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Anthony McIntyre vs. Boston College

The Boston College Project, masterminded by Professor the Lord Bew and implemented by journalist Ed Moloney and dissident Provo Anthony McIntyre, partially achieved its object. Gerry Adams was arrested by the Northern police and questioned over four days with the object of charging him with having been a member of the Provisional IRA. It is not believable that the purpose of the Boston project was not to get Adams jailed.

The first lot of tapes were subpoenaed on the alleged grounds that information was sought about the killing of Jean McConville. However, the PSNI is now to seek the rest of the tapes held by Boston College, giving no particular grounds.

While Gerry Adams was released, no decision has yet been made as to whether charges are to be brought.

Lord Bew kept a low profile—or an altered profile—during the days when Adams was in police custody. He was interviewed on BBC radio on the Friday evening, but without reference to the part he played in the arrest of Adams. He was interviewed as Chairman of a Westminster Parliamentary Committee on political standards.

The British (and Irish) media are well-behaved. They did not seek him out and question him during the political excitement of those few days, when it was thought that the Peace Process might collapse. But, when Adams was released on Sunday evening, the first thing he said to the world press was that he had been arrested on foot of Paul Bew's Boston College operation.

Bew was interviewed on BBC Radio Four's *Today* programme the following morning. He struck the attitude of an otherworldly academic, and the interviewer chose not to mention that he was (or is?) a member of the Official IRA, which has chosen to be in a relationship of long-term feud with the Provos, or even that the feuding led him to become political advisor to David (now Lord) Trimble when, as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, he was doing his best to prevent the Good Friday Agreement from being put into operation.

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The Future of Labour

What contribution can the Labour Party make to the economic and social development of the country? That is the question the candidates for leader of the Labour Party must ask themselves. Going into the recent election the Labour Party presented itself as a defender of the social welfare budget against Fine Gael attacks. There is some truth in the claim, but the Government's insensitive handling of discretionary medical cards left the electorate unimpressed. Since Fine Gael has never claimed to be 'welfarist', it was always likely that the Junior Partner would suffer the most from the electorate's wrath.

But the die was cast before the 2011 election. The threat of burning the senior bondholders and rejecting "*Frankfurt's Way*" has only credibility if leaving Europe and the Euro is contemplated. The former advisor to Michael McDowell, Cormac Lucey spelt out the implications a few years ago in the *Sunday Business Post*. It would involve draconian cuts in public expenditure in order to achieve a balanced budget since credit would cease to be available. No individual or party of the

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Election Results

The Labour Party sacrificed itself for the country by refusing not to take Office as a minor partner in an austerity Coalition after the last General Election. It might have acted selfishly by refusing Ministerial salaries and taking advantage of the drastic decline of Fianna Fail to become the major Opposition party, and thus displace the system of Civil War parties, of which it had so often complained. Instead of doing that, it sacrificed its future to the cause of necessary austerity in the present—

altruistic austerity, you understand. And now the electorate has shown how it appreciates such sacrifices.

When the Labour Party came under Official Republican leadership, it declared that it had become a party for the middle class. But the middle class, in the absence of an aristocracy to give it definition, is a rather nondescript, vacuous thing. And middle-class Labour has now been comprehensively overtaken by Sinn Fein—which is what? The best description is perhaps an old-fashioned one: it is a bourgeois -national party. Bourgeois

nationalism, historically, is a constructive social force, very different from non-descript middle classness. Sinn Fein, by virtue of what it has done in the North, is the only party in Western Europe which merits that description. It is not a party of the merely affluent. It is a party generated out of the mass of the community in conditions of warfare, which is capable of carrying the working class with it in its national enterprise because it is to such an extent a working class development in a situation where middle-classness proved to be a hopeless failure.

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[Why The Guilds Failed](#)

by Rev. George Clune

Mondragon, Part 30

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No awkward questions were asked of him as he gave this explanation of his Boston operation:

"The idea then was really in some ways rather academic, to lay down an archive which I can remember saying would probably not be consulted by graduates until say 2024-5.

"That's not the way it's actually worked out and I think it's worth explaining why. But I was motivated above all by the fact that the Troubles were over, but I'd worked on the previous Troubles of the 1920s. The archival resources, the interview material, was slight. It was hard to understand what happened. The idea that, if you wanted to prevent it happening again, it would be a good idea to build up as much testimony as possible——

[Interviewer:] "——So you never expected it to become public?"

"Well, when I left the project, or involvement in the project, there was no decision made about when these things would be made public. In fact some tapes in effect became public about 2010. That was not my original conception. The protocols and the technicalities around the project were evolved after I returned to Ireland.

[Interviewer:] "Do you regret being involved in it?"

"Well, look, it's been a car crash. And I think that one of the sad things is that, first of all, most importantly, not one

width of improvement has occurred for those who suffered during the Troubles. And also academically there's a freeze now, a coldness around similar projects. Remember that we wanted to do Loyalists here. Other people wanted to do work on the Security Forces. That's very unlikely to happen now. Even in other conflict situations now there's a coldness, or a freeze, around those projects and that has to be regretted. There's no doubt about that.

[Interviewer:] "OK. So it's damaged what historians do..."

—but are the tapes credible as evidence? No, Bew said, they were not intended to be evidence. And he had no knowledge of who was to be interviewed.

But surely Lord Bew must have known what the whole world has known for many years—that defectors from the Provisional IRA, who were hostile to Adams because of his part in ending the War, were recording information against him with a guarantee that it would remain secret until their death—not until the death of all concerned, which is how it should have been in the project as now presented by Bew. He must have known for many years that his alleged project had been sabotaged, and changed into a campaign to bring down Adams, who was the lynch-pin of the

Peace Process. And he stayed silent.

Well the project, in the only realistic interpretation, succeeded to the extent of getting Adams arrested and questioned for four days during an election campaign which resulted in substantial increase in Provo electoral support. And the foolish idea that the tapes could be kept secret from the State if the State became interested in them was blown away. Indeed, Moloney seemed to do his utmost to interest the State in them. And the State got a bunch of tapes so that people whose intention was to damage Adams under a guarantee of secrecy until their own deaths ended up giving evidence against themselves and getting themselves arrested.

Well done, Paul!

The following transcript of interviews Brooke Gladstone conducted with Anthony McIntyre (Researcher for Boston College Project) and Jack Dunn (Director of News and Public Affairs office at Boston College). It was published in *Boston College Subpoena News* (4.2.14). They are followed by a transcript of an interview with Danny Morrison

INTERVIEW WITH ANTHONY MCINTYRE:

AM: I served a life sentence for IRA activity including the killing of a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force. And I have been involved ... in the hunger strikes back in 1981 and 1980. And on the blanket protest along with Bobby Sands. I first went to prison when I was 16 and released when I was 18. I returned to prison when I was 18 and was released when I was 35. And I was known to these people to be trustworthy.

BG: What promises did you make to them?

AM: That these interviews would not be released until their death or with their consent prior to that. And that neither the Provisional IRA nor the British state would be allowed to access those interviews.

BG: One of your interviewees, Brendan Hughes, died and a book came out by your collaborator on the project, journalist Ed Moloney. In the book Brendan Hughes figured prominently. He told you that Gerry Adams was involved in the murder of Jean McConville, something that Adams has denied. Here is a little bit of Brendan Hughes' tape.

'I never carried out a major operation without the OK or the order from Gerry. And for him to sit in his plush office in Westminster or Stormont or wherever, and deny it ... I mean it is like Hitler denying that there was ever a Holocaust.'

AM: Well, during the course of the interview, Brendan revealed a lot of his life in the IRA. Gerry Adams was his operational commander in Belfast, and that Gerry Adams had ordered the killing of Jean McConville, had ordered the London bombings and had ordered a lot of IRA activity. Brendan Hughes and Gerry Adams were very close comrades in the IRA back in the day.

BG: Boston College having been confronted with this order to turn over the entire archive calls it a victory that it doesn't have to turn the whole thing over, only eleven documents.

AM: What Boston College secured was a minimising of the defeat. That is what we secured. The state seemed to have a view that 'we were dealing with pushover professors and we will get anything we want out of them.' And they weren't far wrong.

BG: Pushover professors?

AM: Yes.

BG: And they weren't very far wrong you were saying?

AM: No, they weren't very far wrong. There should never have been a discussion about whether we do this or we don't. They should have been straight out of the traps and said 'We will face this head on.'

BG: Hmm Hmm.

AM: Rather Boston College were transmitting messages to the Justice Department and law enforcement that 'we are willing to fold if you give us the right opportunity.' But unfortunately for Boston College, myself, my wife, and Ed Moloney decided to stand and fight. And because we fought Boston College then were embarrassed.

BG: Okay. Let's, let's consider the arguments on both sides of this issue. The British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said in a special on CNN that nobody is above the law: (*'News Report featuring Owen Patterson: We have been quite clear as a government there can be no concept of an amnesty. So, we have to support the police in bringing those who committed crimes to justice.'*)

AM: That's fine. What he actually means is that nobody outside law enforcement is above the law. Because the British authorities have withheld vital information from the relatives of the murdered human rights lawyer, Pat Finucane, murdered by agents of the British state. The British state has withheld vital documents from the victims and families of the people killed in the Dublin/Monaghan bombings in May 1974.

BG: I hear what you are saying. That they are, they are having a double standard.

AM: Well, absolutely. But I mean

Shatter's West Brit acts:

Alan Shatter (Fine Gael) has been forced to resign as Minister for Justice, following mismanagement of the Garda Síochána. The Department has been taken over by Frances Fitzgerald. He was also Minister for Defence, a brief undertaken by Taoiseach Enda Kenny for the moment.

There will be relief across the board at his going, in view of the many decisions he has made which went against the grain of Irish society: above all his views on the 2nd World War and the pardoning of deserters from the Irish Army who joined the British forces. He has also banned the Army from participating in commemorations with a religious dimension. In another decision made in July 2013 he showed his contempt for Irish tradition when it came to naming navy boats. Two Irish Navy boats—the MV Aoife and MV Emer—were decommissioned and ordered replaced. According to RTE radio's "Seascapes" two weeks ago, it has been traditional to maintain and carry on the heroic names from Irish mythology they carried, and transfer them to the successor boats. To the great disdain of some Navy people (according to Seascapes), Alan Shatter declared last July that the successor boats this time would be called MV Samuel Beckett and MV James Joyce instead. It remains to be seen whether this decision is let stand.

As part of the Austerity drive, the Government decided that in future Ministers would not take Severance Payments. Legislation was approved and ready to pass into law. Under the old regime, Shatter would have been entitled to €70,000. It was generally felt that he was honour-bound not to take this money. The question came up as polling was due to start in the various elections held on 23rd May. Shatter held off saying whether he would take the money until late in the day, with the object of damaging his party. He then announced that he was donating the money to an English-based children's charity, 'Jack and Jill'.

people in Boston and America should know about British double standards from the War of Independence out there ...

BG: (*laughs*)

AM: So I don't think you should be too surprised about British double standards.

INTERVIEW WITH JACK DUNN:

BG: Jack Dunn is the director of the news and public affairs office at Boston College. He says Boston College did everything in its power to protect the interviews.

JD: We hired the best lawyer available to fight the subpoenas and we won a significant court case that reduced the number of recorded materials from 85 to 11 interviews that were ultimately required to go over to the Police Services of Northern Ireland.

BG: McIntyre says that rather than lobbying politicians to protect the manuscripts the College instead set about undermining him and Moloney. Now you claim, I think, that the comments by McIntyre and Moloney hurt your efforts to protect ...

JD: Oh they did.

BG: ... the manuscript.

JD: What happened is the first subpoena occurred shortly after Ed Moloney published his book *Voices from the Grave* and after his video of the same name was released in Ireland. There is no doubt in our mind that the children of Jean McConville—who are victims themselves in this—they heard that there was a univer-

sity that had in its archives recordings of conversations with IRA members that could shed light on their mother's murder. So they apparently sought the help of the Police Services of Northern Ireland to issue a subpoena to the United States. And then to our astonishment Ed Moloney said in interviews in American newspapers that Boston College should burn the tapes and that sort of rhetoric that we might somehow burn materials which is something no university would ever consider, no doubt prompted the second subpoena.

BG: McIntyre says that the loss to history of this whole episode is very grave: it irreparably harms the possibility that people will really know what happened during the Troubles. And Boston College should have had the courage to stand up and engage in an act of civil disobedience.

JD: It is just a clash of cultures between an American university that is obviously going to be respondent to a US court subpoena and an individual from Northern Ireland with a long, criminal record who just seems to have a utter disregard for the legal process and a suspicion of any authority.

BG: What about the issue of the loss to history?

JD: The shame of it is that Anthony conducted the interviews with the IRA members and those who have heard the tapes said his work was very weak. Kevin O'Neill, Boston College said that he was stunned by how leading the questions were.

BG: You feel he conducted shoddy

interviews?

JD: A lot of critics such as Danny Morrison, a former IRA member himself, have been critical of Anthony McIntyre suggesting that he interviewed only people who held the same viewpoint that he did, people who would be critical of Gerry Adams.

BG: McIntyre has pushed back and said that the efforts by the Irish police to get the tape is part of a campaign against Gerry Adams. So everyone is charging this is a campaign against Gerry Adams. But perhaps not admissible as evidence. Right?

JD: Probably not. I think Mr McIntyre and I would agree on that, that the information would probably not have value in a court of law. As we all have pointed out one of the great ironies is that Boston College in this very Burns Library holds the recordings of the conversations that led to the various paramilitary groups laying down their arms. And the condition is they will not be available to anyone for thirty years. The Police Services of Northern Ireland have gone after the tapes of the IRA members but never requested the tapes of UVF members.

BG: Has Boston College changed its procedures for gathering oral histories?

JD: I think everyone in the world will change the way they undertake oral histories. When this project began in 2000 everyone followed the Columbia University model which said oral histories really wouldn't be subject to Institutional Review Board. I think that has changed. There would certainly be a heightened scrutiny today. All of the participants entered into this agreement with good intentions. Some good came of it. Clearly mistakes were made on all four of the parties involved. And the reality is that the promise of the Belfast project has been lessened. The political reality clearly got in the way and now I think we have all learned a need for heightened caution as anyone embarks on such a project.

2ND INTERVIEW WITH ANTHONY MCINTYRE

BG: Okay then. The argument for the lawyer for the McConville family says that the wounds of the troubles can never heal while injustice like the murder of Mrs McConville is allowed to fester.

AM: I have a great deal of sympathy for the lawyer's sentiment and I have enormous sympathy for the family of Jean McConville and the family of any person killed. But it is not the task of a researcher to become a gatherer of evidence for law enforcement. Even for clergymen—now

one can argue that researchers produce knowledge and clergymen produce nonsense ...

BG: (*laughs*)

AM: Yet clergymen are allowed to maintain confidentiality and researchers aren't. It seems to me to be a bizarre situation. There are certain obstacles that have to stand in the way of the state for the betterment of society. And I think that academics and journalists need to be protected from this sort of encroachment and incursion. If the only view of society that we have, the only view of the past is that of law enforcement we will learn very little from it.

BG: But how can it really effect policy and improve somebody's life if you don't get to look into it until thirty years hence and the people who committed the wrongdoing on both sides of the struggle are never brought to account.

AM: Well, I mean we have a situation in the North where the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said that the Criminal Justice system had to be turned on its head in order to bring about the Good Friday Agreement. Basically politics in the North of Ireland did trump justice. And it has also trumped truth. Truth in the North of Ireland is used for recrimination not for reconciliation. They want to use it to—yesterday's issues to fight the political battles of today. This information wasn't gathered by ourselves as researchers to hand over to relatives. Because people are simply going to clam up. All the knowledge that could have been brought to the families at some point under a variety of processes about truth recovery and the past has now been sabotaged by this issue. It is very sad that the McConvilles cannot get the truth. I think that the McConville family are behaving nobly and honourably. It's just that I represent a different constituency of knowledge and 'ne'er the twain shall meet.'

BG: Ed Moloney, your colleague in the Belfast Project, has said that the release of the tapes could endanger your life. Do you really think that's a realistic concern?

AM: I am going to see people coming for me even when they are not coming for me...

BG: (*laughs*)

AM: ... because I am in the eye of the storm and I am sensitive. Former colleagues can be very vitriolic and bitter. Some of them with great audacity and chutzpah ...

BG: (*laughs*) ...

AM: ... who many of us have for a long time suspected of being informers are now calling the participants of the Boston College project informers. It's a load of

old hooley. But we must be very cautious. But if you are asking me do I live under the bed fearful that I am going to be attacked imminently? No I don't.

DANNY MORRISON ON ANTHONY MCINTYRE
Interview on LMFM Radio, 31 March 2014

MR (Interviewer): "It's a very flawed partisan project", Gerry Adams said. "Shoddy and self-serving. Not a serious or genuine, ethically based history project." And he described both Anthony McIntyre and Ed Moloney, the key interviewers in this, as "vitriolic critics" and "opponents of the Sinn Féin peace process".

DM: I know of no mainstream member of Sinn Féin who was approached for this project. But I do know the identities of many of those, of the twenty-six interviewees—I know their identities. And I can say hand-on-heart that only one person—among those twenty-six that I know of—only one person could roughly be described as neutral or sympathetic to Sinn Féin. So the rest of them, what we know of the names that have been out there: Richard O'Rawe, Dolours Price, Brendan Hughes and now Ivor Bell has been accused of being one of the interviewees—all of these people are opposed to Sinn Féin...

But the fact of the matter is that this was conceived by people who were... opposed to Sinn Féin. It was carried out by two people who have been vocal in their criticisms and denunciations of... Gerry Adams. The people whom they interviewed, most of the people whom they interviewed, are all hostile to Gerry Adams.

They did not explain in the Donor Agreement to the interviewees that they could only protect this as far as American law went. So these people, the interviewees were actually deceived.

I actually have no problem with someone sitting down with Anthony McIntyre, doing an interview and saying this is what I did if that's what they want to do. But I have major objections to someone sitting down and doing an interview and incriminating other people. For example, when Ed Moloney published his book—and he published it to capitalise on the fact that Brendan Hughes had died and therefore the tapes could be released. But apparently he has exclusive rights to the tapes. At least that's what I was told when I wrote to the library asking: could I hear the tapes?

The whole thing was conceived in secrecy. And there's absolutely no doubt about it that it was a flawed project... It's supposed to be an oral history of the IRA. Twenty-six people are interviewed and

nine of the interviews... relate to the death of Mrs. Jean McConville who was killed in 1972. So... many other things happened in the course of twenty-five—thirty years. But nine out of twenty-six interviews happen to touch upon Mrs. Jean McConville. And we have the judge himself saying that in the ninth case, in the ninth case the interviewee doesn't even mention it until prompted by Mr. McIntyre.

MR: Do you believe that Gerry Adams was a member of the IRA?

DM: ... First of all I wouldn't answer questions like that when I was in Castle-reagh being questioned by the RUC. I think the bulk of the people understand Gerry Adams' position and his predicament here. And the fact of the matter is, were Gerry Adams to admit IRA membership he could be charged. He could be charged yet.

But what Gerry Adams said is... let's have a level playing field. Let everybody, both sides—The British, who were also involved in the dirty war against our community... Let's have an international truth commission and let everybody come out and state what needs stated for the sake of the victims and their relatives.

And by the way—this whole project—were now being told—was heavily influenced by the fact that people were upset that Gerry Adams didn't say he was in the IRA. So now what we have is a huge can of worms. We have got people living in fear of arrest. We have people who believe they've been betrayed by these researchers and by its project manager. And people are going to gaol. People are getting arrested.

MR: What about the point that Anthony McIntyre was making about a trial being used as a truth commission or a truth tribunal and if there would be support from Gerry Adams or Sinn Féin for that matter for such an approach to be taken?

DM: No, because it's one sided... We had a situation here where a British government set up a tribunal, the Saville Tribunal, into the killings on Bloody Sunday. Simultaneously, another British government department, the Ministry of Defence, was destroying the weapons that were involved in order to reduce the forensic evidence at the Saville Enquiry.

So what we have to have here is an international element. Something that we can all subscribe to. Something that we can all trust in. It can't be me going into a British court and saying this and saying that. Because you would still be prosecuted. And the other thing of course is that there's a war, a propaganda war, going on over the cause of the conflict. The Union-

ists to this day refuse to accept that what they did on the Nationalist community for fifty years you know was in some way related to the outbreak of the IRA's armed struggle here in the early 70's. Of course they were related. What happened to the people, the burning down of houses in 1969, the shooting of people, the gassing of a whole community in the Falls Road and the Falls' curfew over three days in 1970. Even before the IRA fired their first shot dozens of Catholics are killed by the state forces.

So there's a battle going on over that and for me to singularly just turn around and say: well, you know, I was responsible or we were responsible it then tends to suggest that you were culpable in causing the conflict. I didn't cause this conflict. I didn't cause the conflict.

So that's the war that's going on. Until we get agreement that the British are prepared to open their files... Let me Michael, give you one example: Sir John Stevens, the head of the Metropolitan Police, came over here in 1990 thinking that he was going to spend a few months investigating allegations of collusion between state forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. He ended up coming back and forth fifteen years. We were told that when he published his report we would be able to read it about what's going on. He was only allowed to publish seventeen pages out of a three thousand page report. So that's the other side of it—the dirty war—what the British were involved in, what they were provoking, the people who they were running. So until we get a commitment from the Brit, the British authorities that the rules apply to them as well then I don't think we're going anywhere.

(Note on Anthony McIntyre's Trial Proposal on LFM Radio, Drogheda. AM:)

"The question I would put to Mr. Adams is: if any trial ever emerges in relation to the killing of Jean McConville and people who are either charged or who have knowledge about the killing of Jean McConville are willing to use the court as a truth commission or a truth tribunal, does Mr. Adams support their right to give evidence in open court? Would he think they're right to do that? And if he does think they're right to do that would he then ensure, or would he insist on his party desisting from calling the people who participated in the project touts or anybody that decides to give evidence in court as part of a truth commission ... will he desist from calling them touts?")

