

IRISH POLITICAL REVIEW

October 2020

Vol.35, No.10 ISSN 0790-7672

and *Northern Star* incorporating *Workers' Weekly* Vol.34 No.10 ISSN 954-5891

Britain And Europe: Some Painful Realities

Irish membership of the European Union along with Britain, as the second English voice in the Union, was the easy way of Anglicising nationalist Ireland. The British decision to leave the EU has therefore caused existential problems for the Irish Anglicisers. Only Professor Anthony Coughlan of Trinity College and the quaintly-named Irish Sovereignty Movement has proposed the obvious solution to the problem—that Ireland should exit the EU as it entered it, along with Britain. Others try to deal with the problem by abusing Britain.

Bobby McDonagh, former Ambassador to Britain, compares it to a small child throwing a tantrum and being in need of chastisement by the adults, but "*the adults are no longer in charge in Downing St.*" (The Adults Are No Longer In Charge In Downing St., Irish Times, 8.9.20).

He then recalls (from where he does not say), "*six flaws in their misunderstanding [sic] of national sovereignty*", "*in their false narrative of national sovereignty*".

First Flaw:

"sovereignty was something to be hoarded in an attic like a long-forgotten Farage family heirloom, or a dusty and delicate treasure to be buried under the Dominic Cummings seat in a Downing St. garden". It was not "the sovereignty most countries value in modern times, something to be used creatively... in our necessarily interdependent world".

But doesn't this somehow seem more applicable to the erstwhile Irish sovereignty over the Six Counties asserted in the state Constitution, from which successive Governments carefully averted their minds throughout the Northern War?

Second Flaw:

continued on page 2

Sir Thomas Artemus Jones —an unsung hero of the Casement story

To paraphrase Yeats, the ghost of Roger Casement keeps knocking on many doors and one door it knocked on very loudly was that of Sir Thomas Artemus Jones. He usually gets just a footnote in the writings on Casement but he was a central character in the story because of his role in the Casement Trial. He was a Junior Counsel on Casement's legal team and, of all the legal people at the trial, Jones was the most engaged with the details of the case—including the typescripts and the unseen diary from which they were allegedly copied. He was at the coalface.

At the time he was the only person outside the police and the Crown to have seen and read the typescripts and he then assumed they were copies of an original. How he came to be convinced that in fact there was no original diary corresponding with the typescripts is a crucial part of the Black Diary story —or yarn.

continued on page 4

Part 2

In Defence Of Dorothy Macardle

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dorothy Macardle was an Irish political writer and historian. A participant in public life from 1918 until her death in 1958 at the age of sixty nine, she identified as an Irish Republican and feminist.

Her most famous work was *The Irish Republic*, published in 1938, a monumen-

tal account of the independence struggle that took eight years to write. She was a supporter and lifelong friend of Eamon de Valera, the architect of the independent Irish State. Her underlining of the value of de Valera's leadership during 1916-23 is one of many themes that make *The Irish Republic* an invaluable historical narrative, but also a classic of political literature.

Macardle's political activity branched into different areas: as a journalist she highlighted areas of social injustice that brought her into conflict with prevailing Catholic *mores*; as an internationalist she moved from anti-Fascism and making war-time broadcasts for the BBC to advocacy of practical humanitarian projects in post-War Continental Europe. In all this she remained true to the principles she espoused as a propagandist on the Republican side in the Treaty War of 1922-23.

continued on page 5

CONTENTS

	Page
Britain: Some Painful Realities. Editorial	1
Sir Thomas Artemus Jones—an unsung hero of the Casement Story.	
Jack Lane	1
In Defence Of Dorothy Macardle. Dave Alvey (Part 2)	1
Readers' Letters: Radio Eireann's Terrorists. Simon O'Donnell	
Hyperbole? Richard Jones	3
Cicero, De Juventute, Fine Gael. Donal Kennedy	8
LEST WE FORGET (41). Extracts from <i>Irish Bulletin</i> . This issue lists British Acts Of Aggression, 15 November 2020 (ed. Jack Lane).	9
Es Ahora. Julianne Herlihy (<i>Elizabeth Bowen: A Review Of Patricia Laurence's Biography</i> , Part 8)	11
Some Thoughts On Harold Evans. Eamon Dyas	13
Paul Grace, 1930-2017. Pat Muldowney (<i>Notes On The Role Of Ex-Servicemen In Derry</i> , Part Two)	14
Ulster Affairs In The Early 1970s. Brendan Clifford	16
Biteback: Recalling Of Collins Ambush Under Fire. Philip O'Connor Letter, <i>Sunday Independent</i> , 30th August	20
The Phil Hogan Debacle. <i>Irish Foreign Affairs</i> Editorial	20
A War On Women? Cogadh Ar Mhna?	23
Corrections To August And September Issues Of Irish Political Review	23
The Human History Of A Shipyard. Wilson John Haire (Part Two)	24
Political Economy: Printing Money, A Response To John Martin. Chris Winch; <i>Helicopter Money And All That.</i> Martin Dolphin.	
Planning? Fergus O Rahallaigh	26
Pearse, Other 1916 Leaders, And A Prussian Prince. Manus O'Riordan (Pt.1)	27
Van the Man on Politics. John Martin	30
The Northern Ireland Protocol. David Morrison	30
Does It Stack Up? Michael Stack (The Leaving Certificate Examination)	33

Labour Comment, edited by **Pat Maloney:**
[The Halligan Legacy?](#)

The British—

"wore the flag of sovereignty without understanding that the EU Member States are equally sovereign, both individually and, where they have pooled sovereignty, collectively".

But "pooled sovereignty", which means sovereignty by the EU as a body over its component states, was never clearly instituted or clearly defined. Earlier this year the EU asserted against Poland a 'law' about the appointment of judges which does not apply in the older EU states. It does not apply in Ireland. But the Irish State was to the fore in asserting it against Poland.

The matter became an issue in the Polish Elections, in which the EU attempted to bring about the defeat of the Government. When it lost the Polish election, it decided not to press the matter further for the time being.

The *Third Flaw* is about fish not recognising borders in the sea.

The *Fourth* is about the British deciding to apply EU rules where it suits them.

The *Sixth* is that, while some great things were done in the name of British Sovereignty, "some bad stuff" was also done, and that it all has "a very distinctive English ring to it"—which just seems to be an irrelevant observation.

The *Fifth Flaw* is that "there is no point in talking up sovereignty if one is, at the same time, intent on undermining it".

But this is just an absurd observation, thinkable only in the more fanciful flights of diplomatic make-believe, in the ideology of an Irish state which ceased to assert itself nationally two generations ago. Sovereignties are asserted against each other. And in the most modern times they have been destructive of one another.

What the modern world is, is what Britain and the United States have made it. The construction of the EU was largely due to the European policy of the USA after 1945, when it was taking over from Britain the half of the world which had not

come into the Russian sphere as a result of Britain turning its second war on Germany into a World War, when it could no longer sustain it with its own resources.

When the EU began to imagine itself as a World Power about thirty years ago, and threw its weight around, it acted destructively. It did this first against Yugoslavia and was instrumental in bringing about the Balkan carnage. Then a few years ago it incited rebellion against the elected Government of Ukraine which made trade deals with both Russia and the EU, instead of aligning itself with the EU against Russia.

The Ambassador's *Fifth Flaw* continues—

"Few acts of sovereignty are as solemn as signing and ratifying an international treaty. A Treaty engages the state by proclaiming to the world that "this is our word and we will stand by it". If the UK were... to default unilaterally on parts of the Withdrawal Agreement, it would not only be disrespecting the EU and international law but also insulting its own sovereignty."

Could there be a more childish conception of world affairs than this?

It used to be said that Treaties were made to be broken. It is no longer said so bluntly in these times of political correctness, but it remains the truth of it. A Treaty is an agreement between two states which holds good as long as it is in the interest of both states.

The Attorney General, Paul Gallagher, in the current issue of the Jesuit magazine *Studies*, quotes the philosopher Spinoza in support of an argument about the EU, but Spinoza's opinion on Treaties was bluntly stated:

"This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering into it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away from either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent, and the link, whereby the commonwealths were mutually bound, breaks of itself. And therefore every commonwealth has the right to break its contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as the motive of hope or fear is removed" (*A Political Treatise*, 1670, Chapter 3).

It is astonishing that an Irish public figure should think that England can be successfully moralised against on the subject of Treaties and International Law. The modern era in Ireland—the post-Gaelic era—began with the Treaty of Limerick. And we all know—or we all used to know—how that Treaty was observed by Britain.

In 1914 tens of thousands of Irishmen were recruited for the British Army by means of propaganda about how Germany broke a sacred Treaty relating to Belgium. Two years later Britain invaded Greece and set up a puppet government there which joined Britain in the war on Turkey.

The United States was constructed by making and breaking a long succession of Treaties with the native peoples of America. And last year it broke a Treaty with Iran, whose terms it had never observed anyway, and forced others to follow suit.

States which are members of the United Nations are supposedly sovereign in their internal affairs, and are supposedly protected in their sovereignty by their membership of the UN. But it has now become common practice—led by the leading democracy—for some members to de-legitimise the Government, or even the regime, of another member, without putting the matter to the UN.

The US has de-legitimised the elected President of Venezuela and recognised as President somebody living outside the state, and has imposed sanctions against the state in an attempt to get their choice of President installed. Britain has seconded that action by refusing to release the Venezuelan reserve of £800 millions in gold, which was (foolishly) lodged in London for safe keeping. That money is needed to feed the people, suffering under arbitrary US sanctions which do not have the support of the United Nations. The EU also recognises the US nominee as the legitimate President of Venezuela.

The US and Britain de-legitimised the Assad Government of Syria and declared some obscure terrorist group to be the legitimate Government. That obscure group disappeared, brushed aside by the fundamentalist Islamist bodies which were the substance of the opposition to Assad's liberal regime. The US and its followers then declared a War on Terror against the effective opposition to Assad, but did so without re-legitimising the Assad Government.

International Law plays no part whatever in these conflicts, and in many others of a similar kind. It has no existence as an actual international system. The five strongest states in the world are officially exempt from it under UN rules, and each of them can confer that exemption on their client states. It is little more than a matter of individual opinion—a debating point.

Radio Eireann's 'Terrorists'

RTE broadcast a radio play on 20th September. I came across this description of the play on a theatre site:

"It is the time of the 'Troubles' (1921). An elderly Jew is trying to learn essential phrases in Gaelic. A young man breaks in seeking shelter from the Black-and-Tans. The Jew feeds and shelters him, finally dressing him unwillingly as a Jew to escape the Black-and-Tans. The man is saved and has learned a little of the character and philosophy of the Jews."

On three other sites the play is described in similar terms.

The author is Wolf Mankowitz. I believe the play was first broadcast by RTE radio in 1991. In the repeat RTE radio broadcast of the play on Sunday 20th September 2020, the actors were the late Peter Dix and Gavin McGrath. (Two unnamed actors played the Black and Tans who searched the house.)

Introducing the play, the RTE announcer said it was about a "terrorist" seeking shelter in the home of a Jew. At the end of the play the same RTE announcer informed us that the author was Wolf Mankowitz. The Jew was played by Peter Dix and Gavin McGrath played the 'terrorist'.

Has it now become the official policy of RTE to refer to the Republicans who fought in the War of Independence as 'terrorists'?

Simon O'Donnell

Hyperbole?

Media commentary tends to use terms loosely. But in the interests of clear thinking we should note the following:

Ethnic Cleansing — in the Balkans Troubles, this word was used first by one of the parties advocating and doing it. But the actual meaning of what was being done was extermination, as used by British leaders enforcing the Great Hunger in Ireland, rather than **Genocide**.

They weren't advocating the destruction of a nation or cultural group, just eliminating them from their patch. That's not to deny the atrocities—in terms of the harm done, the distinction is meaningless, but it is a different goal.

We tend all too easily to use the term *genocide* wrongly.

In Israel, both apply. The Zionists want to exterminate Palestinians in the British sense (make them leave or die), but they also want to eliminate them as a nation.

In both cases, it doesn't for a moment mean they want to kill them all. Just a willingness to kill as many as necessary to achieve the goal.

Decimate is another word used loosely, conveying for many an impression of killing a majority, when, of course, it means killing about one tenth, which in military history is usually a catastrophic defeat for the decimated party.

I doubt any of these terms have been relevant in Ireland since the British left the South, except perhaps at an emotional level, rather than a serious goal of a serious party, but just about everyone here would know much more than me about that.

Richard Jones

The British Government chose to say that, in a certain eventuality, it would break international law on the Irish Protocol of its withdrawal agreement from the EU. It was not at all necessary for it to put it that way. It has long experience in arguing that it is the other parties that break agreements. It must have seen some advantage in putting it provocatively.

What it has said in effect is that it will not allow the national market of the UK to be obstructed by continuing EU authority after it has left the EU.

The EU seems to have decided to punish the UK for leaving, by enforcing on it an element of the Irish sovereignty claim over the North which the Irish state repealed twenty years ago. It seems to be intent on

establishing the EU-Irish Customs Border in the Irish Sea. It may also see this as being necessary to minimising the effect of Brexit within the EU, and be killing two birds with one stone.

A recent issue of *The European* (Sept. 3) contains an interview with Michel Barnier by Marion van Renterghem, during which he describes a discussion he had with Nigel Farage shortly after the Referendum.

"I asked him: 'Mr. Farage, now that you won the referendum on Brexit, how do you see the future relations between the U.K. and the E.U.?' Farage answered in a smile: 'But, Mr. Barnier, when Brexit happens, the E.U. will no longer exist!'

"At this point in our interview, Barnier turned to the audience. On his face, normally so calm, was passion. 'Ladies and gentlemen', he declared solemnly, 'we need to stay together to defend our interests in the world, without shame. Neither the Chinese, nor the Russians, nor the Americans have shame when they defend theirs... They want to blow us up from the inside. I tell you, as long as I have strength, we'll stand in their way. We won't yield an inch to those people. Never!...'

If this is true, it means that he had been living in a world of Anglophile illusion. That is entirely believable. The EU is a world of practical arrangements made within a medium of ideological illusion, and the illusory side has been steadily encroaching on the practical side in recent decades.

Barnier, by his account, has only just come to see what De Gaulle and the founders saw from the start. He had somehow failed to see what Britain was doing the whole time it was a member of the EU.

John Bruton, when he was a Commissioner, saw it at close quarters, and understood it. But, when Brexit came on the agenda, he recoiled from his understanding, because his world was founded on Anglophile illusions.

If Barnier has his way and the EU Customs border is on the Irish Sea, that will be a watershed moment in British/European relations, reversing the trend of half a millennium, and nationalist Ireland might even become national again.

But we are not predicting that this will happen. Barnier is described by the interviewer as having been for all his political life, until very recently, as an Anglophile Gaullist—which is a contradiction in terms. He helped to make English the language of the EU. A flash of Anglophobe enlightenment late in the day on the European side, provoked by a piece of provocative arrogance, is met on

the other side by the steady, providential will to dominance that has carried England through many wild and reckless gambles in its relations with Europe over many centuries.

Artemus Jones

continued

In his book "*Anatomy of a lie — decoding Casement*", Paul Hyde argues that there is no verifiable proof that the Diaries that are now displayed as Casement's in the British Archives were written by him. I would suggest that Artemus Jones's experience as recounted by him helps confirm Hyde's case. Jones left his papers to Bangor University and they do not seem to feature in any of the 'Casement studies' I have come across. And it only takes a Google search to locate them!

For Jones, the question of the original diary became highly relevant when Sullivan, Lead Counsel for Casement, was approached by the Crown just before the trial with the suggestion that the defence be changed to one of *guilty but insane*. Counsel for the Crown produced typescripts of a pornographic nature, which were alleged to be a diary kept by Casement. The Crown claimed that these diaries had been found by detectives at Casement's lodgings, and that the typescripts they presented would be accepted as evidence of insanity.

Jones judged that such a new, purely verbal, proposal like this from the Crown was most improper at this stage of the case. Such a proposal needed "*additional evidence*"—and the essential new evidence needed was for the original diary, rather than mere typescripts to be produced. This was both a legal requirement and a matter of common sense.

And in fact the proposed legal bar to prove authenticity was pretty low. After all, once the original handwritten Diary was produced, any witness familiar with Casement's handwriting would suffice to confirm that they were in his writing. And such a person should have been very, very easy to find. Indeed there were probably hundreds within the Crown service itself who were in a position to verify the handwriting in the 'Diaries', as Casement was such a prolific correspondent with civil servants for decades.

But apparently the Crown could not find one! Jones smelt a rat.

Jones reminds me of a midwife wait-

ing for a delivery and is presented with a baby doll.

Later on, after an approach by Charles Gavan Duffy on 23rd January 1933, Jones prepared a very detailed narrative account of his involvement in the Trial and in particular of what happened when the Crown proposed the change to the defence plea while not producing the original diary ('the document') to support the proposal.

Mr. Jones says:

"No one connected with the defence ever saw the original document which was alleged to have been found in Casement's lodgings... Even if the original document was in the possession of Scotland Yard and even if it had been admissible, it could not be admitted in evidence without formal proof that the entries were in the hand-writing of Casement.

Had it been the intention of the Crown to tender evidence at the state trial that the original entries were in the handwriting of Casement... it would have been additional information which had to be given in accordance with the usual practice. No such formal notice was ever given. It is not an unreasonable inference to draw from the last fact that the Crown had no intention or were not in a position at the state trial to prove that the alleged diary was in Casement's handwriting".

Jones concluded as follows:

"Had the document been relevant to the issues in the trial the Crown would have put the original in evidence by advancing legal proof that the entries were in Casement's hand-writing. Such proof is satisfied if a witness, familiar with the accused's hand-writing, swears it is like the disputed writing. Had the Crown got such proof?

The true answer to the question may be inferred from one circumstance of some significance. The rule of practice in English Courts of justice when the Crown proposes to call what is called "*additional evidence*" is clear and quite free from doubt. "*Additional evidence*" means any fresh evidence additional to that already given in the court of first instance upon which the prisoner has been committed to stand his trial. When the Crown proposes to call what is called additional evidence it must give the defence formal written notice of their intention as well as a copy of the evidence proposed to be given.

The object of this wholesome safeguard of justice is that the accused is entitled to know before his trial what evidence he has to meet. In the Casement trial no such notice was given to the defence either before or during the trial.

From this circumstance it is not unreasonable to draw the inference that the Crown were not prepared to prove that the original document (while assuming that it was in their possession) was in the hand-writing of Roger Casement."

All this makes it clear that the Crown never produced the diary they claimed to have in their possession, even when it proposed a change to the defence that depended on what was in the diary. Jones was not just a stickler for adhering to judicial procedures— it was sheer common sense to do so and to demand that the Crown produce credible evidence to justify such a proposal. Jones was not to be bounced on the basis of the typescripts. He had not built up a very formidable legal record for nothing. As the saying goes, 'he was not born yesterday'.

As a legal eagle Jones had to be circumspect. He would not make claims without positive evidence but failure to produce credible evidence, when circumstances required it, is evidence in the negative. When recounting the episode he had therefore to depend on caveats, on inferences and assumptions which were quite legitimate in the circumstances to come to a conclusion. And it is no accident that he went on to be a distinguished judge because he was more than a legal eagle and was endowed with plenty of common sense which is the fundamental requirement of all judges worthy of the name.

And all his conclusions point very clearly to the non-existence of a diary by Casement as claimed by the Crown.

In the 1930s he also corresponded to help W.J. Moloney, who was preparing his book on Casement. Jones was more than happy to oblige. The feeling one gets is that it was a load off his conscience to be able to explain his involvement.

And in letters to Moloney he said, *inter alia*:

"Royal Hotel
Capel Curig.
North Wales
8: IV: '33

Dear Sir

Just a note to thank you for your letter of 23rd ult. and to say how glad I am you are divorcing the wretched affair of the alleged diary from your biography of Casement. I agree thoroughly with what you say about it."

(NLI. MS. 17,601/9/4)

Readers may find 'divorcing' an odd word to use. The explanation is that Moloney was originally planning a biography of Casement, and Jones welcomed that very much and hoped it would put the alleged diary in perspective as a 'wretched affair' that took from Casement's greatness; and a good biography would enhance Casement's reputation by separating, 'divorcing', him from it.

And he concluded in another letter to him that:

"I do know however, that the assumption made by some people in discussing Casement namely that the document was proved to be in his hand-writing at the trial, is utterly untrue.

Yours faithfully,

Thomas Art emus Jones"

(4/3/33)

(NLI, MS 17,601/9/3)

Furthermore, he explained in a further letter to Moloney, dated 8th March 1933 (NLI, MS 17,601/9/4), that his contemporary shorthand notes of the trial were in storage and he volunteered to get them and cross the Atlantic to meet Moloney with them. Clearly there were things he did not want to commit to writing but which were important enough, and he felt so strongly about them, to make such an astonishing offer for the time. He explained that he did not want to post them for fear of them being lost.

This was an honest man in turmoil over what had happened and who wanted to set the record straight—and that was that he had become convinced that there was no diary written by Casement as claimed by the Crown.

Jack Lane

Dorothy Macardle

continued

Outside of politics she pursued a moderately successful literary career, writing well-regarded plays, short stories and novels. The genre of fiction she frequently used has been described as Female Gothic, a category in which women authors used the supernatural to explore subjects that could not otherwise be aired, subjects like fear of domestic entrapment. Macardle wrote repeatedly about troubled mother-daughter relationships, using supernatural elements, invariably reflecting her conviction that women should not be restricted to the domestic sphere.

One aspect of Dorothy Macardle's politics that may strike a chord with contemporary readers is her attitude to anti-Semitism and the State of Israel. When participating in relief work for Central and Eastern European refugees in war-time London, she offered the BBC case studies of refugees she had met who

had been subject to anti-Semitism during the inter-war period. She firmly believed in international solidarity as a bulwark defence against the persecution and forced migration then being forced on Jews and she used those experiences and sentiments in later fiction. Then in 1948, in a letter to the American publisher Ziff Davis, she blocked publication of *The Irish Republic* in the US on the following grounds:

"I am not in sympathy with the current Zionist activities in Palestine and, as the organised Irish in America appear to be associating themselves to some extent with this movement, I feel that my book would inevitably be used as propaganda for a campaign that I deplore" (*Dorothy Macardle*, Leanne Lane, p. 175)

She was successful on that score. The first US edition of the book did not come out until 1965, seven years after her death.

The sources used in compiling this sketch are: *The Irish Republic and Tragedies Of Kerry* by Macardle; *Dorothy Macardle* by Leanne Lane (2019); *Dorothy Macardle—A Life* by Nadia Clare Smith (2006); Macardle's statement to the Bureau of Military History, *Witness Statement 457* (4 December 1950); *From Dundalk to Dublin: Dorothy Macardle's Narrative Journey on Radio Eireann*, journal article by Nadia Clare Smith, *Irish Review*, No 42, (Summer 2010); and *The Schoolgirls of Alexandra*, an *Irish Times* article by Mary Manning (3 June 1978). Many other sources could be used but are difficult to procure; enough extracts from these sources are quoted in the two biographies to allow for a reasonably comprehensive overview. Given that the purpose of this series is a defence of Macardle against the obfuscations of historians with an anti-Republican agenda, the approach taken is to tell her story in as objective a manner as possible.

EARLY LIFE

Dorothy was born into a wealthy Catholic family in Dundalk on 7th March 1889. Her father, Thomas, was the owner of Macardle Moore Limited, a brewing company that had been established by his father in 1862. The large British garrison stationed in Ireland under the Union was a boon for the company, in that it supplied beer to the military in both Dundalk and the Curragh and was known as "*The Irish Army Brewers*". Dorothy's mother, the main figure in her early life, Minnie Ross, came from Surrey in England and had strong family connections to the Scots Greys regiment of the British army.

