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Northern Ireland

Britain's New *Strategic Enemy*!

The British Government declared in early April that it was the "*strategic enemy*" of Russia. The occasion for the declaration was that a "*plausible*" case could be made that a retired British spy living in Salisbury had been given a dose of poison, that nearly killed him, on the instructions of the Russian President.

There were also highly implausible elements in the contention that the Russian Government did it—nobody has been able to suggest a convincing reason that the Russian Government might have had for doing it. The plausibility of the argument that it did it depends on it being assumed that it is the kind of Government that does things for no reason, out of some impulse of wayward evil, regardless of whether what it does serves its own interest or the interest of others.

The Salisbury poisoning served no Russian interest that anyone has been able to think of. The only interest it actually served was that of the Brexitist British Government that was limping along from day to day, in danger of splitting and falling.

We are not suggesting that the British Government did the poisoning from which it has benefitted so handsomely. We are only applying the standard *Cui Bono?* test and pointing out that the poisoning restored the crisis-ridden British Government to rude health.

But, whoever did the poisoning, it was only the occasion—not the cause—of the declaration of war on Russia. The declaration only gave the finishing touch to the propaganda line that has dominated the British state media for a year or so.

Britain de-legitimised the Assad Government in Syria a few years ago, effectively outlawing it and making it fair game for all and sundry. It is not accustomed to having its will thwarted in such matters. Within the past year British news programmes have taken on the character of war propaganda with regard to Russia in both 'public' and commercial channels, and the same has been the case with newspapers without noticeable exception.

The leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, has tried to strike a different note, but

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Decision Time Approaching!

The Good Friday Agreement is not in operation at present, and possibly it never will be again. It worked well, according to its provisions, from the time when Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness made it functional until the SDLP opted out of it, went into opposition to it, and obliged Sinn Fein to end its working arrangement with the DUP and bring about an Election that everybody knew would have a problematical outcome.

The SDLP did this over the trivial issue of mismanagement by the DUP leader, Arlene Foster, of subsidised wood-burning when she was Minister of Commerce. This is now being investigated in exhaustive detail, at great cost, by a Special Commission.

The carefully arranged provisions of the Agreement did not have the purpose of bringing about reconciliation and unity between the two hostile communities in the North in a common devolved government. The purpose was to divide up the system of government into separate pieces, so that each community could have a

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Part 3

The EU response to Ireland's Financial Crisis

On 19th January 2015 the then Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, made a speech to an international conference in Dublin Castle about the Troika's three year Economic Adjustment Programme (December 2010 to December 2013). Having attained office in February 2011 Noonan was the Minister with most responsibility for implementing the Programme and his speech was an

authoritative statement of the Irish Government's view of it. Although couched in diplomatic language and punctuated with references to the modest successes that the Government had achieved, the speech, from beginning to end, was critical of the Troika process.

Noonan's statement which was described in the conference programme as '*Remarks at High-Level Panel Discussion*'

was neither a grandstanding exercise nor an expression of sour grapes. It rather had the objective of giving strong advice to the EU authorities. Early in the speech he tackled the '*burn the bondholders*' question:

"I strongly argued both in opposition and in government, that we should have bail-ins rather than bailouts, and that senior bondholders should accept some of the liabilities of insolvent banks. Well, won the war, but we lost the battle. No

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Mob Violence, Gerrymandering and Blueshirtism

Pat Muldowney reviews Pat McCarthy book

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he has been savaged by the strong Blairite residue in the Parliamentary Labour Party over the Salisbury incident. He advised waiting on evidence before finding anyone guilty. But Sir Keith Starmer would not stand for that: he didn't object to the matter being investigated by the police but insisted that Russia be found guilty immediately on *a priori* grounds.

On the day after the Russian election, a defeated Presidential candidate, Ksenia Sobchak, was interviewed on BBC's *Newsnight*. It seemed a safe bet. But she gave the wrong answer. That's the trouble with idealists. She stood against Putin as an idealistic protest against the nature of things, rather than as a practical political rival. It seemed that her idealism was inspired by British propaganda, which reaches deep into Russia, and she judged Britain itself by the terms of the ideals she had learned from its broadcasts.

The wrong answer she gave about the Salisbury poisoning was that she was

surprised that the verdict about the perpetrators was issued before any evidence was found. It was put to her by Emily Maitlis on *Newsnight*, March 19th, that, if Putin serves out this term, he will by the longest serving Russian leader since Stalin. She agreed, and said that made her sad. Then it was put to her that, by standing against Putin, she gave him credibility. Did she now regret that? Not at all.

"But you must accept that while Putin is in power there is now no effective opposition. Is that true?"

"I will be trying to be effective opposition. We're forming a party.

"Let me ask you a question that is close to British audience's hearts this evening. Our Prime Minister has pointed the finger at President Putin over the poisoning of a Russian man who is a former spy in Britain. Do you believe Putin was behind that?"

"Look, this is actually a very interesting point because, you know, I have very much respect for the justice in London... And I think that after twenty-four hours

to make such conclusion is really something that breaks, you know, this independency of all the system where you have to go to make huge investigation, and then come to the Court, and do all those things. So my answer is, I don't know, maybe Theresa May is right, maybe she is wrong. But anyway in such an old democracy like Great Britain, Theresa May should not behave herself like Mr. Putin does... You can't say in one day that it's only Russia who is in charge... Because there should be a huge profound investigation. And I'm really surprised that this hasn't been done yet, but already such accusations appeared... I mean Russia is not right in many cases, but Great Britain should not behave in the same kind of manner. This would bring us to nothing. I mean some are should be wiser. And I hope that Great Britain can be wise and be really profound on the investigation."

Putin's opponent was cut off abruptly at this point.

*

But Sir Keith Starmer is entirely right against Jeremy Corbyn, on the ground of British statesmanship, in taking a stand *a priori*, in support of the Government against Russia, regardless of facts. Britain does not wait upon facts. It takes a stand regardless of facts and then it causes facts for others to cope with.

It is a little over three hundred years since a British Government mended its ways in response to a factual argument presented to it. That was done by a Tory Government under the impact of the influence exerted on the limited public opinion of the time by Jonathan Swift's argument presented in *The Conduct Of The Allies*. But that was an unusual case. A Tory Government wanted to bring an advantageous conclusion to a War that it inherited from the Whigs but public opinion, shaped by the Whigs, wanted the War carried on to the utter destruction of the enemy so that Goodness might prevail in the world.

Swift showed the Whig notion to be delusional and enabled the Government to make an advantageous settlement—in which it gained a monopoly of the Slave Trade and prospered.

The third centenary of Swift's great, and unique, peace offensive, was not celebrated in Britain six years ago. It is, of course, possible that the Slave Trade element in the Peace Deal was a reason why it was not celebrated, but that is not a plausible reason. The plausible reason is that it is against the nature of the British political body to abort a war to which it has committed itself, and to make a sensible settlement with an enemy it has demonised, instead of carrying the war through to the

bitter end regardless of consequences.

Tony Blair, in his retirement interviews, passed two pieces of wisdom to his Party. He told it that *Britain was a war-fighting state*. And he told it that an essential quality of leadership is an ability to dissociate yourself from the consequences of your actions. Sir Keith Starmer and his colleagues are now desperately trying to save that heritage of practical British wisdom for the Labour Party. And they have not baulked at the official declaration, before a declaration of war, that Britain has now marked down Russia as its strategic enemy.

This is something new in British statesmanship. The Government did not in the past officially declare the state that it intended to make war on to be the strategic enemy. For example, Germany in 1914 did not realise that Britain was its enemy until Britain (and Home Rule Ireland) suddenly declared war on it. If it had officially designated Germany as its strategic enemy, before declaring war on it, it would not have been so easy for it to arrange a 'moral' occasion for declaring war. The enemy, having been told he was the enemy, would have acted more warily, and would have been more prepared to meet Britain as an enemy.

The British purpose in declaring itself the strategic enemy of Russia in advance of a declaration of war on it is not easy to see. But it has been done. And it is a virtual declaration of war. That means that British state broadcasting, and 'independent' broadcasters licensed by the State, now have the formal status of propagandists for war on Russia.

The effect is already evident in public opinion. The view is increasingly heard that Russia, having somehow got a Veto in the UN Security Council, prevents international law from functioning, and that something must be done to remedy the situation.

Russia has the Veto because it broke the Fascist order that most of Europe imposed upon itself in the chaos that followed the Great War. Europe did not free itself from Fascism. It devised Fascism for itself and settled down under it. Fascism was broken by the Russian advance that followed the failed Fascist invasion of Russia.

The post-1945 development of Europe was made possible by the Russian advance—that used to be called a Liberation, but is now increasingly described as a Conquest, or Occupation. That, plus the dollar. And that new post-1945 Europe has yet to demonstrate that it is something substantial in itself. ■

Decline of Dublin Presbyterianism

While doing some family history research in the 1980s I had occasion to visit Abbey Presbyterian Church in Parnell Square (known as Findlaters Church). I got into discussions with the Minister at the time and I commented on the size of the church and asked about the size of the congregation in relation to it. He told me that the Church registers showed that it was a well-supported Church until the 1920s. I ventured to ask whether the decline was as a result of many of the congregation not feeling comfortable in the emerging Irish State.

He replied that the reason was more prosaic—it was to do with employment and career prospects. As far as he understood, it a good proportion of the congregation were employed either directly or indirectly by the outgoing administration and, many of them, being civil servants, were able to take up alternative posts in the UK and in the north of Ireland.

There was then a gradual diminution in numbers as the wealth that had been generated through the direct employment of their numbers while employed by the British State in Ireland no longer circulated within their community, convincing many of them to move to the more robust economies of the north and the UK.

Eamon Dyas

Fintan O'Toole

"Winston has written a book about himself and called it *'The World Crisis'*", quipped A.J. Balfour. Neither Bloody Balfour nor Winston Churchill rank high in my list of heroes and I think either or both might have been hanged a hundred times over without a miscarriage of justice. But I'll say this for Churchill, self-regarding scoundrel though he was: he did brave shot and shell on more than one battlefield and he exposed himself to competition on the hustings.

Contrast his career to that of Fintan O'Toole, a commentator hailed as a star in the firmament of European intellectuals—perhaps to challenge, if not eclipse, Bishop Berkeley and Edmund Burke and so reflect glory on his native place. In 1992 he was commissioned by the Irish Times to reflect on the 1916 Rising on its 75th anniversary. He did no such thing. He wrote nothing of the Rising's context when it was staged, the intentions of the insurgents and their conduct, nor that of the forces opposing them.

He knew that he had been eight years old on its Silver Jubilee in 1966 but could say nothing revealing even of that year except that he had seen Yul Brynner in *The Magnificent Seven*. He revealed a self-centred, solipsistic, reflection of a Narcissistic child who had not matured in the twenty-five years since the Jubilee.

I took down from my attic recently a Souvenir of the Silver Jubilee which I bought in Dublin at the time:—a copy of *The Irish Times* for Easter Monday 1966. On its front page it reported that 900 insurgent veterans of the Rising had attended at the GPO the day before. As only about 2,000 insurgents at most had participated, a whacking 45% of them were still around to be counted. Among the citizens there to celebrate with them probably more than 50% could remember when they were mere British Subjects, despised by their rulers. They could remember Ireland before, during and after the Rising. They had had fifty years to reflect. They had looked into their hearts in election after election and endorsed the insurgents' principles and chosen their adherents as their representatives to conduct the nation's business.

Fintan O'Toole appears to believe that the Irish people took a wrong turning in 1916 and continued along it and that they had no right to do that wrong.

So convinced was he that he threatened to stand for election himself. But he bottled it. He showed all the valour of the would-be brawler who bawls "*Hould me back, I'll Kill 'im*". Methinks there's more Bawls than Balls to the Yellow Narcissus.

Donal Kennedy

Preparing For The 2018 West Cork History Festival

Aubane Historical Society, Aubane, Millstreet, Co. Cork
18 April 2018
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To:-
Simon Kingston
Founder, The West Cork History Festival
Skibbereen, County Cork
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Dear Simon,

THE 2018 FESTIVAL

Hello again.

How are plans coming along for the 2018 West Cork History Festival in August?

Can you tell me if those belatedly and quietly noted on your website as sitting on the 2017 festival committee are in situ also for 2018? Are there any additions? By the way, I don't believe that you ever let me know how one goes about becoming a member of the committee. Perhaps you could do so now. It is not a secret, is it?

2018 is a momentous year, as it is the 100th anniversary of the conscription crisis and the withdrawal of the ILP from Westminster, the 1918 'Sinn Féin' election, plus the appointment of Lord French ('hero of the retreat from Mons') as Lord Lieutenant.

Were I on your committee, I would suggest Brian Murphy of Glenstal Abbey to speak on the subject. As application to participate appears somewhat opaque, I leave it to you to raise at your next meeting. When and where is that, by the way? Please let me afterwards have the committee's response.

2018 is also the twentieth anniversary of the publication in 1998 of Peter Hart's *The IRA and its Enemies*. Do you intend to commemorate his somewhat controversial contribution to the modern history of West Cork? You might consider a balanced panel, consisting of academic critics and supporters, to discuss it.

As you may know, our society was the first to publish in 1999 on Hart's claim to have interviewed an anonymous participant in the Kilmichael Ambush, six days after the last one died. A residue of that finding, by Meda Ryan, appeared in the 2017 *Southern Star* debate between Aubane's Niall Meehan and Eve Morrison (who spoke for you last year). The debate is reproduced, alongside your *Southern Star* and *Irish Times* responses to Tom Cooper, in our pamphlet, *West Cork's War of Independence*.

In the original 1999 publication, that reproduced 1998 *Irish Times* letters on Kilmichael (including Hart's), we re-published Brian Murphy's review of the Hart book, in which it was pointed out, again for the first time, that Hart censored an archival source. The British Army's *The Record of the Rebellion in the Sixth Divisional Area* indicated that some Protestant loyalists in West Cork actively engaged in informing. Omitting that qualification, while including a preceding sentence on Protestants in other parts of Ireland not giving information to Crown forces, allowed Hart to claim, falsely, that IRA targeting in West Cork was sectarian.

That is a roundabout way of letting you know that an invitation to an Aubane author to speak in a debate or discussion on the twentieth anniversary legacy of Hart's contribution would be appropriate. Our authors contribute (as you can see) original findings and considered interpretations. As for other contributions, I note that Ian McBride's first intervention last year, as the new Foster Professor of Irish History in Oxford, was a sympathetic appraisal of Hart. He took issue in particular with Dr John Regan of Dundee, author of *Myth and the Irish State* and *The Irish Counterrevolution*.

You could invite those two to speak.

Our society is inclusive in representing both sides in a debate and hope you are in a position to do so as well. Again, we await your response.

I hope you find these suggestions helpful. Would you like us to contribute some essays for the festival in 2018, as we did with the very well received *The Embers of Revisionism* in 2017? Please respond as soon as you can.

Yours sincerely,
Jack Lane

PRO, Aubane Historical Society

cc. 2017 Committee members:- Victoria Kingston, Founder; Danielle O'Donovan; Finola Finlay; Robert Harris; David Clarke; Di Pitcher

Review: *The Story Of The Skibbereen Eagle*

See www.skibbereeneagle.ie/about/ and www.skibbereeneagle.ie/u.../the-story-of-the-skibbereen-eagle/ for more detail

The Fine Gael Eagle Eyes Of Varadkar And Goveney

On 24th June 1893, the *Unionist Skibbereen Eagle* boasted and bluffed about its self-perceived importance: "*Even Emperors have trembled before its fierce gaze. It has been stated by no less an authority than the Czar Nicholas that it was the influence of the 'Eagle' that stopped the Russian war.*"

On 5th September 1898, the "*Skibbereen Eagle*" further editorialised:

"We will still keep our eye on the Emperor of Russia and on all such despotic enemies, whether at home or abroad, of human progression and man's natural rights."

Here is the story of the *Skibbereen Eagle*:

"In 1898, to widespread bemusement, a small Provincial Newspaper in an equally small town in the South West corner of Ireland sonorously warned the Czar of Russia that it knew what he was up to and he should be careful how he proceeded, for 'The Skibbereen Eagle' was wise to his game and in future would be keeping its eye on him! It is doubtful that Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, even noticed the Eagle's admonitions but as history soon proved he should have paid closer attention to the Eagle's insightful opinions!

The legendary 'Skibbereen Eagle' newspaper was founded in 1857 in the small town in West Cork, Ireland from which it took its name. It was initially a monthly publication and then became weekly, grandiosely expounding its British imperialistic stance on local, national and international affairs as it was aimed squarely at its readership, the local Protestant land owning and merchant classes or, as they were nicknamed by Irish Nationalists, the 'West Brits'... Perhaps the most famous moment, worldwide, for 'The Skibbereen Eagle' was when it became embroiled in international relations with Russia in 1898 which became known as 'keeping an eye on Russia'."

As the current Fine Gael Taoiseach and Tanaiste seek to emulate the "*Eagle*", the following letters were among those published in the "*Irish Times*" this March 29th, under the heading of: *Keeping an eagle eye on Russia*

"Where was the Strategic Communications Unit when the Taoiseach needed it most? Striding out to meet reporters after the European Council summit in Brussels last Friday (March 23rd), the Taoiseach

volunteered that: 'It was actually at my proposal, and that of President Macron, that we changed the conclusions to say that we agreed with the UK position rather than were just concerned about it'...

Taoiseach, France is France, its economy is bigger than Russia's. It can afford to go toe to toe with President Putin. That's what the big beasts do!

Of course, it's nice to count yourself as one of the big boys, but as a small, non-aligned country that must box clever in external relations, such unnecessary posturing leaves Ireland desperately exposed.

Shades of the Skibbereen Eagle promising to "keep its eye on the Emperor of Russia"?
John Drac

"In 1948 in Ottawa, Canada, John A Costello as taoiseach in the first Irish inter-party government ended the last formal British link over most of Ireland when he declared an Irish Republic, formally inaugurated in April 1949.

It now appears that 70 years later the British Foreign Office under Boris Johnson has once again taken back control of Ireland's foreign affairs, courtesy of the decision of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney, to expel a Russian diplomat based in Ireland on the premise that the 'Russian Federation was highly likely to have been responsible for the attack in Salisbury on March 4th, 2018, and that there was no plausible alternative explanation'.

This decision of expulsion, which is incompatible with our policy of neutrality, should have been made, not by government alone, but by the Dáil after exhaustive debate of the known facts."
Tom Cooper

"Stay friends with Russia" was Bismarck's maxim. This was ignored by the Kaiser in his foreign policy before the first World War.

It was also disregarded by Hitler, who launched a grand alliance against the USSR composed of Germany-Austria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Croatia and Slovakia, along with the Blue Division from Spain and tens of thousands of SS volunteers each from France, Belgium and Holland.

However, such adventures in Russia were not limited to those led by Germany. The UK, France, the US and Japan all intervened in 1918-20 during the Russian civil war. An Anglo-French force invaded Crimea in 1854 and Emperor Napoleon took Moscow with his pan-European Grande Armée in 1812.

While none of this makes Russia an innocent party in history or indeed the present, it provides a perspective from their side that must be taken into account if Europe is to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Ireland, by expelling a Russian diplomat, instead of remaining impartial, is now lending support to the 'Great Game'

of international power rivalry, a term incidentally coined by the Anglo-Irish Captain Arthur Conolly. He was beheaded in Uzbekistan for spying in 1842. Let's hope Ireland's new role in big-world politics has a happier outcome. *Kevin Enright*

Manus O'Riordan

Northern Ireland

continued

piece of it independently of the other— not unity but separate development.

Now that it has been out of operation for more than a year, other things are in the air. Brexit seemed to put the ending of Partition on the agenda. The Dublin Government saw the possibility of having the Customs Border between the EU and the UK placed between Northern Ireland and Britain, rather than between the North and the Republic, by-passing the so-called democratic politics of the Northern Ireland system. It seems unlikely that that will come off.

It seems to have been no more than displacement activity on the part of a Dublin political body that was horrified by the prospect of being left alone in Europe, without Britain.

In the case of many, including former Taoiseach John Bruton, the EU seems to have functioned as an Irish way of being British. They are desolate at the prospect of being merely Irish again after Brexit. That indicates how European they have become since 1972.

Where the Brexit Border will be remains to be established, but another element in play is population change in the North. It is now reckoned that, among people of working age in the Six Counties, Catholics are in the majority, and that majority will increase with time.

What will happen if the Border Poll provision of the GFA is triggered and there is a majority for Irish unity? Isn't it clear? The Ulster Unionist body, which was then part of the general British Unionist Party, agreed in 1916 to a Six County exclusion from the Irish Home Rule Act and this was confirmed by the 1920 *Government Of Ireland Act* and the 'Treaty', with the understanding that the Six Counties would join up with the rest of Ireland if a majority wished it.

That agreement was made when it was taken to be a certainty that the two-thirds Unionist majority in the Six Counties would maintain itself, and would probably increase.

But what happened was that, under Six County devolved government, with the Six Counties excluded from the party-politics (the democracy) of the British state, the Unionist population declined relative to the Nationalist population.

