

Irish Foreign Affairs

Volume Five, Number 4

December 2012

“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

Contents

Editorial p. 2

JFK Conspiracy Theories Part 2 *John Martin* p. 5

Clear on Co-Determination But Muddled on Middle-East *Manus O’Riordan* p. 11

Starving the Germans: the Evolution of Britain’s Strategy of Economic Warfare During the
First World War—The French Connection *Eamon Dyas* p. 12

UN Recognises Palestine as a State *David Morrison* p. 17

Reports: Launch of *Northern Ireland: What Is It? Professor Mansergh Changes His Mind*
p. 22

Launch of *The Genesis of National Socialism* p. 25

Review: *All Hell Let Loose* p.36

Documents

Road Map for Negotiations Between the US and Iran p. 28

NATO Held “Dangerous Instrument” Undermining the UN, Former Assistant UN Secretary-
General Halliday Says p. 30

Africa and AFRICOM p. 31

Russia Turns a Page p. 33

A Quarterly Review published by the *Irish Political Review Group*, Dublin

The democratisation of certain Arab States was considered advantageous to the globalist interests of the West—the West being the USA and the European Union—and it was actively supported by propaganda and other means. The democratisation of other Arab States was not considered advantageous to Western interests, and the West assisted in the suppression of democratic movements in them.

Some of the Arab States fostered the secular liberal values which are the official ideology of the West. Others were strictly Islamic regimes. The states in which the West helped to suppress the democratic movements were the states with feudal Islamic regimes. The States which the West played an active part in subverting were those in which the regime fostered Western values.

The Baath regimes in Iraq and Syria fostered Western liberal values. Ireland had extensive connections with Iraq in particular and the experience of Irish people who went to work there was that it was a country not essentially different from their own. Women were free to behave in the European manner there—or not to, if that was their choice. The practice of religion was free, both with regard to the different varieties of Islam, and the relations between Islam and the various forms of Christianity existed there from the earliest Christian times. The various public amenities which were taken for granted in the West were taken for granted in Baathist Iraq too. A substantial stratum of Western-style middle-class life had developed there in which people from the West felt at ease.

But the State which cultivated this liberal development, and protected it, was not democratically organised. And it was under the slogans of democracy that the West decided to destroy the Baath regime in Iraq.

Britain was to the fore in the campaign to destroy the 'tyranny' which fostered liberal values in Iraq.

In Britain itself the cultivation of liberal values was not done in a medium of political democracy. Liberal development preceded democratic development by a long way. The small ruling class of the 18th century cultivated liberal social values and engaged in fierce suppression of tendencies which it regarded as inimical to liberalism. The long campaign to exterminate Catholicism in Ireland—which came close to exterminating the native population in the mid-19th century—was done in the name of liberalism. It was not done in the name of democracy. The ruling class was of the opinion that democracy was incompatible with liberalism and would destroy it.

Britain was not governed democratically under the regime of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which lasted until 1832. It was governed by an aristocratic ruling class acting in the name of a monarchy which it had rendered powerless. The middle class which flourished economically and culturally under that regime began to demand access to political power. In 1832 the bourgeoisie forced Parliament to admit them to the Parliamentary process by threatening to go on economic strike. The 1832 Reform enfranchised only a small minority of the population. Further small additions to the Parliamentary franchise were made in the course of the 19th century. But it was not until the Reform Act of 1918—made politically necessary by the introduction of Conscription in 1916 to fight the Great War—that a majority of the British population got the vote.

The British Prime Minister declared in Parliament the other day that Britain had been "*a bastion of democracy for centuries*". Nobody disagreed, even though everybody with

any knowledge of the history of the franchise must have known it was nonsense.

The British ruling class resisted democratisation. It did not resist it merely out of a lust for power. It was concerned that democratisation would bring about the destruction of what it had constructed. Its war against the French Revolution was preached by Edmund Burke as a war against democracy, and the course of events in France was taken to be proof that democracy didn't work.

Britain has been a democracy—in the sense of having a Government based on a Parliament elected by general adult franchise—for less than a century. What it had for centuries—about three centuries—was government by a ruling class which arranged itself into two political parties and sorted out its differences by means of periodical elections of a Parliament by a minuscule electorate. The Government was based on this representative Parliament of the ruling class. Parliament was where the ruling class threshed out its affairs. Internal government of the country was done for the most part by the powerful families of the ruling class who were supreme in their localities, regardless of which party was formally in Office.

The main business of the State was the conquest of the world. Both parties were in essential agreement about this. The Royal Navy was the chief instrument of the State and the ruling class as a whole disciplined itself into acquiring the skills of seamanship. The execution of an Admiral "*to encourage the others*", satirised by Voltaire in *Candide*, was a serious act of self-discipline by the ruling class. Admiral Byng was judged to have acted timidly, and it was not by timid evasions of opportunities that the world would be conquered.

Before the 1832 Reform the political parties were loose groupings of powerful families. The Tories opposed the Reform but, once it was enacted, they organised themselves into something like what we now know as a political party in order to function in the enlarged electorate, and the Whigs followed suit.

Historically, the Tories derived from the opponents of Cromwell's Puritan Revolution—from the Cavaliers. The Whigs derived from the Cromwellians.

The Tories stood for the Landed interest. The Whigs, while being large landowners, stood for the money interest.

The Tories were in Government at the start of the Irish Famine in 1846 and they took it to be the business of the Government to prevent the Irish populace from starving. The Whigs (often called Liberals by this time) came to Office and, in a resurgence of the Cromwellian spirit, which combined utility with piety, they saw it as their business to assist Providence in its obvious intention of removing the Irish cross which stood in the way of the redemption of the world.

The 1832 middle class was moulded to the political structures of the ruling class, and its more ambitious and successful elements were absorbed into it. An upper stratum of the working class was enfranchised in 1867 and absorbed. The problem of how to admit the mass of the populace to the franchise without having the state threatened by a raw democracy, enthusiastically motivated by illusory expectations, was solved by the Great War.

The Liberal Government, crucially assisted by the Irish Home Rulers, managed to generate a millenarian conviction in the mass of society that this was a war against a powerful force of Evil in the world and that if this Evil force, based in

Prussian Germany, was defeated there would be perpetual peace. Scripturalist Utopianism, which had only been having forty winks beneath the militant Darwinism, revived with redoubled force. But it was the Darwinist, H.G. Wells, who gave the most appealing expression to the illusion of the moment with his pamphlet—his atheist Millenarian tract—*The War That Will End War*.

The unexpected strength of the German resistance led to the intensification of the crusading spirit in Britain. The entire populace was drawn into it. In 1914 *Votes For Women* was out of the question. There was a male apprehension that women stood for some different kind of politics. But the part played by the suffragettes in “white feathering” reluctant men into the army was reassuring and women were given the vote without question by the *1918 Reform Act*, though at a higher age than men for a few years.

British democracy, the most stable in the world, was not established as the realisation of an ideal. It was brought about, under ruling class hegemony, as a long, slow adaptation to changing social circumstances. Each measure of electoral enfranchisement consolidated the power of the existing State. The final measure was organised in a popular atmosphere of Imperialist militarism in the midst of the Great War that was launched by the oligarchy in 1914 and was then embraced by the mass of society.

The Peace Settlement made by the British democracy in 1919 was a very bad settlement because it was driven by the millenarian passion by which the masses had been roused to fight the war. The enemy had been demonised in the course of the war and therefore he was punished rather than settled with at the end of the war. When the ruling class had freedom of action a hundred years earlier, after the defeat of France, it had made France an active party to the post-war settlement arranged by the Congress of Vienna. In 1919 the ruling class was bound by the virtuously vindictive passions of the democracy that had come into being in the course of the war, so the evil enemy was excluded from the peace process. He was plundered and humiliated for the good of his soul, so that the cosmic scales of Justice should be balanced. And he was required to disown

the viable state of the pre-war era and construct a new state according to an ultra-democratic ideal.

The British ruling-class state was altered gradually into a democracy within the structures of state established by the ruling class. The state which the victorious Entente Powers required the German democracy to destroy in 1918-19 was already a democracy in substance—or was at least as much of a democracy as the British Empire was. The new German democracy required of the Germans by their conquerors was without foundations—it was not a further democratic reform of the substantially democratic German state which had been evolving since 1871. The new democracy, repudiating the State through which Germany as a political entity had come into being and developed for close on half-a-century, could only be an ultra-democracy based on first principles. And its task—the task imposed on it—was not to democratise a State but to form a State.

The German Revolution of 1918-19, carried out in the hope of conciliating the victorious Allies, was the true Revolution of Destruction.

The German Republic, proclaimed in the midst of ultra-democratic anarchy early in 1919, was chronically unstable throughout its fifteen years of existence. It never succeeded in becoming an actual State. The powers which need to be combined in a functional State remained dispersed among the populace. Ultra-democracy might be defined as democracy which lacks the essential attributes of a State.

When fascist movements developed amidst the democratic post-war anarchy and one of them established functional States, it was welcomed by the Powers which had precipitated the anarchy by foisting ultra-democratic principles on their defeated enemies which they never applied in their own affairs.

Three generations later—three generations during which the world was occupied by World War, Cold War, and anti-Imperial war—there is a recurrence of a propaganda of dysfunctional ultra-democracy by functional democratic states. A most bizarre idea of democracy was broadcast around the world for the purpose of disintegrating the Libyan State. And, at the moment of writing, every effort is being made to prevent the revolution in Egypt from stabilising itself by establishing a functional State which accords with the outlook of the great bulk of the population.

When Britain detached Egypt from the Ottoman Empire it did not govern it. As Lord Cromer grandly explained, Britain “governed the governors” of Egypt. After the governors of Egypt had been compelled by the British Ambassador to give Britain the use of the country in two World Wars, an Egyptian national movement ousted Britain from the government of the country which it had never governed. It did not need to declare independence: Britain had declared that Egypt was independent under its “government of the governors”. The Egyptian Government was an independent Government that did what it was told by Britain.

In 1972 it stopped doing what it was told. In 1956 Britain entered into conspiracy with Israel and France to invade it and reduce it to subordination. The United States, which was still in Anti-Imperialist mode at the time, threatened to wreck the British economy financially if it did not desist. During the period of substantial independence which followed, Egypt prepared to make war on Israel, an expansionist Jewish colonial state which had been imposed on the Middle East, against the

Irish Foreign Affairs is a publication of
the *Irish Political Review* Group.
55 St Peter's Tce., Howth, Dublin 13

Editor: Philip O'Connor
ISSN 2009-132X

Printers: Athol Books, Belfast
www.atholbooks.org
Price per issue: €4 (Sterling £3)
Annual postal subscription €16 (£14)
Annual electronic subscription €4 (£3)

All correspondence:
Philip@atholbooks.org

Orders to:
atholbooks-sales.org

opposition of all Governments of the region, by a resolution of the UN General Assembly and arms supplied by the Soviet Union and the USA. The assault across the Suez Canal in 1972 almost succeeded, but failed. In the aftermath of failure Egypt was obliged to make peace with the Jewish conquest—a conquest that had spread far beyond the area allocated for a Jewish State by the 1947 UN resolution.

A second period of indirect government followed. This time it was the US that governed the governors. The main business of the domestic government was to secure Israel's border for it on that side, and to prevent the predominantly Muslim character of Egyptian society from determining the conduct of the state.

A middle class stratum which mimicked the Western middle class developed in the shelter of the military rule by which the indirect government was conducted. The military government was not representative of Egyptian society, and the Westernised middle class stratum did not seem to know what Egyptian society was.

The Arab Spring in Tunisia—which ran its course quickly and lightly—found an echo in the flimsy Westernised Egyptian middle class, which seemed to be unaware that it was a dependency of the “tyranny” against which it began to demonstrate.

The “tyranny” was the condition of existence of the socially-detached, hothouse, Western sophistication of this middle class. The social element with relation to which it actually was a tyranny was the 90% majority, which lived its life, underneath the oppressive State, in the social networks of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A year after the Revolution, there is an imminent ‘danger’ of its being consolidated in the form of a viable democracy.

Middle class protest that the revolution is being “hijacked” is being broadcast around the world by the Western media. The BBC has even said who it is being hijacked from: secularists, liberals and Christians.

We do not know to what extent the Christians were active in the revolution. They had a relatively secure niche under the old regime, and their leaders then had a social function as an educated but conservative middle class. It should have been evident to their leaders that their position would not be improved by democratic nationalist revolution. But the Western media, as usual, presented democracy in fantasy terms—and authentic revolution sweeps people along regardless.

As to the secularists and liberals—they had secularism and liberalism under the tyranny.

It is being complained that Morsi, who has taken the revolution in hand to stabilise it in representative structures, is breaking the law by his Decree that he will not allow the Judges set up by the tyranny to pass judgement on the affairs of the elected Constituent Assembly.

The Western media has been full of The Revolution, The Revolution, The Revolution. Suddenly the Revolution is

declared to be in breach of law. But where could the law come from in a revolution, but out of the revolution?

The construction of functional Muslim democracy in Egypt—which is what was always implicit in the revolution—would not be in the Western interest. Permanent revolution, which ran on freely until it exhausted itself in chaos, would. □


The Irish Free Press

by **Brendan Clifford**

Aubane Historical Society 2007

The opponents of the Treaty were utterly defeated in 1923 by the forces of the pro-Treaty party. Yet, within four years, the defeated party was equal in electoral support to the pro-Treaty party and formed the Government of the State five years later.

Effectively, it has remained in power ever since with interludes of coalition governments formed around the pro-Treaty party which has never since won an election in its own right.



This is a phenomenon that needs explaining. It appears to be taken for granted by most historians as if it was all in some way inevitable, even though nothing is inevitable in politics.

This book sets out to explain the crucial elements in the story that saw the formation and emergence of Fianna Fáil and how it first established itself as the major party of the state.

It also looks at the significance of the newspaper it founded, The Irish Press, and its unique contribution to Irish political and social development.

JFK Conspiracy Theories Part 2

by John Martin

In the first part of this series it was suggested that uncorroborated witness statements should be examined with caution. High profile cases attract hoaxers, attention seekers as well as mentally unstable people who genuinely want to help. In the case of the John F. Kennedy assassination the effect was amplified. The intense media coverage accentuated the emotionally charged atmosphere which reverberated throughout America and the rest of the world.

An Imposter?

It was therefore not at all surprising that numerous people came forward to claim they had seen or spoken to Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination. In most cases the sightings of Oswald were at times when he was known to have been somewhere else. The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that the witnesses were either mistaken or seeking attention. But many conspiracy theorists cannot leave it at that. Instead of dismissing such evidence they assume that there was an Oswald imposter.

Anthony Summers in his acclaimed 1980 book *Conspiracy: who killed President Kennedy?* gives the imposter theory an airing. He notes that many of the sightings have "Oswald" acting in a violent way and being accompanied by a Cuban. The theory goes that the purpose of the imposture was to incriminate Oswald and identify him with a left wing cause. In my view this theory is preposterous. Firstly there was so much tangible and real evidence incriminating Oswald, why would a putative conspiracy risk detection by employing an imposter. Also, the real Oswald had established left wing credentials (e.g. defected to the Soviet Union, arrested for pro Castro activities). What more could be achieved by an imposter?

Nevertheless Summers ploughs the imposter furrow. As usual his conclusions are tentative which makes him appear reasonable. Of all the various sightings of Oswald he finds one by Silvia Odio, a Cuban refugee, to be the most plausible.

Three men knocked on Odio's door late at night in Dallas about two months before the fateful day. After the assassination she remembered that one of the men was introduced as "Leon Oswald" and another of the three had phoned her the day after the encounter to say that the Oswald character had advocated the assassination of President Kennedy.

The idea of an imposter seems implausible since in this case "Oswald" was in the company of anti Castro Cubans. So, apparently the imposter would have been discrediting the right rather than the left. But Anthony Summers says that the men involved identified themselves as members of JURA, representing the Social Democratic opposition to Castro. He suggests that there may have been a right wing conspiracy to discredit left wing anti Castro activists! In my view this is risible. Why would the right want to discredit *any* anti Castro

tendency and run the risk of a Government crackdown on *all* anti Castro tendencies.

This incident occurred some time between September 24th and 29th, 1963. The timing makes it unlikely to have been Oswald, but not impossible. Oswald was travelling by bus between New Orleans and Mexico City at around that time. If the person was Oswald he would have needed access to air transport and private transport. This, of course, is grist to the conspiracy mill. It suggests that Oswald was not the left wing loner of popular perception but had friends who had resources.

If it was Oswald, what was he doing with anti Castro activists? It is unlikely that he could have infiltrated an anti Castro group since he had already declared himself publicly to be in the pro Castro camp on radio in New Orleans a month before (17/8/63 and 21/8/63).

The Warren Commission thought Odio was an honest witness, possibly because she had not courted publicity. The FBI only discovered this lead by chance, while investigating something else. However, Anthony Summers does not tell us that the person who vouched for Odio in Warren Commission testimony was her (ahem) psychiatrist. It seems that Odio was prone to severe panic attacks causing her to lose consciousness and was on medication. However, it must be admitted that her sister Ann supported Silvia's evidence, but Ann had only a brief view of the three men from the hall.

The FBI conducted a thorough investigation of this and concluded that three people did indeed visit Silvia Odio at the end of September 1963. Their names were Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard and William Seymour. The source for this was Loran Hall. However, Hall later retracted this story. FBI agent James Hosty believed (1) that the other two threatened Hall since Hall's original story had implicated Seymour (the person Odio believed was Oswald) in a Federal crime (threatening to kill the President of the United States). Incidentally, these three people were right wing anti Castro activists, but may have given the impression they were members of JURA (the organisation that Odio's father belonged to) because the purpose of the visit was to enlist Odio's help in fund raising for the anti Castro cause.

In my opinion the FBI view was correct in this incidence and the Odio sisters were mistaken. The presence of Oswald at the Odio apartment does not make sense in terms of his known behaviour before and after the incident. In New Orleans, a month before, he publicly proclaimed his Marxism and defence of Castro. Within a few days of the Odio incident Oswald was in Mexico city seeking a visa for Cuba.

General Edwin Walker

On April 10, 1963 there was an assassination attempt on General Edwin Walker at his home. If Oswald was

guilty of this act it would have a two-fold significance. Firstly, it confirms his violent disposition. Secondly, it reinforces his left wing credentials. If it is accepted that Oswald was a genuine *homme de gauche*, it makes it highly improbable that he would have been involved in any right wing conspiracy.

General Walker was a right winger, who resigned under the Kennedy administration because he was prevented from propagating his political views to his troops. On his resignation he became active in politics. He was a segregationist and went around the country inciting opposition to racial integration. In February 1962 he finished last of six candidates in a Democratic Primary for Governor of Texas (at that time the Democratic Party was the party of choice for Southern racists). The successful candidate was John Connally who accompanied Kennedy in the Presidential motorcade and was injured by a bullet which first hit Kennedy in the back.

Anthony Summers says that Walker was also passionate in his opposition to Castro (page 246).

