were not *au fait* with the French arrangements challenged the suitability of the plans from their incomplete understandings of the situation. In relation to these challenges Grenfell makes a very interesting point in relation to the view that England went to war on behalf of Belgium:

"Even after the British ultimatum had been presented and expired... Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief designate, brought up again his project of going to Antwerp. There was a good deal

to be said for Sir John's point of view. The British *casus belli* had been the violation of Belgian neutrality. And if it was the threat to Belgium that was bringing Britain into the war, it could not be unreasonable to suggest that Belgium was the place to which the British Expeditionary Force should go. So also, thought Lord Roberts, who had been invited to give his opinion. But Wilson was not interested in Belgium. He had spent four hectic years working out in the minutest detail the arrangements for the British Expeditionary Force to leave the country as quickly as possible after the outbreak of war and fall into line with the French Army; and it maddened him to think that these careful plans might be upset at the last moment. . .

"But Wilson need not have agitated himself. The numerous threads of moral obligation that he and Grey had stretched between the British Army and the left of the French line were stronger. . . . And they were reinforced by the fact that the Wilson plan to bring the Expeditionary Force into immediate alignment with the French was there, complete, worked out in great detail, ready for instant execution. To have neglected it at the last moment, besides opening the way to French accusations of perfidy, was to throw the whole General Staff arrangements back into the melting-pot. It was as nearly

certain as anything could be that the plan would be adopted; and so it was. The British Expeditionary Force went across as Wilson had previously arranged. He had achieved the aim for which he had worked so hard" (*Sea Power*, pp46-7).

There is nothing to suggest that John Redmond asked any awkward questions about whether the War he recruited for in Ireland was really about saving 'little Catholic Belgium'. However, what Grenfell revealed was that the Great War on Germany came about, not as a result of a desire to save Belgium, but rather in the form of a made-to-measure pre-existing secret plan to make war on Germany in conjunction with French allies, when a suitable opportunity arose.

The important thing about Captain Grenfell's account is that it provides a new angle on how determined and concrete was the British intention and predisposition to make war on Germany. It was so determined and concrete that it overrode the traditional British method of warfare of centuries and overwhelmed the exponents of this extravagantly successful mode of war with a *fait accompli* accomplished

in secret through a cabal of powerful individuals within the British State.

Pat Walsh

To be continued

* **Note**

Paul Cambon (1843-1924) served as France's Ambassador to Britain between 1898-1920.

Cambon, who was born on 20 January 1843 in Paris, graduated with a degree in law in 1870. After a series of minor government posts he was appointed French Ambassador to Spain in 1891, so beginning a long and distinguished diplomatic career.

Following a brief stint as Ambassador to Turkey—where he tried and failed to persuade the British to leave Egypt—he was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain in August 1898 in the midst of the Fashoda Crisis.

Cambon devoted much of his 22 year tenure as Ambassador in London to the improvement of Anglo-French relations, determined to draw French and British diplomatic interests closer together. The pinnacle of his achievement was the successful conclusion of the Entente Cordiale agreed between France and Britain in April 1904 and the forerunner of the alliance system comprised of Britain, France and Russia set against the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). It was these two alliance systems that went to war in August 1914.

In 1905 Cambon's diplomacy during the Moroccan Crisis were of great assistance in furthering France's diplomatic position with respect to Germany.

Fintan's Lament

The Parting Glass: The Story of Irish Migration (Archive, Radio 4 UK, Sat., 08.08.11), dealt with "Ireland's long and tragic history of emigration. . .". The "acclaimed Dublin journalist" Fintan O'Toole oversaw the proceedings. He began with an anecdote: some years ago 350-odd people attended an O'Toole family wedding, more than half of them were born outside of Ireland and a third were "people of colour". He mused on the fact that "being Irish is a very complicated" matter. A recording of Terence O'Neill ('liberal' Unionist Premier of Northern Ireland 1963-'69) backed up this assertion. This might have been an implicit vilification of 'Northern Nationalists' refusal to do—something. We became happy wee Welfare State Brits. The Unionists responded with a pogrom.