Dorothy was the eldest of five children,

her brothers Kenneth and John being immediately below her, followed by a sister, Mona, and youngest brother, Donald. In the custom of wealthy families at the time, the children were educated at home, initially in a staffed nursery and later by a governess. In due course the boys all attended an English boarding school, Oratory, known as the Catholic Eton. A favourite pastime of the children, probably led by Dorothy, was playing with a toy theatre. As adults, Dorothy, Mona and Donald all had connections with professional theatre. Whereas most middle class families in Victorian Britain and Ireland had one domestic servant, the Macardles had four.

Referring to her upbringing in a Statement to the Bureau of Military History (Statement 457), Dorothy allows herself one terse sentence: “*I was brought up under an English mother*”. Minnie Ross made a point of inculcating the values of her own upbringing in her children. As an eleven-year-old in 1900 Dorothy accompanied her mother as part of the cheering Dublin crowd for the visit of Queen Victoria. In a show of childish enthusiasm on returning to Dundalk she decorated the family home with all the flags of the British Empire.

In contrast to the fervent unionism of his wife Thomas Macardle was a nationalist, albeit one who supported limited autonomy for Ireland under the Empire. He actively supported Redmond’s strategy of Irish participation in the British war effort in advance of the expected implementation of Home Rule after the War: two of his sons, Kenneth and John, enlisted as officers in the British army; Donald was too young for military service. Tragedy befell the family when Kenneth was killed in the Battle of the Somme in 1916. In 1917, as a Justice of the Peace, Thomas was unsuccessfully involved in efforts to dissuade Austen Stack and other prisoners from continuing with a Hunger Strike following the death of Thomas Ashe. For services to the Crown during the war Thomas Macardle was awarded a knighthood.

At some time between the Censuses of 1901 and 1911, Thomas and Minnie separated. The political differences between them may have been a contributory cause, although tension between Minnie and her mother-in-law may have also been at work. Indications of the effect that her family background had on Dorothy are given in much of her later fiction. She discussed her background explicitly in a talk entitled, *The Young Victorian, the*

first of four autobiographical broadcasts she made for Radio Eireann in 1956. Below are some excerpts from the first two broadcasts taken from Nadia Smith’s article in the Irish Review.

“Dundalk was an important garrison town and in our nursery the garrison spirit burned bright” (Irish Review, p. 32).

[On her parents’ relationship]: “he had married an English girl, an officer’s daughter, herself a little soldier, every fragile inch of her, whose loyalties were intense. He would not thwart them or quarrel with them” (Irish Review, p. 32).

[On her feelings of being repressed]: “the artificial shibboleths and conventions which Victorian and Edwardian standards imposed, cramping and frustrating the lives and energies of growing girls, and of mature women too” (Irish Review, p. 32).

[On her resentment at being left at home while her brothers attended boarding school]: “I shall never forget the dread of the future that closed in on me then... the years stretched like a desert ahead... all life’s realities seemed to be shut away as if by an invisible wall. The sensation haunts me in nightmares still” (Irish Review, p. 37).

[On women from similar families to her own, whose early experiences of domestic repression pushed them in the direction of republicanism. With these women]:

“there was something deeper than an ethical sense of justice and much more universal than nationalism. The cause of freedom was a passion with them” (Irish Review, p. 32).

Regarding the last point a list of women from unionist or wealthy backgrounds who gave service to Republicanism in overcoming British rule might include figures like Alice Stopford Green, Alice Milligan, Constance Markievicz, Maude Gonne MacBride, Mary Spring-Rice, Kathleen Lynn, Hannah Sheehy Skeffington, the four Gifford sisters, Rosamund Jacob, Albinia Broderick, Linda Kearns, Muriel MacSwiney, Charlotte Despard and Macardle herself. By no means an exhaustive list, but the combined contribution of such a contingent cannot be described as peripheral. In any case five individuals from the list, Kathleen Lynn and the Giffords, went to the same College as Dorothy: Alexandra College in Dublin.

ALEXANDRA COLLEGE

At age sixteen, after some argument, Dorothy succeeded in persuading her parents to let her attend Alexandra College. At a superficial level it seems incongruent,

given that the College was a Protestant-run solidly unionist institution, that she continued to speak highly of it throughout her life—she once referred to it as “*the Anglo Irish world at its best*”. Her association with ‘Alex’, involving three separate time periods, was clearly for her an important formative experience.

Dorothy spoke about the college in the second of her Radio Eireann broadcasts, *The Dublin Student*. She described its Principal, Henrietta White, as a strong supporter of the “*right of women to the highest education and to a full share of professional and political life*” (Lane, p. 16). She also praised the ethos of the Alexandra College Guild. The Guild,

“made questions of public welfare student’s concerns... The slums, this dreadful strike and lockout, the tuberculosis, the hunger and despair—what was the root cause of it all? I wondered—was the government doing enough? Could more be done if Ireland had Home Rule? So a breach was made in the invisible wall” (Lane, p. 16).

As a student Dorothy gravitated towards English literature. She admired Shelley and Byron for their “*ardent love of justice and human brotherhood and their sense of the rights of man*” (Smith, p. 33).

Her three stints at Alexandra were: the years of her secondary education (1905-1909); following graduation from University College Dublin, two years studying for a University Teachers Diploma (1912-14); and following three years she spent in Stratford-on-Avon, five years as a tenured Lecturer (1917-22). From a 1978 article by Mary Manning about Alexandra we catch a glimpse of how Dorothy was regarded as a teacher in the later period.

“Dorothy Macardle was a most intriguing and fascinating personality. It was greatly to Miss White’s honour that she valued a fine teacher and endured Dorothy’s involvement with the IRA (she had already served a short prison term for handing out subversive literature) because Miss White herself was deeply loyal to the British Crown. ...Macardle was tall and thin with a pale bony face, heavy-lidded eyes and an expression of burning intensity. ...She taught English like an angel: “Now today we will begin our course on Keats. Keats, I will remind you, is a child of the English Renaissance, an Elizabethan, born too late, as Matthew Arnold says.” ...For her drama offering that year she chose Yeats’s ‘Countess Cathleen’. It was a daring choice and must have been viewed with some misgivings by Miss White. ...We rehearsed frequently in Miss Macardle’s flat which was at the top of Madame MacBride’s [Maude Gonne MacBride] house in

Stephen's Green, just around the corner from the College. We had to keep quiet about this, because some of the girls' parents would have been horrified if they had known: 'All that crowd, very close to the Sinn Feiners you know!'" (*Irish Times* Archive, 3 June 1978).

Dorothy's employment with Alexandra ended when she was arrested during the Treaty War in late 1922, a source of deep regret to her. Yet, in its cultivation of high intellectual standards for female students and its promotion of civic engagement, the college had, arguably, assisted her along the road to Republicanism.

BECOMING A REPUBLICAN

Picking up the narrative thread at the point where she finished her first period at Alexandra in 1909, she attained in 1912 a First Honours Arts degree at University College Dublin, gaining third place nationally in English Language and Literature. She then returned to Alexandra to study for a University Teachers' Diploma and, on successfully completing that course, headed for Stratford-on-Avon where she worked on Shakespeare projects and edited several Shakespeare plays for school textbooks.

In *The Riddle of England*, her third broadcast in the autobiographical series, she described how her idealism about England was dashed when she encountered anti-Irish prejudice among members of the English upper class. She recounted how in later years she came to understand that:

"in the light of modern psychology that virulent loathing is comprehensible: the conqueror can't tolerate those who resist him and most people shrink from those they have wronged" (Smith, p. 33).

Smith describes how she met more sympathetic, progressive, educated Englishmen at Shakespeare Conferences but that, as the war progressed, their number decreased with the high death toll in the trenches. Dorothy informed her radio listeners that, years later, when she had become an active Republican, she was able to use her English connections, [Lady Asquith, wife of the former Prime Minister and Charlotte Despard, sister of Lord French, the Irish Lord Lieutenant, among them], to lobby for the reprieve of two young Irishmen on trial for their alleged role in an ambush.

While in England, Dorothy received news that her brother Kenneth was missing in action. On behalf of the family she communicated with the British War Office seeking information. When his death was confirmed, it was Dorothy who asked

that Kenneth's name be conveyed to the newspapers for inclusion on the Roll of Honour. Nadia Smith speculates that this personal tragedy may explain her interest in Spiritualism. It may also explain why, regarding the First World War, her expressed sympathies lay with Britain, contrary to those of major figures in the national movement that she admired like Roger Casement, James Connolly and Eamon de Valera.

At the beginning of 1917 she returned to take up the teaching post at Alexandra referred to above. At this time she began writing plays, four of which were staged to mixed but mainly favourable reviews: *Moonshine* (Boudoir Theatre, London, December 2017); *Asthara* (Little Theatre, Dublin, May 2018); *Atonement* (Abbey Theatre, December 2018); and *Ann Kavanagh* (Abbey Theatre, April 1922). Mixing in theatrical circles in Dublin and getting to know leading figures like W.B. Yeats, Edward Martyn, Constance Markievicz and Maude Gonne MacBride, she became caught up in the post-1916 ferment.

At some point between 1917 and 1919 Dorothy joined Cumann na mBan and Sinn Féin, participating in low-level activities for both. Alongside Eithne Coyle, Bernhard Halligan and Gobnait Ni Bhruadair (Albinia Brodrick), she canvassed for the Sinn Féin candidate, Sean Milroy, in the East Tyrone By-Election of April 1919 which Milroy lost. Following Sinn Féin's landslide victory in the December 1918 General Election and the ensuing outbreak of the War of Independence, she participated in propagandist work for the party. In the archived papers of veteran Republican, Maire Comerford, there is a reference to Dorothy together with Maude Gonne MacBride and Charlotte Despard "*being involved in the publication of the Irish Bulletin*" (Lane, p. 18):

"they followed the Black and Tans, or soldiers into towns where homes had been burned and people evicted. She was then about 35, both the others being in their seventies. It was no wonder that the British dreaded their opinion and their pens as much, if not more than an IRA column in the field" (Lane, p. 18)

In the Autumn of 1920 Dorothy rented an apartment in the Stephen's Green home of Maude Gonne MacBride. In the last of her 1956 broadcasts she stated:

"Proudly I acted as Madame's aide. She was labouring to exhaustion all day and going at to her work underground as a Judge in the Republican courts. Nothing was too arduous nor too humble for her to

undertake, Dependents of prisoners and of Volunteers flocked to her house, some of them in desperate need. Her hall was piled with garments collected from her friends and she would fit people out there, behind a screen" (Lane, p. 23).

During the War of Independence she assisted Maude Gonne in setting up the *White Cross*, a relief organisation funded mainly by donations from the US. One of her roles was to travel the country investigating claims for relief so that funds could be disbursed.

Faced with the great political dilemma of the 1921 Treaty she had no hesitation in opposing it. As her father stated to the authorities when she was imprisoned, "*she was never led by others*" (Lane, p. 19); while respecting the views of figures with more experience than her, she made up her own mind on basic questions. Hearing of de Valera's rejection of the Treaty she was greatly relieved. That de Valera chose Dorothy as the godmother of his son, Terry, in 1922 testifies to a close relationship between them even at that early stage.

The other male figure that she admired through her propagandist work was Erskine Childers, one of the editors of the *Irish Bulletin* during the War of Independence and a close ally of de Valera on the anti-Treaty side. Like Dorothy, Childers was a convert to the cause of Republicanism, having given much of his life in service to the Empire. Author of *The Riddle of the Sands*, he was also a literary intellectual. Dorothy wrote of him in a journal she kept while in prison:

"He was a man whose praise one longs for. He praised me & made me write for the Republic & all this time while he was fighting. I have done my best. I would have loved to know that he was pleased" (Lane, p. 24).

Childers established an anti-Treaty publication called, *An Phoblacht* (The Republic) which Dorothy contributed to. She travelled to Belfast to report on the expulsion of Catholics from their homes and the concomitant sectarian violence. When the Treaty conflict in Dublin ended in July 1922 Childers was summoned to the Munster stronghold of the anti-Treaty forces to provide military advice and leadership. A travelling party comprising Robert and Una Brennan, Kathleen O'Connell (de Valera's long term assistant), Childers and Dorothy was assembled as being less likely to attract the attention of Free State security forces than males travelling alone. Dorothy parted from the group at

Waterford. The mission was ultimately unsuccessful in that the Southern forces refused to accept Childers as a leader.

When she returned to Dublin, under advice from Molly Childers, Dorothy set about establishing a small news organ supporting the anti-Treaty position. Only a few editions had been produced when, on November 9th, she was arrested.

Her arrest happened by accident. Deputising for Maude Gonne, she had received a communication from the US from Muriel MacSwiney, Terrence MacSwiney's widow, desperate for information about her daughter, Maire. Muriel had learned that Nancy O'Rahilly, the woman minding Maire, had been arrested, and she knew that her sister-in-law, Mary MacSwiney, the child's guardian, was on hunger strike. Dorothy undertook to call to the Sinn Féin office in Suffolk Street to discover who was looking after Maire. Arriving outside of the office she saw that the building was being raided. As she later described in her prison journal she decided to enter the building to help in the removal of incriminating documents, have consulted a fellow member. In the event everyone on the premises was taken into custody.

(This is described in Leanne Lane's biography (p. 32), but no further information about Maire is provided. I know from an autobiographical sketch by Muriel (*Muriel MacSwiney – Letters to Angela Clifford*, Athol Books, 1996) that she was re-united with her daughter on her return from America in 1923, so arrangements for the care of Maire in the interim must have been made through Sinn Féin.)

Dorothy may have been arrested unintentionally but, when the authorities investigated her case under pressure from her father, the application for release was rejected. Presumably her propagandist activity was deemed a danger to the State. Erskine Childers, as head of propaganda of the anti-Treaty IRA, was considered a more serious threat by the Free State authorities. He was arrested the day after Dorothy's arrest at the house of his cousin, Robert Barton, in Annamoe, County Wicklow. In the changed atmosphere that followed the death of Michael Collins, he was charged with "*being in possession of an automatic pistol*" which he argued, truthfully, had been a gift from Collins. Sentenced to death on November 19th by a Military Court, he was executed three days later.

Although Spartan in its conciseness and self-deprecatory, the following excerpt from her *Statement* to the Bureau

of Military History (No. 457, 4 Dec 1950) accurately sums up her journey to Republicanism.

"I was awakened to an awareness of Irish nationality, like so many others of my generation, by the poetry of Yeats, especially Cathleen Ni Houlihan, the Irish legends collected by Standish O'Grady, Lady Gregory and others, the Abbey plays and all the writings of the Celtic Twilight School. These interests and my own very imitative writing introduced me to the circle of writers and active nationalists centring around George Russell and Maude Gonne MacBride.

In the autumn of 1920 I became resident in Madame MacBride's house in St Stephen's Green and was very proud to be allowed to act as her assistant in her innumerable activities for victims of the fighting, and particularly in initiating the organisation which developed into the Irish White Cross.

In the intervals of my teaching at Alexandra College I did investigation for the White Cross in various parts of

the country. This took place especially during the Truce. Like most converts to a cause, I was zealous to the point of fanaticism.

My intense anti-Treaty feelings separated me from most of the people with whom I had been associated in republican work and in 1922 I volunteered to Erskine Childers who was editing a paper called the Republic. I visited Belfast during the pogroms and wrote articles for his paper.

When the Civil War started he had to work underground. I served as one of his staff and when he was ordered to join the army in the south I accompanied him as far as Waterford. Returning to my flat in Madame MacBride's home, and instigated by Mrs. Childers, I began to bring out one of the innumerable little cyclostyled papers which were circulating. I called it "Irish Freedom". Madame Markievicz did sketches for the cover. Very few numbers had appeared when I was arrested in 1922."

Dave Alvey

To be continued

Cicero, *De Juventute*, Fine Gael

I write not of Cicero, Illinois, a Chicago suburb once run by Al Capone and his mob, and in the news as I write because of the backlash from the police murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis.

No, I write of Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose ethnicity was shared by Capone, and whose moral character, philosophy and political skills have been imputed to Fine Gael.

A letter *The Irish Times* (June 2) by John Dillon (Regius Professor of Latin and Greek, Emeritus) of Trinity College, Dublin, supports the idea put forward by Pat Leahy in the same paper recently.

I last had contact with Cicero when I was 17 and "*Pro Lege Manilia*" was on the Leaving Cert Syllabus. What I remember of it would not cover a manilla envelope, and what I remember of "*De Senectute*" (Concerning Old Age) which was inflicted on me, though it wasn't on the Syllabus, wouldn't cover the back of a Postage Stamp. Old Age held little interest for me, buried in a boarding school, one hundred miles from civilisation and sixty from Cork. My imagination was fired with other notions.

I see that Fine Gael favours allowing children under 16 years of age, to choose to have their sexual organs surgically re-arranged without the explicit consent of their parents. My sister studied medicine under Eamon de Valera (son of the Statesman) who explained that, despite appearances, gender could not be definitively

established at birth. So surgical readjustment might be appropriate at some stage. But it seems to me that the party's policy, rubberstamped after its adoption by the LGBT pressure-group, is crazy, and not the cunning stunt it imagines.

Why LGBT anyway? Lesbian relationships were never illegal, nor were lesbian women harassed by police, blackmailers or gay-bashers.

As for Cicero, did he give anyone his thoughts on Youth. *De Juventute*, anyone?

America's greatest Car Rental Companies, Herz and Avis, never let anyone under 25 rent their vehicles. A few years ago their policy got the support of science when it was established that, while the human brain is as powerful as it will ever get by age 12, it does not reach maturity before 25.

Before that age a person might be compared to a Ferrari, with a powerful engine, but faulty steering and brakes. I see that HERTZ has just filed for Bankruptcy because of the Virus. I imagine Avis has gone belly-up also.

I seem to have read that Fine Gael proposed to reduce the voting age to 16.

Another Silly Stunt?

The American Founding Fathers, some of whom were addicted to Roman models set the minimum age for Senators at 30. Senators, are by definition "Elders" so that made sense. The Irish idea of having whipper-snappers in the Senate is, if you will pardon my Latin *ipso facto* **nuctes** [nuts]!

Donal Kennedy

While continuing our series on events of 1920 with the help of the daily newspaper of the First Dáil, the *Irish Bulletin*, we are reducing the amount printed to less than a day as reproducing the full monthly collection of the weekly summaries is taking up too much space at the expense of other items in *The Irish Political Review*. Instead, we will be making available to subscribers each month more of the weekly summaries of events for that month, as well as all the previous instalments which have appeared in this magazine, on our dedicated Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/FrankGallagher1919/>

It should be noted that these weekly summaries are not by any means the full content of the *Irish Bulletin* which also contains daily accounts of all significant developments in the war and not just these specific events.

LEST WE FORGET (41)

The following is a list of the Acts of Aggression committed in Ireland by the armed Military and Constabulary of the usurping English Government as reported in the Daily Press for week ending:-

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 20TH 1920.

S U M M A R Y

<u>DATE:- NOVEMBER</u>	<u>15th</u>	<u>16th</u>	<u>17th</u>	<u>18th</u>	<u>19th</u>	<u>20th</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Raids: -	144	210	64	50	86	245	799
Arrests: -	33	113	29	21	24	61	281
Courtsmartial: -	-	33	-	7	6	1	47
Sentences: -	15	2	-	-	-	-	17
Proclamations & Suppressions:-	-	1	-	1	1	-	3
Sabotage:-	6	9	8	3	1	15	42
Armed Assaults:-	4	7	4	5	6	19	45
Murders:-	1	-	1	4	3	1	10
Daily Totals: -	203	375	106	91	127	342	1,244

The sentences passed for political offences during the above six days totalled
 TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AND FOUR MONTHS.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15th 1920.

RAIDS:-

During the weekend English troops in Dublin City and suburbs raided the following premises and residences:-
 Mr. J. Behan, 157, Townsend Street.
 Mr. P. Dolan, 28, Kirwan St. Cottages, Manor St.
 Messrs. Easons, wholesale newsagents, etc.
 Mr. C. English, 145, Phibsboro' Road.
 Messrs. Charles and Cluskey, 50, Eccles Street.
 Corner Townsend Street – Hawkins Street (vacant).
 Mr. O'Flanagan, poultry shop, Wexford Street.
 Hairdresser Shop, York Street.
 Apartments over 53, S. George's Street.
 Ryan's Bootshop, Sth. Anne Street.
 O'Malley's Clothing Factory, 117 Lower Abbey Street.
 Mrs. Keogh, 34, Lower Abbey Street.
 Tenement House, Charlemont Street.
 Mr. Healy, Vintner, 80 Hollybank Road.
 Fleming's Hotel, Gardiner's place.
 Mr. H. Maher, 14, Lower Sherrard Street.
 Tenement, 93, 52 Upper Dorset Street.
 Mrs. Gauldfield, 50, Blessington Street.
 Mrs. Kiernan, 47, Ignatius Road, Drumcondra.
 Mr. O'Hanlon's, 10, Innisfallen Parade.
 Raids by English military and constabulary took place in

the following towns and country districts:-

Co. Dublin:- Residence of Mr. T. McDonald, The Vale, Shankill. Five houses in Dundrum, including the gate lodge at Gortmore of Lady Redmond, J.P., and the residence and gate lodge at Hilton of Mr. P. Golden, Insurance Agent. In the latter house the constabulary wrecked the furniture and stole a razor, a stove, boots, clothing, food and beer, a lamp and a suit length of Irish tweed.
 Co. Cork:- Over 50 residences and business premises including the residence at Macroom of Miss Margaret Desmond, Member of Macroom Council.
 Co. Derry:- Residence of Mr. P. Lynch, Lear Park House, Member of Derry City Council.
 Co. Sligo:- Four shops in Sligo Town.
 Co. Tipperary:- Over thirty homesteads in the Glen of Aherlow.
 Co. Clare:- Twelve houses including the Presbytery of Rev. W. O'Kennedy, Killanena.
 Co. Kerry:- 15 farmhouses at Ballydwyer (also known as Ballymacelligott). Mr. J. Rowland, 60 Eccles Street.
 Mrs. Gronin, Pawn Office,

ARRESTS:-

The following were arrested by English military and constabulary:-
 Miss. Margaret Desmond, Member of Macroom Council,

Co. Cork.

Mr. P. Lynch, Lear House, Park, Co. Derry, Member of Derry County Council.

Ald. L. Gilgan, Manager of Messrs. Collery's Stores, Sligo, and J. Breheny, his assistant.

Mr. James Crowley, Member for North Kerry in the Republican Parliament.

Mr. C. English, aged 18, 145, Phibsboro Road, Dublin.

Mr. Francis Golden, Insurance Agent, Dundrum, Co. Dublin.

Miss. Anna Fitzsimmons, Dundrum, Co. Dublin.

Three young men whose names have not transpired:- Dundrum, Co. Dublin.

Fifteen young men in Bansha district, Co. Tipperary, (names not yet known).

Dr. Shanahan, who had been summoned from Tralee, Co. Kerry to attend to unarmed civilians who had been shot in cold blood by English Constabulary at Ballymacelligott (Ballydwyer) Creamery, Co. Kerry, was arrested by the constabulary when about to minister to the wounded. Soon after the doctor had been arrested one of the men, whose life might have been saved by medical attention, died in great agony. The doctor's servant and five friends who had come to visit the wounded – Messrs. Connor, Dowling, Herlihy, Carmody and McAlister – were also arrested.

SENTENCES:-

Mr. John Browne of Cappamurra, Co. Tipperary, was sentenced by courtmartial to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour on a charge of attempting to disarm an English military patrol.

On a similar charge Messrs. Thomas Buckley and John Dockery of Ferbane, King's Co. were each sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour.

The following sentences were imposed for possession of "seditious" literature and documents:-

Miss. Anita McMahon, Keel, Achill Island – 6 months' imprisonment

Michael McElligott, Listowel, Co. Kerry – 16 months' imprisonment with hard labour.

James Cullen and Peter Finlay, Portarlington – 1 year each with hard labour.

Simon Egan, Mountmellick, Queen's Co. – year with hard labour.

