

# Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”  
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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In February Irish Justice Minister Alan Shatter announced that Irish soldiers, under British control, will go to Mali in support of France's re-occupation of its former colony. He did not say why.

The British-Irish military intervention in Mali can be traced back to the western coup against Libya's Colonel Gaddafi. France has moved to protect its strategic economic interests in the region.

The official reason for re-occupation is to roll back an Al-Qaida takeover of Mali involving fanatical Taliban-style religious persecution and atrocities.

According to a 2008 report by a French parliamentary committee, about 18 per cent of the raw material used to power France's 58 nuclear reactors came from neighbouring Niger in 2008. Mali itself is rich in uranium and other minerals. For example, it produces four tons of gold every year, mined by men, women and small children for a pittance, in desperate working conditions.

Nuclear energy, including "weaponisable" nuclear power, has been a contentious issue in the region, from Gaddafi's Libya through to Israel and Iran, and including Iran's great enemy Saudi Arabia. Control of nuclear resources and raw materials is a major issue, and Mali is central to it.

Mali's 14 million people, predominantly Muslim, are mostly sub-Saharan black African, with some Arabs and about 10 per cent lighter-skinned Tuareg inhabiting the extensive arid northern parts adjoining Algeria. The Tuareg are a Berber people, the linguistic group indigenous to North West Africa – the "Barbery" Coast.

Colonial French warfare against the Berbers was marked by "razzia" – subjugation by military destruction and plunder. When Timbuktu, an ancient centre of learning, was captured in 1894, the Southern part of France's African Empire was united with Algeria in a great land mass known as French West Africa.

After Mali ("French Sudan") was de-colonised by France in 1960, secessionist Tuareg in Northern Mali rebelled against the Mali government.

Following the latest Tuareg rebellion there was a military coup against the Mali government. The Irish-British expeditionary force is in support of the new military dictatorship in Mali, to put down the Tuareg rebellion.

Relations between Berber/Tuaregs, Arabs and black Africans in the region involve ethnic tension and political differences. In Mali the differences are as deep and real as those in Northern Ireland. But despite the western propaganda about extremist "Islamist" terror and oppression, the differences are not due to religion. The women are not veiled. Tuareg men wear a facial veil, for customary rather than religious reasons.

Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, an Arab, successfully sought to stabilise Mali and to reduce ethnic tensions between the population groups. When Gaddafi was overthrown by a western coup in support of "Islamists", many well-armed Tuareg soldiers who had been resisting Al-Qaeda in Libya returned to Azawad, the secessionist part of Mali.

One of the Malian Tuareg rebels, Lyad ag Ghali, formed a minority group called Ansar ud-Din (Defenders of the Faith) and proclaimed a policy of imposing Sharia law. This has provided cover for the French re-occupation. There are reports of atrocities on both sides. Some reports of rebel atrocities in Timbuktu have been shown to be fabrications.

The British-Irish military expedition in support of the Mali military dictatorship is not for combat but for training, including "gender awareness".

This information comes from the British government. Irish involvement was embarked on without consulting Dáil Éireann or any other form of public discussion. In that respect the Irish government is no better than the Mali military regime that it is now allied with.

The Irish government is practically silent about this highly significant departure. So is this another sneaky attempt to re-orient Irish foreign policy?

Shatter gave no compelling reason for Irish involvement in Mali; the agreement (to put Irish soldiers under British command in an imperialist sortie) was "historical" and came just under two years since the visit of Queen Elizabeth: "*It is yet another indicator of the total normalisation of relationships between all of us on this island, the island of Ireland, and between this State and the United Kingdom.*" 'Irish, UK troops to deploy to Mali' *Irish Times*, 13 Feb 2013.

Nothing in particular to do with Mali, then. Just the first green shoots of getting things back to normal between Ireland and Britain, the way they were before the unfortunate parting of the ways between the two countries. Well, one country really. After all, for more than a century Ireland was the backbone of British power, in the sense of providing the bulk of the cannon fodder for world conquest. Then, like now, the good-hearted Paddies did not ask their master for reasons when they signed up in droves for the killing fields. Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die.

The following statement by British "defence" minister Philip Hammond provides more information.

'We welcome the Irish contribution which will help develop further working relations between our two countries,' said Mr Hammond. Philip Hammond, the defence secretary, confirmed that Britain would contribute 40 personnel to a European Union training mission due to start in the spring.

Twenty-one soldiers from 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment will do the infantry training, and 12 personnel will carry out mortar and artillery training.

In addition, the UK is contributing four personnel to the headquarters staff and three civilians from the Foreign Office's Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative to provide human rights and gender awareness training.

The team will be augmented by a further six infantry trainers from the Republic of Ireland. 'Britain to send Military Advisers to Mali', *Daily Telegraph*, 18 Feb 2013.

In the circumstances, Kevin Myers has done a public service by speaking plainly in the Irish Independent newspaper on 15 February 2013:

'But be in no doubt. The Mali training mission has nothing to do with traditional "peacekeeping": the days of social workers with guns are over, the era of peace-enforcing, by violent means, is upon us.

From Nigeria to Somalia, throughout the Arab world, and on either side of the Hindu Kush, armed Islamism is resurgent. Ireland is now taking its place in the line in the great war of values, which was formally declared on 9/11. NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen says he would welcome Irish membership of NATO. So would I. ... FINALLY, finally, some sense has prevailed in the Army's relationship with the British army. The deployment

of a handful of Army soldiers on a training mission in Mali with soldiers of the Royal Irish Regiment, a full 90 years after the two armies went their separate ways, is a long overdue recognition of political, cultural and geographical realities. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the Minister responsible is Jewish, and is therefore less beholden to the traditions of querulous deference to "republican" sensitivities, which has gravely undermined the willingness of our political classes to engage in any closer military co-operation with the British.

'Helping Britain's army marks end of "social workers with guns" era', *Irish Independent*, 15 Feb 2013.

The excuse for foreign conquest used to be Christian salvation, or Progress, or Civilisation, or Human Rights. It can be Democracy, but that's an awkward one in the case of Mali, where we want to prop up a compliant military dictatorship which just happens to be sitting on mineral riches.

Judging by the Irish government's conduct, it seems we no longer actually need a reason to align ourselves with forces using missiles, drones, smart bombs and depleted uranium. We pay the wages of our soldiers, supposedly as a "defence force" for Ireland. But the government does not see fit even to invite public discussion by our political representatives before involving them in propping up a military regime in another continent.

**War with Everybody** is a foreign affairs article (29.10.1842), still profoundly relevant, from the third issue of the *Nation* newspaper, founded in 1842 by Thomas Davis and Charles Gavan Duffy:

War with everybody is at present the enviable condition of our amiable sister of England.

At the uttermost end of earth her soldiers and sailors are triumphing – if triumph that can be called which is victory without glory – over a nation of feminine creatures, destitute even of the brute instinct of resistance, and apparently incapable of imitating the most timid animals, which becomes valorous by despair. Thousands of these unhappy wretches, who yet, be it remembered, are human beings, nurtured to men's estate, not without many sufferings, tears and cares, – every one of them having parents, wives, children, friends, or some or all of these

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to lament their loss – are being butchered mercilessly – mowed down by canister and grape, or driven into the rivers at the point of the bayonet – and for what?

Why, simply, because a horde of scoundrel smugglers, busy in the pursuit of unhallowed gain, have been interdicted by the Emperor of China – a potentate whose relation towards his subjects is less monarchical than paternal – from poisoning with their contraband opium the bodies, and rendering more imbecile the minds of his People.

This is, truly, an honourable warfare for a great, moral (!) and religious (!!) nation to be engaged in; and we need hardly say, we wish it all the success it deserves.

Then, in the country beyond the Indus, where, really and truly, they had no business whatever – in Affghanistan – where ruled a monarch friendly, or at least not hostile, to the British – some insane fear of Russia and Persia, or rather some accursed lust of power, plunder, and blood-letting, disguised under the mask of affected fear, set armies in motion through dangerous passes, and over barren mountains, to achieve the semblance of a triumph in the capture of Cabul, and the dethronement of Dost Mahomed – the best, if not the only friend the British had in these barbarous regions.

But there are no Chinese men-women in Affghanistan, nor is Akhbar Khan a mandarin of the third button.

The doctrine of resistance is perfectly well understood among these fierce children of the crescent; and fearfully have they carried this doctrine into practice. Let the bones of thirteen thousand British subjects, whitening in the wintry blast, testify how dearly England has paid for her unjust, and worse than that – her foolish, her stupid aggression upon this indomitable People.

There is no disguising the fact: England has been "thrashed" by a fellow living at the back of a mountain, this said Akhbar Khan. He shot down their Envoy – exterminated their legions – carried away captive their women and children; and the whole energy, wisdom and bravery of their rulers are now put into action, not to subdue the Affghans – not to tax them – not to divide and govern them – not even to convert them; but to buy off British women and children, get the most respectable [terms?] they can for future transactions.. ... (reprinted in **The Nation: Selections 1842-1844**, Aubane Historical Society, 2000; Volume One: Young Ireland, Daniel O'Connell, Monster Meetings, State Trials, A New Irish Culture.)

The remainder of this article ranges widely over world political and economic affairs, including contemporary rebellions in Canada, American protectionist tariffs, and German national development.

Colonel Gaddafi sought to stabilise the regional state system in Africa. In Mali he achieved a degree of reconciliation between Tuareg, Arab and black Africans. Whether or not it is an unintended consequence, the destruction of Libya has set in train the unravelling of adjoining states. Nigeria, Chad and Niger are now vulnerable.

Ireland did not participate actively in the overthrow of Gaddafi. Why should it dabble mischievously in the resulting mess? Whatever one's views might be about propping up the Mali military regime, it seems certain that the situation in that country is a direct consequence of the western push against Gaddafi's government.

Just like Afghanistan, it seems a safe bet that this new Irish involvement in imperialism, undertaken as *fait accompli* and without public discussion, will not end well. □

## JFK Conspiracy Theories Part 3

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by John Martin

### The Garrison Investigation

In May 1963, not long after his assassination attempt on General Walker, Lee Harvey Oswald left Dallas to seek employment in New Orleans, the city of his birth. He remained there until the 25<sup>th</sup> of September when he set off for Mexico City before returning to Dallas in early October. If there was a conspiracy, some believe it could have been hatched in the “Big Easy”.

In November 1966 Jim Garrison, a District Attorney for New Orleans, initiated an investigation of the JFK assassination. This was not just a private investigation; Garrison could mobilise the resources of the City in pursuing the case.

It appears that the starting point was the Warren Commission testimony of a New Orleans lawyer called Dean Andrews, who claimed a client contacted him on the weekend following the assassination with a request to represent Lee Harvey Oswald. Andrews identified this client as “Clay Bertrand”.

Andrews had – he claimed – only ever seen Bertrand two or three times. Communication was usually by phone. Bertrand paid for the defence of a group of Mexican homosexuals who had a frequent need of legal services. Andrews claimed that on a couple of occasions Lee Harvey Oswald accompanied these homosexuals at his office. The services that Oswald required related to reversing his dishonourable discharge from the Marines as well as obtaining US citizenship for his Russian wife.

All of this was intriguing; it conflicted with the conventional view that Oswald was a left wing loner. Although Andrews couldn't say what Oswald's sexual orientation was, it was suggested that he was a “swinging cat” (i.e. a bisexual). However, Andrews had no contact details for Bertrand and this mysterious character was never found. There were no records of any transactions with this person (Andrews claimed his office had been burgled). So it looked like this colourful, jive-talking, New Orleans lawyer was another one of the numerous attention seekers that bedevilled the Warren Commission.

Another strand to Garrison's investigation related to a rumour that a person called David Ferrie was involved in the assassination.

Even by the colourful standards of New Orleans, Ferrie was a bizarre character? He had failed in his ambition to become a priest. He was a homosexual, who had compromised himself at work losing his job as a pilot for Eastern Airlines; and was a participant in various right wing anti Castro activities including the Bay of Pigs invasion. He had done work for Carlos Marcello's lawyer. Marcello at the time was reputed to have been one of the most powerful mafia leaders in the United States.

It should be emphasised that a lawyer who represents a reputed mafia leader is not necessarily himself guilty of

illegal activities. The same applies to Ferrie, who merely did investigative work. So, while it would be accurate to say that he had “mafia associations”, it does not follow that there was anything sinister in this.

The other notable characteristic of Ferrie was his remarkable appearance. He suffered from chronic alopecia, which left him without any hair. He wore a red toupée and false eyebrows.

The source for the rumours about Ferrie's involvement in the JFK assassination came from a person called Jack Martin (né Ed Suggs). Notwithstanding his distinguished name it would be difficult to come up with a more unreliable witness. He had a criminal record; was an alcoholic; and known to be a teller of tall tales.

The investigation appeared to be about to grind to a halt following the death (from a brain haemorrhage) of the chief suspect David Ferrie in February 1967. However, it was reignited when a person called Perry Raymond Russo came forward. He wrote a letter to Garrison indicating that he knew David Ferrie and had some information about the assassination. Before Garrison had received the letter Russo approached the media to tell his story. He claimed to have known Ferrie very well and confirmed that the latter talked frequently about killing Kennedy. Russo did not know Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination. This story was confirmed in an interview at Russo's home in Baton Rouge with the Assistant District Attorney Andy Sciambra.

A few days later Russo travelled to New Orleans where he was subjected to unorthodox interview techniques by the office of the District Attorney. He agreed to have sodium pentothal administered to him as well as being subjected to hypnosis. Sodium pentothal is sometimes called a “truth serum”. It is claimed that it releases painful memories that have been repressed. In the past it achieved prominence in child abuse cases where adults “discovered” for the first time that they had been sexually abused as children. However, it is not now considered reliable forensic evidence. While the patient might become more uninhibited, he also becomes more suggestible. So if the interviewer or psychiatrist suggests something that never happened, the patient might very well end up believing that it, in fact, did. So according to this view the drug doesn't release memories that have been repressed but induces a false memory.

Following his interviews in New Orleans Russo's story had been transformed. He now “remembered” attending a party or “gathering” at Ferrie's place at which the assassination of John F. Kennedy was planned. The other attendees at this event, apart from Ferrie, were “Clem Bertrand” and “Leon Oswald”.

At last some corroboration for Dean Andrews' story! Okay, the first names are a little off. Russo said “Clem” rather than “Clay” Bertrand and “Leon” rather than “Lee Harvey” Oswald, but if he had remembered the names precisely, it would have



been even more difficult to explain why he took more than three years to come forward with his sensational story.

Even more was to follow. Russo was able to identify the true identity of “Clem Bertrand”. Clem Bertrand’s real name was Clay Shaw (the same forename as Andrews’ “Clay Bertrand”). Jim Garrison was able to announce to a gasping world press that the crime of the century had been solved!

One of the first questions that arose was the motive for the crime. Clay Shaw was a homosexual as was Ferrie, so Garrison deduced that the motive was a “homosexual thrill killing” along the lines – he thought – of the Leopold and Loeb case immortalised by Alfred Hitchcock in the film “Rope”(1). Interestingly, it is not generally believed that there was a homosexual motive for this famous crime from 1924. The fact that Garrison thought there was tells us something of his own preoccupations (2).

However, as well as the World Press, conspiracy theorists (many of a liberal, left political persuasion) descended on New Orleans. It is likely that it was explained to Garrison that the homosexual angle was preposterous and accordingly the motive was transformed into a right wing conspiracy involving the CIA.

The first obstacle that Garrison faced was the preliminary hearing. He had to prove that the State had a prima facie case against Shaw before it could come to trial. His case was heavily dependent on the evidence of Russo. He was the only witness with any evidence of a conspiracy to kill Kennedy. The case either stood or fell on the credibility of this person.

Firstly, the obvious question was why Russo had taken more than three years to tell his story. The suspicion of Shaw’s defence team was that following the death of Ferrie, Russo realised that nobody could contradict his story.

Secondly, as mentioned above how could Russo explain the evolution of his story. In the initial media interviews in Baton Rouge he said he didn’t know either Oswald or Shaw. As the defence counsel pointed out, he had produced a “rabbit” in Baton Rouge, which had been transformed into a “lion” in New Orleans. The New Orleans interview was the first time “Clem Bertrand” and “Leon Oswald” were mentioned as participating in a conspiracy to kill the President.

Thirdly, why was Russo made privy to the conspiracy unless, of course, he was part of it? But Russo denied any involvement notwithstanding his dislike of Kennedy (he campaigned for Barry Goldwater in 1964).

Fourthly, why would Shaw use a pseudonym? Shaw was a business and civic leader in New Orleans. He was the Managing Director of the International Trade Mart, which was a project designed to encourage foreign trade with New Orleans. In this connection he was frequently on television and the print media. As well as this he had a striking appearance. He was 6 foot 4 inches, broad shouldered, with a shock of white hair. Once seen he was not easily forgotten. How could such a person get away with using a pseudonym?

Finally, there was the question of Shaw’s credibility versus that of Russo. Shaw was a decorated war hero and admirer of

Kennedy, whom he had once met at the White House. Russo’s reputation was far less impressive. He hated Kennedy and although a college graduate seemed to hang around with some odd characters. In court he said that he sold pornography that Ferrie had imported from Cuba. He also admitted to seeing a psychiatrist.

In short, the evidence against Shaw was pretty flimsy. Nevertheless, Garrison managed to convince the Grand Jury (consisting of three judges) in the preliminary hearing that there was a prima facie case and so it was allowed to go to trial.

Paradoxically, the weakness of the prosecution case presented a problem for the defence. Shaw denied ever having met either Ferrie or Russo, so the defence was left flapping at thin air. There was nothing specific to rebut. Indeed, the defence counsel Irving Diamond complained that it would have been much easier to defend his client if Shaw had known Russo or Ferrie. Then the defence would not have had to attempt to undermine the credibility of the witnesses who claimed they saw Shaw in the company of Oswald or Ferrie and the court could concentrate on the details of the alleged conspiracy.

A feature of the Trial was that the Prosecution felt it necessary to impeach the conclusions of the Warren Commission, which concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Indeed one of its most famous critics, Mark Lane, was in the court prompting the prosecution team. Irving Diamond for the defence felt it necessary to remind the jury that Clay Shaw was on trial and that disagreement with the Warren Commission was not sufficient grounds for finding him guilty.

Another feature of the trial was the resources available to the prosecution team. It emerged that a group of wealthy businessmen had contributed almost \$100,000. Apparently there was no law against private individuals helping the State to prosecute a criminal case against an individual they did not like.

The trial of Shaw did not begin until almost two years after he was arrested in March 1967. It descended into farce when one of the pillars of the prosecution case collapsed. Dean Andrews admitted that the name Clay Bertrand was a figment of his imagination. This begged the question as to how the prosecution could come up with a witness who substantiated Andrews’ fairy tale. It appeared that the State had manufactured evidence against an innocent person.

There was no surprise that the jury took less than an hour to return a not guilty verdict. The *New York Times* described the trial of Clay Shaw as “one of the most disgraceful chapters in the history of American jurisprudence” (3). But Shaw’s ordeal had not ended. Having lost the case Garrison sued him for perjury. Russo admitted privately to a member of Shaw’s defence team that Shaw was not at the famous party at which the assassination of Kennedy was supposed to have been planned. But when Russo was called as a witness he pleaded the fifth amendment on the very reasonable (and ignoble) grounds that if he had given a truthful reply he would have incriminated himself.

Shaw won this case and also succeeded in obtaining an injunction preventing Garrison from bringing further cases against him. But his victories were Pyrrhic and seemed to have no effect on the court of public opinion. Garrison was re-elected

as District Attorney beating Harry Connick, the father of the famous singer. The publicity might even have helped the sale of Garrison's books (nobody was interested in Shaw's story).

Shaw had been a wealthy man before he was dragged into Garrison's mire. By the early 1970s he had been driven to the edge of bankruptcy. In 1977 he received further legal vindication when the US court of Appeals accepted his claim for compensation from Garrison and the State of Louisiana. The Court described Garrison's actions as "persecution" and the trial of Shaw as "Kafkaesque" (4). But no legal remedy was available since Shaw had died in 1974 at the age of 61.

It is probable that Jim Garrison would have been consigned to an unpleasant footnote in the story of the JFK assassination. But in 1991 he was rehabilitated by Hollywood. Oliver Stone's film *JFK* is the gospel according to Garrison. To add insult to injury the real Jim Garrison was given a cameo appearance playing Justice Earl Warren.

It is possible that Stone did his film without the aid of sodium pentothal or other drugs. Nevertheless it is indisputable that he "remembers" far more than even Perry Raymond Russo. In Stone's version Ferrie confesses his crimes to Garrison and Ferrie doesn't die of natural causes but is murdered by a sinister representative of dark forces.

Garrison is played by Kevin Costner. He is not an unscrupulous demagogue but the quintessential American hero fighting for truth and justice.

The actor Tommy Lee Jones portrays Shaw as an effete, decadent type.

Russo was a consultant to the film and expressed satisfaction at the result, but his character is distorted out of all recognition. The person, who reveals the assassination plot, is a handsome, right wing, rent boy, played by Kevin Bacon. Russo, on the other hand, although he described himself as a "pervert" was a heterosexual. However, it must be admitted that in this instance Stone's fantasy is more plausible than Russo's. In 1963 when Russo was supposed to be seeing Ferrie regularly he was in his early twenties while the unprepossessing Ferrie was in his early forties and Shaw was in his early fifties. Russo seemed to share some of Ferrie's right wing views, but would that be enough to explain why Ferrie and Russo saw each other regularly? Shaw, on the other hand, described himself as being a liberal in the tradition of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Stone's rent boy theory is pure invention, but it is at least a more plausible explanation for such diverse people as Russo, Ferrie and Shaw finding themselves in the same room together.

Another difference between the film and Russo's evidence is the scene in which the assassination of the President is planned. Russo describes it as a relatively sedate gathering whereas the film portrays it as a drug fuelled homosexual orgy. Again, Stone's fantasy is more plausible than Russo's. It is inconceivable that conspirators to the assassination would reveal their plans to someone who was not involved unless they were completely out of their minds.

### **Anthony Summers on Garrison**

To Anthony Summers' credit he had very little influence on Oliver Stone's film. His book (*Conspiracy: Who killed*

*President Kennedy*) was published in 1980, mid way between the end of the Shaw Trial in 1969 and the release of Stone's film in 1991.