There is no doubt that the Walker assassination attempt was a serious one. The shot was fired from outside his home. Fortunately for the General, who was in his study, the bullet hit some lattice work on the window which diverted the bullet causing it to miss his head by an inch.

The evidence for Oswald's guilt is overwhelming. After the Kennedy assassination photographs of the Walker residence and maps were found among Oswald's personal effects. His wife Marina testified that he was absent from their apartment on the night of the Walker assassination attempt. He also told Marina that he had made the assassination attempt and gave details of how he did it. He travelled by bus. After he fired at the General he walked several kilometres hid the rifle and then took the bus home. A few days later he collected the rifle.

Marina told the Warren Commission that on the night of the Walker assassination attempt she discovered a note in Russian giving her detailed instructions as to what to do in the event that he was arrested or killed. Warren Commission experts examined this document and confirmed that the handwriting was that of Lee Harvey Oswald. Although there is no date on the document, details in it concerning rent payments are consistent with it being written at around the time of the Walker assassination attempt.

The bullet which missed Walker was badly damaged and ballistic experts could not establish that it had been fired from Oswald's rifle "to the exclusion of all other weapons". But the firearms panel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) conducted neutron activation analysis and concluded that it was "very likely" that it came from Oswald's 6.5mm Mannlicher Carcano.

On the weekend after the assassination George de Mohrenschildt, one of Oswald's acquaintances, made an unexpected visit to their apartment. Warren Commission testimony from Marina Oswald and de Mohrenschildt indicates that Oswald was shocked when de Mohrenschildt made a joke suggesting that he (Oswald) had shot at Walker. It was obvious that the "joke" had hit the target.

Summers says (page 236) that at a party in February 1963 Oswald had an animated discussion with a German geologist called Volkmar Schmidt. Schmidt compared Walker to Adolph Hitler.

In 1993 many years after Summers' book, a fuller account of Schmidt's conversation with Oswald was given on American television's PBS channel (2).

The conversation began with Oswald being "obsessed with anger" at President Kennedy because of the latter's Bay of Pigs invasion. Schmidt was under the impression that Oswald idealised Cuban socialism while being critical of Soviet socialism. Schmidt responded by saying that the racist General Walker was a more deserving target for criticism than Kennedy. On recalling this in 1993 Schmidt was embarrassed that he might have planted the Walker assassination attempt in Oswald's head.

This conversation is significant for two reasons: it confirms that Oswald had a political motive for assassinating Walker; it also indicates that Oswald had no love for Kennedy. He didn't regard Kennedy as a liberal or on the left, but as a right winger because of the President's anti Castro policies.

All of this is remarkably consistent with Oswald's New Orleans radio interviews in which he describes himself as a "Marxist" but not a "communist" (i.e. not a supporter of the Soviet Union).

Summers is non committal on Oswald's responsibility for the Walker assassination attempt and therefore avoids acknowledging the problem this presents for his putative right wing conspiracies. However, he does focus on evidence of a conspiracy. He says (page 243) that immediately after the gun shot was heard a 14 year old boy, Walter Coleman, peered over a fence and observed two men in a church parking lot adjacent to the Walker residence. One of them left at speed in a Ford. The other was beside a 1958 Chevrolet bending down putting something in the back of the car. Coleman didn't notice this person leaving the parking lot. Whatever about "Ford man", "Chevrolet man" was in no hurry to leave the parking lot. It appears that Coleman thought that the gunshot was the sound of a car backfiring and didn't pay the scene any more attention.

It is only in the footnotes at the end of the book that Summers tells us that there is a conflict between Coleman's evidence – as recorded by the Dallas Police in April 1963 – and the FBI version in June 1964. The FBI report says that "Ford man" left the parking lot at "normal rate of speed". Understandably, the FBI report of June 1964 is more detailed than the Dallas police report of April 1963. The Dallas police were merely investigating an attempted murder, while the FBI was examining a matter related to the assassination of a President.

The FBI estimated that Coleman was looking over the fence about two seconds after the shot was fired. Therefore if his testimony is accurate, neither of the two men could have been at the place where the shot was fired at Walker. Also, neither of the men were in the driver's seat when Coleman first observed them. "Ford man" was behind his car and was "hurrying towards the driver's seat" while "Chevrolet man" was first observed "walking" towards his car. It doesn't seem likely that either car was a "getaway" car since the driver would be expected to be already in the driver's seat. Neither of the two men resembled

Oswald. In my opinion none of them had anything to do with the Walker assassination attempt.

It is also worth noting that when Oswald returned home at about 11.30pm that night and heard a radio broadcast that a boy on the spot had seen one or two cars in the alleyway behind Walker's house, he exploded in laughter and said, "Americans are so spoiled. They think you always have to have a car, whereas I got away on my own two feet" (2).

A Chevrolet features in another aspect of the Walker investigation. One of the items found among Oswald's personal effects was a photograph of a 1957 Chevrolet in the rear of General Walker's house. Someone had cut the registration number of the car out of the photograph. Marina Oswald in her testimony was adamant that the registration number was in the photograph when FBI agents questioned her about it after the assassination. For once Summers believes her testimony.

The obvious conclusion is that the police tampered with the evidence. But what is the significance of this? Summers suggests the possibility that Oswald had accomplices for the Walker assassination attempt. He then quotes the HSCA to the effect that such accomplices could be candidates for the "grassy knoll" shooter of November 22nd, 1963 (page 245).

To put it mildly, this is a leap of the imagination. Is it likely that Oswald would take a picture of his supposed accomplice's car? Would someone involved in the assassination of Walker park his car in what looks like the rear driveway of the General's house? And is it really plausible that such an "accomplice" would be protected by someone within the Dallas police or the FBI?

A more plausible explanation is that someone within the FBI or Dallas police force wanted to conceal the car owner's identity because the latter was an undercover agent. It must be remembered that in April 1963 General Walker would have been considered a far greater threat to the security of the State than the isolated and obscure Oswald.

If protecting the identity of an undercover agent was the purpose of tampering with the photograph it does not appear to have been successful. A political associate of General Walker, Robert Surrey, tentatively identified to the Warren Commission the car owner as Charles Klihr, a political associate of General Walker. Also, in the course of General Walker's Warren Commission testimony Klihr's address and phone number were revealed! Given the speculation concerning the "grassy knoll" shooter it is remarkable that Summers did not seem to be aware of this.

Two years after the Warren Commission completed its work, one of its lawyers, Wesley Liebeler decided to write a book about the Commission's work. He wrote to Charles Klihr asking him if he owned the Chevrolet. Very shortly after Klihr received the letter he passed it on to the FBI's Dallas Office.

The Special Agent in Charge considered it important enough to send a memo to the Director of the FBI (presumably J. Edgar Hoover). The memo concludes by saying:

"The Dallas Office is in complete agreement that no information whatsoever should be given to Mr. Liebeler..." (3)

There are a number of points that arise from this memo. Firstly, if Klihr was not an undercover agent his behaviour was extraordinary. Walker and his political associates were hostile to State institutions. It seems that they had difficulty accepting that their brand of politics was on the losing side of the Civil War! For example, Robert Surrey, said in his Warren Commission testimony that he suspected the Walker's residence had been bugged. He was the only Warren Commission witness who pleaded the fifth amendment (in relation to questions about his distribution of leaflets accusing President Kennedy of treason). It seems inconceivable that a bona fide Walker political activist would immediately pass on correspondence relating to the Kennedy assassination to a federal institution such as the FBI. It also seems extraordinary that he would advise (as if seeking its approval) the FBI that he was not going to respond to Liebeler.

Secondly, the memo confirms that there was no FBI interview with Klihr on file and no intention to interview him. The reference in the third paragraph to reports by FBI Special Agent Robert Gemberling is discreet. The memo does not say if the reports indicate that Klihr was the owner of the car. In fact the reports (Warren Commission exhibit 1066 and 1245) confirm without having interviewed Klihr that he was the owner of the Chevrolet. I can only assume that the FBI did not think it necessary to interview Klihr about something that it already knew about. The general tenor of the memo is to ensure that there is no further discussion of Mr. Charles Klihr.

It seems that the security services continued to take an interest in General Walker long after the Kennedy assassination. In June 1976 this "interest" was reciprocated in an unexpected way: Walker (aged 66 at the time) was convicted of making sexual advances on a male undercover police officer in a Dallas public park!

J.D. Tippit

About forty five minutes after the assassination of Kennedy, Officer JD Tippit was murdered. It is sometimes said that the killing of Tippit is the Rosetta stone of the Kennedy assassination. The police officer was gunned down in a quiet residential Dallas suburb. If it is accepted that the killer of Tippit was in flight from the deed committed in Dealey Plaza, then this culprit must also be the President's assassin.

Anthony Summers approaches the Tippit murder in a similar manner to the Walker incident. He doesn't assert Oswald's innocence but instead looks for evidence of a conspiracy. And, of course, if the Tippit murder is a Rosetta stone, then evidence of a conspiracy in this case would also lead to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President.

At about half an hour after the assassination (i.e. 1.00pm approximately) Oswald arrived at his boarding house. He was the only employee of the Texas School Book Depository who had not returned to work. He quickly changed his clothes and took a gun with him before going out again.

It is unclear what route he took. But about a mile from his boarding house Officer Tippit approached him on East Tenth Street at approximately 1.15pm and four shots struck Tippit. If the time between leaving the boarding house and shooting Tippit was 15 minutes, that would require Oswald to have been walking at a brisk pace of 4 miles an hour. Summers thinks the time was less than 15 minutes. This would require Oswald

either to have run part of the way or taken a lift (suggesting an accomplice because Oswald did not drive). Summers thinks that someone would have noticed Oswald if he had been running. But, in my opinion, this is not necessarily the case. By 1.00pm most people would have been glued to their TV screens as news filtered out about what happened in Dealey Plaza a half an hour before. Secondly, Oswald would have been full of nervous energy at this time. It is conceivable that his brisk walk might have broken in to a run.

There are at least four witnesses that either saw Oswald shoot Tippit or saw him immediately (i.e. within seconds) after the shooting, but Summers chooses to focus on two quite peripheral witnesses: Ms Aquilla Clemons and Mr. Frank Wright. Here is what Summers says about the first of these:

“Mrs. Aquilla Clemons, who was in a house close to the spot where Tippit was killed, told independent investigators she saw *two* men near the policeman’s car just before the shooting. She said she ran out after the shots and saw a man with a gun. But she described him as ‘kind of chunky...kind of heavy’, a description which does not fit Oswald at all.”

Summers then quotes from a filmed interview Clemons had with the famous conspiracy theorist Mark Lane to the effect that the “chunky” and “heavy” man with the gun told another man to “go on” and both men went (presumably by foot) in opposite directions.

There are a number of curious aspects to Clemons’ interview. Firstly, she sees two men near the police car just before the shooting and then runs out after the shots. If she could already “see” the crime scene from the shelter of her house, why was it necessary to run out of her house while bullets had hardly stopped flying? Her behaviour is in marked contrast to the four people who were genuinely close to the crime scene. Helen Markham froze; Domingo Benividez and William Scoggins attempted to hide; Jack Tatum prepared to flee by putting his car in gear.

Secondly, through the magic of the internet we can actually witness Lane interviewing Clemons in March 1966 (almost two and a half years after the event). The first impression of Clemons is that she is kind of “chunky” and “heavy” herself. Summers says that she was also a diabetic. It is a little difficult to imagine the heroic Mrs. Clemons running anywhere, never mind towards the scene of a violent crime.

Thirdly, the Lane interview is not conducted with anything like the rigour of Warren Commission interrogations, whose witness testimony was taken under oath. Clemons is not required to state where precisely the police car was; how far each man was from the police car; from what direction they approached the car; in what direction they fled; how far Clemons was from the scene etc. Clemons’ responses are rather drowsy and vague.

Fourthly, in defence of Summers, it should be said that he helpfully provides a scaled map of where the respective witnesses were. By my calculations Clemons was 70 yards from the crime scene.

Finally, a few words should be said about what Summers calls the “independent investigators” who spoke to Clemons. Such investigators are certainly independent of the State, but

does that suggest that they are “objective”. Mark Lane does not claim to be objective. He has defended himself against criticism that his interviews are replete with leading questions on the grounds that he was Lee Harvey Oswald’s defence counsel. Indeed he tried to overturn the inquisitorial terms of reference of the Warren Commission in favour of an adversarial system in which the deceased Oswald would be, in effect, tried and Lane as defence counsel would have access to all the evidence prior to cross examination.

Summers claims that another witness corroborates the testimony of Clemons. Here is his summary of this witness:

“Frank Wright lived along the street from the spot where Tippit was killed and heard the shots as he sat in his living room. While his wife telephoned for help, Wright went straight to his front door. He later told researchers: ‘I was the first person out’ and caught sight of Tippit in time to see him roll over once and then lie still. Wright also said, ‘I saw a man standing in front of the car. He was looking toward the man on the ground. The man who was standing in front of him was about medium height. He had on a long coat. It ended just about his hands. I didn’t see any gun. He ran around on the passenger side of the police car. He ran as fast as he could go, and he got into his car. His car was a little gray old coupé. It was about a 1950-1951, maybe a Plymouth. It was a gray car, parked on the same side of the street as the police car but beyond it from me. It was heading from me. He got in that car and he drove away as fast as you could see.’”

The first thing to say about this is that it in no way corroborates Mrs. Clemons’ story. Wright only sees one man fleeing the scene. There is no mention of a heavy or chunky man with a gun.

Summers doesn’t tell us precisely how far Wright was from the crime scene, but his scaled map suggests that this witness was at least 90 yards away. It is quite remarkable that Wright, who was sitting in his living room could react so quickly to the shots. He had to rise from his chair; rush to the front door and yet was in time to see Tippit “roll over once and lie still”. The presumed murderer hadn’t begun to escape from the scene, but was still standing in front of Tippit. Wright’s evidence is possible only if he went to the front door before the last bullet was fired. This is conceivable since, as we shall see later, there was a pause between the initial volley of shots and the final shot.

The difficulty with Wright’s evidence relates to the killer’s flight path. No other credible witness claims that the murderer ran to his car and drove off. All the witnesses who were closer to the crime scene saw Oswald with a gun, discharging cartridge cases as he made his escape on foot. Perhaps Wright couldn’t see clearly. The person fleeing the scene was running farther away (i.e. beginning at 90 yards and then farther) from Wright. The police car or other cars might have obscured his view of the person fleeing.

By now it should be clear that there is nothing “democratic” or even “socialist” about witness testimony. All witnesses are not equal. Some witness statements are of practically no value; others can be the key to solving the crime. Also, there is no requirement to be “liberal” or tolerant of diverse views in considering evidence. In cases where one witness contradicts

another witness they both can't be right (although it is possible that they are both wrong).

It is noteworthy that Summers spends hardly any time analysing the statements of witnesses that were closest to the crime scene. The one person who observed the crime from beginning to end was Helen Markham. She was about thirty yards away when she saw Oswald shoot Tippit. To her horror Oswald then proceeded in her direction and was about twelve yards from her before turning left on Patton Avenue. At one stage Oswald fixed her with a stare. Her instinctive reaction was to cover her eyes with her hands.

Summers, quoting Warren Commission counsel Joseph Ball, suggests that Markham was a "screwball". There is no doubt that she was traumatised by what she saw and had to be taken to hospital. Other witnesses corroborated most of her evidence, but her assertion that Tippit was still alive and conscious when she approached him after the shooting tended to undermine her credibility. It also must be admitted that her Warren Commission testimony is very confusing. Frankly, she comes across as a person of low intelligence.

But there are other key witnesses that enable us to know what happened. The Warren Commission heard what appeared to be conflicting evidence concerning Oswald's movements immediately before the shooting. Some witnesses said he was going west before the shooting; others said he was heading east. Dale Myers in the 1993 PBS documentary referred to above (2) resolved the apparent contradiction. Myers' thesis is that Oswald was initially heading west, when he spotted the police car approaching him from the opposite direction. He panicked, did an about turn, and headed east. It was this that aroused the suspicion of Tippit. The police car drove up beside Oswald. We do not know the exact details of the conversation that ensued, but presumably Oswald was asked for identification. The passenger window was open and Oswald was seen with his hands leaning on the door while looking in at Tippit.

Something about Oswald must have disturbed Tippit because he opened the driver's door. As he did this, Oswald stepped back from the passenger window. From opposite sides of the car both men moved forward. Oswald released a volley of shots over the car's front bonnet and into Tippit's body. Tippit had just enough time to take his gun from its holster as he fell to the ground.

Domingo Benavides was driving towards the scene from the east in his pick up truck when he heard the shots. It seems that the natural human reaction to hearing the sound of bullets is to slow down or stop. Three quarters of an hour earlier the President's County Tyrone born chauffeur Bill Greer slowed down when he heard the first shot in Dealey Plaza. Unfortunately, this made the second and third shots easier. Benavides had a similar reaction. Indeed, unlike Greer, he seems to have lost control of his truck and it hit the curb coming to a stop almost directly opposite the shooting as he crouched down in mortal terror.

Jack Tatum had just passed the scene when he heard the shots. He slowed down and looked in his rear view mirror. From the passenger side Oswald walked to the back of the police car and then around to the driver's side where he delivered the coup de grace bullet into Tippit's head. He then walked west. As he approached him, Tatum noticed that the ends of Oswald's lips were upturned in the shape of a smile.

William Scoggins had parked his taxi on the corner of Patton Avenue and East Tenth Street. He was eating his lunch when he heard the shots. His first instinct was to get out of his car because in these situations he knew that it was common for a car to be commandeered in a getaway. Scoggins had no intention of being in the taxi if this happened.

Oswald walked and then trotted in Scoggins' direction, emptying used cartridges and reloading his gun as he went. By this time Scoggins was crouched behind his car. He thought of making a dash across the street, but decided it was too risky. To his enormous relief Oswald cut across the corner, between some bushes and headed south on Patton Avenue. Scoggins was so close that he heard Oswald murmuring either "poor damn cop" or "poor dumb cop". My guess is that the word used was "dumb". Oswald seemed to regard most of his fellow human beings as his intellectual inferiors (4).

When used car salesman and ex marine Ted Callaway heard what he thought were five shots he ran onto Patton Avenue towards the crime scene. He saw the fleeing and armed Oswald on the other side of the street. He shouted across at him, but Oswald went on his way. Callaway asked a Mr B.D. Searcy to follow Oswald while he (Callaway) continued towards the crime scene. Searcy very sensibly felt that chasing an armed lunatic in a Dallas suburb was way above his pay grade and demurred.

Oswald was next sighted on West Jefferson. Johnny Calvin Brewer, a shoe shop manager, saw Oswald behaving suspiciously as police sirens were blaring. He followed Oswald as the latter approached the Texas Theatre. Oswald slipped in without paying.

The police made a search of the theatre and quickly found where Oswald was sitting. Oswald pulled his gun but was quickly overpowered by four policemen.

Ballistic experts couldn't say for certain if the bullets that killed Tippit came from Oswald's .38 revolver. However they could confirm that the four cartridge cases found at the crime scene came from Oswald's gun "to the exclusion of all other weapons".