The Nationalists were discriminated against, and were curbed in various ways, by the Unionists, but they were not undermined by exclusion from British politics as the Unionists were. The Unionists wanted only to be British. They never asked for a spurious political entity of their own outside the political life of the British state.

Devolution had no essential connection with Partition, but it was imposed by Westminster along with Partition. The Ulster Unionists protested that they did not want it but Whitehall stifled the protest and persuaded them to accept it. The Unionists were therefore placed in a position of local authority, in which there was no political life. Politically they were Tories, Socialists and Liberals, but they followed British elections as mere spectators. Their only politics was the turning out of the Protestant majority at every election so that they would remain within the British state as a kind of annex.

The Nationalist community did not consider itself British. Its members lived their own rich cultural life, taking sustenance from the Gaelic heritage. They would probably have participated in British party politics to a considerable extent if that had been open to them but they were not wounded by exclusion from the British democracy. They were stimulated by a legitimate grievance over the form of British government to which they were subjected, and by the purpose of becoming the majority and joining their national state. And a significant element in life under oppression was that they rejected in practice the monopoly of physical force asserted by the State which held it, and maintained their own army.

Nationalist growth as a population relative to the Unionist community was undoubtedly accelerated by the recent War. The extent of the stimulating effect of the War on the population has not been investigated academically as far as we know. (The academics of this era are in the main zombies.) But that it did have such an effect is beyond doubt. And it had nothing whatever to do with numbers killed either way.

The demographic change had to do with the old maxim (Biblical?) "*Where there is no vision the people perish*".

So, a watershed is approaching. What

is to be done when a Northern referendum is held and there is a majority vote for Irish unity? How will Britain cut itself off administratively from this region of the UK from which it withdrew politically in 1921? If Ulster Unionism refuses to abide by the voting in the territory on which it chose to take its stand almost a century ago, will Britain police it into an Irish state that will have become more alien to it as a consequence of Brexit?

And what will Dublin Governments do? For most of the period since 1921 Dublin has not recognised the British regime in the North as legitimate—not because it is undemocratic even on British terms, but because the Six Counties should be part of the Irish state. But now that it seems probable that the terms set for Irish unity will be met—a voting majority for it in the North—it does not seem at all eager to bring it about.

And Sinn Fein too seems to be disconcerted by the prospect.

Fifty years ago, in the radical Civil Rights agitation and the People's Democracy, the popular chant was *Tories Out, North and South!* And there was much talk about "*two failed states*" on the island, and about unity not being a matter of combining the two failures but of constructing something new.

We pointed out that one of these states was not a 'failed' state and that the other was not a 'state' at all—and that there were no Tories in either of them.

Sinn Fein absorbed much of the spirit of that agitation and it was always there on the fringes of the War. But the War had its own logic. What drove it was the position of the Catholic community in the Northern Ireland system, rather than Partition. It ran its course until the 1921 system was destroyed and another put in its place. Then it ended, leaving Partition in place, and there has been peace for 20 years.

What Sinn Fein has been doing since the GFA is consolidating the position of the Catholic community in the North at the expense of the Protestant community, within the abnormal British Six County system. The 'Protestant Ascendancy' system has been broken beyond the practical possibility of restoration. But the North remains part of the British state. And it remains outside the democratic political life of the British state. But Sinn Fein has broken out of the Northern reservation and become also a major party within the democracy of the Irish state, and subject to its pressures and concerns.

Its success in the South was due in

major part to the fact that it was the party of the Northern War, but also to the fact that the Labour Party, under the influence of the absurd 'Official IRA', had lost sight of Connolly Socialism and descended into the most trivial kind of opportunism.

The War generation is retiring and the new generation seems to be sloganising along the lines of the 1968-9 variety about the 'two failed states', and unification meaning the scrapping of both of them—with the suggestion of the devolution system that Britain imposed on the Six Counties being maintained but placed under Dublin sovereignty. No firm policy has been issued, but that is the flavour of the rhetoric.

But the Irish state, like it or not, exists. Its population is attached to it. It is not inclined to throw itself into the melting pot in the hope of becoming something more attractive to Ulster Unionists.

Unity means the Six Counties joining the Irish state.

The position of the Ulster Protestants in the Irish state would be nothing like that of the Ulster Catholics in the British state, excluded from its democracy, and placed under the authority of a hostile local community.

The Irish state, whether including the Six Counties or not, will, in the near future, necessarily undergo substantial development in the event of Brexit going through in earnest. It will be necessary for it to become itself again.

Its retreat from itself began with Jack Lynch's Arms Conspiracy Trials in 1970, and the handing over of Irish history to Oxbridge for rewriting. Its entry into Europe as a British fellow-traveller served to shield it from the Northern War, for which it had at least some degree of responsibility.

It has been clear since about 1980 that Britain was in Europe for a purpose, and that its purpose was not to become European but to retard and misdirect European development.

The Irish break with Sterling occurred in the context of the EU. It joined the European Stability Mechanism along with Britain, both on a trajectory to join the Euro. But Finance Capital (the leadership of the capitalist class in Britain) had other views. A huge speculative onslaught against Sterling in September 1992—which Chancellor Norman Lamont tried to resist with astronomic interest rates—

drove Britain out of the ERM. That left Ireland, under Fianna Fail Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, with the choice of following Britain out or staying the course towards the Euro.

Now, with Brexit, the country finds itself under compulsion to be independent in the only way that really matters in Ireland—independent of Britain.

The response to Brexit of a Dublin Government with a decisive national will would have been to prepare for means of communication with Europe that bypassed Britain. But that was not the spirit of the response.

But, suddenly, out of the blue, comes the Dutch initiative to connect Ireland directly with Europe by means of a huge vessel, directly with Belgium and Holland—an enterprise in which the Dublin Port Authority appears to have been active.

PS: The *Sunday Independent* of March 12th carried the headline *Sinn Fein Could Lose Its Image As The Ethnic Nationalist Party*. The article beneath it (by Eoin O'Malley) explained:

"In the North it had signed the peace arrangement that made Northern Ireland pretty normal... The normalisation of Northern Ireland makes the dream of unity ever distant... In a normal Northern Ireland, nationalism versus unionism becomes an irrelevant anachronism..."

That is pretty well what was said in 1968, after Sinn Fein decided to replace national struggle with class struggle, only to find itself reduced to minor status as 'Official Sinn Fein' when the realities of the North produced the Provisionals.

The reality of nationalism versus unionism as the only politics in the North persists. It was built into Northern Ireland by Westminster at birth by exclusion from the politics of the state. It is, by British decree, the abnormal normality of the North. And the North is the only piece of the entire democratic world whose electors are excluded from the process by which the Government is elected.

And, as to "*ethnic nationalism*": instead of Sinn Fein losing it, the South will have to regain it when it finds itself alone in the EU without Britain to hide behind. The EU is much more a grouping of nations now than it was in the 1970s when Ireland tried to escape from itself into it, under Britain's wing. In order to be functionally European on its own, Ireland will have to become a nation once again. The "*post-nationalism*" preached by Trinity College thirty years ago was just a trick of the light—or just a trick. ■

"The historian seeks to abstract principles from human events. My approach was the other; for the two years that I lived among the documents I sought to reconstruct the human story as best I could."

V.S. Naipaul, *The Enigma of Arrival*, 1987.

"The world of the post-war immigrant operated in what was not only a geographical but also a temporal limbo. Migrants left home because they wanted a better future, but they mostly imagined that future would be safely back at home, not in Britain. They thought of their present-tense, everyday lives in Camden, Southall, Birmingham or Bradford as a kind of interregnum, a period to be endured or enjoyed because it would make possible a future that was envisaged, as often as not, as a return to a past made viable again."

Lovers and Strangers: An Immigrant History of Post-War Britain, Clair Wills. Allen Lane. London. 2017.

POST-WAR IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN AND CLAIR WILLS

I had recently bought Clair Wills's aforementioned book on immigration and intended to read and review it for the *Irish Political Review* when the whole 'Windrush' immigrants issue broke in British politics. There on the front page of the *Financial Times*, 17th April 2018, was a photo of some very well-dressed immigrants disembarking from the ship, *"Empire Windrush on its maiden voyage in June 1948 with almost five hundred people from Jamaica and Trinidad"*.

The heading was *"Rudd apology to 'Windrush' immigrants"*. On page 2 there was another heading *"Rudd sorry for 'appalling' Windrush errors"*. Amber Rudd, Home Secretary UK, was now in the hot seat when the row erupted publicly and according to the *Financial Times*, which had a sub-heading stating: *"Home Secretary blames policy of predecessor May for immigrant's ordeal"*.

Theresa May is now of course the Prime Minister of the UK and she had been in the Home Office for six years before becoming the Prime Minister.

The *Financial Times* went on to detail how the Windrush immigrants, who had come to the UK in various stages, were

now being treated by immigration officers in a tough harassing way. According to Rudd:

"Frankly, some of the ways they have been treated has been wrong; it has been appalling and I am sorry."

Hearing this in Parliament, many noted how Rudd was implicitly criticising the Prime Minister. As the FT went on to state: *"Members of the 'Windrush' generation, named after the first ship that brought workers from the Caribbean, beginning in 1948, 'were granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK by the 1971 Immigration Act'".* But since 2012, they have been caught up in the Home Office's *"hostile environment"* policies—now renamed *"compliant environment"* introduced in 2012 when Mrs. May was Home Secretary.

This policy seeks to persuade illegal immigrants to leave the UK by forcing employers, landlords and public sector organisations to check an immigrant's immigration status in many situations. *"Many Windrush immigrants do not have formal paperwork and have found themselves denied healthcare, pensions and jobs."* There have even been suggestions by Caroline Nokes, the Immigration Minister that there were—*"some horrendous situations which as minister has (sic) appalled me"*, as she told ITV News. Ms Rudd latter insisted she was not aware of any such cases. *"That's why I have asked the High Commissioners (of countries concerned) that, if they know of any, they should bring it to me"*.

"This is a day of national shame and it has come about because of the hostile environment policy that was begun under her Prime Minister", David Lammy, Labour MP for Tottenham, told Ms Rudd. *"Let's call it as it is. If you lie with dogs, you get fleas. That's what has happened with this far-right rhetoric in this country."*

But the Home Secretary had a solution on hand—the kind favoured by politicians with their backs to the wall—and that was—she was going to set up a 20 person group *"to access the problems and would waive fees for issuing new documents"*.

She promised that cases would be resolved *"within two weeks of receiving all necessary information from individuals"*. Considering that over 50,000 cases are involved and the FT has already accepted that these people had been originally fobbed off with minimal documents—I would like to know how all these poor people would collate all the necessary information, considering some thirty years

later, papers would have either been lost or never issued in the first place.

The Home Secretary now came under fierce pressure, as did her Prime Minister because the Queen's *"favourite organisation"*—and what She has acknowledged again and again is her "foundational legacy"—was assembling in London: the *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting*, where it was being held—

"for the first time in 20 years. Ms May initially declined a meeting with 12 Caribbean leaders to discuss the situation, but later performed a U-turn, with her spokesperson saying that she would hold a meeting as soon as possible."

The spin from Downing Street was that: *"The Prime Minister only became aware of that request this morning"*, the spokesperson said.

"According to the Migration Observatory at Oxford University, as many as 50,000 people born in Commonwealth countries who arrived at the UK before 1971 may have not regularised their residency status..."

"Madeleine Sumption, its director, said most people involved had at some point received documents showing their right to live in the UK but many might have lost the papers in the 30 or more years since they were issued... 'I think this is an illustration of what has always been a predictable consequence of *hostile environment-type policies'*..." (FT)

I would suggest that post-War, with the way these immigrants moved from one place to the next, and the hostile racist abuse they often suffered, especially the blacks (and our Irish lest we forget), that they were nearly always on the move. So the idea that they can come up with their documentation now is absurd in the extreme. If both the Home Secretary Amber Rudd and her Prime Minister Theresa May are serious about this awful injustice—they should just award a general amnesty to these decent people who built Britain and have done with it. Otherwise why have the Queen of England be the Head of the Commonwealth? What is the Prince of Wales and his wife the Duchess of Cornwall doing out traversing the Commonwealth if the subjects of the latter are being treated like lepers at home in the UK?

In the *Financial Times*, that same day 17th April 2018, the editorial stated: *"Immigration outcry affronts British decency"*, with a sub-heading saying: *"Legal uncertainty over Commonwealth migrants must be resolved"*. It wrote:

"Seventy years ago, the 'Windrush

generation' began to arrive in Britain. When the nation was rebuilding itself after the Second World War, a call for help was put out to the Caribbean countries. They eagerly responded and the ship *Windrush* first docked in June 1948 with almost five hundred people aboard from Jamaica and Trinidad. By 1971, half a million people from Commonwealth nations had settled in the UK and become an intrinsic part of life. These families were the vanguard of what is now Britain's multicultural society; an example of the practical and cultural benefits of immigration. That was until the post-Brexit eagerness to clamp down on migration. *The status of the children of the Windrush generation has been put in doubt.* These people who have lived in Britain all their lives but were never formally naturalised, have been denied healthcare, lost their jobs and threatened with deportation.

This is not who we are. Britain is supposed to be a tolerant and welcoming society." (I would have several quibbles with that assessment from my own short experience—JH!) "This is not how hard-working people, who devoted their lives to the wellbeing of the nation, should be treated. Today the world is looking to see the degree to which the UK will remain open after leaving the EU. The treatment of the *Windrush* families is hardly encouraging.

Only when threatened with a public outcry and embarrassment at this week's meeting of the Commonwealth heads of Governments did the UK change its position. Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, apologised in the House of Commons yesterday, shifting the onus away from individuals proving residency. But the situation remains legally fraught and Ms Rudd still has to follow through on such sweeping promises.

Nobody in the Government comes out of this affair with credit. The initial response of Theresa May and her ministers was hopelessly out of touch... Blame for the *Windrush* fiasco must first lie with the Home Office—a department once described as 'not fit for purpose' by a former Labour home secretary... Under Ms Rudd's leadership, the Home Office has become increasingly rudderless... The treatment of the *Windrush* families sends a troubling signal to the three million concerned EU citizens in the UK."

All the assurances in the world from May will not bring comfort to these people—*"with a year to exit the EU and by 2021, the UK is set to make a clean break with the bloc"*.

"The *Windrush* cases—and the Home Office's record—add an element of doubt at an inopportune moment. If Britain wants to uphold its reputation as an open and liberal country, an injection of compassion into its attitudes on immigration is long overdue."

This assessment by an organ like the *Financial Times* is obviously to be welcomed. Their idea however that a Brexit Britain can be "*open and liberal*" is—I would contend—simply untenable. The very forces that are pushing Brexit are definitely going in the opposite direction. Anyone who doesn't see that is simply living in an *Alive in Wonderland* fairytale.

Julianne Herlihy ©

Clair Wills etc to be continued in next issue of *Irish Political Review*

EU response

continued

decision was taken to allow us to include senior bondholders in the resolution of our banking system, even though we tried very hard, we were refused directly by the authorities in Frankfurt."

(*Ireland: Lessons from Its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop*, International Monetary Fund, 2015, p. 34)

He later described how the policy had recently changed and that under the rules of Banking Union, too late for Ireland, there would be no more bailouts by taxpayers of European banks. (He has of course been proved wrong on that as Italian banks have since been bailed out with public funds, but Banking Union remains incomplete. He was right in identifying one of the purposes of Banking Union as breaking the Sovereign-Bank doom loop by ending bailouts.) His next points, reflecting the massive burden of debt saddled on the Irish State, were that risks should be centralised in the future and that all initiatives of the European Central Bank (ECB) should have a "*strong element of mutualisation*" (p. 34).

In concluding he referred to the extremists from both ends of the political spectrum that were making gains across Europe and that had in common a strong antipathy to the EU. On the Troika he spoke of an unwillingness to modify parts of the Programme that were "*self-evidently not working*", and how people on the EU side had "*dug their heels and refused to move*" (p. 35). His parting shot was that, if the authorities that Troika officials reported to—the ECB, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—failed to become more flexible, failed to act politically—his actual words were: "*political management and implementation are absolutely essential*"—then the policies of the EU, if not the European Project itself, would disintegrate.

The approach of the Troika is portrayed in equally critical terms but from a different perspective by Emma Clancy in Sinn Fein's discussion document, *The Future of the Eurozone*. Clancy states that the Programmes imposed on Greece, Ireland and Portugal "*exacerbated the crisis*" (p. 8). Taking a Keynesian stance and citing US economists and fellow Nobel laureates, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, she describes the EU's policy response to the crisis as having inflicted a lost decade on Europe, a phenomenon that she fears may continue for many more decades. She identifies three patterns, all of which are undeniably true:

"Eurozone countries have in general fared far worse in terms of recovery than countries outside the common currency; the recovery within the Eurozone has been sharply asymmetrical, with divergence between strong and weak countries increasing; and there has been a significant rise in inequality in Europe." (p. 8).

In this article I attempt to identify the key issues in the EU response to the Irish crisis by summarising some of the most authoritative sources. The approach adopted will hopefully shed light on what was a protracted and complex saga so that lessons can be drawn from the Irish experience. The next article in this series will be a reflection on exactly what lessons can be learned and on the issues thrown up by the debate about austerity.

SOURCES

I have found three sources to be especially useful. The first is: "*Ireland: Lessons from Its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop*" published by the European Department of the International Monetary Fund in 2015 as a compilation of the documentation arising from the conference addressed by Michael Noonan. A paper delivered at that conference by Barry Eichengreen, "*The Irish Crisis and the EU from a Distance*" is directly relevant but many of the recorded discussions and keynote addresses are also good sources of information. The document can be had by typing 'pdf of Ireland lessons from its recovery from the bank-sovereign loop' into Google.

The second source is a book of essays entitled, "*Brian Lenihan in Calm and Crisis*" edited by Brian Murphy, Mary O'Rourke and Noel Whelan. The book was produced in 2014 as a tribute to former Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan who died in 2011 some months after leaving office. Lenihan played the key political role in the crisis in the sense that he was responsible for delivering 21 billion of the

32 billion fiscal adjustment that occurred between 2008 and 2013 and he initiated and supervised the National Recovery Plan that formed the basis of the EU/IMF Programme. The essays by Alan Ahearne, Martin Mansergh, Ray MacSharry, Eoin Ryan and former Attorney General Paul Gallagher all provide good information relevant to the subject of this article; those by Cathy Herbert and Rory Montgomery are useful background sources. Since it is the most relevant I have used only Alan Ahearne's essay but the basic message of that essay is reinforced by the other contributors that I have named.

The third source is the *"The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath"* by Jean Pisani-Ferry (Oxford University Press, 2014). Pisani-Ferry helped to found the Breughel think tank in 2005 and was its director until 2013. He has worked as an advisor to different French Governments and, as one of 40 advisors currently working for Emmanuel Macron, he is undoubtedly an influential figure on the EU policy-making circuit. Pisani-Ferry's book on the Euro is everything that Joseph Stiglitz's is not and I will have occasion to quote from it in future articles. A statement from Paul De Grauwe quoted in the blurb that it is *"a refreshing mixing of history, politics and economics"* is one that I would strongly endorse. It is well structured and seeks to make complex developments and dilemmas comprehensible. Unlike Stiglitz, Pisani-Ferry places the various economic issues in their political and historic context. However, as with many contemporary economists from social democratic backgrounds, doubt must be registered as to the extent of his independence from the neo-liberal mindset.

ALAN AHEARNE

Alan Ahearne's essay is critical of the EU and, unsurprisingly as he was a paid advisor to the Minister, defensive of Lenihan. Nonetheless, his essay provides a number of invaluable insights into the Ireland-EU relationship in the years 2008 to 2011. Referring to the unprecedented stresses of the Irish crisis he states:

"Ireland's banks were unusually large with loans standing at more than twice the country's total annual income. They had grown exceptionally dependent on international funding markets, just as the global financial system plunged into the most severe crisis since the Great Depression. An additional dimension to Ireland's crisis was the country's membership of a poorly constructed—and at times dysfunctional—currency union." (p. 14)

On the Bank Guarantee he is critical of EU Commissioner Olli Rehn whom he

associates with domestic critics who found it convenient to distract attention from their own role in causing the Crash by blaming *"the country's entire economic woes on the blanket guarantee"* (p.18).

"A well researched book by Donal Donovan and Antoin Murphy (reviewed in part 1 of this series, DA) concludes that the guarantee was the least-worst option and that critics have failed to supply evidence that other solutions would have worked. The former President of the ECB, Jean Claude Trichet, recently described the decision by the Government as 'justifiable given the situation it found itself'. In contrast, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn recently said: 'In retrospect I think it is quite easy to spot some mistakes like the blanket guarantee for banks.' Rehn's comment is puzzling since the European Commission approved the guarantee scheme for state-aid purposes. To conform to EU state-aid rules, government intervention in the banking system 'has to be necessary, appropriate and proportionate'." (p. 18)

On the worsening recession that affected investor confidence in the Irish banks in early 2009 he says:

"The toxic inter-relationship between the State and the banking sector was threatening to bring both of them down. It would be another four years until European leaders would agree to build a banking union in Europe to break the link between sovereigns and banks. In the future, we may see a common backstop for banks in the European Union. But during Lenihan's tenure at Finance, each member state was responsible for stabilising its own banking system." (p. 19)

Ahearne describes how, once it became clear that the Guarantee was not going to be enough, Lenihan set about constructing a long term strategy for managing the crisis. An offensive was to be waged on three fronts: placing the public finances on a sustainable footing; restoring competitiveness to exports by reducing unit labour costs; and repairing the banking system by recapitalising, shrinking and restructuring the banks. The creation of the NAMA bad bank which had to be legislated for in the teeth of a misconceived campaign of opposition, partly fuelled by briefings from AIB bank and indebted developers, became a highly successful element of Lenihan's strategy. During late 2009 and early 2010 the recession eased and the pattern of an increasing outflow of deposits and investment from the Irish banks was reversed to the point that funding to the banks rose by 500 million euro per week on average during the first four months of 2010. Later in the year, however, events

conspired against the Irish Government. An international fiscal stimulus engineered by the larger world economies was prematurely withdrawn and global economic growth slowed. The Greek disaster began to unfold and this had spinoff effects on other EU peripheral economies. The Irish banks became increasingly dependent on borrowings from the ECB system.