Pat Walsh

Labour Party

continued

Left was prepared to engage with these realities. But it was left to the Labour Party in government to demonstrate the emptiness of such rhetoric.

Joan Burton, one of the candidates, has quipped that leading the Labour Party is more difficult than being President of the United States. After the disastrous local and European elections it would be churlish to deny her some sympathy, but it is not true! At least the new Labour leader will not be weighed down by the burden of expectation. Mere survival will be an achievement. A 15% vote in the next General Election would be seen as a Houdini-like recovery after the 7% in the recent elections, even if it would be less than the 19% it garnered in the 2011 General Election. Unlike Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and now Sinn Féin, Labour is under no pressure to please everyone. It now has an opportunity of sharpening its profile. In the process it should not be afraid of alienating a significant portion of the electorate (and even some of its members!). Remember, a mere 15% would be a spectacular recovery.

As things stand, it is very difficult to find a reason to vote Labour. Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin are unlikely to cut welfare as they struggle to win the working class vote. And the Labour Party does not hold the patent for the liberal agenda (if it ever did). All parties favour same sex marriage.

Since the Labour Party, under Gilmore, was unwilling or unable to confront Europe; it should now make a virtue out of the necessity. About ten years ago Mary Harney brilliantly defined the political choice facing Ireland as being between "*Boston and Berlin*". Well, the Labour Party should declare itself to be unambiguously in favour of Berlin and opposed to the Anglo-Saxon agenda.

Labour should not only say it, but mean it. The criterion of Boston or Berlin should determine *all* its policy positions. This would place Labour in the mainstream of the national tradition. Roger Casement saw independence as a means of re-connecting with continental Europe. James Connolly believed that the German social system was superior to the British. And what was true of 1914 is even more true today. In this regard the Labour Party should insist that a representative of the German State (preferably Angela Merkel) be present at the 1916 celebrations as a

representative of our "gallant allies" in Europe.

Social Partnership was introduced in this country following a conversation between the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Charles Haughey. The Labour Party should never be afraid to defend and deepen the institutions of Social Partnership in this country.

If Social Partnership contributed to the boom, there is no doubt that the bursting of the property bubble was the main factor in the crash. Indeed, this could be said of the United States as well. Sub prime lending was credit extended to people who could not afford to own their own homes. Germany does not have booms and bust in her property market. Only 40% of German householders own their own homes compared to about 70% in this country. Unexpectedly, the issue of homelessness became an issue in the most recent elections.

The Labour Party's response should have the following elements. Firstly, there should be an increased investment in public housing in conjunction with NAMA.

Secondly, it should seek to abolish all tax reliefs and incentives for home-ownership. There is no good social reason why home-ownership should be encouraged.

Thirdly, the private rental market should be tightly regulated. Such regulation would include rent controls, tenant rights and maintenance obligations. Also, pension funds should be encouraged to invest in residential property. There are far too many amateur landlords involved in the private rental sector. This policy would sharply distinguish the party from Fine Gael, which believes that residential property should be left to the whims of the market.

Fourthly, the Labour Party should be defending property charges rather than blaming the Troika or the previous Government. There is an unanswerable economic and social case for property taxes. The Labour Party should be making that case.

All of this is not to suggest that Labour should be passive in relation to Europe. Over 20 years ago Ireland made a significant contribution to a united Germany which was opposed by Thatcher. Mitterrand, Kohl and Delors realised that Ireland was no longer the feeble ally of Britain and was rewarded handsomely with billions from the Social Fund.

Being pro-Europe means encouraging moves towards greater cooperation and

integration, which are prerequisites for the survival of the Euro. It means opposing the "Atlanticist" tendency represented by Britain which sees uncontrolled expansion of Europe as a means towards undermining its internal political coherence.

At the present time Labour faces in Sinn Féin a formidable opponent in a crowded political landscape. If it is to survive it must be daring and radical. Otherwise it will deserve to be consigned to unlamented oblivion.

Election Results

continued

Ireland

The 2014 Local Elections were held on Friday 23rd May, the same day as voting in the European Elections and two Dáil By-Elections (Dublin West and Longford Westmeath) The last General Election was held just over three years ago, and the results show a considerable change in political support.

1. LOCAL ELECTIONS

These are the first elections held under the *Local Government Reform Act 2014*, which reduced the number of Councils and redrew boundaries but increased the number of seats from 883 in the 2009 Local Elections to 949. Borough and Town Councils were abolished under this Act. New municipal districts were created within most Counties. Generally, a Municipal District contains one Local Electoral Area, though a few districts around larger urban areas contain multiple Local Electoral Areas.

Total Results were:

Fianna Fáil: 266 seats, increase of 48 seats, 427,644 votes (25.3%, up 0.1%)

Fine Gael: 232 seats, decrease of 108 seats, 404,713 votes (24%, down 8.2%)

Sinn Féin: 157 seats, increase of 103 seats, 256,314 votes (15.2, up 7.8%)

Labour Party: 51 seats, decrease of 81 seats, 121,898 votes (7.2%, down 7.5%)

People Before Profit: 14 seats, increase of 9 seats, 29,051 votes (1.7, up 0.9%)

Anti-Austerity Alliance: 14 seats, increase of 10 seats, 21,097 votes (1.2%, up 0.3%)

Green Party: 12 seats, increase of 9 seats, 27,146 votes (1.6%, up 0.7%)

Workers' Party: 1 seat, down 1, 3,147 votes (0.2%)

United Left: 1 seat, New, 2,879 votes (0.2%)

South Kerry Independent 1 seat, 2,139 votes (0.1%)

Workers & Unemployed Action Group 1 seat: down 1, 1,927 votes (0.1, down 0.1%)

Republican Sinn Féin: 1 seat, 1,561 votes (0.1%)

The following stood but did not gain seats:

Direct Democracy(3,607), *Éirígí* (3,120); *Independents for Equality* (1,828), *Fís Nua* (930), *Letterkenny Residents Party* (428), *Communist Party* (215); *Independent* (193)

2. By-Elections

Dublin West By Election caused by the resignation of Patrick Nulty (Independent)

Ruth Coppinger of the Socialist Party elected with 5,977 First Preference votes, 20.64%.

She joins Socialist Party leader Joe Higgins in the Dail

Longford Westmeath By Election caused by the death of Nicky McFadden of Fine Gael

Gabrielle McFadden, Fine Gael, elected with 12,365 First Preference votes, 25.23%

3. European Parliament election, 2014

The European Election was held on Friday 23rd May on the Single Transferable Vote system, the general system used in Ireland. Due to the accession of Croatia to the EU, the number of seats was reduced to 11. This entailed redrawing boundaries. The total electorate is 3,245,348. Turnout was 1,701,942 and there were 31 candidates.

Fine Gael 369,120 votes, 22.3%, down 6.8%, 4 seats (same)

Sinn Féin 323,300 votes, 19.5%, up 8.3%, 3 seats (up 3 seats)

Fianna Fáil 369,545 votes, 22.3%, down 1.8%, 1 seat (down 2)

Independents 328,766 votes, 19.8%, up 8.3%, 3 seats (up 2)

Parties failing to get seats:

Labour Party 88,229 votes, 5.3%, down 8.6% (down 3 seats)
Green Party 81,458 votes, 4.9%, up 3%
Socialist Party 29,953 votes, 1.8%, down 0.9% (down 1 seat)

Direct Democracy Ireland 24,093 votes, 1.5%
People Before Profit Alliance 23,875 votes, 1.5%
Catholic Democrats 13,569 votes, 0.8%
Fís Nua 4,610 votes, 0.3%

Northern Ireland

Both European and Local Government elections were held on the same day, Thursday 22nd May

1. Europe

The election used the Single Transferable Vote, the only United Kingdom constituency to do so. Three seats were available and the area is treated as a single constituency. The Eligible Electorate was 1,226,771 and there was a 51.85 % turnout.

The three candidates elected were: all sitting candidates:

Martina Anderson (Sinn Féin; SF) at the first stage, 159,813 votes, 25.52%
Diane Dodds (Democratic Unionist Party; DUP) who was elected at the seventh stage, 131,163 votes, 20.95%
Jim Nicholson (Ulster Unionist Party; UUP) who was elected at the eighth stage, 83,438, 13.33%

75,806%, 12.11%
Alex Attwood (SDLP) 81,594, 13.03%
Anna Lo (Alliance Party) 44,432, 7.10%
Henry Reilly (UKIP) 24,584, 3.93%
Tina McKenzie (NI21*) 10,553, 1.69%
Ross Brown (Green Party) 10,598, 1.69%
Mark Brotherston (Conservative Party) 4,144, 0.66%

* NI 21 split shortly before polling, after declaring it would classify itself as 'Other' at next Assembly Election

Other Candidates:

Jim Allister (Traditional Unionist Voice)

2. Local Elections were held in a re-organised Local Government system, with 26 Councils being reduced to 11 areas and 462 seats. The results were:

DUP 130 seats, down 15; 144,928 votes 23.1%, down 4.1%
Sinn Féin 105 seats, down 10; 151,137 votes, down 0.7%
UUP 88 seats, down 11; 101,385 votes, down 0.9%

SDLP 66 seats, down 1; 85,237 votes, down 1.4%
Alliance 32 seats, down 2; 41,769 votes, down 0.7%
TUV 13 seats, up 10; 28,310 votes, up 2.5%

Gaybo's Little Skirmish At The GPO

We were gathered about the TV. Gaybo came on. Serious mien, yet with a secret smile That lift of the head. The modulated voice. Each word articulated. GBS's Dublin Protestant accent. The shrug. It was his moment, alright. The programme about the da did him proud. We'd been regaled about his World War One exploits with the British Army. All buckles, brasses and swagger-canes. Such swank. So much killing.

The da had been a natural for the cavalry. Not the engines, now. The gee-gees. He'd trained in rustic Kilruddery. A coachman to some Pukka Sahib. Seems the quality proliferated in Wicklow. Big Houses all about. Servants all over the place. The bow and the curtsy. But, spare a thought for the pay. Darn it. How to pay for the pandy and the '*cabáiste*' *. A shortage of

shekels. And that crowd of usurers above in '*La maison*'. Pheasants on the table, peasants on the run. Well-plucked. But, we knew our place. Touching the forelock. The Jockey's Salute. Anyway, the da wound up mounted on his steed, charging around France. In the thick of it. Must have been before the tanks. Thanks, but no thanks. I'd been thinking of Beecher's Brook or the Melling Road.

The da joined up early on. Duty calling. He'd gone off to tame the Huns. All so moving. He'd been an Old Contemptible. So called by the Kaiser, the cousin of herself, HRHQ. Family spats can catch on. She changed her name. He did not reciprocate.

Next, Gaybo is in a British Army graveyard in France. Very emotional. He turns away. A private moment.

Giddy up. Back in Dublin, all is well

again. Pictured before the GPO, he smiles condescendingly. The da always referred to that '*little skirmish*' down at the GPO. It seemed a bitt patronising of the da, I thought, as if coming from Parnassus. Then Gaybo put in the boot. The *bete noir*, Pearse. I don't think he liked him. Some amusing incident, gently tolerated. The bold child sent to bed early. Could be rehabilitated. But, Pearse! Gaybo lifted the head and gave the little sniff. The wind was coming from the wrong direction. The stab in the back. Gaybo shrugged.

The da fought for the freedom of others. Mine, too. Little Belgium figured a lot. He never asked Casement. Seems some 50,000 Irishmen perished. They are commemorated at the British Army War Memorial at Islandbridge. Where are the speculators gone? And all those dead. For what? For whom? There is no comparable monument for those who died for Irish freedom.

An expert went and put his foot in it. Those experts. He held up three bedraggled medals. The da's. A bit inadequate, I thought. '*Les Miserables*.' The expert proved to be indiscreet. These, he said, were only *campaign medals*. They were not for valour. Poor Gaybo. He recoiled. He'd been on a high. Some tumble. Down he came. Up, again. Rocking on the Kop. It reminded me of the Ali v. Fraser fight. Or the '*rumble in the jungle*'. Now, that was slaughter. A paean to violence.

Some people seem to glory in blood-letting. Especially when others are doing it. Strange, it is. And that raggedy bunch of rebels in Baile Átha Cliath. So few. So much accomplished. No, no, perish the thought. Gaybo lifts his head and sniffs. Again.

Woa, boy! Woa!

Question: What's a weed?

Answer: A poppy in the wrong button-hole.

One day, years ago, this guy said, '*My name is Gabriel*'. I fell back. Recovered. He added, '*But you can call me Gay*'. Gabriel seemed a beautiful name to me. I'd never heard of anyone called Gabriel. There were no Gabriels from where I'd come. I'd heard of Angel Gabriel. But that was different. Nor had anyone said to me before, '*you can call me Gay*'.

Anyway, Gaybo is a half-way house. Homely and welcoming. Everyone's favourite uncle. You'd have First Communion come every week. But I can't forget the Big House with the peasants, smothered in feathers, plucking the pheasants and the shot-guns firing about all over the place. The coachman saddling up the

* cabbage

'osses'. Tally-ho. 'Oos for stirrup-cup? I can see old Gaybo gently flicking his whip at the 'osses' Rumpoles o the Bailey. I opened a new tin of Brasso. I was taking a shine to him, though he went hard on Annie Murphy, that time. They say you should be nice to people on the way up, or they might not be nice to you on the way down. But I'm waiting to see how it will be on the way up The way down was awful. Like when you change trains at Mallow and catch the banger to Tralee. Later, going back to Mallow, it's the same banger. Ups and downs. No difference.

The 'Little Skirmish' had spread a bit. Maybe Gaybo hadn't heard. He's a Rialto lad. Born and bred. And his neighbours were all at it. Well, some of them. The South Dublin Union, Marrowbone Lane, Roe's Distillery, Watkin's Brewery. (Gaybo's wife's family owned Watkin's.) These malcontents came from Brabazon Square, James Street, Thomas Street, Meath Street, Gray Street, Regional Street, Pimlico and Rialto. From the tenements about. From further afield. From Inchicore and Harold's Cross. From Dolphin's Barn. From Terenure and Rathfarnham. Reared on stories of Emmet and Tone. Sitting at fire-places, watery-eyed, staring at damp, smoky turf. Hearing tales of Anne Devlin; the treachery of Leonard McNally; the Hanging Judge, Lord Norbury who'd sent hundreds to be hanged. There were few vacant lots in Croppie's Acre. Sniff. Another shrug.

The Fourth Battalion assembled in Emerald Square, Dolphin's Barn, on Easter Monday 1916, at 1100 hours. Numbers much reduced. (The Countermanding Order had reduced them to 120.) Most had some weapon: Lee Enfield Rifles, Mausers, assorted pistols and revolvers. Some had bandoliers. Most were becaped. Some wore green uniforms. A few had Sam Browne belts. Each carried a paper food parcel. Some Carried picks and sledges. They marched in a column of route, going into the unknown. Going wherever the road led. They had great trust in their leaders. After years of training, they relied upon them. They had discipline and obedience. To take on an Empire, in such an environment, was awesome

The Officer Commanding was Comdt. Eamon Ceannt. He was a official in Dublin Corporation. He was a Signatory to the Proclamation. He spoke Gaelic and was a well-known piper. He was married, with one son. Tall and erect, he had a soldierly appearance. He wore a mous-

tache and was dark-haired. He was highly admired and respected. He was serious-minded and religious, and devoted to the pursuit of freedom for his country. His family name was Kent and he was of English descent. He would be executed after the Rising.

The Second-in-Command was Cathal Brugha, or Charles Burgess. He was short and stocky, and also a Gaelic speaker. He was noted for his physical fitness. He'd been educated in Belvedere College. He was a man of extraordinary courage, as events were to prove. He was to survive the Rising, though wounded any times. He would recover in hospital, being too badly-wounded to be executed. He would die later, in the Civil War, as he came out the door of the Hammon Hotel, in O'Connell Street, felled with revolver in his hand, as former comrades shot down. Brugha was married, with a family. He had been Minister for Defence in the first Government. He'd opposed the 'Treaty'.

One of the Battalion Lieutenants was William Cosgrave, an elected member of Dublin Corporation. He came from a family of publicans in James Street. One of his step-brothers, Frank Burke, was shot dead in the South Dublin Union during the Rising. Cosgrave would take the Free State side in the 'Civil War'. He became leader of the Cumann na nGael (later Fine Gael) Party and become Taoiseach. His son, Liam, subsequently also became Taoiseach.

One of the volunteers, Joe McGrath, from Dolphin's Barn, subsequently became a Minister in the Cumann na nGael Government. He evaded capture at Marrowbone Lane, jumping over a wall and calling out, "*Tooraloo, lads*". Later he became the head of 'the Irish Hospitals' Trust' and the Sweepstake, becoming a millionaire and horse-owner. (He owned Windsor Lad.) Another of the Volunteers, Paddy O'Brien, was the Four Courts Garrison Commander, at the start of the 'Civil War'. He led the break out and afterwards was killed in action at Ennis—corthy, Wexford, on the Republican side. McGrath had borne responsibility for the notorious Oriel House during the 'Civil War', too.

A Captain in the Fourth Battalion was a young teacher from Pearse's Scoil Eanna, Con Colbert. He was single. He came from Limerick. He spoke Gaelic and was religious. He was quiet and determined and had served in the scout movement, Fianna Eireann. His motivation was the freedom of his country. He was executed

after the Rising, having taken command of the Marrowbone Lane Garrison during Easter week. The Colberts were of Palatine stock, who had come to farm in the Golden Vale during the eighteenth century. Central to the Fourth Battalion, also, was a Gaelic Football Club, called Bulfin's. GAA Clubs were pervasive, as was the Gaelic League. Educational levels varied, though many had their schooling ended early. They were oddly a mixture of intellectuals and intelligentsia, leavened with the proletariat, and sharing a sense of independence and ambition which emerged from the depths of history. Their aspirations seemed to come from unselfish motivation. Animosity, it appears, did not figure highly. The common weal was their objective. Broadly they were of the Left, but not doctrinaire. Most were from working-class backgrounds. Many might not have spent a night away from home before. The average Volunteer would have been in his early twenties. Literate, but not sophisticated.

John Bull hovered. There were many about clad in Khaki. They were a supply source, drinking in hostelrys carrying their rifles, on leave from the Front. These Lee Enfields were treasured. A quick snatch. And run.

The South Dublin Union never fell. Marrowbone was never penetrated. Roe's Distillery was vacated. Watkin's Brewery was evacuated, in favour of strengthening Marrowbone. The Holland Brothers and Mike Liston became heroes. The British suffered heavy casualties. When the dust cleared, the surrender was observed. The garrisons at the Union and Marrowbone, headed by Ceannt, marched, under escort, to St. Patrick's Park, near the Cathedral. They went proudly. They must have felt some sense of satisfaction. There they were disarmed. Along with the Jacobs' Garrison (The Second Battalion), they were marched to Richmond Barracks. Crowds, fuelled by the Shilling, shouted and cursed. Later, it was to the cattle boats and deportation. Imprisoned throughout England and Scotland. Then, most, to internment in Frongoch, N. Wales. Some sentenced, most on 'the never-never'. Then the fatal error. Looking for the pound of flesh. "*What if the dream come true?*"

Brigadier-General Lowe was the British field commander. A very qualified officer. He'd proven himself in the wars of the Empire. He was an aggressive leader. His problem was to identify the main rebel positions. The picture soon emerged. The GPO was the headquarters. This was his objective. The South Dublin Union was

the rebel West Flank. Boland's Mill was the East Flank. The Four Courts was Control North. Jacob's was control South. Lowe made an incision down Thomas Street, Dame Street, the Castle, to Trinity. This would be his new Headquarters. He made another incision, bypassing the Four Courts, down Church Street, to Capell Street, to Henry Street. The GPO was not threatened. He'd become bogged down on the extremities, but he'd extricated himself. Now, he'd go for the jugular. His artillery rained fire on the city centre. His problem was to preserve the integrity of his advancing troops.

This was not a "little skirmish". Gaybo would have loved it. Like the da. A right old 'ding-dong'. As ever, the acquisition of military Intelligence had proved itself.

At night the skies ran red. The city was an inferno. Buildings were ablaze. Walls were collapsing. Streets were piled with rubble. Snipers picked out targets. Machine-guns rattled away. "Ease, pull, tap." Everywhere were explosions. Observers relayed corrections. Bullets whined. Ricochets bounced. Ammunition supply was a problem, more easily solved by the British. They could provide rations more easily too.

In the Union and at Marrowbone, the battle raged on. Crown forces had entered the Union. Fighting became hand-to-hand. Street by street, house by house, it was fought out. Brugha performed extraordinary heroics. Grenades were exploding everywhere. Debris was all over. Fire was coming from everywhere and anywhere. Twice Crown Forces withdrew. Was the Crown teetering? Confusion reigned. A battle won? Not quite.

Marrowbone was never pierced. Crown forces came from Rialto, past the ridge, down the canal extension. They took heavy casualties. Fairbrother's field was littered with dead and wounded. A sniper's dead body dangled from a tree. Bodies lay in grotesque shapes. The fallen moaned. The wounded were aided by stretcher-bearers. The dead were let lie. Guns were over-heating. Sticking to hands. They had to be let cool. Hands were plunged into water-buckets. Any 'blood and guts merchant' would be sated. A bit like the Somme without the gas. Gaybo would give the shrug.

But the big guns won out. The surrender came. That "little skirmish" at the GPO. How the da must have smiled. But one of the Lancer's 'osses' had spent the week lying outside the GPO. Brown breed. Some sort of omen, may be. Pointing

where?

An Bunreacht, Article 40.2.2: "No title of nobility or of honour may be accepted by any citizen except with the prior approval of the Government".