Summers in his book points to an apparent anomaly in the evidence. Of the four bullets, three were Western-Winchesters and one was a Remington-Peters brand. But of the four cartridge cases found, two were Western-Winchesters and two were Remington-Peters. However, Summers concedes that the Warren Commission "got around the discrepancy" by offering alternative explanations. The first is that five shots were fired (see Ted Callaway's evidence above): three Westerns and two Remingtons. One of the Remington bullets missed Tippit and was never found. Also, one of the Western cartridge cases was never found.

The second, and in my view more plausible explanation is that four bullets were fired; all were accounted for. However, before the shooting began there was an empty cartridge case in Oswald's gun. So, he discharged five cartridge cases at the crime scene (three Winchesters and two Remingtons) even though only four bullets were fired. One of the Winchester cartridge cases went missing. Dales Myers has a discussion of this and other issues on his website (5). He thinks he knows the

identity of the person who kept the missing cartridge case as a souvenir.

All the ballistic evidence points to Oswald's guilt. There was no ballistic evidence suggesting a conspiracy or a killer other than Oswald. Numerous eyewitnesses saw Oswald either at the scene of the crime or fleeing from it. Only two peripheral witnesses dissent from the consensus and these do not in any way corroborate each other. Acquilla Clemons' "chunky" and "heavy" gunman disappeared into thin air, never to be seen again. Frank Wright's man fleeing the scene by car with no gun was never spotted by Clemons or anyone else.

In conclusion the evidence for Oswald's guilt is overwhelming.

Notes:

- 1) <http://www.jfkassassination.net/hosty.txt>
- 2) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/transcripts/1205.html>
- 3) <http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/K%20Disk/Klihr%20Charles/Item%2004.pdf>
- 4) See Warren Commission Testimony of William Stuckey
- 5) <http://jfkfiles.blogspot.ie/2010/12/tippit-murder-why-conspiracy-theorists.html>

John Martin adds:

Gerald Ford, the former president, is on record as saying that the Warren Commission "told the truth, but not the whole truth".

It is very likely that there was a "cover up" in the sense that the CIA did not give the Warren Commission all the information it requested. It is also very likely that the Warren Commission did not publish all the information that the CIA gave them.

However, it does not follow that the CIA or even members of the CIA had any involvement in the assassination of JFK. So, what could the CIA have been covering up?

1) Oswald was a CIA informant/agent

I don't believe this. But as mentioned in the first article I wrote on this subject, it is very likely that George de Mohrenschildt was pumping Oswald for information (he encouraged Oswald to write memoirs) on the Soviet Union and then passing it on to the CIA. So Oswald was an unwitting informant. It would have been embarrassing to the CIA to admit this, indicating it knew more about Oswald than it was letting on.

2) CIA plot to kill Castro

Oswald supported Castro. Any investigation of the JFK assassination would have to investigate Cuba. The CIA did not want to reveal its operations and in particular its plot to kill Castro which was not known at the time.

3) Castro plot to kill Kennedy

I don't believe that Castro had any involvement in the assassination. But the American establishment (particularly the Democratic side) feared that this might be so. If there was any suggestion that Castro (a Soviet ally) had any involvement there was a fear that there would be calls for retaliation (leading to a Third World War). Also Johnson feared that a left wing conspiracy (if discovered) would lead to a Republican landslide in the 1964 Presidential election and a generation of political dominance by the Republicans.

It is very noticeable that Earl Warren's brief was not only to find the truth, but to allay fears and rumours damaging to the interests of the United States. Recent research suggests (not conclusively) that Castro knew about Oswald and his threats to the President (they were made on his visit to Cuba's Mexican embassy in Sept 1963) and did nothing about it. There is some evidence (very inconclusive) that Cuban intelligence was taking a close interest in what was happening in Dallas before the assassination.

The CIA did not want any information to be made available that might point the finger (incorrectly) at Havana.

These articles perhaps read like a "true crime" series. Nevertheless, the JFK assassination has been a cause celebre for the American left as well as the left in other countries and therefore is worth tackling, if only to puncture some illusions. The subject will become more topical next year, which will be the 50th anniversary of the assassination.

There will be two more articles on the subject. The first will cover the Garrison investigation. This was an investigation (or witch hunt) by a New Orleans attorney. It formed the basis of Oliver Stone's well known film. The final article will concern the CIA and its relation to the US state. □

Site for Athol Books Sales:

<https://www.atholbooks-sales.org>

Find out what's new at:

<http://www.atholbooks.org/whatsnew.php>

Clear on Co-Determination But Muddled on Middle-East

by Manus O'Riordan

A report from the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)

When the European Economic and Social Council resumed proceedings after the summer break, two of its initial set of meetings provided contrasting examples of both clear and muddled thinking. The clarity in question was to be found at an extraordinary meeting of the EESC Workers' Group which had been convened on August 28th to express support for a draft report from the European Parliament's Employment and Social Affairs Committee. This report's subject matter deals with the consultation of workers and the taking of effective action in anticipation of company restructuring. On the speakers' panel were the draft's *rapporteur*, the Spanish Socialist MEP Alejandro Cercas, and Judith Kirton-Darling, Confederal Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation.

Alejandro Cercas pointed out that his report was calling on the EU Commission to present to the Parliament a legislative proposal which would apply to restructuring operations covering at least 100 workers in a single company, or 500 employees in a company and its dependent companies in one or more EU Member States. The Cercas report notes that, as a result of the crisis that had unfolded since 2008, the rate of structural change has speeded up sharply, with the number of job losses almost doubling the number of jobs created. The draft report calls for a directive that would require companies to recognise the right of every employee to benefit from appropriate training. Companies should be required to develop, in cooperation with employees' representatives and public authorities, mechanisms that anticipate and plan for future employment and skills needs. It specifically calls for "mechanisms for the long-term planning of quantitative and qualitative employment and skills needs that are linked to innovation and development strategies and that take into account the foreseeable evolution of employment and skills, both positive and negative".

The Socialist *rapporteur* pointed out that even if every Socialist, United Left and Green MEP voted for the report, it would still fall two votes short of being carried. His aim, however, was not just to win over an extra couple of votes, but to seek significant support from MEPs belonging to centre and right parties, with the objective of securing a substantial majority. In my own intervention in the debate, I warmly welcomed his approach. We could no longer be content with risking yet another glorious defeat. The objective was to win a victory. It should not be forgotten that Social Europe had been constructed on the basis of certain values once shared by both the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic traditions. But it was not only a shift towards neo-liberalism among Christian Democratic parties that had caused Social Europe to unravel. The most deadly blow against Social Europe had come from the ranks of Social Democracy, when British Labour Prime Minister Blair formed an alliance with Spanish Conservative Prime Minister Aznar to spearhead the neo-liberal agenda in EU affairs. In working towards a reconstruction of Social Europe, I argued that it was important once again to appeal to what was social in all European political traditions.

I accordingly drew attention to an August 2009 interview with *Die Welt* in which the German Chancellor Angela Merkel had been pointedly asked whether the German system of co-determination (joint decision-making by enterprise management and workers' representatives) was one of the principles of the Social Market Economy that she would like to see extended worldwide. Merkel replied: "*Internationally, German co-determination can't be adopted in a one-to-one correspondence. But a fair cooperation*

of employees' bodies and enterprise leaderships, also an increased participation in the enterprise by employees, this I consider an interesting element which could also be spread wider internationally. We have been told by the unions that even in the ILO, for a long time our unions were laughed at when they said that the principles of the social market economy should be internationally secured. But resulting from the worldwide crisis, this laughter has to some extent disappeared." [Editorial note: See www.angela-merkel.de/page/117_205.htm for the full Merkel interview in German. Its key statements were first translated into English by John Minahane and published in the August 2012 issue of *Irish Political Review*.] The degree of Merkel's own sincerity or insincerity in these remarks is not the main issue here. The fact that she has not since repeated them might lead to the latter conclusion. But the fact that she had to state such principles at all, when asked a direct question on the matter, was evidence that she had to respond to a Christian Democratic constituency that still holds such principles dear. In her reply to the debate, Judith Kirton-Darling pointed out that ETUC's own lobbying on the proposed initiative was indeed almost exclusively concentrated on MEPs from centre and right parties, and she indicated that Merkel's statement would now be used in that regard.

In contrast to such a positive meeting, however, it was regrettable the extent to which muddled thinking was to be found in an EESC information report on the role that should be played by civil society in the implementation of the "partnership for democracy" in the EU's neighbours of the Mediterranean region. This report was presented to a meeting of the EESC's External Relations Section on September 4th. The report spoke of "the Arab Spring which has raised so many hopes and expectations among local communities and has garnered the support of people throughout Europe and across the world". But when it came to specifics, it could only produce the following expression of confusion, referring to "countries where uprisings have already taken place, given what is happening in Syria". In other words, it irresponsibly avoided recognition of the reality of what is actually underway in Syria - a horrific civil war which, fuelled by the foreign intervention of the Western powers and Saudi Arabia, is capable of setting the whole region ablaze.

In the report's chapter entitled "culture, religion, citizenship", one could have no quarrel with its recognition of the reality that in "countries today considered to be Muslim, where Islam is the predominant religion, the religious factor automatically plays a major role in social dynamics, law and politics". But then that chapter proceeded to seek refuge in banal appeals to "interfaith and intercultural initiatives". Being incapable of mentioning the word "Christian" even once, the report put its head in the sand regarding the increasingly sectarian and communal character of that conflict. I pointed out that the Western powers' invasion of Iraq - with the objective of the anti-Baathist "regime change" which it brought about - had led to the destruction of entire Christian communities from the homeland where they had existed from the very origins of Christianity. And where had that Iraqi Christian exodus found refuge? In Syria, to a large extent. But now Syrian Christians themselves were under fire, merely for trying to remain neutral in the current civil war. Such was the fate of Christian communities as "punishment" for the tolerance they had enjoyed under secular Baathist regimes in both Iraq and Syria. I stated that I could not support a muddled EESC report which evaded such issues. The meeting, however, went on to adopt that report, with 59 votes for, 9 against and 13 abstentions. □

Starving the Germans: the Evolution of Britain's Strategy of Economic Warfare During the First World War – The French Connection

by Eamon Dyas

Britain's plan for France.

Shortly after the end of the Boer War two things became clear as far as British policy makers were concerned. Firstly, that Germany was a significant and growing European threat to Britain's commercial hegemony in the world and, secondly, that a war with Germany was inevitable. As a primary element in organising for the coming war it was further recognized that any alliance between France and Germany would be disastrous for British plans and had to be prevented at all costs. British foreign policy was thereafter directed at the prevention of the emergence of such an alliance between Germany and France as a prior condition for the implementation of its war plans.

However, France was important to Britain for other reasons. Although Belgium was to provide the pretext for the forthcoming war, a pretext that enabled Britain to assume the role of gallant rescuer coming to the aid of "poor little Belgium", it was France that provided the means by which Britain could fight its war with Germany almost by proxy. If France could be manoeuvred into bearing the brunt of the physical impact of the war with Germany, Britain's role could be restricted to supplying back-up in terms of man-power and concentrate instead upon the use of its naval power in the strangulation by blockade of German trade and industry. The outcome would be a Europe where Britain's two main competitors would be destroyed or left exhausted and depleted to a level which took them out of the picture for years to come. Until 1911 this was the basis of the thinking behind the Liberal Imperialist early strategy in the forthcoming war. After 1911, in the aftermath of the Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, and the removal of Morocco as an issue between them, British plans for a land war were forced to accommodate a closer relationship with the naval plans for an economic war in order to cover a different eventuality.

The Liberal Imperialist plans were always predicated on the fact that a war with Germany would never take place if it were dependent upon Germany taking the initiative against Britain. Germany had no plans for initiating such a war for a number of reasons. Firstly, its naval programme was always a defensive one designed for the protection of its mercantile fleet from British naval interference. Her post-1900 naval rebuilding programme was based on her experience at the hands of the British Navy during the Boer War when German and United States neutral mercantile ships were systematically intercepted by British naval warships as they went about their business even thousands of miles from the centre of that war. Consequently, Germany was determined to possess a naval fleet of sufficient size to act as a deterrent against a repetition of such actions by the British Navy in the future. At the same time her naval programme was never intended to achieve any kind of parity with the British Navy. Germany regularly acknowledged that the peculiar interests of the British Empire with its territorial possessions across several continents required her having a much larger navy than any other European country. Secondly, Germany's primary ambition was not territorial aggrandisement but the expansion of her commercial and trading activities and consequently its Army was purely a European focused

one. Although it had a large Army it was primarily a conscript army and designed, as Haldane always acknowledged, to fight a European war – a war which was traditionally explosive in nature but of short duration, again acknowledged by Haldane. Thirdly, even if it ever intended to initiate a war with Britain, it was incapable of invading Britain because its Navy never achieved sufficient size or strength to threaten the much larger British Navy nor of undertaking the logistical task of transporting German troops in sufficient numbers across the Channel within the required timescale for an effective invasion – a fact acknowledged by every successive British Government Inquiry in the years leading up to the First World War (the 1908 C.I.D. Invasion Scare Inquiry and the 1909 C.I.D. Inquiry into Beresford's claims both dismissed the reality of a threat of invasion from Germany).

No, if there was going to be a war between Britain and Germany it could not depend on a direct German assault on Britain to trigger it. There had to be a third party catalyst – something that would act as the charge that set off the wider conflagration.

Although British ambitions in Egypt and Persia may have been the major initial impulse behind the signing of the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904 there was also the added consideration of preventing Germany getting a foothold on the Moroccan coast. Protection of the British naval base at Gibraltar had always dictated its outright refusal to permit another significant Power taking up such a position.

It was these combined considerations that compelled Britain to abandon its traditional aloofness from European alliances as well as its pre-existing view of France as a potential enemy when she signed the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904. The diplomatic and military balance between Germany and France was a delicate thing at the start of the twentieth century and Britain was all too aware that by entering into this arrangement with France she was upsetting that balance.

Furthermore, the Anglo-French military negotiations that began in 1905 as a direct result of the Moroccan arrangements inherent in the *Entente Cordiale* were fashioned by British support for a particular section of French politics - the section which was aggressively colonialist, anti-German and eager for the annexation of Morocco and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. But there were significant elements which did not share such sentiments, which were less aggressively colonial and viewed the Alsace-Lorraine issue as of diminishing importance – in other words, the section which saw the future of France in terms of a closer economic relationship with Germany. But in order to advance her strategic alliance Britain chose to place herself in opposition to this alternative expression and as a consequence became directly involved in French politics in a very partisan manner. Britain now had a direct investment in ensuring that the French political expression which coincided with its own anti-German agenda either maintained command of government or, in those circumstances where it did not directly control the levers of State, to assist it as an effective disruptor of

any movement of French politics too far away from the position required by British interests.

But sustaining such a position was a difficult thing to achieve over time. The nature of the initial war plans of the Liberal Imperialists meant that, although committed to render military support to France, knowledge of such plans was restricted to the armed forces and a small number of politicians of both countries. This proved more problematic for the French political allies of the Liberal Imperialists than for themselves in Britain. From the time of the arrival of the Liberal Imperialists in government in 1905 to the declaration of war in 1914 France went through twelve different governments. This in itself compromised both the extent and depth of knowledge of British military intent among the political decision makers in government at any one time. The relative volatility of French politics was also something that the Liberal Imperialists had to take into account in their planning with the French army. The problem was compounded by the fact that French politics operated along lines of ever-changing blocks of deputies rather than political parties of the British type and this made it impossible for circles of inner knowledge to emerge in the same way as they did in Britain. Consequently potential political allies of the British war party in France were often in the dark as to the current state of military planning or the level of commitment of the Liberal Imperialists at any given time. But in the face of such difficulties there was another side of French politics which provided Britain with an alternative channel by which it could influence events and that was the traditional nature of French colonialism and its relationship with the central French government.

“It is a commonplace of colonial history throughout the ages that policy at the outposts of empire tends to escape the control of the central government. What is remarkable in the French case, however, is the degree to which colonial policy even at the centre was not decided by central government. During the final phase of French expansion the abdication of government control in Paris was even more striking than at the periphery. Because the official mind of French imperialism was so weak, the unofficial mind possessed for thirty years an influence to which it could not aspire in England. That unofficial mind was known to contemporaries as *le parti colonial*, the French colonialist movement.” (*The French Colonialist Movement during the Third Republic: the unofficial mind of Imperialism*, by C.M. Andrew, read at the Society’s Conference 19 September 1975. Published as part of the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, fifth series, Vol. 26, 1976, pp.143-144).

The disjointed relationship between French colonial policy and central government proved to be an ideal environment where the war agenda could be nurtured along the required lines. The “unofficial minds” which flourished in the world of French colonialism were receptive to this agenda and could be brought along in the wake of the war planning of the French and British general staffs. But they could also be extremely useful when the requirements of that agenda necessitated the political disruption of any movement within French politics which had the potential of generating more friendly relations with Germany. In those instances the issue of Alsace-Lorraine or Morocco could be stirred up as reliable obstacles in the way of such developments. This was possible because, as we shall see later, the separate world of French colonial politics from French parliamentary politics did not preclude an overlap in personnel between the two arenas.

However, the Liberal Imperialists soon found that it was not a simple matter of creating conditions of instability through the support and underpinning of the colonialist and anti-German element in French politics. It was not enough to simply prime the political charge and then wait for the inevitable provocation to stir the German bear into a response. To ensure the potency of its creation Britain found that she had to nurture and sustain those elements in French politics which best served the Liberal Imperialist agenda and this left her own strategy open to changes demanded by the requirements of the evolving situation in French colonial and parliamentary politics.

Nations are complex organisms and even political expressions within their body politic are complex things. Britain had not allowed for the possibility of French colonialists’ ambitions seeing any coincidence of interests with German finance, nor had she calculated that many of her erstwhile allies in French politics would end up, in the aftermath of the 1911 Agadir crisis, turning on her on account of Britain’s continued support of a Spanish presence in Morocco.

The French strategy of the Liberal Imperialists was dependent upon the continued inability of France and Germany to navigate their way through the cultural and historical minefields of Franco-German relations. Then, in the face of British obstruction and to her astonishment, such a thing was very much on the cards in 1909 when the growing commercial entente between Germany and France compelled the Liberal Imperialists to begin the process of adding muscle to the French component of the British plans for war in order to inject more resolve into their French anti-German allies. It could no longer get away with what many French colonialist politicians had come to believe as merely a verbal commitment to a military investment in France. A strong restatement of its military commitment was the minimum that was required to reassure its French political allies of its seriousness. It had become a matter of chronic necessity not only to bolster the fortunes of the French imperial party at a time when it began to lose its way but also to provide the previously sceptical part of French politics (in 1909 represented by Clemenceau and later by others) with proof of a sufficient commitment to war by Britain to move it away from the path of Franco-German rapprochement.