By 1980 the Garrison investigation had been discredited and at first sight hardly features in Summers' book. According to the book's index Garrison appears on four pages; Shaw appears once; and there is no mention at all of Perry Raymond Russo. However, in some respects the Garrison investigation remained influential even before Stone's film. His fingerprints are all over some of the themes covered by Summers and other conspiracy orientated writers.

One of the most famous alleged sightings of Oswald before the assassination was in Clinton, Louisiana: a town with a population of 1,500, 90 miles North of New Orleans. It was ignored by the Warren Commission but was quite an important part of the Shaw trial.

As discussed the weakness in the prosecution case against Shaw was that it was dependent on one witness: Perry Raymond Russo. Garrison failed to produce any credible witness in New Orleans that saw Oswald with Shaw. He had to go all the way up to Clinton to find such accommodating witnesses. Summers gives only a very partial account of the Clinton witnesses.

Oswald was supposed to have arrived in Jackson which is the neighbouring township to Clinton, looking for a job. He first went to a barber late in the afternoon. Summers doesn't tell us that the barber, Edwin Lea McGehee, thought that Oswald arrived in a battered car with a woman: perhaps Marina Oswald! Here we have the first problem: neither Oswald nor Marina could drive and didn't have a car. Secondly, if someone was living in New Orleans looking for employment, why would he travel "on spec" to a small town to find a job, especially if he didn't own a car.

Thirdly, the "Oswald" character was looking for a job as an electrician in a local hospital. But the real Oswald had no qualifications. The barber recommended that "Oswald" go to the local Louisiana State representative for advice. This person, Reeves Morgan, recommended that he register to vote.

The story now takes a bizarre twist. Instead of arriving in a battered car he is next seen in a Cadillac with two men at around 10.00am in Clinton. According to the Town Marshall John Manchester – and other witnesses - Clay Shaw was in the driver's seat and David Ferrie was in the passenger seat, while Oswald was in the back.

The Oswald character steps out of the Cadillac and queues in order to register for a vote. Here we have a lacuna. After meeting the barber and then the local politician in the evening what did Oswald do? Did he and Marina stay over night in the Clinton/Jackson area or did they return to New Orleans? What were the changed circumstances that enabled Oswald to emerge from a Cadillac in a subsequent morning? Summers has no views on these questions.

The sightings of Oswald in the Jackson/Clinton area are from more than one person. Indeed, the stories of the witnesses appear to corroborate each other. However, they are remarkably vague as to when they saw Oswald, who had become one of the most famous (or notorious) people on the planet by November 22nd.

It was some time between "late August and early September 1963". They could not be more precise than that. However, McGehee and Morgan remembered that it was a cool day. Shaw's defence team called a meteorologist who said that the town of Clinton was basking in a heatwave from mid August to mid September. At no time did the peak daily temperature fall below 85 degrees fahrenheit (29 degrees centigrade). On most days it was above 90 degrees (32 degrees centigrade).

An explanation for the contradiction is revealed by evidence from Henry Earl Palmer, the registrar of voters in Clinton. On May 29, 1967, he gave his first formal, signed statement to the DA's office. He said that "some time between September 1st and October 15th of 1963 he had occasion to talk to Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. Palmer said he feels very strongly that it was in the first week of October, possibly around the 6th or 7th" (5).

Since Oswald had left the State of Louisiana on 25<sup>th</sup> of September, never to return this would have been another crack in the very shaky prosecution case.

However, in the trial in 1969 Palmer reverts to the consensus view that Oswald was in the Jackson/Clinton area in late August or early September. In my view it looks like the original story from witnesses was that Oswald was seen in early October. When it was realised that Oswald had left the State of Louisiana on 25<sup>th</sup> of September the story had to be changed. However, McGehee and Morgan retained the detail about the weather conditions in the original story. We know that Oliver Stone's hero, Jim Garrison, had the habit of threatening witnesses with a charge of perjury if their statements were not to his liking (6).

But what are we to make of the story about Oswald's attempt to vote? This was a tumultuous time in America. The Blacks were campaigning for Civil Rights. As part of this campaign an organisation called the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was mobilising the Blacks to register to vote. It was in this volatile atmosphere that Oswald alighted from the black Cadillac. Incredibly, Oswald arrived at about 10.00am in the morning and was queuing all day. The Cadillac remained parked outside the Clinton Registrar's office waiting for him to complete his business. He was one of among only two whites in the queue. Late in the afternoon the town registrar (Palmer) told him that since he was not a resident he was not entitled to vote. So, apparently, the day had been wasted for Oswald, Ferrie and Shaw.

CORE workers Willie Dunn and Corrie Collins thought the Cadillac represented an unwelcome visit from the FBI (are FBI agents in the habit of driving around in Cadillacs?!). Summers offers the opinion that Black political leaders interpreted the FBI presence as a means to intimidate. This is not my understanding of the civil rights struggle in the 1960s. The FBI representing the Federal State was in conflict with local law enforcement officials over racial integration. Summers does not tell us the political allegiances of some of the key witnesses. Both the registrar of voters Henry Earl Palmer and the town marshall, John Manchester, were members of the Ku Klux Klan. The barber Edwin McGehee and the State assembly man Reeves Morgan had similar racist political views (7).

What does Anthony Summers make of all this? He says:

"Lee Harvey's role in the episode remains unexplained. The intention may have been to link him with another left-wing cause" (page 336 and 337).

In my view this is nonsensical. No witness in the Shaw trial was under the impression that the Oswald character was associated with the CORE activists. If Oswald was trying to associate himself with a left wing cause for the purposes of discrediting it, why would he arrive in a Cadillac? Why would the driver of the Cadillac dissociate himself from CORE (John Manchester's testimony)? Why would the Oswald character say to the Registrar that the reason he wanted to vote was that he was looking for employment in a local hospital?

There are numerous reasons why Clay Shaw could not have been the driver. For example, he was particularly busy at the Trade Mart project at the time and would have been missed if he had taken a day off. He didn't own a Cadillac and there is no credible evidence of him associating with David Ferrie, never mind Oswald. Summers suggests that the various witnesses who identified Shaw were mistaken and that the person who was actually driving the Cadillac was a person called Guy Bannister.

Bannister is certainly a more likely candidate than Shaw. He was an ex FBI man of right wing political views, an associate of Ferrie, who ran a private detective agency in New Orleans. He also, as we shall see, had a tenuous connection with Oswald. However, Summers does not tell us that the question of whether the person driving the Cadillac could have been Guy Bannister was tested in the Trial of Clay Shaw.

While the prosecution in the Shaw Trial could pursue a political agenda to undermine the Warren Commission conclusions, the defence team could not afford such a luxury. A guilty verdict would have resulted in a life sentence for their client (capital punishment had been suspended in 1967). Accordingly, while defence of the Warren Commission would have exonerated their client, they were quite prepared to consider conspiracy theories which did not involve him.

Shaw's defence team showed a picture of Guy Bannister (played by Ed Asner in the Oliver Stone's film) to both John Manchester and Henry Earl Palmer. Both said under oath that Bannister was not the driver of the Cadillac. Even more disappointing from the defence team's point of view was that it turned out that Palmer actually knew Bannister. So he could be certain that he had not mistaken Shaw for Bannister.

In my opinion Summers is indulging in similar wishful thinking to that of Oliver Stone. He is inserting his own ideas into a fantastic story to give it some plausibility. But a reading of the transcript of the Shaw Trial indicates that there is no possibility that Manchester or Palmer were "mistaken". Manchester claimed that the driver of the Cadillac identified himself as being from the International Trade Mart. Palmer claimed that a check of the car traced it to the International Trade Mart even though the International Trade Mart did not have cars registered with it.

Nothing about the Clinton sightings makes any sense. Therefore, in my opinion, the witnesses were lying – most likely under pressure from Garrison's investigative team. Any evidence produced from the Garrison investigation must be regarded with scepticism.

## **Guy Bannister**

Finally, there is one piece of evidence relating to Oswald's activities in New Orleans that is not easy to explain. On a small



proportion of the pro Castro literature that he was distributing there is the address 544 Camp Street, New Orleans.

The 544 Camp Street address was in the same building as the address of Guy Bannister's detective agency. The latter address was 531 Lafayette Street. So, although the addresses shared the same building, there were separate entrances. Also, within each address there was no connecting door. So, contrary to the impression given by many conspiracy theorists including Anthony Summers (page 315), the 544 Camp Street address was not the address of Guy Bannister's detective agency, but it was adjacent to it.

What are we to make of this? The only evidence that Oswald rented the office is the hand made stamp on some of the literature he was distributing. In his correspondence with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) organisation in New York he said that he rented an office (no address was given) for 3 days, but implied that he was evicted for political reasons. In my opinion Oswald was exaggerating his level of commitment and had never rented any office on behalf of the FPCC.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) interviewed the landlord for the premises, Sam Newman. The Bannister business was the only tenant in 531 Lafayette Street. There had been two tenants in the 544 Camp Street address during the period that Oswald was in New Orleans (from May 1963 to September 1963): the *Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Workers Union*; and the *Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America*. Neither Oswald nor the FPCC was a tenant in that period. None of the employees of the Unions that were tenants remembered ever seeing Oswald in the premises.

There was also a coffee shop on the ground floor, with a separate entrance. The proprietor of the shop Jack Mancuso described Bannister, Ferrie and Jack Martin as "steady customers" but did not recall ever seeing Oswald. The janitor of the premises, James Arthus, could not recall ever seeing Oswald.

Some of Bannister's associates said that he was "aware of Oswald" before the assassination. One of them, Ivan Nitschke, claimed that Bannister had some of Oswald's handbills in his office. This is not too surprising when it is considered that Bannister was an anti Castro activist and that Oswald had been distributing pro Castro leaflets within a short distance of Bannister's office as well as being on a local radio station defending Castro.

The HSCA interviewed numerous associates of Bannister. Only two claimed to have seen Oswald in Bannister's office. These were Jack Martin and Delphine Roberts. In both cases the HSCA found their evidence unreliable since on previous occasions they had denied that they had ever seen Oswald in New Orleans. Anthony Summers in his book seems to take Roberts claims very seriously and doesn't mention that the HSCA rejected her evidence.

Gerald Posner in his book *Case Closed* makes the point that Roberts claims to be related to the "King and Queen of Wales (sic) and Mary Queen of Scots" as well as "being one of the very few, since the beginning of the world, who has ever read the sacred scrolls that God himself wrote and gave to the ancient Hebrews for placing in the Ark of the Covenant" (8).

## The Mafia

Jim Garrison has been criticised by many conspiracy theorists for not investigating Mafia involvement in the JFK assassination. As mentioned above David Ferrie and Guy Bannister had "Mafia associations" even if those associations appear to have been innocuous.

Any reading of the literature surrounding the JFK assassination cannot avoid the conclusion that the Mafia had a pervasive presence in American society during the early 1960s.

The Mafia had extensive interests in Cuba, which were destroyed following Castro's accession to power. In this respect there was an identity of interests between the American State and the Mafia: both wanted to get rid of Castro. Senior Mafia figures were used by the CIA in attempts to assassinate Castro. However, while working with one arm of the American State, the Mafia was threatened by another arm of the State. Bobby Kennedy had been conducting an aggressive campaign from the Justice Department to destroy the power of the Mafia.

There is no doubt that the Mafia had a motive to kill the President. The Kennedy Administration had placed it under unprecedented pressure. But while there was a motive, there was also a serious risk. If any suspicion pointed to Mafia involvement in the assassination, there would have been a danger of a backlash against it from the State. Also, there was no guarantee that Kennedy's successor would have been any less aggressive in opposing Mafia power. While Lyndon Johnson succeeded Kennedy, it was by no means clear at the time that he would be anything more than a caretaker President. Any Mafia plan to eliminate John F. Kennedy would have had to consider the possibility of Bobby Kennedy succeeding him.

The Chief Counsel for the HSCA, G. Robert Blakey, suspected the Mafia had a hand in the assassination, although he admitted that the evidence for such a thesis was not of the type that would stand up in court (9). So what was the evidence?

The FBI had quite detailed knowledge of the Mafia in the early 1960s from wiretaps and informants - the most famous of which was Joe Valachi. In examining the evidence the HSCA distinguished between the Mafia as a corporate entity and individual Mafia leaders. In 1963 the Mafia was controlled by a Commission consisting of Vito Genovese, Carlo Gambino, Thomas Lucchese, Joseph Bonnano of New York; Sam Giancana of Chicago; Stefano Magaddino of Buffalo; Joseph Zerilli of Detroit; Angelo Bruno of Philadelphia; and Raymond Patriarca of Providence.

The HSCA's description of surveillance transcripts confirm that the Mafia was demoralised as a result of the war being waged against it by the Justice Department under Bobby Kennedy's leadership. There were numerous examples of threats against both Kennedys, but little or no evidence of any serious attempt to carry out these threats. The HSCA gave an extract from a February 1962 conversation that Philadelphia crime boss Angelo Bruno had with one of his lieutenants in which he discourages the latter from talking about killing the Kennedys on the grounds that what would follow could be worse.

The Mafia Commission had also some very serious internal problems. In early 1963 Joseph Bonanno wanted to seize control of the Commission by murdering Carlo Gambino and Thomas



Lucchese. The plot was discovered when Bonanno attempted to recruit Joe Columbo, who promptly reported the matter to the Commission. Interestingly, according to the HSCA, Gambino, one of the intended victims, urged caution in dealing with the matter, while Sam Giancana thought Bonanno should be killed.

In the light of these difficulties it is unlikely that the Commission as a whole would have been capable of implementing a plan to assassinate the President and then conceal it from the FBI. While individual members of the Commission might have been capable of doing so, the level of surveillance they were under both before and after the assassination makes it extremely unlikely.

The HSCA then examined other likely Mafia suspects. Two powerful Mafia leaders at that time were Carlos Marcello and Santos Trafficante. Marcello's influence extended over Louisiana, including New Orleans, parts of Florida and Texas. He had no love for Bobby Kennedy who deported him to Guatemala. Although Marcello returned within a couple of weeks, he considered his deportation an "illegal kidnapping".

As leader of the New Orleans branch of the Mafia, he had a special place within the Mafia hierarchy. According to the HSCA this was the oldest branch of the American Mafia and did not have to seek authorisation from the Commission for its activities.

Santos Trafficante was based in Florida, but was less powerful. His significance lay in his involvement in Mafia activities in Cuba before the fall of Batista, as well as a CIA plot to assassinate Castro.

The HSCA found no evidence of either Marcello or Trafficante being involved in the JFK assassination. The absence of evidence does not, of course, mean that they were not involved. FBI surveillance of them was less effective than other Mafia leaders. However, the HSCA noted that both of these characters were very cautious individuals and therefore considered it "unlikely" that they would participate in the assassination.

Since 1963 there have been numerous surveillance operations of Mafia leaders and yet nothing has emerged that would link the Mafia to the JFK assassination. Also, there have been numerous arrests of mafia leaders in which they have turned State's evidence. Again nothing has emerged to implicate the Mafia or associates of this organisation.

Another problem with the Mafia thesis is that organisation had no record of political assassination. Unlike the Sicilian Mafia, the American Mafia did not kill political leaders or other representatives of the State such as Judges or policemen.

Despite the best efforts of conspiracy theorists no substantial links have been found between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Mafia. Anthony Summers tries his best but doesn't come up with very much. For example, he points out that Oswald's mother was friendly with a person called Clem Sehrt, who was the "lawyer and financial adviser to a Louisiana banker associated with Carlos Marcello" (page 339). Summers also says that Oswald's uncle, Charles Murret was prominent in illegal bookmaking in 1944 (page 340). And that's about all.

There is no doubt that Jack Ruby had links with the mafia, but there is no credible evidence of any links between him and Oswald, other than the fact that Ruby killed Oswald.

The HSCA reasoned that if Jack Ruby was part of a conspiracy to kill Lee Harvey Oswald the conspiracy must have pre-existed the JFK assassination since such a conspiracy would have taken more than 48 hours (the time between the JFK assassination and the murder of Oswald) to implement. Furthermore, if the conspiracy to kill Oswald pre-existed the assassination, it is likely that the conspirators were also involved in the JFK assassination. What other motive could such conspirators have except to silence Oswald?

The HSCA didn't believe that Ruby was a member of the Mafia. However, he did operate on the margins of the law. As the manager of a strip club he encountered similar characters, some of whom could be described as being involved in organized crime. In the months leading up to the assassination Ruby had labour problems and was in frequent contact with officials of the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA) relating to amateur strippers in the Dallas area. Many of the officials were prominent figures in organised crime.

The HSCA found that Ruby's killing of Oswald was "not a spontaneous act". In my opinion, if it was not "spontaneous" there is no evidence of planning. All the witnesses who were in contact with Ruby in the days following the assassination said that he was traumatised. His sister Eva Grant said that he was more upset by the killing of President Kennedy than the death of his own father.

The movements of Ruby before the killing of Oswald don't suggest a cold blooded, calculating assassin. On the morning that he killed Oswald he drove to Dallas with his dog and left it in the car to go to a Western Union office. The Office recorded that Ruby wired some money to one of his employees at precisely 11.17 a.m. He then walked to the Dallas police station, which was nearby and entered through the basement. It was at precisely this moment that Oswald was being transferred from the station to the County Jail. The window of opportunity for killing Oswald was very narrow and it was by a sheer fluke that Ruby managed to slip through.

The murder has the hallmarks of an impromptu act. The police had announced the previous day that Oswald would be transferred some time after 10.00 a.m. If Oswald had been transferred on schedule he might still be alive today.

The HSCA found no evidence of Ruby profiting from assassination.

It seems inconceivable that a social misfit like Oswald and a violent buffoon like Ruby should play such key parts in such a momentous event as the assassination of an American President. There must have been more powerful forces pulling the strings! And yet an examination of the evidence leaves no clue pointing to such master manipulators. If Oswald and Ruby were not acting alone, the conspiracy must have been a very, very good one.

The final article in this series will analyse the CIA.

## Notes

1) The source for Garrison's belief that the assassination was a homosexual thrill killing is a journalist called James Phelan who is cited by David Reitzes here. <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/jimloon5.htm>

2) Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb were two highly intelligent Chicago university students from a wealthy background, who wanted to commit the perfect murder. The crime was committed in 1925. The victim was a 14 year old boy, who was found naked and whose face was disfigured by acid. It is possible that Leopold and Loeb were homosexuals. Certainly, their relationship was very close. However, there was no evidence of any sexual motive for the crime. The reason the murderers undressed the boy and threw acid in his face was to hide his identity and hamper the police investigation.

3) [http://www.edwardjayeinstein.com/archived/jfk\\_print.htm](http://www.edwardjayeinstein.com/archived/jfk_print.htm)

4) <http://federal-circuits.vlex.com/vid/clay-l-shaw-jim-garrison-appellants-36838436>

5) <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/clinton2.htm>

6) See an article by the Conspiracy theorist David Lifton about the experience of Kerry Thornley at the hands of Garrison (<http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/lifton1.htm>).

7) <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/clinton4.htm>

8) <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/delphine.txt>

9) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/transcripts/1205.html>

### John Martin adds:

The police bent over backwards to accommodate the media: on the Friday when Oswald was arrested; on Saturday; and then on Sunday morning when Ruby killed Oswald. It was a circus. I can only think the reason was that many law enforcement officials in America are democratically elected.

Ruby was not called to the police station. The point I made in one of my articles was that the police announced to the media that Oswald would be transferred to the County Jail at 10.00am on Sunday. As far as anyone knew that was the time he was going to be transferred. However, the interrogation of Oswald on Sunday morning took longer than expected.

Ruby got up late on Sunday morning. The reason why he drove into Dallas was to go to a Western Union Office to wire some money to one of his strippers. Pay day for the strippers was on Friday. But Ruby had closed the club on Friday (the day of the assassination), Saturday and Sunday as a mark of respect. So, the strippers were left short. The Western Union Office was within 5 minutes of the Police Station from where Oswald was due to be transferred. The record of the Western Union Office indicated that the wire transfer was made on 11.17am. Ruby was in the police station, just in time to kill Oswald at about 11.30am.

The other relevant fact is that Ruby brought his dog with him and left it in the car.

The killing of Oswald bears all the hallmarks of an impromptu act. It certainly does not look like a mafia hit. If Ruby had set out on Sunday morning to kill Oswald, he would have been at the police station before 10.00am. Other business, such as paying one of his employees would not have distracted him. Also, would Ruby, a devoted dog lover, have brought his dog along if he knew in advance that he was going to kill Oswald?

Another point, is that Ruby had an opportunity to kill Oswald on Friday evening. He was at the Press Conference that Oswald was presented to the media. If Ruby was controlled by the mafia and the mafia was involved in the assassination, it would have wanted Oswald killed as soon as possible (i.e. on Friday, not Sunday).

There is so much more information that could be given. Ruby was a total nutcase, the idea that the mafia would have anything to do with him is preposterous. In subsequent years his mental state became clearer. In jail he thought that there was a plot to kill all Jews in Dallas. I could go on... □

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## Thomas Davis and the Sack of Baltimore

by Pat Muldowney

In 1631, pirates from North Africa's Barbary Coast raided and burnt the town of Baltimore in County Cork, taking many prisoners as slaves. Here is a piece of Thomas Davis's poem about the attack:

### The Sack of Baltimore

All, all asleep within each roof along that rocky street,  
And these must be the lover's friends, with gently gliding feet—  
A stifled gasp, a dreamy noise! "The roof is in a flame!"  
From out their beds and to their doors rush maid and sire and dame,  
And meet upon the threshold stone the gleaming sabre's fall,  
And o'er each black and bearded face the white or crimson shawl.

The yell of "Allah!" breaks above the prayer, and shriek, and roar:

O blessed God! the Algerine is lord of Baltimore!

Oh, some must tug the galley's oar, and some must tend the steed;  
This boy will bear a Scheik's chibouk, and that a Bey's jerreed.

Oh, some are for the arsenals by beauteous Dardanelles;

And some are in the caravan to Mecca's sandy dells.

The maid that Bandon gallant sought is chosen for the Dey:

She 's safe—she's dead—she stabb'd him in the midst of his Serai!

And when to die a death of fire that noble maid they bore,

She only smiled, O'Driscoll's child; she thought of Baltimore.