At this point in the essay Ahearne devotes a few paragraphs to Ireland's relationship with the ECB which get to the heart of the EU response to the Irish crisis. He states:

"Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy's disastrously timed agreement at Deauville in October (which they later tore up) to force a country that applied for a bailout programme to default on its sovereign debt was the straw that broke the camel's back. Investors were now very concerned that the Irish State and its banks would default on their debts.

On the plane to Washington D.C. that month for the annual IMF/World Bank meetings, Lenihan and I discussed at length the pros and cons of exiting the euro area. He was always willing to investigate alternative strategies. Lenihan concluded that an exit would be disastrous for the people of Ireland. He recognised that the European Central Bank was providing invaluable support to the Irish banking system, but he wanted the ECB to do more. He pointed out that if Ireland were a state in the United States, the Federal Reserve would be offering unconditional support. He admired the Fed as a genuine lender of last resort.

Instead, the ECB was pressurising Ireland to reduce the amount of emergency loans that the Eurosystem had extended to Irish banks. In frustration, Lenihan sometimes referred to the ECB as 'that bank in Frankfurt'. He became aware that senior people at the ECB were briefing market investors that the bank was considering the withdrawal of financial support to parts of the Irish banking system. Investors were alarmed. By now, funding in debt markets for the Irish banks had dried up and they were haemorrhaging deposits.

As the financial pressure on Ireland intensified, the Government hoped that the ECB would step up its purchases of Irish bonds under the Securities Markets Programme. These hopes were dashed. One-and-a-half years later, with Italy and Spain under severe financial pressure, the ECB, under new boss Mario Draghi, belatedly introduced a potentially limitless bond-buying programme. In response, market confidence in Italy and Spain improved dramatically" (p. 24).

BARRY EICHENGREEN

As stated earlier, Alan Ahearne worked as an advisor to Lenihan and might therefore be viewed as having an Irish bias.

Barry Eichengreen, a prominent US economist specialising in the international monetary system, has no such bias. In the early nineties he was critical of the EU decision to create a single currency and, although critical of the IMF, has worked for that institution. Eichengreen's presentation to the Dublin Castle Conference took a different line to Ahearne's by describing the Guarantee as "*ill-advised and regrettable*" while recognising it as an understandable response in the circumstances. However, many of his observations echoed those of Ahearne. Like the other essays in *Brian Lenihan in Calm and Crisis*, Ahearne's covers the Euro debt crisis up until the negotiation of the Troika Programme in late 2010; Eichengreen's review extends across the full period from 2008 to the end of the Programme in 2013.

A key issue addressed by Eichengreen is the debate about what losses should be imposed on 19 billion euro of senior unsecured and unguaranteed debt that occurred as part of the negotiation of the Troika's Irish Programme in late 2010 and early 2011. He states:

"The IMF initially favoured a haircut of roughly 50 per cent, a proposal that gained the Irish Government's full support. But the ECB opposed this approach on the grounds that it might disrupt the flow of wholesale funding to other euro area banks." (page 117).

"A better way of addressing the ECB's concerns would have been for it to reiterate its commitment to provide funding against collateral to banks elsewhere in the euro area. That this was not done may have reflected worries about how further expansion of the central bank's balance sheet would be perceived in other member states. If so, it is regrettable that such concerns were allowed to prevail" (p. 118).

Taking the Eichengreen paper as a whole, I count 12 instances where he shows that EU measures had an adverse effect on the Irish crisis and three instances where he shows them to have been beneficial. On one issue not mentioned in the paper, the renegotiation downwards of the rates of interest charged on the Troika loans, there was a beneficial effect, although that was mainly due to pressure from the Irish Government. In April 2015, a few months after the Dublin Castle Conference, Fine Gael MEP Brian Hayes stated that the Government saved Irish taxpayers 10.3 billion euro by renegotiating the terms of the Troika bailout. The reduction was achieved through the Promissory Note deal, the early IMF repayment deal, and other negotiations.

The 12 instances where EU actions or

arrangements adversely affected the Irish crisis are: in 2008 Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) that might have been used to assist the Irish banks, rather than the Guarantee, was provided in a way that attached stigma to the borrower (it would have undermined investor confidence) and therefore could not be used; the raising of ECB interest rates in 2008 and 2011 impaired Irish economic growth in a time of recession; the protracted nature of the Greek negotiations in 2010 undermined investor confidence in the Eurozone and undermined Irish efforts to control the crisis; public expressions of concern by ECB officials regarding the high level of ELA flowing to Irish banks in 2010 likewise undermined Irish efforts; ECB initiatives like the Securities Market Programme and Long Term Refinancing Operations had a favourable impact on Portuguese and Spanish spreads but not on Irish spreads (Irish Bonds were not purchased); the Deauville Declaration by Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy on 19th October 2010 caused a sharp increase in spreads on the debt of the Irish sovereign; a European Council statement issued following the June 2012 summit that "*similar cases will be treated equally*" conveyed an impression that 25 billion euro of bank related debt incurred by the Irish State would be mutualised through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), but the statement was later explained to apply to future cases only; the Troika forced the pace of fire sales of Irish assets so that the asset prices were depressed; Eichengreen refers to three further EU actions that made things unnecessarily difficult for Ireland, "*inaccurate assumptions about fiscal multipliers, botched stress tests and on-again-off-again progress toward banking union*" (p. 123).

The three instances where Eichengreen shows that EU institutions assisted Irish efforts to contain the crisis are: the restructuring of the Promissory Notes in February 2013; pressure applied by the Troika to slow the pace of fiscal consolidation during the Programme (a relatively minor consideration that merits attention chiefly because it is mentioned in the economic literature and is relevant to the debate about austerity); and Draghi's "*whatever it takes*" speech in July 2012 which contributed to Ireland making a clean exit from the Programme at the end of 2013.

JEAN PISANI-FERRY

A description of the EU response to Ireland's crisis would be incomplete without noting the argument from an EU perspective. The most well informed and

measured expression of that viewpoint, arguably, is provided in *The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath* by Jean Pisani-Ferry. The analysis provided in that book includes an honest description of many of the same mistakes and failures of EU institutions and Governments described by Alan Ahearne and Barry Eichengreen, but it is different in that Pisani-Ferry paints a more comprehensive picture of the complexity confronting EU leaders between 2008 and 2013.

This is shown in a chapter headed, "*Let the Banks Pay?*" which among other topics deals with the question of whether the Irish Government should have been allowed to impose haircuts on "*the unguaranteed holders of debt securities issued by insolvent banks*" (p. 90). Describing how the ECB "*played hardball in the Irish case*", Pisani-Ferry states:

"Opposition from the ECB and most euro-area governments deterred Ireland from taking this route. Both the government of Taoiseach Brian Cowen and, after the February 2011 election, that of Enda Kenny attempted to convince European partners to accept at least symbolic private-sector involvement in the rescue of the banking system. But the ECB and the Eurogroup remained adamant that creditors had to be repaid in full. The U.S. Treasury was reportedly also not keen on haircutting senior bondholders" (p. 90).

Treating Bondholder debt in the wider context of debt restructuring, he discusses three possible explanations for the ECB's hard line stance.

"First, the central bank wanted to make it clear that sovereign debt restructuring was not harmless. In modern finance, government bonds are considered the safe asset *par excellence* and they are used as benchmarks for grading the entire array of credit risk. All other assets are routinely evaluated on this basis: government bonds are taken to be safer than bonds issued by the private sector, which are, in turn, regarded as safer than stocks. Consistent with this view, banking and insurance regulations assume that government bonds carry less risk than all other assets; as a matter of fact, until 2006, banking regulation considered that government bonds from advanced countries were *entirely* risk-free. To admit that they might not be repaid in full, therefore, amounted to removing a cornerstone of the financial system" (p. 90).

The second possible explanation according to Pisani-Ferry was fear of contagion, which applied to both sovereign and bank debt. He quotes a May 2011 assessment from the Moody's rating agency explicitly stating that, if a Greek default was allowed to happen, Ireland

and Portugal followed by Spain, Italy and Belgium would find it increasingly difficult to access international money markets. But, as the subsequent restructuring of Greek debt in October 2011 showed, the danger of contagion had been exaggerated. Pisani-Ferry contends that, until reality was finally acknowledged in October 2011, the EU was following an incoherent policy of lending to bankrupt countries at punitive rates while rejecting restructuring (p. 92). The third possible explanation he offers, like the second, sheds light on the Euro-debt crisis but is indefensible: Jean Claude Trichet's belief that, as President of the ECB he could dictate to Governments, and his inability to adapt to the new realities of the post-2008 world. When Trichet was replaced by Mario Draghi in November 2011 a clear line was drawn between political decision-making which was a matter for political authorities and the technical financial matters which should fall under the remit of the ECB.

The Euro and its Aftermath was published in 2014 and, as this is being written in April 2018, it continues to be directly relevant to discussions about the future of the Eurozone; it has not been bypassed by events. Its usefulness lies in showing that glib criticism of the EU institutions sometimes needs to be tempered by a fuller picture of the Euro crisis, yet Pisani-Ferry does not hold back from describing the weaknesses of the EU. A conclusion drawn in the final chapter of his book will strike a chord with those elements of the Irish political class with direct experience of dealing with the EU in the crisis years. He states:

"Europe consistently displayed a strong sense of survival but it has equally consistently failed to display a sense of common purpose" (p. 175).

The EU can be relied on to avert disaster but lacks the political will to bring things much further than that.

Notwithstanding the different perspectives that Fine Gael and Sinn Fein bring to the EU debate, Michael Noonan would be hard pressed to deny that the manner in which, in Emma Clancy's words, the EU "*exacerbated the crisis*", causing collateral damage to the Irish economy. For at least four years the EU had an aggravating effect on the Irish recession. That is not to say that membership of the EU lay at the root of Ireland's economic woes after 2008. The connection with Europe has mostly been hugely positive for Ireland on a number of levels and even in the worst of times during the crisis there were advantages to

that connection, not least as seen in the change in monetary policy introduced by Mario Draghi that assisted the successful exit from the Troika Programme.

The crucial issue through the Euro-debt crisis and the eventual recovery is the extent that the European Project became bound up with neo-liberal economic policies and the anti-political technocratic mindset that accompanies neo-liberalism.

In the daily political knock-about Fine Gael and Fianna Fail may score points against Sinn Fein on the grounds of that party's traditional opposition to the EU (which SF has moved a considerable distance away from), but in the debate about the future of the EU, parties with a firm commitment to rolling back the Thatcherite legacy of economic liberalism constitute the only hope that the European Project can be put back on track.

Dave Alvey

The Sinn Fein Leadership Visits the Irish Diaspora In London

An event: Towards a United Ireland was held on the 24th March, 2018 at the Congress Centre (TUC Headquarters) Great Russell Street, in Central London.

It was the Sinn Fein leadership saying hello to the Irish Diaspora in London.

The large hall was filled to capacity. Outside, while queuing leaflets were handed out by protesters from the Veterans for Justice, former soldiers who had served in NI. At one time slim and fit they were now nothing more than wee fat men who looked as if they wouldn't harm fly.

The queue took the leaflets with a good humour and without protest, which to me showed a confident political maturity. We were going to listen to a professional body of optimistic politicians inside. Another tiny group waved UVF and loyalist flags. Again those in the queue noted them with good humour and laughed. Van loads of police arrived and spoke to the protesters, moving the ex-service men to the other side of the street. The loyalist protester group were already there, obviously wary of the continuing arrival of SF supporters who now queued all the way down a side street. It was a damp squib day for them.

Inside Michelle Gildernew, MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone opened the proceedings and introduced Mary Lou McDonald, President of SF and a Dublin TD.

The two women politicians were very impressive in their speeches and outlined the difficulties involved in getting a united Ireland.

They were followed by a discussion from Panel One which consisted of Marcus Barnett of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, and a newly elected Internal Officer for young Labour, along with Matt Carthy, SF MEP,

former Mayor for Carrickmacross, Professor Peter Shirlow, Director of the University of Liverpool's Institute of Irish Studies, and Patricia Mac Bride, a political analyst and media commentator who has appeared on RTE, the BBC and Al Jazeera plus France 24. She is also a practising magistrate in Derry. They launched into a lively discussion on getting a united Ireland and its aftermath.

Peter Shirlow, a self-confessed unionist, who didn't particularly want an united Ireland, did say it was an inevitability. He was now concerned about the human rights future of those professing to be British in the North, and was listened to attentively by the audience without interruption or murmuring. This was basically a London North of Ireland audience, people who had not been part of the day-to-day politics of the Six Counties. (He stumped for the name *Northern Ireland* without a protest from anyone) Though I may be prejudiced, the teaching of the Two Nations theory, which started with our own thinkers, had got through to his audience with SF's realistic adoption of it.

This was followed by a very good speech from Michelle O'Neill, MLA. You could see now, with this third woman, that SF had turned out a very articulate and confident group of females. I felt, as a male: who needs men with this development? Let's say equality was there and created by the rise of Sinn Fein.

The Panel Two discussion consisted of Dawn Foster, a *Guardian* columnist, and Geoff Bell, active in the Civil Rights in the North from 1967 to 1972, then lived in London for the Anti-Internment League and the Troops Out Movement; and Mary Hickman, Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Irish Studies at London Metropolitan

University. Here we had an examination of the Irish Diaspora in London. There was great optimism about turning around those of Irish descent to the idea of a united Ireland. They outnumber in England alone the entire population of the island of Ireland of six and a half million. I wasn't so optimistic. I am a Paddy-Daddy to five children, a foreigner, an exotic, to these English-thinking beings I have helped to bring into the world. Irishness is just a very small part of their makeup. Their German-Polish-Rumanian part Jewishness is closer to their hearts. All cooking under the crust of Englishness. There just isn't any room for the Six Counties. The pie is now already baked.

There is more and more racial mixing among the English (and the Irish in Britain) and Irishness becomes even more remote. So now you can add Angola and Barbados when grandchildren appear. The nicest comment you can get from them to their teenage friends is: *'Be careful of my granddad he comes from Northern Ireland.'* I feel quite Mafioso after that. At least they know there is a place called NI. I will confess to feeling a certain lack of confidence in such conversations.

I know I have been damaged by my experience as a boy in Belfast and in Carryduff, County Down with unrelenting sectarianism, personal name-calling, the feeling of belonging nowhere, physical attacks on my family's home, attempted murder through the poisoning of our well-water, having to hide for years, as a teenager and an adult, who I really am in order to get an apprenticeship. A typical life of a Catholic in a deliberately maladjusted territory where nothing and nobody is for you from above.

Maybe some Irish parents in England don't have those complications, but I do notice in most cases their children are totally English. An Irish/English football event sometimes does have the Irish Tricolour and the Union Jack in the window, intertwined to show friendship but don't talk political Ireland to them.

It was good to have the Professor Emeritus of Sociology Mary Hickman speak at a SF meeting, and full marks for SF in inviting her, but statistics and research can't give a proper account. It leads to box-ticking and false optimism. Some English children of Irish parents have stayed true to their parent's background. Some even gave their lives here in England during the IRA's struggle against the British State. Others with Irish names have suffered during that period by having their homes raided and being rejected for

jobs. A foolish action by the British security forces.

Gerry Adams closed the proceedings with speech born out of vast experience. With all the loathing and hatred directed at him by the British and Irish media, he remains the typical Northerner, full of humour with a feel-good personality. He got a tremendous welcome from the audience and a standing ovation. The audience then followed him when he left the podium and corralled him with admiration.

Overall the meeting asked what a united Ireland of the future would look like. The answer was left open. It may not be what we think it should be. Nor may it come about in the way we think it should. The main message was that the island of Ireland has changed considerably and that many things were already in place, like basic human rights in the Southern part of the country with more to come. The existence of Sinn Fein has and is changing the landscape.

The SF leadership showing up in London is to be repeated in five years' time.

In the meantime the audience was asked to spread the word. I glimpsed an image of Mao's first-step-starts-the-longest-journey, when Gerry Adams said that one person talking of a united Ireland to another person and convincing him/her doubled your audience.

Outside the small protest groups had gone and the police had quadrupled.

But it was all for a good cause. It was the recognition of Sinn Fein as a major force.

Wilson John Haire
24.3.2018

The Loughinisland Massacre: No Stone Unturned

The above title was of a film shown on 27th March in Committee Room 21, Westminster Parliament.

I'm sure the theme of it is already well known to most who are politically active in London: Three loyalist gunmen, one the driver, one to keep the door open and one to fire an automatic rifle into O'Toole's Pub, in the village of Loughinisland, County Down. Six killed, five wounded, while watching the 1994 Fifa football World Cup. Culprits: the UVF, collusion by the RUC who helped to get rid of what was forensic evidence, including the abandoned car, which would have had a wealth of clues as to the killers. Then the

long drag over the years for justice when the murderers were identified. With the firer openly running an office-cleaning business with his wife, who was also implicated in the planning not far from where the killings happened.

Much the same audience you find at SF and other meetings to do with the North of Ireland, men and a couple of women of a certain age. This time the relatives of the families of the dead attend, all the way from Loughinisland. One lost her husband, one lost her father when eight years old. They have hit the trail to Germany, Peru, Washington, US to show the film and reveal their feelings about what happened in their personal lives because of it and their constant anger at the lack of justice.

This meeting was to be held in the Betty Boothroyd Room in Portcullis House, a modern building across the road from Westminster, but it was cancelled by those in charge and a later date was made for the event to take place in Committee Room 21, Westminster Parliament. When we got there, after a lengthy wait of queuing outside, going through airport-type security checks, it was discovered that Committee Room 21 was in the equivalent of the attic in the Westminster building. It was a climb up stone steps of three very high storeys. Even the police apologised when they were directing us up there. They could see the elderly audience, some with sticks, a couple of women in stiletto heels, beginning the long climb. Those running the meeting saw this as a deliberate move by the Westminster staff. It was later revealed the Betty Boothroyd Room in Portcullis House had been vacant on the date required by the Loughinisland organisers.

The film itself was directed professionally. I was surprised to see John Ware, a BBC journalist, appear in it. He was talking of compromise over Loughinisland in a remote voice that had no vested interest in the tragedy. I remember him in a BBC programme at the time of the Omagh Bombings, shouting outside people's houses just over the Border, and accusing them of the bombing when no one had any proof. After that he went into hiding for a few months. Now here was this figure of hate appearing in this film. Someone sitting beside me raised the question of why he was in this film. I enlarged on this in giving some of Ware's history and his anti-Irish attitude. There were nods from the Loughinisland Committee but that was all.

Later in the meeting it was revealed the BBC refused to screen the film, as did other TV channels. I began to think the

BBC had made a promise to screen it if John Ware was included then ratted on the deal later.

The floor was thrown open to questions but there were no questions for most of us knew all the details already. It was statements and comments that were coming from the floor. It was to be one question one person. So I didn't get a chance to develop my argument about a possible BBC double-cross, as I was ignored when I wanted to say more, even when there was no great enthusiasm from the floor to continue commenting.

There is a tradition of loyalist killers being able to walk the streets of Belfast and other areas. I have walked by them in the streets myself in the early 1950s. My father has pointed them out to me on a number of occasions. Now you have this again with the Loughinisland loyalist killer going about his business as if nothing has happened.

The organisers pointed out that, even if the three plus the wife of one of them, were brought to justice, they would only serve two years under the GFA. So where does it all end with members of PIRA also free under the GFA? The Loughinisland situation surely has to be different because of British state collusion in the killings. That is what the struggle is about and what motivates they who lost loved ones.

WJH, 28.3.18

Stop The War Coalition: Demo - Saturday, 7th April

Attending A Gaza Protest!

This demonstration was organised by the *Palestinian Solidarity Group* with *Friends of Al-Aqsa* to protest the killings of 27 Palestinians of Gaza, so far, by the Israeli Army. This was a peaceful Palestinian demonstration to protest at the effective confiscation of their land by the Israeli State.

The Socialist Workers' Party was in charge as usual. There was a raised platform opposite 10 Downing Street from which someone chanted: "*We are millions, we are billions. At the 20th we are millions, we are billions*". I found myself being turned into a pig and an illuminated sign on the gates across the mouth of Downing Street lit up with the words: ANIMAL FARM!