D. Coughlan, Monasterevin – 3 months' imprisonment.

The following sentences were imposed for possession of arms:-

John Coakley, Cork City – 18 months' imprisonment with hard labour.

Albert Burrow, Carlisle Road, Derry – 6 months' imprisonment.

For having acted as Republican police when they were arrested on a charge of theft, Charles Weston, Donabate, Co. Dublin and James Crinegan, Swords, Co. Dublin, were sentenced to six months' imprisonment each with hard labour.

Daniel Buckley of Abbeyfeale, Co. Limerick, was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment with hard labour for publicly accusing the English constabulary of murder.

Patrick O'Connor of Wexford was sentenced to 12 days imprisonment for refusing to give evidence at an English military courtmartial.

ARMED ASSAULTS:-

Mr. A. O'Tuama was assaulted by English constabulary while awaiting a train at Moate Station, Co. Westmeath. They threatened to shoot him and one of them struck him in the face with a knuckle-duster.

Mr. David Ellis of Hardwicke Street, Dublin, was fired on by English troops on the morning of the 14th instant. Mr. Ellis is a distributing agent for English Sunday papers and was about to start on his rounds when he was sighted by the troops who opened fire without challenge or warning.

English troops on the 10th inst. entered the Presbytery of Fr. O'Kennedy, Killanena, Co. Clare. They struck him in the face and tore his clothing. They then forced him at the bayonet point to enter a lorry, and after taking him twelve miles he was thrown out on the wayside. The troops also entered an adjacent chapel and stole sacred vessels. Vestments and chalices were thrown on the floor.

SABOTAGE:-

Following an attack on an armed patrol of English constabulary in the Glen of Aherlow, Co. Tipperary, on the 13th inst. English troops in the middle of the night descended on the adjacent town of Tipperary and attacked many houses, burning three to the ground and partially destroying others. The houses destroyed include the residence and pharmacy of Mr. P.J. Moloney, Member for Mid-Tipperary in the Republican Parliament. The house was sprayed with petrol, Mrs. Moloney and her young children getting five minutes in which to clear out.

Messrs. Lipton's Provision Stores were also completely gutted. The residence of Mr. W. Allen, Member of Tipperary Urban Council, was partially burned. Mrs. Allen – the only occupant – being ejected at the point of the bayonet.

Ballydwyer Creamery (also known as Ballymacelligott) was burned to the ground by English constabulary. Adjacent farmhouses belonging to men named Hayes and Dunne were also set on fire.

MURDER:-

Annie O'Neill, an eight-year-old girl of 22, Charlemont Avenue, Dublin, was shot dead by English military on November 13th. On that evening Annie O'Neill with some other children were playing on the avenue outside their parents' houses. A party of English military in two cars suddenly drew up at the street corner. Some boys and young men standing at the corner ran away at the sight of them. They ran in the direction in which the children were playing. Without any regards for the latter, the soldiers opened fire and hit two of the children. Annie O'Neill was shot dead and another little girl, Teresa Kavanagh, aged 6 and a half years, was wounded. The military were not in any danger and were not acting in self-defence. The youths who ran away were not armed; they were not "wanted" men..... subsequently

'The Drowned Blackbird.'

"Lovely daughter of Conn O Néill,
sleep long after your great loss.
Don't let your noble kinsmen hear you
weeping after your treasure's death.

The song of that swift, nimble bird
is gone for good, my beauty pale.
But where's the treasure brings no trouble?
Hold a while, don't beat your hands . . .

O beauty, grown from kings of royal Ulster,
Be steady now; it is better than raving wild.
Your small bird laughing loveliest on the bough-tips,
fret no more for his death: he is washed in lime."

Séamus Dall Mac Cuarta (1647?-1733)

Mac Cuarta was born probably in Omeath, Co. Louth, and seems to have spent most of his life moving about in his native district and in the Boyne valley, where he was one of an active group of poets and musicians. Either blind or defective in sight from youth, he depended to a great extent on his literary talents for his livelihood, at a time when substantial patronage was on the wane due to the terrible changes brought about by the Cromwellian and later colonisations of the Gaelic people.

An Duanaire 1600-1900: Poems of the Dispossessed. Ed. by Séan O Tuama and verse translations by Thomas Kinsella. The Dolmen Press. Dublin. 1981.

"The Most Unforgettable Character I've Met.

When Sarah, then Cartey, first arrived at Bowen's Court, County Cork, she was a girl of fourteen. She left her home in County Tipperary to become a kitchenmaid in my grandfather's house... the Master owned large estates in both counties... everyone went in dread of Mr. Bowen. He was a just man, but he was hard... Sarah Cartey at first saw little: the basement claimed her; over the stone-flagged floors she hurried to and fro. ...the kitchen worked at exacting pressure: if a meal were not on his table up to the minute, the Master would 'roar aloud' at which the whole household quaked... Sarah did not question the social order. The injustices (as they would appear now) of my grandfather's household did not strike her... Sarah, scrubbed at the pots and pans. If downstairs you worked like a black, upstairs you had to 'behave' like a Spartan... she was doing the work of six, turning her hand to everything—cooking, laundering, scrubbing. I don't know how many times a day she plied up and down between the basement and attics. But she always had time to joke with the young gentlemen, or to help the young ladies to dress for balls..."

'The Mulberry Tree', Writings of Elizabeth Bowen, Selected and Introduced by Hermione Lee. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, London. 1986.

Elizabeth Bowen

A Review of Patricia Laurence's biography

Part 8

When Elizabeth Bowen wrote the above piece about Sarah Cartey in 1944, she noted that her grandfather titled "the Master" at all times (surely a verbal genuflection) was tyrannical and that all the servants "quaked".

Charles Ritchie in his diaries 13th May 1956 noted:

"I have been reading in Bowen's Court the terrible account of old Henry Cole Bowen, E's grandfather, an improving landlord and a Victorian ogre who

eventually went mad as did E's father. This undercurrent is always here in this place ..."

The money dried up and the estates vanished as did many of the servants. Sarah remained faithful and as such made a great impression on Elizabeth Bowen. But it is when the former writes about the young Sarah that we get a real impression of the writer herself:

"Her girlhood had been in the days of the Land League; she was to live through the repercussions of the 1916 Rising,

through 'the bad times' that followed the Great War, through the Civil War after the Treaty... Sarah never took sides... she never examined the ethics either of landlordism or British rule... though she was on civil terms with all the neighbours, she was on close terms with none—and she never talked: her discretion stood her in good stead..."

For Elizabeth Bowen, the 'War of Independence' is quaintly termed "*the bad times*", as it indeed was for her 'people', but was it thus for her servant Sarah? The descendants of the great Gaelic nation were reduced to 'physical servility' but were their thinking processes to be colonised by the Big House as well? If Sarah Cartey remained so pliant in her service to the Big House people, today that very process would be termed 'cultural grooming' and with justification. A girl of fourteen, a woman who married a local Bowen stalwart at thirty and had one son and was then widowed, who was always at hand to service the needs of Elizabeth and Alan at their Big House. She got cancer at nearly eighty and went up to Dublin for treatment. Here is how Elizabeth Bowen described that event:

"Before she left "for treatment" she was busy: she had a great deal to see to. She went over every inch of the house—yes, it was fit for us to come back, if we choose, tomorrow. In the larder, she checked over the bottled fruit, and re-covered some dozens of jars of jam. She wished she could have made more strawberry, that was our favourite.

"She had bound her son Paddy to secrecy about her illness: "I must not be worried—wasn't the war enough?" "

Sarah died,

"her heart gave out under the treatment" as Bowen wrote. "It was now, at last, that she realized her wish to return forever to Tipperary. As she had asked her son, she was buried there. Her funeral drove past the farms and gates and hedges whose pictures had always been in her heart."

At the very end of this piece of writing, Bowen seems to become aware of the reader, she finally becomes 'self-conscious' of her treatment of another woman, servant or not. She now wishes to upgrade in a way, Sarah's service to the Bowens, to burnish it up and make it something it certainly was not. She writes with an undercurrent of nervousness that endeavours to entrap the reader into a complicit reading of the nature of the Bowen/Cartey relationship:

"You may say she gave her genius to a forlorn hope—to a house at the back of beyond, to a dying-out family. But I think no gift goes for nothing. She never lowered her flag; and by that she alone

could make me believe in greatness. If we can play our parts in building a better world in Sarah's spirit, we shall not do too badly."

The double negative in the second sentence tells all—in my opinion. As Bowen had this article published in 1944 in *'The Windmill'* as *'Tipperary Woman'*, she is still justifying the 'Big House' and the needs of its occupants.

World War II was nearing its end but a life spent in domestic servitude should, Bowen tries to convey, be seen as somehow heroic. That flag, Sarah's flag was never raised in the first place as she knew only too well; and Bowen's evocation of it as a uplifting symbol shows how totally self-absorbed she was. As denizen of the 'Big House', she had already written a devastating critique of it in her 1929 novel *'The Last September'*, the Big Houses were "islands", inward looking and only ever interested in other big houses which were also "islands". But the war changed everything and now Bowen wrote what were essentially elegies for the Big House people like herself and even the loyal Irish servants got their mention as well.

The American scholar Vera Kreilkamp in her devastating critique *'The Anglo-Irish Novel and the Big House'* scorned the very idea that servants were valued, shrouding them in their basements unlike the horses in their comfortable stables. And she says this:

"... Bowen's 'Last September' is strikingly disloyal to the conservative tradition that is later elegized in 'Bowen's Court'."

But of course Bowen, writing at the time of the war, wrote not only spy reports but propaganda which Patricia Laurence is keen to point out in her biography *'Elizabeth Bowen: A Literary Life'*. She managed to find a real nugget of information: a propaganda film, *'Fighting Norway'*, which Bowen "partly scripted" "for the Strand Film Company that produced wartime documentary propaganda films. She signed a contract" with them, as did "Dylan Thomas".

As Laurence reports this,

"was part of the British propaganda effort to build the morale of the Norwegian government in exile in London after the Nazi occupation in April 1940. Her scripts became part of the released film 'Fighting Norway' that focused on the resistance of the Norwegian trade unions and schools to the occupation of the country. Bowen worked on the script with others over a period of three months and received a letter from Donald Taylor of Strand in 1942,

agreeing to pay her £50, indicating that "the said film will contain a substantial part of the Writer's work."

Laurence also acknowledges that Elizabeth Bowen—

"continued to be employed by the MOI (Ministry of Information) "throughout and after the war, writing situation reports towards the end of the war on the condition of the seaside towns of Dover, Hythe and Folkstone." (These formed part of the major Cinque Ports which were vital in securing Britain's flank only 21 miles from Calais. —JH). "Bowen well describes the Dover of 1944 writing: "For four years, since France fell to the Nazis, Dover has watched, waited"."

"Some of these reports became essays, published in journals, signed as MOI [Ministry of Information] contributions, and later in 'Collected Impressions'." (Bowen's partial memoir published in 1975, two years after her death —JH)

Laurence cites Alan Hepburn who "reports that tax records reveal that the MOI paid Bowen from 1944-1947".

Alan Hepburn, now James McGill Professor of Twentieth-Century Literature at McGill University, Montreal, had become quite the scholar on Elizabeth Bowen and has edited three important books of all her Broadcasts, Reviews, Articles and Essays etc. His research, as Laurence shows, looks at how much she was paid by the MOI during the later years. Heather Bryant Jordan's *'How Will the Heat Endure: Elizabeth Bowen and the Landscape of War'* already notated her earlier payments from the MOI. But, as Lane and Clifford have written, it is impossible to really know how much Bowen was actually paid, as so many of her Reports to this day are unavailable.

Britain reveals only that which will be in its own interests as ever and it polices its archives as it policed the country during the war. Indeed Hepburn reveals that Bowen, in her essay *'London, 1940'*, in its draft form, *'Britain in Autumn'*, before the censor intervened, wrote of the community spirit she felt as an Air Raid Warden:

"We have almost stopped talking about Democracy because, for the first time, we are a democracy. We are more, we are almost a commune ..."

Hepburn elucidates thus:

"Bowen's comments about democracy emerge from a specific context. Because the government passed the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act in May 1940, democracy per se did not obtain in Great Britain during the war. Under martial law, as Clement Attlee told the nation on the radio:

"Parliament has given to the Government full power to control all persons and property. There is no distinction between rich

and poor, between worker and employer; between man and woman; the services and property of all must be at the disposal of the Government for the common task". Attlee advocates "the common task", and Bowen glimpses a "commune" in the war effort. While preparing *'London 1940'*, Bowen cancelled the passage about the democratic levelling that wartime fighting created."

The censor, moreover, cut passages from the essay.

"Perhaps", Hepburn speculates "as a consequence of the censor's disapproval, Bowen moderated her apocalyptic tone; the direness of the situation had led her to false prophecies. The "people's war" did not create revolution, nor even the possibility of revolution. War simply rallied patriots to fight for the cause of democracy."

And naturally Bowen was one such patriot.

Patricia Laurence seems to see in Roy Foster's work a scholarship that is quite noticeably lacking in reality. In the September edition of the Irish Political Review, I wrote about how Foster and others continue to take aim at the works of Jack Lane and Brendan Clifford, especially in their consistently updated *'Notes on Eire: Espionage Reports to Winston Churchill'* and of course their famous 1993 *'North Cork Anthology'*. When Brendan Clifford noted how Bowen talked up "her Irish credentials" for the spying work she was intending to do in Ireland, most commentators cried foul, especially in these latter years with academia and the media going completely overboard.

But Heather Bryant Jordan in her 1992 book, *'How Will the Heart Endure'*, which predated the *'North Cork Anthology'* by one year, also saw through the chicanery of Elizabeth Bowen's identification as being Irish. World War II was beginning and the British wanted all corners covered—so to speak. So here is Bryant Jordan musing:

"During the 1930s a number of Elizabeth Bowen's friends, both English and Irish, had urged her to write about her family's history in Ireland. Since Bowen enjoyed cultivating her Irish side, she played up the mystique of her Big House to her English friends." (Italics—JH).

Clifford came to the same conclusion too and he was nearly lynched.

Bryant Jordan also looks at Virginia Woolf's famous letter to her sister Vanessa Bell, where she called Bowen's Court "a great stone box" but also looks at Woolf's diary of the same time where she is even more scathing. But it is the latter's comments on the servants that caught my attention. She wrote that they were:

"tattered farm girls waiting... and then

I talked to the cook, & she showed me the wheel for blowing the fire in the windy pompous kitchen, half underground ..."

No names for any of the servants of course for Woolf or her likes but the cook she mentions is very certainly the Sarah Cartey about whom Bowen wrote about also in the war years.

In 2004, Neil Corcoran, who at that time was the King Alfred Professor of English at the University of Liverpool, wrote an important book titled: *'Elizabeth Bowen: The Enforced Return'*, Oxford Press. He manages to display a cool-eyed look at what Lane/Clifford were endeavouring to do with their scholarship. He too noted that Bowen—

"was not, therefore, performing a negligible function in Ireland, but a politically sensitive and significant one involving not only English attitudes to Irish neutrality but the development of English strategy in relation to a potential re-conquest of sovereign Irish territory: which is why her 1940 reports were passed on by Lord Cranborne, who received them in the Dominions Office, to Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the opinion that this is "a shrewd appreciation of the position"."

The footnote states thus:

"Elizabeth Bowen. 'Notes on Eire', Reports to Winston Churchill, 1940-2 with a Review of Irish Neutrality in World War 2, ed. by Jack Lane and Brendan Clifford (Millstreet: Aubane Historical Society, 1999.) Since this is the only form in which these documents have ever been published in full, I cite this text in my references to them. It is very badly edited, however, and its transcriptions are not always reliable. I have checked the references I make against photocopies of the original documents, which I have also read in situ at the Public Records Office. They are classified as FO800/310 and DO130/28."

Considering that Neil Corcoran had the great fortune to be in academia and also to be grant-aided by two different bodies, the *Arts and Humanities Research Board* and the *Carnegie Trust* for his book, Lane and Clifford on the other hand, had only their only limited personal resources to do theirs. So it would be nice if that was acknowledged by Corcoran who has the mighty Oxford University behind him as well. But then, that would be asking too much from an academic it seems. But Corcoran in the text of his book goes in for the kill and lays into Lane/Clifford.

"... in 1999 an organization based in North Cork called the Aubane Historical Society published Bowen's reports—and this is still the only way to read them in

their entirety in published form—with the subtitled 'Espionage Reports to Winston Churchill, 1940-2', in a volume which includes an attack on Bowen as an 'English' spy in Ireland during the war, a lengthy defence of Irish neutrality along the de Valeran lines that the war was an imperial adventure, and an account of the controversy generated in the Irish Times and other Irish newspapers by an earlier attack on Bowen from this same source in 1997."

"The Aubane Historical Society's polemic is ignorant in some respects: it appears, for instance, unaware that some of Bowen's work is actually set in Ireland, and it nowhere refers to her New Statesman defence of neutrality. But it is not altogether unintelligent, and is not unscrupulous; and it serves to show how great a strength of feeling there still is in certain circles in Ireland about the justification for neutrality itself and about the part played in Ireland during the war by people like Bowen (and John Betjeman)

who were perceived, when their wartime work came to light, as espionage agents; a feeling all the more bitter in Bowen's case since she claimed to be Irish—or, in the formulation of Brendan Clifford, one of the Aubane editors, she 'polish(ed) up her Irish credentials' during the war as a deliberate 'cover for espionage'."

I am so delighted that Corcoran brought up Elizabeth Bowen's *New Statesman* article because its contents show what Bowen really thought of the Irish, and in the next issue of the *Irish Political Review*, this will be dealt with extensively. And, as for Lane/Clifford being unknowledgeable about Bowen's fiction being set in Ireland, just look at their *'North Cork Anthology'* and there is Bowen's *'Seven Winters'*, an account of her Dublin childhood, and some extracts from *'The Last September'*, her 1929 fictional account of the 'War of Independence'!

Julianne Herlihy ©

Some Thoughts On The death of Harold Evans

Harold Evans was responsible for quickly dispatching an *Sunday Times Insight* investigative team to Derry in the immediate aftermath of the atrocity in 1972. The authorities were not inclined to systematically gather evidence at that time and if it were not for the arrival of the Insight team within days of it happening a lot of what has survived would have been lost. The Insight team also had the benefit of access to the nationalist community which any State investigator would not have had. This meant that they were able to record eye-witness accounts and be granted sight of photographs etc. taken by local people at the time. They also interviewed hospital staff and coroners who dealt with the aftermath. The result was around 12 boxes of evidence that ended up in the archive of the *Sunday Times* and which constituted a damning indictment of the behavior of the British Army on Bloody Sunday.

This evidence was deliberately withheld from the Widgery Inquiry that was set up the same year, 1972. There is a document among the papers in the archive which shows that this was a conscious decision on the part of the *Sunday Times*. I'm not sure who made that decision and why it was made. The reasoning could be the usually journalistic one of protecting sources. Alternatively, it could have been the result of a suspicion among some at the *Sunday Times* that Widgery was meant

to come to a conclusion that exonerated the army and a belief that the long term welfare of the archive was best kept away from anyone associated with Widgery. In the end Widgery produced a whitewash that defied the evidence which in the meantime remained on the shelves of the *Sunday Times* archive.

I began employment with News International in the 1990s and made a point of checking the Insight evidence when I became archivist so was aware of it when the *Saville Inquiry* was set up in 2000. I subsequently ensured that this material was brought to the attention of the Inquiry when it started gathering evidence. This resulted in the Saville team sending a para-legal person to the archive to assess its possible relevance. After that assessment the Inquiry demanded it be sent to them and this placed me in a dilemma. I had been wary of the Inquiry taking "ownership" of the boxes of evidence and, fearing it might become 'lost', I got my staff to spend a day photocopying everything before it was sent to the inquiry. I also notified the Finucane law team who were representing the victims.

Needless to say all of this was done without informing senior management. By the time they realised what was happening it was too late to stop it. I subsequently got carpeted by the Managing Editor of the *Sunday Times* on a charge of revealing journalistic sources. I pointed out that the

material was just outside the 30 year rule that the archive operated and as such the public interest argument, in my opinion, justified the two year premature release.

Some months later I was again carpeted, as the material I had sent to Saville included a couple of journalist's notebooks. It seemed that the (by now long retired) journalist in question was claiming that my action in revealing these notebooks had damaged his reputation for protecting sources. He threatened to sue me and the *Sunday Times*.

In the end the management of the *Sunday Times* placated him by commissioning some articles from him.

The *Sunday Times* material was acknowledged by the Saville inquiry and the Finucane people to have made an important contribution to the findings, and the whole episode left me feeling grateful to Evans for responding to the Derry atrocity so quickly and then in ensuring that the evidence wasn't discarded as it could have been.

As far as Evans's subsequent career went, he was taken off the *Sunday Times* when Thatcher demanded his head as a price for allowing Murdoch to procure *The Times* together with the *Sunday Times* in 1981. When Murdoch moved him to *The Times*, he was never again the journalist he was. Evans was only at *The Times* for a year before leaving, citing proprietorial interference. In that time he pursued an anti-Thatcher editorial line but I always had the impression that it was fuelled by personal animosity for what she had done to his career more than principle.

Also, it has to be borne in mind that, during Evans' glory days on the *Sunday Times* (Thalidomide exposure, Bloody Sunday etc), the paper was owned by Roy Thomson who was a genuine hands-off proprietor who allowed Evans his head in the stories he pursued and the money spent in pursuing them.

When Murdoch bought the *Sunday Times* and *The Times* in 1981, it represented the end of the glory days of both the *Sunday Times* and Evans.

In more ways than one Evans' reputation as a journalist was only made possible by the indulgence of Roy Thomson. Without the freedom (and money) that Thomson provided, it's difficult to see Evans ever achieving what he did and by the same token difficult to see a future where the results of such a combination could ever again take place in British journalism.

Eamon Dyas

Notes On The Role Of Ex-Servicemen In Derry:

Paul Grace, 1930 - 2017

Paul Grace, a Trade Unionist who played a significant role in the Civil Rights Campaign and in various efforts to establish Labour politics in Northern Ireland, died on 2nd May 2009 aged just under 77.

While maintaining his home in Derry, Len Green's wife's brother-in-law, Paul Grace, became a full-time national official of the Post Office Trade Union in England. In those days Trade Unions had great political influence in Britain. Though not personally connected to the Northern Ireland-based Campaign for Labour Representation, Paul independently pursued this cause up and down the highways and byways of the Trade Union movement in England, where it was vehemently opposed by strongly entrenched, ideology-bound political factions which were politically powerful behind the scenes in those days.

With his broad Tipperary accent and formidable personal presence, seasoned Civil Rights veteran Paul Grace single-handedly ground down the opposition, by relentlessly asserting the obvious brute fact of British Government power and agency in the Six Counties, and the need to bring it under democratic control, and by resolutely refusing to be lured into ephemeral ideological doctrinal disputes which led nowhere.

Unlike Paul Grace, Len Green was not born Catholic and he had no Irish national heritage in his Salford background. When I first met him, he had completed a political career in the SDLP. Being well accustomed to the outlook of the SDLP, I was surprised when Len responded favourably to the Labour Representation message about the cleverly camouflaged role of the British State at the very heart of the structured conflict in Northern Ireland, and how this could be stopped by democratising the British state in the Six Counties.

Paul was born in English in Co Tipperary, near Cloughjordan, on 29th June 1932, one of six brothers in a family of twelve. At age 16 he went to work in England and joined the RAF there. He served in Ballykelly, Co. Derry, in the 1950's, where he was 'batman' to the Commanding Officer.

Like most southern Irish people, he had little initial knowledge of Northern society. He told me that he once went out with a

girl who said her father was an Orangeman. He understood this to mean that the man worked in the fruit trade.

He married in 1954 and lived in Artisan Street, in the present location of Rosemount Gardens. At that time he was notable as the only possessor of motorised transport—a motorbike—in that area.

After leaving the RAF he worked for the Post Office, and became active in the Post Office Workers' Union in Derry. In the 1960s he was involved in the Derry Housing Action Committee, the Derry Unemployed Action Committee and Derry Labour Party.