# Confucius Confused in EESC Opinion on China

by Manus O'Riordan

## A Report from the European Economic and Social Committee

As an Irish member of both the Workers' Group of the European Economic and Social Committee and its External Relations Section, I have criticised that Section's response to the horrific Syrian Civil War - with an irresponsible bias for "regime change" - in the December 2012 issue of *Irish Foreign Affairs*. This was not the first such critique. See <http://siptucommunicationsdepartment.newsweaver.ie/images/21161/41174/1725455/EESC%20Report.pdf>

for my June 2011 *Liberty Online* article where I had also stated that Section's support for a draft opinion which declared that "*the whole of North Africa is aflame with revolts against authoritarian regimes*" and which then proceeded to argue that the European Union "*must act more swiftly and without delay, better than it did in cases such as the intervention in the Mediterranean (Libya, for example)*". This, to my mind, was effectively championing Anglo-French military activity aimed at "regime change".

"*There is no such entity as the whole of North Africa*", I argued. What was being referred to as "the Arab Spring" might be capable of effecting democratic revolutions in Nation States with a well-developed sense of national identity, such as Egypt and Tunisia. But the situation was very different in Libya. What was taking place in that country was tribal warfare. The draft opinion was a very dangerous one, as it was associating the EESC with the Anglo-French military intervention in a Libyan civil war. The war to effect regime change in Iraq had brought chaos to Iraqi society. And the war being waged by British and French imperialism to bring about regime change in Libya would result in even more catastrophic chaos. I therefore declared my opposition to that draft opinion, as it sought to bring about EU support for that war and render the EU responsible for bringing such chaos to North Africa through the disintegration of Libyan society.

This past November 13<sup>th</sup>, however, it seemed that the EESC External Relations Section was back in more constructive mode with a draft opinion entitled "*An emerging civil society in China*". It declared support for EU-China dialogue and cultural exchange, while remaining critical:

"As an active member of the United Nations and its organisations (including, amongst others, the ILO) and, most importantly, as a permanent member of the Security Council, the People's Republic of China bears responsibility for the implementation of the spirit and values of the United Nations. This also includes compliance with all UN resolutions on human rights issues (UN Charter). However, China is still far from compliant in everyday life, especially when it comes to social and individual civil rights, but also consumer and employee rights. Infringements against international treaties and standards are common; the same is true for the environment."

In my own intervention in the debate I agreed with such a critique, not least for the reason that, as a trade unionist, I am opposed to the connivance of the Chinese authorities

with western multinationals engaged in the capitalist super-exploitation of Chinese workers, and I am unequivocally in favour of the development of free trade unions in China, matched by recognition of the collective bargaining rights that are required to counter such super-exploitation. I was also of the opinion that the following formulation was an accurate statement of fact:

"In all probability, one key challenge for China in the future will be the emergence of rapidly accumulating private wealth alongside existing poverty; the income and wealth gap is getting bigger. This problem is exacerbated by demographic development and will have a sustained impact on civil society activities. Due to the circumstances in which they emerged and under the existing political framework, civil society organisations in China cannot act in the same way as equivalent bodies in the EU. Even if some of them have a certain degree of *de facto* autonomy, they are subject to extensive bureaucratic control. At best, they enjoy 'dependent autonomy', which in plain English means that the rights of civil society organisations or actors cannot be closely compared with those in the European Union and democratic States in general (this applies particularly to freedom of expression and assembly)."

What made the initial draft opinion so constructive was its absence of hectoring rhetoric. In a paragraph entitled "Citizen and state in China", its Austrian *rapporteur* had provided a soberly balanced and historically reflective exposition:

"In the Chinese tradition, and in Confucianism in particular, the role of the individual is different to that in European tradition. The subordination of the individual to larger collective entities (previously: primarily family and clan, today: party and state) has shaped Chinese society for more than two millennia. With its centuries-long evolution of competing states, the idea of the state in Europe is perforce different from that in China, where the concept of *tian xia* ('everything under heaven') made the state's external borders porous until colonial powers imposed the paradigm of national borders on Chinese (at the time, Manchu) state power. Although the historical development of China's political structure reflects global developments in the 20th and 21st centuries, the internal transformation from a collective-based model of society to one focused on the individual is only beginning. The custody of the 'community' (represented by the state and the Party) over the individual prevails, for the individual is not seen as 'enlightened' enough to be trusted with responsibility for himself and for the 'community' that has been carved out in Europe over centuries of emancipation. With China's rapid integration into the international community (following self-imposed isolation in the 1960s, for example) through (international and bilateral) links of very different origin, an increasing number of people-to-people contacts have become possible and been forged. This has resulted in growing knowledge, and thus understanding, of other models of society."

This formulation, however, would not satisfy a Swedish EESC member, who proposed a drastic amendment to the "custody" sentence, so that it would instead read as follows: "The Chinese



Communist Party's power over the individual prevails, because the individual is not seen by the Party as 'enlightened' enough to be trusted with responsibility for himself, a relationship designed to prevent democratic progress."

I expected that the Austrian *rapporteur* would oppose this amendment. But, no! She endorsed it! This was despite the fact that it undoubtedly nullified the balanced perspective of her own original draft. The proposer of the amendment went on to argue that relativism was unacceptable. Democracy had to be championed as a universal value, and not just a specifically western one.

I argued that this amendment was tantamount to calling for regime change in China, with CPC rule being replaced by some type of multi-party system. Had nothing been learned from the disintegrative effects on various societies of previous calls for regime change? For all the enthusiasm expressed by the EESC for the "Arab Spring", and its supposed association with democracy, one fact of life was being conveniently ignored. I pointed out that the most transparently democratic elections to be held in the Arab world, - elections that had been subjected to the most intensive international monitoring - were the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006. These had been fairly and squarely - and decisively - won by Hamas, not just in Gaza, but in the West Bank and Gaza as a whole. (Hamas won 76 of the 132 seats, while the PLO's Fatah won just 43 - leading to the *New York Times* headline on January 27<sup>th</sup>: "Hamas Routs Ruling Faction". In March 2006 Hamas's Ismail Haniyah became Prime Minister of a coalition government for the Palestinian Authority as a whole.) It was a June 2007 Fatah coup aimed at regime change to overthrow that democratic election outcome, which was successful in the West Bank but defeated in Gaza, that resulted in exclusivist PLO rule in the West Bank being matched by exclusivist Hamas rule in Gaza.

I returned to the argument that an amendment suggesting regime change in China would thoroughly undermine what was constructive in the original draft opinion and would militate against meaningful EU-China dialogue. I was supported in the

debate by only one other speaker, a Portuguese member who argued against the EESC formulating a narrow political opinion, since genuine dialogue between cultures could not be based on foisting our political system on others. The amendment was in the end carried by 78 votes to 8, with 6 abstentions. Since, however, the amendment's proposer now indicated a willingness to re-visit its wording before the draft opinion would finally be voted on in plenary session, I decided to abstain at this juncture. The amended draft was then adopted at this Section meeting by 87 votes for, none against and 8 abstentions.

At a Workers' Group meeting on November 28<sup>th</sup> the member in question approached me with the assurance that he had not intended to suggest regime change and, in my presence, asked a fellow Swede to draft a new amendment for the EESC plenary meeting on December 13<sup>th</sup> which, he was confident, ought to clarify the matter to my satisfaction. It had indeed been my intention to travel to Brussels for that meeting, but illness prevented me from doing so. From a report of the meeting, however, I saw that the opinion on China, as further amended, had been adopted by 68 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions. But the "new" amendment could not have been further removed from the assurance I had been given. Regime change was as strongly suggested as ever before. The only difference in the wording was that the CPC was no longer being condemned for purposefully setting out to prevent democratic progress. The "new" wording in the version of the EESC opinion that was finally adopted now read as follows:

"The Chinese Communist Party's power over the individual prevails, because the individual is not seen by the Party as 'enlightened' enough to be trusted with responsibility for himself, which prevents democratic progress."

In other words, all that was being allowed for was that such an outcome might have been arrived at unwittingly, rather than by design. No doubt, in any future EU-China dialogue, the CPC leaders will be suitably impressed by the fact that, while still being accused by the EESC of "preventing democratic progress", they are now viewed as more fools than knaves! □

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(continued from p.35)

power of Trotsky, or of Zinovieff, the Dictator of the Red Citadel (Petrograd), or of Krassin or Radek—all Jews. In the Soviet institutions the predominance of Jews is even more astonishing. And the prominent, if not indeed the principal, part in the system of terrorism applied by the Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Counter-Revolution has been taken by Jews, and in some notable cases by Jewesses. The same evil prominence was obtained by Jews in the brief period of terror during which Bela Kun ruled in Hungary. The same phenomenon has been presented in Germany (especially in Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey upon the temporary prostration of the German people. Although in all these countries there are many non-Jews every whit as bad as the worst of the Jewish revolutionaries, the part played by the latter in proportion to their numbers in the population is astonishing.

### **"Protector of the Jews."**

Needless to say, the most intense passions of revenge have been excited in the breasts of the Russian people. Wherever General Denikin's authority could reach, protection was always accorded to the Jewish population, and strenuous efforts were made by his officers to prevent reprisals and to punish those guilty of them. So much was this the case that the Petlurist

propaganda against General Denikin denounced him as the Protector of the Jews. The Misses Healy, nieces of Mr. Tim Healy, in relating their personal experiences in Kieff, have declared that to their knowledge on more than one occasion officers who committed offences against Jews were reduced to the ranks and sent out of the city to the front. But the hordes of brigands by whom the whole vast expanse of the Russian Empire is becoming infested do not hesitate to gratify their lust for blood and for revenge at the expense of the innocent Jewish population whenever an opportunity occurs. The brigand Makhno, the hordes of Petlura and of Gregorieff, who signalled their every success by the most brutal massacres, everywhere found among the half-stupefied, half-infuriated population an eager response to anti-Semitism in its worst and foulest forms.

The fact that in many cases Jewish interests and Jewish places of worship are excepted by the Bolsheviks from their universal hostility has tended more and more to associate the Jewish race in Russia with the villainies which are now being perpetrated. This is an injustice on millions of helpless people, most of whom are themselves sufferers from the revolutionary regime. It becomes, therefore, specially important to foster and develop any strongly-marked Jewish movement which leads directly away from these fatal associations. And it is here that Zionism has such a deep significance for the whole world at the present time.  
(continued p. 26)

# Starving the Germans: the Evolution of Britain's Strategy of Economic Warfare During the First World War—the French Connection Part 2

by Eamon Dyas

[This series on the *Evolution of Britain's Strategy of Economic Warfare During the First World War* forms the text of a forthcoming book.]

To propagate history as defined by “liberal man” was the purpose behind the publication of the series *The Nations of Today: a new History of the World*, edited by John Buchan and published within five years of the war ending. It was designed to re-establish the continuum of the British version of history and its acceptance in the wider post-Versailles world at a time when British actions in the wider world had thrown up the possibilities of alternative histories retaining the capacity of explaining British actions from a different perspective.

## Fitting Delcassé into history.

In Buchan's series, the essay in the volume on France which covers the period in which we are interested was written by John Ronald Moreton Macdonald and is called ‘The Third Republic’. Macdonald has this to say on the significance of the replacement of Hanotaux by Delcassé as Foreign Minister of France:

‘In Europe itself the intimate relations between France and Russia were emphasised by an interchange of visits between the Tsar and President Faure (October 1896 and August 1897); an easier situation was established between France and Italy; while relations between France and Germany became decidedly warmer. Hanotaux may have contemplated a real agreement with Germany directed against England; but just at the critical moment the Meline Cabinet fell (June 14, 1898), and Delcassé replaced Hanotaux at the Foreign Office.’

(Buchan, op. cit, chapter on *The Third Republic* by John Ronald Moreton Macdonald, p.154)

While Hanotaux's period as Foreign Minister is depicted as pro-German, the implication is that after him came a new era in French foreign policy which was more friendly to Britain. However, when we look at what in fact happened we find that Delcassé not only inherited Hanotaux's foreign policy but took it forward with enthusiasm. Théophile Delcassé became Foreign Minister with the support of the aggressive colonialist lobby. He had previously worked in the French Colonial Office as Under-Secretary for Colonies (from January 1893) and was largely responsible for the elevation of colonial issues to a higher governmental importance. This was reflected in the fact that before his arrival the Colonial Office was seen as a junior section of the Foreign Ministry and it was largely down to his efforts that it became a separate department in its own right with its own minister at its head—a position that he himself occupied when he was made Minister of Colonies in the Second Dupuy Cabinet (May 1894-January 1895). Delcassé became Foreign Minister in June 1898 and the conventional wisdom disseminated by British imperial propagandists is that the advent of Delcassé as Foreign Minister heralded a change in French foreign policy from one which favoured Germany to

one which favoured Britain. This is the line taken in the above essay by Moreton Macdonald:-

‘During the last seven months of Faure's presidency the Foreign Office had been occupied continuously by Delcassé. He was at once confronted with the important question whether the policy of rapprochement with Germany which Hanotaux had pursued should be continued or abandoned; for a German Note had just reached the Quai d'Orsay [location of the French Foreign Office - ED] in which France was invited to agree with Germany on the subject of the Portuguese African colonies. Delcassé's failure to answer this Note signified a complete reversal of Hanotaux's policy. From that moment French diplomacy started on the road which ultimately led to the Entente of 1903 (sic).’ (ibid., p.156)

The ‘Note’ from Germany to Delcassé on the subject of the Portuguese African colonies is described by Macdonald in a rather opaque fashion. The context implies that it must have been sent a short time after Delcassé became Foreign Minister which means a short time after June 1898. The only issue surrounding Germany and Portuguese Africa at this time was the issue resolved through the Anglo-German agreement of August 1898. Throughout the 1890s the British Government of Africa was bent on two things. Firstly, to prevent the Transvaal gaining an independent access to the sea at Delagoa Bay; and secondly, to prevent rival European powers gaining a commercial, naval, or political foothold in the area. Delagoa Bay came within the jurisdiction of Portugal and, in an agreement with Britain from 1875, the Portuguese Government had committed to make no concessions in Mozambique to any third Power and in the event of any such concession being considered Portugal also agreed to give Britain first refusal on any rights that were on offer. This agreement was reconfirmed in 1891. The terms of the Anglo-German agreement of August 1898 changed elements of that arrangement. In return for German acceptance of British hegemony over the Transvaal the British offered Germany the northern half of Mozambique in the event of a collapse of the Portuguese Empire. This enabled Britain to retain control of the Delagoa Bay area although the agreement did offer some commercial concessions in the area to German companies. The fact that Macdonald, in his account, invests so much importance in the ‘Note’ surrounding this event is instructive. Rather than it revealing a dislocation in the relationship between France and Germany it shows the opposite. France only had a marginal interest in the issues being negotiated and the fact that Germany even bothered to inform her indicates a fairly close relationship in the first place. This was a secret agreement between Germany and Britain, parts of which were not even revealed to the British Colonial Office at the time and the British certainly did not reveal it to France. It is possible that Delcassé was not too impressed by Germany's behaviour in pursuing this agreement but to interpret it as evidence of a rift between the two countries, let alone as the cause of a new pro-British departure in French foreign policy, is somewhat of an exaggeration—something that is certainly underlined by the nature of the subsequent contact between France and Germany.

Between his appointment as Foreign Minister of France in June 1898 and his embrace of Britain as partner in the Entente Cordiale in 1904 Delcassé remained a French imperialist and it was not a matter of him simply jettisoning his predecessor's pro-German policy and replacing it with a pro-British one. When Delcassé became Foreign Minister he inherited the perennial issue of French ambitions in Egypt—the issue that more than any other stirred French imperial animosity towards Britain—and his feelings towards the continuing British occupation of the region remained one of outright hostility.

But Delcassé was a French imperialist of the old school and as the nineteenth century faded so too there emerged a new more realistic type of imperialism. The element in French imperialism which, at the end of the nineteenth century, had the greatest sense of purpose and which commanded more support from the commercial and industrial interests, was that which targeted Morocco. Aware of the weakness of the economic case for the wider territorial possessions, the Moroccan colonialists, although not necessarily advocating the abandonment of the wider empire, nonetheless attached a higher priority to gaining Morocco. Some of the people behind Delcassé's appointment as Foreign Minister in the aftermath of the Fashoda humiliation represented this new imperialism. It was this group that began lobbying for an accommodation with Britain over Egypt. However, Delcassé's old imperial instincts meant that this did not become official policy until February 1903 when the combination of an awareness that he was not going to entice Germany into a joint action against Britain and the pressure from the new colonial group in the Chamber of Deputies under the influential Algerian colonist, Eugène Etienne, compelled him to seek an accommodation. This accommodation was sought on the basis of French ceding her claim on Egypt in return for British recognition of France's claim on Morocco. However, until that time he continued to pursue a policy that most certainly was not pro-British.

In the interim he had continued to seek a means of wresting Egypt from Britain, or at least of making conditions so uncomfortable for Britain that she would prove more amenable to an accommodation with France. In 1899, just over a year after he was appointed Foreign Minister, working on the principle that Britain's difficulty was France's opportunity, he invited Germany, at the start of the Boer War, to join the Dual Alliance with Russia to end the British occupation of Egypt. Germany's refusal to be part of such an arrangement led to a further attempt to garner German support for an alliance ostensibly to provide mediation in the Boer War (Delcassé was at the same time making secret military preparations to directly intervene in that war—see 'France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale', by Christopher Andrew. Published in *The Historical Journal*, Vol.10, No. 1, 1967, pp.97-98). Germany's response to this second approach was prevarication—insisting that France abandon her claims to Alsace-Lorraine in return—a demand that Germany knew was not going to be acceptable to the political sentiment represented by Delcassé. As a result of Germany's refusal to enter into an active scheme against Britain and with the realisation that it was going to be impossible to force Britain out of Egypt without such support, Delcassé was left with the option of seeking an alternative Egyptian strategy.

Until March 1900 Delcassé continued to hold out hope for German support in his proposed move against Britain. Up to that point he had also intended to seek Germany's approval before undertaking French expansion in Morocco. From now on, in the face of Germany's reluctance to become involved in his plans for confronting Britain over Egypt he refused

steadfastly to negotiate with Germany on the issue. But this did not mean that he immediately abandoned the prospect of all military co-operation with Germany. The fact that he sanctioned a joint Franco-German force under German command during the Boxer Rebellion of 1901 is indicative of a continuing wish to accommodate Germany in other areas than Egypt. Nor did he immediately turn to Britain with an offer on Egypt. Instead he put the Egyptian question on the back burner and decided to concentrate on Morocco. Towards that end he began negotiating with Spain in the summer of 1901 on a Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco without any reference to Britain or Germany. British policy at this time was to ensure that none of the Powers could exert control of Morocco because of its potential to threaten the British naval base at Gibraltar. Despite this, Delcassé continued his negotiations with the Sagasta Government of Spain throughout 1902 and actually worked out an agreement to the point where Spain was about to sign. However, under pressure from the British who had by now got wind of what was going on, the Sagasta Government first delayed signing and then suddenly resigned from government in December 1902 leaving the agreement with France unsigned. The new incoming Spanish Government under the Conservative Francisco Silvela complied with the decision of his predecessor not to sign the agreement with France and so, at the beginning of 1903, Delcassé was left with nowhere else to turn.

In the meantime, Britain, wary of France's previous attempts to form an agreement with Germany, went through a change of policy which had as its initial object the prevention of such an agreement coming to fruition in future. Through a mixture of intimidation and inducement of Spain, Britain ensured that Delcassé's strategy regarding Morocco reached a dead end, with Spain becoming Britain's gate-keeper in Morocco. Britain then set about cutting off any prospect of Delcassé returning to Germany for support. This is one historian's account of what happened next:

'At the turn of 1902-3 there was a dramatic and almost simultaneous change in English and French policy. In December 1902 the rapid spread of a rebellion in Morocco, which threatened for a time to throw the country into anarchy, induced Lansdowne to favour an accord with France for the first time. Almost at the same moment two new developments convinced Delcassé that a broad agreement with England was both possible and desirable. The first was a change of government in Spain which brought to an end the negotiations for a partition of Morocco. The second and more important was the evidence received by Delcassé that England was no longer the implacable opponent of his Moroccan policy and now actually desired an entente with France.' ('France and the Making of the *Entente Cordiale*', by Christopher Andrew. Published in *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1967, p.101).

Although this is a rather simplified version of the events leading up to Delcassé's agreement to open official talks with Britain it at least shows that the version of Anglo-French relations pushed by Buchan in his post-war history project was far from the truth. Rather than it being part of a natural evolution of French and British politics the *Entente Cordiale* represented a radical departure from both French and British policy up to that time. Delcassé had been subjected to significant pressure from Etienne's colonialists to accept the necessity of bartering French interests in Egypt for control of Morocco but it was the combination of German reluctance to co-operate in his anti-British schemes and Britain's manipulation of Spain that caused him to realise that he had run out of alternatives. Even then, he



had remained unenthusiastic about the Egyptian proposals until the official Royal Visit of Edward VII to Paris in May 1903—a visit specifically designed to serve the purpose laid out for it by the British Government:

‘The royal visit to Paris has been acknowledged to have done a great deal to prepare public opinion on both sides of the Channel for the Entente Cordiale, but had none the less been usually considered of ‘no diplomatic importance’. To French statesmen, however, the visit had the highest diplomatic importance, for they believed that Edward had it in his power to determine the direction of English foreign policy. A month before the king’s arrival in Paris Delcassé had confirmation of his desire for an entente with France from reports made by his ambassador in Lisbon during Edward’s visit to Portugal. Although only fragmentary accounts survive of Edward’s talks in Paris with President Loubert and with Delcassé it seems clear that in them the king considerably exceeded the role of a constitutional monarch. In a discussion on Morocco with Loubert Edward expressed complete agreement with the detailed views advanced by the president on [the role of France in Morocco]. In his conversations with Delcassé the king warned him not to trust the Kaiser, whom he called ‘both foolish and wicked’. This and other evidence of England’s hostility to Germany was interpreted by French statesmen as the main reason for England’s new-found friendliness towards France.’ (ibid., pp.103-104).

This resulted in a return official visit by the French President, Émile Loubet, accompanied by Delcassé in July 1903 and it is from this point that official talks can be said to have begun. The way was now open for Delcassé to be transformed from the implacable foe of Britain to become its erstwhile friend. The fact that he was conspiring militarily against Britain a couple of years earlier and that the only reason that the conspiracy failed was because of the refusal of Germany to become involved was simply deleted from the historical record. To have owned up to German behaviour at that time would have considerably diminished the carefully crafted narrative that cast German ‘Prussianism’ as the eternal treacherous enemy of both France and Britain.

