

Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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August 29th was a day of infamy. Britain refused an opportunity for doing good in the world by making war. The Government wanted to make war on Syria. It was constitutionally entitled to do so without consulting Parliament. Britain remains an absolute monarchy in this respect, with the Prime Minister exercising the power of the Monarch. But the Prime Minister, in breach of precedent, referred the decision to Parliament, and Parliament, to its disgrace, refused to commit the state to war.

The media were furious. Their importance in the world is intimately connected with the war-making capacity of the state. BBC interviewers can summon Prime Ministers and Presidents of helpless states around the world to interviews and treat them with contempt because Britain has the recognised status of being a war-fighting state. One of Tony Blair's last acts as Prime Minister was to remind Britain that it was a war-fighting state. There are only three such states in the world today and Britain is second in the hierarchy. And now Britain has reneged on a war.

The formal issue on which war was to have been launched—alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government in defiance of an alleged fundamental international law forbidding them—was a bogus issue. There is no such fundamental law. There is only a “*line in the sand*” drawn by President Obama. There can be no such law because the main user of chemical weapons in war in the era of the United Nations is the United States. And something which the United States does cannot be illegal in any meaningful sense, because the United States cannot be indicted of a war-crime by the United Nations, let alone be found guilty and punished.

The fundamental law which the Syrian Government is alleged to have transgressed is only a policy which the US applies to others—or to some others, because it does not apply it to Israel.

During the House of Commons debate Malcolm Rifkind, a former War (‘Defence’) Minister, building a circumstantial case against the Syrian Government, said that Syria was the only state in the Middle East with stockpiles of chemical weapons. Gerald Kaufmann immediately contradicted him, pointing out that Israel had them and had used them. Rifkind said that was a point in a different argument.

Nobody mentioned the American weaponry used in Vietnam and Falluja. But it can be assumed that the MPs knew what it would have been rash for them to say.

So Parliament voted against war. If decisions about war continue to be referred to Parliament and it continues to decide against war, Britain will cease to belong to the elite of war-fighting states in the world, and the privileged status of the British media will be undermined. It will probably not happen, but the media personalities have

had a glimpse of the abyss that might possibly be before them, and they are angry.

In their anger they spoke scathingly of David Cameron as the first Prime Minister since the early 18th century who lost control of Parliament to such an extent that it prevented him from going to war.

We have not seen any detail about this early 18th century reference. The only incident that springs to mind is not of Parliament preventing the Government from going to war, but of Parliament enabling the Government to end a war that was begun while it was in Opposition.

The war in question was a balance-of-power war against France. The Tories came to power during this war and wished to end it. But the Whigs had worked up public opinion for the war, and wanted it pressed to the destruction of France, or of its ability to make war. Jonathan Swift, a Tory pamphleteer, wrote a pamphlet called *The Conduct Of The Allies*, in which he argued for a settlement which would give a very substantial points victory to England, and treated the continuation of the war until the enemy was destroyed as the pursuit of a delusion.

The pamphlet had a considerable effect on public opinion, enabling the Government to make peace on very advantageous terms. Perhaps the most advantageous item in the Treaty of Utrecht for Britain was that it gave it the monopoly on selling slaves to Latin America.

Swift was an Englishman who happened to be born in the English colony in Ireland. But modern Ireland has claimed him as Irish. However, it has reduced him to an author of satires which are most effective as children's stories, and an amorous letter-writer. It has preferred not to learn politics from him. □

A New Book from the Aubane Historical Society

The Graves Of Kilmorna

A Story of ‘67

By Canon Sheehan

With an introduction by Brendan Clifford

The Graves Of Kilmorna is a novel of the Fenian Rising of 1867 and of the subsequent decline of national life in Ireland under the influence of the Home Rule Party.

The author, Patrick Augustine Sheehan (1852-1913) completed the novel shortly before his death. It was published the following year, 1914, when the Home Rule Bill was being formally enacted by Parliament but was set aside in fact; the Home Rule leaders were recruiting Irish cannon-fodder for the British War on Germany and Turkey; and a new Rising was being planned. Sheehan, the author of novels of high quality, was the Parish Priest of Doneraile in North Cork. He was actively involved in social and political affairs (land reform and the All-for-Ireland League). His first posting as a priest was to Exeter in England, where, as a prison chaplain at Dartmoor, he became familiar with the conditions in which Fenian prisoners were held.