In Derry, the housing and unemployed campaigns were the basis of the Civil Rights campaign in which Paul became heavily involved, liaising between different parts of the campaign around the North, and organising the all-important stewarding of rallies and demonstrations, to ensure they remained peaceful. He was a member of the Derry Citizens' Action Committee which ran the Civil Rights campaign in Derry. Tall and commanding in bearing, he wielded a lot of influence in the campaign.

Soon after this he was appointed a full-time official in the Post Office union, and he worked for about twenty-five years in England, maintaining his home in Derry.

In 1977 the Campaign for Labour representation was started by David Morrison, with Eamonn O'Kane, who had also been Northern Ireland Labour Party members involved in the Civil Rights agitation. As the NI Labour Party (which was unconnected with the British Labour Party) withered away in the face of social and political realities, the CLR sought to put the onus for socialist politics where it belonged—on the Labour Party which at that time was the sovereign government of the state.

The CLR was a membership group which lobbied within the British Labour Party and, in Northern Ireland, strongly publicised the view that British Governments, including Labour Governments, were, in effect, colonial rulers in Northern Ireland as they did not receive, or even seek, an electoral mandate to govern there.

Their power and authority there was based, ultimately, on armed force.

In 1988 I arranged a meeting in Derry of officers and officials of most of the larger Trade Unions in the Derry area, to discuss the British Labour Party issue, and how it might be progressed by N. Ireland Union members who, because of the powerful block vote, had a role in determining Labour Party policy. The meeting was chaired by James O'Kane, Independent Chairman of Strabane District Council and former Republican activist. Eamonn O'Kane and David Morrison attended on behalf of the CLR.

The obstacles to the project were discussed, along with strategies for overcoming them. The obvious points were that Catholic Trade Unionists might resist the entry of a British political party to the Northern Ireland scene. But the British Labour Party had a policy of Irish unity by consent, and it was fairly obvious that Irish unity, if it were to come about, could only happen if the British Government agreed to it. The British Labour Party, though out of government at that time, was the most likely means by which this might happen. Also, in 1988, the British miners' struggle, and other resistance to the Thatcher Government, had been keenly observed and had the effect of promoting a quite positive attitude to the British Labour Party in some left-wing circles in Derry.

On the other hand, Protestant Trade Union members might resist a party which supported Irish unity. Against this, it was argued that, if unionist Protestants wanted their views and opinions to be heard in the seat of power and government in Britain, they could not accomplish it from the sidelines. *"If you're not in you can't win"* was the line put by Eamonn O'Kane to the meeting.

But, though important, these were marginal issues for those present, whose primary purpose was to promote effective socialist politics through the electoral system. This was their motivation, not the unionist/nationalist question. In fact, they saw participation in the electoral politics of sovereign state power as a means by which the sectarian issue might be eased out of Northern Irish politics.

The approach to be followed was simple. The British Labour Party had various component parts, including Trade Unions, whose delegates to Party Conferences voted as a Union of hundreds of thousands of members—the "block vote"—and therefore potentially wielded decisive power in the policy-making of the Party. The Unions were much more

powerful than individual party members. On any policy issue, Union Delegates to the Party Conference followed the line or policy determined by their own Union Conference. In regard to Northern Ireland issues (such as whether the Party should seek an electoral mandate in N. Ireland by organising and contesting elections there), Union Conferences generally deferred to the views of their members and delegates from Northern Ireland itself.

Those present at the Derry meeting of 1988 were members of British-based Trade Unions. As such, though they could not participate in the electoral and governing work of the British Labour Party, they were entitled to participate in Labour Party Conferences and policy making. They could wield enormous influence on their Union's policy on N. Ireland matters, and hence, through the 'block vote', on the Labour Party's Northern Irish policy.

Most of these Unions had a local Northern Irish Regional decision-making Council, and this would have to be won over to a policy of using their Union's block vote to change the Labour Party's policy on electoral involvement in N. Ireland.

There was a striking elegance to this strategy. By successive leveraging, a relatively small number of people in N. Ireland could accomplish a political measure which could transform the way Northern Ireland was governed. And it was not pie-in-the-sky. The issue could be presented to Union Branches and Councils in N. Ireland, in which many of the participants were non-sectarian socialists, and step by step, the Party organisation issue could be taken through their Union policy-making processes, and then, by the block vote, carried in the Labour Party Conference.

Those present at the Derry meeting were Union officials and activists to whom the cut and thrust and wheeling and dealing of Union politics were second nature. The strategy and its purpose appealed strongly to them.

Subsequent to this meeting, the participants remained loosely co-ordinated, if not unorganised, as they sought to bring Union power to bear in the councils of the British Labour Party. The CLR continued to be the public face of the campaign, agitating in Northern Ireland and Britain, and presenting powerful arguments against the way in which the British State governed in N. Ireland.

Meanwhile, in the Post Office Union, Paul Grace, as a Union official in the London Head Office, debated the issue in branches and meetings throughout Britain as part of his regular schedule of work. This Union was left-wing, with political groups in control of many areas. But Paul overcame

their rather doctrinaire and convoluted arguments against Labour representation in Northern Ireland, partly by the power of his personality, but also by throwing the argument back to them—to explain their reasoning to someone like him, a non-ideological Tipperary-man to whom their theories made no practical sense.

They may not have realised that they were dealing with a subtle and experienced person, who had been able to dominate, in his own way, the left-wing cauldron of Derry politics in 1969, where the impossible was accomplished—the temporary removal of the British Imperial State from a square mile or so of its land- and air-space by unarmed civilians. I doubt whether the practical reality of this was something that most British left-wing activists of the time could even begin to comprehend. But Paul knew it, as he knew by experience the possibilities and limitations of political activity, electoral and otherwise.

With other Unions, the Post Office Union moved to a supportive position. Two of the people who expressed this support were the Union General Secretary, Alan Johnson, Labour's Minister for Health at the time and tipped to be Gordon Brown's successor, and Kate Hoey, a Northern Ireland-born MP for a London constituency who had Post Office Union sponsorship.

The CLR and various Trade Union campaigns began to yield results over the next few years, into the early '90's. But, as the project entered the realm of practical reality, cracks and tensions emerged. In Derry it was known that Paul Grace would soon be retiring from his job as a Trade Union official in England, and returning to live permanently in Derry; and it was hoped that he might exert a positive influence.

In fact, his retirement to Derry in 1994 practically coincided with a meeting organised by Kate Hoey MP, whose purpose and intention were to take control of the relatively unorganised Labour supporters in Derry with a view to hijacking their campaign in the unionist interest. Strange but true.

Within a fairly short time it was obvious to Paul, and to everyone else involved, that it was not going to be possible to use the British Labour Party to bring about a non-sectarian form of socialist electoral politics in Northern Ireland.

Paul had a happy and contented retirement, and he enjoyed a passion for golf, which he continued until his final illness.

Pat Muldowney

Next month: *Tony Martin*

Ulster Affairs In The Early 1970s

If the John Hume of the Dublin obituaries did not exist he would have had to be invented. He did not exist. Therefore he was invented.

The John Hume idol of Constitutional nationalism after the event is too good to be true and therefore too good to be effective. Goodness which denies the existence of the world in which it exists cannot be effective in that world. If its goodness is to be considered good, it can only be if withdrawal from a world which can never be entirely good is a good thing. And if that withdrawn goodness, which contemplates itself in isolation, has an effect on the world, it must be by some means that has been altogether lost sight of in the progress that began in 1968.

It was not peaceful protest that ended the War. Peaceful protest was one of the causes of the War. After peaceful protest had helped to bring about the war, it lost purchase on the course of events.

The great peace campaign called the Peace People mobilised large numbers for displays of goodness, and won Nobel Prises, and was irrelevant to the course of events. It blazed up for a moment, salved the conscience of the Dublin Establishment, and disappeared without trace. It was futile because it did not address the political circumstances that made war possible.

Early in 1972, after the British Army shootings in Derry, John Hume said that it was now a case of "United Ireland or nothing". That was a declaration of war, made at a moment of heightened public feeling, by a public figure who was listened to.

There were peacemongers in the Nationalist Party under its new name of SDLP. The Party Leader, Gerry Fitt, was one of them. Fitt, who had called himself Republican Labour until 1969, said he had entered politics for the purpose of helping lame dogs over stiles. He was by temperament a British Labour politician but he was not allowed to join the British Labour Party because he lived in the British Six Counties. He tried to act as if the SDLP was a Labour Party, and complained that he was prevented from doing so by "*the countrymen*" who made up the bulk of the Party. And the most

obnoxious of the countrymen was, of course, John Hume.

The other would-be Labour politician in the Party was Paddy Devlin. He had been a member of the futile Northern Ireland Labour Party, which only existed because the Labour Party of the state excluded the Six Counties from its sphere of operations.

In 1971 Brian Faulkner, the Unionist Prime Minister, attempted to set a reform process of the Northern Ireland system in motion. He proposed at Stormont the setting up of strong Parliamentary Committees, some of which would be chaired by the SDLP. Fitt and Devlin responded enthusiastically. They said it was "*Faulkner's finest hour*".

We speculated in the Workers' Weekly about how long their enthusiasm would be allowed to survive when they came down off the hill and became subject to the pressures of the countrymen. It did not outlast the weekend. Reform of Stormont was off the agenda. John Hume took it off. The SDLP withdrew from Stormont and reassembled as the Alternative Assembly at Dungannon, based on a false memory of the Dungannon Convention of 1782.

Radio Eireann's *Sunday Miscellany* in honour of John Hume began with a reminiscence by Anne Devlin, Paddy Devlin's daughter, that was out of joint with everything else in the programme. It was a memory of how, before the War, life was lived vicariously in British party-politics. I remember how this was the case as late as the British General Election in the early Summer of 1970. It was then that the absurdity of the Northern Ireland set-up first struck me. People in Belfast argued about the Election as animatedly as people in London did, apparently oblivious of the fact that they were excluded from it and could only vote for Six County parties.

A Stormont Prime Minister in the 1950s had tried to get BBC Northern Ireland excluded from BBC party-political broadcasts on the ground that those parties did not operate in Northern Ireland. He was over-ruled by Whitehall. Northern Ireland was therefore subjected to the propaganda of the British party politics which produced the English sense of political normality, while being excluded from actual participation in that actual party-politics. The

Northern Ireland public was thereby given a sense of political normality that was alien to Northern Ireland circumstances.

In 1969-70 there was therefore a groundless expectation that, if the gerrymandering was abolished, the property vote in Local Government ended, and the B-Specials abolished, British political normality would prevail. The failure of British normality to prevail was certainly a factor that nudged the situation towards War.

John Hume seems to have begun with an assumption that there was an orderly political normality latent in the Northern Ireland situation—either the British or another one. He was educated to be part of the Irish elite, having been at Maynooth with Cardinal O'Fee. His early reform activity in Derry seems to have been of a kind with Fr. McDyer's in Glencolumbkille—joining the efforts of others at establishing a Credit Union and encouraging small businesses. In the course of that activity he became acquainted with Ivan Cooper, who was to come with him to the SDLP, in which he seems to have been the only significant Protestant.

In 1968 he encountered Unionism at its worst and realised that he had to be a nationalist. He had no Labour affiliations. The SDLP related to Fitt and Devlin.

I only ever met him once. It must have been in the Winter of 1970-71. I debated the issue of whether the Ulster Protestant community was in any meaningful sense a part of the Irish Nation. If it was, then there must be something within it that nationalist persuasion could reach. I could not see that those who insisted that it was part of the nation were making any effort to discover the nationalist element within the Protestant community and tap into it!

My view was that the Ulster Protestants were separate from nationalist Ireland in origin and development and that communication with them could only begin if that fact was recognised.

All I can remember from Hume's rebuttal is the assertion that they clearly were part of the nation, since they had no difficulty in pronouncing such Irish names as Cullybacky and Ahoghill. I took this to mean that he was not going to be distracted by factual detail from the political cause to which he had devoted himself. And anyway it was before an English audience.

What Hume did with the SDLP was make it the Constitutional wing of the Provisional IRA. Sinn Féin was the political wing, which was an altogether different

matter. The SDLP was the Constitutional wing, or the Constitutional alternative, to which concessions, which were made advisable by the War, could be made with propriety.

My only discussion with the political wing was, I think, early in 1970. It was in Surrey Street, on the Lisburn Road, shortly before BICO moved to Athol Street in the City centre. The discussion was arranged by Len Callender. There were, I think, three Sinn Féiners. The only one I recall is Rita O'Hare. We explained what we had in mind: Nationalist recognition of the distinct existence of the Ulster Protestant community, so that communication between the two communities might be possible, and then the development of a reform movement involving both. She was utterly dismissive of this project on the ground that we had a cloud-cuckoo-land notion of the potential for change of the Protestant community, which was hidebound in its routines.

She had better grounds for making that judgment than I had for rejecting it. I only knew the Protestant community from the outside. The course of events demonstrated that she was right and I was wrong.

The question of one nation or two did not arise in that discussion. It only ever arose in discussion with the pettifogging, debating-point, arguments of Constitutional nationalists.

What I was certain of was that the will of the Protestant community to its own distinct existence would not be broken by the established Nationalist positions, Constitutionalist or otherwise—and in my experience the Constitutionalism of that era contained a very strong dash of the otherwise. It was a Fine Gael Front Bencher who told me most emphatically that the Unionist will would be shattered when some physical force was applied and the Tory Government—Its Master's Voice—made some concession to that force. Well, Stormont was abolished by the Tories in 1972, and the response was a Unionist resurgence that was free of the 'fur-coat brigade'. So I was not altogether wrong.

Our project, as put at that meeting in Surrey St., was never seriously put to the test. The first step—recognition by the Irish State that Protestant Ulster had a national existence of its own—was not taken: not until 28 years later, after the War had been fought, when its effect could only be negligible.

It is hard to say when Provisional

Republicanism took on a definite existence in the political life of Belfast—when dissident Republicans became the authentic Republicans. I don't think it had happened by the time of that meeting in Surrey St., which must have been February or March 1970. My recollection is that it took shape in the early Summer, and that what gave it substance was not a hardening of the opinion of old Republicans, but a fresh influx from the radical movement that had been far from Republicanism in 1968-9.

BICO moved to Athol St. (No. 10) in the late Spring or early Summer and quickly became a political centre there for a while. The ground floor was reconstructed into a hall by Len Callender and Micky and Tommy Dwyer; and semi-public meetings drawn from all quarters were held there, making it a unique source of information about what was happening.

There has been some discussion recently on the Internet (which I never see) about what the focal point of Athol St. campaigning was in that period. It was directed at the Dublin Establishment, in support of a demand that the Constitutional assertion of sovereign authority over the Six Counties should be rejected in order to make cross-community developments possible. That campaign culminated in the picketing of the Department of External Affairs in Dublin by a cross-community group of Northerners in April 1972. The group—which included Eamonn O'Kane, Tommy Dwyer, Micky Dwyer, Com O S, and David Morrison)—chained themselves to the railings in front of the External Affairs Building. They were arrested and jailed. They were later bailed out by a number of Dublin citizens, including Conor Cruise O'Brien, who salved his guilty conscience by that means. They all received fines, some of which may have been paid.

It was established that the Irish State would neither act to give effect to its constitutional assertion of sovereignty over the Six Counties, nor repeal that assertion of sovereignty—which, in the absence of action to implement it, was nothing but mischief-making.

(When De Valera created that Constitution in the late 1930s, his object was to unite fractured republicanism in support of a constitutional politics. The Articles 2 & 3 formulations might have been a requirement for establishing a stable democratic regime in the Free State in the 1930s, when the founders of the Treaty regime had become Fascists. They helped to draw the fractured anti-Treatyites together

as a strong, democratic Constitutional force which suffocated the attempt at development by Fascist means—that is, by a replacement of government by party-political conflict in Parliament with a system vocational institutions combined into a corporate state.

Whether that was unambiguously a good thing is called into question by the bizarre self-destruction of Fianna Fáil, on which effective government through the Parliamentary system depended. The Fine Gael academic elite in the 1930s—which included Professors Tierney and Hogan—put a strong case against the Parliamentary system of party-politics. But the dominant ideology of the past three-quarters of a century says that the system of Parliamentary party-politics is unequivocally a good thing, and is the only good thing in this sphere of things, regardless of consequences. And, in the 1930s, the Constitutional assertion of Irish Sovereignty over the part of the British state that was in Ireland brought Fianna Fáil and the IRA into the effective alignment which preserved Parliamentary government.

Maintenance of the sovereignty claim in the 1970s, after an internally-based insurrection had come about in the North, one that was condemned and denounced by Fianna Fáil no less than Fine Gael, was a different matter. And it was the crucial thing which, in the actual course of events, led to the destruction of the Sunningdale system.)

Many people agreed privately that repeal of the sovereignty claim would be the right thing to do, but explained that it could not be done because the state was democratically governed.

Soon after Stormont was abolished, a project for an internal Northern Ireland settlement was set in motion. William Whitelaw, who filled the new position of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was the last aristocratic politician to play an active part in British government. The art of politics, as practised by the ruling class for a couple of centuries, came naturally to him. He bamboozled Unionist and Nationalist politicians into taking part in a series of meetings which at the end of 1973 led to the Sunningdale Agreement. Athol St. decided to wait on the outcome of those meetings before concentrating on the exclusion of the Six Counties from the party-political system of the state as the main issue. We supported the Sunningdale devolved government for the four and a half months that it lasted—January to mid-May 1974.

Half-way through that period, in mid-March, we saw that it was heading for the rocks and we tried to warn the SDLP. Micky Dwyer, who was acquainted with Paddy Devlin, wrote to him pointing out the danger and suggesting a meeting to discuss how it might be avoided. Devlin replied that the SDLP had matters well in hand, and that in any case it would not bother its head with advice from an organisation that could hold its AGM in a phone-booth.

The danger lay in the fact that the Dublin Government was nominally a party to the Agreement, and a Court action was taken against it, alleging that by signing the Agreement it had broken the Constitution by recognising British rule in the North as legitimate. The Government pleaded in defence that its signature on the Agreement was not in breach of the sovereignty claim in the Constitution because it only meant that it was not its intention to enforce the sovereignty claim, but that this did not prejudice the right of any future Government to enforce it. The Court accepted this defence. The Sovereignty claim stood.

An advert then appeared in the Belfast papers in mid-March, consisting of a paragraph from the Dublin Government's Defence pleading, and a statement by the Ulster Workers' Council that, in the light of the ongoing sovereignty claim by Dublin, the full establishment of the Council of Ireland could not go ahead. It demanded that, either the establishment of the Parliamentary North/South tier of the Council (the 'Council of Ireland'—due in mid-May) should be deferred, or a Northern Election be held, so that the Unionist electorate could decide whether they still wanted to go ahead with the Council in the light of the revelation that Dublin had not withdrawn its Sovereignty claim over them. (The Premier, Brian Faulkner, seemed to have accepted the Agreement on the understanding that the Sovereignty Claim had lapsed.)

That was when BICO tried to persuade the SDLP to take evasive action.

The Protestant working class in Ulster was the main organised working class force in Ireland. It was cut off from politics by the British Labour Party boycott. It never had more than a token connection with the Northern Ireland Labour Party. (The NILP Club in Belfast had the strange rule that "*party songs*" were not allowed: an implicit acknowledgement that the only real parties were the Unionist and

Nationalist parties.) It was organised within the British Trade Union system, but officially it came under the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish TUC and was unknown to the British TUC, though it was active in the individual Trade Unions. The Labour Party, which was in power in Northern Ireland (with Merlyn Rees as Secretary of State and Stanley Orme of the Connolly Association as second in command), had no connection with British organised labour in the region.

But there was no doubt that the working class existed as a power, though it had no official standing. And it decided to act. And it acted through what was in effect an unofficial Shop Stewards arrangement, which was a well established practice in Britain at the time. And its action in mounting a 'Constitutional Stoppage of work' was met with official bewilderment and hysteria.

The SDLP showed how little it had to do with Social Democratic and Labour affairs by treating the protest with contempt.

Gerry Fitt, the Party leader, lived in two dimensions, one of which consisted of a slightly archaic version of British social-democratic ideology. His response to the unofficial Strike that met the attempt to press ahead with the setting up of the Parliamentary tier of the Council of Ireland was that it was an attempt at a fascist coup d'etat and that, if it was not crushed by established authority, there would be a replay of what happened in Germany in 1933.

The Ulster Workers' Council did not demand that the Sunningdale system be abolished. It only demanded that the full establishment of the Council of Ireland be deferred in the light of the revelation that the Dublin sovereignty claim over the North still held, or that the devolved Government seek a clear mandate for a joint arrangement with a state that claimed sovereignty over it. Both conditions were rejected by the SDLP and the Dublin Government, whose spokesmen were Conor Cruise O'Brien and Garret FitzGerald.

The proposal for a fresh election was taken to be a demand for the abolition of Sunningdale. It was taken for granted that, in the light of what had happened since January, an appeal by the devolved Government to the electorate would fail.

In the matter of the Council the SDLP behaved recklessly. It declared publicly that, once the Council was established, the North would easily be trundled into the Republic, and it had itself photographed in joint session with the Dublin Cabinet.

The Dublin Government might have met the UWC and kept Sunningdale viable by calling a Referendum to repeal the Sovereignty Claim. It chose to go in the opposite direction. C.C. O'Brien said too many concessions had already been made to the Unionists. The establishment of the full Council should be pressed ahead with. O'Brien later pleaded that the Coalition Government was helpless in the matter because only Fianna Fail counted in state politics in the Republic.

The Labour Secretary of State made no attempt to negotiate with the Strikers. Labour had no point of contact with organised labour in Northern Ireland.

When Rees failed to crush what had become a General Strike with the middle class in tow (as had happened in the South during the War of Independence), he just abolished the whole show.

And that was the end of devolved government for a quarter of a century—until the IRA, having established that it could not be defeated in war and realised that it could not win the war either, settled for devolution on radically altered terms—terms such as nobody contemplated in 1974—with a view to becoming the major constitutional force within these terms.

So who wrecked Sunningdale?

The SDLP and the Dublin Government.

It was only then, in late May 1974, that Athol St. decided that the undemocratic Northern Ireland variant in the structure of the British state was the only thing worth dealing with.

PS: On Elizabeth Bowen And The UWC Strike

In a recently published American book on the British novelist and spy, Elizabeth Bowen (Professor Patricia Laurence: *Elizabeth Bowen—A Literary Life*, 2019), I am mentioned. Or a Frank Clifford is mentioned, and what Frank did is what I did. One of those things is listed as a demonstration at Cork University about Bowen spy reports.

I was never at any demonstration at Cork University. Neither was Frank! He goes nowhere without me. And I have been on the precincts of Cork University only twice at most since I first ventured out from my tiny corner of North-West Cork over sixty years ago. Cork University is one of the remotest places in the world from the life of Slieve Luacra.

Jack Lane reviewed the book for the March *Irish Political Review* and dem-

onstrated how slipshod it was in matters relating to Aubane. It is so bad that the author was unable to make any defence of it and she conceded the point (*Irish Political Review*, April of this year).

The source of her remarks about me seems to be Robert Fisk. Fisk was the Belfast Correspondent of the London *Times* during the General Strike. He reported on the Strike at the time and he published a book about it the following year: *The Point Of No Return: The strike that broke the British in Ulster* (Times Books: Andre Deutsch, 1975).

I first noticed Fisk some time before the Strike. He was the subject of a local Belfast version of BBC's *Desert Island Discs*. He appeared as a chirpy, and no doubt brilliant, Oxbridge graduate, fresh out of University. Listening to him on that radio programme is the closest I have ever been to personal contact with him. Anything he said about me, if it was not based on what I published, could only be based on gossip—and there is always plenty of gossip, and journalists seem to live on it.

I am not actually named in the Fisk book, only quoted. The quotations are from the *Bulletins* of what he calls the Workers' Association. He describes the Workers' Association as "a vaguely left-wing and virtually Stalinist pressure group" (p118).