### **The Entente Cordiale and the fall of Delcassé.**

The *Entente Cordiale* between Britain and France was signed on 8 April 1904. In the wake of that agreement France went on to sign a secret accord with Spain on 6 October 1904 which defined their relative rights in the future development and administration of Morocco along lines defined by Britain. France followed this by an agreement with Italy by which she waived all claim on Tripoli in favour of Italy acquiescing in the proposed new arrangements for the administration of Morocco.

The *Entente Cordiale* was not just about Morocco. It was designed to remove or neutralise those elements of imperial interests that had the potential to cause conflict between Britain and France. It embraced a wide range of agreements on areas of contention between the two countries ranging from the Newfoundland fisheries and the boundary problem in West Africa, as well as differences in Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. However, the central core of the agreement was that relating to the barter of French claims to Egypt for Britain’s acceptance of French unique interests in Morocco. But whereas the other agreements did not involve the interests of third parties (or more accurately, the interests of a third European Power), the one relating to Morocco did and it was

incumbent, under the rules of international diplomacy, for both agreeing parties to inform the other interested party of any new arrangements in such circumstances. Despite this, France failed to notify Germany and Germany was left to find out about it from Britain. But the diplomatic slight involved in France not formally notifying Germany was not the issue that caused Germany to take exception to the new agreement. It was the fact that the economic arrangements inherent in that agreement adversely impacted on German commercial interests:

“So far as Britain and other Powers were concerned, Morocco was in future and in an economic sense handed over to French industry by the British Government to the detriment of British and foreign – other than French – industry and enterprise.” (*Morocco in Diplomacy*, by E. D. Morel. Published by Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1912, p.65).

Germany most certainly was an interested party in any agreement that involved the future of Morocco. She had been a participant in the Madrid Conference of 1880 which dealt with the Moroccan issue and she was a signatory of a Treaty of Commerce in 1890 with the Government of Morocco. Consequently, by the time of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 Germany had significant trading interests in the country. It should also be borne in mind that the new arrangements for Morocco in the *Entente Cordiale* were done without the involvement of the Moroccan Government despite the fact that in 1901 and 1902 France had publicly assured Morocco on repeated occasions that she had not the least intention of threatening the independence or the integrity of the State of Morocco.

“At the close of 1904 no international agreement, collectively signed by all the Powers, explicitly proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco, existed. But the Madrid Convention of 1880 implicitly recognised that independence since all the Powers had on that occasion negotiated with the Sultan on a basis of equality. Moreover, the independence of Morocco had never been questioned any more than the independence of Persia, or Russia, or the United States. Morocco was independent.” (ibid., note on p.71.)

Yet, in the *Entente Cordiale* and in the other secret agreements involving France and Spain the matter of Moroccan sovereignty was of no consequence. Under the terms of these agreements France had removed British opposition to a French absorption of eighty per cent of Moroccan territory and had mortgaged to Spain the areas of Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco (this was an essential element of the Anglo-French agreement as it ensured that France would continue to be excluded from an area of the Moroccan coast that was particularly sensitive to the security of Britain’s Gibraltar naval base).

“But in thus disposing, contrary to their public pledges, in the real or fancied interests of the peoples they represented, of the future of an independent African State, 219,000 miles in extent, containing eight million inhabitants, and of great natural wealth, the British, French, and Spanish diplomatists had acted without any international sanction, and had, moreover, deliberately deceived the world.

The only feature of the deal of which the world at large, outside the three contracting Powers, had public cognisance so far as Morocco was concerned, was that Britain had declared her political disinterestedness in that country, and had recognised a

special French interest within it – on certain conditions.” (ibid., pp. 73-74).

The pertinent elements of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French agreement and the secret Franco-Spanish Convention only became known in November 1911. It appears that Germany, at least in the immediate aftermath of their signing, remained ignorant of their secret contents. On April 12 1904, Count Bülow, the German Chancellor, in the course of answering a question in the Reichstag on the subject of the just published Anglo-French agreement replied:

“We are interested in that country, as moreover, in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic standpoint. Our interests therein are, before all, commercial interests; also are we specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed by any Power.” (quoted in ibid., p.84).

However, between then and the beginning of 1905 it seems that Germany got wind of the fact that not all was what it appeared. On 30 March 1905, the German Emperor, Wilhelm, on board the *Hamburg*, escorted by the cruiser *Frederick Karl*, made a courtesy call at Gibraltar where he dined with Sir George White, the Governor of the island. Sir George White hailed from Derry and had been a hero in Afghanistan where he won the Victoria Cross. During the Boer War he commanded the garrison during the siege of Ladysmith; his son, Jack White, after serving in the British army became an Irish republican and trained James Connolly’s Irish Citizen Army. The day after the visit to Gibraltar the Kaiser sailed into Tangier (a visit that had been planned earlier in the year and was not a “spur of the moment” decision) where he spent two hours in conversation with the Sultan’s representatives who had come from Fez to meet him. The gist of his remarks to the representatives of the Sultan, based on the authorised French version were as follows:

“The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign, and it is to him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring that result about. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to introduce into this country I consider that he should proceed with much precaution and should take into account the religious feelings of his subjects so that at no moment shall public order be troubled as a consequence of these reforms.” (quoted in ibid, pp.84-85).

The Sultan of Morocco was an over-westernised reforming secular ruler who had been encouraged in his tastes by easy access to French finance. Germany, anxious that the country remain stable, sought to draw the Sultan’s attention to the implications of his lifestyle and westernising reforms for the religious sensibilities of his subjects. It was not in German interests that the country descend into religious and tribal chaos but it was in French colonial interests (France subsequently used the excuse of instability in the country as justification for military intrusions) and so the policy and behaviour of the French colonialists was fashioned with such an object in mind. The arrangements within the *Entente Cordiale* were a reflection of the contempt with which both France and Britain held the Sultan’s Morocco. Germany’s behaviour in encouraging the

Sultan to assert his sovereignty was in direct opposition to the aims of the *Entente*. Encouraged by Germany’s declaration in support of that sovereignty, in April 1905 the Sultan called for an international conference of the Powers on the issue of Morocco. Germany immediately supported such a call. This provoked a campaign of criticism from British officials and media which lasted for most of the rest of the year. In the meantime, in France, the political class was left bemused. Not being privy to the secret Articles of the British or Spanish agreements many of them were at a loss to understand why the whole issue was fast becoming an international crisis. But of course, the bulk of the political establishment was only acting on those elements of the agreements that had been publicly declared. Delcassé, however, and some of his close colleagues, in full knowledge of the secret Articles, became the vociferous opponent of any proposals for talks with Germany to resolve the crisis let alone any agreement to an international conference.

If the first efforts of Britain to exert an influence over French politics (in the context of the lead-in to the First World War) could be said to date from the visit of Edward VII to France in May 1903 which opened the door for official talks between the two countries on the basis of French claims to Morocco, the second one was in April 1905 when Britain sought to stiffen Delcassé’s resolve in resisting German calls for the international conference on Morocco. The reason for this can be seen in the letter from the First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher, to the British Foreign Minister, Lord Lansdowne, on 22 April 1905, in which Fisher tells him that ‘*This seems a golden opportunity for fighting the Germans in alliance with the French, so I earnestly hope you may be able to bring this about.*’ (Quoted in Marder, op. cit., pp.116-117).

The opposition of Germany to the attempted British-supported French takeover of Morocco was seen as an opportunity for war with Germany but this depended on the continued refusal of the French to make any concessions to Germany and it was therefore necessary to convince Delcassé of Britain’s resolve to go the full way. Consequently in Britain government officials and the media expressed their violent opposition to any facilitation of Moroccan and German demands. *The Times* was particularly anxious to show its support for Delcassé and to forestall the proposed international conference:

“The ‘diplomatic machine’ worked full time through its chosen organs. M. Delcassé was represented as the unhappy victim of German resentment for the leading part he had played in concluding the Anglo-French general settlement, and France as being harried at the point of the bayonet into compassing his fall. . .

I commend a perusal of the foreign pages of *The Times* of this period—say from May to November 1905. They make astonishing reading. The insults and threats to Germany mingled with personal abuse of the Emperor William, in the Paris and Berlin telegrams, especially the Paris telegrams, are incessant. No less remarkable is the partisan bias in favour of M. Delcassé against his home critics. Praise of M. Delcassé is the test of statesmanship, and the rare expressions of it are religiously recorded; criticism of his policy and the numerous expressions thereof are rigidly curtailed, or explained as evidence of the narrowest party politics. Germany’s right to a say in the Moroccan settlement is scornfully denied. The idea of a Conference is violently opposed.’ (Morel, op. cit. p.88).

So, here we see Delcassé, the man who only a few years earlier had been plotting military action against Britain, being given the

full weight of British government support as an essential friend of Britain. At the same time Germany was being castigated as the villain of the piece, despite the fact that she had helped to frustrate a military action, planned by that same individual and designed to take place during the time Britain was experiencing its greatest challenge since the Napoleonic wars—and all of this in order to avoid an international conference to decide the future of Morocco.

In France itself, Delcassé's position was becoming untenable. The wider population, ignorant of the secret arrangements between Britain and France, remained confused as he appeared to be leading France into a war with Germany for unfathomable reasons. Also, those who supported him found it difficult to make the case for resistance to Germany primarily because of the weakness of France's long-term ally, Russia, but also because he had been abandoned by Etienne's colonial group. At this time Russia was unable to meet her military commitment to France as she was going through the twin traumas of her war with Japan and the 1905 revolution. Even in the eyes of the more assertive French imperialists the situation in which the country found itself was one where, in the absence of Russia from the military equation, it was reliant upon the word of its erstwhile enemy *Perfide Albion* to come to its aid in the event of a war. Increasingly, French politicians began to realise that they really had no choice but to agree to the international conference demanded by Germany and consequently Delcassé was forced to resign on 6 June 1905. But Delcassé was not a man to retire from the stage quietly. Shortly after his resignation, in a last-ditch attempt to bolster the anti-German position in France, in an interview published in *Le Gaulois* on 12 July 1905 he urged a continuing opposition to Germany. In the process of this interview he sought to show that the absence of Russia was more than compensated for by the existence of the British Navy on the side of France:

"Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would

assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany's ports or her trade, or her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. . . The entente between the two countries and the coalition of their navies, constitutes such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea." (quoted in *How Diplomats Make War*, by A British Statesman [Francis Neilson] Published by B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1915, pp.101-102).

The definite impression from this statement is that by this time Delcassé had been in receipt of a commitment from Britain that she was prepared to use her Navy in support of France in the event of a war with Germany. This impression is reinforced by a report in *Le Matin* (the newspaper by which the French Foreign Ministry usually made unofficial public statements) in the autumn of 1905 in which it stated that Britain was willing to send a force in support of France into Schleswig-Holstein. Furthermore, Delcassé was reported to have told his colleagues that '*If Germany and France quarrelled, England was willing to mobilize her fleet, throw a force of 100,000 men into Schleswig-Holstein, and seize the Kiel Canal.*' (Neilson, op. cit., p.100). This was also confirmed by M. Jaurès who said that he had been given exactly the same account by a member of the Cabinet (Morel, op. cit. p.108). This scenario is almost identical to Fisher's early plan for the Royal Navy that was discussed earlier. It does not include the British Army Expeditionary Force plan as this was something that had its basis in the enhanced military 'conversations' between the General Staffs of both countries, approved by the Liberal Imperialists in January 1906. That aspect of the planning would appear to have been introduced in order to retain credibility and encourage the continued antipathy of the French war party against Germany in the aftermath of Delcassé's fall and the decision to engage with Germany in the talks leading to the Algeciras agreement. □

(to be continued)

## Thomas Davis on Imperialist Ventures

Here is Kipling's advice to a British soldier, on what to expect in Afghanistan:

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains  
And the women come out to cut up your remains  
Just roll towards your rifle and blow out your brains  
And go to your God like a soldier.

Judging by his "Ballad of Freedom", Thomas Davis would be happy to see the current batch of Irish soldiers in Afghanistan killed or kicked out, just like the first British invasion of that country:

The Englishman, for long long years, had ravaged Ganges' side –  
A dealer first, intriguer next, he conquered far and wide,  
Till, hurried on by avarice, and thirst of endless rule,  
His sepoy's pierced to Candahar, his flag waved in Cabul;  
But still within the conquered land was one unconquered man,  
The fierce Pushtani lion, the fiery Akhbar Khan –  
*He slew the sepoy's on the snow, till Sindh's full flood they swam it*  
Right rapidly, content to flee the son of Dost Mohammed,  
The son of Dost Mohammed, and brave old Dost Mohammed –  
Oh! Long may they  
Their mountains sway,  
Akhbar and Dost Mohammed!  
Long live the Dost!

Who Britain crost,  
Hurrah for Dost Mohammed!

Here is what Davis wrote about France's early 19<sup>th</sup> century incursions into Berber country:

The Frenchman sailed in Freedom's name to smite the Algerine,  
The strife was short, the crescent sunk, and then his guile was seen,  
For, nestling in the pirate's hold – a fiercer pirate far –  
He bade the tribes yield up their flocks, the towns their gates unbar.  
Right on he press'd with freemen's hands to subjugate the free,  
The Berber in old Atlas glens, the Moor in Titteri;  
And wider had his razzias spread, his cruel conquests broader,  
But God sent down, to face his frown, the gallant Abdel Kader –  
The faithful Abdel-Kader! Unconquered Abdel-Kader  
Like falling rock,  
Or fierce siroc –  
No savage or marauder –  
Son of a slave!  
First of the brave!  
Hurrah for Abdel-Kader!

Nothing there to give comfort to our engagement with the Royal Irish Regiment in Mali!



# The Cost of Continuing the War: Churchill and John Gray

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by **Brendan Clifford**

The Irish Minister for Justice and Defence has introduced a right of desertion for soldiers of the Irish Army in wartime. While he did this in connection with the World War launched by Britain in 1939, a general principle must be implicit in his decision.

It might be that the Minister in question, Alan Shatter, owes his primary allegiance to a foreign state, and that he acted in its interest, but he is not a dictator. He could only do what he did with the active support of his party, Fine Gael, and its Coalition partner, the Labour Party. And he could not have carried the measure without the tacit support of the Opposition parties.

The Opposition, in party terms, consisted of Fianna Fail and Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin can be excused. It was treated abominably—or Northern Ireland was—by the 26 County Government and Opposition in 1970, and subsequently, and one can hardly argue that it was chiefly its business to uphold the integrity of the Army of the 26 County state.

It was Fianna Fail's business to do that. And, if Fianna Fail had conducted an active campaign in support of the integrity of the Army as an instrument of the state, it is unlikely that Minister Shatter could have carried the measure.

But it was not only the integrity of the Army that was at issue. Minister Shatter also questioned the integrity of the state—and found against it.

When Britain launched yet another World War in 1939 the Fianna Fail Government in Ireland declared that it would be neutral in the War. That decision was supported by the Labour Party and by the Fine Gael Party—except for a small element in it that continued to maintain a Fascist position.

Fine Gael was founded in 1933 through a merger of the Treaty Party, Cumann na nGaedheal, and a small Redmondite party. It was founded as a Fascist party. It imagined that De Valera was a weak uncertain leader, who was dependent on the Communist movement in the form of the IRA, and that the IRA would soon oust Fianna Fail and make Ireland Communist. The force that had shown itself capable of stopping Communism in Europe was Fascism. Therefore Fine Gael was founded as a Fascist Party.

The notion has been put around in recent times that in 1939-45 the Irish state was in denial about the existence of the World War, and that the censorship only allowed the world conflict to be called The Emergency. That is malicious nonsense, as a glance at the wartime newspapers will show.

But there are major issues from that period which Ireland is in denial about. And the biggest of them is that there was a Fascist Party in the Dail in the 1930s, and that it was Fine Gael.

A recently produced film about Frank Ryan gives its audience to understand that Fascism in Ireland was located in the IRA led by Sean Russell, and that Frank Ryan—who had split from the IRA on socialist grounds and fought against Franco in the Spanish Civil War—became a Nazi collaborator in captivity when the Franco Government handed him over to the Germans

in 1940. No evidence is presented that Russell was a Fascist. The viewer is invited to understand that, because Russell sought arms from Germany, he was a Fascist.

The actual ideological Fascism which had representation in the Dail is excluded from the film.

The historian responsible for the film is Dr. Fearghal McGarry. And Dr. McGarry is one of the academics who peddles the big lie that Ireland was in denial about the World War and called it The Emergency.

The major academic intellectuals in the 26 Counties in the 1930s were members of Fine Gael—this was a natural consequence of the destruction of the Republic in the Treaty War in 1922-23, and the formation of a new State structure on British authority. A generation after the War English Universities began to establish hegemony over Irish academic life. But in the 1930s there was autonomous academic life in Ireland, and it was connected with Fine Gael, and it was substantially Fascist.

Acutely reasoned critiques of Parliamentary democracy were published by Fine Gael Professors. The mainstream force supportive of Parliamentary, party-political, democracy was Fianna Fail. Militant anti-Fascism was expressed by the socialist wing of the IRA, which became the Republican Congress.

In 1936 Fine Gael demanded that the Government should recognise Franco's insurrection against the elected Government of the Spanish Republic as the legitimate Government of Spain. A great pro-Franco agitation was conducted around the country by the Irish Christian Front. And a body of Volunteers was raised by the founding leader of Fine Gael, Eoin O'Duffy, to go to Spain and join Franco's forces. A force of Republican Volunteers went to fight against Franco. De Valera resisted the Fascist agitation and recognised the elected Government of Spain until Franco's movement gained actual control of the country.

Fianna Fail maintained Parliamentary Government by a series of election victories. The transition of Fine Gael to Parliamentary government happened in the context of the World War. The triumph of Francoism in Spain would in itself probably have reinforced the Fine Gael stance of the 1930s. But the British launching of World War overlapped the ending of the Spanish War and deprived it of the international influence it might otherwise have had. And then Fascist Spain declared itself neutral in the World War. During most of the first year of the War Fascist Italy was neutral. And it was Italian Fascism much more than German that influenced Fine Gael.

Peoples and states do not live through a historical event retrospectively. It is only a retrospective myth that the World War launched by Britain in September 1939 is a single event, having the same character throughout its duration. In actual time the War was a series of events of different kinds. Situations which in retrospect are slid over, and conjured away, were lived through in detail in actual time.

The first nine months of the War are called the Phoney War. This is a propaganda construct designed to divert attention from

them. The suggestion is that nothing happened in them and that therefore they need not be thought about. They are unreal in mythological retrospect but they were real in their time and it was in living through them that Irish neutrality was declared and consolidated.

If the World War ever took on the character of an ideological anti-Fascist war, it did not have that character in the first nine months. Militarily, that was a period during which the two most powerful states in the world, with the two strongest armies, were making leisurely preparations to crush the German State, which had only recently been released from the punitive military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. And two of the major Fascist states in Europe, Italy and Spain, declared neutrality in it.

The Irish state had gained its independence from Britain only the year before Britain declared World War on Germany. Its democratic assertion of independence in January 1919, mandated by the Election of December 1918, had been beaten down by Britain, by methods which it would not be unreasonable to describe as Fascist, in 1919-21. In 1922 a regime based on a half-measure of independence was established in the Treaty War, by a Treaty Army armed by Britain. In 1932 a Government was elected which repudiated the Treaty. It withheld a payment to Britain dating from the period of Imperial Government. Britain tried to break this Government by the Economic War. The Economic War ended in 1938 with a British economic concession, and also with the concession of three Naval bases which Britain had occupied until then.

If the Irish Government had not had control of its Naval bases in 1939 the Irish State would have been in the War, as Britain's ally or instrument, whether it liked it or not. No enemy could have taken a declaration of neutrality by the Irish Government as stating the reality of things if British warships were operating out of Cobh and the other bases held by Britain. And there can be little doubt that a strong movement would have risen within Irish politics for the ending of this costly military subordination to Britain. And such a movement, in the circumstances of the British declaration of war on Germany, would have been in *de facto* alliance with Germany.

The Republican movement that declared war on Britain in 1939 on the issue of Partition was easily contained by the Dublin Government. Irish public opinion was not outraged by it—the view was that Britain was getting a little bit of what it richly deserved—but neither was it actively supportive of it. Things would have been very different indeed if the issue had been Britain dragging Ireland into yet another of its Wars by retaining Imperial control of Irish Naval Bases after pretending to recognise it as an independent state.

Churchill condemned the surrender of these bases to the Irish state. He described it as an act of Appeasement. And so it was. What Appeasement initially meant, before it took on a new meaning in the post-War mythology of the World War, was concession of authority within Empire to forces hostile to the Empire. Churchill was a strictly Imperialist anti-Appeaser. He took his anti-Appeasement stand in the early 1930s against a small measure of delegated authority to local forces in the Indian Empire. The relinquishing of control of the Irish bases in 1938 was an act of Appeasement of that kind, though more serious than the Indian measure, because it conceded territory to a foreign state close to home.

Martin Mansergh, adviser to Taoiseachs, has denied that Britain is a foreign state relative to Ireland. He maintains, in effect, that the default position of the Irish state is British. And it could be argued that, under the Governments of the last twenty years, the Irish state has been reverting to its British

default position. But Chamberlain's concession to De Valera in 1938, and Dev's consolidation of that concession in 1939, did establish Irish independence *de facto*, and thereby established Ireland as a foreign state relative to Britain. And that *de facto* status is not easily defaulted. Weak Governments, made up of people who wish things were otherwise with relation to Britain, have not been able to make them otherwise. Governments come and go but the factual independence of the state remains. And, because it is a fact and not merely a policy, the accidents of international politics—particularly European politics—have tended to consolidate its separateness from Britain, even under Governments whose wishes did not lie in that direction at all.

For a couple of generations, during which political life was much more nationalistic than it is now, the Irish pound was only the pound sterling dressed up in green. An accident of European politics led to the Irish pound becoming real and acquiring a rate of exchange against the pound sterling. Other alienating developments in Irish/British relations followed, as a matter of course rather than by an exercise of political will, from that fact.

If Chamberlain had not found it expedient to appease the Irish national will, as brought to bear on him by De Valera, and concede *de facto* Irish independence on the eve of the World War, it seems very improbable that the subsequent course of events would have been as it was.