It was the usual mainly white middle-class, middle-aged to retiree crowd. A speech by Jeremy Corbyn was read out. No Labour Party rep. spoke—in order to do down the anti-Semite smear I expect—

Origin of the Handwriting in the Disputed Casement Diaries

Below are three characteristic examples of diary material written by or purported to have been written by Roger Casement, with attendant dates and published sources.

The first, from 1903, finds Casement in County Antrim, where he had spent much of his early teens, where he meets up with relatives and his sister Nina. There is a reference to the report he had recently completed on the Congo atrocities which he had just posted to the "F.O." (Foreign Office).

28 DEC 1903

"Finished report and sent it to F.O. by 3.20 train by reg'd post. Left with Aunt C. she to Nanaveere—and I to Ballymoney and then on to Portrush. Wired Nina. Beautiful got in with sister at Ballymoney. Nina met me at station and dined together at Portrush" (*The Black Diaries*, 2002, Jeff Dudgeon).

The second refers to Casement arriving in Lisbon, Portugal in 1910 on his way from South America to Paris and eventually London. He goes to visit a Portuguese gentleman named O'Neill, who had aristocratic Ulster Gaelic ancestry. His attention is distracted by various "types" he observes on the streets of Lisbon as he goes by. There is a distinct note of pederasty in the

making it look as if they had anti-Semite things to say.

What with Trotskyite SWP placards everywhere I didn't feel like hanging around much longer.

I began to doubt if most of these demos did any good when there was very little working-class support or interest. Even the one million and two million mostly middle-class demos in London against the Iraq War was ignored by Blair. That country went on to be savaged just the same.

Fond memories flashed in my mind of demos that did change things. Like the Harland & Wolff Shipyard *Apprentice Strike* of 1950, which brought about better conditions and a pay rise to lift us out of penury. Copied later by Scottish and English shipyards.

The 1950s London building workers demos brought in better conditions and dignity and was the start of a campaign for helmets and protective clothing—though that did take some years to accomplish. Injuries in mining was No 1 at the time, with building being No 2. The savage

account. He is, it seems, drawn into one and perhaps more brief sexual encounters. Events occur in a frantic way, as if in a cartoon.

28 DEC 1903

"On shore at Lisbon at 10 a.m. and to Avenida where long-legged boy types and sailor. Then to Largo Camoens and to Taurus to lunch and then Largo again and young soldier lad (18 or so) in grey twill—Splendid—followed. To O'Neill's house and down to Largo near Consulate where arranged things and on to Arsenal and Necessidades Palace and several types and back to Avenida and then by Banco di Portugal an enormous offer lying on one side like Agostinho, but too late... at 4 on board and "Ambrose" sailed to Oporto" (Ibid).

The third comes from the journal Casement kept between 23rd September and 06 December 1910, which is sometimes referred to as the *Putumayo Journal* or the *White Diary*, as there are no overt sexual references. This, as the example below demonstrates, is written in a clear and elegant prose, quite in contrast to the first two examples.

26 OCT 1910

"Found Commission enjoying the

defeat of the miners by the State machine and the closing of the pits brought building to the No 1 position for death and injury.

There was no report of the Palestine event in the media that I could see.

WJH

ENGLAND'S WAR PIPES

It is a slight droning you might have heard, a low drumming permeates the atmosphere, they talk of heroes and war without fear, the drones the drums the constant Huns compared

to England's holy mission in the world. An auction programme on television halts for the museum of nuclear fission, we are walked through with Union Jacks unfurled, then back to the marketplace for a taste of haggling and bargains to be had. But soon back to the battlefield in haste, this time they eat barbed wire and die as dads but never the enemy or as waste.

A Laliq vase goes for ten pounds, that's mad!

Wilson John Haire

2 April 2018

pleasure of Mr Montt's society in a horrid, abandoned, pirate stronghold. All looked pulled down and ruinous and utterly neglected. Saw only one Indian outside the staff and muchachos, he was terribly thin, a skeleton, and scarified all over the nether limbs. Sealy and Chase brought him up to the veranda to show me and I called Barnes and we inspected the poor being..." (*The Amazon Journal Of Roger Casement*, Ed. Angus Mitchell, p319. 1997).

HANDWRITING

The so called *Black Diaries* are not written in what we would regard as prose. There are few words of qualification and those that are there tend to be the same few which appear and then reappear, such as *enormous*, *huge*, and *splendid*. For example the word "huge" appears twenty times between July and December 1910. The writing is made up of shortened expressions suitable for the old style telegram or even the contemporary text message. That there is only limited space for each day's entries in the pre-printed desk diary books helps provide an explanation for this.

The handwritten words that make up the *Black Diary* entries are fairly clearly and deliberately formed. The telegraphic style of expression must put an onus on the writer to form the letters clearly. So much of the content is a sequence of nouns which need to be all understood by the reader, sometimes necessarily for the totality to make sense. Generally, if we are dealing with prose writing, the overall context and thrust of the narrative can assist us distinguish words we can not make out from the handwriting. However, this is not possible with the controversial diary material. Here, every word counts as it stands in for some action taken or is necessary to fill out the overall meaning. So, here every word needs to be formed with some level of deliberateness.

Casement's private letters and his other journals and diaries are written in prose, often on lined foolscappaper. The distinctive handwriting flows without hindrance; flowing up and then down, forming exuberant curves and loops and squiggles. It tends to be more anarchic and unbound than what is found in the disputed diaries. It is challenging to the unaccustomed eye. However, where the reader is flat out unable to decipher a word, the meaning can usually be derived from the overall context and theme. The production of prose allows those with problematic handwriting some leeway to let them selves go.

EVOLVING FORGERY THESIS: CLASSIC PHASE

The decade from 1957 to 1966 formed a period when the contention that the Diaries might be forged enjoyed a wide

currency. This was particularly so in Ireland. Much of this was due to the activities of a number of researchers who published their views in a variety of outlets. We can say it was the era when the forgery thesis enjoyed its prime: its classic phase. 1957 saw the publication of *The Accusing Ghost or Justice for Casement* by the English poet and literary academic Alfred Noyes.

A version of the *Black Diary* text, minus the 1911 diary (by far the most sexual and most outrageous of the diaries), appeared in 1959, published as part of an account of Casement's life; *The Black Diaries* by Peter Singleton-Gates and Maurice Girondias.

In August 1959 the British Government finally officially admitted the existence of the Diaries. The documents however, were made available for viewing under restrictions. Only those deemed by the authorities to be legitimate Casement scholars could get an opportunity to view. One of these was Dr Roger McHugh, the Dublin-born literary critic based at University College, Dublin.

Presented with reasonably accurate typescripts and access of sorts to the handwritten documents, investigators now had an opportunity to make a more informed and precise analysis of what they were dealing with. There was an opportunity to develop new insights based on new and more accurate information. In 1960 Roger McHugh produced what is still regarded as a classic study; the thirty page *Roger Casement; the Public Record Office Documents* which appeared in the Belfast journal, *Threshold*.

He concluded that there was now a very strong case that the Diaries "*were not authentic but have been faked by the interpolation of indecencies into gapped and partly pencilled volumes*". In his study he reiterated arguments that had been known to the controversy for decades. But he also opened up new lines of argument based on what had recently become available.

Now he could claim there were "*discrepancies and contradictions*" within the documents and also with authentic outside sources. These discrepancies related to the circumstances of Casement's Peruvian travels and investigations, witnesses to his behaviour at that time, and the quality of his then state of mind. McHugh believed it would have been inconceivable for Casement to have lived the lifestyle described while under the eye of hostile and suspicious adversaries. The Diaries relate the mind of somebody "*deranged*", yet Casement's correspondence of the time bore witness to somebody in full control of their mental faculties.

Another researcher was Herbert O.

Mackey, a Dublin-based skin specialist who wrote a number of articles and books advancing the view that forgery had occurred; the most interesting appearing in 1966 and was based on his own close physical scrutiny of the documents. It was a short book titled *The Truth about the Forged Diaries*.

As with McHugh, the writer Frank O' Connor and other forgery theorists of the time, some of the discrepancies and inconsistencies Mackey believed he had discovered can now be seen to have an innocent explanation.

All these writers conceived the Diaries as being originally the private property of Casement which had been taken possession of by the Intelligence chiefs some time before his capture at Banna Strand. Into these original personal diaries of his compromising material had been introduced by other unseen hands.

The final product would not have required such a mighty amount of industry and effort as the great mass of it was already pre-produced and available. All that was needed were various additions and deletions to be carried out, as required, by a trained and practiced team. A more or less exact correspondence with Casement's known and established travels and movements provided a striking, and for some a jarring, note of authenticity.

Mackey, the researcher who had taken the greatest care to examine the pages up close and under magnification, referred to a number of diary pages where he claimed the physical evidence of altered writing could be witnessed.

It was only the 1911 Diary, by far the most sexual in its contents, which was deemed, by these writers, to overwhelmingly consist of forged handwriting.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE DIARIES

Before the mid-1950s (when leaked transcripts became available to a few), what the Diaries were, or what they contained or indeed whether they existed at all, was something that could only be a matter for speculation. From 1916 to 1959, the Home Office would neither confirm nor deny their existence. They existed in a kind of limbo.

Discussion of the possibility of forgery was limited by lack of access to the originals, to copies of the originals or to transcripts. Yet, arguments in favour of forgery were made and made articulately. Attention was called to the incongruity of what was known of Casement's character and behaviour, as known to his associates and friends, and what the Diaries were

said to contain; and there was a problem of a lack of corroboration. The lack of willingness of the Home Office to as much as acknowledge their existence, much less provide access, reinforced the suspicion that there was something sinister to hide. The failure of the authorities, in 1916, when the documents were put to political use, to take measures to establish authenticity in an open and legally credible way, as opposed to operating in an atmosphere of subterfuge, bolstered suspicion.

At the time of his trial, and while the Diaries were being used against him, there was a propaganda campaign in full flow in which discrediting allegations were made against Casement which have long been revealed as spurious, for example, that he had been receiving money from the Germans. This being the case, it is not hard to envisage the forging and display of alleged extracts from personal diaries as part of the ongoing project of defamation.

Ironically, the most intriguing and unsettling argument in favour of forgery was, unwittingly, provided by those who most assertively took the stance that the Diaries were fully and assuredly Casement's. Sir Basil Thomson, then head of Metropolitan Police Special Branch, claimed to have uncovered them among Casement's belongings held in his London apartment. Thomson was a prolific writer who published a number of books. The problem is that Thomson's accounts of the discovery in his writings differed significantly in detail one from another. It is hard to understand how such a sensational discovery could not lodge itself firmly and with precision in the mind—and especially a mind of the quality of Sir Basil's—unless, that is, in his various accounts he was being less than honest.

F.E. Smith, the prosecuting counsel in Casement's trial, provided a different written account again of the discovery. In his book *Famous Trials of History* (1926), he claimed the "diary" (sic) came ashore with Casement when he arrived by rowboat from a submarine onto Banna strand, Co Kerry in April 1916.

NORTHERN IRELAND: LONG SHADOW

As the 1970s progressed, attitudes towards traditional nationalism in Ireland came under concerted challenge. Political violence, on a daily basis, was occurring in Northern Ireland. Those who regarded the Diaries as forged now tended to keep their heads down. They were wary of being accused of being somehow covert supporters of the Provisional IRA and its campaign of shooting and bombing.

The academic community avoided the pro-forgery position. It became less than respectable to advocate in favour of forgery in the prevailing wary political atmosphere. An emerging school of anti-nationalist, so-called historical "revisionism" treated the question as a closed one where the only people who disbelieved in authenticity were those harbouring a prejudice against gay people and their sexuality.

There were rare academic conferences at which the Diaries were mentioned. However, the reality was that the academic community, almost without exception, had withdrawn from the forgery question in the sense of treating forgery arguments seriously. It was left open to a tiny fringe to present such arguments.

The extent to which the academic community had withdrawn is illustrated by the contents of the monumental 754 page book; *Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society* (1989) by Joseph Lee, University College Cork, Professor of Modern Irish History at the time. Lee is and was known as a historian of nationalist outlook. Yet, Casement is mentioned only once in his book and that is in passing and in relation to somebody else. That somebody was Eamon De Valera. An eighty-three year old De Valera had risen from his sickbed to attend the interment in Irish soil of former comrade Roger Casement. This was mentioned by way of indicating the strength and quality of De Valera's character. That a full solemn state funeral was involved got no mention. The year inaccurately given in the text was 1966. In fact the remains were interred at Glasnevin Cemetery in 1965.

Occasionally there were newspaper articles and Letters to the Editor expressing a pro-forgery position. Mostly this involved a handful of people. Chief among these were Eoin Ó Máille and Michael Payne.

LINGUISTIC FINGERPRINTING

Since the 1970s Ó Máille had studied the documents, particularly key-words and expressions commonly used by Casement. Many words and phrases to be found in Casement's attested writings were absent. In a pamphlet, *The Forged Diaries Exposed* (1993), Ó Máille reported that such words as "confess", "moreover", "realise", "unless" and many more did not appear in the disputed material. According to Ó Máille, Casement's "linguistic fingerprint" was lacking. This was, he believed, powerful evidence of forgery.

An outcome of this type of analysis was a belief that the documents had not been written by Casement at all, either partly or wholly, since his signature "linguistic

fingerprint", his personally characteristic words and phrases, was missing from all of the disputed material.

A writer then fresh to the controversy, Angus Mitchell, produced a thought-provoking book, *The Amazon Journal of Roger Casement* which appeared in 1997. This was a detailed account of Casement's 1910 investigative journey to the Putumayo area of Peru. It was based on archival records, much of these consisting of Casement's own and undisputed letters and journals. For the first time in over thirty years, a full-scale book had appeared which uncompromisingly asserted the Diaries were the result of forgery. A thirty-page chapter devoted to the forgery question formed the start of the book: the forgery claim had elbowed its way back into an uncomfortable perch at the edge of the academic and publishing mainstream.

The work of Ó Máille and Payne was mentioned with approval by Mitchell. In addition, he referred to the deliberateness with which the words and letters were formed in the disputed material, which differed from letters and other matter that had been known to have come from Casement's hand. Though it was not precisely and definitively stated, Mitchell apparently was siding with those who said the Diaries were forged in their entirety. Yet, he was prepared to hedge somewhat, as to whether the forgery was whole or partial: "a number of sexual references look as if they have been interpolated into the text..." he wrote in relation to the 1910 Cash Book. (*Amazon Journal*, p28, 1997) This is an account book of Casement's expenditure in 1910-11 which contains sexual references interspersed among mundane day to day financial details.

THE QUESTIONED DIARIES AND THEIR ORIGINAL DAY TO DAY USE

My view is that we should conceive of the Diaries as originally consisting of jotting down of words and phrases created on the move. Thus a rudimentary summary of the events of a certain day was recorded for future reference. This answers the basic questions: who, what, where, when and how. The Diaries were not intended as a facility for extended commentary or description. As such, the vocabulary in use is limited and repetitive. When a linguistic comparison is made with Casement's voluminous prose writings, a match between the two vocabulary sets will not be found. This is because we are dealing with very different types of writing answering very different needs and purposes.

Linguistic analysis does not make sense here, as we are not comparing like with

like. Language is used in a different way in the Diaries. It was not made up of prose writing. Thus it is not valid to use it for straightforward comparison with Casement prose from some outside source. The linguistic comparisons using a computer done by O Máille and Payne and referenced in their 1993 pamphlet are no indication that Casement could not have written a substantial part of the Diaries.

PARTIAL FORGERY—EXPLANATORY FORCE

The concept of partial forgery, as developed by figures such as McHugh and Mackey during the classic phase of the development of the forgery theory, has much more explanatory force. Such an explanation fits in with descriptions and commentaries we have relating to the appearance of the handwritten originals from a number of individuals who inspect-

ed them.

A project of partial forgery would have meant a lesser workload for the forgers. This would have suited the narrow and fragile timeframe any such forgery undertaking would have been subject to.

If we consider the first two diary entry examples above (28 Dec 1903 and 28 Dec 1910), we have two illustrative examples of daily entries from the so-called *Black Diaries*. The first one has no questionable content. We can take that one as being in its original state, as Casement wrote it. The second one can be considered to have undergone a certain amount of modification, as it were, and does contain content which generally would be found objectionable, even by modern contemporary standards.

Tim O'Sullivan

Part 2 will further develop the conclusions outlined above.

Senator Craughwell and the Presidency

It is unclear whether a Presidential election will take place this November. Going by the general view that Michael D Higgins has proved a popular and effective President, it would make sense that he should continue for a second term. The main parties with the exception of Sinn Féin have indicated that they would support such an outcome. But a fly in the ointment, in the form of independent Senator Gerard Craughwell, is upsetting matters.

Senator Craughwell has been arguing that, as Michael D Higgins promised to remain in Office for one term only, he should be held to that. He has been quoted saying, "*Politics is being debased by broken promises*". If he can get the backing of 20 members of the Oireachtas (parliament), which he claims to have already, or four local Councils, then he can stand as a candidate and a Presidential election will need to be called.

I should declare an interest here. I consider that, in his Presidential role, Michael D Higgins made a difference to the 2016 centenary celebrations from having a genuine sympathy for the legacy of the Rising. I also believe that there are sometimes good reasons why public representatives need to break electoral promises which they made in good faith. I hope that President Higgins remains in Office for a second term and that the country is spared the expense and distraction of an unnecessary election. In 1991 Michael D. Higgins wrote the Preface for and launched a book which I wrote entitled, "*Irish*

Education: the Case for Secular Reform".

It so happens that I supported Gerard Craughwell's successful bid to become President of the Teachers' Union of Ireland (TUI) in 2012 by providing a testimonial about him and helping to bring out the vote. Arising from a number of campaigns in which I was involved while Senator Craughwell was President of the Union, I would say that he is in no position to be delivering lectures about electoral promises. I will provide two examples.

I must firstly explain that many Further Education teachers view the TUI as being tacitly hostile to the cause of Further Education (FE). TUI representatives will state otherwise but dissatisfaction with the Union on that issue has been widespread among FE teachers for many years and it has often been a source of contention at Union Congresses. Gerry Craughwell was savvy enough not to include any promises about FE in his election manifesto but it was expected by FE teachers, including myself, that being such a teacher himself he would use his position to tackle the Union's poor record regarding the sector. He actively encouraged that expectation. I would say that he gave an implicit promise to raise the profile of the FE sector in the TUI once elected.

The first example was a campaign of opposition to raising the staffing ratio in Further Education Colleges, announced in 2012 as part of the 2013 Budget. A decision was made by Dun Laoghaire branch of TUI, of which I was the Chair, to

call a public meeting on the issue. I set about contacting various media organisations to ensure that the meeting would receive publicity. I contacted some people in RTE and then informed key personnel in Dun Laoghaire to be ready to give TV interviews. On the following day I was phoned by Gerry Craughwell who gave me strict instructions to leave the publicity to TUI.

In the event, the meeting which took place in the late afternoon of Wednesday, 13th March 2013 was highly successful. A large room in the Royal Marine Hotel was packed to capacity (about 350 people); a number of former students spoke impressively of how their college experience had changed their lives and enabled them to find employment. The event had a successful outcome in the sense that local Minister Eamon Gilmore subsequently arranged a meeting between managerial representatives from Dun Laoghaire and the then Minister for Education, Ruairi Quinn; because of exceptional circumstances obtaining in Dun Laoghaire, a temporary alleviation from the new staffing ratio was agreed (I believe this lasted for two years.) Regarding publicity, however, the meeting was unsuccessful. A complaint was duly sent by Dun Laoghaire branch to TUI Head Office and in reply various excuses were given. It is my belief that Senator Craughwell, who addressed the meeting, toed the line from Head Office in ensuring that the event received no publicity.

The second example occurred in December 2013, during a campaign of opposition to a proposal from the Department of Education that certain FE teachers should in future be demoted to being '*tutors*'. The affected courses were: Beauty Therapy, Hairdressing, Security Studies, Animal Care and First Aid. Since the public meeting of March that year Dun Laoghaire branch had merged with County Dublin branch and my position had changed to being Further Education Officer of the new Dublin Dun Laoghaire branch, the largest branch in the country.

At an impromptu meeting at the Sallynoggin College of Further Education for the affected staff in all three Dun Laoghaire Colleges, it was agreed that what we were dealing with was old-fashioned educational snobbery (teachers on selected non-academic courses were being identified as inferior, despite the fact that many of the courses were 2-year advanced courses), and that we would stage a protest outside Leinster House against it.

I got in touch with the Cork City branch which, like Dun Laoghaire, had three FE colleges. Cork formally decided to fund a

delegation to travel to Dublin and join the protest. I also raised the protest as an agenda item at a well-attended meeting of the new branch; the proposal was enthusiastically passed. As the day of the protest came near I was summoned to Head Office in Orwell Road. A meeting was conducted with TUI General Secretary John Mac Gabhann, then President Craughwell, a number of Union officers and I. It was put to me that the protest was against the interests of the Union and should be cancelled. I recall that John Mac Gabhann believed that the cause of education would suffer from being associated with "*Dun Laoghaire dog handlers*" (dog handling was a conspicuous component of the Animal Care course).