Volunteer James Burke, Fourth Battalion, a prisoner in Kilmainham Goal, during the Rising: "*The Dublin Fusiliers were the worst of the lot.*"

HRHQ may some day announce: "*Arise, Sir Gaybo. Be ye upstanding.*"

John Morgan (Lt.Col. retd)

Corrections:

Two typographical errors crept into Colonel Morgan's article on 1916, '*One More Desperate Sally*', last month. 'Dublin Military Police' should read 'Dublin Metropolitan Police'. And the sentence, 'Republicans achieved depth, material support and all round protection, to some degree' should read 'Republicans achieved depth, *mutual* support and all round protection, to some degree'.

The White Nigger Controversy Re-emerges

The Irish Times made a small concession to the real world in an article by Dan Keenan (*The Irish Times*, 28.4.14). The article gave some political context to what has become known as the "white nigger controversy", in which the British Ambassador reported to his superiors in 1969. Sir Andrew Gilchrist reported:

"McDowall (sic) is one of the five (Protestant) owners of the *Irish Times*, and he and his associates are increasingly concerned about the line the paper is taking under its present (Protestant, Belfast-born) Editor, Gageby, whom he described as a very fine journalist, an excellent man but on Northern questions a renegade or white nigger."

The article quotes the above paragraph and explains that there was a political conflict between Major McDowell, representing the Unionist tradition of the newspaper, and Douglas Gageby who at the time had been promoting John Hume.

But that was not the newspaper's line in January 2003 when the controversy first emerged. Then, its story was that McDowell was trying "to help solve the problems in Northern Ireland" (*The Irish Times*, 27.1.13) and the British Ambassador was somehow mistaken when he reported that McDowell used the phrase "white nigger" about his editor.

So perhaps, after eleven years, we should be grateful for the newspaper's moment of clarity. Unfortunately the remainder of the piece has the usual evasions and misinformation. In particular Keenan makes the following three points:

- a) Major McDowell sought advice from "a senior British diplomatic figure".
- b) "*The controversy became public in 2003 with the release of State papers*".
- c) McDowell "*took no action against Gageby*".

Let's now deal with those three points:

"BRITISH DIPLOMAT"

The idea that McDowell sought advice from a senior British diplomatic figure is very misleading, if not simply wrong. He, in fact, sought help from the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson when he (McDowell) was in London in September 1969. Wilson was not available at the time, but interestingly expressed the view that McDowell's attempted contact related to "intelligence" matters rather than "journalistic activity". Wilson wanted the British Ambassador to meet McDowell. It was in response to the British Prime Minister's instruction that the meeting in October 1969 took place in which McDowell made his "white nigger" remark about his editor.

"PUBLIC IN 2003"?

To say "*the controversy became public in 2003 with the release of State papers*" is a bizarre reconstruction of what happened. The facts of the matter are that the "*controversy became public in 2003*" when the "white nigger" letter was published in the *Irish Political Review* in January 2003 and then in an edition of the *Sunday Independent* (26.1.03). The "*release of State papers*" occurred in December 1999, more than three years earlier.

The "white nigger" letter is a controversy, not only because of the content of that notorious letter, but also the reporting, or lack of reporting, of it by the so-called paper of record.

The newspaper's excuse is that it was unaware of the letter before January 2003 even though every year it reports on the release of documents from the British Public Records Office. This failure was also in spite of the fact that the newspaper's journalist did unearth in December 1999 another letter, which referred to the British Ambassador's 'white nigger' letter.

"NO ACTION AGAINST GAGEBY"

There are no grounds for thinking that McDowell "took no action against Gageby". McDowell did not retire gracefully soon after October 1969. On the contrary he consolidated and increased his power in subsequent years. With the help of Lord Arnold Goodman (Harold Wilson's "Mr Fixit") he devised a structure for *The Irish Times* that concentrated power in his own hands, as well as giving himself and the other Directors a very generous pay off. Douglas Gageby left (or was pushed out) in 1974 and only returned in 1977 when McDowell's controversial appointment (Fergus Pyle) brought the newspaper to the brink of financial ruin. Gageby left for good in 1986.

Among the personal titles that the dear leader (McDowell) held in 1974 were:

- a) Chairman (for life) of *The Irish Times Trust Ltd* which controlled the newspaper.
- b) Chairman (for life) of *The Irish Times Ltd*.
- c) Chief Executive of *The Irish Times Ltd* until he decided to resign.

He remained as Chief Executive until 1997 when he decided to resign at the age of 74. However he retained the title of Chairman of *The Irish Times Trust* until December 2001. In December 2001 he was made President for Life of *The Irish Times Group*.

Conor Brady, who was Editor from 1986 to 2002, is quite informative on McDowell's leadership style:

"His Achilles heel was his absolutism. He believed he had the responsibility to decide on virtually everything in the ultimate. Whether it was the menu at a board lunch, the brand and model of motorcar to be driven by certain employees or the choice of new equipment for some department, he immersed himself in the detail. Staff at all levels knew he had the final say, and that he frequently invoked it. He exercised the right to second-guess or over-rule anything apart from the day-to-day content of the newspaper (*Up with the Times*, Gill & Macmillan, 2005, Page 117).

Brady's claim that, for all McDowell's absolutism, he did not interfere with the newspaper's day-to-day content is a little disingenuous because as Brady admits he (Brady) had to account for himself alone in front of the Trust (controlled by McDowell) once a month. Also, his Contract of Employment "had to go on the hazard" of being renewed every 12 months.

Unfortunately, we have not yet heard from McDowell himself. Before his death in 2009 he granted an interview to the then

Editor of *The Irish Times* Geraldine Kennedy. The interview took place over two days, but McDowell prevented it from being published. Apparently, the prohibition still applies after his death!

John Martin

Irish Times: Past And Present,
a record of the journal since 1859,
by John Martin
€21, £17.50

Review: Catastrophe And Resurgence, *The Catholic Predicament In 'Northern Ireland', Volume One: Catastrophe, 1914-1968* by Pat Walsh. Belfast Historical & Educational Society. €24, £20 postfree in Ireland and Britain

'Catastrophe'

This book reveals a history of Catholic West Belfast I was half-aware of it but didn't want to know too much about it. Harry Diamond, MP, leader of the Republican Labour Party and other DIY parties, for Belfast Falls was around then in the late 1940s and the early 1950s when I became politically active as a teenage communist. Diamond's anti-communism and his 'let's-all-get-down-on-our-knees-and-pray' syndrome in old Stormont did say something about the history of Catholic West Belfast, plus those Joseph the Worker parades on May Day.. But I was only interested, as were others in the Young Workers League, in the 1916 Commemorations at Milltown Cemetery. We sought out members of the then thin ranks of the IRA by going to some Republican-sponsored dances in St Mary's Hall. You could tell how close-knit and dynastical these young Republicans were when the band and the dance stopped when we walked in as a mixed Catholic/Protestant delegation. Some wanted us kicked out but we had been invited by a prominent Republican. We had been working mostly in the Protestant areas of Belfast and some of the towns outside it, like Carrickfergus, as did the CPNI, so we thought as young people we must do some work in the Catholic areas.

The leadership of the CPNI got to hear of our interest in that aspect of West Belfast and the Markets area and they weren't too pleased. Most of them, if not all of them, were Trade Union leaders and their prime mission was to keep the Protestant industrial working-class happy in the shipyard, the aircraft factory and in the heavy engineering industries. They looked East to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies—not West to Catholic West Belfast. When they could, they got Catholic workers into the Protestant-dominated industries and into the Fire Brigade, mostly against the wishes of that workforce. They were a powerful

lot but generally Catholic West Belfast and the Markets area was not on their list of priorities.

Now—with industrial Belfast gone, to be replaced by industrial theme-parks and call centre, so gone too is militant industrial communism—Catholic West Belfast has become the main political centre of interest and it has an amazing story to tell, the one I couldn't stomach all those years ago. This book tells how it became a recruiting ground for WW1, led by Joe Devlin, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the Belfast *Irish News*:

"Of all the parts of the Irish nation it was the Belfast Catholics who were engaging most in purposeful activity within Ireland and in the wider UK State. They were possibly the least Republican community in the Nation at the time of Partition and the most enthusiastic about the Home Rule project under their leader Joe Devlin."

What is best about this book is that it deals with the North specifically and shows it to have a separate development from that of the South. It is true to say that Northern Catholics were much more drawn to English cities and many UK ways, including entertainment. As children we listened to the BBC Children's Hour and as adults to their radio comedians, and during WW2 we encountered masses of British and American troops. With heavy military equipment trundling the roads day and night it made their war feel exciting, maybe something you would want to join in, providing it wasn't going to be over too soon before you grew up. Yet these Catholics, says the author about an earlier enthusiasm for the UK:

"... Were to be cut off from the foremost object of their desire, a self-governing Irish state within the Imperial State. And they were to be cut off from the second best option: participation in the reform movement in Britain."

There was to be no co-operation bet-

ween the Ulster Protestant and the Ulster Catholic. The Catholic had survived the planter's genocide and now those native survivors were in no way going to rule over the descendants of those early settlers, and even wee Joe Devlin wasn't going to alter that with all his recruiting of Catholics to fight in England's totally unnecessary war against a Germany it saw as a competitor.

It's all there in the book. Some of the Devlin's speeches in the British House of Commons are unbelievably craven when he realises the game is up post-WW1 and that his parliamentary party is falling apart. One in particular has something of the silent film pathos. There is laughter from the chamber which Devlin sees as sneering from these smug pulling-a-fast-one, wiped-your-eye-there-mate, cold-blooded, lack-of-conscience elements. How Devlin could bear even thinking about how he had encouraged young Catholic men into the slaughter of WW1 and have no reward for the Catholic North in the end is beyond me.

It is true most young men like the idea of war and being transported to foreign lands but mostly they fight these desires. An authoritative figure can reinforce this longing and give it justification. At least Redmond died before he could have that long think about how he became a tool of British Imperialism and helped kill off thousands of his countrymen, though his son Willie didn't learn a lot from his dad's sad cuckolding. Contrast one of Wee Joe's speeches on pages 81-82 with Lloyd George's down-to-earth-well-thought-out speeches that looked after Britain's interests without emotion, caving in to no one.

On page 60 there is a breath of fresh air when James Connolly writes of Wee Joe Devlin in *The Worker's Republic* of the 28th of August, 1915:

"That great, that heroic figure, Wee Joe Devlin, at the recent Convention of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (Board of Erin), told how his society had rallied to the Empire in its day of difficulty... "

Later in his article he castigates those who call Wee Joe *the Wee Bottle-washer*, an occupation he had before he rose to power. Connolly rightly says a bottle-washer is an honest trade but a recruiting sergeant luring men to their deaths, the men who trusted him and voted him into power, isn't.

There is a very interesting piece on Father O'Flanagan, early Sinn Fein's Vice-President, and his two-nation view of

Ireland. The *Irish News* claims O'Flanagan made out a case for partition because he is quoted by Lloyd George. The problem about such an interesting book as this is you could keep on quoting long passages out of it, making a meal of it, when you are trying just to give an appetiser. The UK-based Connolly Association had great admiration for Father O'Flanagan and published a number of pamphlets on him. I can't remember reading anything about his two-nations theory. I could be wrong but then again the CA was a '*One-Nation, One People*' organisation which they declared on banners which I sometimes carried on demonstrations, and especially on that long march from London to Birmingham in the early 1960s.

I could easily say that I have been involved in discussions about Michael Collins for most of my life and now I feel I have got 99% of the answers to my queries. His brilliance as the IRA's head of Intelligence is well documented elsewhere in other publications but nowhere, until now, has his trickery, his subterfuge, his sell-out of comrades, his mercilessness, his betrayal of the Catholic North been so well presented. It gets you wondering what really went on in his negotiations with Lloyd George and Co. Cahir Healy, the veteran Northern Nationalist reviewed a book on him in October 1958 by Rex Taylor called *Michael Collins, The Big Fellow*. I still have the yellowed, flaking, falling apart, paperback version put out by the publisher Four Square, price 3/6. Cahir Healy's review must have been in the hardback copy for I haven't read it before. Pat Walsh re-produces what he has to say and remarks that Healy was:

"More interested in telling the Northern Catholic story than reviewing the book."

Walsh then goes on to quote "Cahir Healy's review at length, including what he has to say about Michael Collins:

"It was a double tragedy that Michael Collins should have entered politics. He lost his life at 31 in consequence, killed by jealous or disappointed comrades. He held the fate of nearly half a million Northern Nationalists in his hands, but with little knowledge of their relation to the Irish nation. He was a soldier, with much knowledge of guerrilla warfare, but not a politician, as he admitted... "

Further down the review Cahir Healy has this to say, which I think is an extremely important and is the crux of the matter, when Griffith and Collins are picked for some private talks after the Whitehall negotiators, having sent to Dublin for

private memos on both men as to their characters. I suppose we call that profiling today.

Healy says: "The plea was made later that the Irishmen were confronted with a terrible alternative - "Sign or we resume the war"...".

"Collins never agreed they were confronted by this threat", Cahir Healy says.

The USA entered the WW1 situation in its last year and saved Britain from defeat, and, as writers in the *Irish Political Review* and other publications have said, this must have been the beginning of Britain's empire-decline. Would Irish-America after that tolerate Britain doing to the Irish what they did to the Boers—blockhouses to disrupt travel, concentration camps for whole families?

I have doubts about this for many years myself. Collins was a tough dedicated soldier, a master schemer who was quick to wipe out his opponents like the Cairo Gang of Brit spoons.

Even now, when the Brits knew his identity and had him unarmed, he gave orders for the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and advisor for the Ulster Unionist cause. And he admitted it, threw it in their faces. He was young and vital and not easy to scare. I can see sit him sitting there sneering at these soon-to-become fossils of Empire. If he wasn't afraid of his own people, with his many scheming ways, why would he be afraid of the enemy whom he had helped drag to the negotiating table. He had had killed the cream of their intelligence services. And you must give it to the Brits they respect such nimble operators. So whether Collins was forced into signing or not I tend to think Collins knew what he wanted, and what was possible—a Catholic Nationalist nation that excluded almost a million angry Ulster Protestants he couldn't understand, and whom he knew had armed themselves back in 1912. He had to then enforce his idea for his new nation on close comrades and so became the strongman. It is possible he would have made trouble for Britain in the future if he had of been allowed to live. He died too young at 31 when he had a lot of developing to do. Tell that to his Irish victims?

Pat Walsh deals very adequately with the Border Commission when it was promised the Border could be whittled away like mice at cheese until Protestant Ulster was left with four Counties, or even less. Thankfully this Commission was abandoned in 1925 even though the Border

Northern Catholics felt betrayed by not finding themselves in the new Irish Free State, while the Catholics of the inner Six Counties like in Antrim and North Down felt relieved they weren't going to be an even less minority. Though the Six Counties was to become a semi-detached area from the UK, with its Catholic population isolated away from the politics of the Irish Free State and the mainstream politics of the UK, they were a big enough minority to feel some security with their self-sufficiency, and with that, in the future, able to grow and take on the might of Britain and their surrogates, beyond what even Michael Collins couldn't have dreamt of. (Now Northern Catholics must be able to forgive the man?)

Up again pops wee Joe Devlin. It's like that mouse who never had a chance to whittle away the Border and who suddenly makes a re-appearance. You think it has died or moved away to a neighbour's house but no here it is running across the carpet in the living room again. You recognise it by its colour though it has become a political chameleon. And that's how Northern Catholic politics had become post Irish Free State and settled Six County Protestant wonderland for a Protestant people. The Nationalist MPs are treated badly, without respect, in what was the new Stormont that has become the old Stormont, and I am listening to Harry Diamond, Belfast Falls MP, on radio, asking Stormont, both Protestant majority and Catholics few MPs, to get down on their knees and pray together. Two people one god or was it one people two gods?

If you ever wondered why Fianna Fail never organised in the North you will get your answer in this book. The 26 Counties was intent in consolidating itself and it wanted no interference from Northern Nationalists who might provide a catheter for British interference. This is perfectly understandable now that I don't personally have to live through that sacrifice any longer. But so too did the Northern Protestant sacrifice their umbilical cord to the UK and stopped developing.

"In 1932 there had been attacks on Catholics journeying South to the Eucharistic Congress. It seems that a small rise in Catholic confidence after a decade of disaster could not be borne easily by Unionism within the sectarian framework of the Six County construct."

As Pat Walsh points out there had also been Northern enthusiasm for De Valera's successes in that year of 1932.

"This was followed by a number of

provocative speeches made by the Stormont Minister of Agriculture and future Prime Minister of 'Northern Ireland', Sir Basil Brooke. Brooke told Unionists not to employ Catholics who he describes as '99 per cent disloyal' and 'out to cut their throats if opportunity arose'."

Prime Minister Lord Craigavon approved of this statement which shocked the Nationalists who saw this as an economic pogrom, the author continues.

Then in July 1935 there was a physical one:

"It's organisers included a new militant Unionist organisation called the Ulster Protestant League, which was inspired by the activities of the SA (Sturmabteilung) in Germany. Over four hundred Catholic homes were burnt, a dozen lives lost and hundreds put out of their jobs."

After all these years It is good to know who shot dead our female Catholic neighbour. It was Glasgow Street off York Road, Belfast. My father heard a shot on that hot July day in 1935. He went to the door and the gunman was walking casually away in broad daylight with a smoking revolver in his hand. That night and for many nights to come he barricaded the front and back doors to our small two-up-and-two down house with the furniture. During the day we went to a park called The Grove opposite our street. It was a huge grassy mound. From there we could watch who would knock on our door. Over a week at least three men knocked on our door, whether they were hawkers or would-be assassins we were never to know. We stayed there on The Grove from dawn to sunset with a few sandwiches and bottles of cold tea. I heard later my parents quarrelled continually. My father was unemployed and besides me there were my sisters aged two and one. My father, being a Protestant wanted to live in Protestant areas, my mother being a Catholic would obviously have felt safer in Catholic areas. Though I was three years old I still have vivid memories of those days. How does such a thing affect children? It seems normal and the normality continues when by the age of five you have seen two bodies in the street of dead Catholics. And with your parents acting normally there is no panic. They seemed more concerned with trying to survive financially. You learn to live a day at a time and in a crisis you live by the hour. The book mentions that there was alarm in London about these pogroms so British troops were again on the streets, the first time since the early 1920s. That stopped the concentrated efforts of the pogromists but it continued

in a lower key with a dead Catholic being found in the streets from time to time.

The book progresses to deal with the O'Neill/Lemass meeting on the 14th January, 1965 at Stormont. At the time this meeting fooled a number of Catholics, they thought it was a break-through, that the sectarian nightmare was coming to an end. O'Neill reinforced this illusion by being photographed with a group of nuns. But as the author says it only helped to legitimise the Stormont regime when Lemass encouraged the Nationalist MPs to become the official Opposition to the overwhelming Unionist majority.

The section devoted to Gerry Fitt is an eye-opener. Fitt, representing his West Belfast constituency dressed up as a Socialist Republican while in his Westminster seat he was British Labour and probably would have been happier in that party. He soon found out that the Labour Government was not going to alter the Imperialist arrangement that had been made for the Six Counties though he did bravely try to raise a number of questions about the absence of British Labour organising in the Six Counties.

He wanted equal British rights for his constituents though he wasn't saying this in his West Belfast constituency but just played along with some sort of Republican ideals. He could raise the question of unemployment as it affected the UK but was forbidden by the Speaker of the House of Commons from raising that question when it was affecting the Six Counties. Most Northern Catholics were closer to England than to the Irish Republic, they went to England to work on and off and to holiday there and many of them married into English families so if Gerry Fitt had campaigned for equal British rights in the Six Counties I would say that would be understood by his West Belfast constituents. In the end he fell foul of his constituents over his objections to the developing PIRA and was forced to leave permanently for England, where probably out of revenge he took the offered seat in the House of Lords.

I suppose it is easy enough to criticise Gerry Fitt but what can you do when the Republic of Ireland wants nothing to do with you politically. Fitt already knew this and British Labour put him in a box. You can flail around politically and make a lot of mistakes but will your countrymen/women ever forgive you.

There is also a very good section on Desmond Greaves and the Connolly Association, a front organisation for the

CPGB. Greaves, the master strategist, along with Tony Coughlan and Roy Johnston, did a lot of reshaping of Irish politics, especially the Southern Republican Movement and had influence with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).

But they just didn't understand the Ulster Protestant. The grandiose plans Greaves had for that National entity was farce rapidly becoming laughable. It's best to read it for yourself or I'll go on all day about it.

A lot of our battle in selling the Irish Democrat around the London pubs, which at that time seemed to be the main entertainment centre for the Irish, was having to continually deny the Connolly Association had any association with the CPGB. Most of the Irish didn't seem to care about this, or they didn't know, but there was always the political activist who knew a lot about the CA and made our lives as paper-sellers difficult. But we did manage to sell every copy.

If you were a militant organiser on building sites in conjunction with the CPGB you naturally ended up in meetings at what was then the quite impressive *Daily Worker* building, in Farringdon Road, with its huge neon sign telling the whole world that this was the home of a communist newspaper. Then Desmond Greaves would come into the canteen and spot you. That made him very unhappy. He once asked me what the fuck I was doing here and I told him what the fuck I was doing here. But he was still unhappy at being spotted in that building by another member of the CPGB.

On that 1960s march from London to Birmingham I mentioned in which we carried the Connolly Association banner of wishful thinking: "*One Country, One People*", we were put up overnight by CPGB members who lived along the route and by the tweed-clad English Catholic women of Bedford. We were never to discuss left-politics, even with members of the CPGB. We were to be pure Irish Nationalists. What enraged him even more was the local media on the way with their photographs of our 'column' with some of us wearing straw hats as if imitating Fidel Castro's guerrilla movement. One paper asked us when would we reach our Moncada Barracks, which referred to Castro's attack on it in 1953. Most of us were secretly flattered by this but kept it from Desmond, who walked all the way with us, and then organised an open-air meeting in whatever town we reached and spoke at it after a 30-mile trek. He could


be nothing more than an impressive figure, a power-house, but unfortunately without the light to see the reality of the Six County setup. Read the section headed: *The Greaves Plan For The North* and wonder how such a normally brilliant intellectual man could get it so wrong.