Churchill came to power about two years later, at the end of the Phoney War. During the Phoney War—or the encirclement of Germany with a view to squeezing the life out of it—he ran the Naval side of the War. He declared at the outset that the Irish declaration of neutrality in the King's war was illegal. If he had been allowed to invade the Irish state in order to bring it into the war, he could have made a plausible case that he was only enforcing the Constitution. The British Constitution, being no more than a matter of prevailing political opinion, is a pliable instrument of the Government. But Chamberlain would not allow it. And, when he came to power himself in May 1940, British Imperial power was leaking away fast.

But for Chamberlain's act of Appeasement in 1938, Ireland would have found itself in the War in 1939 under the terms of the 1921 'Treaty'. After that act of Appeasement Ireland could only have been brought into the War by British invasion. It became a foreign state in its relations with Britain in 1938.

Invading a foreign state to bring it into your war—and especially *this* foreign state—would have had serious diplomatic repercussions.

Britain had invaded Greece in 1916, in order to bring it into the Great War after the Greek Government had resisted inducements and pressures—and it was supported by the Home Rule Party which pretended to be in the War because Germany had violated Belgian neutrality. But the international situation was very different in 1939 from what it had been in 1916. In 1916 Britain had successfully embroiled most of the world in the War and the United States was feeling its way towards it. But in 1939-40 most of the world was at peace. Public opinion in the United States was assertively neutral, recalling how Britain and France had in 1919 systematically obstructed the implementation of the principles on which the US had entered the War and saved them from probable defeat. And, of course, Irish-American opinion was an influential strand in American opinion. Therefore, aside from the possible military consequences of invasion, it would have been diplomatically rash of the Allies to have treated Ireland in 1939-40 as they had treated Greece in 1916.

Churchill came to power when Allied war strategy had gone awry—and he came to power *because* it had gone awry.

Britain and France had declared war but they did not have the will to prosecute it by battle. Their Armies exchanged occasional shots across the Franco-German border for nine months. They had encouraged Poland by military guarantees to refuse to negotiate with Germany on the Danzig issue, but had then stood idly by while Poland was defeated.

The military guarantees to Poland in the Spring of 1939 constituted an encirclement of Germany. Martin Mansergh, flying in the face of commonsense, has denied that the Polish Guarantees, which gave Poland the power to bring the two strongest armies in the world into action against Germany, constituted a military encirclement, but it was not denied in Britain at the time. In the *Oxford War Pamphlets* it was praised as a good thing. If Germany was to be brought to book, how could a military encirclement have been a bad thing?

What made it a bad thing was that Britain and France were not in earnest about it while the Poles believed that they were. Hitler judged that they weren't, and he broke the encirclement by striking at Poland while the Allies looked on. But Britain was not entirely inactive: it bombarded Germany with millions of propaganda leaflets.

The Allies then spent the next eight months trying to spread their declared (but unfought) War to Scandinavia. Russia invaded Finland to strengthen its defences in the Baltic. The Allies then remembered the League of Nations and expelled Russia from it for aggression. They assembled an Expeditionary Force to go and fight Russia in Finland, but the Finns refused to invite them in. Then they tried to stop the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany and in the process breached Norwegian neutrality. But they acted so ponderously that Germany saw what was afoot and pre-empted them with a small, energetic action of its own. Then, while the Allies were still licking their wounds over their Norwegian fiasco, Germany responded to their declaration of war with a novel, hastily-improvised military offensive in France, which disrupted the stronger Allied Armies in a few weeks.

British troops, which had retreated to Dunkirk in good order, were allowed to go home. The evacuation from the beaches was harassed by the German air force—they were at war after all—but the surrounding German Army did not interfere.

France's declaration of war on Germany had again—as in 1870—resulted in the disruption of its Armies and German occupation. The French Parliament did not, as in 1870, call for irregular resistance by *levée en masse*. It accepted the outcome of the war, which it had declared, as determined by the conflict of the regular Armies. It conferred exceptional powers on Marshal Pétain and authorised him to make a settlement with Germany.

Britain, though it had left the battlefield, refused to negotiate a settlement. It might have done so from a position of strength, as compared with France, because the Royal Navy was still the most powerful world force in being—and because Hitler had his mind on the future of world affairs when he should have been concentrating on defeating the local enemy that had declared war on him after collaborating with him for five years, and he saw the British Empire as a necessary part of the world.

Britain refused to negotiate a withdrawal of the declaration of war which it had made jointly with France. So the war continued. And that meant that a final Franco-German settlement could not be made. Pending a settlement of the war, Germany remained in occupation of Northern and Western France while in the rest of the country a new regime was established, in accordance with the will of Parliament, with the capital at Vichy.

Britain denounced French recognition of the military reality of defeat as treason and betrayal. A French journalist responded by saying that Churchill did genuinely love France—as a rider loves his horse.

British propaganda, in which popular films played a considerable part, blamed the military defeat on French degeneracy. A Fifth Column of Hun lovers had gained control of France and had opened the gates. There was not a shred of hard evidence for this view, but in the mental condition to which defeat reduced the popular mind in England it passed muster as a fact—and to this day it has not been repudiated.

The unexpected and spectacular German victory needs no Fifth Column hypothesis to explain it. It is comprehensible in purely military terms. German military plans fell into Allied hands in April 1940. A novel military tactic was therefore adopted, which might easily have led to catastrophe. The luck of the game led instead to an astonishing victory which has ever since been compared to Hannibal's victory at Cannae.

But there was an element in the Franco-British alliance that made it unsound and which probably had a bearing on the outcome.

France had borne the main cost, human and economic, of the war alliance of 1914-18, and in the outcome it was prevented by Britain from securing its position against Germany. While it re-conquered Alsace-Lorraine, it was not allowed a complete Rhine frontier. And, while the Allied war propaganda, British no less than French, had made the unification of Germany around Prussia the major source of evil in the world, with the clear implication that world peace required the quarantining of Prussianism, when the French set about removing the good Germans from the evil influence of Prussianism, Britain wouldn't have it.

Actual implementation of the agreed war policy—or the agreed war propaganda at least—would have established France as the hegemonic state in Europe, which it had been British policy to prevent for more than two centuries. Britain therefore vetoed separatist Bavarian and Rhineland developments encouraged by France. It insisted on maintaining the German state constructed by Prussian influence, with only marginal territorial losses in the West, but with the devilish Danzig arrangement in the East.

French morale in foreign policy was broken by British influence in the early 1920s. The kind of anti-French propaganda that was churned out can be seen in the writings of Major C.J.C. Street in the early 1920s, after he had done his stint as propagandist of the Black and Tan War in Ireland. With France effectively hegemonised by Britain in the matter, maintenance of the Versailles restrictions on German sovereignty depended on Britain. But Britain in the 1920s connived at secret breaches of the Versailles conditions by the democratic Weimar Governments in Germany, and from 1933 to 1938 it collaborated with Hitler in making open breaches of them which restored German sovereignty and made Germany the hegemonic Power in Eastern Europe. Then, suddenly and nonsensically, in March 1939, it decided to curb the German hegemony of Eastern Europe which it had actively helped to establish the previous year.

In 1938 Britain allowed the merger of Nazi Germany and Fascist Austria, having vetoed a merger of Germany and Austria in the 1920s when both were governed democratically. And it destroyed the Czechoslovak state, which it had created in 1919, by awarding the Sudetenland region of it to Hitler—taking away a defensible physical boundary and transferring the advanced Czechoslovak arms industry to Germany. It did this without



consulting the League of Nations, which was supposed to have authority under the Versailles Treaty. And it applied moral compulsion to France to make it renege on Treaty obligations towards Czechoslovakia.

Having thus made a drastic alteration in the power-structure of Europe, and having revoked the Versailles Treaty *de facto* without any attempt to revise it through the League of Nations, it decided to make defence of the indefensible position of Danzig a war issue against Germany. (Transfer of the German-populated city of Danzig would have been a slight thing compared to the German/Austrian merger, and the dismantling of Czechoslovakia.)

It gave a Guarantee to Poland, and France followed suit. The Poles thought that the Guarantee gave them the power to send the British and French Armies to war against Germany if it moved to incorporate Danzig (a kind of anomalous League of Nations City State, outside Polish sovereignty, and with a German municipal Government) into East Prussia.

Britain did this without having any intention of going into battle in defence of League of Nations sovereignty in Danzig, or in defence of Poland if the Danzig issue led to a German/Polish War. If relevant military preparations had been made on foot of the Guarantee to Poland, Hitler would have taken account of them in his conduct, as he took account of the fact that they were not made. A few days after the German/Polish War started, Britain declared war on Germany but did not actually commit its forces in support of Poland—with the result that the German Army, which had not existed a few years earlier, and which had no experience of battle, was given an easy practice-war in Poland.

France echoed the British declaration of war. The British intention was that France should do the main fighting against Germany, as in 1914-18, but France, because of 1919, was determined that this would not be.

It was Britain's war. The course of policy that led to it was British. The decisions which dismantled the Versailles system without reference to the League were British. The decision to give the Polish Guarantee without intending to honour it was British. The decision to declare war five months later without making serious military preparations to wage it was British.

France was carried along in Britain's wake in all of this. But it was determined not to be Britain's dupe for a second time.

In 1919, when playing the major part in setting up the League of Nations, Britain undermined it out the outset by withholding the Empire from it. It used the League as cover for extending the Empire into the Middle East under the Mandate system, but the Empire was preserved as an independent body in world affairs, and, with its size and its ramifications, it was to be the guiding force in world affairs. And Britain, in its collaboration with Hitler in 1933-1938, and its decision to make war on Germany in 1939, acted as an independent Imperial Power and not as a member of the League. De Valera's efforts to make the League an important force in world affairs came to nothing because of this.

But, while acting Imperially in world politics, Britain did not intend to fight Imperially—as the Empire with which it had compared itself had done: the Roman. It intended that France should do its fighting for it. And France, having done that once and been cheated of the fruits of victory, was not willing to do it again.

Britain declared a war which it lacked the will to fight. Going on historical precedent, it reckoned on needing only sufficient

force to start the war and then getting others to fight it, while it tended to the politics of it. In the end, of course, others did fight it. It was fought by two states which were neutrals in 1939-41. They became the dominant Great Powers of the world in the course of fighting it. The war then became a different war from the one started by the British Empire, and the Empire was a casualty of it.

The retreat from Dunkirk was the end of Britain's War—the war launched by Britain as an independent World Empire and controlled by it.

War correspondents report that, when the Army was brought home from France in July 1940, there was a profound feeling of relief in England that an engagement of the 1914-18 kind had been averted.

What Britain had prepared for was a bombing war—and a bombing war was what it fought a couple of years later as a secondary ally of the Soviet Union and the USA.

From June 1940 to June 1941 it "*stood alone*". Having lost the major battle and withdrawn its Army from Europe, it refused to make a settlement and did enough fighting on the margins to maintain a war atmosphere in Europe. Its object was not to fight the war, but to keep it going with a view to spreading it. As the dominant Naval Power in the world, it was able to do this. The result of its pin-prick war was the extension of German power to Yugoslavia and Greece.

What would have happened in the world if Britain had ended the war after its retreat from France and made a settlement on the terms outlined by Hitler is a matter of speculation. The predominant speculation seems to be that events would have followed much the same course as they did as a result of Britain's policy of spreading the war. But this hardly deserves to be called speculation at all. It is a wild fantasy of wish-fulfilment.

The continuing of the War after the retreat from France is usually said to have depended on the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill. The other possible replacement of Chamberlain was Halifax. The 'correct' view is that it would have been a disaster if Halifax had succeeded Chamberlain. In this view of things, Halifax is treated in effect as the leader of the Nazi Fifth Column in England, who would have opened the gates to the Hun. Of course the term Fifth Column is not applied to him. And there was no question of opening the gates. Hitler had no designs on England. He did not want to destroy the Empire—as the English in 1914 had wanted to destroy the German Empire and capture German trade. He was at war with England only because England had declared war on him. If England had called off its declaration of war, the War would have ended with the Empire intact, and with the ending of the War the provisional German occupation of France would have been ended.

That these would have been the immediate effects if England, having lost the battle, had called off the War, is hardly disputable.

And yet there is a sense in which the ending of the War in those circumstances would have been tantamount to surrender. Britain had got itself into a position where it just had to be top dog in the world or go into decline.

Around 1905 it was proposed by the Chamberlain Liberal element in the Unionist Party that the destruction of the Boer Republics should be the last act of Imperial expansion, that the

Empire should be consolidated into an economic and political bloc, and that a world order consisting of a number of Great Powers, of which Germany was one, should be recognised. The leader of the Unionist Party was the Tory, Balfour (who had just presided over the abolishing of the landlord system in Ireland in response to William O'Brien's agitation). Balfour prevented the issue from being decided. The Liberal Party came out strongly against Chamberlain's policy, that was summed up by the term "*Imperial Tariff*". They went into the 1906 Election with a Free Trade policy, which in the circumstances meant continuing the expansion of the Empire, with the implication of war on Germany, which was becoming a serious trade rival, and whose foreign policy was to preserve the traditional states of the world, particularly the Ottoman Empire—which Britain was intent of destroying.

Churchill changed from Tory to Liberal on this issue. The Liberals won an outright majority in 1906 and began organising for war on Germany, with encouragement from Balfour as leader of the Opposition. The opportunity for war on Germany came as the Irish Home Rule conflict approached its crisis. The declaration of war enabled the climax of the crisis—which seemed likely to be civil war—to be evaded, and that was undoubtedly a factor in the war enthusiasm which materialised suddenly when War was declared.

A War Coalition was formed in 1915 and the Unionists became the dominant element in it in 1916. German resistance was immensely stronger than had been expected. In 1916-17 there seemed to be no prospect of the military defeat of Germany on the Continent, and at sea Germany was interrupting the massive imports of food and raw materials on which Britain depended. It was suggested to Balfour, who was running the war at sea, that a settlement should be considered. He replied that nothing short of outright British victory would do. Only that would allow Britain's position in the world to be maintained. That position would be lost if Britain made a settlement with Germany in response to the pressure that Germany had succeeded in putting it under. And, if British supremacy was not maintained, it would matter little how the War ended.

British war propaganda made much of a book published on Germany on the theme of *World Power or Downfall*. The meaning was that Germany in its economic development since the unification of 1871 had followed the British pattern and had become increasingly dependent on food and raw material imports by sea. It had become dependent on world trade and, in the light of the how the Royal Navy ruled the waves, it could only be sure of maintaining this position if it developed sufficient power in the world to protect its trade.

The meaning was not *World Supremacy or Downfall*, but that is how it was presented in the British war propaganda.

Another book published in Germany before the War, by the same author, General Bernhardt, had the title *Deutschland und Der Nächste Krieg*, which translates as *Germany And The Next War*. An English translation was published as part of the British war propaganda, but the title was translated as *Britain As Germany's Vassal*. There was nothing in the text of the book that warranted this title. The change of title was an absurd misrepresentation of the content of the book. But the war propagandists—the intelligentsia organised for war in the Wellington House operation, which later became the Ministry of Information—could put this absurd title on the translation in the confidence that loyal, patriotic people would somehow contrive to read the book in a way that confirmed the title instead of raising doubts about the propaganda. The representative British mind at war is one of the wonders of the world.

The actual British position in the Great War would never be presented in the propaganda as *World Supremacy Or Downfall*. But that was its position. And for twenty years after that War, it was the World Superpower. There was no contender disputing the title with it. France was timid and subservient. The USA had withdrawn from European affairs in disgust. The Soviet Union was an unknown quantity, having been defeated by Poland in 1920 in its attempt to break out of isolation. Japan had no pretensions to world power. And Germany had become what it was with the active collaboration of Britain, with a recently improvised Army that had no experience of battle, and was poorly armed until Britain made it a gift of the Sudetenland. How, in those circumstances, could Britain have lost its supremacist attitude towards the world?

So the latest war had started badly! That's how it always was. As an island Superpower that ruled the waves, it did not need to prepare seriously for wars before launching them, as states with land frontiers had to do. It could start a war in insular security and then prepare for it. But, if Halifax had succeeded Chamberlain in May 1940, after the first setback, the War would have been given up before it had really started. And, while this would have left the Empire intact, World Supremacy would have been lost by the recognition of German power in Europe after a war had been declared for the purpose of destroying it. Then English life would not have been worth living.

These things are rarely discussed with any degree of realism in Britain. That is why a think piece by John Gray, a philosophical journalist in some quality newspapers, on BBC Radio 4 (25.9.11), on the subject of the succession to Chamberlain, is worth reproducing:

## John Gray:

" ...

Churchill had not one life but several. Each was full of challenge and excitement and in one of them he changed the history of the world. Yet there were times when he felt his life to have been futile and the mood of despondency that would sometimes come on him in his most active years which, following Samuel Johnson, Churchill called the *Black Dog*, seems to have been much with him in later life. But, in a strange conjunction of events, it may have been this same Black Dog, together with the intervention of a loyal friend during a few fateful days in early May 1940, that enabled Churchill to achieve the position from which he could alter the course of history.

There have always been those who think Churchill's melancholy could have been a symptom of mental illness. Some have suggested he may have suffered from bipolar disorder, experiencing frequent mood shifts from intense bursts of impulsive activity to paralysing depression. Nowadays we tend to interpret any type of character or behaviour that departs from our standards of tepid normality as a symptom of some underlying disorder. Churchill was certainly not tepid. He was passionate, volatile and intensely emotional in much of his life. That did not make him unbalanced.

Churchill's exceptional openness to intense emotion may help explain how he was able to sense danger that more conventional minds failed to perceive. For most of the politicians and opinion-makers who wanted to appease Hitler, the Nazis were not much more than a raucous expression of German nationalism. It needed an unusual type of mind to see that Nazism was something new in the world, a radically

modern movement with a potential for destruction that had no precedent in history. A recent study by an American psychologist maintains that Churchill's insight was related to his episodes of mental ill-health. We needn't accept the diagnosis, but it's hard to resist the thought that the dark view of the world that came on Churchill in his moods of desolation enabled him to see what others could not. He owed his foresight of the horror that was to come to the visits of the Black Dog.

But Churchill's foresight would have counted for nothing if he hadn't become Prime Minister in May 1940. For Churchill himself this may have been a matter of Fate. Though not a religious believer, he seems to have felt that his life was ruled by a kind of destiny in which he was being prepared for a supreme trial. So it proved to be. And yet from another point of view his becoming Prime Minister when he did was the work of chance. Churchill became Britain's Leader through the intervention of someone who is now practically forgotten.

Brendan Bracken was a strange self-invented personality who achieved success as the publisher of the *Financial Times* and the *Economist* and served as Churchill's Minister of Information during the War. Born in Ireland and growing up in Australia, where his father was a builder, Bracken migrated to England, where he effaced his modest past and became Churchill's confidant during the inter-war Wilderness Years.

Bracken hero-worshipped Churchill and supported him when the world had written him off. But the greatest service Bracken performed was in making it possible for Churchill to take power.

We tend to view the past as if it could not have been otherwise, but for Churchill to replace Neville Chamberlain in 1940 was a highly improbable turn of events. Almost no one who counted wanted Churchill as leader. The Press Lord, Max Beaverbrook—who also played a role in securing Churchill the Premiership—wrote: "*Chamberlain wanted Halifax, Labour wanted Halifax, the Lords wanted Halifax, the King wanted Halifax and Halifax wanted Halifax...*"

Beaverbrook was exaggerating. Chamberlain took a long time before deciding to resign and it's not clear that Halifax did want to become Prime Minister. What is undoubtedly true is that a great many influential people wanted Halifax to take over and it's highly likely that he could have been persuaded to do so.

Crucially, Churchill seems to have shared the view that Halifax, then Foreign Secretary, would be Chamberlain's successor. Churchill took for granted that he would serve under Halifax as Minister of Defence [Minister for War, surely. B.C.] and made it clear he felt it was his duty to serve in this way. We may never know the exact pattern of events over the days of May 9th and May 10th, 1940. Beaverbrook likes to dramatise his role and the accounts left by others conflict in some of the details. But, according to Bracken's biographers, he anticipated that, when Chamberlain decided to resign, he would arrange a meeting in Downing St. from which Halifax would emerge as the next Prime Minister.

Loyal to Churchill and an enemy of appeasement, Bracken was determined to prevent this outcome. So round one o'clock on the morning of May 9th he and Beaverbrook set out to talk to Churchill, eventually finding him brooding alone in one of his Clubs. They warned Churchill of the coming meeting, with Bracken urging Churchill to say nothing if asked whether he would serve under Halifax. In the end Churchill was persuaded to remain silent.

As Bracken anticipated, the meeting was held at Downing St. later that day. And, when the issue of the succession came up, Churchill did what he'd promised. He said nothing. After a long pause Halifax said that his position in the Lords would make it difficult for him to be Prime Minister. Next morning news arrived that Hitler had invaded Belgium and Holland, and in the afternoon Churchill went to the Palace to tell the King he was forming a Government.

Some historians have suggested that Churchill's silence may not have been decisive. If Halifax had become Prime Minister, they argue, Churchill would still have been in charge of the War.

But Halifax would have sued for peace. That was the reason so many in Britain's ruling elite supported him. And this would have changed everything. With unchallenged command of Europe, Hitler would have been able to implement the full force of Nazi ideology.

Some historians have also argued that, if the War had not continued, the Holocaust might not have happened. But Genocide was the logic of Nazism. In the eyes of Nazis racism was a science claiming to show that some parts of humanity were inferior and fit only for extermination. There's no reason to think Hitler wouldn't have followed that logic to its terrible conclusion. And it's entirely realistic to think that the hideous world that Hitler aimed to create would have come fully into being and still exist today.

As Churchill said in a speech in the House of Commons in June 1940 "*If we fail, then the whole world would sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister and perhaps more protracted by the lights of perverted science*".

Even if we don't think past events were bound to happen as they did, we tend to believe that the larger course of history is shaped by impersonal forces, but for a couple of days in May 1940 the fate of the world turned on the fall of a leaf.

If Bracken hadn't left Australia, to reinvent himself as an Englishman and appointed himself as Churchill's faithful protector, if Beaverbrook and Bracken hadn't found Churchill brooding in his Club, if Bracken hadn't succeeded in persuading Churchill to remain silent, and if Churchill hadn't been prepared for the desperate struggle that was followed by the visit of the Black Dog, History would have been very different and the world darker than anything we can easily imagine."

## Some Comments

So a flap of Brendan Bracken's butterfly wings saved the world!