A jog through the history of mass-migration from Ireland, meaning the 26 Counties, followed. Mass migration from Ulster over the centuries wasn't really touched upon. The thesis that it was somehow a (genetic?) fault might have been compromised. There was allegedly an Ulster mass migration "in the early 19th century". The first mass-migration was in the 1730s. (The grain-eating

peoples of Europe were all affected by famine, Ulster Protestants went to British North America. They hunted beaver, bears, and 'Red Indians'—and became the guerrillas who won the US War of Independence.)

Mass migration to America had to do with "the dark heart of Irish history", but apparently not (this being the BBC?), of **British** history—the Famine. Apart from being a misnomer (the island was groaning under the weight of food of every description), this usage implies it was the only one. Famine was an annual event in most of Ireland between the Cromwellian Settlement of the 1650s and its undoing by 1910. (O'Toole admittedly used the phrase 'the Great Famine', as in 'big'.) The metaphor 'coffin ships' was noted. The designation wasn't metaphorical. British ship owners had no compunction about taking money off desperate people and putting them on unseaworthy boats, crew-safety didn't concern them.

There was a diversion into (US) 'nativist' hatred of the Irish. It wasn't put in context. Colm Tóibin remarked that the Scots did not get a similar reception wherever they fetched-up. The actual 'famine Irish' would have been carrying the diseases of social breakdown like cholera.

The basic reason for the hatred and contempt was religion. It's difficult for 'modern' Irish persons like O'Toole and Tóibín to get their heads around this. But religion is the reason why the Irish stood out in the 'Anglosphere'. The cohort that went to Argentina, like the Italians, simply dissolved into the society.

There was no examination of the fact that the Irish, in so far as they are distinguishable from the rest of pinko-gray America, are now in the upper echelons of US society. De Valera claimed, on US radio in the 1930s, that Ireland was a "European motherland" for many Americans. That Dev said it seemed to be enough to make the matter ambiguous. His ambition for a contented, frugal Ireland was described as a fantasy. Surely this programme can't have been made prior to the Celtic Tiger's severe mange? Fianna Fáil (FF) came in for a lot of criticism, some of it quite puzzling. Leaving the UK meant that Ireland was no longer a region of that State. (Partition was not mentioned, but is, surely, relevant if one is making an essentially economic case? The North was hugely wealthy in the 1910s.)

The Northern Ireland authorities got rid of Southern ('Eireann' as they put it) workers who migrated North during WW2

The following letter of 8th November failed to find publication in the *Sunday Independent*

Intimidation?

Recently, (Sunday Independent, 6-10-11) your columnist John-Paul McCarthy wrote of an incident which took place near Kilkenny in 1920 when, as he puts it "two young IRA thugs came to the Butler house on a fundraising mission". I was surprised when he added "Butler's mother was equal to them" and wondered briefly if he was going to suggest she was a thug, too! Instead, he simply highlighted the Butler mother's notions of her own caste superiority in her acrid remark addressing the young IRA men "...and take that cigarette out of your mouth when you are talking to me". Even at that, he tells only half the story for there were three republicans, and not two, on the doorstep that day. The third was of course her own son, Hubert, who remonstrated with her on the spot. Far from 'legging it' as John-Paul McCarthy would have it, the two IRA volunteers probably simply walked away to continue their rounds and spare the family the embarrassment of having witnesses to their familial argument. Mr. McCarthy tries to present the incident as an example of the supposed intimidation suffered by Protestants during the period. Methinks 'the lady doth protest too much'.

Nick Folley

very quickly), was a "market" for Ireland and a "help" (unspecified)). Dairmaid Ferriter claimed that, by the late 1940s, the protectionist polices followed (largely by Fianna Fáil, though an Inter-Party Government was in power 1948-51, then 1954-'57), had not worked. The economy was in good shape and improving during the 1930s. It had a boost during WW2, selling huge amounts of food to GB. There were remits home from the large number of people who got jobs in the wartime economy (and those who enlisted to fight Fascism).

This wartime migration was held against FF. O'Toole clearly feels FF got into power illegitimately and was not really democratic. It was. There was no way a democratic Government in Dublin could stop citizens moving anywhere. (If FF had tried to stop citizens travelling we'd have heard all about it.) Many of these migrants stayed put. There was as much money to be made after the War as during it. And on visits home the edge could be taken off the privations of post-War 'austerity'.