Its actual title was *The Workers' Association For A Democratic Settlement Of The National Question In Ireland*. The WA was a unique group of Catholics and Protestants, with extensive connections into both communities, whose only political basis was an acknowledgement that the two were not part of a common nationality, and that no settlement could be made which did not take due account of this fact.

It was not anti-Partitionist. It took Partition as the accomplished fact within which things had to be done, but it did not take the Northern Ireland pseudo-state to be identical with Partition.

Fisk's description of the WA was not derived from anything published by the WA. It could only have been based on gossip that the WA was a False Front of the BICO.

But even as a description of BICO it was nonsense. BICO was not "virtually Stalinist", it was outrightly Stalinist—

though it was in fundamental disagreement with the Communist Party. In those days, when many strains of 'creative' Marxism-Leninism dominated academic life in Britain, BICO held that the Soviet development under Stalin's leadership was in accordance with the principles of the actual system established by Lenin, and that Stalin became the dominant leader he was because he was the one who kept the Leninist system functional when others were seeking a way out of it, or around it.

The question of whether Leninism had been necessary, or desirable, was left aside. It was what actually existed in the form of a Russian State in 1923. It was the ground on which the great feat had to be performed. And, as Aesop said a long time ago, *Hic Rhodus, hic salta*, i.e: This is Rhodes, jump here. Updated: This is the proletarian dictatorship; the only one. Here is where the deed must be performed.

I see no reason to revise that opinion in the light of what has happened since 1990. Stalinism was denounced as a perversion of Leninism, but when the denouncers sought to discover the pure Leninism that had been perverted, they found that it wasn't there. Lenin then became the villain of the piece.

But this has nothing whatever to do with the Workers' Association, except in Fisk's Smart Alecricy.

The situation Fisk had to report on in May 1974 was that a British Labour Government was confronted with a General Strike organised by shop stewards—as strikes often were in those days—but the Labour Party had no means of communication whatever with the strikers. It was a situation that could have occurred nowhere else in the state, where labour politics and trade unionism were closely connected. One would have thought that its novelty would have provoked Fisk into inquiring how it was possible in the Northern Ireland region of the state. It didn't. He just regurgitated Government handouts and gossip. The Workers' Association *Bulletin* commented on this, and it narked him:

"The Workers Association strike bulletins turned against the BBC in the first week. 'Your reporting has acted as a provocation', one of their bulletins said. 'You have attempted to bring the Ulster Workers' Council into disrepute and to present the strikers as a rampaging mob. You are feeding British public opinion with false reporting which backs up the political bungling of Rees and Orme. You are bringing yourselves into contempt'."*

Yet within a few days of that broadsheet's publication, the BBC was being attacked in the Assembly, where Faulkner told his party men that the Northern Ireland Economic Council was of the opinion that 'radio reports had not been helpful to the situation'... To be criticised by two opposing sides in Northern Ireland has traditionally, if somewhat falsely, been equated by the press as a sign of its own impartiality, and so in the first week of the strike most of the BBC staff assumed there was little wrong with their coverage" (Fisk, p131).

The word "Yet", which begins the second last sentence in that passage, indicates that Fisk somehow imagined that Faulkner and the WA were in conflict over the Sunningdale arrangement. If he had troubled to find out what the WA was, he would have found that it supported Sunningdale, and supported Faulkner, whose Party was absolutely necessary to the maintenance of the Sunningdale Government.

As to the staff of the BBC, they are not free-ranging journalists but state propagandists—propagandists of the state Government and not of the devolved Government—and the Parties which governed the state had no party-political connection with the devolved Government, and did not even take part in elections to the devolved Assembly. And it was made abundantly clear a decade later, when *Newsnight* under Vincent Hanna tried to strike out with an independent line on Northern Ireland, and was sacked, along with the board of the BBC, that the job of BBC 'journalists' is to propagate the Government's line.

Fisk, as an employee of the *Times*, was not formally a state propagandist, but for all that he said in his reports he might as well have been. He never reported the fact that Northern Ireland, though an integral part of the British state in almost every other respect, was comprehensively excluded from the democratic party-political life of the state.

The asterisk in the extract I have given indicates this footnote—

"The Workers' Association also raised the question of interviews with extremist leaders and suggested that standards applied to the IRA were not adopted by the media when Protestants wished to make their case known. Their bulletin took a swipe at me as well: "Many of you, in the name of impartial reporting, have spent much time talking to Provisionals, and reporting their version of events. Robert Fisk of The Times, to cite one example, justified this approach on Northern Ireland radio recently. He justified impartial reporting of the 'enemy' case because he regarded the Northern Ireland conflict as a civil disturbance within the state rather than as a conflict between the state and its

enemies. But when it comes to the Ulster Workers' Council and an industrial strike . . . Mr. Fisk's journalistic impartiality evaporates, and he reports the strike as if he were a paid propagandist of Merlyn Rees' Ministry". The Workers' Association, of course, made no mention of intimidation" (p131).

We did not mention intimidation because it was hard to find.

Of course that depends on what one sees as intimidation. In Monday Club terms picketing was intimidation. And, of course, picketing is a form of intimidation. But it is a form of intimidation that had long been established as common practice in Britain, unquestioned except for an occasional Ealing film championing absolute individualism, such as *The Angry Silence*.

The most effective form of intimidation anywhere is public opinion.

Pickets were established by Trade Unions in Belfast. Leaders of the TUC, who had lost all organic connection with Trade Unionism on the ground in Belfast because of the Labour Party boycott and the official transfer of authority to the Irish TUC, were brought in to break the Strike by walking past the pickets. Only a handful of workers followed them.

Although the UWC demand was entirely reasonable, and was democratic as far as that word has meaning in an essentially undemocratic governing system, I fully expected that it would be swamped by Vanguardism * and lost. I got a few novels and a supply of candles to occupy my time until it blew over. But, by the second day, it was clear that it was a genuine shop-stewards' action, and that Vanguard was being kept at a distance. And that is what made it effective. What Fisk means by intimidation is not effective in the stubborn culture of Protestant Ulster. It was as the Strike became effective in the terms on which it was called that it gathered the widespread support from the general Protestant population and became irresistible.

* William Craig's type of militancy. On 13th February William Craig declared: "*God help those who get in our way for we mean business*".

Neither the Times nor the BBC reported what the UWC demand was. Fisk did not do so in his book. He does not even mention the Dublin Court action in which de jure sovereignty over the North was reasserted—which was the cause of all that followed. Faulkner was prevented from negotiating by the SDLP and the

Dublin Government. And the Secretary of State preferred to pull down the whole Sunningdale structure, rather than try to save it by taking the matter of the Council of Ireland into his own hands as the State authority. (And then, when there was no purpose to it except idle curiosity, he became a subscriber to the Workers' Weekly, now incorporated into this magazine.)

Fisk, on another page, quotes a paragraph from another Workers' Association *Bulletin*:

"Barr and Graham are heeded by their rank and file in trade union affairs proper. But when they led the back-to-work campaign they were not acting as trade union leaders but as politicians. In political matters they are at loggerheads with their members, so the campaign failed... There is a tacit understanding in the trade union movement that political and economic matters will be kept separate. In circumstances of sharp political division this is a necessary condition for keeping the trade union movement united in economic matters. Barr, Graham, etc. broke this convention by trying to use their leading position in the economic struggle for political ends. And it is this fact... that caused this morning's fiasco" (p118).

Andy Barr and Jimmy Graham were members of the Six Country Communist Party. At the time, Barr was President of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, while Graham was the NI Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.

The Communist Party of Great Britain did not organise in the Six Counties. The Six County Party merged with the 26 Country Party around that time to form the Communist Party of Ireland.

Communist Parties sought a base in Trade Unions, rather than in general politics. They applied themselves diligently to Trade Union business and quickly became influential in committees because they acted with a political purpose. Application to the detail of Trade Union business becomes tedious once basic rights are firmly established, and so Communist Parties become disproportionately influential—and they give Trade Unionism a public edge—which has been lacking since the decline of the CPs, when Trade Unionism became a mere routine.

The complicating factor in that matter under consideration was that the Six Counties lay between two states and had bits of each of them in its make-up.

At base Six County Trade Unionism was a part of British Trade Unionism. British State policy was what counted for it. But

at Congress level it had been attached to the Irish state.

And the only common political ground between the two Six County communities was the Communist Party. It was very narrow ground, but it was all the ground there was. It was only the Communist vision that attracted people from both communities. And the Six Country Party at some point adopted an all-Ireland orientation, and sought to follow that orientation with equivocal resolutions passed by committees which attracted little public notice.

Discounting the singular presence of Ivan Cooper in the SDLP, it was only in the CP that there were Protestants who were anti-Partitionists. And, as far as I recall, both Andrew Barr and Jimmy Graham were Protestant by origin. And the Party ideology somehow indicated to them that they should go along with the General Secretary of the British TUC, Len Murray, when he was brought to Belfast by the Labour Secretary of State to break the Strike by crossing the pickets.

Murray didn't have a clue about Northern Ireland. Effective political knowledge in Britain is Party-bound. Murray was cut off from effective knowledge of Northern Ireland by its exclusion from the Labour Party, even though actual Trade Unionism in the Six Counties was at base an integral part of British Trade Unionism for the most part.

After the wrecking of Sunningdale by the SDLP and by Dublin, I went to London to work for a while. I was contacted there by a shipyard shop steward who was regularly in London on Trade Union business. He took some trouble to explain to me why what the Workers' Association was attempted could not be achieved. What it amounted to was that Biblical Protestantism was too religious to be political in any complicated way. I got the impression that he had discussed it with others and this was the conclusion they had come to.

And, though he was sufficiently political to see the sense of what the Workers' Association was attempting, and approved of it, he was himself immersed in the religious condition he was describing. He was a competent Trade Unionist, active in the affairs of a British Trade Union, but he was also a believing Protestant of the strictly Biblical kind, and he was a Loyalist.

The Protestant working class would resist political manoeuvres against it, as in the case of Sunningdale and the Dublin sovereignty claim, but that was the extent of it.

He also told me that Paisley had called the leaders of the various Loyalist groups together and given them a talking to. He said that there could be no repeat of the 1912 movement against Home Rule. There could be no repeat of the war that had been prepared for then, and which was warded off by the World War. It might be that inclusion in the Irish state was inevitable in the long run, but it could be delayed by passive resistance.

(I should explain that this was after Merlyn Rees had tried to "*Ulsterise*" the War. He had scrapped Sunningdale, rather than negotiate terms. And he set about persuading Loyalist paramilitaries that the British State was going to pull out of Northern Ireland shortly and that they should be ready to take their fate into their own hands and establish an independent Ulster. Our information about this was published at the time in *Workers' Weekly* and was never disputed.)

My informant did not make a point about Catholicism being a political religion—or a religion that carried politics along with it—but that was understood. It was in fact one of the grounds for the Penal Laws. The Reformationist British view was that religion should be subject to the State. It should be strictly national, and take its politics from the State. Roman Catholicism had been the religion of the Roman State. It then survived the State by more than a thousand years, but carried a political dimension along with it because of what it had been. It was a free-ranging religion with its own political dimension.

The Protestant colonisation of Ulster developed under very unusual circumstances. It was in essence not part of the State religion by which Britain governed Ireland for a couple of centuries. In its effective Presbyterian dimension it was a detached part of Scotland where, under the 1707 Union, the Presbyterian Church was the State Church. But it had no Establishment status, either Anglican or Scottish.

However, its Scottish dimension gave it a degree of protection, which enabled it to do its own thing for the better part of three centuries, without fear or favour, neither persecuted nor persecuting.

It is much more political today than it was in the 1970s. It is practising at politics. And it is out of Paisleyite Loyalism that this has come.

Brendan Clifford

· Biteback · Biteback · Biteback · Biteback · Biteback · Biteback · Biteback · Biteback

Recalling Of Collins Ambush Under Fire

Sir — Mary O'Rourke, in her column last week, recalled in her ever-pleasant style Brian Lenihan addressing the annual commemoration at Béal na Bláth 10 years ago. But in it she continually repeats that Michael Collins was "assassinated". This is just not true. "Assassination" is the pre-meditated killing of someone in particular. But virtually no one — apart from film-maker Neil Jordan — claims that the IRA group which attacked the Free State military convoy entering their region during the Civil War, had any idea Collins was in the armoured car their bullets ricocheted off so harmlessly.

Collins should have stayed inside the car and driven on. However, there appears to have been drink taken, and Collins recklessly insisted on getting out and engaging the attackers, who were positioned high up on the adjacent hillside. Why, we don't know, for his aides pleaded with him not to.

Maybe — and this is purely conjecture — it was because he had not actually personally ever been in a gun battle, at least not since he served as Joseph Plunkett's aide in the GPO at Easter 1916.

At Béal na Bláth, Collins sadly went down with all guns blazing — what in military jargon is called "killed in action" — in a battle in which he needlessly insisted on participating. There was no "assassination".

Philip O'Connor, *Sunday Independent*, 30.8.20

We reprint below the Editorial to *Irish Foreign Affairs*, September 2020
IFA appears quarterly and costs €5, £4 per copy. It carries historical analysis and reviews international events from an Irish perspective
Four issues: Electronic €10 (£8). Postal Euro-zone and World Surface: €24; Sterling-zone: £15

On-line sales of books, pamphlets and magazines:

<https://www.atholbooks-sales.org>

The Phil Hogan Debâcle

The most representative Irish Government there has ever been has deprived the Irish state of the most influential position it has ever held in the European Union. The Taoiseach, Micheal Martin, has sacked EU Trade Commissioner, Phil Hogan.

The present Government is so representative that it is unable to govern. It is barely able to hold together.

The issue on which Hogan was sacked was attendance at a golf dinner, organised by the Golf Committee of the Dail, at which, it is suggested, Covid guidelines were broken.

Hogan denies that any laws were broken, or that any regulation was breached. The most that can be said is that a guideline which it was intended to make into a regulation was not observed.

Hogan had nothing whatever to do with the organising of the dinner, or the making of laws and regulations about Covid social

distancing, but the dinner was attended by people who were involved in the governing of the state, including a Supreme Court Judge, who remains on the bench.

It was not the Government's business to monitor the doings of the Commissioner it had nominated. A Commissioner, once appointed, ceases to be a functionary of the Government which nominated him. The Commission is an EU authority, whose personnel are drawn from the states of which the EU is made up. It is the core institution of the European Union. Without it, the Union would be a mere alliance of convenience between the various states.

But now a component state of the Union has usurped the authority of the Union by (effectively) sacking a Commissioner over whom it assumed it had continuing authority because it had nominated him.

If this action, driven by nationalist populism, is allowed to stand as a precedent, then the end of the EU is nigh.

This is not the first time an EU Commissioner has been sacked in response to populist rabble-rousing, but it is the first time it has been done through the action of the Government which nominated him. There was no demand anywhere but in Ireland that he should be sacked.

The previous sacking was of a French Commissioner, Edith Cresson, but that was not done in response to a French clamour. It was done in response to a populist clamour led by Pat Cox and the European Liberals and was part of a campaign to weaken the central institutions of the EU by establishing a spurious democracy where there were no grounds for a genuine democracy.

The sacking of Mme. Cresson was followed by a sacking of the entire Commission. The populist phrasemongers held that she could not simply be replaced by another nominee because the Commission was an integral whole and it either stood or fell together. It remains to be seen whether that will be done in the present instance.

A second ground for the clamour against Hogan is that he was on a visit to Ireland, and should therefore have subjected himself to strict quarantine for a fortnight. He said that, while in Ireland, he had occasion to visit a doctor, and the doctor had given him a Covid Test and found him to be free of it. But that was dismissed as being irrelevant. The regulation had to be applied mindlessly. Anything else would be elitism. So held the Editor of the Irish (formerly Cork) Examiner, Daniel McConnell (who had led the clamour) in an interview with Pat Kenny on Newstalk.

Kenny raised the matter of Tanaiste, and former Taoiseach, Varadkar going in and out of the state without ever quarantining himself, and excusing himself on the ground that he was an important business. The Taoiseach did likewise. What business could the Tanaiste in a makeshift Government have that was more important than the business of the EU Trade Commissioner?

But Hogan was only visiting on holiday? He was attending a holiday event of the elite of a society which, for better or worse, has decided to be bourgeois-capitalist and to make itself a central point in the transactions of international finance capitalism. Is important business in that sphere dealt with only in an office and during office hours?

The Government that made the disciplining of an EU Trade Commissioner a matter of domestic Irish politics is a Coalition of three parties plus some Independents. It is at the mercy of every change

in the breeze of public opinion.

What is called democratic government is representative government by political parties which are always trying to unseat one another. Nothing else is now recognised as democratic. In representative government there is a tension between being representative and governing. The tendency in recent times in Ireland and in Europe has been to give priority to representativeness over the function of governing.

The establishment of representative government was pioneered by the British State, and it has been maintained there during a long period when it was breaking down in other states, because in Britain priority has always been given to government over representativeness.

Proportional representation in multi-member Constituencies, which encourages the representation through separate parties of various shades of opinion, has been ward off in Britain, despite a number of attempts to introduce it—but Britain introduced it in Ireland in 1920 for the purpose of weakening whatever government would replace the British administration.

Two months ago, the British Government had a much more difficult problem about a breach of Covid regulations, that was much more serious than the problem presented to Micheál Martin by Phil Hogan's attendance at a Dail golf dinner. Dominic Cummings drove from London to the North of England during Lockdown, to visit his parents. The visit was discovered and publicised by the media. A media and Opposition howl was raised, demanding that Cummings should be sacked. But the Prime Minister considered that Cummings' expertise was needed for the conduct of government, and he rode out the clamour.

Micheal Martin caved in. The British mode of representative government has often been condemned as a form of elective dictatorship. But that is its virtue.

It was the French Revolution that proclaimed democracy to the world, but it was Britain that established a viable system of the democracy during the following century, while France was going through a series of popular revolutions and authoritarian counter-revolutions: Republics and Monarchies; democracies and charismatic authoritarianisms.

The political philosopher Edmund Burke, when the French Revolution was

proclaiming general human rights, said that the basic human right was a right to be governed without continuous commotion.

And the way this was to be done by representation was through the bundling together of opinions in two parties, so that the electorate could actually make a choice about government.

In France each Revolution brought forth a great proliferation of parties, each expressing a particular shade of opinion. This made government impossible and led to forcible restoration of authority.

Ireland, despite the subversive influence of PR, had a viable party government for more than three-quarters of a century after the Free State obsession with denying legitimate expression to anti-Treaty opinions was overcome by the Fianna Fail victory of 1933.

The system depended on the effectiveness of a rural-based Fianna Fail in holding a wide range of opinion together as a functional Party, capable of winning elections. The present crisis is the result of its decline in the hands of Bertie Ahern and its collapse in the hands of Micheál Martin, the Smart-Alec, due in great part to its repudiation of its origins and its demonization of Charles Haughey who, through virtuoso statecraft, made Ireland a player in the world of Finance Capitalism, on which its present prosperity depends, and gave the major European states the impression that Ireland was not just a British hanger-on.

The Trade Commissioner—who has been sacked by a virtual political nonentity, Micheál Martin, for next-to-nothing (because, formalistic quibbles aside, that is what has happened) two years ago, when he was EU Agricultural Commissioner, gave the Irish Government a severe talking-to, when it seemed to be in despair over Brexit, told it that there was a future for Ireland in Europe, even if Britain would not be there to look after it, and put some backbone into it. He changed the policy of the State with regard to Brexit from relying on an Irish deal with Britain, to relying on Europe to look after Irish interests in the face of British bullying. The policy was so successful that Britain has still not recovered from the shock!

And now Martin has thrown away the best card Ireland has in Europe!

And the Europeans must now be coming to think that the Irish are small-timers after all. □

A War on Women? *Cogadh ar Mhná?*

This TG4 programme, “*Cogadh ar Mhná*”, set new standards in the revising of the War of Independence period. A programme of that title should surely begin with at least an estimate of the recorded number of women sexually assaulted during the War as well as why, when, and by whom, they were carried out.

Instead it began with an assault in January 1923: an unsuccessful robbery for money by people “*who called themselves Republicans*”. This was doubly odd as there had been numerous sexual assaults on women for years before this. Why begin with this one?

Also, as this was during the so called ‘civil war’, it begged the question as to what period this programme was covering. This anomaly was then explained by the claim that the *Irish Revolution* is the term that now covers both the War of Independence and the ‘Civil War’. That, apparently, is the collective name for both—apparently they were the same war!

So the War to establish and defend the Irish Republic, the War of Independence, was the same as the war than was fought to demolish that same Republic! It never occurred to me that revisionism would descend to such moronic nonsense. Is this TG4’s unique contribution to the history of the period?

We have had a few decades of the assertion that the War of Independence was a war on Protestants and, as that has been discredited, academia has come up with another explanation for the war—now it’s to become a war on women. As is truly said, you never know what’s going to happen yesterday.

We were then repeatedly told that this aspect of the War, sexual assaults, was not known about and had been hidden and that histories of the War had been sanitised of such violence. Apparently this criminality was done by all sides: all were equally guilty of the crimes and the cover-up. And now the programme was discovering all this for the first time! It was to be a series of Eureka moments for the makers and the audience.

One began to wonder if these people had ever heard of the *Irish Bulletin*, the newspaper of the Government of the day, which was replete with reports of such crimes for years. Reports that were carried at length, with Statements by the victims themselves—in most cases with their names

and addresses.

The *Bulletin* was mentioned of course: it had to be, as it is the best contemporary source for such things, as for so much more. But any references to it were always devalued with the *caveat* that it was a propaganda organ. The programme-makers should read Dave Alvey’s piece in the *Irish Political Review* last month on the meaning of propaganda then and now.

This ‘*caveating*’ went to the extreme of belittling the reporting in the *Bulletin* of one of the most notorious rape cases, that of Mrs. Healy in Cork on 8th February 1921. The crime was committed in her home at 106, Gerald Griffin Street. The *Bulletin* report, with her very brave statement, was mentioned on the programme—but with an implicit suggestion that the *Bulletin* had merely used the crime for propaganda purposes—being itself a propaganda publication.

However, the same report, when mentioned at an event held in UCC, was deemed acceptable without any *caveat*. The rape only became fully authentic when put in an academic context!

There is another agenda operating here than that of documenting sexual assaults on women. The idea is that Academia knows best about this, as with every other thing; and it knows much better than the Government of the day when it comes to consideration and reporting of such issues.

I hope the programme-makers would accept that a literal war on women includes murdering women, as well as sexual assault. Everyone knows there was a general Order by the IRA, *not* to kill women spies and that this was broken in a few well-known cases—which caused much agonising then, and since. Such killings, and other assaults, were carried out to punish the single, specific crime of aiding the Crown forces. Men and women were treated equally in this regard.

But there WAS a general order to wage war on women and it’s surprising that the programme did not know of it and reveal it to the listeners! We have republished a report of what happened, as carried in the *Irish Bulletin* on 22nd November 1920. It seems that, after a series of notorious killings of women in 1920, Dublin Castle felt obliged to issue an **Order** to justify these actions and to provide cover for the perpetrators. Here it is:

R.I.C. Office,
Dublin Castle,
11th Nov. 1920.

Country Inspector,

Information has been received that it is the intention in Sinn Féin circles to employ Irish women in the Commission of outrages.

This should be borne in mind when outrages are being investigated.

It is known that Members of the Cumann na mBan have been trained in the use of firearms, and it is possible that in some cases they have taken active part in the commission of outrages.

(Signed) C.A. Walsh,
D.I.G.

As Cumann Na mBan was not an armed force, this was literally a declaration of war on women, literally a *cogadh ar mhná*. As the programme-makers were aware of the *Bulletin*, they can hardly have missed it! But reporting this fact would spoil the argument that informed the programme: that all sides were as guilty as each other during the War of Independence, as far as the ‘war on women’ was concerned.