And, if it did not save the Jews—and saving the Jews, we are increasingly told, is what the War was really about—that was because the Jews were beyond saving in 1939-40. Hitler was defeated, but most of the Jews in Central Europe were exterminated. And, if it appears that they were exterminated as an incident in the catastrophic sequence brought about by Churchill's policy of spreading the War, that is delusion, deception, or sophism.

The Jews were doomed once Hitler came to power because of something he had written in *Mein Kampf*. They were doomed because it was in the logic of Nazism.

During the last couple of years of the War I read about it in the papers (the *Press* and the *Examiner*) and did not get the idea that the Jews had much to do with it, beyond being victims of it. In the late forties I read a British paperback about the Nuremberg



Trials and found no reason to disagree with the general opinion around me that, as trials at law, they were bogus—and I still don't. The first major book I read about the War was Churchill's account, when it was published in the early fifties. I did not get the idea from it that it was about the Jews. About the same time I read *Mein Kampf*, because it was available in the small local lending library. I noticed that Hitler disliked the Jews (which was common knowledge), but the book consisted chiefly of an account of how the world was run, and how superbly Britain had conducted its propaganda in the Great War.

Slieve Luacra had not been deluged by British war propaganda then, and I worked out an understanding of the War dispassionately, and in accordance with the habits of thought prevalent in the area. That habit was to take events and circumstances in sequence, as leading consecutively from one event to another. It is a habit I have never been able to overcome. And, with that habit of mind, all I can see in Gray's argument is apologetic propaganda made nonsensical by a small element of reason he let into it.

Hitler's treatment of the Jews was not the reason he was made war upon by Britain. Britain did not "appease" Nazi Germany as a Power which it found dominant in Europe and whose hostility it hoped to ward off by conciliation. Britain, the World Superpower and the guardian of the Versailles Settlement, restored *de facto* sovereignty to Nazi Germany, having refused it to democratic Germany. It broke the Versailles Treaty by its actions without ever urging a formal revision of it. It was active in establishing Nazi Germany as the dominant Power in Central Europe, with the hegemonic influence in central Europe that went with it.

Then it suddenly decided to make war on it, ostensibly in defence of the last remnant of Versailles, the indefensible position of Danzig. After the setback in France, it did its usual thing of spreading the War. The great prize in this strategy was German/Soviet War. It was in the hinterland of that War that the large-scale extermination of Jews was carried out. The Soviet Union opened its borders to Jews in flight from Nazism. (It was the only state which did so, except perhaps for Fascist Spain to some extent.) Large-scale Jewish survival in Eastern Europe depended on Soviet power. The Soviet Union broke Nazi Germany, but then, a couple of years later, Western Cold War propaganda declared that the Soviet Union had taken up the role of Nazi Germany as the destroyer of Jewry.

Now I cannot see how this course of events would probably have happened anyway, even if Britain in 1939—instead of encouraging the Poles to refuse a negotiated transfer of Danzig to East Prussia with the delusory military Guarantee—had exerted pressure on the Poles to get rid of this indefensible remnant of Versailles, as it had put pressure on the Czechs to transfer the eminently defensible Sudetenland to Germany—even though, unlike Danzig, it had not been part of the German state. (Britain was not much less the creator of the Polish state than of the Czechoslovak state.)

And I cannot see how in 1940, with Poland having disappeared as an ostensible reason for war, a settlement of the War after the defeat in France would probably have led to world war anyway.

World War was brought about in the medium of the British strategy of keeping Europe on a war footing in order to spread the War. If Britain had ended the War, with the Empire intact and its Navy ruling the waves, and had actively set about making contingency arrangements about the East European situation in which Germany and the Soviet Union had become neighbours, it would not have been a simple matter for Hitler to start a new war with the object of conquering the world.

If Hitler came close to conquering the world—he didn't, but it is conventional to say that he did—it was through defensive action, or action that could credibly be presented as defensive—in a continuous war situation laid on by Britain.

As for the exterminations: they were carried out in the chaotic situation of expanding war to which there were no influential observers, and in territories that were not under German control in June 1940.

As to extermination—whether of the Jews or of others—being in the logic of Nazism, I could never find grounds for this view. There were some rhetorical flourishes which could be given that meaning by far-fetched interpretation. But it was no policy—as was the case for example in the United States with the native peoples. The exterminations were carried out furtively, in obscurity, during three years in the total war in the East. The German people had other things on their minds during these years; Himmler did his best to ensure that they did not know what was going on; and Churchill, who must have known through the Enigma readings and the reports from the Polish Resistance, did not bombard the German population with credible information.

The Nazi policy was to curb Jewish influence in public and commercial life and relocate Jews out of Germany where possible. The Nuremberg Laws were similar in many respects to the British Penal Laws in Ireland.

It seems highly improbable to me that, if the war situation had been ended by Britain (on whom it depended) in June 1940, the Nuremberg Laws would have been extended into extermination laws within the territory of Germany as it was in June 1940.

I could never see the logic of Nazism that Gray sees. Was that because I grew up in MacNiece's "neutral island in the heart of man"? I didn't think so. I was never very susceptible to British propaganda and the twenty years I spent trying to bring Northern Ireland within British democracy, against British determination that it would not be, made me even less so. Nevertheless, it was reassuring to find that Thomas Mann, who was *the* good German, in American exile from Nazism during the War, could not see it either. He said so in lectures which he delivered in Washington during the War, with the administration as his audience:

"The peoples born and qualified for politics instinctively know how to guard the unity of conscience and action, of spirit and power, at least subjectively. They pursue politics as an art of life and of power that cannot be entirely freed from a strain of vitally useful evil, but that never quite loses sight of the higher, the idea, human decency, and morality: in this regard they feel politically, and they get along with themselves and with the world in this fashion. Such getting-along with life, founded on compromise, the German regards as hypocrisy. He was not born to get along with life, and he proves his lack of qualification for politics by misunderstanding it in clumsily sincere manner. Not at all wicked by nature but with a flair for the spiritual and ideal, he regards politics as nothing but falsehood, murder, deceit, and violence, as something completely and one-sidedly filthy... Since he thinks it is unalloyed evil, he believes he has to be a devil to pursue it. Crimes were perpetrated that no psychology can excuse... For they were superfluous; they were not essential and Nazi Germany would have gotten along without them. She could have carried out her plans of power and conquest without their aid. In a world that knows trusts, cartels, and exploitation, the idea of monopolistic spoliation of all other nations by the Goering Concern wasn't anything new and strange. The embarrassing thing about it was that it compromised the ruling system too greatly by clumsy

exaggeration. Moreover, as an idea it came a little too late... Their crimes, I repeat, were not a necessary factor of their belated embarkment upon exploitation; they were a luxury in which they indulged from theoretical predisposition, in honour of an ideology..." (*Germany And The Germans*, a lecture delivered in the Library of Congress, 29 May 1945).

It was a brave thing for a German intellectual to say in 1945, that in great part the Nazi regime only did what other powerful regimes did—by implication, what those who defeated them and were about to put them on trial did. I didn't think much of Mann as a novelist, apart from *Lotte In Weimar*. I'm sure I would have found him obnoxious as a person. But his Washington Addresses during and immediately after the War—particularly this one, and the one defending Nietzsche, *In The Light Of Recent Events*—show that he was an authentic German intellectual of the kind that began with Kant. And he was the end of the line.

The practical blending of good and evil in the art of power politics, as demonstrated by the English over many generations, was achieved by Hitler until 1939. He was then disoriented by an unexpected degree of success. The war in the west was forced on him, as was the tactic by which it was won in a few weeks. He had made no plans for a follow-through. He dithered. British intervention in Greece drew him to the Balkans. The ongoing war situation maintained by Britain kept his relationship with the Soviet Union unstable. In attacking Russia he had three possible aims: To oblige Britain to make a settlement by depriving it of the only potential ally that might enable it to win; to destroy Communism; to gain *Lebensraum*. The first of these seems to have been the one which made immediate military sense. It would have fitted in with the third aim, which is the one set out in *Mein Kampf*.

The Balkan War delayed the attack on Russia for six weeks. Moscow was not taken when Winter set in. But, at the start of 1942, Hitler found himself in a position from which something like a conquest of the world might be attempted. In September 1939 the Liberal leader said in the House of Commons that Hitler's aim was world conquest. It then became the conventional thing to say, absurd though it was in the light of the balance of military and material forces. A couple of years later Hitler was led by events to a position from which it seemed realisable. But he never adapted to that position or adopted policies appropriate to its realisation.

*Lebensraum* and world conquest did not fit together well. *Lebensraum* was a conventional colonial project. It required the subjugation and displacement of the people of a particular region which would then be opened to German colonisation. It was just what Britain did in the North of Ireland and many other parts of the world. What it required in the first instance was the disintegration of the Soviet Union by establishing the various peoples of the Soviet Union into self-governing nationalities under German protection. As far as one can tell, substantial sections of the various peoples were willing to take part in such a project. And German overlordship could have been maintained (at least in the short term, which is all that counts in war) by a very light touch. World conquest was a very different project.

Hitler could not have expected to find himself in the position in which he found himself in 1942. He didn't know what to do with it. He did neither the one thing nor the other. He just kept pushing on blindly. He had run out of perspective.

What was done in the next two years was a kind of displacement activity within the Nazi regime—the ideological self-indulgence described by Mann.

The extermination of the Jews had nothing to do with the enhancement of Nazi power in the vista that had opened up to it. Whether the anti-Semitism of the 1930s was a propaganda ploy or followed from an actual belief that Jews exercised a deleterious influence on German national life, the matter had been dealt with. Whatever might have been the case under Weimar, the Jews were not running the *Reich* in 1939.

If the Nazis had mastered the art of power politics in the manner of the English (whom they held in high regard), they would have seen that anti-Semitism had served its purpose and changed tack.

In the English art of politics power was pre-eminent over ideology. The function of ideology was to serve power. The English, when imposing the Penal Laws on the Irish, no doubt believed that Catholicism was evil as the Nazis believed that Jewry was evil. But, when a situation arose in which it was advantageous to the pursuit of power to make an alliance with Catholicism they did so. And they did it without beating their breasts over what they had done to Catholics—and even without losing the conviction that Catholicism was evil. Seen with a calculating eye from the vantage point of power, evil doesn't seem all bad.

If the Nazi leaders took Jewry to be a power of evil in the world, then they took it to be a power. That power had been tamed within Germany. Jews had been gathered up in camps in Eastern Europe in the hinterland of the War. The SS set about exterminating them, apparently because they could think of nothing else to do with them. They succumbed to ideology at the expense of power. If power had been the first consideration, other things would have been found to do with them. There had been collaboration between Nazism and certain strains of Zionism. All Zionists did not pretend that Palestine was a land without people waiting for a people without land. There were some who recognised frankly that Zionism was a colonial project whose achievement required the breaking of the will of the existing population of Palestine and the displacing of them.

Instead of feeling out the possibility of further collaboration, the SS succumbed to ideology and engaged in extermination. But, instead of doing it openly, and telling the world it was doing it a favour, it did it furtively, in maximum secrecy. And Churchill, who must have known of it, kept the secret.

Mann ridiculed the good German/bad German dichotomy. He said the bad Germans were good Germans overtaken by misfortune. But for a long time now in Germany there have only been good Germans—careful, industrious, and thrifty, but abysmally good.

Angela Merkel recently "*reminded Germans that Nazi crimes were possible only because ordinary people allowed them to take place*", according to an *Irish Times* report:

"*Germans tolerated Hitler's rise—Merkel*. Chancellor opens Berlin exhibition to mark 80th anniversary of Nazi rise to power. Merkel tells visiting Egyptian leader that human rights should be adhered to there..."

It is not easy to tell what "*human rights*" means in Egypt now. A regime is being forged after the previous regime was destroyed by a revolution of destruction. A Westernized middle class element which did well under the old regime apparently felt oppressed because it did not rule. It was to the fore in the initial stage of the revolution. It knew that what was seriously

oppressed by the old regime was the Islamic movement, which with its social services and spiritual life made life tolerable for the majority of the population under the military dictatorship maintained by, and for, the West. It was the power of that movement that undermined the dictatorship, and that therefore set about constructing a new regime.

The Westernised middle class could maintain a Western liberal lifestyle under the old regime. It began to complain about *Islamofascism* when a new regime began to be forged in accordance with the views of the majority. It declared that the rule of law was being breached, *the rule of law* being the judicial system of the dictatorship. It is clear that what it wanted was in effect a reform of the military dictatorship into a dictatorship operated by a representative government of the middle class. It wanted something like the British system of 1832 but didn't know how to go about getting it. And Merkel, with her cockeyed view of German history isn't the person to tell them.

At the *Reichstag* ceremony, Bundestag President Norbert Lammert recalled that "*the path to Auschwitz began with the destruction of democracy*". The Nazi takeover was, he said, "*not an accident of history, nor was it a coincidence or inevitable*". (So let the Egyptians figure that one out.) The report continues:

"That was not always a given in Germany, according to the 90 year-old Holocaust survivor, Inge Deutschkron. She reminded a special Bundestag sitting yesterday how... Konrad Adenauer once told the Bonn parliament that the majority of Germans were opponents of the crimes against the Jews. "He said many of them helped Jews escape their murderers", she said. "If only that was the truth"... " (30.1.13).[See note below]

Adenauer was the founder of Merkel's party and creator of the Federal Republic after 1945. As Mayor of Cologne he had experienced the British conquest of 1919 and the early 1920s. He pioneered in Cologne the social market that became standard in the EU. He was removed from Office by the Nazis, retired to a convent, and was interned towards the end of the War. After 1945 his great object was to prevent a recurrence of the British influence that had such catastrophic effect between the Wars. In reconstructing the German state, he did not assume that the German people was rotten, or that the Nazi regime was entirely inauthentic—leaving himself open to the charge that all he had done was change a few levers.

Along with the Italian Christian Democracy, De Gaulle, and the Benelux leaders, he constructed the European Union against British influence, and it flourished. His successors let Britain in, and it is now touch and go whether it survives.

Britain had never made a secret, over the centuries, that its interest is strongly against the unity of Europe. It never lets up on the propaganda designed to disable European thought processes. It was gripped by the destiny of ruling the world about four centuries ago and works at it full-time. If Germany cannot pull itself together and recover something of the spirit of Adenauer and Thomas Mann, British balance-of-power strategy is likely to have another full innings.

The Jewish problem in Europe in the inter-War period followed largely from the British decision to destroy the Austrian Empire, in which the Jews were a transnational middle class. In the states into which the Empire was broken up, they were remnants of Empire in conflict with the weakly developed native middle classes which had nationalist power. Anti-Semitism therefore was general.

Germany followed the British pattern of development after the unification of 1871, with such success that by 1900 Britain decided that it was necessary to destroy it. What happened to Germany in 1919 is unique. A viable democratic capitalist state was broken down politically, reduced to its social elements, subjected to an ultra-democratic Constitution which prevented the development of stable authority. Having reduced it to a kind of chaos, Britain supported it against France for balance-of-power reasons. Escape from that chaos was found through a revolutionary movement, Nazism, with which Britain collaborated actively for five years.

Having built it up, Britain then set about knocking it down. It could not be that Britain did not know, either when building it up or when making war on it, that the Nazi system was unstable, revolutionary, liable to do anything under stress.

Britain became the ruler of the world in 1919. Churchill said so. Birkenhead said so. Who was better placed to know?

And that is how it ruled. □

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## A Home for the Jews. (continued from p. 12)

Zionism offers the third sphere to the political conceptions of the Jewish race. In violent contrast to international communism, it presents to the Jew a national idea of a commanding character. It has fallen to the British Government, as the result of the conquest of Palestine, to have the opportunity and the responsibility of securing for the Jewish race all over the world a home and a centre of national life. The statesmanship and historic sense of Mr. Balfour were prompt to seize this opportunity. Declarations have been made which have irrevocably decided the policy of Great Britain. The fiery energies of Dr. Weissmann, the leader, for practical purposes, of the Zionist project, backed by many of the most prominent British Jews, and supported by the full authority of Lord Allenby, are all directed to achieving the success of this inspiring movement.

Of course, Palestine is far too small to accommodate more than a fraction of the Jewish race, nor do the majority of national Jews wish to go there. But if, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown, which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event would have occurred in the history of the world which would, from every point of view, be beneficial, and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire.

Zionism has already become a factor in the political convulsions of Russia, as a powerful competing influence in Bolshevik circles with the international communistic system. Nothing could be more significant than the fury with which Trotsky has attacked the Zionists generally, and Dr. Weissmann in particular. The cruel penetration of his mind leaves him in no doubt that his schemes of a world-wide communistic State under Jewish domination are directly thwarted and hindered by this new ideal, which directs the energies and the hopes of Jews in every land towards a simpler, a truer, and a far more attainable goal. The struggle which is now beginning between the Zionist and Bolshevik Jews is little less than a struggle for the soul of the Jewish people.

## Duty of Loyal Jews.

It is particularly important in these circumstances that the national Jews in every country who are loyal to the land of their adoption should come forward on every occasion, as many of them in England have already done, and take a prominent part in every measure for combating the Bolshevik conspiracy. In this way they will be able to vindicate the honour of the Jewish name (concludes p. 34)

and



# Social Democracy and the Shaping of Germany, 1945-49 - Part 1

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by Philip O'Connor

This is the first instalment of a series of extracts from a thesis written at Trinity College Dublin in the early 1990s. It is based on the extensive studies that appeared in Germany during the previous decades on the history of the German labour movement at national and local level, on published memoirs, on interviews with some surviving Social Democratic Party (SPD) officials and politicians of the time, and particularly on the records of the SPD, the trade union movement and Allied occupation powers, as well as the personal papers of many former leading actors, found in a range of archives in Germany.

The archives referred to in footnotes include the archive of the SPD itself (AsD), at that time in Bonn Bad Godesberg (now in Berlin), the archives of the German trade unions (Hans Bockler Stifting - HB), the German Federal State Archives (Bundesarchiv Koblenz - BA), records of local labour movements in the archives of cities (e.g. Hamburg State Archives - StaaH), and others. The term 'NL' in references refers to the papers of individuals. In the 1970s-80s the archives of the occupying Allies began to become available - first and foremost those of the US Military Government (OMGUS) and the wartime US intelligence organisation, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). While some Allied records remained "classified" at the time, particularly those of the British, the US records were released in surprisingly large measure, and full microfilm copies of those relevant to Germany lodged in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), Munich.

The text of the thesis is largely unchanged from the original written between 1990 and 1993, and no account is taken here of other studies that have appeared since, which, from a brief review, do not seem to have produced anything significant to alter the views of the thesis. The thesis therefore remains still a novel interpretation of the events it recounts. The main argument – outlined in the Introduction which is not included here – is firstly that the SPD that emerged as the major opposition party in West Germany in 1949, having thought itself the natural post-war party of power, was a very different force to the party that had been defeated and destroyed in 1933. It then sets out to trace the forces that shaped the new party, the influences behind them, and the conflicts that led to their dominance. While the story stops in 1949, with the founding of both the Federal Republic of West Germany and the eastern German Democratic Republic, many of the features of German politics for the succeeding decades had taken shape by then. These included, not least, the composition and politics of the SPD and of the wider German labour movement, which have continued to the present to play a major role in German life.

I remain grateful to the people who assisted me in writing this work at the time, especially the staff at the Department of Modern History in TCD who supported me through advice, supervision, and the organisation of a waiver of fees which made it possible to pursue this in the first place. Trips to Germany for research over two long and glorious summers in 1990 and 1991 (spent variously with friends, in apartments or, more often, in a tent with my family on camping grounds in at least a dozen cities from Hamburg to Munich and Berlin to Bonn) were facilitated by modest grants from the German

Academic Exchange Service. To all involved I would like to express my gratitude.

For the benefit of readers of this journal I have added before the chapter an introductory essay on the history of the SPD before 1933. The concluding part of Chapter 1 will appear in the next issue of "*Irish Foreign Affairs*".

## Introductory Essay: The SPD from its foundation to 1933

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* or SPD) was established in 1875 through the merger of the Prussia-based General German Workers' Association (ADAV), founded by the nobleman Ferdinand Lassalle, and the Saxon- and West German-based Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel. While both elements sought the achievement of socialism through working class democratic dominance in society, they differed in their approach, a difference that would cast a long shadow over internal party disputes. While the "Lassalleans" were fundamentally anti-bourgeois and focused on achieving the social progress of the working class through cooperation with the State, building on the progressive history of social formation initiated in Prussia through reformers such as Freiherr von Stein, the "social democrats", who had arisen as a break-away from the "progressivist" liberal movement of the 1848 Revolution, were hostile to the "authoritarian" state and more inclined to seek progress through alliance with liberal groups and saw socialism as only possible through a revolutionary overturning of the existing order. The groups had also differed on German unification, the Lassalleans supporting Prussian leadership while the social democrats sought a unification that included German Austria and minimised the influence of Prussia. This division became superfluous when the statecraft of Bismarck achieved a *fait accompli* with German unification in 1871 under the leadership of Prussia (whose King became *Kaiser*), with substantial autonomy for its component states and a constitution granting wide ranging democratic and social powers. [1]

Following its foundation, the party soon rose to become the largest socialist party in the world, closely related to a mass trade union movement. It dominated the Socialist International with a political programme based on the *Communist Manifesto* of the 1848 *émigrés* Marx and Engels. Bismarck's constitution provided a full adult franchise for the *Reichstag* (while the franchise remained relatively restricted at first in the component states of the *Reich*) and the SPD achieved nearly half a million votes in 1877, rising to a million and a half in 1890. Its organisation (along with the trade unions) was suppressed under the Socialist Laws of 1878-90, though its candidates could still contest elections and trade unionism could function at factory level. During this period about 900 SPD activists were exiled by the courts and several thousand served terms in prison for charges ranging from "criminal conspiracy" to "insulting the monarchy". Despite the lifting of the oppressive laws in 1890, the SPD adopted the radical Marxist influenced Erfurt Programme the following year, which phrased its democratic

aims in the terminology of class struggle and the “dictatorship of the proletariat”.