Read also about People's Democracy and Michael Farrell, the demise of the Nationalist Party and the coming end of old Stormont when the Lemass/O'Neill meeting removed its fig-leaf and all pretence about the Brit pseudo-sod known as Northern Ireland.

This book starts in 1914 and makes a very enlightening journey to the edges of 1969.

This is the book to arm yourself with. It is a pocket-battleship. I look forward to reading the second volume *Resurgence*.

Wilson John Haire
16 May, 2014



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Letters To Editor

France & Sanctions On Russia

I have just returned yesterday from Hamburg (4th June), where I'd been attending International Brigade and German Anti-Fascist commemorations.

Among the speakers was Vera Thaelmann, granddaughter of the German CP leader Ernst Thaelmann, arrested by the Nazis in March 1933 and, after 11 years in solitary confinement, killed in Buchenwald concentration camp in August 1944.

Thaelmann's wife Rosa and daughter Irma (Vera's mother) were inmates of Ravensbrueck women's concentration camp and survived the War. There is an international association of the remaining Ravensbrueck inmates and inmates' families, in which Vera T is active. She informed the Hamburg gathering that there was a Ravensbrueck gathering in Paris last week but, in an extreme interpretation of EU sanctions against Russia, visas were refused not only to those wishing to travel from Russia, but also to some from Eastern Ukraine, including a Ravensbrueck camp survivor from Mariupol.

Manus O'Riordan

The Ukraine Crisis

Mikhail Khodorkovsky was given what amounted to a party political broadcast during the *Today* programme on Radio 4 on 22nd May. Judging by the extensive and articulate responses, he had obviously been sent in advance the questions he was to be asked and the interview was recorded a few days earlier. Although I may be wrong, I know of no other occasion when this type of facilitation was provided by the *Today* programme (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27513321>).

Eamon Dyas

COUNTDOWN

Night and day you face the PSNI,
only you and them 'neath a darkening sky,
where they obviously plot
some political mishap.
We think of you night and day.

Night and day they crow
over this seventeen-hour daily interrogation show
but from out of your windowless cell
know we are in the ring, hear the bell?
Soon it could ring continually night and day.

Night and day they chip away
at your soul, which we share and put on display.
You've been down this rocky road before
and glimpsed Whitehall's well-kept whores,
again they ply their trade night and day.

Night and day where spartan you dwell,
buried once as thoroughly as the Book of Kells
but reclaimed for the nation as you will be.
For its hide they skin a flea.
Day and night, night and day.

Wilson John Haire,
4 May, 2014.

(apologies to Cole Porter)

Shorts

from
the Long Fellow

PRIVATE VERSUS SOCIALISED WEALTH

A recent European Central Bank survey of European household wealth shows that the Germans are among the poorest people in Europe! The median German household reported net worth of just 50,000 euro. This compared to 100,000 for Greece and 180,000 in Spain.

How can this be explained given that Germany's median household income (33k euro) is well above Greece (22k), Spain (25k) and Italy (26k)?

The answer appears to be that the statistics do not include public wealth, nor do they include private wealth that cannot be traded. For example, a German worker is entitled to generous pension rights when he retires, whereas workers in other countries may have to make their own provision. A private pension fund has a market value, but a value cannot be put on the future pension rights accorded to German workers under the "*pay as you go system*".

German householders in rented accommodation have fixity of tenure almost as secure as property owners. They also have long-term rent agreements but again these cannot be traded and therefore a value cannot be assigned to them. Only 40% of German households are owner-occupied whereas the corresponding figures for Greece, Spain and Italy range from 70 to 80% (Ireland was not included in the survey).

Germany has a strong corporate sector; the per capita value of her capital stock is twice that of Spain and yet the average financial wealth held by a German household is only 25% higher. The explanation for this is that a large portion of German corporate wealth is not held in commodity form. Share values in German corporations do not reflect the total wealth of these companies because control of these corporations is shared with the workers whose representatives have voting rights on the Board of these companies. So part of the value of the company is vested in the workers, but this value does not appear in any household balance sheet.

Could there be a link between the form that wealth is owned in Germany and her

economic prosperity? Karl Marx was of the opinion that private ownership of the means of production was a fetter on the forces of production. Private ownership has, of course, not been abolished in Germany, but it tends not to be owned individually but collectively.

Successful economies such as Germany and, more recently, China do not rely on market signals, but on active planning by banks and the State for their investment decisions.

THE ANGLO TRIAL

It was predictable that Judge Martin Nolan did not impose a custodial sentence on Willie McAteer (a former Financial Director) and Pat Whelan (former Director of Lending). The charge against them was trivial. Section 60 of the Companies' Act 1963 forbids a company making loans to individuals buying shares in that company. In over 50 years the provision had not been used. The person in Anglo-Irish Bank who had the most responsibility for the scheme is David Drumm, who was the Chief Executive at the time. He is now in the United States and may not be extradited because the law that was broken has no equivalent in that country, although there are laws against manipulating the share price.

Judge Nolan took the opportunity to take a few pot shots at the Financial Regulator of the time, Patrick Neary. Neary, of course, is an easy target, but what should the Financial Regulator's Office have done? Quinn Insurance had been made vulnerable by the gambling debts of Sean Quinn caused by his purchase of Contracts for Difference in Anglo-Irish Bank's shares. The Bank decided to comply with the request of the Financial Regulator's Office to waive the guarantee that Quinn Insurance had given for Sean Quinn's loans. This made the bank's position more perilous.

The Bank was also exposed to Sean Quinn himself. He, in effect, "*owned*" almost 30% of the shares of the bank in the form of Contracts for Difference. If Quinn was unable to close off his position, the shares would have reverted to the CFD providers, many of whom had links to Hedge Funds who had a vested interest in the collapse of the bank's shares.

In the prevailing financial conditions in the World at the time, a collapse in the share price could have caused a flight of deposits in the bank. If Anglo collapsed there was a risk that the contagion would spread to the other Irish banks.

But Judge Nolan seems to think that the letter of the law should have been observed

regardless of these circumstances.

As has been said in last month's *Irish Political Review*, the banking crisis cannot be reduced to a morality play in which all the blame is attributed to evil individuals. There were some profound weaknesses in the system, but none of our politicians seem to be interested in this aspect. An obvious lesson that can be drawn from the recent trial is the catastrophic dangers posed by Contracts for Difference. These are banned in the United States. Why is there not a demand for their prohibition in this country?

STIMULUS PACKAGE

The Long Fellow has never been a Keynesian. Apart from the dubious economics, the politics are not necessarily in the working class interest. Keynes was not a socialist; he was a liberal.

Recently, on RTE radio's *Drivetime*, Jack O'Connor, the leader of SIPTU, expressed the view that there should be pay increases as we needed a stimulus to the economy. Much to the Union leader's chagrin, Danny McCoy of IBEC (the employers' organisation) couldn't agree more on the question of stimulus but advocated tax cuts to give a boost to retailers. O'Connor countered that there was no point in robbing Peter to pay Paul; meaning that reducing public expenditure to finance tax cuts would not stimulate the economy. That is a subtle point, which will be lost on people. In the public mind a stimulus package means tax cuts.

Michael Noonan has suggested that there may be tax cuts in the next budget. But the problem with tax cuts is that the more people they include the more expensive they are. It is cheaper to give tax cuts to higher income earners than the population as a whole. Accordingly, the Minister is proposing broadening the standard rate tax band. This will be of benefit to middle and high income earners, but will be of no help to individuals with a salary of less than 32,800 euro and single income married couples with a salary less than 41,800. The Labour Party should resist such proposals. If there are any tax cuts they should be focussed on increasing tax credits or widening the lower rate band for the Universal Social Charge which applies to the first 10,036 euro of a person's salary.

But there is no point in stimulating the economy if the increase in consumer spending is unsustainable. The Labour movement needs to focus on increasing the productive forces of the economy. ●

Dunmanway, & Reviews

Barry Keane (*Irish Political Review*, May) says that I misrepresented him by selective editing *a la* Peter Hart in my summing up of his conclusion in *Massacre In West Cork*, when I wrote:

"Keane's concluding speculation—on the definite side of tentative—is that "there was an unauthorised and illegal attempt... to punish and drive out mostly Protestant unionists... by some members of the IRA for the murder of Michael O'Neill"... (Reviews, Irish Political Review, April 2014).

The alleged misrepresentation lies in the omission of the words "It seems" from the sentence I quoted: "It seems there was an unauthorised" etc.

I'm not sure that I see the difference between saying that he speculated that this was the case and saying that it seemed to him that it was the case. "It seems" means something like "It looks to me"; and in its context in the book, "It looks very much to me". And I would be surprised if many of his readers did not understand him as saying that, while there is no direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence is so strong that the practical assumption should be, until direct evidence to the contrary turns up, that the Dunmanway killings were done by Anti-Treaty Republicans in revenge for the killing of their acting leader Michael O'Neill, and also with the purpose of driving out Protestant unionists.

As for misrepresentation by selective editing, it would be a futile thing to do in this magazine, where a right of reply is guaranteed, and nobody can claim that it was refused. Peter Hart's selective editing (approved by Professors Fitzpatrick and Townshend) was published all over the world by the Oxford University Press, which does not operate a right of reply.

Barry Keane also takes issue with another sentence in my review: "If rejection of the Treaty is to be held responsible for a murderous massacre in Dunmanway, a more comprehensive view of the Treaty situation is required than Barry Keane gives".

He comments:

"I make no such claim and this is a complete misunderstanding of what my book is about. I advance **no motive for the massacre**. I gathered all the available evidence and I state that the circumstantial evidence... points in a particular direction

but it would never be sufficient to convict anyone beyond reasonable doubt. Rather than announce that I had solved the riddle and named six members of the Bandon IRA as the killers... I deliberately hung back from making judgement and **invited the reader to decide**. True I suggest that the most likely scenario is that members of the Anti-Treaty IRA at Bandon were responsible but I am at pains to ask the reader to make up their own mind..."

This I can only see as a kind of literary coquetting with the issue. And it is given short shrift by *History Ireland* (a much improved publication since its takeover by globalist capitalism, though still seeing the world through revisionist blinkers). Eve Morrison says briskly: "He accepts that the killings were carried out by the local anti-treaty IRA" (May/June). And I'm afraid I can't disagree with her reading of the book. It doesn't leave the matter open-ended, presenting the reader with something to puzzle over. It presents him with the case for the prosecution against Anti-Treatyites.

At the same time Barry Keane left himself open to the charge, by another strand of the revisionist Establishment, of blaming the victims by his efforts to find if the victims might have been in contact with the British regime. The internet magazine *Dublin Review Of Books*, published a review by Gerald Murphy, who would have Munster wearing sackcloth and ashes for having resisted the Occupation force by means of irregular warfare. Murphy wonders if Keane's tracing of family connections "is perhaps just another example of people blaming the Protestants for their own suffering..."

Murphy commends the book in other respects, e.g., "it does not shy away from naming names of those believed to be associated with the massacre"; and he details "the character flaws of IRA men alleged to have been involved: Con Crowley, for instance, is described as being notorious for quarrelling and brawling in the post-Truce period..."

Keane might object that he didn't actually name Crowley as one of the killers, but I don't think Murphy misrepresents him in taking it that he did so virtually.

Murphy also commends him for using the phrase, "the arrogance of unfettered military power", in connection with local leaderships of the IRA. The phrase was

used by Michael O Donoghue in his *Memoir* to describe the treatment of his brother, who served out his time in the RIC and was not exactly welcomed back to his home area in Waterford on his retirement at the end of the War of Independence. Perhaps O Donoghue felt that his own service in the IRA should have shed honour on all members of his family, even if they had stayed with the other side. But the War was not really a family affair. And, because the British refused an orderly transfer of power in 1919 to the movement that had won the election, and tried to wreck that movement by force, the will of the electorate could only be given effect by strong-willed and capable individuals taking matters into their own hands in various localities. Call that "the arrogance of unfettered military power" if you please, but without it the democracy would just have been trampled on. And it is not realistic to expect that the instant the War ended no distinction should have been made between those who were on the one side and those who were on the other. Events in real time have momentum. And of course war had not actually ended in April 1922. The Treaty Government was making war on the Belfast sub-Government in the North, and a resumption of war in the South was clearly on the cards.

A review in the *Irish Catholic* (6 March) by Ian d'Alton, titled *The Arrogance Of Unfettered military Power*, takes it that Keane asserts that the killings were "largely a one-off operation by an out-of-control IRA unit". So it seems that only Keane himself thinks that is not what he wrote.

D'Alton says it is "very difficult to enter into the mindset of West Cork Protestants in that dreadful spring of 1922 unless you were of that community". Undoubtedly it was a dreadful Spring for them. But the dreadfulness did not lie in a handful of killings. It lay in the fact, not believed possible until it happened, that their State was doing a deal with the Irish which would recognise them as a governing power. That turn of events was traumatic for the Protestants who continued to live within the culture of the colonial collective, as most of them did. But that is not what d'Alton refers to.

He says there were "Protestant memories of the murders and mayhem perpetrated against them during the Whiteboy agitation of the early 1820s", and it seemed reasonable to West Cork Protestants that "this might have been starting again".

I think this is a case where sleeping dogs might have been let lie. The White-

boys rebelled as best they could against the extortions of a small minority which monopolised power in politics, property, military office, and law. They were crushed by what it can hardly be denied was *arrogant, unfettered military power*, decorated with what England thought was the kind of law the Irish deserved.

What did the colonial mindset recall of those events a century later? Did they remember how they had put the Whiteboys in their place, and expect that the great grandsons of the Whiteboys would do as they had been done by?

Decolonisation is a delicate business. A million people died in India 25 years later in a process presided over by Lord Mountbatten—after half-a-century of divide and rule politics which Britain found it advantageous to discard at a moment's notice.

In 1922 the colony in the North was consolidating itself under Treatyite assault and Britain gave it a free hand to punish natives.

D'Alton says, of the 10 Dunmanway killings, "*whatever their motivations, the perpetrators broke an ethical rule of war—that any response must be proportionate*". But proportionate to what? If the context is the antagonism of colonist and native—and that seems to be where we are at—then would seem to be a moderate "*final reckoning of the ancient conflict between settlers and natives*" (Hart p288), bearing in mind the Protestant/colonist treatment of Whiteboy regions.

I am not suggesting that the Dunmanway killings were such a reckoning, but those who present them in that light—and Barry Keane does not rule it out—should profess wonder at the moderation of it, instead of hyping it into an atrocity which has left an indelible stain on the character of the IRA, or even of the nation.

Barry Keane says:

"I didn't go scabbling around looking for evidence to replace Meda Ryan's list of 'helpful citizens' (which by the way Ms. Ryan concedes does not exist: Ryan, 2005 p. 450 n.72). Instead I found a wealth of new evidence to explain why these men might be targeted..."

The way I put it was:

"it seems to me that, in the absence of the documents Meda Ryan saw, he tried to find other evidence that those who were killed singled themselves out in some way as being pro-British, either through coming under suspicion in 1919-21, or by refusing to contribute to an Anti-Treaty levy in March 1922, but didn't manage to convince himself"

I don't see that his way of putting it really contradicts mine.

But I think he tries to have it both ways: that there was selective assassination of Unionists suspected of being active supporters of the British military regime, which was at the same time a move to drive out Protestants.

And I had not realised that Meda Ryan now acknowledges that the list of informers, which she said she had seen, does not exist. So I looked up the reference given by Keane for this suggestion: note 72 on page 450 of her book on Tom Barry. It says: "*Risteard O'Glaisne to Tom Barry, 5/8/1949, TB private papers*". Then I traced this reference endnote to the statement in the text to which it refers—which was not a simple thing because of the way the book is made. That took me to page 226, where Meda quotes a letter from O Glaisne, a West Cork Protestant, to Tom Barry shortly after Barry's book was published in 1949.

O Glaisne remarked that the West Cork Protestants "*now live happily in the 26 county State thinking and acting constructively*", but—

"when these ordinarily quiet, humorous, positive philosophic people think about 'The Troubles'... all their ordinary attitudes forsake them... A brushful of incidents and ignorant rumours smeared this part of their minds at that time with a tar which is quite undefaceable... I have often thought to right wrong impressions, have after much mutual invitation succeeded in reducing bigots to silence, only to find the same old prejudices come out again six months later..."

O Glaisne said he was "*not only stimulating Irish Protestants to be Irish but also to be Protestant*". But it seems evident that for those Protestants Protestantism was not a mere set of beliefs about the supernatural but was bound up with commitment to a historic/political destiny from which it could not easily be separated.

John Chinnery was one of those killed in April 1922. O Glaisne met his brother:

"As a Protestant he is, I would say, typical of the best of his generation, a man of deep, direct piety. But he was also very happily progressive. He evinced the keenest interest in Irish and spoke in conversation of "*our own governments*"—that phrase can always be regarded as strikingly significant from an Irish Protestant... We must eradicate traditional prejudices... because I think Protestantism as a spiritual force will have to be more vigorous if ever in the history of Protestantism it is to justify itself in Ireland..."

Of John Chinnery, O Glaisne says he was suspected of giving information to

the British, and he was caught "*open-handed*" passing a letter to the police.

I could find nothing in the passage indicated by Note 72 which Keane cited as his source, or in the pages around it, which suggests that Meda Ryan conceded that the list of "*helpful citizens*" found in the Dunmanway Workhouse did not exist.

Her problem of having seen a document which she cannot produce is something I am familiar with. A very long time ago I came across a statement in some old book or magazine that there were three hedge schools in the townland of Gneevies at the start of the 19th century, but now I wouldn't know where to start looking for it. And, about 50 years ago, I had easy access to the British Newspaper Library, which has the best collection of Irish and British newspapers, and spent some weeks reading them about Irish developments in the first half of 1922, and about De Valera's international speaking tour in the Anti-Partition campaign launched by the 1948 Coalition. At one meeting, in the British Midlands I think, he was asked if it was his opinion that the IRA no longer had a useful political purpose and should be abolished. He did not say that this was his opinion. His meaning, though minimally expressed, seemed clear enough. There was no proper business for the IRA in the 26 Counties after the effective repeal of the Treaty in 1938, therefore it was suppressed. He would not, as the most influential political leader in the Republic, say that the IRA would possibly have proper business in the North, because that would implicate Dublin in the internal affairs of the North, which would be impolitic. So what he did was refuse to say that there was no future for the IRA.

At that time I had no notion that I would ever have to write history. I just read the papers for my own satisfaction and took no notes. Some years later I had drifted into politics, the IRA had revived, and John Bowman published a book about Dev on the North on behalf of the Dublin Establishment, which had been disconcerted by the Northern insurrection, in which there was no reference to that significant incident. I knew that things were not as Bowman presented them, but I had neither the time nor the opportunity to look over all those papers again and find Dev's refusal to say something, which was turning out to be more relevant than all he had said on the record.

Meda Ryan's failure to present the document that she saw doesn't mean that she didn't see it. She was clearly shown the document under strict conditions of

confidentiality and her hands are tied. Occurrences like that are not surprising, given family sensitivities about alleged informants even decades after the event.

As far as I know, she doesn't have gangs of researchers at her command to search for it. The Trinity College operation does seem to have gangs of researchers, and also to have an inside track with the State apparatus. But I have sufficient acquaintance with academics in Ireland that they have considerable ability not to find what they do not want to find even when it is under their noses.

*

I attributed to Barry Keane the view that rejection of the Treaty was "*responsible for a murderous massacre in Dunmanway*". He objects, "*I make no such claim*".

I went by his statement:

"One thing is very clear—these killings were a direct result of the way the War of Independence ended and the divisions that the Treaty caused within the IRA. Once the IRA lost its discipline and cohesion anything could happen" (p200).

And on the previous page:

"What does seem to be certain is that the killings were carried out by elements of the IRA and that they were in reaction to the death of Michael O'Neill. It is clear that the individuals at the head of the Bandon IRA had either been shot (Michael O'Neill) or were missing in Dublin at the critical moment when it was decided to take revenge for O'Neill's death. It is significant that respected local commanders (Connolly in Skibbereen and Ross in Bantry) were able to maintain control of their areas without apparent difficulty and order was restored once Tom Hales returned to Bandon" (p199).

All I can understand by this is that the killings were carried out in the context of the Treaty conflict by the Anti-Treaty IRA in Dunmanway, at a moment when the top local leaders were away in Dublin trying to negotiate a national compromise; that they were provoked by the killing of the acting commander by a British military man; that they were acts of revenge against carefully selected targets suspected of collaboration with the enemy; and that, when the regular commander returned, he stopped them.

The last point is stated a number of times in the book as far as I recall: the killings stopped when Tom Hales came back, implying that they were done by his Volunteers while he was away.

Barry Keane doesn't like my Cavalier attitude to law in the situation resulting

from the disruptive way the 'Treaty' was sprung on the nation.

Sinn Fein had set up what appears to have been a fairly orderly system of what one might call bourgeois law between 1919 and 1921. It functioned, and was widely accepted, despite the British terror, and the British Courts came to be seen as enemy institutions. It was not what is usually meant by revolutionary law.

A number of academic historians have in recent times discovered that "*the Irish revolution*" was not a revolution at all, meaning in effect that it was nothing like the Bolshevik Revolution. There was no social revolution, so what was all the traditional nonsense about *revolution*?

I had very much the traditional idea of what happened from 1916 to 1921. That is, I got it from what was being said around me. I don't think I read a history book about Ireland until I was drawn into politics by Pat Murphy when I was nearly 30. I had read a great deal about other things, including revolutions. And I did not think of Ireland as having had a revolution. It had just wrenched itself apart from England. The enemy was external to it, with only a military presence within it.

And the traditional view of the War of Independence was not quite what Barry Keane was describing:

"The traditional Irish history is the simplistic one of the gallant men of the 'Old Brigade' driving the British before them out of Ireland by force" (p50).