Consequent upon this new situation, after 1909 the initiative within the British Committee of Imperial Defence and among the Liberal Imperialists began to take more account of the need of how its position was perceived among its natural allies in French politics. The fear of the growing misdirection of the French colonial party and the continuing pro-German momentum of the sceptical element grabbed the attention of the British Liberal Imperialists like never before. This is part of the background of the resultant ‘struggle for supremacy’ in 1911 between what has been called the two alternative British strategies for war. But, as has already been argued there was no serious “struggle for supremacy” between the Schleswig-Holstein and the War Office plans as the continued existence of both after 1906 can only be understood as part of the British plan for minimal troop commitment to mainland France. Rather it was the evolving situation in French politics after 1909 that compelled the C.I.D. and the Liberal Imperialists to adopt a more open commitment to the strategy of involvement on French soil at this time.

France and empire.

France was placed in an impossible position by the British Liberal Imperialists’ reckless pursuit of their war agenda. It was France that was meant to bear the main burden of its realisation and, in the interim, it was France that was placed in

the precarious position of supplying the necessary provocation of Germany. This created a volatility in French foreign policy towards Germany that helped sustain the political instability in Europe making any outcome other than war highly unlikely. But, although unlikely, war need not necessarily have been the outcome. Events were to prove that, even in the face of British mischief making, it was quite possible for France to have achieved her imperial ambitions in North Africa without coming into armed conflict with Germany. The problem was that the behaviour of the British Liberal Imperialists encouraged the aggressive French colonialist element in ways which diverted the balance of French politics from the direction that might have made any accommodation with Germany possible and towards the route charted by the combined influence of residual nationalist resentment over Alsace-Lorraine and French imperial ambitions.

By the end of the nineteenth century the race for empire was reaching the end of its course. There were some additional imperial adventures to come but the main imperial issues that remained related to inter-Imperial differences over borders and levels of administration within the imperial territories. Germany, being late to enter the race had to content itself with what the other Powers had failed to pick up or what it could negotiate in terms of shared interests. The main territorial empires of Europe were those of Britain and France and both countries continued to haggle over the boundaries of their respective territorial claims in such places as Madagascar, Siam and of course Egypt. At this time, Germany, although still interested in picking up what it could in terms of a territorial empire, was compelled to invest its main energies not in territorial expansion but in commercial and industrial activities. However, it began to excel in these areas at around the same time that Britain was taking cognisance of the fact that it was precisely such areas of commercial and industrial activities that represented the mainspring of its own future wealth. The responsibilities of empire in terms of territorial occupation had been a drain on resources for some time but as long as other imperial powers shared a similar burden the relative competitiveness of British commerce and industry remained intact (at this time the U.S.A., the rising star of world trade, was only beginning to reveal the benefits of being unburdened by the responsibilities of a territorial empire). But here, for the first time, in the form of Germany, was a European nation which, relatively freed from such burdens and by concentrating on industrial and commercial development could very quickly overtake Britain's supremacy in world trade and markets.

Britain, on the other hand, was not prepared to deal with the relative decline in the economic advantages of territorial imperialism by simply discarding its possessions. These possessions, although diminishing in importance, continued to offer significant economic advantages in terms of the supply of raw materials and markets for British manufacture and in any case its empire had come to represent something existential in its sense of who and what it was as a presence in the world. Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, its global possessions, helped service and sustain the British Navy's ability to protect the country's trading interests. Coaling stations, maintenance harbours and safe havens, were critical necessities for a navy the size of Britain's and it was its Navy that ensured it maintained control over much of the world's trade routes. For these reasons Britain continued to aggressively defend its possessions against domestic resistance and encroachment from other imperial Powers while at the same time refusing to bode any challenge to its commercial and trading supremacy.

France was an imperial power which did not have such widespread responsibilities and one which did not have the same existential relationship with its empire. Britain's sense of itself was expressed through its Empire and filtered through a belief in an unbroken chosen mission going back more than 300 years. This was a sense of mission free from time and place and one which was not only about trade but also about bringing its version of civilisation to the world. Its bounty to the uncivilised world came in the form of Christianity. It was not about to make the subject people British – as a chosen people that was not in Britain's gift - but it could make them Christians. The ideal thing of course was to colonise the occupied territories with British settlers – the basis of the Greater Britain thinking – but that was only possible where certain conditions prevailed. The demographics of India and much of her African empire made such a thing impossible as there is only so much genocide that one nation can inflict. If it could not eliminate a population it could at least tap its resources. Of course the basic economics of the relationship was disguised in terms of bringing Christianity to peoples that had been let loose in the wilderness. It was this paternalistic relationship with its empire that inculcated a sense of worth among the constituent classes of Victorian Britain. Even the lowly working class could content itself with the knowledge that it was still British and there were other, less fortunate, souls in the empire who could only aspire to be Christians.

France, on the other hand, had a more prosaic relationship with its empire. It did not view its subject people through the lens of religion – it had nothing to give them except itself. Religion in France did not occupy the same position in civic society as it did in Britain and had not informed its outward march on the world in the same way. France introduced itself to its subject people and offered them the chance to be like France. It may have believed itself to be a chosen people but that recognition was not something that had been bestowed on it – it bestowed it on itself. Consequently it was not constrained in how it could dispense its specialness as there was no dispensing authority above it. However, this relationship of relative equality in specialness with its subject people was incapable of generating and sustaining the sense of superiority that the British relationship achieved. But that was never the purpose of the thing. To France, the primary purpose of its empire was to enable it to retain prestige in Europe. It was not about the business of bringing Christianity (although there was a strand based on such motivation) or trade to its subject people. It held territory primarily because it believed it gave it influence in Europe. For that reason France's relationship with its empire produced nothing like the social cohesion that was apparent in Britain at this time – its working class could not look out to its empire and see less fortunate souls in the same way as their British counterparts. But because its relationship with imperialism was deficient in the proselytising drive of religion or the same level of acquisitive trading impulse as that in Britain the French imperial cause had to be advanced through the formation of political organisations created to make their cause heard.

Consequently, from the point of view of economic considerations, France's relationship with its empire did not generate the great chartered trading companies such as Britain's East India Company or the Imperial East Africa Company. The main body which sought to infuse French sentiment with the British colonial spirit was the *parti colonial* and:-

“Its only major economic campaign during the 1890s was for the creation of chartered companies on the British model, and even that was by no means completely successful. Although the campaign began in 1891, the Congo was not given over

to concessionary exploitation until 1899, and by 1905 the experiment was generally recognized to have failed.” (The French ‘Colonial Party’: its Composition, Aims and Influence, 1885-1914, by C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner. Published in *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1971, p.102).

The French capitalist class was also not interested in colonial enterprise to the same extent as in Britain:-

“As the colonialists complained, the most characteristic attitude of French business towards colonial expansion was indifference. In 1914 French investment in Russia alone was almost three times that in the whole French Empire. French trade with the Empire, on a percentage basis, was a third of what it had been before the Revolution. Colonialist visions of economic eldorados in such unlikely places as Bahr-el-Ghazal and Lake Chad had little appeal for cautious-minded French businessmen. The parti colonial viewed with a recurrent sense of outrage the failure of French business to perceive its imperial mission. . . .” (The French Colonialist Movement during the Third Republic: The Unofficial Mind of Imperialism, by C. M. Andrew. Published in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fifth Series, Vol. 27, 1976, pp.146-147).

Besides the belief that its empire gave it influence in Europe there was the added belief among sections of the French establishment that territorial expansion was something which offered the nation a form of redemption in the aftermath of the debacle of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

“The French colonialist movement represents the highest stage, not of French capitalism, but of French nationalism. For its supporters during the first generation of the Third Republic colonial expansion was, first and foremost, the road to national recovery after the traumatic defeat of 1870. During the final years of the Second Empire, Prevost-Paradol had argued that faced with the rapid expansion of Bismarckian Prussia, on her eastern border, France could remain a great power inside Europe only by expansion outside Europe: in particular by building an African Empire on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. This argument became more compelling after the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian War.”(ibid., p.148).

Because commercial considerations did not play such a pivotal role in decisions relating to territorial expansion, France ended up with an empire that by the end of the nineteenth century was even more of a drain on resources than was the case with Britain.

“The European rivalries born of the African partition strengthened still further the colonialist concern with French prestige. The further the scramble for Africa continued, the more the colonialists became obsessed with beating their European rivals in the race for what remained, and the less attention they paid to the value – if any – of the territory they claimed.” (ibid., p.149).

It is difficult to view Britain historically as Britain without its empire but it is possible to view France historically as France without an empire. Empire was not an intrinsic part of France’s sense of itself as a coherent national entity. In other words, empire was not a continuum in French national identity whereas it was, and remains, as far as Britain was concerned. Insofar as it commanded any support in the wider French society it was because it had become tied in with the rebuilding of prestige in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war. Consequently, because of its association with issues of national prestige most politicians expressed an adherence to the *idée coloniale* without

possessing a colonising mentality. However, within that term there was a wide divergence of belief and attitude. In most cases, adherence to the colonial ideal was merely nominal but when it was taken seriously the logic of its situation inevitably brought France into conflict not with Germany but with Britain. Britain had been an unofficial ally of France during the Franco-Prussian war (as a supposed neutral in that conflict she took advantage of that position to supply France with war materials on an almost industrial scale—something that informed German attitudes during the Second Hague Peace Conference). As a result of this unofficial relationship, in the immediate aftermath of Franco-Prussian war, although Britain remained an opponent of France in the field of empire building, expressions of anti-British sentiment became somewhat muted. Attitudes however began to change at the latter end of the nineteenth century as France began to invest more energy in its task of empire building and as a result kept coming up against Britain as its main protagonist.

Gabriel Hanotaux was an expression of this situation. He was an intellectual politician and historian (he wrote a number of histories including a 17-volume history of France). Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of May 1894 in the Dupuy Cabinet, with the exception of a ten month period between the end of January and beginning of November 1895, he remained Foreign Minister of France until 14 June 1898. During his time he set out to delimit the French empire and establish a new relationship with Russia. His was also a period when French policy was one which sought closer relations with Germany. Because the appetite for French territorial expansion was related to its desire to re-establish national prestige in the aftermath of the 1870-71 war with Prussia, the relationship with Germany was problematic and the attitude of Hanotaux to Germany all the more indicative of a significant shift in French perspectives at least among certain sections of the political elite.

What happens after Hanotaux in terms of French foreign policy remained a problem for British establishment historians after the end of the First World War. Ostensibly Britain went to war as an ally of France and Russia and to justify the horrors and mayhem that resulted from this alliance it was necessary to recast France as a long-time loyal friend of Britain and Germany as the long-time treacherous enemy. But of course the recent history between these countries was far more complex. Both France and Germany possessed an inconvenient history after Hanotaux. Although the assistance provided by Britain to France during the Franco-Prussian war provided some grounds for the belief that France was the friend of Britain (many French refugees found a haven in England during that war and *The Times* at one point even produced an issue of the paper in which almost all the classified advertisements on its front page were in French) the general thrust of French politics was always, at the least, suspicious, and at most, hostile to Britain. According to the 11th edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Hanotaux’s “distrust of England is frankly stated in his literary works.” Hanotaux recognised Britain as the main threat to French interests. Notwithstanding his subsequent role as French propagandist during the First World War at this time he remained identifiably anti-British. Incidentally, “in his history of the war, Gabriel Hanotaux tells of a conference with the late Robert Bacon, then a member of the Morgan [banking] firm, in 1914, in which he and Bacon drew up plans and specifications for a great scare campaign in this country [the U.S.A. – ED]. Hanotaux also suggests that France was ready to make peace in 1914, but was dissuaded by Bacon and other American politicians, who gave assurances that they would ultimately bring American into the war on the side of France.” (see: *Shall It Be Again*, by John

Kenneth Turner. Published by B.W. Huebsch, inc., New York, fourth printing, November 1922, pp.260-261).

From the point of view of a consistent British post-war historical perspective it was therefore necessary to re-invent the role of Hanotaux's successor, Theophile Delcassé, the man viewed as the architect of the 1904 Entente Cordiale, and recast him as the great friend of Britain—the man whose arrival on the scene represented the new dawn of cordiality between the two countries—and this is precisely how he came to be depicted. Unfortunately for British propagandists Hanotaux's legacy was not based on something transient, a temporary hiccup in the warm relationship between Britain and France. It represented the default position and it continued to inform French foreign affairs after he had been replaced by Theophile Delcassé.

The problem of history.

A multi-volume history of the world was published a short number of years after the end of the First World War. The series was entitled *The Nations of Today: a new History of the World* and was edited by the writer and Director of Information and propagandist during the war, John Buchan. In an interesting general introduction Buchan states the purpose of the series:

“The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man's ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have ‘closed up.’

Buchan explains the importance of history and the importance of ensuring the continuity of history. The new post-War world with its re-questioning of the past and its new constituency of citizenship needed a way to understand foreign affairs in terms of an inherited history - a history which provides a consistency of narrative between the world before the First World War and the world which came after that war and anything that breaks that consistency cannot be viewed as legitimate history. Buchan goes on to explain the fact that history can be viewed from different perspectives and the danger that comes from two perspectives in particular. These perspectives he describes as emanating from a belief in ‘political man’ on the one hand, and of ‘economic man’ on the other:

“Take two familiar conceptions, the ‘political man’ and the ‘economic man.’ Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the ‘economic man’ is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.” (France: the Nations of Today: a new History of the World, edited by John Buchan, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, [1923], General Introduction, p.iii).

These two creeds are epitomised by Prussianism and Bolshevism and both are invalid because they are un-historical.

“We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly un-historical, that they have been framed without any sense of

the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen is regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrenders his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He has no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It was also a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age that creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that ‘counsels of (ibid., p.iii-iv).

Thus, according to Buchan, Prussianism and Bolshevism represented ongoing forces that may in the future take on different guises but essentially they represented one side in an eternal fight between those who seek to ensure the continuity of history and those that would seek to fracture that continuity. History, of course, is a moveable feast. What is deemed to be history from one perspective is not necessary the same history when viewed from a different perspective. What concerned Buchan was that Britain's version of history would be the one which gained the status of inherited truth across all perspectives. In counter-position of his ‘political man’ and the ‘economic man’ as the focus for errant false histories Buchan posits what could be defined as British “liberal man”, a perspective which views the events of history as the best outcomes from all possible outcomes made real by Britain's role in the world. The continuity of history is measured as something that is consistent with Britain pursuing her own interests because such interests always coincide with the best interests of mankind at large whether mankind at large recognises it as such or not. □

UN recognises Palestine as a state

by David Morrison

On 29 November 2012, Palestine won an historic victory at the UN when the General Assembly voted by an overwhelming majority – 138 in favour to 9 against, with 41 abstentions – to recognise Palestine as a state, in the teeth of bitter opposition from Israel and the US.

The defeat for Israel and the US was even worse than it appears at first glance because only 3 significant states (Canada, Czech Republic and Panama) sided with them in rejecting the proposition. The other 4 votes against came from the Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, and Palau, all tiny south Pacific island states that are dependent on the US.

More significant still, Israel has lost more ground in Europe, which a few years ago Israel could rely on for support. Only one EU state (Czech Republic) backed Israel, 14 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) voted to recognise Palestine as a state, and the other 12 abstained.

(The UN press release GA/11317 [1] gives details of the proceedings and of the voting, which is reproduced below).

A Reuters report by Crispian Balmer summarised the outcome as follows:

“The margin of Israel's defeat in a UN vote that granted de-facto statehood to Palestine has disappointed Israeli political leaders, whose attempts on Friday to play down the result could not disguise its significance. ...

“But the fact only three major countries sided with Israel at the world forum on Thursday - the United States, Canada and the Czech Republic - underscored how isolated it has become on the international stage regarding peacemaking with the Palestinians.

“Even old friends like Germany refused to stand alongside us. There were external factors, but it is hard not to see this as a total failure for our diplomacy which will obviously have consequences’, said a senior official who declined to be named.” [2]

Full membership applied for

The events at the UN on 29 November 2012 were the culmination of a process that began at the UN on 23 September 2011. On that date, President Mahmoud Abbas made a formal application for full UN membership for a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, that is, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian territories which have been under Israeli military occupation since June 1967.

Had that application been successful, Palestine would have become the 194th UN member state, recognised at the UN like any other, despite the fact that it is wholly occupied by another UN member state. However, to be successful, the application required

- a positive recommendation by the Security Council to the General Assembly, and
- a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (that is, two-thirds of the members present and voting, excluding abstentions).

The application was always going to fall at the first hurdle and never reach the General Assembly, because the US announced long in advance that it would veto a positive recommendation in the Security Council. In the event, no vote was taken in the Security Council and the US didn't have to cast its veto.

Non-member state fallback

Palestinians always had a fallback position, which was to seek observer rights at the UN as a "non-member state", a status which has in the past been a stepping stone to full membership, for example, for West Germany (1952-1973), South Korea (1949-1991) and Switzerland (1946-2002). This step does not require the approval of the Security Council and therefore could not be blocked by the US. It merely requires a simple majority in the General Assembly.

That was achieved on 29 November 2012 when the General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/67/19 [3] by 138 votes to 9. Paragraph 1 and 2 of this resolution states that the General Assembly:

“1. Reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967;

“2. Decides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations ...”

The resolution notes that 132 UN member states have “accorded recognition to the State of Palestine”. A further 30 or so states, including Ireland, while not going as far as recognition, have established some form of diplomatic relations with it. It wasn't surprising, therefore, that 138 states voted for the only form of recognition at the UN that was available, namely, as a "non-member state". It was surprising, however, that so few states voted against.

Support for full membership?

In Paragraph 3, the resolution also expressed the hope “that the Security Council will consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the United Nations”.

That is a message from the General Assembly to the Security Council to recommend full membership and indicates that the General Assembly would vote for full membership, if it were to receive such a recommendation.

Most likely, Ireland would have voted for full membership for Palestine had that opportunity presented itself. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2011, Foreign Minister, Eamon Gilmore, said:

“The day will come, not too far off, when the General Assembly will be asked to vote on a proposal to admit Palestine as a member of this Organisation or perhaps, as an interim step towards the achievement of that goal, to accord Palestine non-member observer state status. Provided that the resolution is drafted in terms that are reasonable and balanced, I expect Ireland to give its full support.” [4]

On 29 November, Ireland voted with 137 others for the “interim step”.

What does upgrade mean?

What will observer rights at the UN as a “non-member state” mean in practice for Palestinians?

At the UN itself, there will be very little change. As far back as 1974, the UN General Assembly recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as “the representative of the Palestinian people” and granted it observer rights at the UN. Prior to the present upgrade, Palestine had a permanent mission at the UN with observer rights, but as a liberation movement, not as a state.

Becoming a "non-member state" recognised by the UN means that Palestinians will continue to have observer status but now as a state, with a territory – the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip – recognised by the UN.

This is a firm statement from the nations of the world that there should be a Palestinian state in all of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 – and that Israel should withdraw to allow one to be established.

Palestine may join UN-related bodies

Being a “non-member state” will allow Palestine to apply for full membership of other UN-related bodies (about 20 in all), for example, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The US cannot veto any of these applications, so it is odds on that any application would succeed.