The party had its strongholds among the skilled industrial working class in the medium and small sized manufacturing cities of the predominantly Protestant western, northern and central (now eastern) areas of Germany. It developed an entire sub-culture involving mass membership organisations of over a million members, including workers’ educational associations, workers sports clubs, cultural associations, an extensive national and regional party press and so forth. A feature of great importance in its later history, well into the 1960s, was its lack of support among Catholic workers, not least in the then emerging centres of heavy industry and coal mining in the Ruhr and Silesia (now in Poland). Catholic workers had their own organisations, often though not exclusively through the Centre Party (the *Zentrum*), as well as their own Christian trade unions, which were particularly strong in the mining and steel industries. A Catholic working class sub-culture analogous to that of the socialists rapidly developed in those areas.[2]

The party maintained a radical, oppositional stance in the *Reichstag*, growing to be the largest party by 1912, with 4.25 million votes and 110 seats (out of 397). The Bismarckian *Reich* was an evolving affair however and, while maintaining its radical oppositionist stance, the SPD was increasingly drawn into the work of parliamentary committees, finally crossing the Rubicon in 1912 by voting in favour of elements of the budget. This trend was even more pronounced at the level of the composite states of the *Reich* which had considerable autonomy in many policy and taxation areas, and similarly or even more so at local council level. Apart from Prussia, where the “three class” voting system based on income rendered a working class vote a third the value of a bourgeois vote, the franchise was continuously liberalised in other states, and the SPD was increasingly involved in local coalition arrangements, with liberals in the south and the Centre Party in the west. The party was also involved extensively in the social partnership based administration of the social insurance system at local level, health and other social and educational services.

The SPD was a highly centralised and class conscious party, dedicated to a revolutionary ideal framed in Marxist terms, and prepared to “take over” society and the state when the contradictions of capitalism would usher in its final crisis and collapse. But the experience of pragmatic politics and social advance – particularly in southern and western Germany – eroded its fundamental oppositionism. The SPD had a massive press and vigorous intellectual life, with theoretical debate and argument the order of the day. In the south and west, charismatic regional leaders emerged – such as Georg von Volmer in Bavaria - who were more attuned to local political traditions and modalities than to the dictates of Marxist purity. They played down the anti-Royalism of the official party, ignored the theory of the inevitable “proletarianisation” of the “*Mittelstand*”, which in south and west Germany alienated the large stratum of independent skilled craftsmen which dominated small industry, and sought to suppress the official atheism of the party that nullified the potential appeal of the SPD among the large and growing Catholic working class. In the harsher political circumstances in Prussia, with its restrictive franchise and greater reliance on orderly structures for social progress, Marxism maintained dominance over the party leadership. From 1900 onwards this was challenged by “revisionist” theoreticians, notably Eduard Bernstein, who had been intellectually re-formed by a long stay in London under the influence of the English Fabians. He disputed party theories on

the declining rate of profit as disproved by events and called for the abandonment of ideological goals in favour of incremental growth of working class power in society, famously announcing that “*the movement is all, the end is nothing.*” Marxist orthodoxy was vigorously defended by the intellectual elite of the party, mainly Prussia-based and coincidentally also notably of Jewish background (although Bernstein himself was also Jewish). Foremost among these were Karl Kautsky, sometimes known as the “high priest” of the SPD, and Rosa Luxemburg, a charismatic figure who had risen to prominence as an editor in the party press in Prussian-Silesian Breslau. Luxemburg was the party’s leading internationalist, a position forged in a fierce struggle against the natural nationalism of the Polish Socialist Party (Breslau was a mixed Polish-German city). [3]

But the Marxist orthodoxy also well reflected the defiant, confident mood of workers in fast-industrialising Germany and was supported by a party leadership fearful of disunity and fragmentation across the very diverse local polities of the German *Reich*. Attempts by the “revisionists” to modify the party programme were easily seen off at party conferences. The rise of the SPD as both a social and political force between 1890 and 1914 seemed relentless and unstoppable. This was the period when Germany emerged as a great industrial power, overtaking Britain in industrial output by the turn of the century. The *Mittelstand* was indeed contracting, and the cartellisation of industry and the rise of a monopolistic finance capital seemed to confirm Marxist theory. Simultaneously working class social power was growing through participation and influence in local administrations and political alliances, the running of Bismarck’s social insurance system and most notably the rise of industrial trade unionism. For all its “authoritarianism”, Prussia had led the way in developing workplace representation and cooperation in the organising of industry and training of workers, developing a system that could trace its roots back to the pre-capitalist Guild system. Factory inspectorates had existed from the early nineteenth century (and even earlier) and elected Works Councils were formalised in law in the 1890s. Collective bargaining was legalised and agreements across industries, regions and sectors was a growing phenomenon. By the turn of the century German trade unionism represented the largest and most organised working class in the world, its millions of members greatly outnumbering even the SPD itself, and enjoying a rapidly improving standard of living.

The Russian mobilisation that followed the Austrian military response to the assassination by Bosnian Serb nationalists of Archduke Ferdinand in July 1914, led to the SPD voting war credits, leading the *Kaiser* to announce emotionally that he no longer saw parties but only Germans, meaning particularly the social democrats who royalists had previously denounced as unpatriotic. Within the SPD, while previously militantly opposed to war, few favoured a pacifist stance against the threat from “Russia, the champion of terror and barbarism” (Bebel) and the party overwhelmingly rallied to a “war of defence”. This was the basis for what became known as the “*Idea of 1914*” through which a united society would see the working class take its “rightful place” in the ordering of the affairs of the state. The majority of the SPD remained loyal to the state throughout the war while supporting any opportunity for a negotiated peace, such as that promoted by Pope Benedict XV in 1916 but rejected by the Allies. On both the “right” and the “left” small dissident groups emerged within the SPD, notably the Independent Socialists (USPD) who rejected support for the war which it saw as developing into an imperialist project, to the “national socialist” grouping of *Reichstag* SPD members who adopted a nationalist, annexationist and expansionist

position. This was not a re-run of the Marxist/Revisionist split. Both Bernstein the revisionist and Kautsky the defender of Marxist orthodoxy supported the Independent Socialists, as did other formerly traditional SPD politicians like Rudolf Hilferding, later a Weimar Minister. On the other side, two of the most prominent “national socialists”, Paul Lensch and Konrad Haenisch, had been on the extreme left anti-war wing of the party before 1914.[4]

The existing system of works councils and sectoral collective bargaining arrangements was formalised and expanded in 1916 and mobilised in the war effort, organising production, distribution and even food supplies in a system of “War Socialism”. This was institutionalised through a *Reich* level coordinating committee of industry, army and trade unions (socialist and Christian), with similar institutions at the level of each sector and industry, and a greatly strengthened role for trade union dominated works councils at plant and company level. [5]

Throughout most of the war, the militantly pacifist and nationalist extremes respectively of the SPD were quite marginal, with the “Majority SPD” remaining supportive of the war and advocating a negotiated peace without annexations, on the basis of a withdrawal to the starting positions of 1914. Several factors combined to destabilise the internal position in Germany from early 1917 – the increasing effectiveness of the British naval blockade, the revolution in Russia and the entry of America into the war. Food shortages led to widespread hunger and, inspired by events in Russia, this provoked growing unrest, strike action and anti-war demonstrations, led particularly by shop-floor movements among the skilled workers of the engineering workers union (DMV). The movement started in the strongholds of the SPD in Central Germany – notably Leipzig and Berlin – and fed into a growing mood of war weariness which even the defeat of Tsarist Russia and the ending of the war in the east at the end of 1917 did not halt.

The Hindenburg offensive in France in 1918 – meant as a knock-out blow to set the scene for a settlement – came close to success, but ended in stalemate and withdrawal as the US Army made itself felt for the first time in the war. The war in the west was ended by a ceasefire (“Armistice”) on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1918 pending agreement on a treaty concluding it. The civil unrest within Germany – with the blockade continuing relentlessly – and the adoption by the German Government of a peace position on the basis of US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (pre-war borders, national self-determination, no indemnities) precipitated the disintegration of the Army and the spread of a movement of Workers and Soldiers Councils throughout Germany. Allied demands for the removal of the *Kaiser* were echoed in the growing republican inclinations of the SPD and *Zentrum*. A secret pact was concluded between the General Staff, the SPD leadership and industrial interests to ensure an orderly transition to a Republic and negotiation of a treaty with the Allies. While this secured military and industrial support for the political settlement, the SPD for its part undertook to defend the political and territorial integrity of the state, including suppressing any revolutionary and separatist activity that might arise. The situation was further stabilised by the conclusion by trade unions and employer federations of a national agreement on wage and price controls, collective bargaining, working hours and workplace democracy, and the formalisation of social partnership institutions.

In the event a majority of the Workers and Soldiers Councils sided with the Majority Socialists, with minority groups forming the basis of a growing Independent Socialist movement

– especially in old SPD heartlands such as Saxony-Thuringia, Silesia (Breslau) and Berlin – and a newly formed Communist Party (KPD) created by the anti-war Berlin Spartacist faction led by the pacifist SPD *Reichstag* member Karl Liebknecht (son of the party founder Wilhelm, who had come to socialism through radical liberalism) and the Marxist internationalist Rosa Luxemburg. A Congress of Workers and Soldiers Councils, elected by local revolutionary councils throughout Germany in December, returned only 10 “United Revolutionaries” among the 489 delegates. The majority consisted overwhelmingly of SPD supporters, some Independent Socialists (formed into the USPD) and many non-party political, Catholic and liberal workers’ representatives. The Congress rejected a motion for a “Council (i.e. Soviet) Republic” and organised national elections. A provisional revolutionary government led by the majority SPD emerged from the Councils, the *Kaiser* abdicated and, at first, apart from the armed rising by the Spartacists in Berlin and some isolated showdowns between Councils and loyalist troops in several towns, violent confrontations were rare. The elections, held in January 1919, returned 165 majority SPD and 22 Independent SPD seats (the latter mostly from traditional left wing socialist strongholds in Central Germany), along with 91 for the Christian Peoples Party (the former Catholic *Zentrum*, including a substantial proportion from its trade union wing), 75 for the left-liberal Democratic Party, 19 for the right-liberal German People’s Party, 44 for the national conservatives and 7 for various splinter parties. A constitutional assembly was summoned in Weimar and drew up a liberal democratic constitution. Tensions continued on the streets, but the major disputes between socialists centred around the extent of socialisation measures in the economy. While strikes, food shortages and protest movements were widespread, the early government moved resolutely to demobilise troops, organise food supplies, activate welfare provisions for demobilised soldiers and organise a return to work. Germany was ready to settle down.[6]

Between February and June 1919 this situation changed completely as the terms of the proposed “Peace Treaty” being dictated rather than negotiated at Versailles became known. Not alone were huge territories, mainly in eastern Germany, though also some in the west, including Alsace-Lorraine, to be separated from the *Reich*, but reparations equivalent to half a trillion dollars in today’s values were to be paid to the *Entente* powers for war damages, industrial plant was to be dismantled and handed over to *Entente* countries (including a third of all railway rolling stock) and Germany’s colonies were to be removed and placed under the “trusteeship” of the western powers. The critical issue was the basis for these terms – the “war guilt” clauses in articles 231-248 of the Treaty and the total disarmament and military occupation of Germany decreed by the Treaty. Despite German protestations that these terms destroyed the basis of peace represented by Wilson’s 14 points, the Allies insisted that the crippling blockade would remain in place until the Treaty was signed or else its terms would be enforced by military means. The SPD chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann, told the National Assembly: “*If this treaty is signed, it would not alone be Germany’s corpse that would remain on the battlefield of Versailles, [but also] the noble corpses of the self-determination of peoples, the independence of free nations, the belief in all the beautiful ideals under whose banner the Entente had claimed to be fighting . . .*” Scheidemann resigned but the Independent Socialists reluctantly saw no alternative to signing other than “*the withholding of our prisoners of war, occupation of our sources of raw materials, escalation of the blockade, unemployment, starvation, mass death, a horrendous catastrophe . . .*”. A new coalition headed by the SPD trade



unionist Gustav Bauer and consisting of the left parties and the Catholic *Zentrum* was cobbled together and signed the Treaty. Liberals, national conservatives and other groups voted against. The Weimar Democracy had got off to a bad start.[7]

The Allied demands at Versailles meant that the volatile but stabilising civil and political peace within Germany shattered completely and irrevocably.

National conservative circles and groups of the military turned against the Republic. New political groupings sprang up across the country in opposition to it. The *Freikorps* - hastily organised militias of former soldiers mobilised by the government primarily to secure the outer eastern borders of the *Reich* - became gathering grounds for anti-Versailles sentiment. Fringe anti-Semitic groupings began an agitation against the “Stab in the Back” of internal discontent that had led to the defeat at Versailles of an army undefeated in the field. But it wasn’t only traditional society that went into political melt down. The unity of the labour movement also collapsed, and disorder spread to the streets in the shadow of the Treaty and the growing anarchic activities of right wing groups and militias. A wave of spontaneous strikes and demonstrations broke out across Germany. The Independent Socialists (USPD) who had previously been simply a pacifist movement became the focus for the discontent of workers, establishing “Soviet Republics” in the Ruhr, Munich and elsewhere in imitation of events in Russia and often encouraged by “ambassadors” from Moscow who were encouraging the development of a Communist Party along Soviet lines and committed to armed revolution. The government, without an army and forbidden by the Allies from recruiting one, mobilised the *Freikorps* militias to suppress the revolutionary and separatist tendencies emerging, and this in turn provoked armed resistance. For two years Germany descended into civil war. The all powerful SPD of 1918 was destroyed, losing half its support in the 1922 elections. The Independent Socialists (USPD) was regrouped following massive Russian intervention into the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which subsequently became a major force in the main industrial strongholds of the SPD, particularly in Hamburg, Berlin and Central Germany, and also among the Catholic workers of the Rhineland, Ruhr and Silesia, among whom the SPD had been previously only a minor party.

The young Adolf Hitler, returning to Munich in 1918 from the western front for demobilisation with his unit, had served throughout the war as a frontline soldier, had been made a corporal and decorated for bravery. While plentiful in his opinions, he was not known for adopting political positions or even for anti-Semitism. Popular with his mates, he was elected by them to represent their material interests on the Workers and Soldiers Council. Hitler was horrified by what he experienced in Munich. The revolutionary situation had thrown up a Council movement which established a Bavarian “government” headed by Kurt Eisner, a traditional (and Jewish) social democrat who joined the anti-war movement and Independent Socialists. As prime minister he organised the abdication of the Bavarian monarchy and founded the “Bavarian Free State” with a strong separatist tendency. He accepted the war guilt thesis of the *Entente*, wanted to separate Bavaria from Prussia, and refused to dissolve the government following its resounding defeat in Bavarian elections. The Workers and Soldiers Council was propelled by events in a radical direction, with left wing, often identifiably Jewish intellectuals coming to the fore, leading it to declare Bavaria a “Soviet Republic”. Assassinations of left and right wing activists became the order of the day and the beleaguered army garrison sought intervention by the *Reich*

authorities. A hastily mobilised *Freikorps* descended on the city, was met by armed resistance and suppressed the Council [8] movement in a bloodbath. A new biography of Hitler based on previously unknown sources has recently established that it was only in the midst of these events that the soldier Hitler was politicised for the first time, and became an anti-Semite, latching on to prevalent theories of “Jewish Bolshevism”, and becoming a spy and later an “educator” with a secretive army propaganda unit.[9]

The sequence of events of the “German Revolution” is of great importance to later developments. Until the “*diktat*” of Versailles became generally known from February 1919 it seemed that the state and society had mastered a transition to a Republican regime, social conditions had stabilised and political conflict, despite some localised unrest and a rather harmless revolutionary atmosphere, was settling down through the new structures. The radicalisation of the right, and then of the left, and the accompanying rise of separatist tendencies, were all propelled to the fore by the reaction to the “war guilt” clauses and then the signing of the Treaty. Many historians – particularly since the appearance in 1961 of Fritz Fischer’s book, *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, which means the “Bid for World Power” but was published in English as *Germany’s Aims in the First World War* [10] – have disputed this and, building on Fischer’s thesis, have argued that in 1918-19 the German political, social, industrial and military “elites”, weakened by defeat and social revolution, encouraged and backed the SPD in its stabilisation of the situation so as to burden it with responsibility for the inevitably harsh Treaty and keep a free hand to revive its own power. Fischer had argued that these same elites had conspired to initiate the First World War to resolve the social stalemate represented by the rise of the SPD, particularly evidenced by the 1912 election results. The elites believed that a complete social, political and economic democratisation of the state would otherwise have been inevitable, but through a war strategy this social revolution could be disorientated and re-channelled into an imperialist, expansionist project. While Fischer’s theory proved very popular and has dominated German history writing since, leading to a conflation of the two world wars and a thesis of a “continuity” of German imperialism as the core European problem of the twentieth century, its major weakness is that it has never produced the “smoking gun” in terms of hard evidence for this conspiracy (other than general attitudes current in certain circles). The conspiracy theory transferred to 1918-19 suffers from the same weakness and is far from being established. In the absence of evidence, this writer holds to the view that the *Kaiserreich* was an evolving and increasingly democratic social and political entity, and that the causes of the First World War are to be sought elsewhere. Consequently the 1918 situation was also a fluid situation, capable of developing in various directions. The direction in which it was initially developing suggests a stabilisation that was disrupted by the “war guilt” clauses of the Versailles Treaty.

Over the following decade the Weimar Republic experienced a series of ups and downs. An attempted military putsch by an element in the army was brought down by a general strike in 1920. Civil unrest remained widespread, with confrontations between worker militias and the *Freikorps*. The system eventually stabilised in 1924, after the ending of the French occupation of the Ruhr, the bringing of rampant inflation under control, the overthrow of the Socialist-Communist coalition regimes in Saxony and Thuringia and the rescheduling of the war debt through the Dawes Plan. Coalition governments of various hues replaced each other at national level in succession, with the SPD playing a prominent role in the early years and again

from 1928, when it achieved its best result of 30% of the vote. Although the system and the economy stabilised, with wage levels recovering their 1913 levels by the end of the 1920s, the large groups that had abandoned their loyalty to the State and the Republican settlement at the time of Versailles never returned to it. The National Conservatives that had led the governments of the mid-1920s never departed from their ideal of a return to the pre-1918 monarchy, farther right wing movements, although losing electoral appeal, continued a constant agitation against the Republic as a “Jewish plutocracy”, the Communist Party with widespread support in the working class, stood for the replacement of the Republic by a “Soviet Republic”, the liberal parties lacked conviction in the weak Weimar regime, and even the SPD held out as its goal – endlessly debated at party conferences – of how to transform the system into a true socialist one. While the coalitions of the 1920s managed the economic stabilisation, restructured the war debt and pursued a foreign policy of *rapprochement* with the West and East, all parties advocated the reversal of the Versailles settlement, by peaceful means or otherwise. Perhaps the system would have evolved in a peaceful direction if the early moves towards a European economic integration had borne fruit, but when the economic crisis hit in 1929, particularly through the stopping by the US of the flow of credit to Germany through the imposition of capital controls, the political system easily collapsed.

## Social Democracy and the shaping of Germany, 1945-49 - Part 1

### Chapter 1:

#### Political re-alignment of the SPD underground and in exile

##### Introduction

This thesis examines the story of the SPD in the immediate post-war years, from 1945 to 1949. But that is a story that cannot be told without some reference to the nature of the party's collapse as Hitler came to power in 1933, and developments within those elements which took to an underground existence within Nazi Germany or among the circles of émigré socialists—numbering up to 7,000 by 1938—who continued political activity in exile. These two groups composed the social democrats ‘of the moment’ in 1945-6.

The underground circles within Germany – to the extent that they survived the war and the violent oppression of the regime – were small, disparate and politically disoriented in 1945. They nevertheless existed in nearly every city, town and village, had maintained some kind of continuity with their political pasts and were important initiators of early political activity on the defeat of the *Third Reich*.

The exile circles have a particular importance firstly because of the success of one small group in maintaining a threadbare legitimacy as a representation of the old SPD National Executive (*Vorstand*) throughout the years of exile, a factor of great importance to the legalistic mind of German social democracy. Secondly they are of importance because, contrary to the assertions of the dominant historical literature, they played a crucial role, through a covert alliance with particular elements in the Anglo-American wartime leadership, in shaping events on the ground in Germany at the end of the war.

This chapter therefore recounts some of the history of the underground and exile circles of the SPD during the twelve years of the Nazi regime, to the extent that is relevant to the post-war events. It does not deal in detail with the numerous resistance activities of the heroic groups which sought to instigate a collapse of the regime from within, or the terrible fate that many of them met.

### 1. The SPD, its exiles and the “National Revolution” of 1933

The economic and political conditions created in Germany in the wake of the international economic and financial crisis led to the breakthrough of the anti-Versailles, national socialist movement (NSDAP) led by Adolf Hitler. From a voter base of just 2.6% in 1928, this movement arising from the middle class, agrarian and proletarian sections of nationalist Germany achieved 37.4% in the July 1932 *Reichstag* elections.[11] Following the collapse of the last coalition government involving the SPD in 1930 due to its inability to deal with the crisis, a series of semi-authoritarian regimes had been ruling by emergency decree with a tendency to ever more autocratic rule. In April 1932 the SPD lost its electoral majority in Germany's largest federal state, Prussia, and the government of Franz von Papen used the opportunity to abolish parliamentary rule in the state. A threatened general strike by the unions and the SPD failed to materialise in July, and Goebbels wrote in his diary: “*You only have to show the Reds your teeth and they fold.*” And a few days later: “*The Reds have missed their big moment. It will never return.*”[12]

Against a background of crisis, political drama and much violence, von Papen, in a move designed to “tame” the turbulent “Nazi” revolutionaries, arranged for Hitler to assume the Chancellorship in January 1933. Although there were already some signs of economic stabilisation, and national socialist support actually dropped to 33.1% in the November 1932 elections, the Nazis seized their opportunity and forced a further election in March 1933 in an atmosphere of rising street anarchy. The burning of the *Reichstag* by a Dutch anarchist was used as the pretext to ban the Communist Party (which had won 17% of the vote in November 1932 to the 20.4% for the SPD). The vote of the liberal and centre parties (with the exception of the Catholic *Zentrum*) collapsed and the Nazis achieved 43.9%, ensuring their control of the state. On 23 March the *Reichstag* passed the Enabling Act granting full powers to Hitler as ‘Führer and Reichskanzler’ and initiating the end of parliamentary politics. The ‘National Revolution’ and its revolutionary terror phase had begun.