It was much more a view of handfuls of stubborn men (I knew some of them) managing to survive manhunts by the British Army over two years and fighting a small military engagement now and then, and the populace at large enduring extreme harassment by the Black And Tans and Auxiliaries.

The Truce removed the direct pressure of the British State apparatus but the Treaty restored indirect British pressure in an extremely damaging way by means of political manipulation, with the threat of a return to war in intensified form if things were in danger of not working out as Britain intended.

A Provisional Government was set up by Britain to see to the implementation of the 'Treaty'. A small majority of the Dail members met as the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the rejected 1920 Act. It could be argued that, since the Parliament of Southern Ireland included a majority of Dail members, the Provisional Government was set up by agreement between the Dail and Britain. But Britain never recognised the Dail as the legitimate

authority in Ireland. And it was not the Dail that helped to arm the Provisional Government gave it access to the international arms market.

An important aspect of the Treaty was to give Irish legitimation to the last three years of British rule—the three years after it lost the election. The Provisional Government was in British law a creation of the British Government, and in that sense a continuation of it, and it accepted responsibility for the conduct of its creator.

Where did that leave the Republican law system of 1919-21? Can there be any real doubt that it subverted it?

The setting up of the Provisional Government, in the way that it was set up, threw nationalist Ireland into a condition of internal disorder such as had not existed in 1919-21—and in that sense threw it into a revolutionary condition.

Michael O'Neill went to the Hornbrook house as a member of the Republican Police, which was a detachment of the local IRA. When the door was not opened to him he went in by a window. He was shot as an intruder by a British military Captain within. Is it likely that that act would have been judged to be murder in a Court under the authority of the Provisional Government four months after the 'Treaty' and two months before the 'Civil War'?

The system of law under which it would have been judged to be murder had been subverted by the Treaty as a national system. British jurisdiction was accepted by Treatyite Sinn Fein as the medium from which the Free State would develop. And the transition from Republican Government to autonomous Free State Government under the Provisional Government was supervised and controlled by Britain, as was Britain's right under the 'Treaty'. Therefore I cannot see the grounds for saying, from a Treatyite viewpoint, that Capt. Woods was clearly guilty of murder when he defended his home from a break-in by a member of the anti-Treaty IRA.

Barry Keane says he is incredulous that I took his book to have been written from a Treatyite viewpoint. It never crossed my mind when reading it that it was anything but Treatyite, and I am still at a loss to understand it in any other terms. I think this must be a version of the old problem of atheism—Are you a Catholic or Protestant atheist?

He quotes his view of the Treaty from the book:

"What was conceded by the greatest empire the world has ever known was messy and incomplete but grudgingly

accepted. Those who believed in the republic above all else took up arms against the settlement and quickly realised that the Irish people had made up their minds that the settlement would have to do for now. As it turned out, the Treaty was 'a stepping stone' to real freedom, but at the time nobody was certain of this" (p200).

And he comments:

"By no stretch could it be suggested that this is pro-treaty (or anti-treaty for that matter) despite the fact that I am a member of Fine Gael. The Dáil ratified the Treaty and while you might wish it were not so, or question the motives of those who ratified it, the fact is it was ratified..."

Well, if Barry Keane says he has no position on the Treaty, I can only apologise for taking his book to be Treatyite, and move on to discuss what the Treaty was.

It was not the piece of writing headed *Articles For An Agreement...* It was the compulsion on the delegates to sign it without the authority of their Government—a compulsion which gave effect to the British refusal to recognise them as delegates of a Government. It was the breaking of Sinn Fein by insistence that what the delegates signed up for under threat of war would only be conceded to Dail members who agreed to meet as MPs under the authority of the 1920 Act which the Dail had rejected. It was the British veto on the Election Pact agreed by Treatyites and Anti-Treatyites for the election of June 1922, and it was by the launching, on British insistence, of Treatyite war on the Anti-Treatyites before the Dail or Parliament elected in June was allowed to meet.

Barry Keane says that: "*Central to the Irish agreeing to the Treaty negotiations had been the principle that the Treaty would be an agreement between two equal nations*" (p53). And:

"Collins was trying to sell the Treaty on the basis of it being a stepping stone to real freedom when Churchill, on April 12th, said "Whatever happens in Ireland, however many years of misfortune there may be in Ireland, whatever trouble; the Treaty defines what we think should be the relations between the two countries...., and if a republic is set up in Ireland that is something which the British Empire can in no circumstances whatever tolerate or agree to"..." (p53).

Churchill, says Keane, was "*repudiating*" the central principle that the Treaty was an agreement between two equal nations. What Churchill was telling the Commons was that Irish independence was "*in the gift of the British parliament*".

He "*failed to temper his language sufficiently to give the pro-Treaty Provisional Government some breathing space...*" (p53).

In fact Churchill repudiated no "*agreement between two equal nations*", because there was no such agreement. And he was certainly under no legal or moral obligation to allow Collins space to step away from the Treaty for the purpose of conciliating the Anti-Treatyites. His business was to curb Collins, ensure that his signature to the 'Treaty' would bind him, put the *stepping stones* out of his reach, and direct him in the British interest to ensure that the political/military force which had brought Britain to the negotiating table would be severely damaged as a precondition of British withdrawal.

The 'Treaty' as a political event began with the war ultimatum in December 1921 and culminated with Irishmen killing Irishmen in the British interest in July 1922. Churchill saw the 'Civil War' as a substantial British achievement and he had reason to feel satisfied with his work.

Is it imaginable that Lloyd George, Churchill and Birkenhead did not know what they were doing when they made the Irish delegates sign their document without consulting their Government, and then released it to the world press, with appropriate propaganda spin, for the Irish Government to read about in the papers?

I'm not aware that I questioned the motives of the delegates for signing. I'm sure most signed because of the threat of intensified Imperial war if they did not sign on the instant, before the train left. Griffith let himself be sidetracked into personal relations and private undertakings with the enemy and felt bound by his word of honour to a political scoundrel. Others signed because Collins said they should. Others signed because Collins browbeat them and held them responsible for the horrors that would rain down on the people of Ireland if they held out.

The following is from Barry Keane's longest comment on the 'Treaty':

"As British imperial interests were best served by peace with partition in Ireland, that is what the British conceded..."

"The frank comments of Michael Collins about how the end of the war came about, published after his death... agree with the British political analysis contained in the cabinet papers. Ever the politician, he quoted anti-Treaty Robert Barton's admission in *The Republic of Ireland* of 21 February 1922 that: "it had become plain that it was physically impossible to secure Ireland's ideal of a completely isolated Republic otherwise

than by driving the overwhelmingly superior British forces out of the country".

"Collins used this to support his claim: "What it was never possible to make the more extreme of our conferees appreciate was that we had not beaten *and never could hope to beat the British military forces*. We had thus far prevented them from conquering us, but that was the sum of our achievement".

"Effectively Collins was pointing out the inconsistency in Barton's logic. Barton had willingly signed the Treaty, but later repudiated it, claiming that he had been forced by a threat of 'immediate and terrible' war to sign. This was particularly robust politics on Collins' part, because he destroys Barton's credibility by using his own words against him..." (p48-9).

Barton signed willingly only in the sense that nobody was holding his hand and forcing it to drag the pen along the page. He was a Protestant landowner and he signed only under moral blackmail applied to him by Collins on behalf of the Irish people who would suffer if he did not sign.

The 'Treaty' process was inaugurated by Collins acting in concert with Lloyd George. It seems to me that he decided some days earlier to take the matter into his own hands and present his Government with an accomplished fact. Of course all were equally responsible in an abstract sense, but political affairs are never conducted abstractly. It is pretty clear that the 'Treaty' would not have been signed without Government approval but for the influence exerted by Collins on the other delegates, and the extreme pressure he exerted on Barton.

Realistic discussion of whether the 'Treaty' was right or wrong should begin with the discussion of Collins' decision to take matters into his own hands and compel the others to follow him and sign without consulting their Government even though their instructions were to sign nothing which the Government had not approved.

At the last Government meeting Griffith had argued for accepting the British terms. Collins had not. He stayed silent. Then he went to London and acted.

He denied that he was panicked into signing by Lloyd George's threat of *immediate and terrible war* if the document was not signed instantly. I see no reason to disbelieve him. But then I see no way of avoiding the conclusion that, some time before the melodramatic showdown, he had decided to take the affairs of the Irish state into his own hands, and hustle the Government and the Dail along, as he had hustled the delegates.

I have often described Collins's act in

these terms. I have never met with a factual refutation of that description. But I have heard Collins's conduct defended on the ground that the Dail Government, and the Dail itself, were little more than make-believe—"imaginary" is the currently fashionable term—that Collins represented the only real element of the situation on the Irish side, and that it was time somebody acted decisively on the realities of the situation.

I do not at all deny the possibility of formal democracy being devoid of the political reality that is necessary for the conduct of states in a hostile world, and that a superficially democratic set-up might call for a strong man to act independently and save something of the reality of things from the fantasy espoused by the elected Government. And I think Collins must have seen the matter in these terms to act as he did.

An alternative course of action for him would have been a showdown with his Government instead of tormenting poor Barton. He could have put it to them forcefully that there was nothing more to be gained through negotiation, that he was in favour of settling for the terms on offer, and if they continued hawking he would have to consider his options.

What was required on the Irish side was a settlement with Britain which preserved Sinn Fein and the IRA in whatever arrangement Britain could be got to agree to. What was required by the British interest was the breaking of Sinn Fein and the IRA.

The method adopted by Collins for making a deal was one that maximised opposition to the deal he made. He must have been confident that, nevertheless, he could master the situation, marginalise the elements that took the Irish constitutional development too much in earnest, and carry the bulk of the IRA with him. That is what his *de facto* declaration of independence in London on December 6th required him to do. But it is what he failed to do.

I don't know that many people thought the IRA could have defeated the Empire if the Empire mobilised against it as it had mobilised against the Boers twenty years earlier, and as Lloyd George now threatened to do. Britain, despite having become a democracy in 1918, remained strongly Imperialist in outlook, and the League of Nations, disembowelled by Britain, was of no consequence. Therefore a deal would have to be made in which the Dail made concessions to the Empire. And, for the

maintaining of the greatest possible unity in Sinn Fein and the IRA, it was necessary that the crucial decision should be taken within the leadership—the Government—and that the persuasive power of the Government should have been brought to bear on its implementation.

That could not be the case when the crucial decision was taken by Collins, not only without Government authority but against Government instructions, and people read about it in propaganda releases of the British Government.

T. Ryle Dwyer presents a case for Collins and against De Valera in ultra-democratic terms, disregarding the fact that functional democracies—leaving aside the USA and Switzerland, where there are very unusual circumstances—are systems of authority subject to periodical approval by the populace through a choice of highly organised representative parties, rather than "*government by the people*" in the plain meaning of that phrase.

This system is sometimes disparaged as elected dictatorship, but it is what exists as functional democracy. An Irish body politic capable of sustaining a Government against hostile action by the Imperial Power came together in 1918 under the hegemony of the newly-established Sinn Fein Party. It had not existed before 1918. The Home Rule electorate did not constitute a body politic in that sense. The Home Rule Party was essentially a protest party, aspiring only to be set up in a devolved system under British sovereignty and ongoing Whitehall authority. When entering Parliament it bound itself by an Oath of Loyalty to the Crown, and refused to take part in government even when it held the balance of power at Westminster and chose which of the British parties was to govern. In 1915, when the Liberal Government, which it put in power and on which it depended to set it up in devolved government in Ireland, threw in the towel and formed a Coalition with the Unionist Party, and even Ulster Unionists were installed in major Government Offices, the Home Rule Party refused Government Office, though it continued to support the Coalition from the backbenches and to recruit cannonfodder for it in Ireland.

Sinn Fein was the first Irish national political party in the proper meaning of that term. It sought an electoral mandate to govern, it was given the mandate, and it governed.

Edmund Burke, who was not a foolish person, said that the basic right of a people was the right to be governed. The Irish people gave Sinn Fein a mandate to govern

them in 1918 and it governed them. It did not throw society into chaos with visionary revolutionary schemes. When the British regime tried to generate disorder it maintained order.

Then in December 1921 Collins acted in place of the Government of which he was supposed to be a part, and disorder was the result.

Disorder in Ireland was of course a British purpose with the Treaty. I assume it was not Collins's purpose, and that he acted as he did because he grossly over-estimated his influence and his ability to hustle everybody into compliance.

Faced with the accomplished fact of Collins's 'Treaty', backed by Britain's worldwide propaganda apparatus, Dev, instead of falling into line, referred the matter to the Cabinet. When the Cabinet accepted it by a majority of one, he referred it to the Dail. When the Dail accepted it by a majority of seven, he said it was something which could only be decided by the electorate.

Dwyer says he kept moving the goalposts—or, in the parlance of American football, the "*goalline*". And he asks:

"If the Cabinet had opposed the Treaty, would the Dail have been given any more say than it had with the July proposals?" (*Michael Collins And The Civil War*, p13).

Of course it wouldn't! Not in the first instance anyway. Representative government works from the centre outwards.

In July 1921 Dev rejected Lloyd George's final terms, and when war was threatened he dealt with it by saying how he would put the matter to the world. The Cabinet backed his rejections of the proposals, and the matter was not put to the Dail.

In rejecting the July terms Dev based himself on the established Irish Constitutional position. In December Collins presented him with the accomplished fact of a substantial amendment of the established Constitutional position. The two situations are not similar in substance.

By acting independently of the Government in this matter, without having made the Government understand that acceptance of the British offer was a matter of fundamental importance to him, on which he was prepared to break the practice of consensus Cabinet action which had prevailed for three years, he must have known that he was forcing a Constitutional crisis.

I assume that he was convinced that he could carry the bulk of the Sinn Fein Party

with him through force of personality, and carry the IRA by means of IRB leverage. It may be that he believed in the legend that had been spun about him, as Parnell had believed in the legend of the "uncrowned King". But he found that the reality was very different. The IRA had long ceased to be a front on the IRB. Its most effective sections had not been built by him. They had built themselves. They were nobody's creatures. It would have required the combined force of a united Cabinet to persuade the Army as a body to accept, or tolerate, whatever concessions to Imperial grandeur the Cabinet decided were unavoidable. Collins, by springing his accomplished fact on the nation through the Imperial propaganda apparatus split the Cabinet, split the Dail, and split the national electorate in a critical situation. Then he failed even to hold his IRB together in support of his Treaty. And the Sinn Fein Party disappeared in his hands over the next six months.

In order to gain Republican support, he made lavish promises that he was unable to keep. The most reckless of these was an undertaking to prevent the establishment of Northern Ireland by making war on it. There was never any possibility of his Northern campaign succeeding. The only effect of defeating contingents of the Unionist militia, the Specials, was to bring the regular British Army into action. Whitehall, for its own reasons, let him have his war on Northern Ireland (i.e. on Britain) for a couple of months before ordering him to make war on the Anti-Treatyites, his allies in the war on the North.

The net effect was that he brought Republicans in the Six Counties into the open to be crushed by the Unionists when the Treaty War started, and that he had drawn many of the Munster Anti-Treatyites up to Donegal where he rounded them up immediately after changing tack and shelling the Four Courts. This, of course, facilitated the conquest of Munster, which he then had to undertake.

That was the Treaty. If he had acted as a member of the Cabinet in the first week of December, it would have been something different, whether or not the words on the peace of paper called the 'Treaty' were different.

I don't think it is meaningful to treat a disrupted state as being a democracy, or as democracy being a component of the disrupted condition of the state. Democracy is a form of State, not a means by which a state is constructed.

The Treatyite faction declared itself to

be the democracy of the situation by virtue of having won the vote which disrupted the elected Irish governing system. Persistence in that attitude led to war. But if the Treatyites had lost that vote, there would still have been war, because the empire had made no commitment to abide by the outcome of the Dail vote, or the outcome of a general election vote. It had said with great emphasis that it would not tolerate a republic in Ireland.

The Treaty faction formed a State by force in the course of 1922. The force which enabled it to overcome the Republicans was supplied from outside. This development was in process in April 1922.

The war against Britain was not over in April 1922. It was suspended with a strong probability that it would resume. Supposing that the victims of the Dunmanway killings were actively loyal to Britain, it cannot be said that this fact was irrelevant to current politics because the war had ended and the country was at peace. Britain kept up the threat of war, and the understanding was that it would be war by Boer War methods—the rounding up of entire populations into concentration camps and

the networking of the country with chains of blockhouses. The Boer War was well remembered when I was young and the cry, *Up the Krujer*, was often heard.

This did not happen because Collins, when he cracked, broke in the British direction. It was not widely expected, in view of his actual collaboration with Anti-Treatyites against the Treaty in the North, that—when the breaking point came in the South—he would make war on the Republic with British arms. The expectation—or at least the hope—was that, having had a breathing space of many months in which to build up Irish military power, he would meet the next British ultimatum by stepping onto the first of the stepping stones, dare the British Prime Minister to resort to the Boer War methods which 20 years earlier he had condemned as "barbaric", and meet the assault, if it came, with a strengthened power of resistance.

The Dunmanway incident did not happen in peacetime. It happened during a Ceasefire.

Brendan Clifford

Some Collins's And Somervilles, Part 5

Conspiracy Theories And The Elusive Crossley Tender

It is often argued that facts should not be allowed to get in the way of a good story. I beg to differ. Some Collinses and Somervilles, the subject matter of this present series, is a good story, where I have been concerned with drawing together some little known facts that ought to dispel certain myths. But I have also allowed this series to get in the way of an even better story—my series entitled "An Irish Anti-Fascist Volunteer and Some Other Soldiers". Part One was published two years ago, in the May 2012 issue of *Irish Political Review*, and Part Six a year ago, in the May 2013 issue. At that juncture I diverted into other topics. But that particular series was thereby left hanging and incomplete. It cannot be left in that state, as it has important lessons to teach about the role of all Dáil parties in pardoning and apologising to those who deserted the Irish Army in this country's hour of need during World War Two, and I must return to it after completion of this present series. I should, however, not delay any further in letting the facts get in the way of "a good story" from the very first paragraph of that earlier series:

"There were, of course, Irish anti-fascist volunteers in the British armed forces during the Second World War. In 1964, at the age of 15, I was bequeathed a mandolin by a dying Second World War veteran. No it was not *Captain Corelli's Mandolin*. A passing thought: Was that romantic novel and the film's fictional character based on a real Italian officer who had started out as a fascist but ended up an anti-fascist? Who knows? My mandolin came from an Irish volunteer in Britain's RAF. It was primarily an expression of heartfelt gratitude to my mother who constantly visited him in hospital as cancer was bringing his life to an end. But the gift was also an expression of profound admiration and affection for my father. Regrettably, the son's response to the mandolin proved unworthy of that veteran's deep friendship with his parents. Having finally been successful in putting my foot down in resistance to any more compulsory violin lessons, I was damned if I was going to take up another instrument. A decade later, my mother and I agreed that it was only appropriate that the mandolin should be returned to the war veteran's family, where it would at least have a more immediate emotional—even if not an immediate musical—resonance, and our action was greatly

appreciated."

The mandolin in question had belonged to the Republican Communist Kevin Neville, the ex-IRA Curragh camp internee who, as a convinced anti-fascist, had 'signed out' to volunteer for the RAF in the latter half of World War Two and who later, as a Saor Uladh volunteer, would be wounded in action in the November 1955 attack on Rosslea RUC barracks with which the Republican Border Campaign commenced. That was indeed how, two years ago, I genuinely 'remembered' the ultimate 1970s fate of Kevin Neville's mandolin. As it happened, due to construction work on our home, much of our household goods had been placed in storage in 2009 and a significant portion did not re-emerge until the latter half of last year. And what, to my surprise, did I find among them, but the mandolin in question! What was missing was a guitar that my father had brought me back from the USSR in the 1960s, and in which I showed no interest, so my memory was now corrected to recall that it was this guitar my mother had asked me to pass on to a family who could not otherwise afford to have a son of theirs take up! But if there is any member of Kevin Neville's family out there who would now like to have his mandolin, I will readily oblige by returning it!

That anecdote highlights the problems of oral history, whether through innocent forgetfulness or deliberate evasion, unless further explored for back-up evidence. This particularly applies to the life and death of Michael Collins, a problem compounded by the conspiratorial character of Collins himself and his immediate circle. It has been further bedevilled by some on the Republican side who, for some strange reason, do not wish to accept that in the Civil War unleashed by Collins against the Republic, and in the armed engagement which he insisted on fighting out, it was a perfectly natural outcome that he should meet his end from a Republican bullet on 22nd August 1922. Instead, they have resorted to bizarre conspiratorial theories that he was "assassinated" by a British Secret Service agent supposedly planted among his Free State entourage—with gossip more often than not pointing the finger of suspicion at Emmet Dalton and/or some unknown AN Other—and the reason advanced for such a 'conspiracy' is that Collins was supposedly about to make his peace with the Republicans, for which fantasy there is not a shred of evidence. As I wrote in *Irish Political Review* last August, detailing the Free State capture of Cork from the Republicans, it was

Collins himself, through his sister Mary Collins-Powell's joint Intelligence operations with Captain Hugh Somerville, who had been most closely associated with the British Secret Service!

The *Holly Bough* is published by the *Cork Evening Echo* each Christmas, and the Christmas 2013 issue contained an article by Editor John Dolan entitled: "*Collins: The final mysteries; What WAS his route that fateful night in 1922... Do we REALLY know the identity of his killer? And what DID happen that killed him?*" There was one attempt to resolve the mystery, however imperfectly, of the first question, and another confused attempt to generate a 'conspiratorial' mystery around the second question. The Editor, John Dolan, related:

"This year, new twists were added to these debates, when Radio na Gaeltachta broadcast a series about the Civil War, *Fuinneog Feirste*, featuring intriguing new testimony from two men, Manus O'Riordan and Sean Kelleher. Manus revealed how his mother, Kay, who was from Clonakilty, had a sighting of Collins in her home town around 6 pm, about two hours before he died. Hers is the only sighting of him in Clonakilty on his way back to Cork and significantly, she said he had no escort at all. Kay, whose maiden name was O'Mahony..."