The collapse of the Irish economy was treated as an Act of God. Was it? In *Irish Political Review*, January 2008, Manus O'Riordan adverts, in *John Dulanty—High Commissioner For Whom?* to Dulanty (the Manchester-born Irish representative in London). Dulanty tried to get the UK authorities, specifically J.H. Thomas, Secretary of State for Colonies (Labour—in the National Government of the 1930s), to publicly indicate that "consequences" would flow from a declaration of a Republic in Ireland.

The first Inter-Party Government declared a Republic in 1948. The Labour Party in government in London responded by passing a Government of Ireland Act, guaranteeing the position of Northern Ireland in the UK State. That Government (despite its consolidating socialist welfare and health policies at home) acted, in the wider world, in an Imperialist fashion. The Indian Empire had to be let go. But independence was made problematical by partition. Conceivably the collapse of the Irish economy was a 'consequence' of emulating India.

The female migration was touched on partly by way of a delightful person called Queenie Mulvey from Mayo. She recounted her adventures in going to work in Leeds in 1949. She travelled by cattle boat, after having borrowed part of the fare from a grumpy uncle. Dressed in a big white ribbon, and specially whitened pumps, she went straight to a job in Leeds University. (The University recently did

a major investigation of migration into Yorkshire.) This aspect of migration (common in all migrations—Ireland is not unique in this matter) was not examined: the family, friend, and regional connections. (All the pre-partition Italian families in Ireland are from two towns in the 'heel' of Italy. Marilyn Cohen's "A Girdle around the Globe" in *Reclaiming Gender* (ISBN 0 312 21337 9) notes a connection between Gilford, Co. Down and Greenwich, Washington Co. (NY State).) Another essay, in the same book, claims that the Irish migration to GB in this period was largely female—and educated. How many, of this cohort, were illiterate or incapable of working? (The British 'popular' press claimed that these migrants were a drain on the economy. The more things change...)

Ferriter said it was "lucky" for the Establishment that so many people could be absorbed by England. He gave no indication of what he thought would happen in Ireland, if migration had been problematical. FF (Seán Lemass, in particular) was deemed to have been complacent, even though the party was not in power for a good chunk of this period. The other parties, including Labour, were clearly too feeble to matter. If the numbers claimed here were bottled up in Ireland FF would probably have done something about it. It had, after all, supplied those leaving with skills. Lemass never pointed out (and certainly O'Toole doesn't) that Great Britain owed the Irish Republic a huge debt. It is mentioned in passing that many migrants went to work in the "new National Health Service". The NHS depended on Irish, then Afro-Caribbean, and now

Filipino people (trained at and their own and their various nations' expense).

Entry into the "European Union" was fudged. Ireland entered the EEC (European Economic Community) on GB's coat tails. In so far as Ireland wanted to join the group (it had been trying since 1961) it was to get out from under England and join a growing Christian Democrat alternative to Communism and Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Ireland played a part in making the EEC/EU something substantial in the world. Garret FitzGerald seemed to have a notion of what 'Europe' was about but was too interested in nationalist manoeuvring in 'the North' to put his mind to the matter. Conor Cruise O'Brien gave up on thought about the time of entry into the EEC.

Ireland got rich in the 1990s (for the first time, apparently). Lemass, in an interview in 1966 in *The Word* magazine, produced by an RC Order of missionaries said that £600,000,000 was invested by citizens of the State outside of the State. (To get the Euro equivalent add an absolute minimum of three zeros to that figure).

Anyway, we've screwed up again. The 'crisis' originated elsewhere and has engulfed the whole 'North Atlantic'. That was ignored by the programme. As was the idea that, if Ireland hadn't been so keen on the 'Anglo-Saxon' model of economic development, it might have avoided the worst of it. Despite the raging at FF, its long-term policies of industrialisation building on the agricultural base, is probably the main reason why Ireland has not gone the way of Greece.

Seán McGouran

ITEMS FROM THE IRISH BULLETIN - 5

The Irish Bulletin (7th July 1919 – 11th Dec.1921) was the official organ of Dáil Eireann during the 1919 – 1921 period. Lawrence Ginnell, then Director of Publicity for the Dáil, first started it in mid 1919 as a “summary of acts of aggression” committed by the forces of the Crown. This newsheet came out fortnightly, later, weekly. We reprint below the summaries published for November 1919.