In this atmosphere, the SPD rejected the Enabling Act in the *Reichstag*, restating its commitment to the “*rule of law*”. But it also offered the new Government its “*loyal cooperation*” in tackling the crisis confronting Germany. It established an office abroad – the “SoPaDe” – initially intended to publicly dissociate the party from the Socialist International and its denunciations of Germany. This small grouping based in Prague soon began to distance itself from the party within Germany, criticizing its “legalist” strategy and finally opposing it outright when on 17 May the SPD members in the *Reichstag* voted in favour of the new government's foreign policy statement of determination to undo the Versailles Treaty. A small number of SPD deputies voiced their support internally for the SoPaDe rejectionist line, but maintained party discipline and voted with the majority of their comrades in the chamber.[13]

The atmosphere of terror and confusion in Germany – with wholesale violence and extra-judicial imprisonment escalating – certainly played a major role in these events. But there was also something of the atmosphere of 1914, when the SPD had rallied to the national unity sought by the Kaiser in meeting the threat of Russian mobilisation that started World War One. An SPD deputy recalled how his party's vote in favour of the government's foreign policy resolution provoked "a storm of applause" and "even Adolf Hitler appeared moved for a moment". Members of the conservative nationalist party (the DNVP) began singing the *Deutschlandlied* (i.e. 'Deutschland über alles') and "most in our ranks joined in, some with tears running down their cheeks". Party members within Germany believed they "had no alternative but to draw a clear line between ourselves and our old friends in Prague". A *Reichskonferenz* of the party was summoned in Berlin on 19 June where "the mood against the exiles was again very heated", and a motion was adopted unanimously withdrawing recognition from the SoPaDe and establishing a new Executive headed by the respected former *Reichstag* president Paul Löbe. The decision was "endorsed by competent party bodies throughout the Reich".[14]

While several thousand socialist and trade union activists, as well as some politicians (including Kurt Schumacher) were rounded up and held under brutal conditions in illegal "protective custody" by Nazi paramilitaries, where many were beaten and some were murdered, the organisations of labour sought to maintain some kind of legal existence. Like the trade union leaders who declared their support for the "National Revolution" and began to remove "non-Aryan" officials from their positions, many social democrats also hoped for a role for the SPD in the new order of things as an alternative to obliteration. The party leadership retired its Jewish members and an attempt was made to renegotiate a re-legalisation of the party press.[15] The Württemberg state SPD Executive voted to instruct its local elected representatives "to act in a way that leaves no doubt as to our good will towards the political re-ordering of Germany planned by the National Revolution" and the party in both Saxony and Bavaria adopted a similar course. In Hamburg the SPD sought to negotiate a political alliance with the NSDAP and the Berlin party expelled its youth organisation for building an underground organisation.[16] But it was to no avail: like the trade unions before them, on 22 June the SPD was banned.

Chapter 1 of this work concludes in the next issue of "Irish Foreign Affairs"

## Notes

1. There are many histories of the SPD. In the 1980s, the party's own house publishers, Dietz Verlag, started publishing a massive multi-volume history of the party from its origins to modern times, written by leading historians under the editorship of Gerhard A. Ritter and the overall title *Geschichte der Arbeiter und der Arbeiterbewegung*. Two fine compact histories are Heinrich Potthoff and Susanne Millar *Kleine Geschichte der SPD. Darstellung und Dokumentation 1848-1980* (5<sup>th</sup> ed., 1981) and Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*. Munich, 1972. Among other books I have also used the insightful doctoral thesis written in 1927 by the post-Second World War leader, Kurt Schumacher, *Der Kampf um den Staatsgedanken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, published for the first time in 1974, with an introduction by then SPD Minister and former KPD Central Committee member, Herbert Wehner.

2. Ronald J. Ross, *Beleaguered Tower: The dilemma of political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany*, Notre Dame Press, 1976.

3. See also: Georg von Vollmer, *Reden und Schriften zur Reformpolitik*, ed. Willy Albrecht, Bonn Berlin, 1977; J.P. Nettel, *Rosa Luxemburg*, Schocken Books, New York, 1969.

4. See respectively, Prager, *Das Gebot der Stunde. Geschichte der USPD*. (1921, reprint Berlin Bonn, 1980), and Peter Sigel, *Die Lensch-Cunow-Haenisch Gruppe: Eine Studie zum rechten Flügel der SPD im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1976.

5. Gerald D. Feldman, *Army, Industry and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918*. Princeton 1966.

6. In general for this period: Heinrich August Winkler, *Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1918-1924*, Bonn Berlin, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1985.

7. Quotes from Potthoff and Miller, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD*, 98-99.

8. *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918*, Hamburg 1961, published in English as *Germany's Aims in the First World War*.

9. Thomas Weber, *Hitler's First War*, Oxford, 2010.

10. *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918*, Hamburg 1961. On Fischer's various publications on the subject, see the Wikipedia entry [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz\\_Fischer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Fischer).

11. Election figures from 'Ergebnisse der Reichstagswahlen 1919 bis 1933 in', Miller and Potthoff, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD*, 263.

12. Quoted in Miller and Potthoff, *Kleine Geschichte der SPD*, 140.

13. Lewis J. Edinger, *German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era*, Berkeley, 1956, 15 ff.; Erich Matthias, 'Die Sozialdemokratische Partei', in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), *Das Ende der Parteien 1933*, Königsstein-Düsseldorf, 1979, 101-278; Albrecht, *Schumacher*, 73 ff.; Peter von zur Mühlen, 'Die SPD zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand', in Jürgen Schmädke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), *Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler*, Munich, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1986, 86-98.

14. Wilhelm Hoegner, *Flucht vor Hitler. Erinnerungen an die Kapitulation der ersten deutschen Republik 1933*. (1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1937), Munich, 1977, 153-4, 173-9.

15. Gerhard Beier, *Das Lehrstück vom 1. und 2. Mai 1933*, 1975, 25 ff.; Manfred Funke, 'Gewerkschaften und Widerstand. Zwischen Ausharrung und Orientierung auf die Zukunft', Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), *Widerstand und Exil 1933-1945*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Bonn, 1989, 60-75; Edinger, *German Exile Politics*, 17 ff.; Hoegner, *Flucht vor Hitler*, 170 ff.

16. Text of Württemberg SPD resolution of 10.3.1933 and voting record in *Änderung in der Regierung Baden-Württembergs?*, unsigned letter in *Neue Württembergische Zeitung*, 28.04.1947, in AsD-NL. Schoettle, Mappe 15. This version was authenticated by Wilhelm Keil, the Württemberg SPD leader, to Schumacher, who was a former Reichstag member for the Württemberg capital Stuttgart in a letter of 6.2.1946. AsD-Best. Schumacher, Mappe 95/J3. On similar events in Saxony and elsewhere, Jutta von Freyberg, Bärbel Hebel-Kunze, 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit des Faschismus', in idem. et al (eds.), *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1863-1975*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cologne, 1977, 180-241; On Hamburg, where SPD Police Senator Adolf Schönfelder took the initiative, PO'C interview with Helmut Kallbitzer, Hamburg, 24.09.1990. On Berlin, Erich Schmidt, 'Der Berliner Jugendkonflikt', MS 1934, reprinted in Morsey, 'Die Sozialdemokratische Partei', 242 ff. □



## Euro-UK-Ireland: IIEA tries to have it every way

by Jack Lane

The Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) is the Irish imitation of Chatham House. It is the nearest thing the Government has to a think tank about major international issues. It recently published "*Untying the Knot? Ireland, the UK and the EU*" which seeks to take account of how the Government should react to the UK's increasing moves towards leaving the EU. It is at pains to be what it sees as even handed, as if both parties, the EU and UK, were equally responsible for creating the increasing divide between them, and goes on to propose how Ireland can change all of that and restore peace and harmony between them.

It would have been useful if it pointed out very clearly that the 'untying' concerns the EU but not the Euro. There is no untying to be done with the Euro as the UK is not and never will be tied to it. This is rather important as the Euro and its future is the crucial issue for Ireland and the majority of European states and their peoples. But this appears as a side issue in the paper.

The IIEA introduction to the paper starts by seeing Ireland on the back foot and - "*stands to be one of the biggest losers from a UK withdrawal*" - but despite this the paper proposes that Ireland can be king maker, concluding with the following advice: "*Acting as a 'broker' between the UK and the EU as the two sides steer a course through choppy waters could be of benefit to both sides. Moreover, by mediating between the two sides and working to ensure that Britain's requests get a fair hearing on the continent, Ireland could look after its own interest of keeping the UK within a fully functioning single market.*" The paper does not see Ireland as neutral between the two, but argues instead that British demands for concessions are actually in the Irish interest: "*In fact, Ireland could benefit if the concessions given to the UK were applied to all Member States, since these concessions would probably contribute to a more competitive Union.*"

This is all illusionary and follows on logically from the assumptions in the paper. It assumes among other things that the UK's demands can be taken at face value and that they can be satisfied within a recognisable EU structure worthy of the name. Anyone who joins up the dots of the UK's rapidly developing attitude to the EU knows that the only direction is withdrawal. The paper points out many of the dots but fails to draw the picture that emerges and then work on that assumption.

The paper also assumes that the UK does not really know how to look after its interests and needs our help!

The oft-repeated mantra of '*a fully functioning single market*' sounds very hollow when those promoting it most loudly also insist on maintaining their own currency that can be used, and is used, as a instrument for devaluation which makes a mockery of a single market worthy of the name. The UK has 'quantitatively eased' their currency to the tune of £365 Billion to date. It is absurd to claim there is a single market with two competing currencies and one operating like this. The reality is that there are two actual markets developing, the Euro and non-Euro areas, and while there is an overlap at one level, there is divergence and conflict where it really matters – with the currencies.

The IIEA authors are dealing with a fast changing reality that leaves their main assumptions increasingly redundant. The new reality was summed up neatly in a recent piece in the *Financial Times*:

"The euro's main political effect is to drive a wedge through the EU, something not yet fully understood by the bloc's policy establishment. The vast majority of insiders still treat it as a regulatory organisation at its heart, rather than as a macroeconomic union. I have followed this transition at first hand in Brussels for the past decade. The vast majority of people involved in EU politics have put monetary union into a drawer, regarding it as something for economists to worry about. They themselves continue to frame the debate as they always have – treating the EU as a grand, free-floating political project. They never saw any conflict in the distinction between EU membership and euro membership." (March 3, Wolfgang Münchau).

The IIEA paper shares all the weaknesses Münchau refers to.

Rather than facing up to the reality of UK moves to withdrawal and planning accordingly the paper creates a series of hobgoblins for Ireland about the consequences of an UK exit:

"An outright withdrawal of the UK from the EU would likely have profound implications for Ireland. It could weaken the fragile compromise in Northern Ireland, disrupt the free movement of goods and people between Ireland and the UK, undermine bilateral cooperation in key policy areas and thereby challenge Ireland's resolve to remain a core EU Member State."

The '*fragile compromise*' was not determined one way or the other by EU membership and its future will not depend on EU factors. It was determined by the Provos and the US Government. All other parties were simply their facilitators in the process. If the UK wants to establish a fortress UK in relation to Ireland then so be it. In any case the UK cannot be denied its right to set up border posts etc. around its state if that follows from its withdrawal.

This theme is developed further:

"In a worst-case scenario, this could see passport control being introduced on the Irish border. Nationalist communities would again feel cut off from the Republic and efforts to develop an all-island approach in certain policy areas would be undermined. Other questions would be likely to arise in key areas such as justice and home affairs cooperation, which is already set to be undermined by the UK's possible block opt-out from pre-Lisbon police and justice measures in 2014. Such a move by the UK would undoubtedly have an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of valuable police cooperation and risk undermining the fight against cross-border terrorism."

The nationalists of Northern Ireland have shown themselves well able to deal with bigger problems than passport controls and the paper in the same breath acknowledges that the UK is set to undermine common police and justice measures in the EU. This latter admission is an illustration of another fact referred to elsewhere in the paper that: "*...the UK is furthest from the centre in every serious policy debate, and this is unlikely to*

*change in the coming years.*” Why then not accept the inevitable and plan accordingly? Yet the paper keeps assuming that all this could change with the help of Ireland’s diplomacy and that the UK or the EU - or both - will fundamentally change course.

The paper says that there is “a risk of barriers to trade and investment (however low) between the UK and Ireland could have implications for the free movement of goods between the two counties”

The Republic is the UK’s fifth largest export market. The UK will think long and hard before upsetting this market by imposing trade barriers and if they do it will simply mean changes in trade patterns for Ireland. The current sterling devaluation is about the biggest barrier that could be erected and Ireland has to cope with that. And this real barrier is not referred to at all in the paper! All indications are that Ireland is

coping with it and it has proved itself at least as good as the UK in accessing new developing markets to widen its choice for exports and imports.

The choice in this debate is really between an EU and no EU if the concessions demanded by the UK are conceded. And between Ireland as a committed member of the Eurozone or becoming a cheer leader of the British position. All else is fudge. Fudge is a necessity at times in practical policies but if think tanks have any use it is to be free of the need for fudge, and state matters plainly for the use of their governments.

This IIEA paper departs from that role and is advising a course that is not alone illusory but, if acted upon, would detach Ireland from the core Eurozone and take it back over two decades to when, in the words of Patrick Honohan, there was in Europe a general “*perception that Ireland was, for monetary purposes, an adjunct of the UK.*” □

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## Minister Creighton Quizzed on UK Sterling Competitive Devaluation and Need for Eurobonds.

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by Manus O’Riordan

On February 14<sup>th</sup> last the Minister of State for European Affairs, Lucinda Creighton, addressed a plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee on the priorities of the Irish Presidency of the EU. She was quizzed on the threat to Irish economic recovery from a competitive devaluation of sterling and reminded of her own previous support for Eurobonds as a necessary instrument in Eurozone economic recovery. Manus O’Riordan of the EESC Workers’ Group reports.

At a preliminary meeting confined to Irish EESC members, I informed the Minister of the across-the-board support at the January plenary, for the demand put by a British TUC member to European Council President Van Rompuy, that there should be no concessions made to British Tory blackmail in attempting to renegotiate the UK-EU relationship. She replied that Irish Presidency could not be seen to be lecturing the UK. I responded by arguing that the UK needed to be sharply reminded how privileged a position it held in the EU Single Market, with a freedom of movement for the sterling-euro exchange rate which should not be abused to the point of a competitive devaluation that violated the very principles of the Single Market. I pointed out that the 9 percent devaluation that had occurred in sterling’s euro value since last August was akin to slapping a 9 percent tariff on Irish exports, and the Minister acknowledged the validity of that point. Since the subsequent downgrading of the

UK’s credit rating, the prospect has worsened still further, to the extent of sterling facing a fall to parity with sterling over the next year, which would be equivalent to the *de facto* tariff on Irish exports to the UK widening to a horrifying 21 percent.

At the full plenary session itself, I had been requested by the Workers’ Group to restate a previously published position of mine: “EESC opinions have repeatedly emphasised the urgency of introducing Eurobonds as an essential mechanism for tackling the economic crisis. I would hope that the Irish Presidency will at last see the implementation of such an EU strategy.” I reminded the Minister of her own 2011 statements that “the idea of national governments pooling debt instruments could be a positive development” allowing borrowing “on the international markets at sustainable interest rates” and that “The crisis in the Eurozone requires brave and unprecedented action. The solidarity involved in a Eurobond system would go a long way to stabilising the markets and ensuring the survival of the euro currency.” The Minister replied that she was realistic enough to recognise that there was not yet sufficient trust established between Member States to allow for such a development over the coming months, but added that she remained an enthusiastic supporter of the principle of Eurobonds and saw them as a necessary, but later, component in the stage-by-stage establishment of a single Eurozone-wide banking system. A “full and frank exchange of opinions” occurred, to use the language of diplomacy. □

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(continued from p. 26)                      make it clear to all the world that the Bolshevik movement is not a Jewish movement, but is repudiated vehemently by the mass of the Jewish race.

But a negative resistance to Bolshevism in any field is not enough. Positive and practicable alternatives are needed in the moral as well as in the social sphere; and in building up with the utmost possible rapidity a Jewish national centre in Palestine which may become not only a refuge to the oppressed from the unhappy lands of Central Europe, but which will also be a symbol of Jewish unity and the temple of Jewish glory, a task is presented on which many blessings be. □

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# **Zionism versus Bolshevism**

## **A struggle for the soul of the Jewish people**

**By the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill**

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(reprinted from the *Illustrated Sunday Herald*,  
8.2.1920)

Some people like Jews and some do not; but no thoughtful man can doubt the fact that they are beyond all question the most formidable and the most remarkable race which has ever appeared in the world.

Disraeli, the Jew Prime Minister of England, and Leader of the conservative Party, who was always true to his race and proud of his origin, said on a well-known occasion: 'The Lord deals with the nations as the nations deal with the Jews.' Certainly when we look at the miserable state of Russia, where of all countries in the world the Jews were the most cruelly treated, and contrast it with the fortunes of your own country, which seems to have been so providentially preserved amid the awful perils of these times, we must admit that nothing that has since happened in the history of the world has falsified the truth of Disraeli's confident assertion.

### **Good and Bad Jews.**

The conflict between good and evil which proceeds unceasingly in the breast of man nowhere reaches such an intensity as in the Jewish race. The dual nature of mankind is nowhere more strongly or more terribly exemplified. We owe to the Jews in the Christian revelation a system of ethics which, even if it were entirely separated from the supernatural, would be incomparably the most precious possession of mankind, worth in fact the fruits of all other wisdom and learning put together. On that system and by that faith there has been built out of the wreck of the Roman Empire the whole of our existing civilisation.

And it may well be that this same astounding race may at the present time be in the actual process of producing another system of morals and philosophy, as malevolent as Christianity was benevolent, which, if not arrested, would shatter irretrievably all that Christianity has rendered possible. It would almost seem as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people; and that this mystic and mysterious race had been chosen for the supreme manifestations, both of the divine and the diabolical.

### **'National' Jews.**

There can be no greater mistake than to attribute to each individual a recognisable share in the qualities which make up the national character. There are all sorts of men—good, bad and, for the most part, indifferent—in every country, and in every race. Nothing is more wrong than to deny to an individual, on account of race or origin, his right to be judged on his personal merits and conduct. In a people of peculiar genius like the Jews, contrasts are more vivid, the extremes are more widely separated, the resulting consequences are more decisive.

At the present fateful period there are three main lines of political conception among the Jews, two of which are helpful and hopeful in a very high degree to humanity, and the third absolutely destructive.

First there are the Jews who, dwelling in every country throughout the world, identify themselves with that country, enter into its national life, and, while adhering faithful to their own religion, regard themselves as citizens in the fullest sense

of the State which has received them. Such a Jew living in England would say, 'I am an Englishman practising the Jewish faith.' This is a worthy conception, and useful in the highest degree. We in Great Britain well know that during the great struggle the influence of what may be called the 'National Jews' in many lands was cast preponderatingly on the side of the Allies; and in our own Army Jewish soldiers have played a most distinguished part, some rising to the command of armies, others winning the Victoria Cross for valour.

The national Russian Jews, in spite of the disabilities under which they have suffered, have managed to play an honourable and useful part in the national life even of Russia. As bankers and industrialists, they have strenuously promoted the development of Russia's economic resources, and they were foremost in the creation of those remarkable organisations, the Russian Co-operative Societies. In politics their support has been given, for the most part, to liberal and progressive movements, and they have been among the staunchest upholders of friendship with France and Great Britain.

### **International Jews.**

In violent opposition to all this sphere of Jewish effort rise the schemes of the International Jews. The adherents of this sinister confederacy are mostly men reared up among the unhappy populations of countries where Jews are persecuted on account of their race. Most, if not all, of them have forsaken the faith of their forefathers and divorced from their minds all spiritual hopes of the next world. This movement among the Jews is not new. From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxembourg (Germany), and Emma Goldman (United States), this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilisation and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence, and impossible equality, has been steadily growing. It played, as a modern writer, Mrs. Webster, has so ably shown, a definitely recognisable part in the tragedy of the French Revolution. It has been the mainspring of every subversive movement during the Nineteenth Century; and now at last this band of extraordinary personalities from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the Russian people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the undisputed masters of that enormous empire.

### **Terrorist Jews.**

There is no need to exaggerate the part played in the creation of Bolshevism and in the actual bringing about of the Russian Revolution by these international and for the most part atheistical Jews. It is certainly a very great one; it probably outweighs all others. With the notable exception of Lenin, the majority of the leading figures are Jews. Moreover, the principal inspiration and driving power comes from the Jewish leaders. Thus Tchitcherin, a pure Russian, is eclipsed by his nominal subordinate Litvinoff, and the influence of Russians like Bukharin or Lunacharski cannot be compared with the

(continued p.12)



# Deutsches Reich.



## Germany: Languages and Peoples

This map comes from a German school atlas printed in 1913. It shows "Peoples and Languages" in Central Europe. It is reproduced here in connection with the map which appeared in the last issue of IFA, showing Central Europe in 1925. On that map could be seen the two parts of Germany, separated by a strip of land.

The Versailles Treaty had recreated the state of Poland, and given the new state access to the sea through that strip of land, so that a 'corridor' connected the bulk of Poland to the Baltic Sea. This strip was 100 km wide at its widest point and 20 km at its narrowest. East Prussia, with its capital Königsberg and its port Danzig, became a separate enclave.

This gave rise to antagonisms between the German and the Polish populations of the corridor, and between the two States. A large proportion of the German population of that strip of land left the new Poland and moved to Germany. Travelling between the two parts of the country was not straightforward; train passengers were subjected to inspections and the trains sealed while crossing the 'corridor'.

The Weimar republic, in its attitude to the Versailles Treaty, accepted the situation on its western borders, but never accepted the eastern borders.

Hitler did accept the eastern borders; his demands were that the city of Danzig should be administratively attached to East Prussia (it was so attached geographically), and that a motorway and a railway, connecting the two parts of Germany, and over which Germany would have control, be constructed. This was not accepted by Poland.

Looking at the 1913 map, it can be seen that there was a "Polish corridor" in reality before it was created by the Versailles Treaty.

The area situated south of Denmark (marked 'Niedersachsen') is homogeneous as far as language and ethnicity is concerned; so is the area to the west of Niedersachsen, as far as the port of Emden; so is the area east of Niedersachsen, as far as Stolp and beyond. Continuing east, there is a mixed area, marked 'Kassuben', and further east another homogeneous area, marked 'Preussen' (Prussia), with its two cities of Danzig and Königsberg.

The area marked 'Kassuben' is the area that was given to Poland at its formation in 1919. It was inhabited by a mixture of Germans and Poles; among the Poles were the Kashubians, who had their own language but who in the main considered themselves Polish.