“The Fighting Irish”

By Brendan Clifford

The militaristic qualities of the *Fighting Irish* have been much celebrated in recent years—that is their preoccupation with, and their capacity for, extreme violence, in blind obedience to orders, for political purposes about which they have not been consulted, is celebrated. That is, the Fighting Irish who took the Royal shilling and went around the world killing to order, are celebrated.

“For a neutral country, Ireland claims a remarkable military tradition”, Dr. Fearghal McGarry wrote in the *Irish Times* (17 April 2012).

Dr. McGarry has told us authoritatively that Ireland was so neutral in 1939-45 that it refused even to acknowledge the fact that a World War was being fought. Instead of calling the World War a *war* it insisted on calling it an *Emergency*. To assure myself that I wasn’t hallucinating when I remembered reading about the *World War*, during the World War, in the Irish papers of the time, I went to the trouble of looking up those old papers published in neutral Ireland. And there it was, every day, the *World War*.

So it’s an indisputable vulgar fact that the World War was called the *World War* in neutral Ireland. But the authoritative truth—the academic truth—is that neutral Ireland carried its neutrality to the extreme of denying that there was a war going on in the world.

Of course Dr. McGarry is not the only academic who has said this. And no academic has disputed this higher truth as far as I know.

Dr. Patrick Maume of Cork University has accused me, in the pop-history magazine *History Ireland*, of alleging a conspiracy amongst academics in Ireland to misrepresent fact in the history which they write. So it’s not a conspiracy. It just so happens that a fact which is not a fact is presented as

historical truth by one academic, and it stands uncontradicted over the years in academic literature by all the other academics. There is no collusion to falsify history. There is no silence lest speech should endanger one’s career in the academic rat race. It just so happens.

Some years ago there was an Irish contestant in the highbrow BBC quiz, *University Challenge*. One question was, *What was the 2nd World War called in Ireland?* The factually correct answer—the 2nd World War—would have lost him a point. So he gave the academically-approved answer—*The Emergency*—and gained a point. And the English view of the Irish as people who live in delusion was confirmed from the horse’s mouth.

Nevertheless, says Dr. McGarry, “For a neutral country, Ireland claims a remarkable military tradition”.

When did Ireland become a neutral country? It could not have been before 1938. It was only in 1938 that an Irish Government gained control of the Naval Bases held by Britain. It could not have been neutral if Britain had been making war on Germany from Irish territory. So the “*military tradition*” referred to by Dr. McGarry relates to centuries when Ireland had no power to be neutral.

“Irish recruitment”, he writes, “peaked in the Victorian era, following the relaxation of Penal Law restrictions on Catholic recruitment, when more than 40 per cent of the British army was composed of Irish-born recruits”.

So the remarkable Irish military tradition is British. It flourished at a time when the mere advocacy of Irish independence was treason. And how could there be an Irish military tradition when there was no Irish political authority and Ireland was merely a region of the British state? There is, after all, *some* connection between military activities and states.

The British state broke up Irish society and recruited the fragments into its Army and sent them around the world to do its killing for it. That is the bulk of the military tradition of ‘neutral Ireland’ that Dr. McGarry refers to.

His article is a review of *The Fighting Irish: The Story Of The Extraordinary Irish Soldier* by Tim Newark, published in London by Constable. We are not told, either by the publisher or by Dr. McGarry, who Tim Newark is. I assume he is a British soldier who has become a military historian. The book comes with a recommendation by Andrew Roberts, who restored British history to its authentic Jingoistic mode following its long generation of pretentiousness and confusion when the Universities were dominated by half-baked Marxism. Roberts tells us that, from the Battle of the Boyne to Afghanistan, “*Ireland has produced some of the world’s toughest, bravest and most dedicated soldiers*”.

An Irish soldier is obviously a British soldier from the Irish hinterland of Britain, which continues to exist.

The Irish military tradition does not figure at all in the book. Tom Barry isn’t there. And the two Irish wars of the 20th century—the wars fought against Britain in Ireland—are not there. That makes it clear enough what Dr. McGarry means by Ireland’s “*remarkable military tradition*”.