Date:- November.	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	Total.
Raids:-	1004	102	-	2	8	2	1118.
Arrests:-	12	1	1	1	9	3	27.
Sentences:-	-	22	5	3	1	1	32.
Proclamations & Suppressions :-	5	-	1	-	1	1	8.
Courtmartials:-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1.
Armed Assaults:-	-	-	1	-	1	4	6.
<u>Daily Totals:-</u>	1021	125	9	6	21	11	1192.

Date:- November.	17th	18th	19th	20th	21st	22nd	Total.
Raids:-	1	82	13	33	28	3	160.
Arrests:-	4	7	2	1	9	10	33.
Sentences:-	12	-	-	-	3	3	18.
Proclamations & Suppressions :-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3.
Courtmartials:-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2.
Armed Assaults:-	2	1	1	-	-	-	4.
<u>Daily Totals:-</u>	22	90	16	36	40	16	220.

November.	24th	25th	26th	27th	28th	29th	Total.
Raids:-	2	251	1	2	20	219	495.
Arrests:-	1	5	-	-	-	5	11.
Sentences:-	-	-	4	-	6	-	10.
Proclamations & Suppressions :-	3	4	2	2	-	1	12.
Armed Assaults:-	4	4	1	-	-	-	9.
Courtmartials:-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1.
<u>Daily Totals:-</u>	10	264	8	5	26	225	538.

Does
It
Up

Stack
?

BARNARDOS

When a child is brought before a Court for any reason and one or both of the child's parents are incapable or not present, it is a function of the Court to appoint a person as a "Guardian *ad Litem*" for the child. This has become a nice little earner for Barnardos when they get their own people nominated by the Court. The fees for GALs (as they are irreverently called) are set by the HSE at €100 per hour paid to Barnardos and Barnardos pay their nominee €60 per hour. Some GALs are reported to be getting up to €250,000 a year from multiple appointments. What do Barnardos actually do *for children*?

DEATHS OF A THOUSAND CUTS

The standards of public and private morality have been dropping and dropping. Or so it seems to us on each occasion when we hear of some depravity which is new to us. But maybe standards have always been low. For example, in November 1580 Walter Raleigh and his fellow Captains were present when Lord Grey negotiated a truce with the five or six hundred occupants of Dún an Óir near Smerwick Harbour, Co Kerry. They were told to come out and lay down their arms on the grass in front of the Fort. They did this. Then they were told to go back into the Fort and wait. Then Lord Grey instructed Walter Raleigh, his captains and men to go into the Fort and butcher them all with their swords. This butchery was done and Lord Grey's Secretary, Spenser the "*gentle, murderous poet*" as Séan Moylan famously called him, wrote a report of the treachery to Queen Elizabeth 1 of England and was much praised by her and her court for their actions. So lying, cheating and murdering seem to have been acceptable four hundred years ago and even was rewarded.

So what has changed? The murdering goes on in Libya, Iraq etc. and the lying and cheating is widespread not only here in this country but throughout the 'free West'. The latest trend is sort of psychological conditioning, as for example, when "Aviva" is laying off staff. First Aviva announces a bombshell that several hundred jobs are to go. When that bad news is absorbed, there comes another announcement that 1,200 jobs are to go. A week or so later, all Aviva's offices in Ireland are to close we are told. And then

later another announcement is made that the jobs "*won't go before Christmas*". Relief! Do we really believe that the Aviva management are behaving like headless chickens? That they don't know what their plans are from week to week? Aviva is in the insurance business which is supposedly heavily regulated. Does the State allow a regulated business to behave like this to its employees and customers? But of course the State is at this sort of psychological manipulation also. Kite-flying, the Irish *Times* cartoonist portrayed it as. The people are mentally assaulted by changing almost daily announcements of cuts here, cuts there, taxes to rise, jobs to go, as if the several Ministers do not know what they are doing even though between them they have hundreds of supposedly expert staff.

None of them seem to have studied *The Law And The Profits* by C. Northcote Parkinson (he of the Parkinson's Law) in which it is shown that where taxes are perceived by the public to go beyond a reasonable level (about 20%) there will be tax avoidance and the tax avoidance will be greater, the more the taxes go beyond a reasonable level. This is commonsense and understandable to all, except the Government apparently. Is it not obvious that the Government is not seriously trying to protect and increase jobs when it proposes to increase taxes on tools and equipment? The result of an increase in taxes will inevitably lead to a growth in the black economy and a drop in revenue for the Government. It does not stack up to increase VAT!