The propaganda *caveat* about the *Bulletin* had the single object of obscuring which military force had actually declared and waged a war on women. A pathetic programme!

Jack Lane

Corrections To August and September issues of *Irish Political Review*:

A Reader Writes—

"In the August and September Magazines, I noted two matters that need editing.

Taking the September Magazine first and the more substantive one. In the article on VJ-Day and WW2 in the East, a reference in page 10 was made to the Battle of Trafalgar, which was in 1805 not 1803 as stated.

A battle in 1803 would have involved Britain breaking an international Treaty (doubtless in a specific and limited way!)

In the August edition an article on the formation of the FF/FG/Green Coalition, the date of 27th January was mistakenly quoted in page 18, though 27th June was referenced later on in the article. Apologies, if this sounds a bit nit-picking!

Editorial Comment: We are grateful to this reader for pointing out these errors. *Irish Political Review* tries to be as accurate as possible—but even we are not perfect!

The Human History Of A Shipyard

"Towards the end of the nineteenth century, at the height of the industrial revolution, the city of Belfast WAS its shipyards. A city whose rise to wealth had been founded on linen, reached its apogee in shipbuilding. Its biggest yard, Harland and Wolff, built the largest and most famous ship ever to sail and sink—the Titanic.

The industrial revolution—and shipbuilding in particular—transferred Belfast from a small, lively provincial city into a fully-fledged manufacturing giant. The city took on the appearance of a typical nineteenth century industrial centre, similar to many others in north-west Britain. Belfast and its surrounding region became very much a part of that large British manufacturing economy which symbolised the imperial high noon. As such, it looked physically different from other Irish cities and towns and that, in turn, had implications for its politics.

In telling the story of Harland and Wolff, Workman Clark and other Belfast yards, Kevin Johnston is in fact writing a social history of the city of Belfast from 1850 to 1970."

That is written on the dust jacket of Kevin Johnston's social history of the Belfast shipyards, *In The Shadow Of Giants*.

If it had of been merely a variation in politics, that might have been resolved. But it was nationality that was in question.

If you wanted an Irish city you went up the Falls Road, or into Short Strand or to Ardoyne and other Catholic areas, to another nationality—where it was Irish dancing, the Irish language, and where history went further back than the Protestant 17th Century version. There, social conditions could be appalling and poverty was rampant through inequality.

Sections of the Protestant working-class could suffer similar conditions, if they were unskilled labourers. Housing was divided into kitchen houses and parlour houses. The kitchen houses had a front door which opened immediately into the kitchen with a smaller room, in the back called the pantry where the food was cooked. There were two small bedrooms upstairs. Lighting was by gas mantle, and though I am describing the 1930s of my childhood, this gas-lighting lasted well into the 1950s.

The parlour house had a front door which led into a passage-way, which on the right had a parlour and further along a kitchen with at least three bedrooms upstairs. These were the houses of the Protestant skilled workers.

This was the Belfast of the 1930s I remember. My father, being a Protestant, and skilled, always had our Catholic family in parlour houses until 1938 when we had to flee to the countryside of Clontonacally, Carryduff, in County Down—though owing over a year's rent, and other debts during a period of mass unemployment. Grass grew on the slipways of the two

shipyards, Harland and Wolff and Workman Clark.

My father had served a seven-year apprenticeship as a joiner in the Workman Clark shipyard, which was on the County Antrim side of the Belfast Lough, while Harland and Wolff was on the County Down side of the Lough. It was founded in the 19th Century and built its last passenger liner in 1935: my father had a job on it. Going to work one morning, he saw the sky was red and heavy with smoke. The ship, which was ready to sail to Bermuda within a few weeks, was on fire. It was a suspected insurance scam as the economic atmosphere became worse with massive unemployment. The two shipyards had thrown thousands upon thousands out of work. Workman Clark was never to recover and closed down forever.

My father was part of a working-class shipyard dynasty with his brothers, sons and cousins working there. If there were any jobs available, then his dynasty, like other dynasties, were going to get work ahead of individuals. Of course my father's side of the family were Orange, RUC, B'Special, and British Army, and maybe freemason.

My father, who rejected all of this, and married a Catholic, but he was still brought into the dynasty. My surname being Protestant was reinforced with a Protestant first name so as I could join that dynasty. Which I did and was therefore given an apprenticeship as a woodworker.

I had left the shipyard for a different job and then decided to go back and work there.

I joined a large group of men, joiners, of about two hundred, gathered on the jetty in front of a ship that had just come off

raw from the slipway and needed finished internally and externally. A head-foreman stood on a bollard to search the crowd for familiar faces. I was spotted and pointed at. I had a job. Most of the other men were started as well, after the dynasties had its members started first.

It wasn't all cheerfulness and unity among the mainly Protestant workforce. There were tensions between them and rivalry among the Orange members. They spoke of those who had a few degrees of the Order above them and never seemed to be made redundant when things became slack.

The surprising thing was the number of radical Protestant workers that existed who didn't belong to the Orange Order, B'Specials and freemasonry. They weren't members of any political parties like the CPNI or the local N.I. Labour Party. Most had lived in the US at one time, including my father, and had tales of hardship to tell.

A few had had lived near the Mason-Dixie and told of the joy of black people, when they crossed the line in a bus, in not having to occupy apartheid seats. Though things were bad for the black people, there were some Northern comforts.

The story of those who had worked in the US was mostly to do with being worked until exhaustion. One joiner told of getting home so sweated and hot, he usually ran a cold bath and got in with all his sweat-saturated clothes on.

A number of them followed the ideas of Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, the occultist, philosopher, and founder of the Theosophical Society. Some read Sean O'Casey but that wouldn't make them anti-Partitionist. I don't know why they read him. Maybe they were searching for whatever socialism he was supposed to have. But mainly they were mildly socialist and, like my father, believed in a Northern Ireland that needed severe reform. Within the Unionist family The Protestant management were sensitive to their outlook and there were times when the radical Protestant groups were put to work on one deck, while the deck below was reserved for the Orange Order, freemason members. The radicals got along well with the few Catholics in the shipyard who had declared themselves Catholic, in that they weren't afraid to declare their historical differences as an intellectual exercise.

Generally the vast majority if the shipyard Protestant workforce got along with the Catholic in their midst. Though declaring themselves British, they somehow seemed to have adopted the open

Irishness of friendship. Turn up having forgotten your sandwiches (Piece), and they would share what they had with you, despite what you were. Of course as a Catholic you kept your opinions to yourself. The odd one who didn't usually found a .303 rifle round in their jacket with a note saying:

'This will be in you not on you.'

That was the time to leave, for a hard core existed that even had the radical Protestant keeping his mouth shut. These were the ones who boasted of have arms at home for one reason only—shooting the Catholic if they forgot their place in their territory, Northern Ireland.

There was suspicion and rumour about my true identity but I was an ardent communist and constantly preached against Unionism, Churchill, and against US aggression during the Korean War of 1970, and so on. Oddly enough, at one time, I realised it was the Catholic in me that kept driving me on. I brought in CP literature and distributed it. They seemed to like communists. I was told to clear off to Moscow a few times, which was better than being told to clear off to Rome or to take a hike down South.

Dynasties operate from an early age. I was sent a letter to report to a Head-Foreman's office in 1944. I was twelve years old. It was WW2 and the shipyard was heavily guarded with heavy machine-guns and anti-aircraft ack-ack guns. There were a couple of tanks and some armoured cars. To enter this huge industrial complex built on Queens Island was to feel swallowed up after getting off the tram, where I had been searched and questioned.

Maybe I had the feeling that pervaded in the German 1927 film *Metropolis*, directed by Fritz Lang. I was to see this film as a teenager but by this time I didn't believe in its interpretation that heavy industry was hell. On a human and individual level it wasn't hell.

It was a miracle that humans came into this in building something that completely dwarfed them. Entering such a complex from a rural Carryduff, with the air thick with industrial smoke, hundreds of lightning-like flashes from arch welders and the noise of riveters and caulkers, was certainly a change from the sound of horses hooves and cattle grazing in the fields.

Humans fitted in quite comfortably among the machines of this *Metropolis*. They didn't become zombies, and they stayed human enough to joke and laugh, and to enjoy their work, and to have the sense of being needed.

The shipyard, as I discovered at the age of twelve, had its own free bus service—two single-decked buses, camouflaged in war paint, with the windows painted black. (They were still running ten years later, still in their war-paint!) I was about to board one, after getting off the tram, but was asked where I was going:

"East Yard, Musgrave Channel Road, Deep Water Wharf, Thompson Works, Engine Works...?"

But I was already at my designation, as the sat-navs of today say.

The Head-Foreman's office was all glass and high above the work benches of the joiners. I remember being taunted about Catholicism and hearing crude jokes about Catholics but I gave nothing away. I have often wondered why me for this treatment.

Was it those rumours again about my father and a mixed marriage? Was I being tested to show that I was capable of keeping my mouth closed and knowing my place? I do remember being amused at the Head-Foreman's clowning, as he put his hand to the top of his head to say his head hadn't been made flat, where a priest usually patted the new-born's still soft head, in his blessings. That kind of crudity didn't bode well for the future of the Protestant. The Ulster he followed was just a recycled crudity that seemed to go on forever, I thought, in years to come.

It was wartime and he was asking me about Rome and not Berlin. He never mentioned Hitler but did mention the pope a few times.

Anyway, I was part of a dynasty, Orange, B'Special, RUC and the British Army.

A cousin was fighting in Burma (Myanmar), and an American cousin was flying over Tokyo trying to burn its civilians to death in their wooden homes. This head-foreman had to watch his step. I was in.

At 14, in April 1946, I was to start in the shipyard as an office boy for two years, before going to my apprenticeship at 16. My father kept asking me if I really wanted to follow in his footsteps as a joiner. A member of his family, a cousin worked in the Main Offices as a manager. I could become an apprentice draughtsman. I was more or less dragged there to see him but I turned down the offer. It seemed I had more choices that I could cope with. I had never been out of a job during my life in NI, and I could have continued like that for as long as I wanted.

There were two worlds in my life—one was in rural County Down, where all

sorts of life-threatening things happened to us like the poisoning of well-water, the stoning of our house, and the parade of B'Specials outside our front gate as intimidation.

The other world was the friendliness of our family B'Specials, ex-British soldiers and my very friendly RUC sergeant cousin. These two worlds never met, nor knew of each other publicly. On top of that, my maternal aunt was married to another RUC sergeant, a former soldier from WW1 who had become a Catholic out of love for my aunt. He had been given the Carryduff posting after a series of attacks on us and he had arranged an ambush of the culprits and put the fear of God into them. There was peace for a while, due to this very Protestant-Catholic until he disappeared into Special Branch with his whole family. Never hair nor hide of him was seen again, nor of my aunt, nor of my two Catholic cousins. After his departure the attacks started again.

Meanwhile I worked away as an apprentice in the shipyard. It was the Joiners' Shop, a former aircraft factory, when Harland & Wolff were making Stirling bombers for the war effort. It was divided into units of maybe thirty benches that stretched as far as the eye could see. The place was so big you couldn't recognise anyone if you stood at one end and looked to the other end. In the centre of it were the wood-working machines. Each unit had a Charge-Hand who wore a brown dustcoat and a bowler hat. Above them were Foremen and above them was a Head-Foreman and above him was the Shop Manager, all had offices with glass walls overlooking the maybe 1000 benches.

There were a mixture of WW1 former soldiers and WW2 former soldiers and Royal Navy men. They had all been professional military men, but they didn't mix. The WW1 ones seem to have stuck to their UVF ideology, that had got them to join up, and the WW2 men were somewhat resentful at being pushed into dangerous situations, which they didn't deem necessary, when it was the Russians who were winning the war, and in the end, saved their lives as well. This attitude didn't last, a couple of years after coming back from WW2 they were joining the B'Specials as the environment took over. I was now being taught my trade by a very friendly B'Special. I often saw him cycling through Belfast in his B'Special uniform with a .303 rifle on his shoulder and he would shout over:

"How's she cuttin'?" (Is your saw sharp enough—how's life?)

To Page 32, Column 2

Printing Money: *A Response to John Martin*

Reading John Martin's reply to my queries about his own article (Irish Political Review July) on MMT (Modern Monetary Theory), I began to wonder to what extent any disagreement that we might have is verbal rather than substantial. He thinks that printing money by itself cannot increase the purchasing power in the economy. I agree, and furthermore I don't think that printing money can by itself lead to more goods being produced.

But saying that is not the same as claiming that printing money increases the purchasing power of the State at the expense of the private sector. Unless I have completely misunderstood him, that is what John is claiming.

However, he goes on to note that the money printed by the State can be spent in the private sector and furthermore this can have a positive effect on the economy. This is so when, for example, the State invests in productive potential such as research, publicly-owned enterprises, infrastructure and education. Such investment can create (like savings) the conditions for successful manufacturing that will neutralise any inflationary effects that printing money might have. Nothing that I have read in

John's writings on these subjects suggests that we disagree about this.

I think we need to be clearer about what we mean by 'austerity'. In his final paragraph John seems to mean by this that countries like Germany prioritise production over consumption. Again, I agree about this. There may be long-term problems with the kind of mercantilist approach adopted by Germany, but that is another matter for another day. We in the UK understand by 'austerity' the restriction of public expenditure to reduce the budgetary deficit, not the prioritisation of production over consumption. As John points out, this latter is not what has been happening in the UK.

However, when reduction of the budgetary deficit leads to a decline in the capacity to educate, to carry out research, to communicate, to maintain a healthy population and to transport goods and people, then productive capacity is indeed damaged, further leading to a country's propensity to import rather than sustain itself. As far as I am aware, although Germans are keen savers, they also make sure that their education and training system, their

railways, their hospitals and their scientific research are invested in, including by the State. This cannot be said of the UK. I'm not aware that we disagree about this, but we mean by 'austerity' two distinct types of action. The British version of 'austerity' leads to disinvestment in productive potential, that of Germany investment in productive potential.

Of course there is an interesting question lying behind these largely verbal disputes about printing money and austerity and that is the extent to which it is wise for the State to stimulate investment through printing money as well as relying on private and corporate savings. If the main problem involved in doing so is inflation, then that will be a menace only to the extent that injecting money into the private sector fails to increase productive capacity and the availability of goods. If the conditions for creating and using productive capacity have already been run down, as they have in Britain, then it may be more difficult to use printed money to enable the production of consumption goods. It will have to be used, in the absence of savings, to revive productive potential first.

Chris Winch

Helicopter Money and all that

One of the propositions of MMT [Modern Monetary Theory] is that State spending (above what is taken in taxation) is required when the private sector decides not to spend, since otherwise an economy will go into recession.

Most economic commentators assume that the opposite holds—that States want to spend but will only be able to spend if the private sector chooses to save an equivalent amount. They look at Japan, for instance, where State spending is high and say that luckily private sector saving is high enough to allow the Japanese State to spend so much.

The MMT folks look at Japan and say the opposite—that the high level of private sector saving forces the State to spend to prevent the economy going into recessions.

David McWilliams' description, in an article in the *Irish Times* on 29th August,

of the current Irish economy is very much along MMT lines. The private sector, he argues, is too nervous to spend anything so demand is being taken out of the economy. Only the State has the ability to step in and plug the gap.

MMT does not have any policies. So it does not favour free health care or free education etc. It purports to describe how a State which creates its own currency functions. I suppose you could say it favours full employment and low inflation but that hardly distinguishes it from other economic theories.

What distinguishes MMT from other economic theories is the power that MMT attaches to the State's ability to create its own currency. (The best account of MMT that I have yet read can be found in the book, *'The Deficit Myth'*, by Stephanie Kelton.)

If Ireland were a currency-creating state, the MMT policy recommendation would be that the State should hire anyone who wants to work and doesn't have a job. The State would be the employer of last resort. I would encourage people to read Pavlina Tcherneva's book *'The case for a Job Guarantee Scheme'* for a fuller description.

This is clearly a different solution to McWilliams' helicopter money proposal in his 29th August article. The MMT folks would agree with McWilliams' attempt to support demand, but would question the efficiency of helicopter money. They would see the Government as employer of last resort as more efficient because they see the lack of demand in the economy as being more specifically a lack of demand for labour. Helicopter money may eventually lead to a demand for labour but the MMT folks argue that it's better to solve

the lack of demand for labour by directly employing the unemployed in useful work. But like McWilliams they would not be concerned with the deficit implications of either policy.

However there is a very big elephant in the room which McWilliams chooses to ignore. Ireland is a currency-user rather than a currency-creator. Since Ireland cannot issue euros, it must cover fiscal deficits by selling bonds. That means finding investors who are happy to give up Euros for Irish Government debt. And these Euros will then be distributed as helicopter money. But, since Ireland does not create Euros, this adds definite risk to the debt.

In the US and UK during the GFC [Great Financial Crash of 2008], as the level of Government debt went up, the interest on UK and UK Government Bonds went down. The same can be seen in the current Covid crisis. Deficits have reached unprecedented levels, but the interest rate on Government Bonds has gone down.

Yields on UK Government Bonds are often negative as the private sector desperately seeks safe assets.

Standard economic theory argues that, as Government borrowing goes up, interest rates go up. So standard economic theory cannot explain what we are observing. MMT can, because it distinguishes between currency-creating states and currency-using states.

Currency-creating states have complete control over short-term interest rates and significant effect on longer-term interests.

Compare that with Ireland in the GFC. Interest rates on 10-year Government Bonds went from under 5% percent in 2010 to nearly 12% in February 2011. The MMT folks would see Ireland's status as a currency user as a severe limitation on Ireland's freedom of action. Can the ECB, which creates Ireland's currency, always, be relied upon to buy unlimited quantities of Irish Government bonds? McWilliams chooses to completely ignore this critical issue.

Martin Dolphin

Planning?

It is worth noting the role of the Catholic Hierarchy in it all. I recall Professor Paddy Lynch (UCD) explaining how the word '*programme*' was used instead of '*plan*' (and '*programming*' and not '*planning*'). It was Paddy who came up with the ruse—that is my memory. Even though the French (de Gaulle) had made this kind of economic management respectable with the *commissariat*, there was still a nagging fear of '*planning*' as a term.

My memory is that Paddy's line was that the Church was won over by the Jesuits (obviously), through *Studies* and Milltown Park and, if I recall correctly, by Bishop Philbin (who was considered the intellectual in the Hierarchy). Fine Gael was also on-side, critically Alexis Fitzgerald and Gerry Sweetman. Lynch always claimed that Sweetman, and not Lemass, should be credited politically with the adoption of *planning* (in truth simply a kind of Keynesian policy with a focus on State investment initiatives especially in respect of agriculture).

Fergus O Rahallaigh

(Part One)

Pearse, Other 1916 Leaders, And A Prussian Prince

Under the heading of "*A Prussian solution to an Irish problem —An Irishman's Diary on Prince Joachim and the 1916 Rising*", Ronan McGreevy, the *Irish Times* 'Archives Editor' and selective keeper of its historical flame, had the following published this July 20th:

"One hundred years ago this month, Prince Joachim of Prussia, the sixth and youngest son of Kaiser Wilhelm II, shot himself in his castle outside Potsdam in eastern Germany. Germany's defeat in the first World War profoundly affected all Germans. For Joachim, it meant the end of the reign of the Hohenzollerns, the Prussian family which had united the country and provided its first emperors. Germany's defeat in the first World War profoundly affected all Germans. For Joachim, it meant the end of the reign of the Hohenzollerns, the Prussian family which had united the country and provided its first emperors. His father was in exile and disgrace in the Netherlands, leaving his family reduced to the status of commoners. Joachim was a decorated war veteran who won the Iron Cross in the early stages of the war. He married in late 1916, but his marriage was already troubled by the time he took his own life at the age of 29 on July 18th,

1920. In a parallel historical universe, Prince Joachim might have been the first king of an Ireland freed from British rule. This bizarre claim first surfaced in 'The Irish Times' during the 50th anniversary commemorations of the Easter Rising in 1966. Desmond Fitzgerald's eyewitness account of what went on in the GPO was posthumously published (he died in 1947) on April 7th, 1966. In it Fitzgerald recalled a conversation in the GPO which he had with Joseph Mary Plunkett and Patrick Pearse. They suggested that in the event of a German victory in the war, a live proposition in 1916, a German invasion force could free Ireland from British rule. The Easter Rising rebels invoked the aid of their 'gallant allies in Europe', namely Germany, in their enterprise. Had the Aud been able to land with its cargo of German guns and ammunitions, the Rising might have been a more protracted affair."

McGreevy's wording regarding the Fitzgerald eyewitness account—"this bizarre claim"—had been carefully chosen, as had that of his derisive tweet regarding his "*Irishman's Diary on Prince Joachim, the unwitting, uncrowned King of Ireland*". Was McGreevy merely commemorating—or was he actu-

ally celebrating—the centenary of Prince Joachim's suicide? While first published in the *Irish Times* in 1966, as has been repeatedly noted by McGreevy since 2016, it is not necessary to take out a subscription to that paper's archives to read the full Desmond Fitzgerald narrative of 1916. In 1968 his son Garret published Desmond's memoirs for the full 1913-1916 period of his life, and he published them yet again in 2006, with the book now more fully titled *Desmond's War: Memoirs 1913 to Easter 1916*.

Such publication history, of course, went totally unmentioned in McGreevy's bit of fun this July 20th. And so it had also been four years ago when, in conjunction with McGreevy's Centenary project, the *Irish Times* 1966 feature was reproduced in the *Irish Times* on 21st March 2016, under the following heading:

"Inside the GPO in 1916: Desmond Fitzgerald's eyewitness account. First published 50 years ago, this first-hand account by the father of the future taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald created a storm by claiming that the rebel leaders sympathetically discussed the likelihood of the Germans putting a prince of their own on the Irish throne."

Seeking to sustain its sensationalist "*storm*", the editorial introduction, in italics, began:

"On April 7th, 1966, 'The Irish Times' published a supplement to mark

the 50th anniversary of the Rising. It contained this first-hand account in which Desmond FitzGerald suggested that the rebel leaders were considering putting a German prince on the Irish throne... These edited extracts are from an autobiographical account that Desmond FitzGerald wrote before his death, in 1947."

During the months that followed, McGreevy continued with his own spin on what he presents as a "bizarre claim". Under the heading of "Was it for this? Reflections on the Easter rising and what it means to us now", McGreevy again wrote in the Summer 2016 issue of *Read- ing Ireland—The Little Magazine*:

"Not even taoisigh can agree on the legacy of the Rising. John Bruton has always maintained that the Easter Rising was unnecessary and that independence could have been achieved without resorting to violence. Garret FitzGerald, whose parents Desmond and Mabel were both in the GPO, has a counterargument, which he articulated in 2006 for the 90th anniversary of the Rising... FitzGerald confronts head-on the revisionist school of thought led by Bruton, which insists there was an alternative peaceful path to Irish independence. Such a belief, FitzGerald wrote, was 'alternative history gone mad... There is little reason to believe that Britain would have permitted Ireland to secure independence peacefully at least until many decades after the Second World War'..."

"It is clear from a lengthy first-hand account of the Rising by Garret FitzGerald's father Desmond that the rebels themselves were confused as to what kind of society they envisaged. FitzGerald's account was first published in the 'Irish Times' in 1966, almost 20 years after his death... Desmond FitzGerald's account created a sensation at the time as he alleged that the rebel leaders were thinking of installing a German prince on the throne of an independent Ireland. They even had Kaiser Wilhelm II's sickly son Joachim in mind... It is clear from the response by Ernest Blythe a few weeks later in the 'Irish Times' that there was a lot of incredulity around at the notion that the rebels planned to replace one monarchy with another. Blythe did not participate directly in the Rising but was privy to its planning and confirmed that the German prince proposal was indeed all true. He revealed that the true motives of the rebel could be surmised in two words, 'Brits Out'. He wrote: 'It is necessary to remember that for a long time, the term republic had been for most people in this country simply a code word for complete independence and separation from Britain and scarcely excluded the idea of a democratically accepted constitutional monarch.'"