Already, in November 2011, Palestine was admitted to full membership of UNESCO, even though at that time it wasn't

recognised as a state by the UN (see Sadaka Briefing *Palestine wins UNESCO membership* [5]).

This event would have been of little significance, if it wasn't for the fact that there is legislation on the US statute book, enacted at the behest of Israeli lobby in the US, which compels the US to halt its funding of UN-related bodies if Palestine is admitted to full membership. The legislation allows the US President no discretion in this matter.

As a result, the US has been forced to withdraw its funding to UNESCO and it may lose its voting rights in UNESCO in a year's time (see Reuters report *UNESCO chief says U.S. funding cuts "crippling" organization* dated 11 October 2012 [6]).

If Palestine is admitted to other UN-related bodies, then, without a change in this legislation, the US will have to withdraw funding from these bodies as well, and perhaps lose voting rights as a result.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

Now that Palestine has been recognised as a state by the UN, is it possible that individuals could be prosecuted by the ICC for crimes carried out in Palestinian territory, that is, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza?

The ICC can prosecute individuals for (1) genocide, (2) war crimes and (3) crimes against humanity, as defined in the Rome Statute of the Court [7]. The ICC acquires jurisdiction in respect of these crimes by states granting it jurisdiction under Article 12 of the Statute. A state can grant jurisdiction to the Court

- (a) by becoming a Party to the Statute (Article 12(1)) or
- (b) by making an ad hoc declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction (Article 12(3)).

The ICC can try individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed in the territories of states that have granted the Court jurisdiction.

In January 2009, prompted by Israeli actions against Gaza during Operation Cast Lead, the Palestinian Authority made an ad hoc declaration to the Court under Article 12(3) in the following terms:

“In conformity with Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Government of Palestine hereby recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court for the purposes of identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed in the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002” [8].

It took the ICC Prosecutor over three years (until April 2012) to decide that the Court couldn't accept the jurisdiction offered. This decision hung on whether or not Palestine was a “state” within the meaning of Article 12(3), which says that a “State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question”.

Strangely, the Prosecutor concluded that it wasn't up to him/her to decide whether or not Palestine was a "state", within the meaning of Article 12(3), saying that "competence for determining the term "state" within the meaning of article 12 rests, in the first instance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, in case of doubt, will defer to the guidance of General Assembly" [9].

After the General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/67/19 accepting Palestine as a state, the Prosecutor's office announced that it "will consider the legal implications of this resolution" [10]. It is possible therefore that the Court will amend its original response and accept jurisdiction in the occupied Palestinian territories without further ado.

Alternatively, Palestine can become a Party to the Statute, which under Article 125 merely requires an instrument of accession to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who will be the arbiter of whether Palestine is a "state" within the meaning of Article 12(1). Given that Palestine has been accepted as a state by the UN, it is almost certain that the answer would be YES.

Can individuals be prosecuted?

Assuming the ICC acquires jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories, can it prosecute individuals for offences carried out there? Normally, the primary duty for prosecuting these offences lies with the state in which they were committed – and the ICC only acquires jurisdiction to prosecute them if the state fails to do so. In this instance, however, it is impossible for the state to do this, since it is wholly under Israeli military occupation.

Assuming this isn't a problem, for what activities might individuals be prosecuted? One activity springs to mind immediately, namely, settlement building: under Article 8.2(b) (viii) of the Rome Statute

"the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" [7]

is a war crime.

Since there is no doubt that some 500,000 Israeli civilians have been transferred into territory occupied by Israel, and the process is still going on, there is a prima facie case that Israelis responsible for the settlement building programme, including the present Prime Minister, are guilty of war crimes. It may be that Americans and others who fund settlement building are guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes.

In order to try an indicted individual, the ICC has to get custody of him/her, which would be difficult in this instance, since neither Israel nor the US is a Party to the Rome Statute and is therefore under no obligation to hand over an indicted individual to the Court. However, 121 states (including all 27 EU members) are, so indicted individuals would need to be careful about their travel arrangements.

UK opposes prosecution for war crimes

If the ICC acquires jurisdiction over Palestinian territories, there is at least a possibility that those responsible for settlement building are brought to trial for what the whole world, apart from Israel and the US, regards as illegal activity.

One would expect that states, like the UK, which accept the jurisdiction of the ICC themselves would be enthusiastic about extending its jurisdiction to the occupied Palestinian territories and seeking to bring to justice individuals responsible for activities that constitute a crime under the Rome Statute.

Yet, prior to the General Assembly vote, the UK Foreign Minister, William Hague, offered to support the resolution, if the Palestinians promised, amongst other things, not to seek ICC jurisdiction over their territory. Here's what he told the House of Commons on 28 November 2012:

"Our country is a strong supporter, across all parties, of international justice and the International Criminal Court. We would ultimately like to see a Palestinian state represented throughout all the organs of the United Nations. However, we judge that if the Palestinians were to build on this resolution by pursuing ICC jurisdiction over the occupied territories at this stage, it could make a return to negotiations impossible." [11]

It could also bring individuals responsible for war crimes to justice. Happily, the Palestinian leadership did not assent to this request, and the UK abstained in the vote.

Two days later, when in retaliation for the UN action, Israel announced plans for yet more building in settlements, William Hague reacted as follows:

"I am extremely concerned by reports that the Israeli Cabinet plans to approve the building of 3000 new housing units in illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israeli settlements are illegal under international law and undermine trust between the parties." [12]

Dare we suggest that, if settlements are illegal under international law, then, if at all possible, those responsible should be tried in an international court and, if found guilty, punished appropriately? Dare we suggest that, to that end, Palestine should be encouraged to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC?

Conclusions – why should there be negotiations about ending an occupation?

It goes without saying that UN recognition of Palestine as a state will not change conditions on the ground for Palestinians. It may even make them worse as Israel responds in its usual vindictive manner against Palestinians, and the international community stands idly by and allows it to happen.

The opponents of the Palestinian UN initiative have kept repeating the mantra that the only way for Palestinians to get a state is not via the UN but by entering into direct negotiations with Israel.

But Israel is not going to withdraw of its own volition from the territories it has occupied militarily since 1967, so that a

Palestinian state can come into being. And it is impossible for Palestinians to make Israel withdraw by direct negotiations or any other means – they are powerless to prevent Israel expanding settlements indefinitely, let alone to bring an end to Israeli military rule. Without outside pressure being applied to Israel to make it end its military occupation, a Palestinian state is unattainable.

Negotiations of this kind are equivalent to allowing a thief to negotiate with his victim about the amount of stolen goods, if any, he is going to give back, while he keeps his boot on his victim's throat. Without outside pressure being brought to bear on the Israeli thief, the Palestinian victim is not going to get any of its stolen goods back.

Of course, if the Security Council were doing its job, Israel would be convicted of theft and sanctions imposed on it, until such times as it returned all the stolen goods and paid reparations for all the damage it did to them while they were in its possession. After all, that's what was done to Iraq when it invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990.

References:

- [1] www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm
- [2] uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/uk-palestinians-israel-isolation-idUKBRE8AT0Q220121130
- [3] unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/181c72112f4d0e0685257ac500515c6c
- [4] www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=87146
- [5] www.sadaka.ie/Articles/Briefings/BRIEFING-Palestine_wins_UNESCO_membership.pdf
- [6] www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/us-unesco-funding-idUSBRE89A0Q620121011
- [7] www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf
- [8] www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf
- [9] www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf
- [10] www.timesofisrael.com/international-criminal-court-to-consider-implications-of-un-vote-on-palestine/
- [11] www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121128/debtext/121128-0001.htm
- [12] www.fc.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=840600682

Vote on Status of Palestine at United Nations

The draft resolution on the Status of Palestine at the United Nations was adopted by a recorded vote of 138 in favour to 9 against, with 41 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States.

Abstain: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, United Kingdom, Vanuatu.

Absent: Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Liberia, Madagascar, Ukraine. □

Ireland on the UN Human Rights Council.

Ireland was elected on the United Nations Human Rights Council in November 2012, alongside Argentina; Brazil; Ivory Coast; Estonia; Ethiopia; Gabon; Germany; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Montenegro; Pakistan; South Korea; Sierra Leone; United Arab Emirates; USA; Venezuela.

The Human Rights Council exists since 2006, replacing a previous body discredited by the poor human rights record of its members. One wonders how the situation has improved with the change of name: for example Libya, having been elected

under Gadaffi on 13 May 2010, continues to be a member until next year (2013) despite having no effective government. Of course nobody asks the question why, if its human rights record was as bad under Gadaffi, was Libya elected to the UN Human Rights Council in 2010?

In accordance with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 60/251 the Council shall consist of 47 Member States, which shall be elected directly and individually by secret ballot by the majority of the members of the General Assembly.

A new publication from Athol Books
Northern Ireland: What Is It?
Professor Mansergh Changes His Mind

By Brendan Clifford


Launched at the Teachers' Club, Dublin,
November 2012 (See Report p. 22)

This book is called *Northern Ireland: What Is It?* It might also have been called, *Northern Ireland: What Is It For?* After all, there must have been good reason to establish such a perverse system of government in a society so divided. Or perhaps *The State Of Northern Ireland* would have been to the point. The ambiguity of that title also goes to the heart of what this book is about: the governing arrangement established by Britain and the trouble it has caused. The 1920 *Government of Ireland Act* described itself as providing for the "good government" of an area broken off from Ireland—but the forms it set up made bad government inevitable. In a sense "*Northern Ireland*" was a time-bomb planted by stealth with the detonation coming some fifty years later.

But why was this done? What was "*Northern Ireland*" for? That is a question which has never been considered.

This book considers what was established in Northern Ireland and why. The *why* is important. It had—and continues to have—to do with the handling of the bit of Ireland

which broke the Imperial State: an Ireland which had to cope with seeing a national minority misgoverned across the Border.



Professor Nicholas Mansergh was a historian, constitutional expert, and part of the inner ruling class of Britain. He wrote a book on Northern Ireland in 1936 which correctly described the constitutional form while misconceiving its politics. In 1983 he altered his opinion of "*Northern Ireland*" and endorsed an academic description of it as an Irish 'state', setting a trend picked up by a medley of other academics. This book takes a look at those writings and takes issue with their approach, which fitted in with the new Oxbridge project of "*Re-Writing Irish History*". History-writing has become a political project. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, it might be said that politics is a continuation of war by other means. Britain may have lost in 1922, but the war is not over yet.

"*Northern Ireland*" is clearly continuing to serve the purpose for which it was set up.

A Belfast Magazine, No. 38.

(continued from previous page)

The membership shall be based on equitable geographical distribution, and seats shall be distributed as follows among regional groups:

- * Group of African States (13)
- * Group of Asia-Pacific States (13)

- * Group of Eastern European States (6)
- * Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (8)
- * Group of Western European and other States (7)

The members of the Council shall serve for a period of three years and shall not be eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms.

(continued p. 27)

Report: Launch of *Northern Ireland: What Is It? Professor Mansergh Changes His Mind*

Edited transcript of a talk given at the Teachers' Club, Dublin. November 2012.

Mansergh was an Anglo-Irish gentleman. He had the remnant of a Cromwellian estate somewhere down by Tipperary. As an Anglo-Irish gentleman after the removal of the British administration he followed the British state to Britain where he became a University academic, and later a state administrator. As an administrator, in the wartime Ministry of Information, he was kind of a spymaster. After the war he was a professor in Chatham House, which is a branch of the Foreign Office dealing with world affairs.

His book on Northern Ireland was written before he was fully established as an administrative agent of the State. It was the first book that attempted to describe what Northern Ireland was and it did so comparatively honestly. It didn't say what it was, but it said what it wasn't. It didn't have independent government. It had no shred of sovereignty attaching to it. It was an entirely subordinate structure established by the sovereign government. It was accorded certain powers. It did not have any sovereign right to these delegated powers. The Westminster Parliament remained absolutely the sovereign power. It had the right to overrule legislation of the devolved Parliament in Belfast, or to legislate itself on matters which it had devolved to the Belfast Parliament. He did not say, "Northern Ireland is not a State" because with his description of it it would have entered nobody's head that it could be a State.

The first time I noticed it being described as a State was in a book published by Paul Bew, who is now Lord Bew. After that it became the standard thing to describe Northern Ireland as a State, the Northern Ireland State. This literature describing it in those terms seems to me to have been fostered particularly by Dermot Keogh, Professor of History in Cork University, but it became general. A book published under Keogh's auspices has a title something like "*The Establishment of the Northern Ireland State*" but there is absolutely nothing in the book about the establishment of a Northern Ireland State. Leaving aside the title, which misrepresents the subject of the book, the work itself is an interesting account of the shifting of the subordinate administration from Dublin Castle to Belfast after Partition. And really no more than that.

Ireland was not described as a State when it was governed by Dublin Castle, and shifting the administration to Belfast, which had to be done when the 26 Counties were hived off from the rest of the country, in no sense constituted the formation of a State.

In 1969, when the trouble blew up in the North, I was puzzled about what the region was. We published what was called The Two Nations Theory, which was a statement of fact that the Protestants and the Catholics in the North had no sense of nationality in common with one another.

The Catholics in the North felt that they were part of the people of the rest of the country. The official position in the Irish Constitution was that the 32 Counties constituted a nation. When we published the Two Nations Theory, we said what we meant by a nation. What we meant was what Ernest Renan, who was a French anti-communist, described as a nation, and also what Joseph Stalin, who was a Communist, described as a nation. They were two extremes of European politics, Renan and Stalin, and their definition of what a nation was seemed to us to be realistic and accurate. So that people would understand

what we were saying we published both at the time, back in 1969. We said, that is what we mean by a nation.

Now you could give an entirely different meaning to a nation, which would not be what people actually existing in places think they are. Both Stalin and Renan said that if people think they are a nation, there are no ground for questioning their idea that they are a nation. But you could have it that a nation is a historic entity, independent of the views of the people who are actually alive in the territories at the time: that a nation is a territorial entity not depending on the views of the people who happen to occupy it at the particular moment.

It seems to me that people who were horrified by our description of the Protestants of Northern Ireland as a nation were using that other meaning: that Ireland was a historic territorial-political entity, which should have been maintained, regardless of the opinions of the people in one quarter of the island about their nationality.

We always emphasised that what we meant was the other thing: that people were what they thought they were. And we put it to the SDLP, which was the relevant party at the time, that if they were saying that there was an underlying sense of national affinity between Catholics and Protestants, it was their business to tap into it and bring it to the surface. But it seemed to me that the SDLP knew very well that there was no underlying sense of national affinity between Catholics and Protestants because the party never attempted to develop it. They knew the reality of the social situation: that there was a profound sense of national antagonism between the communities, such that whatever one of them stood for aggravated the other.

Our statement that there were two nations was not a statement of policy, it was a mere statement of fact.

So what was Northern Ireland, the entity established in 1920-21, within which these two peoples in the North were required to exist in a relationship of sharp antagonism with one another without any mediating political medium?

The best definition I could come up with was that it was an undemocratically governed region of the democratic British State. I couldn't get it more accurate than that. I repeated it many hundred of times in print and waited hopefully for somebody to show me that it was inaccurate. I would have been relieved to be shown that it was inaccurate. I had accidentally got into the matter of Northern Ireland and what it was etc.

Why was it undemocratically governed? Because the Government of the state was completely disconnected from electoral activity in the Six Counties. What the electorate in the Six Counties did at British elections – known in the Six Counties as the Imperial elections – had no bearing on the government of the state. Now a democracy is a system in which the adults in the State constituting the electorate decide which party is to govern the State. Elections were held in Northern Ireland but those elections had nothing whatever to do with appointing a party to govern the State. I had lived in the Republic and in London before I went to live in the North. Maybe it is difficult if you live within one particular jurisdiction to appreciate what goes on within another jurisdiction, so I can understand that it

took a kind of leap of imagination to try to envisage life within Northern Ireland under this bizarre system of government.

You had twice as many elections there as you had in the rest of the British State: the Imperial elections to the sovereign Parliament and the elections to the subordinate Belfast Parliament. The Imperial elections were not contested by the political parties that appealed to the British electorate to give them their votes to authorize them to govern the State, nor were the subordinate Northern elections. Both lots of elections were only contested by Six County parties, a Catholic party and a Protestant party. Six County residents were refused admission to the political parties of the state. A number of times on the Labour side an attempt was made to get a person elected in Northern Ireland admitted to the party in Westminster; but it was refused. Northern Ireland was excluded from the party political organisation of the State

It had a separate Parliament of its own, with very limited powers and no sovereign powers whatever. The fact that it was given these very limited delegated powers was made a reason for excluding them from the party politics which determined how the State was to be governed.

There could be no common ground between the two parties there, which were simply the Protestant and Catholic communities organized as communal parties in the undergrowth of the state, cut off from the organized democratic political life of the state. The conflict between them was not about state policy. That was decided by the conflict of the parties in Britain. The subordinate government was conducted by the Ulster Unionist Party which had the specifically anti-Catholic Orange Order at its core, and it was therefore out of the question that Catholics should vote for it even if they were not particularly anti-Partitionist. So the Catholics simply voted anti-Partition, which was the only way of voting against the anti-Catholic Unionist Party. And the Unionists voted to stay in the state where they already were, and under the existing arrangements.

The Unionists had not wanted this arrangement when it was set up in 1920. They were persuaded to accept it as a sacrifice for the Empire, and a threat that it would be worse for them if they refused. So they agreed to run their little devolved Parliament with very little powers, and they agreed to operate this separate political system outside the political system of the State, which therefore had little dynamism in it. It was just frozen.

What we proposed was that the Six Counties should be made part of the democratic political system of the state. So we began a campaign to pressurize the British parties into including Northern Ireland within their sphere of operations. We had very little effect with this propaganda until 1985, when the Hillsborough Agreement drove the Protestants crazy, and we thought here is an opportunity for getting them to understand the predicament that they have been put in by the 1921 Act. We tried to energize them to demand that they be made properly part of the State. They claimed that Ulster was British when Ulster patently was not British in very important respects. We tried to get them to demand that they be admitted to the British political system and become British in a meaningful sense. We enjoyed some success with this for a couple of years. But the Dublin Government and Whitehall were absolutely opposed. And in the North of Ireland Whitehall can bring some pretty severe pressure to bear on people. And in the end it came to nothing.

But the reason it came to nothing was that the Unionist community rejected it in the end. We had considerable success

in publicizing the issue. For a couple of years it was a main topic in Radio Ulster phone-ins. There could have been nobody in the Six Counties who was unaware of the issue. And there was never any coherent refutation given of the case that was made. But in the end we were given to understand quite clearly that the Unionist community, Unionism, would not engage in this effort to democratize the North as part of the United Kingdom. So we dropped it. That was in 1990, about 22 years ago. We dropped it absolutely. It had been attempted. Everybody understood the issue. The majority in the North had chosen this system that had been imposed on them in the first instance.