I made a case as strongly as I was able on behalf of the affected teachers. I referred to the national reputation enjoyed by the Beauty Therapy programme in Dun Laoghaire, how the courses filled up early the preceding year with applicants, how a salon open to the public was operated at Senior College Dun Laoghaire to give the trainees real world experience. I also defended the Animal Care course in Dun Laoghaire College of Further Education which every year achieved the perfect outcome of an FE course: all its graduates either got jobs immediately or graduated to third level courses in veterinary science.

As I recall, John Mac Gabhann could not be shifted from a conviction that defending "*dog handlers*" would bring the Union into disrepute. The argument went back and forth for some time. Gerry Craughwell was firmly in favour of cancellation. I argued that the point at issue was equal pay for equal work. Eventually I was forced to acknowledge that, if the action went ahead it would need to be '*unofficial*', not a realistic option. I reluctantly agreed to recommend cancellation having no other choice. Towards the end of the meeting Senator Craughwell proposed that the Union would support me if I was to write an article about the problem of Teaching Council regulations for the Further Education sector. He assured me that getting the article published in the *Irish Times* would not be a problem and we shook hands on it.

Not surprisingly the Beautician teachers whom I met the following morning were disappointed at what had transpired. It was agreed that I would write to John Mac Gabhann and Gerry Craughwell asking them to spell out exactly what was the big picture of Union interests that would have been threatened by our action. It was also agreed that, as a last throw of the dice, I

would write to the Chief Executive Officer of the Dublin and Dun Laoghaire Education and Training Board.

I received no reply from TUI Head Office but, surprisingly, many weeks later I received an acknowledgement from the Office of the Chief Executive Officer stating that the management team would be discussing my letter. The tutorisation proposal was never implemented by our Education and Training Board and I understand that it was never followed through in any FE college. In correspondence with Cork the Chair of the branch agreed that in the circumstances I had no choice but to cancel the protest.

In the following weeks I duly set about writing the article on the Teaching Council. I consulted with and received help from Cork City branch. I also consulted with a number of FE Principals. When I submitted the finished article to TUI Head Office I never received a reply. In fairness to John

Mac Gabhann he later apologised to me for not answering any of my emails regarding the article.

From these two examples I would say that Senator Craughwell broke an implicit promise to the FE sector to improve the standing of FE in the TUI; he went over to the Head Office viewpoint more than he needed to. He also broke an explicit promise in his election manifesto that '*equal pay for equal work*' would be one of his priorities when he joined with John Mac Gabhann in forcing FE teachers threatened with being demoted to tutors to cancel a protest.

Cancelling that protest which had a branch mandate sent a discouraging signal to the Union rank and file on the question of equal pay. On an individual note he broke a promise to me regarding the article on Teaching Council regulations which has never been published, even by the TUI.

Dave Alvey

Fine Gael's 'Contrived Outrage' Concerning Goebbels

Miriam Lord wrote as follows in the *Irish Times* of 1st March:

"'You're a disgrace' - Stormy exchanges in Dáil after Nazi analogy"

"It was the snow. Sent them mad... Fianna Fáil's Marc MacSharry started it. While he likes creating scenes and is an irredeemable notice box, it's fairly clear that the Sligo deputy didn't intend his description of the Government's recent Project 2040 extravaganza on his home patch as '*a €45,000 Goebbels-style launch*' to be a slur on the Jewish community and an attempt to trivialise the Holocaust. Indeed, there are suspicions that MacSharry took a rhetorical leaf out of Labour bootboy Alan Kelly's book and simply repeated the Goebbels remarks he heard Kelly make on radio yesterday. But the minute he mentioned the infamous Nazi propagandist's name, Fine Gael TDs began to roar... '*Disgusting slur*', said the Minister for Health, Simon Harris. '*Belittling the Holocaust*', said the Taoiseach, as his deputies cried foul... '*An anti-Semitic slur on politicians*', concluded Harris... Harris continued shouting about anti-Semitism and attacks on victims of the Holocaust... Minister of State Patrick O'Donovan egged on his colleagues while howling for an apology... The Minister for Justice (Charlie Flanagan) rose. '*It seems the overexcited state of Deputy MacSharry from time to time has been noted in Sligo as well as here.*'... Flanagan's dander was up. '*Get him to withdraw*', he demanded..."

"Social Democrat Róisín Shortall started telling the Fine Gael TDs to stop wasting time. The noise level rose... The Fine Gaelers began roaring at Róisín. Simon Harris, still shouting about anti-Semitism, asked her if she thought the comments acceptable. She pleaded with the two '*Civil War*' parties to stop the messing. '*This is not about the Civil War. This is about the Holocaust*', intoned Harris. '*Shockin*', said O'Donovan. The Ceann Comhairle had had enough and took to his heels. In his absence, Shortall told O'Donovan to '*shut up*'. '*Imagine if a man said that?*' the Limerick TD shot back, scandalised..."

"Former minister Alan Shatter (a former Fine Gael Minister for Justice, and a member of the Jewish community—MO'R) tweeted afterwards that the '*silly and offensive comment*' from MacSharry was '*neither an attack on the Jewish community nor the victims of the Holocaust*' and their deaths should not be misused '*in a petty Dáil party-political exchange*'... But later, during Questions to the Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar resurrected the issue and called on Fianna Fáil leader Micheál Martin and Labour's Joan Burton to ask MacSharry and Alan Kelly to apologise for their '*Goebbels*' statements. He also, rather unnecessarily, demanded to know if they agreed with what they said. '*This is a reference to the Holocaust... and I think belittling the Holocaust is beneath contempt*', Varadkar told them..."

(Sinn Fein leader) Mary Lou McDonald, who, like the others, is highly suspicious of the way the Government is publicising the national plan and making Fine Gael look good in the process, made the most sensible point of the day. *'I think we should beware of contrived outrage on any side.'* Maybe it was just the snow, making them all mad."

COMMENT

Note: Fine Gael Minister of State Patrick O'Donovan is the eejit who believed that the IRA had carried out the 1974 Dublin / Monaghan bombings, rather than being the UVF / British intelligence operation it was.

Note also, if only for the historical record:

(1): "The Minister gave extracts from various laws on the Continent, but he carefully refrained from drawing attention to the fact that the Blackshirts were victorious in Italy and that the Hitler Shirts were victorious in Germany, as, assuredly, in spite of this Bill... the Blueshirts will be victorious in the Irish Free State." —John A. Costello, Fine Gael TD and Blueshirt, Dáil Debates, February 28, 1934.

Costello went on to serve as Fine Gael Taoiseach from 1948 to 1951, and again from 1954 to 1957.

(2) "How is it that we do not see any of these Acts directed against the Jews, who crucified Our Saviour nineteen hundred years ago, and who are crucifying us every day in the week?... There is one thing that Germany did, and that was to rout the Jews out of their country. Until we rout the Jews out of this country it does not matter a hair's breadth what orders you make. Where the bees are there is the honey, and where the Jews are there is the money." - Oliver J. Flanagan TD, maiden speech, Dáil Debates, July 9, 1943.

Flanagan went on to serve as Fine Gael Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Agriculture 1954-1957, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence 1975-76, and Minister for Defence 1976-1977. In view of the longevity of his continuous presence as TD for Laois / Offaly from 1943 to 1987, for the remaining decade of his presence Flanagan was declared Father of the Dáil 1977-1987. Upon his retirement, he was succeeded as TD for Laois / Offaly by his son, Charlie Flanagan, currently the Fine Gael Minister for Justice.

There are no records of either Costello or Flanagan ever publicly withdrawing or apologising for the declarations quoted above. So much for Fine Gael *"contrived outrage"*.

Manus O'Riordan

April Brexit Summary

Despite much speculation to the contrary Theresa May confirmed on April 23rd that the UK will leave the Customs Union after Brexit. A non-binding vote on the Customs Union will take place in the House of Commons on Thursday April 26th but amendments to two Bills to be debated in May will include a commitment to membership of *"a customs union with the EU"*; these latter votes will be binding. The important element in the debates will be the number of Tory MPs that vote against the Government. Thus uncertainty continues over how the Brexit negotiations will go as a result of the division in the Tory Party.

Other notable developments during April include friction between Fine Gael (FG) and Fianna Fail (FF) over basic strategy in the negotiations, a cautious response from Fine Gael to British proposals, and a *'Future of the EU'* debate in Meath.

It is worth mentioning in passing that during this month Ireland became the first European country to be allowed to export beef to China. Since 2010 Irish dairy products have been exported there and that market has already become second in importance after the UK. The breakthrough for beef will make a significant difference to the manner in which the agri-food sector adapts to Brexit.

FF/FG FRICTION

The significance of the March summit of the European Council was well summed up in the following sentence from an editorial (*The Skibereen Eagle Returns*) in last month's *Irish Political Review*:

"Ireland wasted its moment of power when it took the lead in diverting the EU from putting Britain on the spot about a Brexit border in Ireland and focussed discussion during a long day and part of a night (22nd and 23rd March) on getting token support from the EU for Britain's feud with Russia."

Fianna Fail leader Micheál Martin has stated that the Government made a strategic mistake at the March summit. *"The Government should have blocked the agreement on the transition for the UK until there was more progress on the Border."* (Irish Times, 2 April). This criticism has caused anger on the Government side but Micheál Martin has continued to develop his line of attack. At the annual FF 1916 commemoration in Arbour Hill he stated:

"A rising concern is that Ireland is now being pushed later and later in the negotiations—leaving a real risk that we will face enormous pressure to accept whatever is proposed so that the financial settlement with the UK will not be lost" (Irish Times, Michael O'Regan, 22 April).

In the same article Foreign Affairs Minister Simon Coveney is quoted giving the Government line:

"Negotiations are sensitive and ongoing so it's curious to say that at a time when European backing for Ireland across the EU has been rock solid, Fianna Fáil is trying to create division and fear on Brexit at home for party political gain and a few headlines."

At an earlier stage of the negotiations it looked as though Fine Gael was more in tune with Ireland's traditional foreign policy stance than Fianna Fail under Martin—which would not be saying much. It would be inaccurate to say that the relationship has now reversed but the position of Varadkar and Coveney has slipped back toward a close-to-Britain position whereas Fianna Fail representatives, when they are not fixated on the electoral threat from Sinn Fein, are rightly drawing attention to weaknesses in the Government position. Bipartisanship as between the two main parties has tended to stifle political thought on issues like the Northern conflict over recent decades; it is welcome to see the end of it regarding Brexit.

A CAUTIOUS RESPONSE

On the key question of measures to avoid a hard Border, the Government was reported to be *"cautious"* in its response to the latest British proposals regarding a *"customs partnership"* (IT, 2 April)—these were versions of proposals rejected by the EU in August. By contrast the Barnier Task Force led by Sabine Weyand responded with outright rejection (IT, 20 April). This suggests that the determination to make the Irish Border a central issue in the talks is coming from Brussels rather than Dublin.

To bolster the relationship between the UK and Ireland, Leo Varadkar proposed to Theresa May in February that the Cabinets of both countries should meet annually (Irish Times, April 16). The Taoiseach's idea apparently was that such meetings would act as a replacement for the regular engagement which currently

happens on the fringe of EU events. When the proposal was first announced by Simon Coveney in late January the *Irish Political Review Group* described it as a threat to EU solidarity, an attempt to remain within the British sphere without leaving the EU. That remains the Group's position.

What is interesting at this point is that the British don't seem in any hurry to take up the invitation. They can hardly be blamed for a lack of enthusiasm. What is the point in the UK taking the trouble to continue cultivating a relationship that proved worthless at the hour of need?

A MEETING IN NAVAN

Last year Emanuel Macron spoke of the need for an EU-wide citizens' debate on the future of the Union. By way of an Irish response, a series of *Citizen Dialogues* have been hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the European Movement in different venues around the country. The format of the Dialogue I attended in Navan, County Meath (19 April) was that those attending were divided into groups and each group discussed a number of topics. The topics were: a Prosperous and Competitive Union; a Safe and Secure Union; a Sustainable Union; a Socially Responsible Union; and Shaping Globalisation. As the topics were discussed a reporter took notes and then read back his/her summary to the group; another reporter wrote up the summaries into a set of notes. When the discussions were complete the notes from each table were reported verbally to the whole assembly.

I would say that all of this sounds good in theory. Making sense of conversations between diverse groups of citizens is easier said than done. At my table the summaries had at least some of the points that people had made but the verbal report contained much less of them. By the time all of the reports are combined into a single report most of the Citizen Dialogue will be lost. That is a cynical view but I came away thinking that the entire exercise was something of a foregone conclusion, that it was a sop to be used against the charge that the EU is disconnected from its citizens.

Following the reports there was a 'roving mike' and four contributions were allowed. A woman said that the EU needs to have strict regulations to ensure that private data is protected. I said that the Irish contribution to the EU debate should draw from the lessons of Ireland's experience of the crisis (I first stated that I was from the *Irish Political Review Group*). A student said that the forces of populism

needed to be met head on. And a representative of farmers said that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) needed to be protected, Irish farmers needed tariff-free access to the British market and the level of funding of the CAP from the EU Budget needed to be kept up following Brexit.

Each of these points was answered by Helen McEntee, the Minister for European Affairs, mostly in a clichéd manner. One of her concluding points was heartening to hear. Quite a few of the verbal reports mentioned that Irish neutrality needed to be defended. McEntee referred to that feedback and said it chimed with what they were hearing in other parts of the country. The Irish neutrality policy was indeed a policy that needed to be articulated by the Government at EU level, she said.

I thought that what Minister McEntee said in reply to my point was revealing. She said yes we need to learn the lessons but we need to resist the drive for greater integration. Thinking about it afterwards, it struck me that Fine Gael wants to be in Europe but obstructive of the reforms that would make it coherent. The approach is 'transactional', in the sense that it is about the pursuit of the national interest and little else. This fits with that party's close-to-Britain leanings.

Fine Gael wishes to be involved in the EU but with a mildly Eurosceptic outlook.

There would be plenty to talk about at annual meetings of the British and Irish Cabinets if Ireland was to slot into the place occupied by Eurosceptic Britain.

This mentality can be contrasted with recent statements from Catherine Day, the former Secretary General of the European Commission, when addressing students at Newman University Church in Dublin. In the *Irish Times* of 18th April she is reported saying that the EU might integrate more smoothly after Brexit, once it no longer has a "permanently reluctant member in the room". Five days later she is reported in the same paper addressing an Institute of International and European Affairs conference. The report states:

"One positive outcome from the UK's departure would be the end of 'constant sniping and undermining of what the EU is trying to do' by the British media, which had infected the media across the EU and beyond, said Ms Day, who is now an adviser to European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker" (IT, April 23).

The EU has evolved into an international entity where each of the Member States pursues its own interests in a trans-

actional manner. This pattern reflects the dominance of the European Council which is an inter-Governmental body. Ever since the Commission was nobbled in the Maastricht Treaty, the Union has lacked a leading institution at the supranational level. If the EU is to be more than a bunch of squabbling nations, a strengthening of the institutions at supranational level is necessary.

I will catch up with Continental developments next month.

Dave Alvey

Saddam In Perspective!

The political killing involved in the operation of the Baath regime is put in perspective by what immediately followed its overthrow by the Democratic superpowers.

So, on 19th March 2003, how many innocent Iraqis would one expect Saddam Hussein to kill in the next twelve months, if he were left alone? Presumably, Prime Minister Blair had a figure in his head when he spoke. Scores would seem to be a reasonable guess: *Amnesty International* estimated that "scores of people, including possible prisoners of conscience, were executed" in 2002 [1]. It suggested a similar number in 2001 [2] and "hundreds" in 2000 [3]—and nobody can accuse Amnesty International of being soft on Saddam Hussein.

So, had Saddam Hussein been left alone, a reasonable guess is that a thousand people would have been killed by his regime over the next decade.

In fact, the US/UK invasion of Iraq, and the destruction of the Ba'athist State that followed, may have cost the lives of a million Iraqis: certainly the lives of hundreds of thousands. The precise number will never be known. In March 2015, *Physicians for Social Responsibility* published a review of the various estimates of deaths in Iraq [4] and concluded that, from the Invasion in March 2003 until December 2011 when US troops were withdrawn, "the war has, directly or indirectly, killed around 1 million people in Iraq" (p15). So, it would have taken Saddam Hussein's regime hundreds of years to match the carnage produced by Bush and Blair!

[1] www.refworld.org/docid/3edb47d84.html

[2] www.refworld.org/docid/3cf4bc140.html

[3] www.atour.com/news/international/200107101.html

[4] www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/body-count.pdf

David Morrison

The Russian Revolution

A number of readers have pointed out that in last month's article I described Miliukov as a Menshevik when he was in fact a Cadet.

I'm afraid I never took much heed of the different groups that made up the Provisional Government between February and October 1917. The essential characteristic of that Government is that it did not govern, and it was overthrown by the Bolshevik Party because it had the will to govern.

Back in the sixties, when I did most of my reading about 1917, little heed was taken either by the Trotskyist organisations or the Communist Party of either the Cadets or the SRs (Social Revolutionaries). I knew, in a kind of way, that Kerensky was an SR. The only name I could have associated with the Cadets was Struve. Virtually nothing of his was available in English, and the little I picked up about him was that he began as a Marxist and became a bourgeois. Only the Mensheviks seemed to have any relevance to the political medium in which the ICO was hatched.

Some Trotskyists were uneasily aware of a problematic relationship with Menshevism. They felt that it was obligatory to be Leninist. Everybody was Leninist, including the Master of Balliol College, Oxford. But I could not understand how Tony Cliff of the International Socialists (who was by far the most interesting of the Trotskyists intellectually) was able to maintain a veneer of Leninism over a solid foundation of sound Menshevism.

Cliff's analytical description of Russia in 1917 suggested that what was on the cards was the accomplishment of a bourgeois revolution in substance to fill out the nominal bourgeois revolution that happened with the collapse of the Tsarist State in February. But he never said anything like that while I had any kind of connection with him. He remained a dogmatic Leninist in defiance of the facts which he was establishing. And he held that Stalin betrayed the revolution which at the same time he argued was unachievable.

(Cliff's lieutenant at the time was John Palmer, a journalist on the *Financial Times*. Palmer hovered around the verge of our group for a while. His connection with it was by way of Géry Lawless.

Lawless had published a single issue of a commercially-produced (Irish emigre) newspaper, funded, I imagine, by Cliff's 'International Socialism' organisation. Palmer had an article in it entitled *Parabellum Patriot*. It was about Sean Treacy who helped to start the War of Independence, and was Palmer's uncle.)

The very strange thing about the bourgeois revolution in Russia as anticipated by Marxists, but not only by Marxists, was that it was understood that it would be a bourgeois revolution without the bourgeoisie, and that it was theoretically possible for it to be by-passed in substance. And, insofar as the Cadets figured at all in our discussions, it was as an actual bourgeois party that had somehow got involved in the bourgeois revolution.

I knew nothing about it, nor did Pat Murphy. Nor did we pretend to know. We were there amongst people with very strong opinions, but conflicting opinions, and our business to see if sufficient agreement could be brought about to enable something to be done.

The Cadets, the Constitutional Democrats, the actual bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution, supposing that is what they were, were off the agenda. And I retained the fixed idea that they were not worth bothering about. But, after I had stopped doing anything concentrated about Russia, I came across bits of Miliukov that were very much worth bothering about—and the last thing I would have assumed him to be was a Cadet.

He remarks somewhere that, while he could agree with the characterisation of the February Revolution as "*bourgeois*", it was not capitalist or landlord. It was bourgeois in the sense that it was conducted by intellectuals.

This may make little sense in Irish terms. There is no intelligentsia in Ireland. There are only careerist academics on the make in the rat-race. Contemporary Ireland may be capitalist but it is hardly bourgeois.

In France there is an intelligentsia. In Germany there used to be an intelligentsia and it shaped the world of art and thought to a very considerable extent. In Russia there was over a long period an autonomous intelligentsia which did remarkable

things. And power fell to that intelligentsia in February 1917. Or the power of State collapsed, leaving it to these parties of the intelligentsia to make a new power structure—if they could.

Tsarism fell because the Army lost confidence in the ability of the Tsar to give effective direction to the War into which he had launched it, and it looked to the Duma to take over and do it more effectively. The Duma was a Parliament that had existed since the 1905 Revolution as a powerless adviser of the Tsar.

The Grand Duke, the heir to the throne, thought of continuing the function of monarchy in conjunction with the Duma but was given to understand that this would not be tolerated. He stood aside. The Duma became sovereign with Prince Lvov as Prime Minister.

Prince Lvov was an aristocrat of very ancient lineage; a sentimental Tolstoyan who idealised the peasantry; and the organiser of a national (i.e. state-wide) federation of Zemstvos. The Zemstvo was an elected local government body established in the 1860s, after the Emancipation subverted traditional authority. I don't know how the Zemstvos functioned in their various territories, but it was to the national federation of Zemstvos that one would look for the influence of a national civil society in 1917 as the substratum for a bourgeois state. But there doesn't seem to have been any such civil society element asserting itself in the revolutionary situation.

The function of the Federation seems to have been to support the Army at war, first the Japanese War and then the war on Germany, by providing hospital services, canteen facilities, and even supply of ammunition.