Again no mention here of Garret FitzGerald's own republication of *Desmond's War* in 2006, notwithstanding the fact that the very article of Garret's that McCreevy was quoting from had been written precisely in order to announce that republication! "*Rising And Early Independence Brought Prosperity*" was the heading of that article published by the *Irish Times* on 12th April 2006, which continued with the subheading: "*Home Rule would have made us dependent; we got out from under British rule just in time, writes Garret FitzGerald*". Garret argued:

"The first point I would like to make about 1916 is that it was a product of desperation. For, as my father Desmond FitzGerald was to write a quarter of a century later, the Rising was launched by men for whom in the autumn of 1914 the Volunteer movement, 'on which all our dreams had centred, seemed merely to have canalised the martial spirit of the Irish people for the defence of England'... Only a rising could rekindle the almost extinguished flame of Irish nationalism, he and his friends believed... A case often made against the Rising is that it was unnecessary. We are told that Home Rule would have been conceded after the first World War. That may well be true, but it does not follow that Home Rule would then have led peacefully onwards to Irish independence. That is frankly most unlikely. Indeed, I would describe this thesis as alternative history gone mad."

"Firstly, there is little reason to believe that Britain would have permitted Ireland to secure independence peacefully at least until many decades after the second World War... The truth is that we got out from under British rule just in time—at a moment when the cost of the break was still bearable, involving as it did only a small reduction in public service salaries and in the very limited social welfare provisions of that period. And, of course, without the independence thus secured in the aftermath of the Rising we could never have become a prosperous and respected state and member of the EU... Without the impetus to early Irish independence provided by the Rising, it seems to me impossible to make a credible case for the emergence of a successful Irish State by the end of the 20th century. Indeed, I have never heard anyone even attempt to make a case for a successful Irish economy being achieved on the basis of a move to Home Rule rather than independence in the early 1920s. It is only by ignoring completely this fundamental economic equation that those who seek to advocate retrospectively the delayed Home Rule route to independence have been able to give a spurious credibility to their case."

Garret's article concluded with the blurb: "*Desmond's Rising—an Autobiog-*

raphy by Desmond FitzGerald is republished today by Liberties Press."

But let Desmond FitzGerald now speak for himself, recalling his Easter Rising conversations inside the GPO:

"Practically every time I went down to the big hall on the ground floor I stopped and spoke to Joseph Mary Plunkett... Although he looked like a dying man he seemed to be supremely happy. We talked about our friends, many of whom were due to take part in the Rising, but we did not know where those who were not in the post office might be.

Then he went on to give me a long account of a visit to Germany. I found it intensely interesting. I was enormously impressed to know at first hand that we had negotiated with a foreign power... Pearse came and joined us... I was firmly convinced that it was only a matter of hours until we should all three be dead, and I was also sure that they both shared that conviction with me. I certainly could not ask Mr Pearse how long he thought we should hold out as I had asked O'Rahilly... Both he and Plunkett spoke of how much bigger an event it would have been had the original plans gone forward unchecked. But they did not suggest that even in that case we might have expected a military victory. The very fact that the conversation returned so steadily to what might have been was an admission that there was no doubt now about what was going to be. I could not ask why a date had been fixed and persisted in when no help was forthcoming from outside, beyond the ship of arms that had failed to land its cargo. Whenever that ship was referred to Pearse was careful to repeat that the arms it had contained were not a gift, that they had been bought and paid for either by or through our own people in the United States. The reiteration of that point in the circumstances of that moment seemed to me to be significant in establishing that the Rising was our own work without any outside participation..." (*Desmond's Rising*, 2006 edition, pp 141-142).

"Again the talk went back to what might have been and with the assurance that the arms that had been sent were purchased, and that the Germans had done no more than to try, unsuccessfully, to send them to the purchaser without even attempting to send a voluntary support. It seemed to me that if they were apparently so indifferent to our success now, when by helping us they might well recognise that they were helping themselves, and when our success might well make the difference between success and failure for themselves, then there was still less assurance that in the hour of their victory, if they were to be victorious, they would put themselves out to make the satisfaction of our demand for freedom a condition of the peace that was to follow the war. I therefore asked Pearse what interest the Germans would

have in coupling our demands with their own when and if the hour of their victory came. In putting my question I did not relate it to the fact that the Germans had made so little effort to assist us at that moment. Both Pearse and Plunkett hastened to put forward the theory that even in the event of German victory the Germans would still have to look forward to possible dangers. Obviously they would not attempt to annex England, for to do so would merely create for them a permanent source of weakness within their own system. Neither would they attempt to annex Ireland, for that would merely make us a weakness to them as we were now to England. But they would need to see that England should not be able to challenge them again in the immediate future. In those circumstances it would obviously be good policy for them to take steps to establish an independent Ireland with a German prince as king. They even named the prince: Joachim, the youngest son of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In those circumstances they would have an Ireland on the far side of England, linked with them in friendship flowing from the fact that they had promoted that independence and from the link of royal relationship... Talking of those things that might conceivably have been may seem to have been more calculated to depress us, seeing that even while we were speaking we were conscious that when the assault came it must necessarily overcome us. But somehow they cheered me, and it was quite evident that Pearse and Plunkett found comfort in speaking of what might have been. Those talks between the three of us were repeated at various times during the week. No matter what might be happening when Pearse and Plunkett came in, I went to them immediately." (142-143).

Under the heading of "*An Irish monarchy*", the first of three Ernest Blythe commentaries on FitzGerald's account appeared in the *Irish Times* of 15th April 1966, with the subheading: "*Ernest Blythe writes about the sympathy of some of the 1916 leaders with the suggestion that a German prince should be offered a kingdom in this country*". Blythe related:

"Although I had known nothing about how the leaders had talked in the General Post Office until I read Desmond's account, I was not in the slightest startled by the fact that at the hour of supreme crisis in 1916, they were very far from professing doctrinaire republicanism. Some fifteen months earlier, I had heard Thomas MacDonagh and Joseph Plunkett themselves tell of their attitude; and from his public utterances I judged that Pearse would show himself equally realistic if a choice had to be made. In January 1915, the executive of the Irish Volunteers decided to appoint three full-time organisers, and I was one of those chosen, the others being Liam Mellows and Ginger O'Connell. We were

assembled in the Volunteer offices for a briefing conference with the headquarters staff represented by Pearse, McDonagh, Plunkett and Hobson... For part of the second session, Pearse was absent, having to fulfil some other engagement. It was in the afternoon, to the best of my recollection, and in the absence of Pearse, that Plunkett threw out the suggestion that in certain circumstances the best interests of the country would be served by making a German Catholic prince king of Ireland. No objection was offered to the idea by any of those present, and as far as I was concerned, I welcomed it enthusiastically..."

"At the beginning of 1915, the discussion, however interesting, seemed to me to be merely a bit of pleasant theorising. The war still had the most of four years to run, and none of us were disposed to count our chickens too long before they were hatched. Desmond FitzGerald's disclosure, however, inclines me to think that in putting the idea of an Irish kingdom before a group of newly-appointed organisers in January 1915, Joseph Plunkett and Thomas MacDonagh were aiming to have us pass the word down the line should the occasion arise. If the idea had not been often discussed and generally approved between January 1915 and Easter Week 1916, it is hardly likely that it would have arisen in conversation between Desmond FitzGerald and any of the leaders in the Post Office. (By this stage, it was the Protestant Prince Joachim who was being considered—MO'R.) I do not suppose, however, that James Connolly would have been very eager to have an Irish monarchy. With regard to Seán MacDiarmada, I should feel that he would agree with Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett. When he visited the North at Christmas 1914, I was present at a small social gathering in his honour. Besides Irish patriotic ballads, the songs sung included *The Watch on the Rhine* and *Deutschland Ueber Alles*—to the discomfort of the Catholic owner of the restaurant... It is also necessary to understand that, for a long time, the term, Republic, had been for most people in this country simply a code word for complete independence and separation from Britain and scarcely excluded the idea of a democratically accepted constitutional monarchy."

In between his first publication of his father's memoirs in 1968 and their republication in 2006, Garret FitzGerald returned to that subject in his *Irish Times* Saturday column on 29th May 1993, with the subheading: "*There is little evidence that before independence, most Irish were specifically republican—as distinct from separatist*". He upheld his father's narrative as follows:

"In relation to this account of what had been Pearse's and Plunkett's expectations,

I should perhaps add that my father's memory was known to be phenomenal, and that, shortly after the publication of these memoirs of the period, Ernest Blythe confirmed in an article in this paper that he had been told of the German monarchy plan separately by Bulmer Hobson, Secretary of the Volunteers and another of the organisers of the Rising. It is thus one of the unrecognised paradoxes of Irish history that it was the *failure* (GF's own emphasis) of the 1916 Rising to secure Irish independence with German help that led to the eventual emergence of a republic, and that had Pearse's plan succeeded he would, presumably, have been the Prime Minister to a monarch."

Unfortunately, in that intervention, Garret's own memory was not as phenomenal as that of his father. This is not a criticism of character. My own confusion of memory was to result in me myself misleading Garret on his father's stance regarding Nazi Germany, which I'll explain in Part Two. But, as to 1916, far from Hobson being "*another of the organisers of the Rising*", as stated by FitzGerald, he had to be kidnapped so as to prevent him sabotaging it. As related in the *Irish Independent* on 27th November 2015:

"It seems that a speech ... on 16 April, 1916, was the catalyst that marked him down for arrest by his IRB colleagues. Here Hobson unabashedly warned 'of the extreme danger of being drawn in to precipitate action', proclaiming that 'no man had a right to risk the fortunes of a country in order to create for himself a niche in history'. Desmond Fitzgerald remembered how 'one could feel he was treading on dangerous ground'. Hobson's influence over Eoin MacNeill, Chief of Staff of the Irish Volunteers, was also a major factor in his kidnapping. By the evening of Holy Thursday, with 'definite information that an insurrection was to occur in the immediate future', Hobson rushed to MacNeill's home to ensure that measures were put in place to prevent this. Éamonn Ceannt remembered talking with Thomas MacDonagh, who remarked: 'Bulmer Hobson is the evil genius of the Volunteers and if we could separate MacNeill from his influence, all would be well'. Hence, on Good Friday 1916, with the Rising days away, Seán Tobin—who had succeeded Hobson as chair of the Leinster Executive of the IRB—arrived at Volunteer headquarters to persuade him to attend a meeting at the home of fellow IRB man, Martin Conlon... He was greeted with guns upon his arrival at Conlon's home in Phibsborough... Conlon would later recall that shooting Hobson was an option. Once the Rising had commenced, the job of guarding him was of little interest to IRB men who wanted to join the fighting... Subsequently, on the evening of Easter Monday 1916, under the orders of Mac Diarmada, Hobson was

eventually released. He was no longer considered a threat, as the Rising was under way..."

More seriously, with regard to the credibility of Desmond FitzGerald's eyewitness account from inside the GPO, Blythe had not been the recipient of a second-hand account from Hobson, as stated by Garret in his 1993 article. Both Blythe and Hobson, together with Mellows and O'Connell, had all been direct eyewitnesses present at the discussion initiated by MacDonagh and Plunkett.

But Garret FitzGerald would need to have all his wits about him, after the credibility of his father's account was called into question five years later.

In November 1998, Martin Mansergh, political adviser to Fianna Fáil Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, delivered a lecture which dismissed Desmond FitzGerald's eyewitness account as being no more than "*speculative banter*". Mansergh nonetheless went on to decry the "*pro-German sympathies*" of Pearse and deplore the "*alignment with Kaiser Germany*", but he also seriously misrepresented Connolly as being supposedly at odds with Pearse in that regard. Mansergh reproduced that lecture in his 2003 book of essays, which carried a *Foreword* by Bertie Ahern, then in his second term as Taoiseach. FitzGerald was to respond with a republication of Desmond's *War* in 2004, followed by a robust counter-attack on Mansergh's dismissal in Garret's own 2005 book of essays. This dispute will be discussed in Part Two, as will Connolly's pro-German stance.

Manus O'Riordan

[To be continued]

Van the Man on Politics

On August 31st the President of Ireland, along with other dignitaries, celebrated Van Morrison's 75th birthday.

It is understandable that our President would want to acknowledge his contribution, but the artist had an oblique relationship to Northern Ireland never mind Ireland.

By 1972 he had finally achieved commercial success with albums such as *Moondance* and *Tupelo Honey*, which had led to a re-evaluation of his earlier remarkable album *Astral Weeks*.

At the time, the war in Northern Ireland was in full flow and there was pressure on Morrison to say something, not least because he came from the less articulate side of the sectarian divide.

It is a common misconception that someone who has original insights into one aspect of human life might have something interesting to say about another.

But what could he say? By that time he had left Belfast many years and even before he left his mental outlook had been oriented towards America.

Van the Man never claimed to know anything about politics but he felt he had to say something. And then it came to him!

He had read somewhere that there would be a Mass for Peace at St Dominic's Church in San Francisco. He told a rock journalist that the idea "*blew his mind*". Why exactly was unclear. Maybe he was impressed that people who had no connection with Northern Ireland were more engaged with events than he was.

And that was the genesis of *St Dominic's Preview*. The song is about his escape from Northern Ireland—which he had done before he had even left! In 1972 he felt he had arrived: "*you've got everything you ever wanted and now your face should*

The NI Protocol

On the *Institute for Government* website there is an article examining the *UK Internal Market Bill* clause by clause. Scroll down, clauses 40 to 45 are concerned with the Northern Ireland Protocol. It appears that the clauses seeking to override the Protocol are 42 (which is about documentation for goods moving to GB from NI) and 43 & 44 (which are about State Aid law).

Here is their summary of what these clauses say and mean:-

"What clause 42 says:

This clause gives UK ministers the power to disapply or modify exit summary declarations (and any other exit procedures) for goods moving NI-GB and, in doing so, to disregard domestic laws or international obligations, including any under the Northern Ireland protocol.

What clause 42 means:

The UK government is currently seeking an exemption from exit summary declarations, as required by EU's customs rules which apply under the protocol, for goods moving NI-GB. In the event that no agreement is reached, this will allow the UK to remove the requirement unilaterally.

What clause 43 & 44 says

Clause 43 gives ministers the powers to make regulations to determine how the state aid law is applied, including in a

wear a smile". But it was not quite what he had hoped: "*everybody feels so determined not to feel anyone else's pain*".

Following his seventy-fifth birthday there was no pressure on Morrison to make any political statement, but he decided to do so. He is releasing a trio of songs protesting against the Government's policies to combat the pandemic, which include the following lyrics:

"No more lockdown/No more government overreach/No more fascist bullies/
Disturbing our peace..."

No more taking of our freedom/And our God-given rights/Pretending it's for our safety/When it's really to enslave..."

An artist who has no track record of political protest suddenly intervenes with three songs because he is experiencing, as everyone else is, restrictions on his freedom. Apparently, there is no acknowledgment of the social threat posed by the pandemic. He only feels his own pain.

The self indulgence is breathtaking.

John Martin

way that modifies the protocol itself or is incompatible with international law.

Clause 44 states that only UK ministers may notify the European Commission of state aid requiring approval under the protocol.

What clauses 43 & 44 mean:

Under the Northern Ireland protocol, EU state aid law will apply to any UK act affecting trade between NI and the EU, but the government is concerned that this may have implications for state aid in other parts of the UK.

These clauses would allow UK ministers to apply state aid law according to the UK rather than the EU's interpretation."

HYPERLINK "<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/internal-market-bill>"

When the Bill was published, the *Financial Times* said:

"Legal experts said the legislation was even broader than suggested by the government, and did not make the new powers contingent on a "no deal" outcome in the EU-UK trade negotiations, as had been widely anticipated."

HYPERLINK "<https://www.ft.com/content/a150b01f-dde0-4376-9d6b-bac213a98a84>"

But, surely, a "no-deal" outcome is inevitable while the Government is threatening not to implement bits of Northern Ireland protocol in the last deal? Surely, the EU will insist that these clauses in the *Internal Market Bill* will have to be repealed prior to or as part of another deal—otherwise there won't be another deal.

David Morrison

THE LEAVING CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION

Formal school education, or the lack of it, is an interesting subject to meditate on. For most of human history most people—the vast majority—got on very well without writing or reading. There is some evidence that in Babylonian times, about 5,000 years ago any royal person or any merchant who wanted to communicate with another royal person or merchant a great distance away had to employ a cuneiform writer to write for them on a wet clay tablet which was then dried in the sun and sent by messenger to the addressee who had then to employ their own cuneiform writer to read the message aloud to them and to possibly write a reply.

Because clay tablets are not subject to decay or burning like paper or papyrus is, we have in our museums great quantities of clay tablets with writing on them. The writing is called cuneiform because it was written in wedge-shape characters carved on the wet mud tablet by a stylus with a wedge-shape point. So called by nineteenth century scholars from the Latin *cuneus*, meaning wedge.

So, the expert writer's first job in writing a message was to go down to the banks of a nearby river and scoop up some suitable-looking mud and then pat it into the form of a tablet from two to five centimetres thick and partly dry it in the sun, the surface could be dampened again to make a writing surface. No doubt they were experts at all of this. But the thing is they were specialists and their employers could neither read nor write.

The written tablets were mostly found buried in the Mesopotamian desert. The writers did not call it Mesopotamia, that is a Roman Latin name meaning "between two rivers". The Euphrates and the Tigris. The tablets were discovered mostly after 1840 by German, French, English and American archaeologists, sometimes working together, and sometimes separately. The result being that, where tablets were fractured or where more than one tablet was used to record a story or event, it happens that a part of a tablet

in Heidelberg has to be collated with a part in Harvard, or a part in Paris or Oxford.

Then there is another problem: what language was the tablet written in? There were Summerian and Akkadian and later on, Hebrew, Aramaic and so on. The cuneiform writing was in use for at least 3,500 years up to about 400 A.D.

And of course, there was writing of various other sorts going on in India, China, Japan, North and South America as well as the Celtic Ogham and the Scandinavian runes. All of these communications, for that is what they were, were written or carved by specialists who were a minority in their societies and who wished to communicate over time or space with distant people.

Most of the communications 5,000 years ago were about business matters or the collection of taxes. Nothing new there! Most communications today are also about business matters and taxes and we have added a whole new category concerning Social Benefits and Health.

The ancient Chinese and the Indian peoples developed what we now call literature and which required the art of writing to be communicated. Jacques Genet in his book *'La Monde Chinois'* refers to conversations between Goethe and his friend Eckermann in which Eckermann writes

"During the days when I did not see you" he [Goethe] said, "I have read a great deal, in particular a Chinese novel with which I am still occupied and which seems to me very remarkable."

"A Chinese novel!" I said "that must be rather curious."

"Not as curious as one might be tempted to think" replied Goethe.

"These people think and feel as we do, and one soon realises that one is like them ..."

"But" I said "perhaps this Chinese novel is a rather exceptional one?"

"Not at all" said Goethe "the Chinese have thousands of the kind, and they even had a certain number of them already when our forbears were still living in the woods."

The foregoing conversation took place on Wednesday, 31st January 1827.

Similarly Indian, Japanese and Greek literatures are rich in written stories which were originally passed down from generation to generation in these societies' oral

traditions. Gaelic literature consisted of trained scribes writing down on vellum parchment, the stories and histories received down from druids, *filí* and bards who were specialists, trained perhaps over ten or even fifteen years in the skill of memory. It is reported that a good bard could recite precisely from memory up to 450 poems of a historical nature.

Today trained memory is ridiculed. The children who learned their songs and multiplication tables "by heart" are laughed at. But I would ask does anyone seriously think that all the stuff on computers today will still be accessible to scholars in 5,000 years time, as the data on clay tablets is still accessible?

So what is education? William Wilson, translator of *'Shorter Stories from Balzac'*, says:

"Moreover, the excellent system of our schools where some of the best years of life are spent in acquiring distaste for all education is sufficient to ensure ignorance of any subject in the curriculum."

This is a very extreme view with which I do not agree.

However, I do believe that I was fully equipped for life by the time I was nine or ten years of age. I was fully educated in practical subjects by then and I had two or three great primary teachers.

I was lucky to go on to secondary education and I can fairly say the most educational part of that was the several months I was *'on the lang'* as we say in Cork. (*Mitching* was Dublinese). This was when every day I spent time down the docks, having cups of tea (as slowly as possible to make the pennies stretch out), and discussing cargoes, destinations, ship's captains and stevedore bosses. Much better education than being in school. But my mother didn't think so when she found out about it!

In those days, because there was nothing else to do in 4th year, we did the Intermediate Certificate examination a second time, acquiring more 'Honours'—but what a waste.

I did the National University of Ireland Matriculation Examination in 5th year and, when I passed it my parents were satisfied, and I headed off to London where the wages in the 1950s were high. I worked as a carpenter and learned some more about real life. To me, the snobbery on the site was appalling. As a carpenter one did not

chat with mere labourers, and certainly the foreman and the engineers did not chat with us except to bawl us out from our tea break. It was rough stuff and it was an education: and besides it gave me money for the second-hand bookshops.

By the following March, I could not see a future in hanging doors and fitting skirting boards and I listened to my father who said “*did I leave to home in Youghal to go to Cork to get my knees under a nice warm desk, for you to be freezing to death in a London skyscraper?*” He explained the money was good because it was German reparation money and it wouldn’t last. So I came back to Cork at very little pay but a “*nice warm desk*”. I worked my way through College and got a BComm Degree and settled down as an accountant. So, after all, an education was useful.

However, if you take an accountant’s earnings over say 35 to 36 years and subtract the costs of going to College, you will find that a good carpenter can earn a lot more than that in total over 40 years. But then there’s the “*nice warm desk*”. . .

And we come back to education, as exemplified by the Leaving Certificate examination. Of itself, it doesn’t mean a lot. But to gain admission to a third level college, it is necessary to have the requisite points achieved in the Leaving Certificate. This year the points were awarded by the teachers on the basis of their assessment of the student’s abilities. Society is questioning the necessity for the examination, and at the same time it is obvious that some test is needed at the end of secondary education to indicate in some manner the effectiveness of the system.

Undoubtedly, one function of the prolonged education system is to keep children out of the workforce for as long as possible simply because our affluent society can afford it. “Free” education has a lot to do with the vast crowds of students wanting third level education as a way of passing their time. How long can this very false and rather artificial situation continue? The taxpayers who are paying for it all will wake up some day. As will the parents who pay for clothing, feeding and housing the present enormous number of third level students.

Michael Stack ©

HALLIGAN continued

known public figures already. Socialism was no longer the dirty word it has been in Ireland, no longer (and never again) something to be feared by all right, thinking people.

“Labour itself, which had been a largely rural party ‘the party of poltroons, as someone unkindly characterised it’ began to spread its wings and, despite all the ups and downs since, has never been less than a truly national party.

“Brendan Halligan did all that. He was the principal architect of the speech and the realignment. For one brief shining moment, he and the leader he served loyally were able to offer a real and different version. The history of Ireland in the second half of the 20th century is a history of profound change, especially in terms of the opening of a society that had been barred and shuttered up to then. *Brendan Halligan was one of its architects.*

“Although the high hopes and dreams generated by that speech weren’t realised (and some of us are now the living embodiment of the joke that instead of the 70s being socialist, the socialists are 70), it is, I believe, impossible to deny the importance of the speech and the moment that Brendan Halligan crafted.

“Other things—the Troubles, principally—got in the way of that vision. But that cannot deny the fact that it was a real, transformative moment of vision that still holds out great promise” (*Irish Examiner*, 11.8.2020).

“*The Poltroons*”, this is the mystery that the Left and the Revolutionaries could not understand. “The New Republic”, Berkeley, Paris, Student Revolts—yes, they understood all that, so they told us “but the Socialist movement in Ireland depending on a bunch of ‘Poltroons’, out in the Sticks—there’s something wrong here, this will have to change!

Other things—the Troubles, principally—“*got in the way of that vision*”, says Fergus. What did Labour do? Halligan dissolved its branches in the Six Counties. The world was in revolt and 60 miles up the road, a war that lasted for 28 years was about to begin, and Labour hadn’t a bloody clue! Political reality is an awful experience.