What was this system that they had adopted at this point? It was a system of antagonism between the two communities, organised in communities, without any mediating influence that could soften the antagonism between them. The antagonism just got exaggerated by every act that was done within it. There were people at the outset who saw from the start that the case was the ultimate condemnation of the British handling of the issue. Lord Bew was one of these. He was once pretty close to us. He could not refute our argument. But if he had no rejected it with pseudo-Marxist gobbledegook he would not now be Lord Bew.

We did not make that case in order to indict Britain. It was far from being a traditional republican case. Anti-partitionism had nothing to do with it. It was argued on entirely different grounds. It was argued entirely within the principles of the British Constitution, and it demonstrated that under the principles of the British Constitution proclaimed to the world as being the vanguard of democracy, that Northern Ireland was undemocratically governed. The parliamentary Draughtsman in Westminster, after we had circulated the House of Commons with the argument, contacted us to say that he agreed. But because nobody of substance within the Unionist community was prepared to take it up it was a non-runner.

Now Nicholas Mansergh's book demonstrates, without going into the matter of defining what it is, that Northern Ireland is a powerless delegated operation of the British State.

In my view the basic reason it was set up was when Westminster realised it was going to have to let go most of Ireland: setting up the Northern Ireland system in this way gave it continuing leverage on the South of Ireland. If the North had settled down within the democracy of British party politics—and I'm sure that is what much of the Catholic community would have done very quickly, because Joe Devlin's Home Rule politics was pretty well British politics—Partition would not have been the distorting issue that it has been.

If the Partition had been enacted as a British Act of Parliament, with 26 Counties given their independence, or something leading to independence, and the Six Counties had simply been held within the existing system of the United Kingdom State, I'm sure the matter would have settled down within the party politics of the British State. British party politics are very seductive indeed. But that would mean that the South would just simply become independent. It was the fact that the Northern Catholics were put in this predicament under what was basically little more than Protestant police rule, because the Northern Ireland State never amounted to anything more than a local power of police, that kept Partition a live issue to Britain's advantage.

The war in the North arose directly out of the undemocratic mode of British government there. The Irish State had no responsibility for it. But the refusal of nationalist Ireland to

acknowledge the fact of national division in the North enabled Britain to foist moral responsibility onto it for the war that was the almost inevitable outcome of the way that Britain chose to govern the region. And this irrational feeling of nationalist guilt for something that was entirely the responsibility of the British state led to the collapse of Irish national morale under the impact of the war. British propaganda is skilled at exploiting such opportunities.

Mansergh's book demonstrates, without raising awkward questions, that Northern Ireland is an expedient of the British state. It mentions, without going into the matter, that the British Cabinet decided, at the time of Partition, that the Six Counties should not be governed within the political system of the state. And it acknowledges that the Nationalist community would have preferred to have been governed within the normal political system of the state. He also shows that the great bulk of the legislation concerning the Six Counties continued to be enacted by Westminster.

It is also true that he moralises against the local Northern parties—excluded from the democracy of the state—for being "sectarian". It would be Utopian to expect a British academic on the make to do otherwise. But, allowing for that, it is an honest, well-informed book.

However, a generation later, when Britain's Northern Ireland system had led to war, Mansergh shifted ground. He subscribed to 'Northern Irish State' nonsense by contributing an approving Preface to a book in which it was stated: *British Policy And The Northern Ireland Administration 1920-27* by John McColgan.

The theme of that book is that the nationalist Irish had an effective choice in 1920 between the realisable object of Unity and the will-o'-the-wisp of Independence. The reasoning in support of that view is mere propaganda fantasy. It was Unity that was the will-o'-the-wisp. Independence was not only achievable, but was actually achieved. And it was refusal to

recognise stubborn facts about the character of the Northern Protestant community around 1970, and to base a realistic policy on it, that led to the erosion of national morale.

Now if it is obligatory to describe the Six Counties as an Irish State—and it seems that in the University system it is—then it is a pseudo-state, a sham state.

So I put a chapter towards the end of the book on the problem of the legitimacy of violence in a pseudo-State. An effective State monopolises violence, not because of some philosophical principle or constitutional principle, but because it is a functional State, because the mass of the people are involved in the political operation of the State. So the State by common consent becomes the monopoliser of force, the arbiter of force. That has been the case in the 26 Counties, certainly ever since Fianna Fail was formed and came to office in 1932. You could argue the injustices of the Treaty, but it didn't matter because *de facto* the populace was engaged in the political operation of the State ever since Fianna Fail broke through the Treaty obstacles.

In Britain the monopoly of violence by the State is never questioned; in Northern Ireland because the thing was pseudo and because the populace, both Unionist and Nationalist, were separated from the political functioning of the State, the monopoly of violence could never be achieved, regardless of how many constitutional principles were invoked.

It just could not be a fact that the State monopolised violence there. The IRA never ceased to exist in the North. It could not cease to exist in the North. De Valera gave a backhanded acknowledgement of the fact that it would be unreasonable to expect the IRA not to exist in the North, given what the North was. He did not describe it as an undemocratic enclave within the British state but he must have known perfectly well that that is what it was. And these days States can be bowled over like ninepins if there is any hint that they are not properly democratic. Yet what happened in Northern Ireland cannot be acknowledged by Southern official opinion as having been a legitimate war brought about by an undemocratic regime as part of the British State. □

The Economics Of Partition


A Historical Survey Of Ireland In Terms Of Political Economy

By Brendan Clifford

Athol Books 1992

"The Economics Of Partition"

is a history of Ireland since the 17th century as seen through the categories of political economy. It evolved amidst the intense turmoil of West Belfast in 1969-72. It went through many editions as a pamphlet, growing with each edition, and made a discernible effect on the turmoil within which it was produced. Though unmistakably a



product of nationalist Ireland, its purpose was to demolish the prevailing nationalist view of the Unionist community in Ulster. That view, though expounded by learned academics no less than by demagogic politicians, is shown to be a mere combination of ignorance and prejudice. Having lived a vigorous life as a vulgar pamphlet, "The Economics Of Partition" has now been reduced to respectability as a book. Its battle has been won. Many books now contain ideas which were first developed in it, and usually do so without acknowledging the source. The appearance of this source pamphlet in book form is therefore long overdue.

Report: Launch of T. D. Williams *The Genesis Of National Socialism.*

Report of two launches

The Genesis Of National Socialism by T. Desmond Williams. Introduction, and Appendices on Neutrality and the Origins of National Socialism by Brendan Clifford. Belfast Historical & Educational Society. 2012.

(Edited transcript of a talk given at the Teachers' Club, Dublin, November 2012.)

T. Desmond Williams (1921-1987) was appointed Professor of History at University College, Dublin, in 1948, at the age of 27. He held that post for a generation.

As a student at UCD he wrote an MA Thesis on *The Genesis Of National Socialism*. It was published academically in 1942 by being placed in the University Library. It was first published for wider circulation by Athol Books in 2012.

After submitting the Thesis to UCD in 1942, Williams went on to a scholarship to Peterhouse College, Cambridge, to engage in further research into German history. At the end of the World War he was recruited into British Intelligence and, with a nominal military commission, went to Germany with the British Occupation forces and took part in the investigation of the German Foreign Office Archive. Then he returned to Cambridge, expecting to become part of the academic staff at Peterhouse College. Due to the internal politics of the College, he was denied the Fellowship which Professor Herbert Butterfield had intended for him, and he became Professor of History at UCD instead.

Back in Dublin he became Editor of a magazine called *The Leader* and wrote a series of articles for it about Irish neutrality in the war. In one of these articles he alleged that the Irish Ambassador to Spain, Leopold Kerney, was a Nazi collaborator. Kerney sued him for libel.

It seemed that Williams had based his allegations on information he thought he had seen as a British Intelligence operative working on the German Archives. He relied for his defence on Britain making this information available to him. But the message from Britain was that nothing had been found in the German Archives that would support Williams's allegation. He then had no option but to concede the case.

His article had also been published in the *Irish Press*, which was the party paper of the Irish Government during the War. Kerney pursued the *Irish Press* for costs and damages, but went easy on Williams. Nevertheless, it seems that the incident had a disabling effect on Williams. During his long tenure of office he published nothing substantial.

He was out of his element. His element was Peterhouse College, Cambridge.

It seems that what he did chiefly with UCD was make it a preparatory college for Peterhouse. A long series of historians went from UCD to Peterhouse where they were finished off, and sent back to Ireland to write Irish history under British influence.

It would be unreasonable to condemn Cambridge for not making Irish historians out of them. British Universities serve the British national—or Imperial—interest. Presented with Irish historians to give the finishing touches to, they naturally

sought to train them to write Irish history in a way that was subversive of the interest of the Irish state.

Britain did what Britain does—and what any other state would do, given the opportunity. It is only the Irish state—which had to fight its way into existence against Britain after Britain had refused to concede independence to a ballot-box assertion of it—that would hand over its historians to be trained by a former enemy that still had scores to settle.

Speaking at a launch of the book in Dublin in November 2012, Brendan Clifford said that Williams' Thesis, written as a young student, was the major piece of research on foreign affairs produced in an Irish university that he had come across. And Williams himself never again did anything as substantial.

The Thesis was not actually about the Genesis of National Socialism at all. It only deals with Germany up to 1900, and National Socialism was a product of the defeat of Germany in 1918 by a mixture of military power and false promises, and of the punitive and dysfunctional 'peace settlement' imposed on unarmed Germany by the victorious allies in 1919.

Williams' Thesis leaves it to be understood that Nazism was something that was always implicit in German history—that it was merely the logical working out of the way German history had been going for centuries before the Great War. It occurs to him occasionally that that is implicit in what he is saying and he says it is not what he means. But, since he does not get to the source of actual Nazi development in the chaos of 1918-19, it is what he says even though he doesn't mean it.

What the Thesis is actually about is the formation of the German state in the 19th century. It is worth reading for its account of developments in Religion, Economy and Law in connection with the formation of the state, even though his view of state formation is misconceived.

There were over a hundred German States before the French Revolution. At the end of the Napoleonic period they were reduced to 50. In the course of the next fifty-five years they were united into one state by Prussian action. The United German state was called an Empire because it was an extensively decentralised state, parts of which continued to be governed by Kings, and a King could only be subject to an Emperor.

Williams' account of Prussia is strongly influenced by the British war propaganda of 1914, which was internalised in a stratum of Irish politics by Redmondism. That is to say, the language in which Williams describes Prussia is coloured by the British war propaganda, even though what one can hear Williams say, if the overtones of the language are discounted, is that Prussia was the first modern state—the first state which had an impersonal bureaucracy as an essential part of it. And it should be obvious that an impersonal bureaucracy in the structure of the state is a precondition of personal citizenship.

Of course Prussian militarism figures in Williams' Thesis. Prussian militarism became a British Article of Faith in 1914.

But the unification of Germany by Prussia did not take the form of a military conquest of the other states by Prussia.

Bismarck conducted three small wars during the unification period: a war against Denmark, in alliance with Austria, over

the disputed territory of Schleswig-Holstein; a war against Austria which ended its pre-eminence in the loose German Confederation to which it was incapable of giving leadership; and a war of defence against the French invasion of 1870. The French invasion was intended to disrupt the process of German unification but had the effect of accelerating it.

During the forty-three years between the unification of 1871 and 1914 Germany fought no wars at all, while Britain, France and Russia fought many wars. Yet *Prussian militarism* remains an obligatory Article of Faith.

Germany, a country without natural borders to the east and west, and with strong, aggressive states to the east and west of it, had to maintain a strong Army. It could not have existed without one. But it is hard to find any semblance of justification for the application of the term *militarism* to the use it made of its Army between 1871 and 1914.

Germany was united peacefully by Bismarck in a feat of statesmanship that was unprecedented and was not repeated elsewhere. It was not united democratically, in the sense that the Frankfurt Parliament, with representatives from all the German states, which met in the year of democratic illusion, 1848, failed to unite it. But when was a state ever formed by a democracy? Certainly the British state wasn't. And the British state is the implicit standard by which Williams disparages Prussia.

Germany was united peacefully by Prussia during the twenty years after the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament. The democratic development of Germany began then. Democracy needs a state to develop in.

The British propaganda of the Great War asserted that Prussia was a Junker state, and that the unification of Germany by Prussia made it a Junkerdom, and therefore a major source of Evil in the world. The word "*Junker*" just means a young man of the landed class. In usage it meant an East Prussian landlord. In British propaganda usage, it meant something like the Ascendancy "*Rakes of Mallow*". If Germany was a Junkerdom it was a state run by landlords, and it was therefore inimical to democracy.

Ireland, when it was a kingdom of the Hanoverian British state following the Williamite conquest of the late 17th century, might be described as a Junkerdom. And it certainly exercised a baneful influence on public affairs. The Protestant Ascendancy debased the Irish populace and resisted democratic development to the bitter end.

Williams knew that Prussia was not a Junkerdom. He knew it as a factual detail. But the echo of the British war propaganda was so strong in his mind that he was unable to generalise from the factual detail that he knew. When generalising he repeated the conventional propaganda line.

"The army—with the compulsory service on which it was based—a nobility bound in blind obedience to the service of the king, and an administration personally supervised by the king: These were the three instruments by which this structure was built" (Williams p29).

That is not Junkerdom. And it is not what existed in Ireland when the Prussian state was being built in the 18th century. British Ireland was ruled by a series of big, mercenary landlord families with noble titles. There was no national administration. And there was no king except a figurehead one kept up by the landlords to awe the populace. It is true that there was an Irish Parliament,

but the seats in it were owned by a small group of great landlords.

In the early 19th century reformers at the outset of the Irish national development looked to Prussia as a proof that land reform was possible and that religious freedom for Catholics was possible in a modern state in which the Catholic Church was not an estate of the realm.

British Ireland was a sort of mirror image of Britain. It was formally similar but the substance was lacking.

In England there was a collective ruling class of landlords, formed through all the revolutions and counter-revolutions in the 17th century. That is a unique historical development as far as I am aware. A ruling class was formed from that sequence of events from 1641 through to 1714, and rather than taking power in the state it took power in place of the state. In 1714 it pretty well abolished the state as a political apparatus to which it was subject. Having imported a minor German king to sit on the throne, it ruled using the monarchy as a façade. It decided not to rule as a republic because of the experience of Cromwell's republic. Republicanism didn't work in England. The people couldn't settle down without royalty. So the new ruling class provided them with a monarch to relate to while keeping monarchy powerless.

This ruling class acted for the most part in place of a state apparatus. The state apparatus connected with the monarchy was largely set aside. There was a ruling class, rather than a state structure. The ruling class had a collective existence in Parliament, and the party system developed within this ruling class.

That is one of the great difficulties in the modern world, of setting up a party system that will function on the basis of elections, so that a party in government which loses the election will give up the power of government to the party that wins. That was an extraordinary development. And it happened within British ruling class politics in the 18th century.

The difficulty about developing two-party politics of this kind is the reason why so many states don't function on what we call a democratic basis today. And the reason why it was the case in England was that each aristocrat had his own power in his locality. He was in effect the state in his locality, so the fact that he belonged to the party that lost the election, on the votes of a very small electorate, didn't really matter all that much to him because the state had no power over him in his own locality. He continued being the ruler of his own locality regardless of which party won the election. He could quite happily relinquish the power of government because the power of government was very slight in England in the 18th century. The organised power of state was chiefly directed outwards in world conquest.

The construction of a state apparatus, a bureaucracy, only begins with William Pitt and the Napoleonic War. And there is then a small development of a state bureaucracy. But it is only after the 1832 Reform that you have an effective state bureaucracy beginning to be operative. England was ruled by a ruling class until 1832. The ruling class then decided that it could make a go of admitting the middle-class to the electoral franchise and shape them to its own way of doing things—which it did, very effectively. The middle-class liberalism of the mid-

19th century was kind of a glorification of the ruling class in many ways. The radical element of the middle class was very effectively tamed. And that is how democracy happened in Britain. Increasing numbers of the populace were drawn into the system established by the ruling class and a state apparatus was set up that increasingly gave the individual rights against his aristocrat etc. It was a very gradual process. That did not happen in Germany. British democracy is by far the most stable in Europe.

Democracies constructed according to an ideological model in 1919 proved to be flimsy.

Williams seems to have no sense of this whatsoever. The standard by which he judges German state-development is British development. But he did not know how Britain developed. □

A new publication from Belfast Historical And Educational Society


Launched at the Teachers' Club, Dublin, November 2012

The Genesis Of National Socialism

By T. Desmond Williams

Introduction, and Appendixes on Neutrality and the Origins of National Socialism by *Brendan Clifford*.

The Genesis Of National Socialism is the *magnum opus* of Thomas Desmond Williams. He wrote it as a student at University College Dublin. A few years later he was made Professor of Modern History at UCD. But he never as Professor issued a work comparable for substance and quality with what he had written as a student.



The present work covers the formation, under the guidance of Prussia, of a single German state, by bringing together the scores of German petty states into a voluntary union.

Unfortunately, however, it does not deal at

all with what is said to be its subject—the formation of the Nazi Party. Nevertheless it was awarded an Honours MA Degree.

As something produced within Irish academia, it is beyond comparison. It stands alone as a giant fragment that came from nowhere.

Williams served in British Intelligence before being appointed Professor of History at UCD. In a comment on Williams' work, Brendan Clifford describes the libel action brought against Williams by the wartime Irish Ambassador to Spain, Leopold Kerney, over allegations of collaboration with the Nazis made by Williams, apparently on the basis of what he thought he knew from his work as a British Intelligence operative.

Clifford also contrasts the way Germany united itself with the way England constructed and maintained the United Kingdom.

(continued from p. 21)

African States: Côte d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Kenya Sierra Leone

Asia-Pacific States: Japan Kazakhstan Pakistan Republic of Korea United Arab Emirates

Eastern European States: Estonia Montenegro

Latin American & Caribbean States: Argentina Brazil Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of)

Western European & other States: Germany Greece Ireland Sweden United States

Roadmap for negotiations between the US and Iran (May 2003)

by David Morrison

We reproduce below the text of a fax sent to the US State Department in May 2003, just after the US/UK invasion of Iraq, by the Swiss Ambassador to Iran, Tim Guldumann [1]. In the absence of a US embassy in Tehran, the Swiss ambassador represented American interests there.

The state of relations between the US and Iran at this time is discussed in my article *On US "dealing with Iran"* [2] in Irish Foreign Affairs Vol 5, No 3. See also article *2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks* by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 14 February 2007 [3].

The fax contained an extraordinary 1-page "roadmap" from Iran for comprehensive talks with the US plus a covering letter from Guldumann. The Bush administration ignored the Iranian proposal – its only response was to protest to the Swiss government about Guldumann's "meddling".

The Bush administration ignored the proposal, despite the fact that Iran expressed a willingness to discuss:

· **WMD:** full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavours to develop or possess WMD, full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all further IAEA protocols)

· **Terrorism:** decisive action against any terrorists (above all Al Qaida) on Iranian territory, full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.

· **Iraq:** coordination of Iranian influence for actively supporting political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions and a democratic government representing all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.