THE BLACK ECONOMY

The Black Economy is a real part of every national economy. It varies in its proportion of the national economy from State to State—in Italy it is thought to be up to 60% and much lower in France and low in Germany. In Ireland it may be 40% to 50% of the national economy. It cannot be measured because it is undocumented. Or not publicly documented. Nearly all trades and businesses are involved in the Black Economy. The Revenue Commissioners are catching some of them but most of those who are caught have learned an expensive lesson and so they won't be caught again but they will not stop trading. A pub does it by buying stock for cash in a supermarket and concealing the subsequent sales. The supermarket does it by concealing the cash takings on one of its tills. The bank does it through its massive offshore accounts. Money-lenders operate hugely below the radar in poor housing estates. All in cash. Cash is king in the Black Economy.

The State introduced anti-money laundering laws which are perhaps preventive but mostly useless because most people in the Black Economy do not launder the money at all—they spend it or use it to trade. The banks, as we all know to our great cost, have their own methods of passing money around. The transactions of banks, insurance companies, big traders and dealers are electronic and are so large and so frequent that illegal transfers are easily passed off and concealed and the Revenue Commissioners are not apparently equipped to police them.

The Revenue Commissioners have, over the years, become obsessed by one statistic and that is the cost of collection as a percentage of taxes collected. They boast internationally at how low the percentage is. When you travel by truck or car on the cross-channel ferries you will see four or five Customs officers at Holyhead or Fishguard, and perhaps six or eight officers plus dogs and guns at Cherbourg or Roscoff or Calais. But travelling into Ireland there might be one or two officers—occasionally there are none there at all. The cost is low and evasion is probably widespread. Likely—very very widespread. It may be that covering things up is more remunerative than exposing things. One result is that truckloads of stuff are rolling into Ireland unrecorded. Another result is people trafficking and illegal migration. A report on undocumented migrants was recently issued by the Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland which indicated that 85 % of migrants are in employment in Ireland. Restaurants and the catering sector was found to be employing 34%, domestic sector 15%, construction 6.4% etc etc. Fortunately for them—they are enabled to work by the existence of a substantial Black Economy, as is a large number of other workers.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONSTITUTION

There is little comment in the media on the "*Thirty First Amendment of the Constitution (The President) Bill 2011*" which issued on the 16th November 2011. The objective is to amend Article 12 to the effect that "*and on the system of Proportional Representation*" is to be deleted and "*five*" (years) is substituted for "*seven*", "*the age of eighteen years*" is to be substituted for "*his thirty-fifth year of age*" and "*ten*" is proposed to be substituted for "*twenty*" and certain other proposed changes—the final one of which is "*from which the President may omit the religious references*".

Why the media silence?

Michael Stack ©

MONDRAGON continued

ventures or non-cooperative corporate subsidiaries. The policy at this stage appears to be to move gradually to worker ownership, either wholly or in part, as economic circumstances are seen to permit.

Subsidiaries in Spain have in some instances had the opportunity to vote on whether or not to become co-operatives, and opted for the transition. Whether and, if so, when the remaining non-co-operative businesses and future acquisitions—particularly those overseas—become co-operatives, and the *eventuales* become members, are litmus tests for the MCC whose outcomes have yet to be determined.

What is beyond doubt is the success of Mondragon in economic terms. Annual sales by the MCC are now approaching \$US6 billion. The MCC Annual Report for 1995 shows that sales were up on 1994 by 12.5%, assets by 13.5%, profits by 19.2% and exports of manufactured goods by 34%. A total of 39% of all goods manufactured by the MCC were sold overseas. The MCC now includes Spain's largest exporter of machine tools and largest manufacturer of white goods such as stoves, refrigerators, washing-machines.

It also includes Spain's third largest and fastest growing retail chain—Eroski—with currently 37 Eroski and Maxi hypermarkets, 211 Consum supermarkets, 419 selfservice and franchise stores and 33 travel agency branches. The Mondragon credit union—Caja Laboral—is effectively Spain's tenth largest bank.