Prince Lvov, though he may have been a sentimentalist at heart, was born to command. His head knew what needed to be done in the anarchy that followed the subversion of Tsarism by the Army in the hope that the Duma would construct a political order that would be more effective in supporting the war. The Dual Power of Duma and Soviets needed to be broken. The Provisional Government needed to govern, and in order to do this it needed to curb the Soviet movement—a development in the 1905 Revolution that resurfaced in February 1917. The Soviets (occupational associations) did not have the purpose of forming themselves into the State, but they were an obstacle to the formation of an effective order of state by the Duma.

It appears that Lvov saw what needed

to be done but that, either it was the kind of thing he was unwilling to undertake, or he saw that it was the kind of thing that it was appropriate for a man of the people—rather than a patriarch—to undertake. Anyhow, he handed the task over to Kerensky, the Socialist Revolutionary. And Kerensky, after a while, enlisted the Mensheviks.

Whether Kerensky understood the task and bungled it, or whether he never comprehended the task but was driven towards it by circumstances but always resisted it even while approaching it, I don't know.

Anyhow, he did not do what was required for the establishment of a political order that would prosecute the War more effectively, the Soviet movement continued to spread, and the Bolsheviks took power through the Soviets on a policy of ending the War and giving the land to the peasants—who were already taking it. And, when a Constituent Assembly, returned by state-wide elections organised by the Provisional Government, met early in 1918, there was a functional Bolshevik State in the active centres of power.

The Bolshevik State refused to give way. The Provisional Government, after a year of existence, was still so far from being a State that it could not seriously contest the issue. And, if the Bolsheviks had stood down and let things start again with the Constituent Assembly, it is likely that there would have been Civil War anyway.

British Liberalism had surrendered a few months earlier: a victim of a War which it had launched and which had found out its inadequacies. It gave way to a regime not only of Tories but, worse still, *Unionists!* A regime fronted by a Liberal opportunist driven by frantic energy and unlimited ambition: Lloyd George.

But there was continuity in the British State, because there existed, beneath the form of things, the substance of the ruling class that had directed affairs in the medium of a formal monarchy for two centuries. And, if historical comparisons conducive to political sense are to be made, the relevant British comparison with Russia is not 1917 but 1641.

The issue in 1641 was pure Parliamentary government in pursuit of an ideal. It split the reform movement of the time. The purists won. They defeated the Royalists in a Civil War. A period of parliamentary government followed. It failed. The Monarchy was restored without resistance. Then, in the course of a couple of genera-

tions, a ruling class of gentry/aristocracy took over, preserved the form of monarchy, and established what is called *the Government of the King in Parliament*, with the Prime Minister exercising the Royal Prerogative.

If England persists in representing itself as the model which the world must follow—and it still does, with disastrous effect—then let us at least know what England is politically, and how it came to be a democracy.

The Bolshevik *coup* is said to have aborted the development of a liberal democratic state in Russia. But was what Bolshevism made impossible ever a realistic possibility? The experience of many other revolutions since then suggests not.

Popular revolutions everywhere have resulted in what England describes as dictatorships—except that, when they are friendly to Britain, they are not so described. Is it at all probable that this is due to the coincidence that men of an evil disposition happen to gain influence always and use the influence to pervert the normal course of events in order to gain enormous power and wealth for themselves?

It appears that around the midsummer of 1917 in Russia the project of a collective dictatorship was thought about. It was not attempted, probably because it was incompatible with the idealism of the situation, Liberal and Marxist, that was fed by the popular turmoil. But, if it had been attempted and had succeeded and the parties of the Provisional Government had discarded their Constitutional illusions and had combined into a functional oligarchy, would that not have been somewhat similar to what was brought about in England after Parliamentary Government was tried and failed in the 1650s? What was the ruling class that commanded the situation from the Restoration in 1660 to the Reform Act in 1832—and indeed long after the Reform Act—but a collective dictatorship?

Democratic elements were gradually introduced into the oligarchic British State only after it was established so securely as a State that its overthrow by democratic agitations was hardly even a fantasy, and after it had established itself as an exploitative world Empire that drew the produce of the world to England by direct action, and the ideology of Imperialism had taken root in the mass mind of England. It was only around 1890 that the political elite of the British State began to see general democratisation as a practical proposition.

There was nothing in the English mode of democratisation that gives support for the view that Russia would probably have

become a liberal democracy in 1918 if Lenin had not dispersed the Constituent Assembly.

*

Fedor Dan was an intransigent Menshevik opponent of Bolshevism from long before 1917. He opposed the Bolshevik *coup* in 1917 and maintained an internal opposition to Bolshevism until he was exiled in 1922. Then, before he died in 1947, he wrote a survey of *The Origins of Bolshevism* of which an English translation was published in 1964. In this he describes the Bolshevik development, not as a deviation from a norm that Russia should have complied with, but as being a normal development under the circumstances of capitalism in Russia, much as Miliukov did in the extract I included last month.

He began by comparing the Russian and American states as political developments spreading over Continents:

"Nevertheless Russian evolution took a course completely different from that of the United States, although Russia, even more than America, constitutes a whole continent with inexhaustible reserves of all kinds of raw materials for industry...

"It is not the place here to linger over the conditions that governed the destiny of America. It is a fact that during the half-century that passed between the abolition of slavery and the 1914-18 World War, American industry went through a process of gigantic development. In many respects American capitalism outdistanced European capitalism. The organiser and leader of American capitalist economy—the rapidly growing bourgeoisie—actually became the ruling class in its own country. A firm, spacious and secure edifice of democracy was created on a firm capitalist foundation.

"During those 50 years the tempestuous evolution of Russia, interrupted by revolutionary explosions, took place quite differently...

"To a high degree its capitalism was imported... Its bourgeoisie never achieved the role of the ruling class—either in the sense of ruling the State or in the sense of influencing the masses of the people politically or intellectually. The 'Great Reforms' were not crowned by a democratic constitution, as had been expected by their ardent sponsors, while the State Duma wrenched forth by the 1905 revolution was very quickly reduced to the role of a mock-parliament, scarcely masking the untouched autocracy.

"But political democracy on a capitalist foundation proved to be equally decrepit and unviable in the 1917 revolution engendered by the First World War. In the course of some seven or eight months it perished—together with Russian capitalism and the Russian bourgeoisie. Only in the framework of Socialism—

and a dictatorial Socialism at that—could the task be set, and partially even realised of 'overtaking and passing' the advanced capitalist countries with respect to industry. In contradistinction to America, the 'americanisation' of Russia is being realised not in a capitalist but in a Socialist form. And there can be no doubt that if, as seems indicated, one of the consequences of the anti-Fascist victory proves to be the strengthening of political democracy, then in Russia, in any case, democracy can only be erected on a Socialist and not a capitalist foundation.

"The causes of the unviability of bourgeois democracy in Russia are contained, in the final analysis, in the historically belated entry of Russia on the path of capitalist evolution. This belatedness placed a stamp of singularity on the whole socio-economic, cultural and political development of the country..."

"My work is not a history of the *struggle* for democracy in Russia, but a history of the Russian democratic idea..."

"I hope to enable the reader to understand 'Bolshevism' not as an accidental phenomenon that was summoned to life by a quite exceptional concatenation of circumstances and that interrupted the liberation struggle, which had been going on for decades, of the Russian intelligentsia, working-class and people as a whole, but, on the contrary, as a political product of that struggle and an historically inevitable stage on the road to its consummation. For this reason any polemical intention is quite alien to this book" (p2-3).

"The profound peculiarity of Russian democratic thought lies in this, that from its inception it never for a moment idealized capitalism and was not drawn to it... The nascent Russian bourgeoisie not only was in no way a hero for the Russian democracy that was seeing the light simultaneously with it, but, on the contrary, instantly became for it an object of hostility..." (p10).

And so there was the bourgeois revolution of 1917 in which the bourgeoisie were held in contempt as a "*reactionary*" element. The bourgeois revolution was merely a stepping-stone on the way to Socialism in the view of the democratic parties. But how that step could be taken democratically remained as unclear in practice in 1917 as it had been in theory for a dozen years before 1917:

"The antithesis between Democracy and Socialism, the struggle for whose resolution runs through the history of the Russian revolutionary thought like a red thread, remained unresolved by the 1917 revolution too..." (p408).

The issue was resolved by direct action by the Bolsheviks, and then—

"just as throughout the civil war, so in the years of initial instability and

subsequent gradual consolidation when the Soviet regime, shot through by 'crises', the political profile of the regime and forces contending with each other played a minimal role in the peasant's attitude towards them. The peasantry, or individual strata of it (the 'kulaks', the 'medium peasants', the 'paupers') defined its attitude towards them exclusively from the point of view of its own struggle—in the beginning for land, then for its free use of the products of the land. The 'Constituent Assembly Front' organised by the SRs not only condemned itself to defeat in advance, but did a good deal to discredit the very idea of political democracy in its 'European' form in the eyes of the broad masses of the peasantry. This came about just because, having made this idea their banner, the S.R.s went over to the side of the anti-Bolshevik barricade where there were grouped primarily the leading forces of the so-called 'White' movement, that is, forces in which the peasants rightly saw defenders of the old landed proprietors and the champions of a reversal of the total reapportionment that had just been carried out.

"In Russian conditions circumstances so fell out that the 'kolkhoz' [collective farm] system, which definitively shattered the narrow framework of individual peasant farming, also shattered the limited intellectual and political horizon of the peasantry... For the first time it made tangible... the uninterrupted link between its own economic destiny and the destiny of the state. It was only in the school of the Soviets... that for the first time the peasantry began to learn the 'state' approach to the problems of its own socio-economic way of life too. There, in the Soviets, even after the levelling off of the electoral rights of all citizens proclaimed by the 'Stalin' constitution of 1936, remnants of the privileged classes liquidated by the Soviet revolution were scarcely represented. The monopolists were in fact the 'toilers'—the workers and peasants together with the Soviet bureaucracy and the trade union intelligentsia, who, however, were serving by now not private but state interests. That is why in spite of the 'single candidacy' of Soviet elections and of the 'one-party' regulation of Soviet policy, Soviet 'parliamentarianism' has proved to be far from a 'fiction' but an extremely real factor in the 'democratization' of the Soviet regime" (p468-9).

All of this was democratisation in the sense of the creation of a *demos*—an interconnected national political body. And it is only when such a national body politic exists that the rivalry of political parties for the control of Government in a stable state structure can be carried on.

Iraq in 1990 was in the process of being democratised in this basic sense—of being formed into a national body politic—when

the Western Imperialist democracies declared that it was subject to a Tyranny or Despotism or Dictatorship and decided to overthrow the 'regime'. When the 'regime' was overthrown, a wild murderous anarchy set in, and multi-party elections were held in the disrupted body-politic. These elections could do no more than reflect the anarchy to which society had been reduced by invasion. A British Minister, Hillary Benn, commented: "*We gave them their freedom, and it was up to them what they did with it*".

What multi-party Iraq did, in the condition of being a disrupted body-politic, was make war on itself. What the Russia of the Stalin Constitution did was defeat Nazi Germany after Germany had defeated Poland, France and Britain had withdrawn from the war in Europe after having launched it.

What Dan says about the onset of the World War is entirely free of the fantasy evasions of Trotskyism, and of much more than Trotskyism:

"'Munich' was not merely a political compromise with Hitler. In Munich the governments of Great Britain and France sanctioned his destruction of Czechoslovakia and its *de facto* occupation. After the fusion with Austria, with the closeness to the Nazi Government of Germany not only of the governments of Hungary and Rumania, but also of the 'Colonels' government of Poland, which had taken part in the divisions of Czechoslovakia and had previously refused to give the Red Army the right to pass through Polish territory in case of a war with Fascist Germany, this meant the definitive military-strategic exposure of the Western border of the Soviet Union, the annihilation of the last obstacle to an invasion of its borders by the Hitler armies..." (p430).

And the Soviet/German Pact was a holding operation in response to Munich.

The contrast between Russian conduct in the two World Wars is very great. In 1914 Tsarist Russia was ready for war. It had war aims—very ambitious, expansionist, aims—to which Britain had encouraged it. It was ready to spring, and its sprang. Its mobilisation in July set things in motion. It went on the offensive, advanced, was stopped, and began to break down.

Stalin wrote somewhere in praise of defensive tactics of the kind often employed by Britain. He had no war aims—no reason for going to war. German Intelligence reported that what they encountered was a defensive deployment of a kind that might be adapted for offence. There were Russian reverses in the early stage of the

German invasion but the defensive line was never broken. The German advance was held, and it was then that the Russian steamroller went into motion—causing Britain to scramble back on the Continent after years of delay. And there was no rebellion. The newly-created Russian *demos* held firm throughout the War.

Dan makes reference to articles on Bolshevism by Martov that sound interesting, but I could find no trace of them in English. Martov, who was Dan's brother-in-law, was the oracle of Menshevism. He had combined with Lenin to give Marxist Social Democracy a coherent voice in a magazine called *Iskra*.

The Menshevik/Bolshevik split was a political parting of the ways between Martov and Lenin. Martov wanted to educate the working class to act politically for itself. Lenin could not see the workers, as non-owners of property, cohering as a class politically. His strategy was that working-class action in politics was practically possible only under the hegemony of a scientific socialist party.

Dan suggests that the establishment of socialist economy after the Bolshevik revolution, was assisted by the stratum of Menshevik-educated workers that took part in it. I think that probably was the case. But there is hardly anything of Menshevism available in English translation. Why should there be? Why should the bourgeois world which they failed in 1917 be interested in them? They were committed to a bourgeois-democratic transition to socialism. The bourgeoisie was happy with that as a thing that would never happen. But Menshevism failed—and then its effects were absorbed into the melting pot of the Revolution. Why should bourgeois England bother with them? The wonder is that Dan's book was translated and published.

The translation is, however, introduced with an uneasy Preface by Professor Leonard Shapiro, rejecting the idea that only Bolshevism met the requirements of the condition of Russia in 1917. What if, he says, the others had not done what they did, and had instead done something closer to what the Bolsheviks did?

"The victory of Bolshevism was perhaps only 'inevitable' in the sense that, assuming all the actors in the drama, including the Mensheviks, behaved as they did, it became possible... for Lenin to achieve his object of overthrowing the democratic regime which came into being in February... The Mensheviks *could* after all, have followed the advice of Plekhanov... and have made it more possible for the Provisional Government to

establish a stable regime, which *could* have taken Russia out of the war without ensuring collapse. The Provisional Government, in turn, *could* have shown more foresight in realizing the importance of ending the war, establishing its own legitimacy and disarming the Bolsheviks and their private army—and so on and so forth. There is nothing 'inevitable' in history except the fact that human beings behave in a manner which accords with their traditions, habits and preconceived prejudices..."

Is that not just another way of saying that if the Provisional Government, which was something less than a regime, had acted authoritatively, and made itself a regime by doing what it left for the Bolsheviks to do, there would probably have been no Bolshevik Revolution?

But could the Provisional Government, which owed its existence to the Army, and was committed to the War, have ended the War in defiance of the Army?

Dan, who was present in the situation, took account, with hindsight, of the substantial things in the course of events which provided sufficient reason for the way things went. Shapiro seeks refuge in things that the Provisional Government might have contemplated but did not do.

Long ago, in Belfast Central Library, I came across the *Memoirs* of Baron Wrangel, entitled *From Serfdom To Bolshevism*. I am not certain that he was the famous Whiteguard General. The book gives no information about him, and a biography of the Whiteguard General makes no reference to this book. Anyhow, the following piece, which I copied out, sums up the way the Army saw its Provisional Government:

"The curtain has fallen upon 'the absolutism of the Romanovs'. It was to be followed by a stupid force: 'Eunuchs in power', and that by a closing tragedy, 'King Israel', a drama approved by the Governments of Germany, Britain, Italy and Bulgaria..."

"The Provisional Government consisted of Messrs. Kerensky, Miliukov... but there is no point in mentioning their names. These men, these emasculated wretches, rather, are not as interesting as the Europeans believe them to be. I have seen more than one of their kind in the East; at the first glance you would never suspect them of being the kind of creatures they are. It is only when you can see them at close quarters that you can see that they are entirely lacking in virility and that they are incredibly flabby creatures absolutely destitute of will power; that they are good for nothing and not even competent to look after the ladies of the seraglio... Just as in Russia the 'Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' settled every-

thing... [Wrangel was in the Crimea.] The wretched creatures were therefore merely ornamental objects who did more harm than good. They were harmful because they brought everything into confusion and chaos and let things take their course.

"But I must say a few words about the Grand Eunuch, Kerensky. For some months he was the favourite clown, the principal actor in the force, the star buffoon who got the publicity. He played every part: Minister of Justice, tribune, darling child, young premier, grand old man, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the armies..."

"Fortunately the Bolsheviks cleared out the eunuchs shortly afterwards and rid us of that verminous crowd. That was the one good action they did; though it is true that afterwards they extracted heavy payment for that service..." (*From Serfdom To Bolshevism*, English edition 1927).

That was the bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie—a bourgeois revolution conducted by the intelligentsia—as seen from the viewpoint of the Army, which is, after all, the basic institution of a state.

The Army brought down the Tsar in the hope of getting a Parliamentary Government that would provide it with the means of fighting the War more effectively. The Parliament was implicated with the Soviet movement right from the start through the person of Kerensky. A Soviet was an association of people in the same occupation which decided how things should be done in that occupation.

One of the first acts of the Parliament was to democratise the Army by recognising the associations of its various layers as being authoritative. But an Army is necessarily hierarchical. The Army of the most democratic democracy must be hierarchical in order to be functional. The Parliament subverted hierarchical subordination in an Army at war, and exhorted the officers to establish effective control by means of tact and wisdom.

The Bolsheviks brushed aside the Provisional Government, ended the Tsarist War to which the bourgeois democracy had dedicated itself, and constructed an Army which took on and defeated all-comers.

Brendan Clifford

TO BE CONTINUED

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Azerbaijan Year 1918

The Year of 1918 was a very significant one for the Azeri people, one that is being marked in a series of centenary commemorations presently being held in Azerbaijan, the state that came out of the events of that year.

In March of 1918 the Azerbaijanis in Baku were the victims of a substantial massacre by Armenian forces intent on ethnically cleansing Moslems and other peoples from their traditional lands and carving out "*Magna Armenia*". The Armenian *Dashnak* death squads were backed up with military, financial and moral support from the Western Powers, particularly Britain. They were assisted on the spot by the Baku Commune, under the leadership of an Armenian Bolshevik, Stepan Shaumyan. Shaumyan, acting on Bolshevik authority and attempting to secure Baku's oil for the Leninist state, collaborated in this most reactionary of nationalist ventures.

On 28th May 1918 came the Azeri fightback and the Proclamation of state independence of Azerbaijan. On September 15th Baku was liberated from the combined British/Bolshevik/Armenian forces holding it by a Turkish/Azeri Army commanded by the brother of Enver Pasha. The Government of Azerbaijan entered the city, forming a parliament on December 7th. This Government was recognised by the Command of Allied forces and the British Government on December 28th. It was the first democratic government established in the region—the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the Azerbaijanis were provoked into state formation by the events that engulfed them in late 1917-18. The Armenian *Dashnak* project of Greater Armenia which necessitated the clearing out of the native population, using the Great War as cover for vast ethnic cleansing and killing, meant that the Azeris had to organise to survive as a people. Out of tragedy came nationhood.

Greater Armenia was an insane project of the Armenian *Dashnaks*, sponsored by the Western Liberal Anglosphere. It was fundamentally a racist project involving the attempted destruction of the vast majority of inhabitants of an area to sate the demands of a much smaller number who were promoted as a special people,

with rights of a higher order than the mass of humanity. The Armenians were deemed to be Western, despite having existed in the East for all of their history, and being Christian, were regarded as being a cut above the rest. They were deserving of nationhood whilst others were not!

Magna Armenia claimed Six Vilayets of the Ottoman Empire and a sizeable portion of the Caucasus. This state would have comprised in land area about nearly half of modern Turkey and large parts of what is now Georgia, Azerbaijan, some parts of Iran as well as present day Armenia. The Six Vilayets of so-called "Ottoman Armenia" which were claimed were only about 17 per cent Armenian in 1914. In the entire area claimed by the *Dashnaks*—including the Erivan and Kars provinces of Russia, along with the Six Vilayets and Cilicia—only 21 per cent of the population was Armenian and 73 per cent Moslem.

The logic of Magna Armenia was that either a small minority would have to rule over a much larger majority by force or it would have to clear a large body of the existing population out, either through death or ethnic cleansing. That was what was actually attempted by the *Dashnaks*, and the experience of the Azeris demonstrates conclusively what a successful Armenian state would have resulted in, but on a much larger scale.

One of the most successful *Dashnak* killers and ethnic cleansers was General Andranik. On 19th June 1919—fresh from his killing spree in Azerbaijan, where he had led heavily armed bands of Armenians into villages of defenceless unarmed Moslems and had put everyone, regardless of age or sex to the sword—he appeared on a platform in Westminster with Lord Bryce, William Gladstone's son, G.P. Gooch (famous historian), and our own, T.P. O'Connor.