Middle East:

1. stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad etc.) from Iranian territory, pressure on these organisations to stop violent action against civilians within borders of 1967.

2. action on Hisbollah to become an exclusively political and social organization within Lebanon

3. acceptance of the two-states-approach

References:

[1] media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/us_iran_roadmap.pdf

[2] www.david-morrison.org.uk/iran/us-dealing-with-iran.htm

[3] www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021301363.html

Roadmap

US aims: (Iran agrees that the US puts the following aims on the agenda)

- WMD: full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavours to develop or possess WMD, full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all further IAEA protocols)
- Terrorism: decisive action against any terrorists (above all Al Qaida) on Iranian territory, full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.
- Iraq: coordination of Iranian influence for actively supporting political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions and a democratic government representing all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.
- Middle East:
 1. stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad etc.) from Iranian territory, pressure on these organisations to stop violent action against civilians within borders of 1967.
 2. action on Hisbollah to become an exclusively political and social organization within Lebanon.
 3. acceptance of the two-states approach.

Iranian aims: (the US accepts a dialogue "in mutual respect" and agrees that Iran puts the following aims on the agenda)

- US refrains from supporting change of the political system by direct interference from outside
- Abolishment of all sanctions: commercial sanctions, frozen assets, refusal of access to WTO
- Iraq; pursuit of MKO, support of the repatriation of MKO members, support of the Iranian claims for Iraqi reparation, no Turkish invasion in North Iraq, respect for the Iranian national interests in Iraq and religious links to Najaf/Kerbala.
- Access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology.
- Recognition of Iran's legitimate security interests in the region with the according defense capacity
- Terrorism: action against MKO and affiliated organizations in the US.

Steps:

1. Communication of mutual agreement on the following procedure
2. Mutual simultaneous statements "we have always been ready for direct and authoritative talks with the US/with Iran with the aim of discussing – in mutual respect – our common interests and our mutual concerns, but we have always made it clear that, such talks can only be held, if genuine progress for a solution of our own concerns can be achieved".
3. A direct meeting on the appropriate level will be held with the previously agreed aims
 - a) of a decision on the first mutual steps:
 - 1) Iraq: establishment of a common working group on Iraq, active Iranian support for Iraqi stabilization, US commitment to resolve MKO problem in Iraq, US commitment to take Iranian reparation claims into the discussion on Iraq foreign debts.
 - 2) Terrorism: Iranian commitment for decisive action against Al Qaida members in Iran, agreement on cooperation and information exchange

- 3) Iranian statement “that it supports a peaceful solution in the Middle East, that it accepts a solution which is accepted by the Palestinians and that it follows with interest the discussion on the Roadmap, presented by the Quartet.”
 - 4) US acceptance of Iranian access to WTO membership negotiations
- b) of the establishment of three parallel working groups on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation. Their aim is an agreement on three parallel road maps, for the discussions of these working groups each side accepts that the other side’s aims (see above) are put on the agenda:
1. Disarmament: road map, which combines the mutual aims of, on the one side, full transparency by international commitments and guarantees to abstain from WMD with, on the other side, access to western technology (in the three areas),
 2. Terrorism and regional security: road map for above mentioned aims on Middle East and terrorism
 3. Economic cooperation: road map for the lifting of the sanctions and the solution of the frozen assets
- c) and of a public statement after this first meeting on the achieved agreements.

The United Nations vote on the Cuba embargo — 21 years in a row

(From Bill Blum’s Anti-Empire Report, 11 December 2012 <http://www.killinghope.org/bblum6/aer111.html>)

For years American political leaders and media were fond of labeling Cuba an "international pariah". We don't hear that any more. Perhaps one reason is the annual vote in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution which reads: "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba". This is how the vote has gone (not including abstentions):

Year	Votes (Yes/No)	No Votes
1992	59-2	US, Israel
1993	88-4	US, Israel, Albania, Paraguay
1994	101-2	US, Israel
1995	117-3	US, Israel, Uzbekistan
1996	138-3	US, Israel, Uzbekistan
1997	143-3	US, Israel, Uzbekistan
1998	157-2	US, Israel
1999	155-2	US, Israel
2000	167-3	US, Israel, Marshall Islands
2001	167-3	US, Israel, Marshall Islands
2002	173-3	US, Israel, Marshall Islands
2003	179-3	US, Israel, Marshall Islands
2004	179-4	US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau
2005	182-4	US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau
2006	183-4	US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau
2007	184-4	US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau
2008	185-3	US, Israel, Palau
2009	187-3	US, Israel, Palau
2010	187-2	US, Israel
2011	186-2	US, Israel
2012	188-3	US, Israel, Palau

Each fall the UN vote is a welcome reminder that the world has not *completely* lost its senses and that the American empire does not *completely* control the opinion of other governments.

How it began: On April 6, 1960, Lester D. Mallory, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, wrote in an internal memorandum: "The majority of Cubans support Castro ... The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. ... every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba." Mallory proposed "a line of action which ... makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government." (see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba* (1991), p.885) Later that year, the Eisenhower administration instituted the suffocating embargo against its eternally-declared enemy.

[The embargo is still in place; UN General Assembly resolutions are mere recommendations.]

NATO held “dangerous instrument” undermining the UN, former assistant UN Secretary-General Halliday says.

[Denis Halliday is an Irishman, a graduate of Trinity College Dublin; after a 34 year career with the UN he resigned in protest at the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq.]

NATO is a “dangerous” instrument of American aggression that is undermining the United Nations and “must be abolished,” a former Assistant Secretary-General of the UN says.

“The danger to global equilibrium is a growing NATO being expanded further by American and British ambitions into a monster military force of world proportions, way beyond any Atlantic or European alliance,” writes Denis Halliday, who served in the high UN post from 1994-98.

Terming NATO an “affront” to European states committed to genuine peacekeeping, Halliday says NATO is “a redundant, extravagant and unwelcome military toy that gobbles up human and financial resources to no positive end.”

“It is nothing but a negative force,” Halliday continues in the Foreword to a new book, *The Globalization of NATO* (Clarity Press), by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, the distinguished Canadian geopolitical analyst.

“Worse, under the constant pressure of corporate arms dealers, funding for (U.S.) presidential elections and pathetically beribboned generals NATO has strayed beyond the scope of the original post-World War II alliance into threatening sovereign states such as Iran where dialogue together with homegrown solutions would likely suffice...without loss of innocent life, hugely damaged civilian infrastructure and the horror of nuclear weapons.”

What’s more, Halliday writes, “Genuine humanitarian intervention, or R2P as it is known, can never again be entrusted to NATO forces. Clearly NATO has no objectivity in a situation such as the much needed protection of the Palestinian civilian people from Israeli occupation, violation of their human rights and endless mutli-diverse forms of violence.”

Halliday says that NATO’s expansion accompanied by intrusive military hardware, cyber technology and “the murderous capacity of drones” is actually “threatening North-South peace.”

Halliday warned of “the creeping slime of NATO expansion into Asia” and said its “attempt to surround Russia, China and others can only end badly for the billions of human beings involved.”

Acknowledging the UN has become “ineffective” as a peacekeeper, Halliday says NATO “has no proven interest whatsoever in peace and non-violent coexistence. Warfare is the most profitable business of all. The military arms industry keeps entire economies afloat. Peace would put NATO out of the large scale and rewarding killing business.”

He charged NATO “constantly seeks new resources, new weapons and new members to pursue violence against non-existent enemies, creating opportunities for warfare that require nothing more than dialogue, cooperation in a mature and

civilized manner.” Halliday adds, “There is nothing mature or civilized about NATO, or its leadership.”

Halliday said the U.S. should be “disarming, and investing in the poverty of its own people, dealing with its economic collapse and adjusting to the pain of a declining empire facing its demise.”

In his book on NATO, Nazemroaya writes,

“NATO expansion is not just limited to Europe, but is in pursuit of a worldwide capability to expand Washington’s empire under a global confederacy.”

As part of this expansion, Nazemroaya adds, “The U.S. and NATO have literally authorized themselves to go to war anywhere in the world.”

Moscow feels threatened, he adds, by the offensive military characteristics that NATO has adopted since the end of the Cold War, “which has taken NATO from intervention in the former Yugoslavia to fighting in Afghanistan and Libya, and both security and training missions in the Middle East and Africa.”

Authorities around the world have showered author Nazemroaya with praise for his work in general and *The Globalization of NATO* in particular. “I hope this book will be read by very, very many who can turn this morbid fascination with violence into constructive conflict resolution,” writes Johan Galtung, Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies and Sociology at the University of Oslo, Norway, recognized as the founder of peace and conflict studies. “This book is a must read for those committed to reversing the tide of war and imperial conquest by the world’s foremost military machine,” adds Michel Chossudovsky, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Ottawa, Canada.

Again, “Nazemroaya’s book, in addition to reminding us that the role of the United Nations has been confiscated by NATO, elaborates the danger that the North Atlantic Treaty represents to world peace,” writes Jose L. Gomez Del Prado, former Chairman of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, of Ferney-Voltaire, France. And, in the words of Tiberio Graziani, President of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics, of Rome, “This is a book really necessary to understanding the role of NATO within the frame of long-term U.S. strategy. It not only provides an articulate analysis on the Atlantic Alliance: it is the best modern text devoted to the hegemonic alliance. With this book Nazemroaya reconfirms his ability as a brilliant geopolitical analyst.”

Adds Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, former Chief of the Naval Staff of India, “(Nazemroaya) is one of the prescient thinkers and writers of contemporary times who deserves to be read and acted upon by people with a conscience and concern for humanity’s future.” And Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, former Foreign Minister of Nicaragua and President of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, said: “The Globalization of NATO by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is simply magnificent, erudite and devoid of the ethnocentrism to which one has become so accustomed from Western authors...”

□

Africa and AFRICOM

From African People's Socialist Party (USA)

[Abstract: imperialism is the foundation of capitalism, the pedestal on which Western capitalism is built. ...it was imperialism that gave birth to capitalism and not the other way around.

Africa (and other colonised continents) form the pedestal upon which European capitalism was founded.

Indeed, the current crisis of imperialism, one from which it will never fully extricate itself, is connected to the imperialist “pedestal,” the very foundation of capitalism extricating itself from its supporting role of the capitalist edifice.]

Marx declared:

“The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation...”

In the same work Marx also explained, though not intentionally, the obvious contradiction impacting the relationship between white people, including “workers,” and Africans and most others, the contradiction that is responsible for a commonality of cross-class interests within European society:

“Whilst the cotton industry introduced child slavery in England, it gave in the United States a stimulus to transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal slavery, into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.”

African Internationalists are historical materialists whose investigation and analysis of the world has as its starting point an examination of the world from the objective reality and experiences of Africans and the vast majority of the people on the planet, including the “white” or European people.

So it is clear to us that imperialism is not a product of capitalism; it is not capitalism developed to its highest stage.

Instead, capitalism is a product of imperialism.

Capitalism is imperialism developed to its highest stage, not the other way around.

The imperialism defined by Lenin has as its foundation the “primitive accumulation” spoken of by Marx.

Finance capital, the export of capital, monopoly, etc., are all articulations of a political economy rooted in parasitism and based on the historically brutal subjugation of most of humanity.

Unlike Marx and Lenin, we African Internationalists deny that there has ever been anything progressive about capitalism.

Capitalism was born parasitic.

Capitalism was born in disrepute, born of the rapes, massacres, occupations, genocides, colonialism and every despicable act humans are capable of inflicting on others.

Capitalism was not responsible for some great, otherwise unimaginable leap in production, which—despite its contradictions—resulted in progress and enlightenment.

What capitalism did was to rip the vast majority of humanity out of the productive process—in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Australia and what has come to be known as the Americas.

The hundreds of millions dead due to the slave trade and slavery itself; the millions exterminated everywhere Europeans ventured—these are people whose hands were forever removed from a relationship with nature that would result in “production.”

Europeans achieved their national identity by way of this bloody process.

This is not something that only happened a long time ago. The world's peoples are suffering the consequences of capitalist emergence even now.

Locked in colonies and indirect rule of neocolonialism, restricted to lives characterized by brutality, ignorance and violence in the barrios of the Americas and other internal colonies characterized as Indian reservations and black ghettos, kept under the paranoiac, nuclear-backed, armed-to-the-teeth watch of military forces born of a state power that has its origins in protecting the relationship between capitalism and its imperial pedestal, capitalism has been the absolute factor in restricting production and development by concentrating productive capacity in the hands of the world's minority European population that sits atop the pedestal of our oppressive reality.

Capitalism was not the good, “progressive” force that is the precursor to something better for “humanity.” Capitalism was a disaster that rescued Europe from a diseased feudal existence at the expense of the world.

Europe is not the center of the universe.

In the seventeenth century Galileo, an Italian scientist ran afoul of the Catholic church with his claim that the Earth circumnavigated the sun, as opposed to the prevailing view, supported by the church, that it was the Earth that was the center of the universe.

His view, supported by science, challenged views informed by the limited perspective of the terrestrial world.

Today's white left is also locked into a worldview that places the location of Europeans in the world as the center of the universe. It always has.

Otherwise, Marx would have been forced to declare that the road to socialism was the destruction of the "pedestal" upon which all capitalist activity occurs, not some maturation of contradictions within the capitalist society upon the pedestal, a society that owed its success to the existence of that pedestal.

Destroy slavery to destroy capitalism

In an earlier work entitled *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx made this startling admission:

"Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that gave the colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry..."

"Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe North America off the map of the world, and you will have anarchy—the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations."

What an excellent formula for the overthrow of capitalism!

Certainly this is the view of the African People's Socialist Party and consistent with the trajectory of the Black is Back Coalition and the Break the Silence demonstration designed to bring the cause of the "slaves" of the world center-stage.

The slavery of today is comprised of the colonial, subject and oppressed peoples of the world. The Break the Silence mobilization is part of the trajectory to cause slavery to disappear and objectively, to achieve its predicted attendant consequence.

African Internationalism is the way forward

African Internationalism has brought us to a different understanding than that held by Marx and Lenin regarding the way forward in the struggle against capitalism. It is rooted in our recognition, supported by the extensive quotes from Marx above, that it was imperialism that gave birth to capitalism and not the other way around.

We claim that "African Internationalism is a scientifically falsifiable theory as can be seen in this question: Would capitalism and the resultant European wealth and African impoverishment have occurred without the European attack on Africa, its division, African slavery and dispersal, colonialism and neocolonialism?" (One People! One Party! One Destiny!)

Lenin stated that imperialism is capitalism that is characterized in part by parasitism. But from what we have already seen from the pen of Marx, capitalism was born parasitic.

That is the meaning of the enslavement, colonization and annexation of other countries and peoples by Europe.

A direct line of connection, a unity of opposites, a dialectical relationship, exists between the vast majority of the planet and Europe and Europeans.

Struggle against the pedestal which rests on top of the majority of the world!

There is no other explanation for the vast differences in the conditions of existence of Europeans and the rest of us.

America, Australia, Canada, the Caribbean and much of Asia and the Middle East and almost everywhere the U.S. and Europe are currently engaged in bloody wars and intrigues – represent what Marx has objectified with the term "primitive accumulation."

Indeed, the current crisis of imperialism, one from which it will never fully extricate itself, is responsive to the imperialist "pedestal," the very foundation of capitalism extricating itself from its supporting role of the capitalist edifice.

Objectively, this is the meaning of Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Venezuela, Bolivia, etc. It is in defense of itself that the U.S. and its partners are engaged in every effort, no matter how brutal or duplicitous, to protect the capitalist status quo.

This is the meaning of AFRICOM, the U.S. military project created to ensnare the entire African continent in the permanent embrace of U.S. imperial domination to the exclusion of other avaricious imperialist contenders and African people ourselves.

The future of capitalism also rests on the continued subjugation of Mexicans and "Indians" within current U.S. borders, and especially of internally-colonized Africans whose conditions of existence demand a permanent state of resistance, often spontaneous and unorganized, but always present.

Our hatred of imperialism and oppression is what makes it necessary for the African People's Socialist Party, African Internationalists, to be in the front ranks of the Black is Back Coalition's Break the Silence mobilization.

It is precisely because we understand that the future of capitalism will be determined by the struggle against parasitism, against imperialism, against the pedestal upon which capitalism relies for its survival."

Our recognition, supported by the extensive quotes from Marx above, that it was imperialism that gave birth to capitalism and not the other way around.

Africa (and other colonised continents) form the pedestal upon which European capitalism was founded.

Indeed, the current crisis of imperialism, one from which it will never fully extricate itself, is responsive to the imperialist "pedestal," the very foundation of capitalism extricating itself from its supporting role of the capitalist edifice. □

Russia turns a page

By Denys Pluvillage on Agoravox

[Denys Pluvillage is Founder & General Manager at Institut Franco-Russe de Langues, Cultures et Management (Versailles); Founding Member at BRIC Business; Teacher, Organizational Behavior and Intercultural Management at Institut Supérieur de Gestion, Paris. Article dated 6.11.12. Translated from the French by Cathy Winch.]

In 2008, Russia's attitude to the West started to change. In 2012, the law on NGOs, the banning of USAID, the contempt shown to the European Council and the non-renewal of the Nunn-Lugar agreement, are new proofs of this change of attitude.

In 2008 we wrote that the war between Georgia and Russia in August of that year was a turning point, marking the return of Russia to a role commensurate with the geopolitical history of the country.

A first indication of this turning point was M. Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007. The western media described this speech as particularly violent. In fact it was, for the president and for the vast majority of his fellow citizens, no more than the typically Russian way to express one's opinion, without allusions or other rhetorical devices. What did he say?

"NATO has set its front line on our borders (...) It is obvious that the expansion of NATO has nothing to do with the modernisation of the Alliance itself, nor with the desire to ensure security in Europe. It is on the contrary a grave provocation which lowers the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask against whom this expansion is directed. What happened to the assurances given by our partners in the West when the Warsaw Pact ended?"

This in the Russian culture is a normal way to speak. No one, however, can accuse M. Putin of being stupid, and he knew the reaction that this sort of speech would provoke.

More recently, events in the second half of 2012 seem to us to confirm this turning point, which we date from 2008.

We are not speaking, of course, of M. Putin's come back as president. Everyone knows that his influence on the Russian political scene never weakened, even when he was only prime minister.

The law on NGOs

Chronologically, the first of these events was the law on NGOs in Russia. According to this law, NGOs who are financed from abroad and have a political activity in Russia must declare it and must display on all their publications, including their Internet site, the words "Foreign Agent".

The literary worth of these words is debatable, but before we wax indignant about this measure, we should have a good look at the nature of these NGOs and their work in Russia and in other countries.

American intervention in Russia's internal affairs started with the fall of the USSR in 1992, when the country saw the arrival of a large number of external advisers come to help to "rebuild the country". On the American side, the intervention was not without ulterior motives. Rebuilding the old enemy, yes, but not so as to enable him to become an enemy again. Some advisers were certainly in good faith, but that did not stop them

from making a big mistake, that is, to try and rebuild a country without taking the opinion of its population into account. This is what Stephen Cohen was to call "to rebuild the Russia of our dreams." [1]

The result was not just disastrous economically, politically and socially. It also durably discredited the very notion of democracy in the eyes of the Russian population, and by way of consequence, the NGOs which promote this very democracy.