The MCC is the third largest supplier of automotive components in Europe. In 1992, General Motors designated the MCC as its "European Corporation of the Year". The Europe Union has involved the MCC

in cutting-edge collaborative ventures such as the Deklare project on rationalising design processes; the Demac project on advanced technological applications of sensor and integrated electronics; and the Espirit and Eureka scientific and technological development programs. What began in 1956 as a handful of workers using hand tools and sheet metal to make oil heaters and cookers has now taken its place among Europe's most impressive corporate heavyweights.

What conclusions can now be drawn? What then can be said of the claim by Javier Mongelos that "*Our form of socialism works*"? As to whether Mondragon works, the least that can be said is that it provides an impressive demonstration of the capacity of communities and regions to lift themselves by their bootstraps, through the use of credit unions to mobilise local capital for regional economic development and job creation, and of co-operative principles and structures to reinforce stake-holder identity and so enhance productivity and morale. If Mondragon were to abandon co-operation and revert to a conventional corporate structure tomorrow, jobs would have been created for many thousands of workers who otherwise would have been unemployed, and prosperity in the region would have been maintained at significantly higher levels than would otherwise have been the case.

If there was no more than this to the Mondragon experience, the question might reasonably be asked why it is that more notice has not been taken of Mondragon, particularly in the English-speaking world. Mondragon in a sense is a model of how to build from below what can no longer be hoped for from above. Over and above the significance of the MCC for regional economic development and job creation,

Mondragon has provided a model of sharing. Irrespective of what criticism of the model may be voiced—of the gaps and flaws which may mar the fulfilment of its participatory and egalitarian promise—the co-operatives have given many thousands of workers an exposure to participation in democratic governance and the value created by their labour which is without equal anywhere else in the world. Nor can it any longer be maintained that Mondragon is a uniquely Basque phenomenon, stemming from peculiarly Basque characteristics and circumstances. The emergence of a nascent second Mondragon in the Valencia region of Spain shows that Mondragon is replicable, given the willingness to learn from, and put to work, what it has to teach.

As to whether Mondragon is socialist, what remains uncertain at this stage is whether the indisputably socialist values reflected in the governance structures of the cooperatives and so highly valued by their members will now be made central in the sphere of shopfloor practice, and progressively extended to those to whom their benefits are otherwise currently denied. When and only when these issues are resolved will it be possible to determine whether Mongelos was wholly or only half right.

Meanwhile, it is timely to ask ourselves what relevance the Mondragon idea—the thinking of Arizmendiarieta—might have for the world's largely rudderless socialist and social-democratic parties. To what extent might Mondragon or some variation on it—some rekindling of the dream not only of Robert Owen and William Morris—now fill the aching void at the core of the Left identity which the discrediting of socialism, in the form and senses with which we were once familiar, has now left behind?

(To be continued next issue)

STREET-WISE [UK]

It is war with breakfast lunch and dinner the poppy on TV its staff infests relentlessly they pin it on the guests for those killed while killing *sinner*s they kill moralising about killing the more the nation sinks the more those wars creates an insatiable carnivore the population left with the billing and infected with a war-neurosis government and opposition agree to join in a murderous symbioses bluster and arrogance and pedigree

seems to drive the mass into hypnosis only the street defy their mimicry.

10th November, 2011

SPOKEN FOR WRITTEN FOR

Patriotism today in the UK is like being married to a violent drunk who with reckless disregard smashes homes to junk while on a binge two thousand miles away and to avoid a hangover tops up and casts a bloodshot eye to a drone-infested sky and shouts kill them until there's no reply

then back to his murderous pals who in their cups wonder how the great dragon can be brought to heel or the Eastern bear be poisoned in her den whilst shouting loudly of human rights with zeal. Yet Ms Fál wants to be his bride again despite the black-eye the torn dress the weals the Oxbridge violation via the pen.

1st November, 2011

Wilson John Haire

Note: *Fál* is the legendary name for Ireland

MONDRAGON continued

particularly on the principle of Distributism.

Maisie Ward (1889–1975), a daughter of one of Britain's distinguished Catholic families, was a writer, publisher, and Catholic activist. She was the wife of Catholic publisher Frank Sheed.

Gilbert Keith Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc were leading advocates of Distributism.