I must stop at this point. My mother's name was Keohane. I had no direct dealings with Dolan himself re this article, yet it is difficult to comprehend his typographical error here, as twice elsewhere in the article the correct surname, Keohane, is given, including a caption to a photo of my mother which I had supplied. The article's by-line adds "Additional reporting: Colette Sheridan", and it was she who had interviewed me, and to whom I had supplied a copy of my mother's account, "*Eyewitness to Collins's Last Exit from Clonakilty*", first published in the August 2013 issue of *Irish Political Review*, together with my own accompanying article from that issue, "*Some Collinses and Somervilles and the Big Fellow's Death*". But to return to Dolan's (corrected) narrative:

"Kay, whose maiden name was Keohane, was 12 at the time and Manus said: '*My mother was with her father. She could hardly have been imagining it. What puzzled me was that she said there was no armoured car, no Crossley Tender (a military vehicle—Doran) accompanying him. The sense I make of that is that the Crossley Tender, with a number of Free Staters in it, drove through the fields rather than any road. But Collins had enough bravado to say he wouldn't be shot in his own territory.*' This under-

lines Collins' over-confidence. Was this hubris, when mixed with alcohol, further impairing his judgment? Kay Keohane was distressed after the death of Collins and Manus added that a member of the ambush party, Jim Hurley, was a relative of her father and a family friend. Hurley later became bursar of UCC and a GAA star. '*But the interesting about Hurley is that he made his peace with Collins's brother, Seán, in 1923*', added Manus."

"The other contributor to the radio series was Bandon-based Seán Kelleher, whose anti-Treaty father Tom, was in the ambush party. Seán said his father also thought Collins' route was extraordinary. '*It's strange that Collins' group didn't seem to have any local person that would have known the way back to Cork city*', said Seán. '*That raises suspicions that there were certain people in the convoy that weren't known. There could have been an infiltration by the British Secret Service in the convoy.*' ... The identity of the person who shot Collins has long been pinned on Denis 'Sonny' O'Neill. However, Seán Kelleher said: '*Nobody can say for certain. There are a lot of theories some of which are completely over the top.*' Certainly, historians are in general agreement that O'Neill, a trained ex-British army marksman and sniper, born in Goggin, near Bandon, in 1888, pulled the trigger. He is said to have been aware he had shot dead a member of Collins' party, but only learned the identity of his victim the next morning. Ten years later, he is said to have related a full account to a trusted female friend, Kitty Teehan. In the dangerously emotive days after Collins' death, O'Neill's associates believed his life was in peril if he remained in his native county, so O'Neill moved to Newport in North Tipperary ... and became a founding father of Fianna Fáil in the area... The eminent historian and journalist Tim Pat Coogan says O'Neill was a devoutly religious man and his sisters never believed he could be responsible for Collins' death. Certainly, the evidence that O'Neill fired the fatal shot is strong. He was the only one using dum-dum ammunition that day, which would have caused the gaping wound in Collins' skull that killed him. O'Neill dumped his remaining bullets afterwards for fear of reprisals by Free State troops, which raises perhaps the most enduring mystery of all from that day in 1922. What did he do with the gun that killed Collins? Is it buried somewhere close to the ambush site, or did he pass it on to a friend?"

In view of the fact that Emmet Dalton had said '*Drive like hell!*' and that Collins had countermanded him in order to (literally!) stand and fight, it is possible to acknowledge that in his profoundly egocentric book, *The Dark Secret of Béalnabláth—The Michael Collins Story* (1991), Father Patrick J. Twohig did make a valid observation when he wrote:

"The action was neither battle nor ambush. The fighting 'became general' as the expression is. {My emphasis—MOR}. The motor cycle scout, Lieutenant Smith... took a squad of soldiers from the lorry {the Crossley tender—MOR} and proceeded up the boreen from the bridge in the direction of the firing... Republican Jim Hurley held his gate pillar position while his companion, Tom Kelleher, moved back down to the bend in the boreen in order to prevent the soldiers advancing on them. As he did so he was fired on by the machine-gunner in the armoured car... Collins and Dalton, with the two drivers, had vacated the motor car and were firing from a prone position on the low fence of the roadway. The windscreen had been shattered by what Dalton later described as a burst of machine-gun fire. More likely it was a clip from (a Mauser semi-automatic pistol), Jim Hurley's 'Peter the Painter'..." (p 159).

Why, in 2013, did Seán Kelleher once again seek to confuse the issue as to which side had shot Collins? Was it because, for some reason best known to himself, his father, Tom Kelleher, could not bring himself to behave like Jim Hurley and accept his Republican co-responsibility for the death in action of the Free State Commander-in-Chief, Michael Collins? God knows, 2013 had already seen enough confusion surrounding Seán Kelleher in his key area of public—and Republican—responsibility, as Secretary of the Kilmichael-Crossbarry Commemorative Committee. In the *Southern Star* on 22nd August 2013, 'Archon' queried what on earth was going on:

"Although not quite like the eerie silence that descended on Kilmichael minutes after General Tom Barry gave the order to cease firing, the muteness of the two organisations involved in 'enhancing' the ambush site where the IRA exterminated a company of RIC Auxiliaries is unnerving. After outrage was expressed nationally at plans to give the terrorist Auxiliaries equality of status with the IRA Volunteers, and that a replica of a Crossley Tender was to be placed on the ambush site, critics demanded that the Kilmichael Historical Society and the Kilmichael-Crossbarry Commemorative Committee provide clarification of what was going on. But the only information to drip into the public domain came from a very short interview in a Cork newspaper with Seán Kelleher, the secretary of the Kilmichael-Crossbarry Commemorative Committee. Mr Kelleher categorically denied that the Auxiliaries would be commemorated—'this is not going to happen'. He added that a replica of a Crossley Tender would not be included. 'We can understand people's upset when we saw a photograph of the Crossley

Tender submitted with the plans', he said. This column has no hesitation in accepting that Mr Kelleher stated nothing but the facts, as far as he was aware of them. However, according to the approved planning application (File 13307; Introduction to Proposals Drawing No. L201) specific reference is made to 'Suitable Commemoration for both IRA Volunteers and Auxiliaries'. In another section, Landscape Development Package, a site map refers to the 'Skeleton of a 1920 Crossley Tender (metal 2.2m High; Drawing A)'. Clearly some confusion is at play. Hence the need for a full explanation from the Kilmichael Historical Society and the Kilmichael-Crossbarry Commemorative Committee if for no other reason than that the approved planning application indicates something other than what Mr Kelleher says. Mr Kelleher may well be correct, and our perplexity might well result from inaccurate information relating to the planning application. But, if that is the case, surely it is incumbent on both organisations to clear the air in a transparent and unambiguous fashion? Conversely, if it is the intention of the two organisations to include some type of memorial to the Auxies, as is stated in the planning application, they should make a transparent and unambiguous disclosure of the details relating to the memorial... Eminent historian and author, Peter Beresford Ellis, in a letter to this newspaper, reminded readers of the ferocity of the Auxiliaries in West Cork. He himself remembered elderly people telling him of the nightmares they suffered about the sound and the sight of Crossley Tenders bringing death and destruction into towns and villages. General Tom Barry described in his book, *Guerrilla Days in Ireland*, how the lorries had a special technique. They came speeding into a village. The Auxiliaries jumped out, firing shots and ordering all the inhabitants out of doors. They lined up men, women, old and young, searching and interrogating them, stripping the men naked and beating them mercilessly with belts and rifles. The Auxiliary reign of terror sapped the morale of the people and, indeed, that of the IRA. The terrorists seemed invincible. As Barry says, 'There could be no further delay in challenging them... they (the British) had gone down in the mire to destroy us and down after them we had to go.' That they did and with such success that it now seems bizarre that some people in West Cork should be considering commemorating members of a military force that assaulted, terrorised and murdered their forefathers. But then, maybe the idea is not bizarre at all when under the heading of 'Practical Measures', there is this memorable recommendation in the planning application: the ambush site should be a place that would help 'educate the youth to continue the folklore!'

As for Kelleher's nonsense re Béal-nabláth, the appropriate riposte can be

found in the best and most authoritative work to date on the subject, Meda Ryan's 1989 book, *The Day Michael Collins Was Shot*. Ryan unambiguously established the following facts:

"The following account is based on eye-witness accounts of the aftermath of the ambush, as given to the author... Sonny Neill and Dinny Brien came forward to Jim Kearney and Timmy Sullivan. 'I dropped one man anyway', said Neill... As Bill Powell, Sonny Neill, Dinny Brien, Tadhg O'Sullivan, Con Murphy, John Lordan and a few more sat down to tea in Bill Murray's kitchen they began to analyse the events of the day... Neill, who was seated to Bill Powell's left, said that at least he had 'dropped one man'. And they all agreed that 'getting' one man showed they were still an active armed force. One enemy was as good as another to the man with a gun in his hand... The men in the kitchen had finished their meal when Seán O'Galvin came in. 'Michael Collins was shot!' he exclaimed. Bill Powell felt a grip on his left arm. Immediately one man in the tension-packed room jumped up. 'There's another traitor gone!' Neill, Powell, Murphy, Lordan and Tadhg O'Sullivan and the other men said nothing... A silence followed for a few minutes. 'He's dead', said Sonny Neill. 'May the Lord have mercy on his soul.' Then he got up and walked into the night... The following day Sonny Neill and Jim Kearney conversed. 'I used the wrong bullet', said Neill... 'It was a dum dum!' Kearney knew what that meant. (These were bullets used by the Black-and-Tans, which were picked up by the IRA, ammunition captured after ambushes during the War of Independence and retained by the men.) Neill, who originally had two clips with five bullets in each, told Kearney he was going to dump the remainder... Jim Wolfe, the driver of the armoured car... saw Collins a distance in front of the armoured car when he was hit. 'He was down from us. We had moved up from him. He was out on the road when he swung round. I saw him fall rather awkwardly.' 'Was he with somebody, or on his own?' I asked. 'He was on his own at the time', said Wolfe. As **Collins seems to have been standing alone when he was hit** {my emphasis—MOR}, there is no evidence to show that a close range Mauser bullet {from his own Free State side—MOR} killed him. If he was hit by a Mauser bullet, it would have created a small entry wound in his forehead and a large entry wound in the back of his head..." (pp 125-129 and 135).

"After the ambush Sonny Neill was certain that a dum dum bullet from his Lee-Enfield rifle killed Collins. This was a long range shot (approximately 185 yards) which was said to have hit Collins as he turned round. Sonny Neill was the only man in the Republican party who claimed to have hit any member of

Collins's convoy... Dr Leo Ahern was the first doctor to examine Michael Collins's body and pronounce him dead. *'The wound was a large gaping wound to the right of the poll. There was no other wound'*, he said. *'There was no exit wound ... only the large entrance wound. There was definitely no wound in the forehead.'* He stressed, *'It was important for me to check the wound, and to establish the cause of death. Therefore the wound was thoroughly checked, as was the entire head area.'* ... In view of Dr Leo Ahern's army experience and also his medical experience in an army hospital, I asked him what type of bullet did he think had caused the wound? *'It must have been a flat-nosed—a dum-dum'* (expanding bullet). The wound was too great, and too much of the head matter had been blown off, there was *'too much skull fragmentation'*, to have come as a result of a ricochet, he felt... The doctors confirm the cause of the wound and the calibre of the bullet which killed Collins. Their evidence corroborates which has emerged from my investigation into his death. Seán Hales {Treatyite commander of the Free State Army in West Cork—MO'R} in a statement to Seán McGarry in December 1922 {only days before what would be an actual assassination, that of Hales himself—MO'R}, said: *'They knew they had killed an officer of high rank'*. The author has a statement made by Tom Hales {anti-Treatyite commander of the IRA in West Cork, and present at Béalnabláth—MO'R} to his brother, Major Seán Hales, dated 22 August 1922: *'The Column had pulled out of position and only a few men of a rearguard party were there when the car came in sight. They knew they had killed an officer of very high rank with one of the last shots fired but they had no idea who that officer was.'* Liam Deasy {the anti-Treatyite IRA Southern Division GOC, who had planned the Béalnabláth attack on the Free State Army convoy—MO'R} confirmed: *'We knew it was Sonny Neill's bullet!'* (Deasy interview with author 19/9/73). *'We regretted the type of bullet used. These were picked up after ambushes during the Tan War'*, he said. Deasy said that Sonny Neill personally described the event to the IRA's Chief Intelligence Officer, Seán Dowling, when he journeyed to West Cork in September 1922... All the Republicans who had assembled in ambush at Béalnabláth on the day Michael Collins was shot, afterwards knew who shot him... Michael Collins was shot by the Republican who said, *'I dropped one man'...*" (pp 138-140, 145 and 198-199).

Sometimes, in order to scotch irresponsible conspiracy theories, it is necessary to go into such gory details. I have had a similar unpleasant experience myself. Lewis Clive, born in 1910, was the son of Lt-Col Percy Archer Clive, the Liberal-Unionist and later Conservative and

Unionist MP for Ross, who was killed in action during the Imperialist War on 5th April 1918. Lewis Clive would win a gold medal for Britain in rowing at the 1932 Olympic Games. More important, he became politically radicalised, and was elected as a Labour Party Councillor for the London Borough of Kensington. During the Spanish Anti-Fascist War he would be my father Micheál O'Riordan's Company Commander in the 15th International Brigade's British Battalion. During the doomed attempt to seize Hill 481 from the Fascists, outside the town of Gandesa, in the course of the battle of the Ebro, Clive was killed in action on 1 August 1938, shortly before my father was himself wounded. It, however, became necessary for me to spell out in detail how I knew for certain that Clive had been shot from the front by Fascist fire, in order to scotch a conspiracy theory that he had been shot in the back by a fellow International Brigader. In July 2008, one Alan Warren posted the following entry on the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives Forum:

"I believe that there is a barrack room rumour that either David Guest and/or Lewis Clive might have been shot by Maurice Ryan's machine gun during the assault on Hill 481. John Dunlop mentions the tragedy in his Imperial War Museum sound archives... Does anyone else have any further information about this incident of friendly fire?"

I immediately replied:

"I fail to appreciate that there is any need to have recourse to anonymous barrack room rumour and gossip when outspoken witness statements have long since been published. To suggest that Lewis Clive might have been shot by (the Limerick brigadista) Maurice Ryan may inject a sensationalist frisson into the narrative of the battle of the Ebro, but it is demonstrably untrue. Ian MacDougall's 1986 book, *Voices from the Spanish Civil War: Personal Recollections of Scottish Volunteers*, contains interviews with Tommy Murray, John Dunlop and Steve Fullarton, in which all three related the *'drunken fire by Ryan'* episode and his subsequent execution. These International Brigaders, while engaged in a frontal assault on the enemy, became aware of also coming under fire from behind. Nobody was hit by that fire. But in a conversation I myself had with John Dunlop in Glasgow in 2003, he further related to me that, when he and others subsequently came back to investigate what on earth lay behind that occurrence, they found a drunken Maurice Ryan fast asleep beside his machine gun, together with the spent belt of his erratic, but mercifully off-target, fire. The military discipline required in battle more than

justified Ryan's execution by (the Manchester Irish) British Battalion Commander Sam Wild. And yet Ryan's fellow-Brigaders, Sam Wild among them, always included Ryan's name in the roll of honour of the Battalion's casualties. Why? Because Ryan had previously given good military service before he went of the rails. *'Vino was his downfall'*, was the observation of his friend and fellow Irish Brigader Eugene Downing. Had Ryan been responsible for even a single Republican casualty, there is no way his name would have been tolerated on a roll of honour. Still less would he have been remembered with such fondness by some friends, most notably in the poem, *To MR*, which English International Brigader Jim Jump wrote in his memory. The quote from George Wheeler's memoirs, *To Make the People Smile Again*, is indeed sufficient to dispose of any suggestion of 'friendly fire' being involved in the death of Lewis Clive. As he recalled, 'Lewis Clive re-appeared and asked about the activity on the fascist lines'. George lay crouched in a firing position just ahead of Clive when he felt splashes of blood. 'Turning, I saw Lewis reel and fall.' In other words, **Clive had been standing**. {My emphasis—MO'R}. Having had to turn around to look behind him, George was a witness to the immediate aftermath of Clive's death, but not of the instant itself. But there was a direct witness. A certain squeamishness has hitherto made me reluctant to put pen to paper on this matter. But rather than let legendary red herrings multiply, historical facts should now be recorded. Although my Irish International Brigade father Michael O'Riordan had published *Connolly Column* in 1979, and had written numerous historical articles before and after, he never wrote a personal account of his own experiences in battle. Still less did he ever speak to me during the first 39 years of my own life about the horrors of war, and the more gruesome incidents that he himself had lived through, until he finally did so on November 1, 1988. As we journeyed by car through the mountainous battlefields of the Ebro front, on the occasion of his first return visit to Catalunya in fifty years, my father unexpectedly opened up and spoke of his memories. He recalled being right beside Lewis Clive as they were under fire from the fascist lines. When a lull came in the firing, Clive stood up to get a better view. My father said that he immediately thought: *'A bad commander!'* This was no reflection on Clive's courageous character and bravery, but rather a comment on the recklessness of such bravery in presenting himself in the open as such a soft target for the fascists. The thought had barely formed in my father's head when Clive was shot in the forehead and my father hit by his brains."

I do not believe it is too unkind to describe Michael Collins as a bad Free

State Army Commander-in-Chief for so recklessly standing up, alone and without cover, on the road at Béalnabláth, thus making himself not just a sitting, but a **standing** target. However one regards his behaviour, Meda Ryan's meticulous forensic examination has clearly established that he was killed in action by Sonny Neill (aka Denis 'Sonny' O'Neill). She has thereby debunked all conspiracy theories, whether of the Free State / Fine Gael variety—that *Collins the supposed "constitutional democrat" had been targeted for "assassination" by "anti-democratic" Republicans*, or of the Kelleher / *Fuinneog Feirste* Republican variety—that Collins the supposed "*Republican peacemaker*" had been targeted for "assassination" by the British Secret Service.

It should also be noted that in his Presidential address to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis on 8th February 2014, Gerry Adams pronounced: "*The counter-revolutionaries who succeeded Michael Collins, like their contemporaries in the North, copper-fastened Partition and the two conservative states, which it created.*" The counter-revolutionaries who succeeded Michael Collins?!! What on earth did Adams think Collins was doing during the Civil War that he himself had launched against the Republic?

Does he believe there was a counter-revolutionary 'conspiracy' targeting Collins himself? Conspiracy theories not only result in bad history, but lead to bad politics as well.

Seán Kelleher may continue believing that his "*British Secret Service*" yarn is "*a good story*", but it lies demolished by the facts as established by Meda Ryan. I, however, believe that my mother's eyewitness account of Collins's last exit from Clonakilty is not only a good story, but that it also more than 90 percent accurate in her recollection of the facts. This is not to deny that there are some facts which must be allowed to correct her. I myself have already pointed to the error in her narrative in telescoping two separate, if successive evenings, Collins's exit from Clonakilty and the following evening when news of his death came back to Clonakilty. But are there any more? Echoing my mother, I have been quoted in *The Holly Bough* as stating: "*What puzzled me was that she said there was no armoured car, no Crossley Tender accompanying him.*" Following correspondence with Meda Ryan, however, I now believe that the issue of the two vehicles needs to be separated. Last December, in a memorandum entitled "*Collins: The Final Route*", Meda very kindly sent the following

commentary, quoting references from her own book, but also elaborating further:

"Re the article in the *Holly Bough*, that is a nice photo of your mother. It is disappointing that they gave her the incorrect name. With reference to the article, it is a pity that a new dimension has been added to the route that Collins took on that day as he and the convoy returned to Bandon in the evening. I have written that the Michael Collins' convoy was travelling in the morning on the way towards Clonakilty: (p. 79) 'At the outskirts of Clonakilty the convoy was brought abruptly to a halt because the road was blocked by newly felled trees.' On p. 76, I wrote 'Some of the {Republican} men who had travelled from the Clonakilty area the previous evening told {Liam}Deasy that Republicans had blocked the main Clonakilty road with fallen trees. Therefore it was felt that the convoy might have to turn back sooner than anticipated.' Later in the day Republicans learned (via Cuman na mBan) that the convoy had gone on towards west Cork. The only time that the convoy did not go 'in convoy' was when they were 'broken up' (so to speak) and were separated for a while, was in the morning which I've written about re Long's instructions —Newcestown direction (pp. 68, 69.). Those to whom I spoke, mentioned this detour, but I never heard that there was a problem of total separation in the convoy at any other time. But even on that occasion the armoured car followed the touring car and stopped outside Newcestown Church. Jim Wolfe driver of the armoured car told me these were his instructions. In fact I wrote that travelling into Beal na Blath later that evening, (p. 93), 'The armoured Car was travelling '*four poles behind the Leyland [touring car] which was the required distance*' according to Jim Wolfe. (29/3/1974)"

"As I wrote to you previously (in September), I feel certain that your mother was genuine in her recollection. While the convoy did travel in convoy, there was often a 'gap' between vehicles. So perhaps on that occasion returning through Clonakilty, as happened at other times, that the first part of the convoy had gone on, and then your mother's focus, was on the touring car, as her father had told her that Michael Collins was one of the soldiers in the car. But there can be no reason why the armoured car was not behind the touring car. There was a distance that had to be kept. That could account for your mother not seeing, not remembering, the other vehicles. Obviously her focus was on Collins—in her memory and her recollection of her father with her on that day. (As I have written it was remembered and recollected in that area as *The Day Michael Collins Was Shot*.) Remembering distances from childhood can often be deceptive. Anyhow, I don't know, in this case. But

I'm certain that it was after the touring car and other vehicles 'went up the Convent Rd., and rounded the corner at the Convent Wood' (as your mother described) that they had to take the detour due to felled trees etc., as in the morning and return to the Clonakilty/Bandon road, and proceed to Bandon. The convoy had to travel through Clonakilty on the return journey, just as they had done in the morning, except in the evening, they did not stop. See the morning account (p. 80) where they travelled 'along a narrow bóithrín, familiar to him [Collins], to the town'..."