The record of that meeting was produced as a pamphlet by the Armenian Bureau in London in 1919. Standing beside the murderer/ethnic cleanser, General Andranik, T.P. O'Connor used a famous Gladstonian phrase to declare his support for Andranik's treatment of the Moslems:

"Out with them, Bag and Baggage! (Applause). I agree with all Lord Bryce said as to what the future Armenia should

be. It ought to be a big Armenia, not a small one" (*Armenia and the Settlement*).

A map appears in the pamphlet to show people what Magna Armenia meant in geographical terms. It would have required unimaginable slaughter to have achieved it.

Of course, in the end, only a small Armenia was produced. And that had to be established with the killing or expulsion of nearly 500,000 Azeris from their traditional lands, which had been the Erivan Khanate.

Before the Great War Tsarist Russia had attempted to establish a coherent Armenian colony as a Christian buffer in the Caucasus through a policy of relocating the scattered Armenians on the territories of Nakhchivan, Garabagh and Erivan. In 1905-07 there were Moslem risings against the results of their being supplanted and dispossessed. In response, over 300 Azerbaijani communities were destroyed and Moslems driven out of cities like Baku, Tiflis and Erivan.

However, it was the Great War which finally provided the kind of catastrophic situation for the Armenian *Dashnaks* to avail of, a time in which all things were possible, and all manner of things could be done.

At the start of the Great War the *Dashnaks* and Armenian volunteers for the Tsarist Armies pushing West against the Ottoman Empire were restrained by the Russian State. But in 1917 the Russian State began to collapse. In the new period of flux the Armenian forces were needed not only by those who were seeking to establish a new Russian state but also by Britain, which was attempting to re-organise a new Front against the Ottomans to replace the dissolving forces of its Tsarist ally.

As the Russian Army began to disintegrate around Lenin's Decree of Peace in November 1917, an Ottoman advance into the Caucasus became both possible and necessary. It was possible to recapture Ottoman territory lost to the Tsar's armies, not only from 1914 but also from the wars of 1878. It was also necessary to secure the safety of the Moslem population that now found itself without the protection of the Russian State and at the mercy of the Armenians. There had been no prospect of an Ottoman advance until Lenin's *Decree on Land* invited the peasant soldiers home to claim their farms and dispersed the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

This was the unexpected situation that

confronted the British in late 1917 in the Caucasus.

The Leninist disorganisation of the Russian armies brought the pre-War fears of the British to the fore—the fears that had made them plan for and make War on Germany in 1914. Chief among these fears was the prospect of a Berlin-Baghdad Railway.

It was now being suggested in England that Germany had reoriented the direction of its *Drang nach Osten* towards the Caucasus. The capture of Baghdad by the British in the spring of 1917 had denied the Germans the original objective of their Railway and they had diverted their route eastward instead. For the British all the obsessions became one. The collapse of the Russian Caucasian Front facilitated the *German Drang nach Osten* and the supposed Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian project of their Ottoman allies. The Ministry of Information under John Buchan, who had written extensively about such things in his novels, was inspired. A Cabinet Eastern Committee under Lord Curzon was established to stop the rot.

Arnold Toynbee, famous historian and then political adviser to the British Cabinet, warned:

"The Berlin-Baghdad Railway may die but the Berlin-Bokura line through Asia Minor and Northern Persia will live. This is the new German ambition... this all-land route would be a direct menace to the British position in the Persian Gulf and would seriously threaten India from the west and north west" (FO 371/3060/226241/W/44, 28 November 1917, Supplement on Report on Pan-Turanian movement.)

Arthur Balfour, summing up all of these fears wrote to Lord Reading:

"Germany is trying to weaken us by reducing the Middle East and through it India to the same condition of disorder as she has reduced Russia. She hopes to do this by... Pan-Turanian propaganda, backed by Turco-German military force. Their agents are already endeavouring to stir up Persia, Turkestan and Afghanistan. The Turks have now captured Batum and if they capture Kars, as seems probable, they will be masters of the Caucasus and their road towards Central Asia and India will be open. Unless this movement is checked it is bound to have far-reaching effects..." (FO 371/3327/69398/W/38, 20 April 1918).

Arms, military training, finances and moral support were all made available to the Armenians on condition they held the line in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. The British even courted and went into a temporary alliance of convenience with

the emerging State authority in Russia, the Bolsheviks. Trotsky's Bolshevik armed trains escorted British Imperialist agents around the Caucasus to help cement alliance with the Armenian forces.

However, the Dashnaks were not about to be the willing stooges of the British and Bolsheviks. The Armenians knew that they themselves were the only force on the ground for Britain—a maritime power in bitter conflict with Germany—and for the Bolsheviks, who were only able to hold the oil city of Baku with the guns of the Dashnaks. The Armenians began making provision for their own state, through ethnic cleansing and killing operations against peaceful Moslem settlements in the Caucasus hinterland.

The Dashnaks did this from a position of strength. The British and Bolsheviks tolerated their killing expeditions because they had little choice in the matter if they were to have military forces on the ground. British records reveal that the Foreign Office was well aware what was going on against innocent Moslems and decided to suppress the news lest it cause consternation in the US, from which fresh armies were needed from to win the War. Denial was the order of the day.

Any available force was used to win the Great War. Britain would have utilised both Azeris and Georgians as cannon fodder against the Ottomans as well. However, both were reluctant to fight alongside the Armenians for various reasons. The Azeris knew their security rested with the Turks. The Georgians tended toward support for the Germans as protectors against the Armenians.

The peaceful, unmilitary Azeris were severely disadvantaged against the strongly militarised Armenians. An alternative Azeri development to the Armenian militarisation could not take place. Unlike, the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis had not been told by the West that they were a nation, destined to arise from the surrounding peoples with a special case for nationhood.

There were also few Azeris in the Russian Army of the Caucasus. Despite a general Conscription in 1886, the Azerbaijanis were not drafted because the Tsar distrusted them: he imposed a tax on them instead. The Russian Army had no separate Moslem regiments, so the Azerbaijanis were militarily undeveloped—as opposed to the Armenians, who were highly militarised in both regular Russian forces and irregular Dashnak bands.

In many ways, the Azerbaijanis'

position was similar to that of the Irish Catholics, an unarmed and unmilitary people, opposed by the Ulster Protestants—a highly militarised people, armed both formally and informally by the British State and given their own Division in the British Army. All the military advantages lay with the Armenians, despite being much few in number in the region.

Baku was thrown into flux by a series of events, including the collapse of Tsarist authority, the disintegration of the Russian Army, the Bolshevik *coup*, the arming and arrival of large bodies of Armenians, and the expectation of British Imperialist intervention.

Baku was the only major stronghold of the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia. It was important for the oil industry that had developed over the previous three decades and it had something of a proletariat which had developed out of it. Around a quarter of a million lived there, composed of three peoples—Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Russians. There was a large temporary workforce resident in Baku, mostly Russian. The Azeris were the predominant permanent element of the population in the town and surrounding country.

At the end of March 1918, the Baku Bolsheviks allied themselves with the Armenians to repress the Azeri majority and its Musavat Party and the 'March Events' in Baku occurred. Stepan Shaumyan, who was appointed Commissar for the Caucasus by Lenin, and who led the commune in Baku, was an Armenian who combined his Bolshevism with anti-Moslem proclivities. Certainly, under his authority, a substantial amount of ethnic cleansing of Azeri villages occurred in early 1918.

Shaumyan had another interest in pursuing an ethnic war against the Azerbaijani Moslems, one that was completely against socialist principle. He had been appointed to act as head of a Provisional Government of an Armenian state as part of the Bolshevik '*On Armenia*' Decree.

On March 2nd Shaumyan made a speech condemning the Musavat Party for attempting to secede from Russia. He had been stung by the victory of the Musavat in the elections to the Baku Soviet. There is evidence, from a letter signed by both Lenin and Stalin, that the Bolsheviks had concerns about Shaumyan's Armenian-Nationalist deviation. The letter, in March 1918, told Shaumyan that Comrade Kobozev was being sent as Extraordinary Commissar to Baku and urged him to develop an accommodation with the Moslems and grant autonomy if necessary.

The object was to fortify Bolshevik power in Baku by winning round a sizeable section of Muslims. Any confrontation with local inhabitants was unnecessary and counter-productive. However, Shaumyan did not act in accordance with the letter, if he received it before the end of March, and acted instead in an Armenian ethnic-nationalist manner against the Moslems.

The Azeris were unwilling to fight with the Bolsheviks for a number of reasons. Firstly, they saw the Bolsheviks as merely the expansionary Russian State in new form, particularly since the Pravda Decree, *On Armenia*.

Secondly, the leader of the Bolsheviks was an Armenian with a clear anti-Moslem agenda. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks had been using the Armenians, arming and organising them as a military force and, if the Bolsheviks were driven out, what would be left was a serious threat to Moslem existence in the area.

However, the Bolshevik/Dashnak force was primarily an alliance of convenience against the Moslem majority. Over two-thirds of the 20,000 strong anti-Azeri forces were Armenian and the Armenian element from the Russian Caucasus Army was the best trained element. The Armenian force was indispensable to the Bolsheviks who did not have the support necessary to impose themselves on the Moslem majority inhabitants.

The Armenians initially declared neutrality in the power struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Musavat and deployed for self-defence, hoping to see both forces weakened in the conflict, leaving the city for their taking afterwards. However, as soon as the conflict began, the Dashnaks ordered their forces into battle. The Azeris, who had taken Armenian neutrality in good faith, were taken by surprise by the turn about in their position. After Bolshevik gunboats had decimated the Moslem quarters of the city, Lenin urged Shaumyan to call a ceasefire. The Armenian forces availed of this to carry out a large massacre of the Moslem population.

British Foreign Office reports note that the Armenians, after initially declaring neutrality, availed of the Bolshevik assault on the Musavat to kill over 8,000 Tartars and massacre 18,000 in Elizavetpol. It was reported that the Tartars (Azeris) had suffered substantial losses and a large proportion had been driven out of Baku.

The March events temporarily strengthened the Bolsheviks in Baku. Azeri political power was crushed and the

Armenians weakened. The Armenian forces were absorbed into the Baku Red Army and the remainder disbanded. The Baku Council of People's Commissars was set up on 25th April and declared itself the first Soviet Government in Caucasus.

However, the Armenians had a much different agenda than the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks did not want British intervention whereas that was the primary aim of the Armenians.

Shaumyan dressed up the massacre in the language of class struggle to please his masters and justify his actions. However, by using the Armenians to repress the Moslem majority, the Bolsheviks completely alienated the Azeris. Many fled the city and waited on the Ottoman Army to be their saviours. The Bolsheviks and Armenians became dependent on British Imperialism and the despatch of a British Expeditionary force under General Dunsterville. British Intelligence Officers in the city prepared the ground for the demise of the Bolsheviks and a British/Armenian defence of the city.

The British decided to ally temporarily with the Bolsheviks and Armenians and defend Baku with Dunsterville's expeditionary force. *"If the Armenians get the upper hand it may be possible for General Dunsterville to effect something"*, said Colonel Pike's report from Tiflis. This suggested that the British believed that ultimately it would be the Armenians, on whom the Bolsheviks in Baku had become dependent, who could be relied upon to open the gates to the British forces and ultimately displace the Bolsheviks altogether. Thus, the Dunsterville force, which had originally been assembled to block the Ottomans before the Caucasus, now headed to Baku to stop the Ottomans at the Caspian Sea and secure the oil wells for the British Empire.

Ronald MacDonell, the British vice-consul of Baku in 1918 later recorded his view of the March events in a report for General Dunsterville:

"...trouble started between the Bolsheviks and Musselman over the disarmament of a Musselman ship and culminated in the March massacres. The Armenians joined hands with the Bolsheviks and the Musselman was practically turned out of Baku, not a single Musselman of any importance remaining.

"As may be imagined this added fresh fuel to the hostile feeling felt against us by the Musselman of the Caucasus. Even Russian Officers asked us, half in jest, how much the British Government paid

to carry out such a successful campaign and rid Baku of the Turkophile elements.

"At the time I protested before the Armenian National Council, and still maintain that they made one of the biggest mistakes in their history when they supported the Bolsheviks against the Musselman. The whole of the blame for this policy must be laid at the door of the Armenian Political Society known as the Dashnachtsasoun... Without Armenian support the Bolsheviks in those days could never have dared to take action against the reactionary Musselman."

Although MacDonell was truthful in his allocating blame for the massacre of 12,000 people to the Armenian Dashnaks, he was being disingenuous in avoiding responsibility on behalf of his own Government. It could not have been believed, given the record of the Dashnaks, that the British Government could use them as mere instruments of a policy. The Armenian Dashnaks had their own fundamental objective of clearing territory of Moslems to establish their Greater Armenia and the fact cannot be avoided that the British facilitated them in this in pursuance of what MacDonnell himself called *"the common cause"*. MacDonell himself had provided the finance himself on his train rides from Baku to Tiflis.

The massacre in Baku in March was only one of a series of atrocities that took place. Right across the territory that would become Azerbaijan—in Goychay, Aresh, Javad, Lankaran, Nukha, Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrail, Nakhchyvan and Zangazur—massacres were conducted against innocent civilians by Flying Columns of Dashnaks who would come to an area and devastate it, killing all and sundry. In a few months more than 50,000 were murdered by Armenian armed groups and many more driven from their homes to become refugees in their own land. These actions led on to deaths in the hundreds of thousands from hunger and epidemics that followed the Armenian pogroms.

Only the liberation of Baku by the Turkish/Azerbaijani Army, under Nuru Pasha, on 16th September 1918 put a halt to the campaign and saved a people to build a nation.

Pat Walsh



**Forgotten Aspects
Of Ireland's Great
War On Turkey,
1914-24 by Dr. Pat
Walsh. 540pp.
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The *Irish Times* And the 1918 Anti-Conscription Campaign

The *Irish Times* does not like close scrutiny of its record in this Decade of Centenaries. It entrusted its loyal journalist Ronan McGreevy with editing its own 1916 Centenary Book, *Was it for this? Reflections on the 1916 Rising*. On 20th May 2016 it went on to indulge McGreevy in shamelessly plugging his/their own book himself, and the unique view held by him of that paper's role in 1916, which he sought to push to the fore. And so came the *apologia* from His Master's Voice:

"Contrary to what has often been suggested since, *The Irish Times* never explicitly called for the executions of the leaders of the Rising, but neither did it condemn them. In August 1916, the newspaper suggested the hanged Sir Roger Casement deserved his fate."

How on earth could McGreevy employ such mealy mouthed terminology as "*never explicitly*" to what the *Irish Times* had actually and unequivocally called for? Let us recall that paper's exact words: "*The State has struck, but its work is not yet finished. The surgeon's knife has been put to the corruption in the body of Ireland, and its course must not be stayed until the whole malignant growth has been removed.*" By McGreevy's 'logic', the *Irish Independent* should also be exonerated of the charge that it had called for Connolly and Mac Diarmada to be finished off, because it "*never explicitly*" named them!

McGreevy's "*contrary to*" was, in fact, directed against a former *Irish Times* journalist, John Horgan, who had addressed that issue head on in the *Irish Times* of September 24th 2005. In the concluding sentence of his review of Donal Nevin's biography of James Connolly, Horgan wrote:

"We probably need a book on Connolly in every generation to keep his memory green. Perhaps the next one will also remind us, not only of the *Irish Independent's* splenetic editorial on the eve of the execution of Connolly and MacDiarmada, but also of the *Irish Times's* cold-blooded and repeated exhortations to Asquith and Maxwell, as the protests against the executions gathered momentum, to wield 'the surgeon's knife... until the whole malignant growth has been removed'."

The reality had actually been even worse than that, for such a precise *Irish Times* call had been made from the very outset, in its issue of April 28, 1916, in advance of—and in order to advance—the wave of executions that would run from May 3rd to May 12th.

In his oration at a Liam Lynch commemoration on 11th September 2016, Martin Man-

sergh also pointed out:

"The cursory trials and summary executions, not to mention the out of hand executions carried out by Captain Bowen-Colthurst of these parts, were a travesty of justice... Let us be clear about it. Organs of Irish Unionist opinion in 1916, like the *Irish Times*, like the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, were enthusiastic supporters of the military dictatorship established under General Maxwell, and instituted by a supine British Government, and wanted no early curtailment of martial law. They wanted revolution put down once and for all... President Michael D. Higgins was correct when he said at Easter that but for the Rising his office would not exist."

That evening, a report appeared online, in which the *Irish Times* Munster correspondent, Barry Roche, diligently recorded:

"Recalling the cursory trials and summary executions of the 1916 leaders and how it was supported by organs of Irish Unionist opinion at the time including *The Irish Times*, Dr Mansergh was critical of the argument by former Taoiseach, John Bruton, that Home Rule would have led to Irish independence... Dr Mansergh said in case anyone thought it was because Irish nationalists were seeking a Republic, Lloyd George said in the House of Commons that it was not about whether Ireland was to be a Republic but rather its very demand for sovereign independence which could not be permitted..."

On the following day, September 12th, **the '*Irish Times*' printed—from its own correspondent's report—not a single word!**

A century ago, in its editorial of 24th April 1918, assessing the previous day's anti-Conscription General Strike, the *Irish Times* maintained:

"That issue is not whether Ireland shall, or shall not, be forced to fight in France, but whether Ireland is to be the only free country that rejects its duty in this war."

How it described "*that issue*" was as much an outrageous lie as was its description of Ireland as a "*free country*". But, lest I be accused of selective quotation, I hereunder reproduce that editorial in full.

But, firstly, some context from *Irish Times* pronouncements during the previous week, as well as some weeks subsequent to that General Strike. In its editorial of 16th April 1918, "*Ireland and*

Conscription", the *Irish Times* argued that the British Government's intention to impose conscription on Ireland demanded greater detail in order to hammer home to the dumb Irish that it would be ruthlessly enforced, as indeed should have been done at the very outset two years previously, in 1916:

"There has been much wild abuse of the Government's conscription proposals for Ireland, but little or no useful criticism. Irish Unionists see defects in the proposals, but have abstained from criticism in the knowledge that such criticism would be widely and deliberately misinterpreted. No doubt, Sir Edward Carson's criticism yesterday will be deliberately misinterpreted. He has taken the risk, however, with his usual courage, and the Government will be wise to accept his advice and warning without further delay. We agree with Sir Edward Carson that the Government's manner of introducing its proposals for Ireland is largely responsible for the widespread notion in this country that they are not intended seriously and will not be enforced. The longer that notion is allowed to prevail, the greater the trouble of enforcing them must become; and it will not be dispelled by mere assertion that the Government is really in earnest. If the Government is really in earnest, all its plans must be ready, and ought to have been published before now. It has published no plans... The truth seems to be that, having postponed Irish conscription for two years without the smallest justification, the Government has now rushed at it in a hurry, under the direst military necessity, and has thought out nothing at all..."

The warmongering *Irish Times* was horrified by the complete national unity against Conscription that would be signed, sealed and delivered at the Mansion House Conference of 18th April 1918. Its "*Nationalists and Conscription*" editorial of April 19th fulminated:

"Nationalist Ireland has taken, solemnly and unanimously, a course which may well prove fatal for all the country's hopes of settlement and peace. The new Military Service Bill was passed through the House of Lords yesterday, and has received the Royal Assent. It makes Ireland liable to conscription... Our young manhood must be enrolled for service in France. Against that lawful and most necessary demand the whole of Nationalist Ireland is now in revolt. The leaders of all the Nationalist parties—official, independent, and *Sinn Féin*—met yesterday in Dublin and decided that the Government's decision was a 'declaration of war on the Irish nation', which must be resisted by 'the most effective methods at their disposal'. They sent a deputation to Maynooth, where the Roman Catholic Hierarchy sat in council, and, simultaneously with the issue of the report of the Dublin Conference, the bishops published a pronouncement to their flocks. It declares that conscription should be resisted by 'all

means that are consonant with the laws of God' (Who said, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's'), and it identifies the whole organisation of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland with the revolt against the new Act..."

"If the Government is compelled to enforce conscription in this country and meets with any general resistance, Home Rule will receive its *quietus*, and Ireland, so far as the interest and sympathy of the free nations are concerned, will be as dead as the moon. Her soul will perish in a sordid and, perhaps, blood-stained confusion at the moment when the defeat of Germany's ambitions will make the world young again—a place of boundless possibilities for the triumphant civilisations of Europe and America. If Ireland refuses to send her sons to France, either as honourable volunteers or as honourable conscripts, she will forfeit the good-will of the United States and need never look again for help or sympathy to the democracy of England. She has today what seems to be her very last opportunity of saving her honour and preserving her peace..."

Immediately following on from its Editorials of 22nd April 1918, the *Irish Times* gave us the words of its own Spiritual Director, His Grace the Anglican Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. J.H. Bernard, who, basing himself on the Biblical text "*Fear God, honour the king*", had been preaching as follows at Sunday Service in St. Michan's Church (C of I):

"At this moment a deliberate attempt is being made in this country to prevent the law as to military service from becoming operative. Ireland is called upon, in the sacred name of liberty, to refuse to take her share in the great struggle for liberty which is rending the world in twain. I do not comment in this place on the aims and the wisdom of those who thus openly disavow allegiance to the King and the Empire. I speak to my own people, the members of the Church of Ireland ... Whatever others do... we shall accept without complaint the Act of Parliament which requires each man in the nation to do his utmost in the nation's cause... Do not wait to be conscripts. Offer your services as voluntary recruits without delay... Your duty remains the same, whether others are cowards or shirkers or traitors or not. It is your part, you loyal men who are not afraid, to do something to redeem the good name of Ireland from the shame to which it had been brought... Honour the King is a Bible precept which carries weight with some of us still."