"Our Form of Socialism Works": Mondragon Re-evaluated by *Race Mathews*

"Our form of socialism works" said the now recently-retired Chairman of the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation in Spain, Javier Mongelos, in an interview with the European newspaper in 1994. So large a claim, advanced at a time when the familiar statutory corporation and command economy models of socialism are in disrepute, requires socialists everywhere to pay attention.

What grounds co-operation in the Mondragon mould has for acceptance in theoretical terms as a form of socialism, to what extent the practice of the co-operatives matches their precepts and in what sense the co-operatives work are all questions which legitimately arise.

What is immediately apparent about the Mondragon co-operatives is that nothing about them would have surprised early socialists such as Owen or Fourier. Mondragon in a sense represents a reversion to socialism as it was originally conceived, before socialists allowed themselves to be seduced by the fallacy that there was a short cut to socialism through structures imposed from above by the state.

It is too often forgotten that what socialism meant to socialists in the eighteen-eighties and eighteen-nineties had much less to do with statutory corporations than with various forms of co-operation including the municipality conceived of as a multi-service co-operative society. The notion of the wider state as a proxy for the community—and the problems of bureaucracy which its advocates so largely ignored—were still in the future.

With the benefit of hindsight, where socialists—the Webbs to their eternal discredit foremost among them—can be

seen to have gone astray was when they turned their backs on worker co-operation and wrote off its problems as intrinsic and insoluble. It was left for the Basque Catholic priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarieta and his followers in Mondragon fifty years later to finally free the co-operative movement from the blind alley into which a narrowly-conceived Rochdale co-operativism had manoeuvred it by the turn of the century, and enable progress to be resumed.

What cannot be denied about Mondragon is that it achieves the fundamental socialist purpose of empowering ordinary people to assume control over their lives and the economic well-being of their communities through collaborative action based on a form of social ownership which also accommodates individual property rights. The cooperatives are wholly owned by their workers, who share the governance function, in the case of the Eroski consumer co-operatives with their customers, and of the support co-operatives such as the Caja Laboral credit union with the primary co-operatives which are affiliated with them. Each co-operative has a General Assembly to set broad policy directions and a Board of Directors elected by and from the members. Voting is on a one member/one vote basis. There are no external directors. The Board hires a manager, to whom the day-to-day running of the business is delegated, and approves the manager's choices for other management positions. There is also a Social Council to deal with industrial issues such as occupational health and safety, the setting of salaries—otherwise known as *anticipos* or anticipations of the co-operative's earnings—and the resolution of grievances.

The highest salary the co-operative pays cannot be more than six times greater than the lowest, and the differences are in practice usually smaller. Members also share in the profits or losses of their co-operatives in proportion to their salary classifications, through a system of capital accounts which are held in trust until they retire.

These mechanisms constantly reinforce the sense the members have of themselves as being the owners of their jobs and workplaces. Surveys show that what the members value most about their co-operatives is the opportunity to participate fully in their affairs, job security, free expression of opinions and being able to rise through the system on the basis of merit.

What likewise cannot be denied is that Mondragon has to date been less successful

in democratising the shop-floor level of its activities than its overall governance. What was shaping in the nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies as a major drive to implement work groups and the development of participative shopfloor practices has been interrupted in part by the perceived need for a bottom line focus in order to meet the challenges of harsh economic times and heightened competition arising from Spain's entry into the European Union. The cost in terms of member morale was exposed dramatically in the course of participative action research conducted within the Fagor co-operative group—the original and largest Mondragon co-operative—in the late nineteen-eighties under the leadership the Cornell university anthropologist Davydd Greenwood and Jose Luis Gonzalez Santos.

"For those who operate on the work-floor", the report reads "the sense of not participating in key technical and production decisions, the feeling of being subject to technical and managerial whims, and the consequent belief that they are not being taken into account as equal members is pervasive. The dissonance between the experience of being a member with equal rights and being a worker, technician, or manager operating in a hierarchical system with important power differentials is experienced as inconsistency".

It has yet to be seen if the co-operatives will succeed in eradicating an adversarial perception of issues of organisational hierarchy and the division of labour on the part of many workers and managers that as yet does not differ radically from that of the outside world.

The rapid growth of the MCC has also brought other headaches. The current strategy is to build market share in key areas through strategic alliances with conventional corporations and the acquisition of private companies which have not in all cases become co-operatives. MCC subsidiaries which are not co-operatives have been established in developing countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, China and Thailand. Seasonal fluctuations in demand in some co-operatives are being catered for by the employment of significant numbers of temporary employees—the so-called *eventuales*—who have not so far been admitted to membership.