"The information that I have written about in that area in my book is Emmet Dalton's personal interview with me. Also because I travelled with Jim Wolfe, I got this route from him. (Both these two men were military men). Jim Wolfe accompanied me on the full journey from Limerick right through Cork on to Macroom and on to Bandon and west Cork and we returned via the different route that the convoy took to Cork from Beal na Bláth. It took us almost four days, as I interviewed him throughout. I had Timmy Kelleher, Macroom taxi driver as a passenger for a full day (from early morning) until late, and he took me on the journey that they had travelled from Macroom to Bandon on that (22 Aug 1922) morning. I interviewed Emmet Dalton on a few occasions. Now I feel if there was anything untoward in Collins's convoy and their movements some one of them would have told me. Indeed one of the many other people whom I interviewed and who were involved would have told me. That book, *The Day Michael Collins Was Shot* stretched from the early 1970s into 1989—research and writing. In the ambush site in particular, I feel I got to know almost every stone."

"The *Holly Bough* article also questions the final shot. I have no doubt about it. It was Sonny O'Neill, of that I am certain. He admitted it himself at the time as I have described, when he discussed it with Jim Kearney and others; then years later in Nenagh where he made his home. I've met several people who told me that he had no problem with saying it. I gave a talk in Nenagh a few years ago and many people mentioned it publicly in questions afterwards. His sister, whom I interviewed, told me that Sonny had told her, shortly after it happened. Jim Kearney was with me in her house when I interviewed her. In my book p. 127, I write that Sonny O'Neill was seated to the left of Bill Powell. In the kitchen that night when word came in that Michael Collins had been shot: 'Bill Powell felt a grip on his left arm'. It doesn't really matter about the name of the person who shot him—it was an enemy shot from the National army point of view. It could have been the other way around. But such is history. Nor does it matter where the gun is now, as the article in the *Holly Bough* speculates. No doubt that gun

went on to be used during the continuing Civil War, and must have ended up like many more of such guns."

Meda Ryan's unsurpassed research in interviewing so many participants on both sides of the Civil War makes her book a powerful source of witness statements. And her interviews with Dalton are as significantly revealing on some political issues as they are on military matters. Apart from confirming that Collins was not in the process of embarking on any peace process with the Republicans, we also learn that Tom Hales had not lost any of his non-sectarian reflexes as an O'Brienite All-For-Ireland League activist in his sensitivity regarding North-South relations. Emmet Dalton related the following:

"On the road to Clonakilty, Collins spoke about some of his former friends and colleagues who were now 'on the other side'. He mentioned Tom Hales whom he had visited in jail during the Treaty negotiations. Collins knew that Hales regretted that the signatories did not hold out because he regarded Lloyd George 'as a bluffer'. Collins told Dalton that each time he met Hales, and especially during the discussions on army reunification, Hales maintained that a 'federal Ireland' would solve the problem. 'He spoke of Tom Hales with affection tinged with sadness. Their broken friendship appeared to have affected him.' ... It has been alleged that Collins was anxious to get back to Cork on the night of 22 August to attend a meeting to make peace with the anti-Treaty forces. However, research shows that this is mere speculation ... Dalton said there was no mention of a peace meeting organised for that night: 'As far as I am aware Collins had no intention of compromising... I don't think Lynch, or any of the die-hards had any intention of agreeing to the suggestion of unconditional surrender.' ... No documentation exists, nor is there any indication, that Collins was about to make peace at the expense of abandoning the Treaty, of abandoning the Provisional government, or of abandoning the 'splendid progress achieved' by his forces" (pp 79 and 92-93).

I must accept Jim Wolfe's testimony to Meda Ryan that the armoured car he was driving had also gone through Clonakilty town, at some point after Collins's touring car, on the way back to Bandon from Sam's Cross. The distance between them would be more problematic. Wolfe told Ryan that at Béalnabláth he was travelling "four poles" (that is, 22 yards) behind Collins's car "which was the required distance". It all sounds very disciplined. In his first anniversary account for the *Freeman's Journal* on 22nd August 1923 Emmet Dalton wrote:

"Our motor-cyclist scout was about 50 yards in front of the Crossley tender, which we followed at the same interval in the touring car. Close behind us came the armoured car."

Well, it wasn't close behind in Clonakilty. There had to have been a gap, for my mother had unhindered sight of Collins until his touring car disappeared around the corner of Convent Wood. I accept that in the immediate excitement of discussing Collins's greeting to her father as they turned back into the house, my mother could have been oblivious to an armoured car passing at that point. Moreover, there is a further reason why I accept that the armoured car, no less than the touring car, had to stick to the road and go through Clonakilty town, judging from how Meda Ryan had described it: at Béalnabláth: "*Wolfe tried to drive up the narrow entrance; soon he discovered that it would be impossible to negotiate this rugged track with the heavy vehicle. The armoured car weighed four and a half tonnes and had only ground clearance of ten inches*" (p 99). Meda had written that on the way back from Sam's Cross towards Clonakilty the convoy "*went through the fields*" (p 89), but there is no way either the touring car or the armoured car would have gone through any field. I have been the first to clarify, based on my mother's testimony, that Collins's car came through the town itself, while Meda has since clarified that the armoured car also followed through the town, based on hitherto unpublished details of Wolfe's testimony to her. So, of course, I do stand corrected on that point.

However, that, as far as I am concerned, was the extent of the convoy that came through the streets of the town itself. I am convinced that the Crossley tender did take a short cut through some fields and linked up with Collins just outside the town on the road to Bandon. Would there have been any logic to that, whether that logic be sober or impetuous? Meda recounted how on the way into Clonakilty that morning the convoy, including Collins himself, had spent a good hour trying to clear the road of newly felled trees, before abandoning the task, with Collins leaving instructions for other Free State soldiers to complete the job, adding: "*There are plenty of idle soldiers in the area, we'll rout them out to clear this*" (p 80). Could the Crossley tender have been sent as an advance party to see if that job had been completed, in order to try and avoid the need for the whole convoy to yet again detour via the narrow bóithrín by which they had entered the town that morning?

All that, of course, is mere speculation on my part, trying to find some sense of purpose in a convoy whose behaviour had become increasingly irrational by that late evening.

What is not speculation, however, is what my mother categorically pronounced she most definitely had **not** seen as a twelve year old that evening:

"I was told there was a Crossley Tender, it had been years since I heard that name, 'Crossley Tender'. It never had sunk in. Well, I said if there was, it was nowhere near his car, as we could see him in the back of the car as it went up the Convent Rd., and rounded the corner at the Convent Wood."

While my mother might have been caught up in the excitement of her parents, on seeing Collins pass by, not to notice the armoured car following on as they turned back into the house, there was nothing to cause any excitement before Collins passed by. Anything but. As she described it she was "*alongside the garden wall, probably picking pennyworth, or just idling*". She had often told me how, as a ten year old, she had been absolutely terrified when either hearing from inside the house, or seeing outside it, a Crossley tender pass by, filled with Tans or Auxies. Had any such traumatising vehicle re-appeared and passed in front of her, ahead of Collins's car, she would have jumped out of her skin. As Éamon Kelly recalled his own childhood terror:

"At night when we heard the noise of Crossley tenders coming up Mac's Height we ducked under the table as my mother's hand reached up to turn down the wick of the oil lamp. We crouched in the darkness as the Tan lorries came near the house and we held our breath until they had passed. Then as the sound died away by the Gap of the Two Sticks we gradually emerged and my mother turned up the wick of the oil lamp" (*The Apprentice*, p 21).

The controversy concerning the Kil-michael memorial is further evidence of how such vehicles were viewed. Twohig also described Crossley tenders as follows:

"Brought over by the Auxiliary Division (the 'Auxies') in the Summer of 1920... they carried a movable hood and had an open cab... The Auxies changed the format to the extent of having a large bench down the centre of the body where they sat back to back and facing outwards and always on the ready... It did not enhance the reputation of Michael Collins among Republicans to have inherited them from the British" (p 131).

Collins could even be made jump by

the sound of his own Crossley tender. Meda Ryan described the departure of the convoy from Dublin on 20 August for Collins's tour of the South:

"Already the men who were to travel in the Crossley tender waited for the vehicle ... driven by Captain Conroy... The distinctive sound of the Crossley tender driven by Captain Conroy startled Collins. He saluted and made his way towards the touring car... Lieutenant Smith, the motor-cycle scout rider, led the convoy which set out from Portobello Barracks at 6.15 am. Next was the Crossley tender, driven by Captain Conroy, with a complement of twelve men including Sergeant Cooney, Captain Joe Dolan, and Captain Peter Conlon, and the man in command of the escort, Commandant Seán (Paddy) O'Connell" (pp 45-46).

Ah, the elusive Captain Conroy! He is not mentioned at all in most narratives of Béalnabláth, and is referenced on only two other pages by Meda Ryan, but without a Christian name. Was he some non-descript Free State Army intake without any War of Independence background, a pre-Treaty 'Trucileer' or, worse still, one of the post-Treaty British Army transfers to Collins's Free Staters? He was nothing of the sort, and yet Emmet Dalton could not bring himself to give him a name, other than the depersonalised "*Captain*". Two members of Collins's assassination Squad on the Crossley tender, O'Connell and Dolan, were given their full names and their fighting role at Béalnabláth highlighted. As Meda Ryan related:

"Under the command of Seán O'Connell, the men in the Crossley tender opened fire with the Lewis gun. This, together with the Thompson sub-machine guns and rifles which the soldiers carried, were all quickly brought into action... Joe Dolan who had moved into the armoured car at Bandon because 'it was warmer than the open Crossley tender', had been sitting in the back as they headed towards Béal na Bláth. (It was overcrowded at this stage, according to Jim Wolfe.) {How come? —MO'R.} After an action-filled day Dolan was tired: he relaxed and dozed; his rifle remained planted between his knees. At the first shots he was jerked awake. When the armoured car halted in response to the stopping of the Leyland (touring car) he jumped out and immediately put his rifle into action" (pp 97 and 102-3).

But why did none of Meda's witnesses speak of any "*deadly shot*" being fired by the driver of the Crossley tender, Captain Conroy? For Jimmy Conroy was no novice. He was a veteran of the Jacobs' factory garrison in the 1916 Rising. During the War of Independence he was not only

a fellow Collins Squad member, but the actual room-mate of Charlie Dalton—Emmet's brother! "*He was a deadly shot*", wrote Charlie Dalton, while Collins's "Spy in the Castle", David Neligan, hailed him as "*Jimmy Conroy, the one-man column... If ever anyone deserved a pension, it was he*". It is true that during the Truce he became a hopeless drunk, causing Collins some trans-Atlantic difficulties. And it is true that, six months after the end of the Civil War, Jimmy Conroy was drunk as a skunk on the night of 14th November 1923 when he murdered the Jewish civil servant Ernest Emanuel Kahan, with the Free State authorities facilitating his evasion of justice. But because Emmet Dalton obscured his role on 22nd August 1922 we can say nothing about Conroy's drinking on that day or learn anymore about how he tore off with the Crossley tender, partly "*through the fields*", from Sam's Cross to the Clonakilty-Bandon road, by-passing the town of Clonakilty itself.

Tim Pat Coogan's 1990 book, *Michael Collins—A Biography*, is the most hagiographical of all. He took umbrage at what he regarded as character assassination by Collins's Civil War Republican foes, who had charged him with excessive drinking during the Treaty negotiations, and he was even more outraged by similar charges levelled at Collins by the Neutral IRA leader Seán O'Hegarty. I have no basis for disagreeing with Coogan's conclusions in that regard, not least because he expressed himself as being at all so SURE-footed regarding Collins's triumphalist tour of his native West Cork on last day on earth:

"During the course of the day his presence in the towns he passed through caused a sensation... There were crowds and handshakes, food and drink in plenty. Collins, with his usual generosity, insisted on buying drink for the escort party... Collins himself may have had less to drink than the others, but though there is, as usual, some conflict of evidence on this point, a number of accounts say that the escort was well under the influence by the time they left Bandon for the last time. Emmet Dalton, a very heavy drinker in later life, denied that the party, including Collins, was drunk. '*It's a lie*', he said. But with true soldierly bluntness he privately told members of the crew that made a film about his life for RTÉ that '*we were all arseholes!*' Billy Powell, Captain of the Lissarda Company of the IRA, said that members of the convoy '*were in no shape for fighting. They'd been on a bit of a spree all day. Mick Collins stood them drink wherever he stopped.*' {As told to the author by Liam Ó Donnachadhcha, whom Coogan described as "the Collins' family friend

and historian"—MO'R}. Another account describes a scene in Callinan's pub in Rosscarbery while Collins was away... A row broke out between Dublin members of the convoy and local troops when the machine-gunner of the Slievenamon (armoured car), John McPeake, took a bottle of whiskey from a shelf in the pub. McPeake himself later admitted that there was some drinking on the trip but firmly denied that it was to excess... The pub owner took a message (of warning that there was a Republican barricade at Béalnabláth) and passed it on to Collins. A first cousin, Captain Paddy Collins, said his reaction was to shrug and say, '*Yerra, sure they'd never attack me.*' ... Collins was back with his own, away from the intolerable tensions of Dublin. Forget the war, relax, take a drink, have a chat and a joke. It was human but it was not wartime behaviour. Collins would not have lasted a day had he been so unguarded during the Black and Tan period..."

"(At Béalnabláth) the armoured car (driven by Jim Wolfe) moved up and down the road ... while McPeake kept up a heavy fire from the Vickers machine-gun. Bullets were clipping the grass all round (Tom) Kelliher and he reckoned that had not the gun jammed suddenly he would have been killed. The jamming was caused by one of the inexperienced passengers in the armoured car feeding the belt awkwardly into the magazine. The gun should have been manned by two trained machine-gunners, but in the disorganisation of the time only one, McPeake, had been allocated to accompany the Commander-in-Chief. The other occupants of the Slievenamon were the drivers and two members of the escort party who had got into the armoured car, because it was warmer than the Crossley tender which may also have been overcrowded through taking on extra passengers during the afternoon. (There are conflicting reports on this. Liam Ó Donnachadhcha told me Collins was quoted as saying '*blasht yiz, don't you think we have enough trouble as we are*', when six would-be Garda recruits presented themselves, looking for a lift on their way to Dublin. Other accounts say they were Mayo men. Dalton's account of the last trip does not mention them at all. I have been reliably informed that extra passengers, from whatever county, were present on the return journey.)" (pp 408-410 and 449).

And, of course, Coogan remained completely oblivious of the fact that the Crossley tender driver who had been merrily inviting all aboard was none other than the Collins Squad man, Jimmy Conroy. A Free State conspiracy of silence, indeed!

(to be continued)

Manus O'Riordan

Does
It
Up

Stack
?

GARDAÍ AND DRUGS

Good news. Hundreds of drug dealers were operating in streets and lanes in Dublin's city centre for years and years, almost with impunity. Yes, the dealers were being arrested and were being brought before the Courts every day but in Court they were automatically given bail with the result that the dealers were back on their streets before the prosecuting Garda was back in the Garda Station. This was very frustrating for the Gardaí, very expensive for the State and very remunerative for some lawyers. However some months ago some Gardaí got a bright idea. Now the drug dealers are hauled into the Garda Station where they are searched. Their mobile phones are seized as evidence and any money/drugs they have are also confiscated as "*Station Bail*". The seizure of their mobile phones severely hampers the dealer's activities because they have now lost all their data regarding their criminal contacts i.e. fellow dealers and of course their clients. After this occurrence a few times by undercover young Gardaí posing as fellow dealers/clients, the drug dealers give up and move away from the city centre. Hundreds of dealers have been dealt with like this and the streets of central Dublin are now safer as a result. That is good news for Dublin, its citizens and of course our tourists. Obviously the dealers will continue to do their nefarious business elsewhere but the Gardaí will follow them and hopefully this scourge will be brought under control.

What the dealers were doing was preying on drug users who were attending or trying to attend drug rehabilitation clinics provided by the HSE which were trying to wean off the addicts by giving them methadone instead. The clinics in central Dublin are not the only clinics, there are clinics in the suburbs and that is where the drug dealers are now. The Gardaí will have to follow the dealers and make life so hot for them that they give it up or get a long gaol sentence.

And here we have a crux. The Courts are not dealing effectively with matters which come before them. Adjournments are granted too easily and the laws are not firm enough. It was intended that District Courts were to be courts for Summary Justice and to deal quickly without delay with crimes. This is not happening. There

are fuzzy areas around: "*contributions to the Poor Box*", contributions to the "*Garda Benevolent Fund*", too-facile application of the Probation Act and widespread use of suspended sentences.

Allied to these are laxities in the Prison Service whereby a stretch in gaol is somewhat similar to attending a boarding school for crime. Too much association between prisoners is permitted, for reasons of economy. Television is supplied so that prisoners do not riot, I have been told. And of course the number of prison cells is far too small for the number of prisoners. A week or a month in gaol should be a hard, sharp shock and discipline should be enforced by procedures, such as having a plank bed or a mattress. There should be one cell for each prisoner, meals should be served to each in the prisoner's cells, TV or no TV should be used as a disciplinary measure.

The present system does not seem to be working and must be changed. There is no point in a Garda arresting a wrong-doer unless some punishment or deprivation ensues and it is surely not beyond our expertise as a society to design a system that will work to stamp out petty crime and anti-social behaviour.

The Station Bail, while it has been shown in Dublin to be a good solution to the drug dealer problem, is not the long term solution. This system has been shown abroad to be only too easy to abuse. An unfounded complaint can be made to the Gardaí against a person and that person can be given Station Bail and then have to wait for months and months to have the case come to court and in the meantime the accused person is unemployed and his/her life ruined because of the case pending.

A person is entitled to be innocent until proven guilty but to have that entitlement vindicated any case must be processed within days and if the person is found innocent there must be a punishment for the accuser of the innocent person. Until we get to that situation we are living in a basically unjust society.

DEMOCRACY AND VOTING

The present system of voting in Ireland is most unsatisfactory. The only thing to be said in its favour is that the Ballot Paper identifies whether or not a candidate is a representative of a Political Party. A representative of a Political Party has signed a Party Pledge to abide by the instructions of the political party for which she/he is an election candidate. You are voting for the Party and for the Party promises. When a candidate on the Ballot Paper is an independent candidate the Ballot Paper will not say so—it will state **Non Party**.

When you know a candidate well, you may be able to judge whether the candidate is really Independent Fianna Fail or Independent Fine Gael or Independent Labour etc etc, or whether the candidate is genuinely and purely an independent-minded candidate without any party allegiances.

You can indicate preferences by voting your first preference, second preference, third preference and so on down to your umpteenth preference if there are umpteen candidates on the Ballot Paper.

What you cannot do, and this is why the system is unsatisfactory, is that you cannot indicate your opposition for a candidate. Imagine a village in which everyone knows everyone else and they know which are the competent geniuses, the incompetent geniuses, the foolish persons, the averagely intelligent persons and the persons with commonsense. They will also know the devious smooth talkers and the mildly or even seriously crooked persons. Imagine the villagers gathered in the village square and the election is by show of hands. Someone may shout "Candidate X" someone else my shout "No! I want Candidate Y" Others may shout "No! We should vote for my cousin Candidate Z". When everyone knows that one of the candidates—let us say Candidate X is totally unacceptable there will be mutterings and shouting until someone says let us vote on it. "*Who is in favour of X?*" Some will put up their hands. Certainly X will put up his hand and also perhaps his father and mother, his wife and in-laws will raise their hands. But when the voice asks "*do we accept X?*", there will be a majority of voices saying "*No we don't*" and, when asked "*how many say no?*", a majority will raise their hands to reject Candidate X. That is democracy in action. We in Ireland today have a secret ballot and we should have a box on the Ballot Paper opposite each candidate's name so as to allow voters to express their rejection of an unwanted candidate. A candidate should not then be elected where the "No" votes exceed the "Yes" votes for a particular candidate.

The party system is not itself democratic. This system allows cadres within parties to choose and nominate the candidates to appear before the voting public on the Ballot Papers. If we were not so used to this system it would make us laugh. It is quite outrageously undemocratic. It does not stack up. It is not allowed for in the Constitution of Ireland. Are Political Parties a conspiracy against the people and against the State? Perhaps not, if they carried out the policies on which the Parties get elected. But they don't usually. As Seán Lemass, former Taoi-

seach said one time: "On the day of the count all election promises are cancelled." That is something to meditate on. Another public person said: "the best thing to do is to vote for the opposition".

My own opinion is that it makes no sense to vote for a party which has made major mistakes—economically or socially, and it makes no sense to vote for a party which has in the past broken its most solemn election promises but it does make great sense to vote. There is usually an acceptable alternative.

THE HISTORY MEN & ANOTHER AMADÁN

Repercussions from the Irish President's dinner with the English Queen at one of her pads—Windsor Castle—are still ongoing. I have it on quite good authority from two different sources in University College Cork that one-time History man John A. Murphy is still reeling from being neglected by the Government to be included on the guest-list. John A. was a long-time invitee to garden receptions at the British Ambassador's house in Dublin and any-time that there was a British warship in dock at Cork, he was one of the first to be invited onboard for cocktails and assorted nibbles with the other local hobnobbers. But John A.—alas a gifted wielder of the 'scalpel-in-the-back' in his day is yesterday's man and there is nothing more lonesome than being just that. For Diarmaid Ferriter, called "Ireland's Mr. History" by *Phoenix* (May 23rd to June 5th 2014), it was an awful kick in the rear to be left out of the royal shindig when he is most definitely Mr. Popular where this State is concerned with regards to history. There is Roy Foster—that celebrated Mr. Revisionism himself sitting at Windsor and no place for Ferriter! The snub was never going to be forgiven. So the media were informed by the two history men that the Queen or her relatives were not entitled to be invited by the Government for the celebration of 1916. QED.