By "*rending the world in twain... in the nation's cause*", this warmongering Prelate meant, of course "*the British nation*". Under the heading of "THE CLERGY AND CONSCRIPTION", that same issue of the *Irish Times* also carried a letter from "A Clergyman" C of I, who complained:

"The exemption of the clergy from conscription is a doubtful gift... The heads of the Church (of Ireland—MOR) have given proof of personal loyalty and zeal... If

conscription ever is really enforced in Ireland, there will be many jobs in which clergymen might be very useful without any wrong to their cloth."

In his 2011 book, *A City in Wartime—Dublin 1914-18*, Padraig Yeates recorded:

"Southern unionists had a more realistic assessment of the state of the country than Dublin Castle... (and of) the irresistible rise of Sinn Fein. This was reflected in the election of hard-liners to the Unionist Council in the first week of June 1918. The *Irish Times* (editorial, June 10)... did reflect the growing belief among southern liberal unionists that the time for compromise was over. On Sunday 9 June there was a small demonstration of the widening gulf between the majority of the Protestant community and their co-religionists who had embraced the nationalist position. A group of Protestant anti-conscription women arrived early at Christ Church Cathedral to hold a private prayer session. They had written to the Dean notifying them of their intention. Although they had received no reply, they were surprised to find the doors closed. The group, which included such well-known figures as Alice Stopford Green, Sarah Harrison, Susan Mitchell, Nelly O'Brien and Alice Milligan, knelt down in the pouring rain to hold their prayer meeting. As they were about to leave, an unidentified church official came out, took a copy of the anti-conscription pledge from one of the women and tore it to pieces, saying he 'would not allow any rubbish of that kind in the church'. (*Irish Independent*, June 10)."

"The prayer meeting and the rain were both a foretaste of 'Woman's Day', when thousands of women took to the streets of Dublin and braved gales of up to 55 miles per hour and torrential rain to demonstrate their opposition to conscription. Up to fifteen thousand signatures were collected for the anti-conscription pledge in the vestibule of City Hall, a short distance from Christ Church. Many women's groups marched to City Hall and other venues to take the pledge. The largest was the contingent of 2,400 from the Irish Women Workers' Union, who marched with (its post-Rising General Secretary) Louie Bennett at their head. Louie Bennett was a member of that remarkable generation of women activists to emerge from Dublin's Protestant middle classes to campaign for social justice... Her (own) first recruit (to the IWWU) was her lifelong friend Helen Chenevix... the daughter of a Church of Ireland bishop and, like Bennett, a combination of militant suffragist and advocate of passive resistance" (pp 239-41).

In its editorial of 10th June 1918, the *Irish Times* gave full vent to its fury at the mounting successes of the anti-conscription campaign:

"Within the last few weeks the whole situation has suffered a radical and rapid change for the worse. Three months ago a large number of moderate Nationalists were anxious for a reasonable settlement; that party no longer asserts itself in public affairs. Three months ago the Nationalist Party was a constitutional party; today it has been absorbed, for all practical purposes, in the movement which has declared open war on England. The basis of the Irish Convention was national recognition of the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament. Within the last few weeks the most powerful force in Ireland—the Roman Catholic Hierarchy—has defied that authority on an essential point of principle, and has rallied the whole of Nationalist Ireland to its support. These hammer-blows, following one another in swift succession ... have compelled Southern Unionists to fall back with one accord on their last line of defence... *Sinn Fein* (in this period, the paper always used italics when referring to that party's name, being in an Irish language foreign to it—MOR), now the largest party in Ireland, will accept nothing less than absolute independence... The Government dare not offer the least with which the Nationalists will be content. It dare not offer virtual independence to a country which at the moment is sodden with disaffection, and, by its refusal to do its duty in the war, is doing its best to prevent the Allies from winning the war. Moderate Unionists who supported settlement so long as it seemed to be possible are compelled to recognise today that the time is utterly unsuitable for constitutional changes, and that the only palliative for Ireland's ills—we shall not call it a cure—is just and firm government. To that conclusion they have been driven by the folly of the Nationalist Party, the disloyalty of *Sinn Fein*, and the intolerable claims of the Roman Catholic Church. The Mansion House Conference has undone all the work of the Irish Convention... (resulting in) the natural and definite change in the policy of the Irish Unionist Alliance..."

In contrast to its own warmongering Archbishop, the *Irish Times* denounced as "*intolerable claims*" the adherence by the Catholic Church in Ireland to the national anti-Conscription campaign, and pronounced that peaceful anti-War movement to be itself a declaration of "*open war on England*". The only appropriate response, in the view of the *Irish Times*, was for England to subject Ireland, more than ever before, to "*firm government*". This, then, is the context in which to read its editorial on the General Strike.

Manus O'Riordan

Editorial Note: Due to pressure of space, *The Irish Times* editorial on the 1918 General Strike: 'IRELAND AND CONSCRIPTION' has been held over to the May issue.

Does It Up

Stack ?

ELECTRONIC MADNESS.

How far does the madness for electronics go before someone shouts **stop!**

Has it gone too far already? Any person of herd-like mentality will tend to get angry at any suggestion that the pursuit of electronics and computerisation has gone too far. Many independently-minded people have given up and say it is too late to even try and stop this juggernaut of computer usage.

Computers are useful for certain routine and complicated tasks such as calculating Net Pay from Gross Pay for a large employer. But it must be said that the complications of the tax system have increased simply because The Revenue Commissioners have insisted on computerisation and have at the same time complicated the taxation system to such an unnecessary extent that a computer with suitable software has to be used to operate their systems.

It is a similar case with computers in motor cars. Up to about 1995, cars were either diesel engine powered or petrol engine powered and the operations of the engines were controlled by the driver of the car. Functions such as the amount of fuel to be delivered to the engine cylinders and the frequency of the sparks and the piston strokes were mechanically organised by the camshaft—which was itself a magnificent piece of engineering—all controlled by the throttle (accelerator) pedal operated by the driver. Early driving lessons were fraught with gear-changing difficulties and a jagged screeching progress until the skill to drive and manage the car was achieved.

Of course there was also the whole business of stopping smoothly and gracefully without throwing the passengers around—especially before seat-belts were introduced. Also the driver could switch on windscreen wipers when it rained and switch them off when the rain stopped. At night, the driver switched on the driving lights and used a dimmer switch, foot operated or hand operated to dim the lights so that oncoming traffic would not be dazzled. And that was about it—oh I forgot

the hand signals and the radio. Up to about 1955, when the driver wished to turn right, the window was lowered, the full right arm stuck out pointing right and the manoeuvre was executed. To turn left, the window was lowered and with the right arm fully extended outside the window a sort of circular motion of the hand indicated that any following traffic could pass on the right and the driver's car turned left.

Then about 1955—earlier in more expensive cars obviously—a sort of electrically operated flag could be deployed. One on the right hand door pillar and one on the left hand door pillar, activated by a little lever on the hub of the steering wheel. This avoided the opening of the window. But it was, of course, less visible than the arm out of the window and accidents did occur!

Car radios came in fashion about 1950 and people who did not own car radios said that people would be killed because drivers would be distracted and that car radios should be banned by law. After 1961, when TV became available it was banned except for use by back seat passengers. As a result we did not see TVs in Irish cars—who wants to pay for TV in the back seat? It used to be said that millionaire Tony O'Reilly had a TV in his chauffeur-driven limousine so as to watch the stock market prices and the rugby but the locals having never seen the inside of the limousine thought this to be an urban myth.

Later, early in the 1980s, mobile phones became available and later banned for drivers although back seat passengers could use the phone and even tell their friends on the phone: *"sorry, I have to go now, I have a call coming in on my other phone..."*

But from 1996 or thereabouts cars began to be computerised. The fun was about to stop but the car buying public hardly noticed. Until the car ran into problems. Computerised diagnostics had arrived. Plug the car into a computer and it showed what had gone wrong. All very well but every main-car dealer had a different diagnostic computer for the different makes of car! Chaotic! But by about 2007 or 2008 the computers were being standardised and things proceeded fast from there. Low-carbon emissions had become a fashion also so that 2017 cars are simply computers on wheels.

The driver has an illusion of controlling the car and does indeed still steer the car but apart from starting the engine or stopping the car—that is about all the driver really does. The modern car is un-nerving

for the traditional car driver. Nissan and others have introduced all-electric cars. The Chairman of Hyundai has recently said electric cars are based on a **Big Lie**. They are not cleaner for the Environment. The electricity the cars need is transmitted over wires and cables and pylons the manufacturing of which is hugely detrimental to the environment. The electricity is generated elsewhere at huge cost to the environment. Even wind-generated electricity has a huge capital cost for the environment, as has solar energy in the equipment used for generation. And there is an enormous loss of energy in transmission. Nobody wants to talk about all this because "the herd" wants to "move on".

This herd instinct will be the death of us if it is not controlled by law. Like the proverbial lemmings, the herd instinct will carry us all over the edge of a cliff if it is allowed to govern us.

Already a Robot fanatic has suggested that there should be a Code of Robot Rights. I have no doubt that a Parliament of artificially intelligent robots could legislate for us more logically and even more effectively than our present human legislators, but who would then control the Robots?

And Robots need electricity.

Quo Vadis?

Michael Stack ©

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Redmondite Pig Buyer Politics:

Mob Violence, Gerrymandering and Blueshirtism

Review: *The Redmonds in Waterford, a Political Dynasty:*
Pat McCarthy, Four Courts Press, 2018

A new book by Pat McCarthy describes the careers of three successive Redmond representatives of the Waterford constituency: John Redmond, who was from MP 1892 to 1918; his son Captain William Redmond who was an MP and then a TD between 1918 to 1932; and William's widow, Bridget Redmond, a TD from 1933 to 1952.

John and William Redmond used mob violence to achieve their position in politics, in close alliance with a thuggish outfit called the *Ballybricken Pig Buyers Association*. They were aided and abetted in this by the Royal Irish Constabulary.

Pat McCarthy's new book confirms what was already published about this in *Irish Political Review/Labour Comment*.

Nicholas Whittle was Sinn Féin's Director of Elections in the violent By-Election of March 1918, caused by the death of John Redmond, and in the similarly violent General Election of December 1918.

In his *Witness Statement* Whittle said that, after the March By-Election, he was confident that Sinn Féin had got the measure of the violent Redmond/Pig Buyer/RIC axis. McCarthy's book explains that the extension of the franchise for the December 1918 General Election required re-drawing of constituency boundaries, but that Captain William Redmond MP was able to use his influence in Westminster to ensure that the Waterford constituency boundary was fixed in his favour. Otherwise he would have lost his seat.

With a greatly reduced margin, Captain William Redmond MP narrowly held the Waterford seat in December 1918 by means of a combination of mob violence and gerrymander.

McCarthy's book traces the role of the Pig Buyers in the career of Bridget Redmond, who took over the seat on the death of her husband William in 1932. As was now customary, Bridget's nomination papers were signed by the Chairman and Secretary of the Pig Buyers, who were in effect her Cumann na nGaedheal constituency organisation.

But support for W.T. Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal party was in seemingly irreversible decline in the face of Fianna

Fáil. On the Opposition side C. na nG. staleness contrasted sharply with the exciting new Blueshirt movement.

The Blueshirts were formed in 1933 by Garda Commissioner Eoin O'Duffy (after he was sacked by De Valera), out of the Army Comrades Association which had originally been restricted to former members of the once-numerous Free State Army.

O'Duffy organised a Blueshirt rally in Waterford for 24th August 1933. This was banned by the Fianna Fáil Government, and the rally was prevented from happening by a large force of Gardaí. Instead, O'Duffy was met by a delegation from Cumann na nGaedheal and others in Waterford's Imperial Hotel to propose a merger of the party with his confident new movement.

It seems that they sought, in desperation, to attach themselves to the vigorous, youthful European phenomenon represented in Ireland by General O'Duffy's Blueshirts.

A few weeks later a new political party called *Fine Gael* was launched, but with O'Duffy as leader, not W.T. Cosgrave. Rather than a renaming or re-launch of Cumann na nGaedheal, this suggests a surrender to, or takeover by, the Blueshirts.

In Waterford, Bridget Redmond launched herself energetically into the new Blueshirt-Fine Gael politics, sharing a platform with O'Duffy and marching at the head of Blueblouses, the women's section of the shirt movement.

A thread that runs through the Redmond dynasty in Waterford is their resort to violent street politics. The *shirt* movement was a further manifestation, and in her first entry into political life, Bridget Redmond took to this like a duck to water. Where her deceased husband and father-in-law had people who did their dirty work for them, Bridget had a more hands-on approach and she took a personal leadership role in the Blueshirt movement.

The chaotic political thuggery of the past was to

be seamlessly replaced by disciplined and organised street violence. The Pig Buyers were going national. No doubt their ample coffers were available, not just for booze and entertainment, but for shirts, blouses, clubs and train tickets for the financially challenged.

In the past Pig Buyer mob violence had been protected by the RIC. But de Valera's Fianna Fáil stood resolutely for the ballot box, not the street. Dev succeeded in cleaning up politics, and Redmond's and O'Duffy's movement soon collapsed in disarray.


Worse was to come. The Fianna Fáil Government formed a **Pig Marketing Board** in 1934, and this broke the economic monopoly power of the Pig Buyers.

But their political power persisted. Bridget Redmond held a Waterford seat until her death in 1952. As with her husband and father-in-law before her, the Pig Buyers were the coffin-bearers at her funeral.

An attempt was made to secure the Fine Gael nomination for her husband's nephew, but it went instead to a former pig buyer Teddy Lynch who secured the seat at the next General Election.

The Redmond family dynasty in Waterford extended from 1892 to 1952. But the pig buyers who put them in power and kept them there outlasted the Redmonds.

Pat Muldowney



De GAULLE continued

participate in the communities we are now building, as well as after creating a free trade area with six other States, and, finally, after having—I may well say it (the negotiations held at such length on this subject will be recalled)—after having put some pressure on the Six to prevent a real beginning being made in the application of the Common Market. If England asks in turn to enter, but on her own conditions, this poses without doubt to each of the six States, and poses to England, problems of a very great dimension.

England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. **She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.**

In short, the nature, the structure, the very situation (conjuncture) that are England's differ profoundly from those of the continentals. What is to be done in order that England, as she lives, produces and trades, can be incorporated into the Common Market, as it has been conceived and as it functions? For example, the means by which the people of Great Britain are fed and which are in fact the importation of foodstuffs bought cheaply in the two Americas and in the former dominions, at the same time giving, granting considerable subsidies to English farmers? These means are obviously incompatible with the system which the Six have established quite naturally for themselves.

The system of the Six—this constitutes making a whole of the agricultural produce of the whole Community, in strictly fixing their prices, in prohibiting subsidies, in organising their consumption between all the participants, and in imposing on each of its participants payment to the Community of any saving they would achieve in fetching their food from outside instead of eating what the Common Market has to offer. Once again, what is to be done to bring England, as she is, into this system?

One might sometimes have believed that our English friends, in posing their candidature to the Common Market, were agreeing to transform themselves to the point of applying all the conditions which

are accepted and practised by the Six. But the question, to know whether Great Britain can now place herself like the Continent and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce all Commonwealth preferences, to cease any pretence that her agriculture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat her engagements with other countries of the free trade area as null and void—that question is the whole question.

It cannot be said that it is yet resolved. Will it be so one day? Obviously only England can answer. The question is even further posed since after England other States which are, I repeat, linked to her through the free trade area, for the same reasons as Britain, would like or wish to enter the Common Market.

It must be agreed that first the entry of Great Britain, and then these States, will completely change the whole of the actions, the agreements, the compensation, the rules which have already been established between the Six, because all these States, like Britain, have very important peculiarities. Then it will be another Common Market whose construction ought to be envisaged; but one which would be taken to 11 and then 13 and then perhaps 18 would no longer resemble, without any doubt, the one which the Six built.

Further, this community, increasing in such fashion, would see itself faced with problems of economic relations with all kinds of other States, and first with the United States. It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be very numerous and diverse, would not endure for long, **and that ultimately it would appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the community of Europe.**

It is a hypothesis which in the eyes of some can be perfectly justified, but it is not at all what France is doing or wanted to do—and which is a properly European construction.

Yet it is possible that one day England might manage to transform herself sufficiently to become part of the European community, without restriction, without reserve and preference for anything whatsoever; and in this case the Six would open the door to her and France would raise no obstacle, although obviously England's simple participation in the community would considerably change

its nature and its volume.

It is possible, too, that England might not yet be so disposed, and it is that which seems to result from the long, long, so long, so long Brussels conversations. But if that is the case, there is nothing there that could be dramatic. First, whatever decision England takes in this matter there is no reason, as far as we are concerned, for the relations we have with her to be changed, and the consideration, the respect which are due to this great State, this great people, will not thereby be in the slightest impaired.

What England has done across the centuries and in the world is recognised as immense. Although there have often been conflicts with France, Britain's glorious participation in the victory which crowned the first world war—we French, we shall always admire it. As for the role England played in the most dramatic and decisive moments of the second world war, no one has the right to forget it.

In truth, the destiny of the free world, and first of all ours and even that of the United States and Russia, depended in a large measure on the resolution, the solidity and the courage of the English people, as Churchill was able to harness them. Even at the present moment no one can contest British capacity and worth.

Moreover, I repeat, if the Brussels negotiations were shortly not to succeed, nothing would prevent the conclusion between the Common Market and Great Britain of an accord of association designed to safeguard exchanges, and nothing would prevent close relations between England and France from being maintained, nor the pursuit and development of their direct cooperation in all kinds of fields, and notably the scientific, technical and industrial—as the two countries have just proved by deciding to build together the supersonic aircraft Concorde.

Lastly, it is very possible that Britain's own evolution, and the evolution of the universe, might bring the English little by little towards the Continent, whatever delays the achievement might demand, and for my part, that is what I readily believe, and that is why, in my opinion, it will in any case have been a great honour for the British Prime Minister, for my friend Harold Macmillan, and for his Government, to have discerned in good time, to have had enough political courage to have proclaimed it, and to have led their country the first steps down the path which one day, perhaps, will lead it to moor alongside the Continent.

[Emphasis Added.]



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French President Charles De Gaulle's Veto on British Membership of the EEC

Speech of 14th January 1963

I believe that when you talk about economics—and much more so when you practise them—what you say and what you do must conform to realities, because without that you can get into impasses and, sometimes, you even head for ruin.

In this very great affair of the European Economic Community and also in that of eventual adhesion of Great Britain, it is the facts that must first be considered. Feelings, favourable though they might be and are, these feelings cannot be invoked against the real facts of the problem. What are these facts?

The Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States, States which are, economically speaking, one may say, of the same nature. Indeed, whether it be a matter of their industrial or agricultural production, their external exchanges, their habits or their commercial clientele, their living or working conditions, there is between them much more resemblance than difference. Moreover, they are adjacent, they inter-penetrate, they prolong each other through their communications. It is therefore a fact to group them and to link them in such a way that what they have to produce, to buy, to sell, to consume—well, they do produce, buy, sell, consume, in preference in their own ensemble. Doing that is conforming to realities.

Moreover, it must be added that, from the point of view of their economic development, their social progress, their technical capacity, they are, in short, keeping pace. They are marching in similar fashion. It so happens, too, that there is between them no kind of political griev-

ance, no frontier question, no rivalry in domination or power. On the contrary, they are joined in solidarity, especially and primarily, from the aspect of the consciousness they have of defining together an important part of the sources of our civilisation; and also as concerns their security, because they are continentals and have before them one and the same menace from one extremity to the other of their territorial ensemble. Then, finally, they are in solidarity through the fact that not one among them is bound abroad by any particular political or military accord.

Thus it was psychologically and materially possible to make an economic community of the Six, though not without difficulties. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions; and when it was concluded, it was necessary—in order to achieve something—that we French put in order our

economic, financial, and monetary affairs... and that was done in 1959. From that moment the community was in principle viable, but then the treaty had to be applied.

However, this treaty, which was precise and complete enough concerning industry, was not at all so on the subject of agriculture. However, for our country this had to be settled. Indeed, it is obvious that agriculture is an essential element in the whole of our national activity. We cannot conceive, and will not conceive, of a Common Market in which French agriculture would not find outlets in keeping with its production. And we agree, further, that of the Six we are the country on which this necessity is imposed in the most imperative manner.

This is why when, last January, thought was given to the setting in motion of the second phase of the treaty—in other words a practical start in application—we were led to pose the entry of agriculture into the Common Market as a formal condition. This was finally accepted by our partners but very difficult and very complex arrangements were needed—and some rulings are still outstanding. I note in passing that in this vast undertaking it was the governments that took all the decisions, because authority and responsibility are not to be found elsewhere. But I must say that in preparing and untangling these matters, the Commission in Brussels did some very objective and fitting work.

Thereupon Great Britain posed her candidature to the Common Market. She did it after having earlier refused to

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