Already in 1991, the G7 had tried to impose on Mikhail Gorbachev 'shock' methods. Gorbachev, realising he could not reform his country without foreign aid, had asked for that aid. He was told that aid was conditional on the implementation of a radical 'shock therapy'. [2] On his return he said: "On the subject of the pace and the methods for the transition, their proposals were astonishing." [3] The press concurred, for example *The Economist* advised president Gorbachev, under the headline "Mikhail Sergueievich Pinochet" to use methods employed in Chile, even at the risk of 'provoking a blood bath'. The *Washington Post* added "Pinochet's Chile could serve as a practical model for the Soviet economy."

After M. Gorbachev's resignation, Boris Yeltsin launched reforms inspired by the theories of Milton Friedman, through the agency of a team of young economists, which the Russian media quickly nicknamed 'the Chicago Boys', led by a team of European and American advisers. In October 1992, USAID [4] granted a contract worth over two million dollars to the University of Harvard who sent teams of jurists and economists whose mission was to monitor closely the work of the 'Chicago Boys'.

The net result of these brilliant interventions was that Russia found herself reduced to poverty, the Gross Domestic Product dropped more than 50%, and according to the World Bank, 74 million Russians were living below the poverty threshold at the end of the 90s. At the same time, the country was losing around 700 000 people a year. According to the researcher Vladimir Gousev, "the years of criminal capitalism cost the lives of ten per cent of the population."

The population obviously knew what was happening. The media reported on it, even if the foreign media pretended to believe in "Yeltsin, the great democrat" and the "miracle of the Yeltsin years".

At the beginning of the years 2000, the Russians were able to follow the interventions of other NGOs in countries of Central Europe; NGOs perfected ways of bringing about 'non-violent *coup d'états*' by methods worked out by, among others, Gene Sharp, nicknamed by some of his colleagues "the Clausewitz of non-violent movements". Their first exploit took place in Serbia in the former Yugoslavia. According to Washington Post journalist Michael Dobbs, it cost the American government 41 million dollars to secure the departure of M. Milosevic [5]; the cost included the campaign orchestrated by the American ambassador in Serbia, financed by USAID via NGOs like NED [6], NDI [7] and IRI [8][9]. On the Serb side, the most active agent was the NGO Otpor, which has since offered its services in various countries of the former USSR. One of its leaders, Aleksandar Maric, explained their techniques in a long interview to the magazine *Politique Internationale*. [10]

These same American NGOs continued to perfect their technique of driving away political opponents while making

the world believe that the change was due to spontaneous democratic movements. These movements are known as the “colour revolutions”.

In 2002, the American ambassador in Georgia was Richard Miles (former ambassador to Serbia) and Mikheil Saakashvili was minister of Justice under president Edward Shevernadze. The ‘roses revolution’ was largely supported and financed by NED, “Freedom House”, an organisation based in Washington and led from 2001 by the former director of the CIA, James Woolsey. According to Jonathan Mowat, [11], the “Open Society Foundation” of billionaire George Soros also played an important role in the “roses revolution”.

After Georgia, Ukraine. According to Ian Traynor [12], chief European editor of the British daily *The Guardian*, the same NGOs mentioned above took part in the destabilisation operation; if the American government spent 41 million dollars in Serbia, Traynor sets the bill for Ukraine at 14 million. William Engdahl puts forward the figure of 20 million. The stakes were high, when you think that at the time all pipelines through which Russia delivered gas and oil to Europe went through Ukraine.

The Russian government followed closely the operations of American NGOs in Georgia and Ukraine. For an external observer, the Russian authorities were excessively nervous; Russia is not like Ukraine and even less like Georgia. However, when the same NGOs started to organise and finance so-called opposition groups at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012, the population and the Russian leaders remembered these previous experiences. Hence this new law designed to curb politically active foreign NGOs.

Banning of USAID

The second sign of change is the banning of USAID on Russian territory; the United States were informed officially in September 2012, and it took effect on 1st October. Mrs Clinton had been told in June by her Russian opposite number M. Sergueï Lavrov. The official reaction of surprise shows either that the American administration had not believed in June that it would happen, or a certain amount of bad faith ... or perhaps a mixture of both?

USAID opened its offices in Moscow in 1992, and in 2012 it employed some 60 Russians and 13 Americans. For twenty years it funded a large number of programmes in various fields, like health, the fight against AIDS, the training of judges or the maintenance of electrical networks, for a total it estimates at nearly three billion dollar. It intervened also in the economy and in particular in the wave of privatisations, an operation which has left a terrible memory; a small number of well connected people were able to get their hands on the national wealth, creating a class hated by the Russians: the oligarchs. Now that the aid, which was very useful in 1992, is no longer necessary, the population only remembers the part it played in the disaster of the 90s; the authorities only remember the political interventions. Today the West is again wishing to build a Russia in the image of the United States or Europe, whereas the Russians are now convinced they must find a “third way”.

Each side obviously adopts the version of events that suits them best. But even M. David Herszenhorn in the *New York Times* [13] recognises the ambiguity of programmes of aid in general and of the activity of USAID in particular: “..... historically, in many places, these programmes served as cover for espionage operations.”

For his part, the American ambassador in Moscow, M. Michael McFaul recognised in a book [14] co-written in 2003 with M. James Goldgeier, that American officials had organised

distributions of food in regions of Russia which had been inaccessible in the Soviet area, just to see what went on there.

But at the same time Paige Alexander, quoted by David Herszenhorn in his article, declared: “We have always worked on behalf of the American people for the Russian people...”

Today Russia has straightened out her financial situation and has become a donor country; she no longer needs foreign financial assistance. The ministry of Foreign affairs said that Russia was ready to cooperate with USAID in assistance programmes for other countries.

The attitude to Europe.

Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996, under the impulse of her then president, Boris Yeltsin. It was the time when the young Russian Federation was looking for models and for international recognition. Her economy was in ruin, and chaos reigned in politics and in society. After an attempt at rapprochement with the United States, which met with no response, she turned to Europe.

Since then the relationship has weathered conflicts of various degrees of seriousness, some however driving the two partners to the edge of a break up, as for example, the first war with Chechnya (Russia was temporarily deprived of her right to speak at the Council). At other times, Russia threatened to leave the Council. Each time however she endeavoured to show that she had a legitimate place in this body which is devoted to questions of democracy. Both partners seemed to have passed master in the art of manoeuvres between acceptable public demonstrations and political understanding behind the scenes.

However something changed recently. Russia rebutted criticisms while really trying hard to work with the Council of Europe to find solutions that would be diplomatically acceptable for both parties, but now this desire for conciliation seems to have disappeared.

First of all, M. Sergueï Narychkine, president of the Douma, cancelled his visit to Strasbourg, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). He was to have made a certain number of proposals concerning ‘the building of a Europe without demarcation lines’. According to the Interfax agency, who quotes him, he abandoned the idea because of the attitude of

‘certain officials of the PACE and of certain Russophobe members of Parliament. This is why I have decided not to take part in the session, but I want to stress that I am ready to speak before the PACE as soon as the conditions are met for an objective examination of the problems which I see as relevant today.’

More unusual however is the Russian reaction to PACE’s negative report concerning the country’s respect for its commitments in the field of democracy and human rights. M. Dimitry Peskov, the spokesman for the Russian president, declared, regarding PACE’s official recommendations: “These comments and these appeals are inappropriate, and we will not listen to them.” There is something new in this uncompromising rebuff.

The situation has changed in more ways than one. On the one hand, the European model has lost a lot of its attractiveness in the present crisis. It is interesting to note in this respect that criticisms directed at Europe by M. Putin now concern the economy rather than politics. This crisis weakens the position of Strasbourg in relation to Moscow. After all, Russia has become an important financial contributor. In 2011, with 34 million dollars, she contributed 12 % of the total budget of the European Council.

The non-renewal of the Nunn-Lugar agreement.

The “Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs” (CTR), better known as the “Nunn-Lugar” agreement, from the names of two American senators who were at the origin of the project, was set up in 1991. Its objective was in particular to destroy nuclear and chemical weapons with the help of American experts and with American finance, after the economic collapse which followed the fall of the USSR.

It aimed at converting some military industries and at protecting sensitive technologies at a time when a contraband business in fissile material was reputed to be flourishing. The programme also aimed at the control and destruction of nuclear arsenals in the countries of the former USSR.

As far as Russia is concerned, the programme has reached its objectives. On the one hand the country wants to get rid of this image of a country in need of assistance which dates from the 90s. The vice minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sergueï Riabkov, meant nothing else when he declared: “This agreement does not suit us, especially if you take into account the fact that the situation has changed in Russia and that our financial capacities are in a healthy state.”

Russia therefore announced that she did not intend to renew the agreement when it came up for renewal in May 2013.

Conclusion

Moscow’s change of attitude towards Europe and towards the United States shows that the country considers itself totally committed to finding a new way, a way specific to itself. At the beginning, in the 90s, Russia looked abroad for references and a partnership, first of all with the United States. Its advances were not formally rejected, but Washington continued to treat Moscow as the poor relation. Russia then turned to Europe, but there too it found a condescending attitude and a desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the country to make it conform to its own image.

The American intransigence in the matter of the anti-missile shield is one of the causes of this change of heart. Europe’s attempts to intervene in its internal affairs, but mainly the contempt displayed towards the Russian position on the Middle East, are another cause. Moscow will not soon forget the use made by the Europeans and the Americans of the UN resolution on Libya, which Russia had not opposed.

The main thing is the fact that Western leaders are unable to find a solution to the global crisis. For many years Russians have thought that the West lived in a virtual world whereas they live in the real world. The Kremlin has concluded that we are living through a serious crisis of the economic and political system, and that liberalism has shown its limitations.

To use the words of Fedor Loukianov, editor in chief of the magazine *Russia in Global Affairs*,

“Vladimir Putin, who has secured in March his third mandate as president, is an experienced politician and he is quite pessimistic regarding the future of the world. His criticism of the West is different now to what it was only a few years ago.

He was indignant then that the West could or would not consider Russia as an equal partner, and said that the West was trying to harm her interests. Today he wonders why all the main world leaders act as if set on self destruction, and only succeed in making worse problems which are already very serious.” [15]

It is therefore urgent to find and establish a new system. A strong return to morality and spirituality are part of this search.

Is the break destined to get bigger? I do not think so. Is Russia looking eastwards? That is a legitimate attitude, considering both her geographical position and the development of the economies in Asia, which will soon become more important than those in the West. But Russia will always remain, for geographical and historical reasons, the link between Europe and Asia. In the words of the Russian Prime Minister, M. Dimitri Medvedev: “We have centuries of experience of being at the cross-road of different cultures and civilisations. That is why some call Russia a Eurasian or “Euro-Pacific” country. [16]

Relations with the United States will continue to have ups and downs, as long as the clichés inherited from the Cold War have not disappeared. But the relationship will also change, because, in the words of the American historian of the Soviet Union and of Russia Stephen Cohen:

‘Moscow no longer expects anything from Washington, apart from military security. Everything else, including the capitals she needs to modernise her economy, she can secure from her flourishing partnerships with China or Europe.’ [17]

As M. Henry Kissinger said after a meeting in Moscow with president Putin: “Russo-American relations are among the most important in the world, and I hope that these relations will develop in the future and improve in the coming months and years.”

Notes:

- [1] Stephen Cohen, "Failed Crusade", Norton & Company Inc., New York 2001
- [2] Naomi Klein, "La Stratégie du Choc" (p. 267/640) Actes Sud, 2008
- [3] Naomi Klein, *ibid*
- [4] "US Agency for International Development"
- [5] Michael Dobbs, *The Washington Post*, December 11, 2000
- [6] National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. Each year, with funding from the US Congress, NED supports more than 1,000 projects of non-governmental groups abroad who are working for democratic goals in more than 90 countries. [Own website]
- [7] NDI : "National Democratic Institute"
- [8] International Republican Institute. A non-profit, non-partisan organization, IRI advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, democratic governance and the rule of law.
- [9] William Engdahl, "Full Spectrum Dominance", Wiesbaden, 2009
- [10] "Politique Internationale" - La Revue n°106 - HIVER - 2005
- [11] Jonathan Mowat, "Coup d'Etat in Disguise, Washington's New World Order "Democratization" Template, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articl...>
- [12] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa>
- [13] <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/w...>
- [14] Michael A. McFaul, James M. Goldgeier, "Power and Purpose," 2003.
- [15] "Affaires intérieures affaires étrangères, la frontière s'efface", Par Fedor Loukianov, *Ria Novosti*, 05.10.2012
- [16] La Russie pivot du Dialogue Asie Europe - *Le Monde.fr* | 02.11.2012
- [17] Stephen Cohen 8 mars 2012 - *Huffington Post* □

All Hell Let Loose
The World at War 1939-1945
by Max Hastings

Reviewed by Donal Kennedy

A review in the Sunday Times calls this work "Unquestionably the best single-volume of the war ever written." Hastings himself reviews books in that paper and I always enjoy them. So perhaps the praise quoted is not exaggerated. If one is a pedant, that is. For, when Hastings strays from the great theatres of war to the happy little oasis of peace where I was born in 1941 he seems loosed from the disciplines of a reasoned commentator and free to indulge in ranting fantasies.

Dealing with war, his arguments appear to be supported by facts. I suspect if those facts prove insufficient to sustain his conclusions he would have the grace to confess himself mistaken. But, when strays away from the violence that is his bread and butter Max Hastings runs the risk of Hell's Fire.

He presents no evidence to support his denunciations of Eamon de Valera and Ireland's policy of neutrality. My Catholic teachers used warn of rushing to rash judgements. They also alluded to a Keep Out Of Hell clause whereby those who persisted in error would be granted Divine Mercy. It was called Invincible Ignorance. So there may be hope for Max Hastings yet.

The first reference to Ireland is a quotation from "American writer Joe Dees," "writing from" (neutral) New York to a British friend in January 1941" who says "All talk centers around England. Americans are proud of the way England is sticking it out" and "worried over Ireland's suicidal obstinacy (in remaining neutral)." Hastings apparently thinks it unremarkable that non-belligerent Americans are proud of belligerent Brits and fearful for the lives of the benighted Irish, who, by keeping out of a fight, are apparently risking suicide. You'd wonder what Hastings was smoking when he provided his readers with this nugget.

Ireland's refusal to surrender her ports, which she had only recovered in 1938, to what Hastings calls "the mother country", he attributes to "the fanatical loathing of Irish Prime Minister Eamon de Valera for his British neighbours." Hastings claims that Ireland depended on Britain for most of its vital commodities and all of its fuel. I can remember when I first saw coal and believe it was after the war was over. On the Hill of Howth we burned turf in our fires, and though we had no bogs on the Hill I had never realised that we owed that turf to Mr. Churchill's largesse. We had electric light, and my father, an Engineer, helped build the hydroelectric works on the Shannon in the 1920s, which contributed to the state's resources. We had (rationed) gas, produced from coal, which may have been mined in Britain. As for eggs, we had fresh eggs from our own hens, and I know of no contemporaries brought up in Ireland who had powdered eggs or powdered milk. Local cows and local goats provided us with milk. We had fish from our territorial waters and never tasted snoek. Britain didn't provide us with beef, ham or lamb, nor the leather for our shoes. We had fruit and vegetables grown locally and did not depend on a British airlift for our potatoes. I may be wrong, but I believe that Ireland helped feed Britain during the war, and any necessities she got from Britain did not arise from Mr. Churchill's concern for her welfare.

The only time I felt deprived of anything was when I beheld a pedal car in a nearby garden, which had me green with envy. I can't recall setting eyes on its owner, but heard that his father

was a Captain Dowds. I learned later that he was a Sea Captain, of a schooner belonging to IRISH SHIPPING LIMITED set up in 1941 to help obtain necessities from overseas. Crossing the Bay of Biscay, he was called on to halt by a British warship, which sent a Boarding Party to search his ship. Commanding the Boarding Party was an Irishman, who had been taught Navigation by Captain Dowds in Dun Laoghaire. You might well ask - "How many owed so much to whom?"

Mr. Hastings returns to his attack on Eamon de Valera - "Irish Prime Minister Eamon de Valera, flaunting to the end his loathing of his British neighbours, paid a formal call upon the German Embassy in Dublin to express his condolences on the death of the Reich's head of state."

When Franklyn Roosevelt died a few weeks before Hitler, Ireland's National Flag was flown at half-mast and de Valera paid tribute to him in Dail Eireann, which adjourned as a mark of respect. Hastings does not recall that event. The American Minister in Dublin, David Grey, had treated the Irish Government with contempt for some years. Not knowing how to deal with Dev, Grey would contact Arthur Balfour, who had lived in the Minister's residence in the 1880s when he was Britain's Chief Secretary there. As he had been dead since 1930 the Minister employed Occult means to consult him. This scene might have furnished hilarious copy for Grahame Greene or Evelyn Waugh if set in Haiti or Africa, provided the American Minister been a darker shade than Grey. The German Minister in Dublin had not overstepped the bounds of civility or diplomacy and Dev's visit to his Legation followed diplomatic protocol, nothing further.

Unlike some of de Valera's critics in Ireland and in Britain, de Valera never voiced admiration for the ideologies of Mussolini, Franco or Hitler, nor did he adopt their uniforms nor praise or encourage their adventures. When, in the mid 1930s Italy launched her murderous attack on Abyssinia, de Valera, at the League of Nations, supported a British motion to apply sanctions to the aggressor. In Ireland, he was attacked by Fine Gael for not supporting Italy. For the record it should be stated that amongst the admirers of Mussolini's adventure was Winston Churchill, then ploughing a lonely political furrow, Pope Pius XI, and even Italian Jews. These "surrendered their own holy artefacts, including the gold key of the Ark of the Covenant from their Synagogue in Rome." Together with Christian artefacts they were melted down to finance the Fascist adventure.

I doubt de Valera ever expressed loathing for any nation, nor, indeed, any individual, nor that he ever hated anyone. His Christianity was sincere, and his intelligence would have recoiled from such stupidity. Ireland's British enemies during the Tan War denounced him for his Hispanic ancestry, as did Cumann na Gael in the 1920s, but he never stooped to such silly tactics. A keen Rugby player, he had been to a school where, if someone passed wind, they were said to be "offside" and coarseness of speech and thought was not his style.

He pursued aims by the force of argument, not the argument of force. His private affairs he entrusted to Protestant, Unionist, Solicitors in Dublin over many decades and his son Terry joined the firm. On the 50th anniversary of the Easter Insurrection, he welcomed as his guest the British Officer who had arrested him then.

Far be it from me to suggest that either Ireland or de Valera never made mistakes or that everything they did was right. But I would suggest that, on the ten occasions Ireland chose Dev as her leader, and the lesser number of occasions when she didn't, she chose wisely. □