As for Harry Crosbie, a Dublin developer in trouble with NAMA, he was pictured by the same *Phoenix* wearing his medal from the Queen—the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. Though such a medal (honorary) can only be accepted if the Irish Government of the Republic green-lights it—the medal should never be worn only kept in a little display case which also comes with it. But this doesn't trouble Crosbie because there he is—as bold as brass wearing it on his suit. He should be hauled over the coals by the State and made return it—but I wouldn't hold my breath on that happening.

Michael Stack ©

GUILDS continued

by either gild or government; and in 1776 appeared Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, the classic statement of *laissez-faire*. The Physiocrats propagated the new doctrine; and it was backed, as we would expect, by powerful industrial interests, so powerful that Turgot, the French Prime Minister, sponsored the abolition of the gilds. Even then the French people were not prepared to see the system brought to an end. Turgot was dismissed, and the gilds were re-established. However, they were destined to survive only a few years longer.

In England, they just died out. But, although they died, they did not disappear utterly. In the country towns an annual social function is a relic of the old organisation; and in London there are certain corporations which have convivial meetings and which maintain libraries, schools, hospitals, and other such things. They, too, are survivals of the old gild

system. (Rev. George Clune, D.Ph., P.P., *The Medieval Gild System*, Chapter XI: *Why the Gilds Failed*, Browne and Nolan Limited, Dublin, 943)

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The Irish People Lose The Trust Of Labour In Government

On May 20, under the heading of "What Labour chiefs are saying in elections build-up", the *Irish Independent* reported two previous leaders of the Irish Labour Party as follows:

"Minister for Communications Pat Rabbitte said the electorate will 'forsake' the Government in Friday's local and European elections: 'In 2011 we got more than 19 percent of the vote, 81 percent of people didn't vote for us – but we're taking 81 percent of the criticism.' Education Minister Ruairi Quinn on Labour's unfair blame and his doubts about opinion polls: 'Labour always has a fight on its hands, always. We got one in five votes. We never got more than 20 percent, since the foundation of the State. And yet we're expected to fix the country, when other people break it.'"

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) was the ruling party of veteran German Communist Walter Ulbricht in the former German Democratic Republic. In June 1953, following the uprising of East Berlin workers against the SED Government, Berthold Brecht penned the following poem:

After the rising of June 17
The secretary of the Writers' Union
Had leaflets distributed on the Stalinallee
In which one read that the people
Had lost the Government's trust,
And that it could be restored
Only by redoubled work.
Would it not have been simpler
If the Government had dissolved the people,
And elected another?

Is there an appropriate Brechtian response to the Ulbrichtian *weltanschauung* of Rabbitte and Quinn? A case of *déjà vu* or, rather, history repeating itself as farce?

Manus O'Riordan

GUILDS continued

that can be adduced. If the guilds had been so averse to change as Renard states, if "every innovation" was met by "determined opposition", how could the guild system have succeeded in surviving so long? Each guild was granted a monopoly, but to this was attached responsibility. The guilds had to recognise their social obligations by guaranteeing sound material and good workmanship, a just price for the finished article, and a fair wage to its own workers. But, as time went on, the monopoly was being availed of for selfish purposes. Apart from that, however, if the guilds went to sleep, that is, they forgot the community (provided that they themselves were comfortable), the question arises : why did they do so? Did anything compel them to close their eyes to the needs and rights of others? If it be replied—and it may be replied with much truth—that the guilds rolled themselves up for defence purposes, as a porcupine does, against unfair competition from outside, especially from industry that had never been under guild control, or that had left the town for the express purpose of evading control, the question must be asked : were the guilds themselves responsible for driving these competitors outside the town? Or, were the competitors themselves at fault? And, in either case, why did this thing take place, and why was it allowed by the municipality or by the State?

STATES' ROLE

Again, it is said that the government intervened and broke up the guild system. The government intervened, but not to end the guild organisation.

"It remained the policy of the government and the town authorities," says Ashley, "to keep the various occupations under the system of supervision which had been created in the later middle Ages; and therefore, as new centres of industry grew up, as new occupations made their appearance in old centres, or as the number of men in some petty occupation grew large enough to attract attention, they were all brought, if possible, within the same organisation."

If it be urged that in France the government intervened and granted masters' certificates, even sold them, then the question must be asked : why did the government intervene? Was it because of abuses in the guilds? If it was, why did the abuses arise? Who were responsible for them? Was the guild organisation itself, apart from its members, at fault?

MORAL FACTORS

All these questions point to the basic, although not the exclusive, explanation of the failure of the guilds. The market was enlarged, machinery was invented, industrial units became big, capital was accumulated, the guilds fought with one another, journeymen formed their own organisations—these and similar explanations are put forward by economic historians, and any other sort is ignored. The material factors are analysed and expounded; the moral factors are not noticed—as if the human will had nothing to do with the matter.

And yet, what could have had more to do with it?

"The important point to notice, because most historians fail to stress it," writes Somerville very truly, "is that this fatal policy of exclusiveness, the artificial closing of doors to journeymen, was not due to any material change in the conditions of production, such as the enlargement of the market; it was due simply to moral deterioration, to the growth of selfishness, to the weakening of the old sense of fellowship. 'Contrary to the true meaning of the first foundation of the fellowships and fraternities' is the phrase used in a complaint against the craft guilds of Norwich in 1543. All the critics and reformers of the guilds in the 16th century sought the remedy for evils in the return of the guilds to the observance of their professed principles. Nobody believed that a change in economic conditions had made the guild system obsolete."

Again :

"It is not sentimental moralizing, it is a strictly scientific statement of observed and verifiable facts to say with M. Saint-Leon that the foundations of the guild structure were not the absence of machinery or the localization of the market : they were justice, kindness, respect and obedience among masters and men."

To this he adds a quotations from Saint-Leon the meaning of which is perfectly clear :

"The guild edifice which in the 13th and 14th centuries recalls to our minds the Gothic cathedrals whose great doors and wide naves seemed to call all the faithful, without distinction of rank and fortune, to prayer and blessings, had been transformed in the 18th century to a Bastille where a greedy and jealous oligarchy was entrenched" {Somerville}.

The exclusiveness which was the seed of dissolution was due solely to moral deterioration, to the growth of selfishness, to the weakening and finally the decay of the spirit of brotherhood on which the

whole guild structure rested. It is merely absurd to attribute the failure of the guilds to material, economic reasons. "*The real causes were not material, but moral, they were less economic than religious.*" And again : *the spirit of individualism was supplanting the medieval sense of solidarity, and this was to be fatal to the guilds*" {Somerville}.

What about the material, the economic, factors—the enlargement of the market, the growth in size of the production-unit, etc.?

These of necessity required a change in the guild system, but this change could have been effected if the old spirit were still alive. Unfortunately for England and Europe the guild spirit had largely disappeared; the guilds had lost their adaptability; and in the new milieu they disintegrated. It needs to be added that the moral deterioration which had set in within the guilds had also set in outside them.

"The guilds were obviously failing, from the 15th century onwards, long before there had been any radical change in economic conditions. In the 16th century, the State was doing the things that the guilds had formerly done and which they ought to have continued doing. The guilds failed at their own functions, which they had done for centuries, and this is more significant than their failure to adapt themselves to new conditions and supply new needs" (Plater, Rev. C., S.J., *Letters on Social History*. The Catholic Social Guild. Oxford. 1924.)

It is remarkable that, where the system lived on, there was no extensive demand for its suppression, even though abuses were manifest. Even the journeymen did not want to see the system brought to an end. Reform, not destruction, was asked for. In Norwich in 1543 the guilds were asked to abandon the path which they had taken "*contrary to the true meaning of the first foundation of the fellowships and fraternities*"; they were asked to revive the old fraternalism and observe the principles which they professed. But there was no revival, no reform. The guilds were hardened in their selfishness.

THE PHYSIOCRATS

In France there was no demand for their abolition and for a frank acceptance in their stead of free competition until the second half of the 18th century. In 1758 a French economist put forward, anonymously, free trade as a substitute for control

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GUILDS continued

Somerville appears to suggest here, not that the domestic system could be reconciled with the gild idea, but rather that the position could be saved without very much trouble. If that is so, it is correct. When the guilds were faithful to their ideals, they always ensured that the way to mastership, to independent ownership, would be kept open. In the domestic system this way was closed.

It may be remarked in passing that, whether or not this reconciliation was possible, there was no justification for the degradation of the worker which followed on the abandonment in big industry of the gild organisation.

GEORGES RENARD

Renard has stated that the Renaissance, the Reformation, and State Absolutism operated to the detriment of the Gild System. They did; but that is no ultimate explanation, for it is necessary to ask what was their origin and why they arose. They did not appear without a cause, and that cause was not operative, apparently, in the heyday of the guilds.

Amongst the disruptive influences that operated against the guilds Renard assigns first place to the breakdown in their internal organisation. The guild consisted of three grades, the apprentice becoming a journeyman when his apprenticeship was at an end, and the journeyman becoming (if he so desired, and he almost invariably did) a master after a few years. The guild was a brotherhood. The journeyman and the apprentice lived with their master. They were members of the same domestic unit; they were one in religion; they worked together in the same shop; their interests were very largely identical. But a change came. The road to mastership was made unnecessarily difficult for the ordinary journeyman, and, in practice, mastership was reserved more and more for members of the masters' families. Masters' sons came to be admitted free without serving the required apprenticeship or producing the customary masterpiece, whilst heavy, indeed almost impossible, fees were demanded of the ordinary journeymen, and they were required to produce expensive, and largely useless, masterpieces and to provide costly banquets. Apprentices had to swear that when qualified they would not set up on their own account without the permission of their masters or of the guild officials. Sometimes it was provided by guild statute

that mastership be hereditary. These reasons, internal to the guild, impaired the old spirit of harmony and contributed much to the destruction of the guilds.

JOURNEYMEN'S GILDS

Another reason, also internal, was the appearance of journeymen's guilds. Sometimes these guilds were formed to make provision for the religious and social life of the journeymen, especially those who were working in foreign countries. For them these guilds were a home from home, although, if the journeyman lived with his master, and if the old spirit of fellowship was operative, the master's home and the craft guild, including the guild hall, should have satisfied all reasonable needs. But very commonly these journeymen-guilds were formed in self-defence, to secure fair wages and fair treatment for their members, who now had only a steadily-diminishing prospect of ever becoming masters. That is to say, the guilds were being divided into two sections, which were rapidly becoming rival classes, the employers and the employed—the latter developing into a permanent wage-earning class. This raises the question: why did the masters seek to exclude the journeymen from mastership? Why did they seek to keep them in permanent economic dependence?

Could these journeymen's unions, which sprang up in self-defence, be reconciled with the guild system? Somerville gives it as his opinion that they could, "*Journeymen's unions*", he writes, "*could have been reconciled with the guild system and constituted a useful part of it, as indeed they eventually did*". But if it was essential to the guild system that the way to industrial independence be kept open to all, clearly these unions could not be reconciled with it.

WEALTH AND THE GILDS

Excessive wealth is set down as one of the causes which disrupted the guild system from within. Excessive wealth, it is true; has never been a good thing for the ordinary man; but is it to be blamed for that? In the best days of the guilds a persevering effort was made to preserve a rough equality in this matter, and especially to secure a sufficiency for all; and guildsmen who had more than they needed were urged, and occasionally required, to transfer or to bequeath some of their wealth to the fraternity. This rough equality was the purpose of the universal regulations with regard to engrossing, forestalling, regrating, the number of journeymen and apprentices, the right of lot, communal

purchases, etc. The guildsmen felt that the amassing of large fortunes did good to nobody, and was in fact injurious. Indeed, the system has been criticised for the reason that in its effort to preserve a substantial equality in the matters of wealth it was a brake on energy and ability and hindered economic advancement.

But wealth did not disrupt the guild system. Before it came, the guilds were in decline; and when it came, those who had it did not abandon the guild organisation, but united in guilds of their own. A few of the guilds, particularly the goldsmiths, were probably well-to-do from the beginning; yet in Ireland at least the Goldsmiths' Guild did not decay, but works efficiently even to the present time.

However, even if wealth did cause the system to collapse, we should have to answer the question: why was this so?

Renard sets down divisions between the guilds as another internal cause of disruption.

"One is sometimes tempted to say", he writes, "that the guild system had no worse enemies than the guilds themselves, so much bitterness did they display in their quarrels and recriminations. Town fought town, and in spite of the efforts made by the central authority to unite them they had no idea whatever of agreeing or combining amongst themselves."

These quarrels were sometimes very bitter, and were presumably injurious to the guilds. But the guilds were never static; they were perpetually being subdivided and amalgamated; and causes of dispute, especially with regard to the limits of their jurisdiction, could not have been avoided. However, these disputes were often settled by arbitration; and anyhow the fact that they arose at all was proof, not that the guilds were dying, but that the guildsmen were very much alive.

GILDS OPPOSITION TO INNOVATION?

Renard also mentions "*vexatious regulations*" as a cause of disruption.

"The guilds were not only jealous of each other," he writes, "but also devoid of economic initiative. This was on account of the privileges they held. As each one possessed a monopoly, they were inclined to go to sleep in the little closed domain which belonged to them... Every innovation encountered their determined opposition."

There is truth in this indictment; but obviously the charge as a whole must be false, apart from any positive evidence

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GUILDS continued

and even the cabinet system of government had been matured. The centuries from the 11th to the 18th were creative though somewhat chaotic centuries, full of action, movement, change, progress, and the guilds had proved their adaptability throughout. Why did they at length die and disappear?"

Thus writes Mr. H. Somerville in *Why the Guilds Decayed*.

It is indeed true that the guilds had proved their adaptability throughout this long period—it is even true that they are doing so to-day in so far as they survive and are loyal to the ideals of the past;—but it is necessary to bear in mind that for quite a good while they were doing so with steadily diminishing success. There was a fault somewhere, whether in the guilds, or the guildsmen, or both.

LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION

It has been said that the guilds suited small-scale production, but that, when production became large-scale, they were unable to deal with it and died in a vain attempt.

There is truth in that statement. Large-scale production could not be staffed by a master, one or two journeymen, and a few apprentices; the system, as it took shape historically, could not without modification deal with the new industrial situation. But did that mean that the guild could offer no alternative to the big factory, owned by one or more persons who were not engaged, as a rule, in the work of production, run by a manager on behalf of the owners, and worked by a large number of operatives who had no share whatever in the ownership and had no reasonable hope that they ever would, each worker doing just one small job and being merely one cog in the vast wheel of production?

But it is not correct to say that the guilds flourished in an age when industrial undertakings were invariably small. Nobody can say with truth that the building of Cologne Cathedral was a small undertaking, yet most of it was done during the guild era. Before the days of the guilds there had been large-scale businesses—in, for instance, the old Roman Empire,—but they disappeared and did not reappear for centuries. Why was that?

For better or worse, the Middle Ages favoured small-scale production.

"If they developed local markets rather than larger ones, it was by deliberate choice and not because of economic backwardness. The guilds did not exist because industry was on a small scale,

but industry remained on a small scale because the guilds existed. The people of the Middle Ages did not share our modern eagerness for gigantic factories, any more than we share the Soviet enthusiasm for collectives in place of the American family farm" (Somerville).

Industry remained on this scale because the guildsmen deliberately kept the market small by their system of tolls; and even when the tolls began to disappear, production units did not at once begin to grow in size.

AN IDEAL SYSTEM?

It remains to be seen whether, in the absence of due control, large-scale or small-scale production better conduces to human welfare. Large-scale production is to some extent better for the industrial centre (where there is a concentration of workers, wages, shops, etc.); but what about the areas that are impoverished and the small industries that are destroyed as a consequence? County Clare was not very long ago almost industrially self-sufficient; but to-day how many coopers, shoemakers, weavers, harness-makers, and tanners make a living between Ennis and Loop Head, a distance of almost 50 miles? Kilkenny, Limerick, and Dublin have gained, but Clare has lost. Not that everything was ideal in the days of the guilds.

"It has been said," writes Ashley, "that no great institution—such as the Guild system—can satisfy every side of human nature; that, while satisfying some, it necessarily hampers and injures other. Thus the Guild System was never an ideal system in the sense of meeting all the needs of all the men of an epoch."

It is but fair to the Guild System to say that it did not try to meet all the wants of the world of its day; but it did seek to produce goods of high quality and to sell them at a price which allowed a decent wage to the craftsman and was at the same time fair to the consumer. It did not seek, as the industrialist of to-day does, maximum output at a minimum cost; and it did not tolerate an undue accumulation of wealth in the hands of any of its members. On the contrary, it sought to keep the road to industrial independence open to all its members; it tried to secure a fairly even distribution of wealth; and it made provision for those who, through no fault of their own, were unable to make provision for themselves and their dependents.

It has been said that the guild age was one of small businesses for the reason that mechanical power was wanting, but that, when mechanical power was harnessed, businesses at once began to grow in size.

To that it may be replied, first, that, although mechanical power had been at least equally wanting in the old Roman Empire, there had been large-scale production there, and, second, that mechanical power was not yet available when some of the industrial undertakings of the Middle Ages had already become large.

CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL

Another explanation of the failure of the guilds that has been put forward is that, when the market had grown, greater concentrations of capital were required for trade and commerce, and that the small producer was forced to disappear.

As to this it is to be observed that the market had been growing since the first appearance of the guilds, and that this is the explanation of the disappearance of the all-purposes Guild Merchant; but that, although the market, internal and external, had assumed big proportions by the end of the 15th century, the Guild System was still a power in England until nearly the end of the 17th century (and in France until the middle of the 18th century).

It is, of course, quite true that expanding markets did have the effect of increasing the size of industrial units; but the question remains : how does it appear that this increase in size of the industrial unit could not be reconciled with the guild idea? Was not co-operative ownership possible?

Large-scale trade involved a concentration of capital; but that did not mean that large industrial capital was necessary. As a matter of fact, this accumulation of capital was not necessary until the factory system was established; and by then the guild system was becoming moribund. If this is so, the obvious question arises : why was the system becoming moribund?

"DOMESTIC SYSTEM"

Before the coming of the factory system that was the "*domestic system*", in which the craftsman had been reduced to the status of a hired worker. Could the guild principles and this domestic system be reconciled? That is to say, had the guild system broken down with the advent of the domestic system? With regard to this, Somerville states:

"Guild principles could very well have been applied to the domestic system if the domestic producers had been organised and imbued with the guild spirit, and had been properly supported by public opinion and the public authorities. The domestic workers were still very largely skilled workers, and the capitalists had not yet an unlimited labour supply to draw on."

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Why the Guilds Failed

by Rev. George Clune

It is easy to point out, as has been done that there was evidence of decline in the guilds almost from the beginning; the same thing might be said in reference to an animal organism—death being the triumph of a process that began at birth. But although the guilds were always or near always more or less diseased, they lasted in great or less vigour for from 500 to 700 years; and this was a long life.

Here we seek the reason which not merely contributed to, but was primarily responsible for, their death.

Economists in general favour the idea that the guilds were admirably suited to their day, but that, when and because conditions changed, they just withered and died, as a fish dies when taken out of the water.

"It must be noticed", writes Ashley, "that the economic conditions of the time, the difficulty of communications, and consequently the small market for most commodities, the absence of mechanical aids to production, and the like, rendered anything but small industrial undertakings impossible. As soon as in any industry the amassing of great capital became feasible... the Guild System tended to become a mere form. Given small industrial undertakings; given the current political, ethical, and religious ideas, the Guild System was inevitable" {Ashley}.

ECONOMIC FATALISTS

That is the argument of the economic fatalists (those who hold that economic evolution moves along some predestined course and that it cannot be impeded or deflected). In the Middle Ages (they argue) communication between place and place was slow and difficult, and, as a consequence, the market was local and small and production was on a small scale. The guild was an association for mutual benefit for small producers. But when communication became easier and the market began to expand, bigger production-units became

necessary; and when the harnessing of water, steam, and, finally, electricity, assisted by great concentrations of capital, made huge production units possible, the guilds simply shrivelled and died. That is to say (we are informed), the system must inevitably have arisen; it must with equal inevitability have died; and there is no point in asking whether it was good or bad. *"Like all things that are really inevitable, to ask whether or no it was justifiable is to apply a standard that is inapplicable"* {Ashley}.

FIXED PRINCIPLES

But if man is free, there is no place for determinism; and anyhow, is there no place for motives that are not purely economic? *"Given the current political, ethical, and religious ideas."* Why should the religious ideas then current ever change? If Christ established a Church that was infallible and that, therefore, could not teach one thing to-day and abandon it to-morrow, a change in basic religious ideas would come about only through human perversity. Are we to think that perversity is inevitable? Similarly, ethical

principles cannot change. What is right is right and what is wrong is wrong independently of the passage of time. Political systems may change, but the purpose of government is fixed, and therefore its duties and its right are in essentials always the same. The growth in size of industrial units involved of necessity a change in the guild system of the Middle Ages; but did that mean that the principles and the ideals on which the system and the individual guilds were based had of necessity to be abandoned? This is the real question. Did the guild principles and the guild system which was based on them stand and fall together?

The world of to-day {1943} is vastly different in externals from that of the 11th century (when the guilds appeared), and one can easily realise that a system which was satisfactory then would be unsatisfactory now, even though fundamental human needs have not changed; but it is necessary to bear in mind that the guilds lived on, not merely for 50 or a 100, but for six or seven hundred years. If they survived and were found more or less satisfactory during that long period, they would not, we may presume, be entirely unsuitable to our day—so unsuitable as to be incapable of being adapted.

GILD ADAPTABILITY!

"Conditions changed enormously between the days of the Saxon Monarchy in England and the American Declaration of Independence {1776}, which happened to be in the same year as the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Turgot's attempt to abolish the guilds. Magna Charta had been granted; serfdom had disappeared; printing had been invented; America had been discovered; the world had been circumnavigated; Northern Europe had become Protestant; English literature had reached the heights of Shakespeare and Milton; England had won her Indian Empire; the Parliamentary

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