Finlay states that Halligan “*...as the saying goes, done the State some service*”. Yes, indeed, but what service did he contribute to the Labour movement?

Labour Comment

Shipyard

continued from page 24

I just hoped no Catholic who knew me was around or any member of the Young Workers’ League.

Of all the ex-service men, from WW1 and WW2, I came across in the shipyard none mentioned that they had served in either Ireland or NI, except from one, from WW1,

who boasted of being in the Black & Tans, stationed in Cork City. He been severely

wounded in WW1, coming home with “half a dozen medical drainage tubes sticking out of him”. His stomach had been removed and his abdomen was a hollow. He had

to continually peck at his food the whole day like a bird to get any sustenance. His

face was the colour of a lemon.

He boasted of having shot young men in Cork City (the word teenager wasn’t in vogue then). A sweeper-upper, he would move from bench to bench with his tales of killing. He thought he was impressing us with his tales of gung-ho, but the apprentices, Protestants, loathed him. We all felt he hated us and was envious of our youth and health and might have wanted us dead as well. So a few of us began to make wooden stakes and mockingly show them to him. He didn’t understand these were for driving through his heart as he was too tough to die by any other means. He even admired our work.

Southern cities or the rural areas, over the border, were never mentioned. It was always the Isle-of-Man or Blackpool when they might be lucky enough to get a week’s holiday.

Wilson John Haire

To be continued

HALLIGAN continued

Asked by *Village* “what motivated him to become Labour’s General Secretary in 1967”:

“That’s very much related to what was happening with Brendan Corish and the Labour Party at the time. The thing about the 1960s was that it was a very exciting time everywhere, and here was no different. The place it was all happening was the Labour Party ‘a great extent of that was the leader, who wanted those things to happen, and was terribly open’, says Halligan, who also credits Corish with a novel long-term strategy for the party. ‘He wanted to end the old civil war division and recast Irish Politics by making Fianna Fail and Fine Gael redundant’...” (*Village*, July 2009).

The two Brendans were going to force the two Civil War parties into government with each other or drive one of them into extinction; Labour would be the main opposition party, creating a real left-right divide.

Some people would say they were ahead of their time —to-day, the two Civil War parties are in government together but Holy God, look at the main opposition, a party called Sinn Féin with 37 seat, 24.5% of First Preference votes. ‘Civil War’ politics is dead—long live ‘Civil War politics!’

And what of Labour? Six seats and 4.4% of the First Preference vote! To use Finlay’s terminology, we have four “*Poltroon*” TDs and two 2 Dublin TDs (See Finlay below).

“Older but no Wiser”

What went wrong for 1960s Labour?

“What you can’t take into account of is what history is going to drop into your lap, and what dropped into our lap was the Arms Crisis of 1970”, Halligan states.

“Rather than a disappointing 1969 election result, Halligan says that learning that Fianna Fail ministers were in a plot to send weapons to nationalist communities in Northern Ireland—and a disappointing meeting with the then Taoiseach Jack Lynch—changed the Labour leaders mind abruptly. ‘It was an epiphany’, he remarks today” (*Village*, July 2009).

Like Lynch, Labour did a runner, the dream of flower power and the ‘Great’ social revolution was bought down to earth by reality and 39 years later Halligan still couldn’t explain it!

By 1973, Labour and Fine Gael were ‘hugger mugger’ again!

“Halligan, who says the u-turn caused Corish ‘great anguish, insists that the national interest ‘getting Fianna Fail out of power’ trumped the long-term health of the Labour Party. ‘They thought in terms of the country’, he adds. ‘There’s no question but that to get rid of Fianna Fail was good for democracy” (*ibid*).

Following the 1992 General Election, the Labour Party formed a coalition with Fianna Fail. It was the first occasion that these two parties were in government together. The partnership broke up in 1994 when Labour once again joined Fine Gael and Democratic Left to continue in Office.

Halligan resigned as party General Secretary for personal reasons on 28th October 1980 and was succeeded by Seamus Scally, formerly the Assistant General Secretary.

SMOKING LOBBY

“ONE of Michael D. Higgins’s closest advisers has denied that he left the Labour presidential candidate’s campaign team due to concerns about his past as a lobbyist for the tobacco industry.

“Brendan Halligan, a former Labour Party General Secretary, represented cigarette manufacturers throughout the 1990s, spearheading their campaign to fight tax increases and limit restrictions on advertising.

“Mr Halligan has denied that his departure from the campaign was due to concerns in the Labour Party over his links to the tobacco industry, insisting he left because he had ‘other things to do’.

“Mr Higgins, a non, smoker himself, spoke out against the tobacco industry in a June 2002 Dail debate, criticising ‘those who are making a fortune out of the child abuse that is advertising connected to alcohol and tobacco’.

“His name [Halligan] appears in more than 120 secret files that the big US tobacco companies were forced to disclose after they settled a class action lawsuit taken by 46 U.S. states in the late, 1990s” (*Irish Independent*, 10.10.2011).

Brendan Halligan—

“...went on to become a wealthy man as a director and shareholder of Mainstream Renewables, the international wind, energy company founded by his long, time friend, the entrepreneur Eddie O’Connor, a former student agitator who once described himself as politically ‘to the left of Mao’...”.

According to the share register, Brendan Halligan, who was also a director of the company, had over 188,000 shares valued

recently at €9 a share (*Sunday Independent*, 16.8.2020).

Public Office:

Brendan Halligan: Elected T.D Dublin SW, June, ’76 By-Election to 1977; Senator (Taoiseach’s panel) 1973, 1976; MEP (Dublin 1982, 84, Replaced Frank Cluskey). Contested a seat in three General Election, ’77, ’81 and ’82.

Brendan Halligan: Born: 5th July 1936; Died: 9th August 2020.

Brendan Halligan:

“As a servant of the public in a variety of roles, he has, as the saying goes, done the State some service.” (Fergus Finlay, *Irish Examiner*, 11.8.2020; Finlay worked for three Governments from 1982 to 1997, as adviser to both Dick Spring and Pat Rabbitte.)

“...on Sunday, I discovered that Brendan Halligan had died. And my mind immediately went back further, to the 1960s and early 1970s, when I was still a teenager—and electrified by a single speech.

“It was 1967, in Liberty Hall in Dublin. The leader of the Labour Party at the time was Brendan Corish, a tall, strikingly handsome man with a pronounced Wexford accent. He was popular with party members and with the electorate. He’d been leader about six or seven years, and had brought the party from 13 to 33 TDs, and to just over 15% of the popular vote.

“I could be wrong, but I don’t think that anyone in Ireland had ever heard a political leader use the word ‘socialist’ so often and so prominently in a single speech. I certainly hadn’t, and when I heard Corish begin with the words ‘the 70s will be socialist’, I was hooked.

“Almost immediately, he went on to say that he intended to offer the audience the vision of a new society—what he called (and what the speech became called) ‘A New Republic’.

“A deep sense of vision of what was possible and the desire, as Jim Larkin put it, to ‘close the gap between what ought to be and what is’ was, in its own way, one of the turning points of Irish political history. Other revolutions were happening, in Europe and around the world. The anti-war movement in America, student revolt in France and Germany, the emergence of human rights as a global issue. Thanks to the vision of the New Republic, Ireland was in that mainstream.

“And Labour. People flocked to join the party, and many of them were well,

continued on page 32

HALLIGAN continued

Halligan on the Northern War

“[Halligan] considered that Northern Ireland’s problems would only be resolved by power-sharing and that the primary responsibility for solutions lay with the two communities” (Anthony White: *Irish Parliamentarians, Deputies and Senators 1918, 2018*, IPA publication, 2018).

“Prior to the outbreak of the Troubles, he opened up contacts with both communities and as general secretary of the Labour Party, he dissolved Labour Party branches in Northern Ireland in 1970 to assist in the formation of the SDLP” (*Irish Times* obituary, 15.8.2020).

At one stage when reading the “*Cosgrave Legacy*”, I began to think, did Brendan Halligan write this, and not Stephen Collins. Halligan is sourced 21 times in the Index page, and a good number of the sources cover several pages.

NATIONALISM

“In 1982, Brendan Halligan, the former General Secretary of the Labour Party and Labour deputy and senator, in a series of articles in the *Irish Times* wrote that by its decision [Labour Party] on November 1, 1918:

‘Labour capitulated to nationalism and ensured the continuing triumph of that narrow and conservative ideology over the internationalist and humanitarian beliefs of socialism’.”

“In fact Brendan’s rush to judgement in 1982 was a serious over simplification.

“In his address to the gathering at Liberty Hall in January 2009, to mark the incorporation of the Democratic Programme in the proceedings of the 1919 First Dail, Brendan Halligan revisited and revised his earlier conclusion. He acknowledged the acute fragility of the labour movement in 1918 and the wisdom of not becoming embroiled in a no win contest over national self-determination. It settled for the Democratic Programme and lived to fight another future” (*No Workers’ Republic*, Barry Desmond, Watchword, Dublin, 2009, p.44).

“THE LABOUR PARTY WILL NEVER BE IRRELEVANT”
(*Alan Kelly, Sunday Independent*, 20.9.2020)

Since the 1970s, at the latest, all Irish parties have not been so much “centrist” as offering competing versions of social democracy. Apart from the Progressive Democrats’ pretence at such a stance, Ireland has never produced a convincing

liberal or neo-liberal party. But the Civil War trumps everything. This is still a row over maximising state sovereignty and how far you dare to go with it. Labour are pessimists on that front, still essentially Treatyites.

As a competitor within the social democratic spectrum, Labour has been handicapped by its Treatyism and “*anti-nationalism*”. For decades it has obsessed over “*keeping Fianna Fail out*”, with a bizarre narrative about Fianna Fail as uniquely “*evil*”, needing to be excluded from power (a term actually used by the Conor Cruise O’Brien, and the Democratic Left element). They just couldn’t see the wood for the trees.

Their opposition to Lemass’s tripartism, and later to Haughey’s Social Partnership, was completely dysfunctional from any “*class politics*” point of view. The working class treated them accordingly with contempt. Labour was down to one TD in Dublin by 1963.

But Labour made Fianna Fail : providing much of its programme in the 1920s and keeping Dev in power in the 1930s. It then transitioned to be the anti-Fianna Fail mudguard for Fine Gael from the late 1940s, down to today. Prior to that it had complemented Fianna Fail, giving it the details of welfare state policy.

Where does Labour stand now? On the plus side: Labour championed British style socialism in Ireland—or at least the welfare state bit of it.

But it abandoned the Unions and the economy, in focusing solely on issues of poverty and public services. Nevertheless, it kept these things on the agenda through thick and thin, which FF then implemented under pressure from the party.

When it was in government in the Inter-Party period, the 1970s and 1980s, it certainly expanded the welfare state. In the 1990s it updated all the equality stuff. Since then it’s been *purely* ‘*Fine Gael light*’, epitomised by Rabbitte and Gilmore. Once Fine Gael itself became ‘*Fine Gael light*’, what purpose Labour?

In a nutshell, Labour is a Treaty party and never got fully over that mentality.

Brendan Halligan was Irish and European to the core, his funeral was told on Thursday morning [13.8.2020]. He was “the embodiment in one man of a plural-

ity of identities, overlapping, reinforcing and not contradicting each other”, said former European Parliament president Pat Cox” (*Irish Times*, 13.8.2020).

HALLIGAN AND EUROPE

“He was also instrumental in bringing the Labour Party into the Socialists International and the EEE/EU Social Democratic movement. In 1969, he travelled to Portugal with a socialist international group to support the Mario Soares-led Social Democrats in opposition to the Caetano fascists and was deported.

“He developed links with leaders across Europe and beyond including French socialist politician, Francois Mitterrand and leader of the Social Democratic party in West Germany, Willy Brandt, who made a party political broadcast for the Labour Party in the 1979 European Parliament elections” (*Irish Times* obituary, 15.8.2020).

One issue that drove a wedge between Fine Gael and Labour was the referendum on joining the European Community which took place in April 1972:

“Another politician suffered serious embarrassment in the referendum campaign. Brendan Halligan had been appointed General Secretary of the Labour Party in 1969, having served as Political Director from 1967. He had little opportunity by 1972 to impose his considerable ability on the party. The party’s campaign committee had a somewhat exotic political membership and one of its decisions was to issue a memorandum to all the clergy of Ireland asking them to vote ‘No’. Brendan did not draft the circular to thousands of priests and nuns but was obliged to append his name to the following extraordinary message:

‘It is no dramatic scare to say that close to 50% of our children could be living, within 10 years, on remittance from absent fathers and even mothers... In our view the social, cultural and demographic consequences our country’s full membership of the EEC... would be an irreparable damage to the fabric of our socio-cultural identity as a Christian people with a unique ethos’...” (Barry Desmond, *Finally and in Conclusion*, A Political Memoir, New Island, 2000, p.78).

Halligan recalls!

“As Labour’s young General Secretary during the late 1960s, Brendan Halligan apparently got on well with the media : he helped his party leader Brendan Corish to write a landmark speech, The New Republic, with two *Irish Times* journalists, and the newspaper happily predicted that the party... would eclipse Fine Gael and force a fundamental realignment of Irish politics” (*Village*, July 2009).

continued on page 33

HALLIGAN continued

democracy posed by Charles Haughey. The first definitive moment of change in our policy occurred at the private session of the party's Annual Conference at Liberty Hall [Dublin] in February, 1970. Brendan Corish emerged from the debate to declare that he had an open mind on the issue and said that a special delegate conference should decide the coalition issue" (*ibid.*, p.56/57).

"In effect Corish repudiated his eve of the poll speech of 1961 when he stated that Labour would not join another coalition with Fine Gael. He was attacked for his retraction but he won the day at a bitter special conference later in 1970 [Cork]" (*Ibid.*, p.57).

"Corish, at 54 years of age and after 27 years in Dail Eireann, had learned the real facts of political life under our multi-seat electoral system of proportional representation. The hegemony and domination of Dev was at last laid to rest" (Barry Desmond, *Finally and in Conclusion*, A Political Memoir, New Island, 2000).

THE 1973 ELECTION

"...Fine Gael and Labour in 1973 produced a short, solid and attractive manifesto which let the electorate know just what they would do if elected to government" (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, Stephen Collins, Blackwater Press, 1996, p.127).

"Fine Gael got commitments on law and order, Europe, a peaceful solution to the Northern problem, the removal of compulsory Irish and the abolition of death duties. Labour laid stress on the removal of VAT from food, social reform, increasing house building to 25,000 a year and controlling prices. Garret FitzGerald inserted a clause promising a tax on wealth to replace death duties. There was also a private agreement, not included in the document, that farmers would be brought into the tax net" (*ibid.*, p.127).

Halligan "had drafted most of the Labour Party document presented to Fine Gael." Cosgrave "...you can put anything in as long as you don't give a commitment to get rid of that act" (*Offences against the State Act*).

"Labour had fought tooth and nail in opposition to the "Offences" Act only two months earlier but in the light of Cosgrave's views they backed off... knowing that was the only way into government" (*ibid.* p.128).

"Halligan remembers telling Cosgrave and Corish... 'All that is needed is for the two of you to walk down the centre of any street of any town or village or any part of Dublin together. Don't say anything about politics just talk to each other...

you are both somewhat conservative but reassurance is what the people need at this time'..." (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, Stephen Collins, Blackwater Press, 1996, p.131).

"Relations between the coalition parties were so good that, in April [1973] at the Fine Gael Ard Fheis, Oliver Flanagan was able to declare: 'Now the party of Arthur Griffith stands united with the party of James Connolly'."

(*The Cosgrave Legacy*, Stephen Collins, Blackwater Press, 1996, p.156)

GARRET AND HALLIGAN

In 1959, Halligan returned to Dublin to study economics and law at University College Dublin. Lecturers including George O'Brien, Paddy Lynch and Garret FitzGerald (later Taoiseach), and these proved to be formative influences on the young Halligan.

A merger of Fine Gael and Labour?

"FitzGerald recalls one crucial meeting with Halligan: 'He [Halligan] said a short term link would certainly be of no interest; only a long, term or permanent link — perhaps even a merger 'would have any chance'. Those in Labour favouring an alliance or merger, according to Halligan, were Barry Desmond, Noel Browne, Sean Dunne, Stevie Coughlan and Michael Pat Murphy with Mickey Mullen perhaps persuadable. Michael O'Leary was thought to be hostile, for tactical reasons until after the next election" (p.95, *ibid*).

"Brendan Halligan confirms that FitzGerald was regarded as virtually the sixth Labour Minister in the cabinet. He sided regularly with the majority of Labour Ministers against his Fine Gael colleagues but the arguments at cabinet rarely split along party lines" (*ibid* p.209).

Halligan's veneration of Cosgrave

"Brendan Halligan, who was very close to the centre of power all through the lifetime of coalition as Corish's right-hand man believes that Cosgrave's authority was seriously underestimated by commenters at the time and since" (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, Stephen Collins, Blackwater Press, 1996, p.205).

"... He [Halligan] behaved as if he was Taoiseach; he had a natural authority about him; nobody at all ever contested his authority during the four years and called his judgement into account. He was simply treated with enormous respect by the Labour Ministers" (*ibid* p.205).

"Both Halligan and Dick Burke make the point that Cosgrave had a relationship with senior Labour figures which transcended politics" (*ibid* p.205).

"If the Dail was televised, as it is to, day, I think Cosgrave's public image would have changed profoundly,' says Brendan Halligan. Cosgrave would speak in a very self-confident and very authoritative manner and with a cutting witticism. A withering witticism directed at Fianna Fail. When you sat behind him on the benches listening you felt very secure, you felt somewhat proud, you were reassured. This man gave Fianna Fail a terrible time" (*ibid.* p.216).

"The central thing about Cosgrave was his reverence for the institutions of the State', says Brendan Halligan. 'His party had created the State and its institutions were sacrosanct. Politics he regarded as a sacred and solemn public duty. This was a great attribute of Cumann na nGaedheal which many of us did not appreciate when we were younger" (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, p.221).

ARMS TRIAL

"The atmosphere in Leinster House for those few days was incredible, the most incredible in my life,' says Brendan Halligan. 'Nobody went to bed... There were all sorts of rumours sweeping the place and people... were prepared to believe anything... they were talking about the Gardai, they were talking about the Army, they were talking about the role of parliament itself" (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, Stephen Collins, Blackwater Press, 1996, p.106).

The Labour Party position was spelt out by Barry Desmond:

"I have no doubt from my own contacts in the political system at that time that Liam Cosgrave and Jack Lynch headed off a grave situation which could have embroiled the security forces of the State in the Northern Ireland situation. This was his finest contribution" [Cosgrave] (*ibid.* p.106).

"The events of May, 1970, had a profound effect on Corish. He came to the conclusion that for the sake of Irish democracy there would have to be an alternative to Fianna Fail and the only alternative was a coalition with Fine Gael. He very reluctantly came to that decision," says Halligan. (*ibid.* p.109).

"Conor Cruise O'Brien believes that it was necessity rather than the Arms Crisis which forced the change in Labour's attitude.

"I would like to think it was the Arms Crisis but I think it really stemmed from Labour's need to get off the hook of its own stupid commitment to no-coalition. Halligan and O'Leary got us on to that one and talked Corish into it. They made him give hostages to fortune by delivering strong anti-coalition declarations as if this was an eternal principle. And they had to get rid of this bilge and I think the Arms Crisis was a good excuse'..." (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, p.109).

continued on page 34

**LABOUR**

Comment

ISSN 0790-1712

VOLUME 38 No. 10

CORK

ISSN 0790-1712

The Halligan Legacy?

Brendan Halligan died on 9th August 2020. He was a university graduate with a background as an economist and as an executive in a semi-State company. Initially, he joined the Labour Party as Political Director in 1967. He was appointed General Secretary of the party the following January, 1968, and played a key role in formulating the leadership's strategy over the following decade.

The outgoing General Secretary, Senator Mary Frances (Molly) Davidson, had been employed by the party since 1922, and, while "...she had seemed to see her role as mainly administrative, Halligan sought a more active political role for the office" (Michael Gallagher, *The Irish Labour Party in Transition*, 1957, 82: Manchester, 1982, p.67).

Ms Davidson was a meticulous administrator and archivist. A friend of the writer, who did voluntary work in the party office, discovered that as soon as Brendan became General Secretary he immediately got rid of the 'useless' administrative documents and whatever archives existed going back over decades!

In 1966, Halligan —

"... had delivered a lecture in which he accused Labour of having 'lost the people', and argued that 'its role has been minimal in areas beyond its sectional interests and its responses to change in the main have been defensive'... it is almost respectable now to be a socialist', and declared that Labour intended to force the two major parties into some kind of merger'..." (*ibid.*, p.67).

"Economic growth was the mantra of the 1960s and marked a turning point in opposition politics in Ireland. Brendan Corish was well *in situ* as Labour leader and his intellectual trustee, Brendan Hal-

ligan, was about to take over the organisation of the Labour Party" (*No Workers' Republic, Reflections on Labour and Ireland*, 1913, 1967, Watchword, Dublin, 2009, p.315).

In 1964, Fine Gael TD, Declan Costello presented his social document *Towards A Just Society* and "this alarmed James Dillon, Liam Cosgrave and Gerard Sweetman no end" (*ibid.*). Garret Fitzgerald "finally decided to branch out from academic life, economic consultancy and journalism and joined Fine Gael". The up and coming Richie Ryan regarded FitzGerald "as a dangerous radical who would destroy Fine Gael and Christian democracy in Ireland." (*ibid.*, p.315)

COALITION OUT!

At the 1957 Labour Party Annual Conference in the INTO Hall, Dublin a resolution was passed "that the party would not again participate in an Inter-Party Government". Barry Desmond continues:

Irish Political Review is published by the IPR Group: write to—

1 Sutton Villas, Lower Dargle Road
Bray, Co. Wicklow or

33 Athol Street, Belfast BT12 4GX or
2 Newington Green Mansions, London N16 9BT
or *Labour Comment*, TEL: 021-4676029
P. Maloney, 26 Church Avenue, Roman
Street, Cork City

Subscription by Post:

12 issues: Euro-zone & World Surface: €40;
Sterling-zone: £25

Electronic Subscription:

€ 15 / £12 for 12 issues
(or € 1.30 / £1.10 per issue)

You can also order from:

<https://www.atholbooks-sales.org>

"This resolution was to haunt the party for the next fifteen years until the convulsions within Fianna Fail [Arms Trial] convinced the then leader of the party, Brendan Corish, that coalition was a necessary alternative. He fought the 1961, 1965 and 1969 General Elections on the central plank of a non-coalition policy, much to the delight of Fianna Fail. By 1972, 1973 he and a majority of delegates learned the futility of such absolutist purity.

"However, the economic and social policies of the leadership of Fine Gael were singularly unattractive to Labour during this period. Liam Cosgrave considered the Labour Party to be crypto communist and Brendan Corish was deeply under the influence of the avant-garde socialist pronouncements of Brendan Halligan, Conor Cruise O'Brien and Justin Keating... The Arms Crisis and Charles Haughey were to change all that landscape" (*No Workers' Republic*, Barry Desmond, Watchword, Dublin, 2009, p.253).

[Halligan] "Corish in fact had to make a very powerful speech at the 1969 conference where he used the famous expression. 'We will not give the kiss of life to Fine Gael',..." (*The Cosgrave Legacy*, p.93)

COALITION IN!

"Deputy Tom O'Higgins of Fine Gael and Labour's General Secretary, Brendan Halligan, were to bring Cosgrave and Corish together to form a national coalition government after the 1973 general election" (Barry Desmond, *Finally and in Conclusion*, A Political Memoir, New Island, 2000, p.56).

"After the 1969 general election, the party's general secretary, Brendan Halligan, had convinced Brendan Corish that a 'go it alone' policy for Labour was no longer sustainable, particularly when faced with the perceived threat to

continued on page 35