While overall employment in the MCC increased in 1995 by 1,960—from 25,990 to 27,950—it currently includes 4,165 *eventuales* and 4,671 employees in joint

continued on page 30



LABOUR

Comment

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"*CO-OPERATIVES (Consumers' Co-operatives)*: Association of workers and others on low incomes to secure reduction of living costs through their own enterprises for the purchase and distribution of goods (foodstuffs, clothing, etc.) and services (insurance, burial societies, etc.). The early founders believed that co-operatives would eventually "*supplant capitalism*"—an illusion that still persists among some workers.

"As independent organisations of the working class, and as adjuncts of the Trade Unions, etc., in the struggle against capitalist exploitation, the co-operatives possess importance. But, by themselves, they cannot "*supplant capitalism*"; this is a revolutionary task. In real fact, isolation of the co-operative movements from the general struggle of the workers against capitalism would result, because of competition for jobs, in a reduction of the value of labor-power (i.e. wages) corresponding to the reduction of living costs" (*Marxist Glossary*, L. Harry Gould, Sydney, 1947).

In the 1967 Fourth edition, the following was added: "*Note: Co-operatives in capitalism must be contrasted to those, and their changed and vital role, in Socialism*". This was a Communist Party of Australia publication.

Mondragon Co-Operatives

(Part II)

Labour Comment publishes below an article by the Australian politician, Race Mathews, on the challenges facing the Mondragon Co-Operatives. Though a little outdated (2000), the article outlines some of the serious challenges facing Mondragon and, whatever about Mathews' reformist credentials, his Distributist beliefs are total utopian: he at least, has taken the project seriously. That is a lot more than the interest taken in Ireland or Britain.

The Left have completely disowned the co-operative idea. Where it has arisen has been more as a response and reaction to a critical industrial situation, i.e. Upper Clyde in 1971, or Meriden motor-cycle co-operative in 1975 when workers took over the Triumph motor-cycle plant in Coventry. These projects are unlike Mondragon, which set out to prove that the principle of co-operativism could provide jobs in its own right under worker control.

Race Mathews is a Co-operative economist, and former member of Victoria's State Parliament and Australia's Federal Parliament for the Australian Labor Party. He was a former national Chairman of the Australian Fabian Society. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at Monash University's Faculty of Business and Economics. He has visited Mondragon on a number of occasions.

In the context of Co-operative Economics, Mathews supports Distributism and strongly favours Worker Cooperatives as the basis of a left wing economic model.

Distributism

This is Mathew's understanding of the principle of Distributism based on an article by Maisie Ward.

"In her 1944 biography of Gilbert Chesterton she wrote:

'In Australia, Distributism has given a fresh slant to both Labor and Catholic leadership . . . Most important, however, of all the Australian developments has been the approval of the main Distributist ideal by the Australasian Hierarchy as the aim of Catholic Action.'

"So totally has Distributism been lost to memory that its content and context require explanation. What was Distributism? How did it arise and evolve, by whom has it been advocated and how did

it achieve a level of influence in Australia of the pervasive character ascribed to it by Maisie Ward?

"Distributists favour a 'society of owners', where property belongs to the many rather than the few, and correspondingly oppose the concentration of property in the hands either of the rich, as under capitalism, or of the state, as advocated by some socialists. In particular, ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange must be widespread.

"Distributism emerged as one element of the widespread revulsion and agony of conscience over poverty and dispossession in late Victorian and Edwardian England, and the social teachings that Pope Leo XIII set out in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, in part at the instigation of the great English cardinal, Henry Manning. The encyclical's significance has been summarised by the prominent Anglo-Catholic scholar and sometime Distributist of the inter-war period, Maurice Reckitt. Reckitt wrote:

'*Rerum Novarum* is the charter of Social Catholicism, and stands to that movement in the same relation as the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels does to revolutionary socialism.'"

(*Collateral Damage: B. A. Santamaria and the Marginalising of Social Catholicism* by Race Mathews, Melbourne, 2005).

A COMMENT

On the basis of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) statement above, Mathews would be an utter reactionary: deluding workers into believing that reforms will ultimately lead to socialism,

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