The fragments of the Irish society broken by Britain, with little to live for at home, were drawn into the British Army from around the time of the accession of George the Third, when

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Britain acknowledged that Catholics continued to exist in its Irish region despite the Laws designed to get rid of them.

They were also conspicuous in the American Army after millions of them went there to fill the empty spaces—the spaces that were being made empty—after the British Government disclaimed responsibility in the 1840s for the condition of things it had brought about in Ireland through a century and half of destructive authoritarian government. (Government of a people by a representative Government elected elsewhere by a process from which that people is excluded, is authoritarian in its relationship to the excluded people.)

Newark lists the Irish-born soldiers in the American Army who were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour. Eighty-nine were awarded it for bravery in the Civil War. The Irish fought on both sides, but I assume the Medal was only awarded to soldiers on the winning side. And then seventy-two Medals were awarded for bravery in the “*Indian Frontier Campaigns*” in which Irish-Americans only fought on one side.

The Indian Campaigns, unleashed by the victors in the Civil War, were campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It is only very recently that American historians have begun to apply the principles for which the Civil War was supposedly fought to the treatment of the native American peoples by the victors. Slavery was an atrocity in the eyes of the victorious Yankees. Genocide of the native peoples was a virtue.

A recent book on the Creek Massacre, carried out towards the end of the Civil War, describes the difficulty about agreeing wording for a memorial plaque. Was the incident a battle or a massacre? For the Union officer, Colonel John Chivington, there was no question but that it was a battle.

“Because Sand Creek took place as the Civil War raged, and because the massacre catalysed the Indian Wars that followed, it seemed likely to be read by future generations as a pivotal chapter in the American story. Chivington, who believed that Sand Creek had been a noble and necessary part of winning the West, wanted the episode written into the national narrative as a glorious battle ...

“...Chivington used the gallons of blood spilled along the Sand Creek to depict a masterstroke. Late on November 29, 1864, with corpses still cooling on the ground, he passed along glad tidings to his superior, General Samuel Curtis ...Chivington wrote ‘at daylight this morning [we] attacked [a] Cheyenne village of 130 lodges, from 900 to 1000 warriors strong’. The fight had gone well, he bragged. His men had killed several chiefs, as well as ‘between 400 and 500 other Indians.’ After memorializing his fallen troops—9 killed, 38 wounded, all died nobly—Chivington justified the attack. Pointing to depredations allegedly committed earlier that year by the native people his men had defeated at Sand Creek, he related tales designed to inflame observers familiar with the unfolding Anglo settlement of the Plains: ‘found a white man’s scalp, not more than three days old, in one of the lodges’. In sum, Chivington’s men had whipped ‘savages’ guilty of desecrating white bodies...

“Chivington seemed to understand in that moment that he stood at a crossroads. A Methodist minister, committed abolitionist, and stalwart Union man, he had preached Christ’s gospel on the Plains before arriving in Colorado Territory four years earlier...

“After informing Curtis of his exploits, Chivington...composed a second note, to the editors at Denver newspapers...His men, he wrote, had attacked ‘one of the most powerful villages of the Cheyenne nation. The result represented ‘almost an entire annihilation of the entire tribe’...” (*A Misplaced Massacre* by Ari Kelman, Harvard University Press, 2013, pp8-10).

The fragments of Irish society broken by Britain who remained within the British state and joined its Army won a great many Victoria Crosses.

By far the greatest number, 58, were won in the suppression of the Indian national resistance in 1857—the “*Indian Mutiny*”. Next was the Great War, with 37. Then the Crimean War with 30.

The Second World War brought only 8. Newark does not discuss whether this decline was connected with the fact of the Irish state becoming independent on the eve of the War, asserting neutrality, and exerting an influence contrary to British influence—or was a symptom of the fact that Britain did not commit itself to its 1939 War with anything like the intensity with which it committed itself to its 1914 War.

Some of the other British wars in which soldiers from the Irish region of Britain won VCs were the Anglo-Persian War, the Second Opium War, the New Zealand Wars, the Abyssinian Campaign, the Cape Frontier Wars, the Zulu War, the Basuto War, the 2nd Afghan War, the First Boer War, the Sudan Campaign, the Siege of Malakand, the 2nd Boer War, the Somaliland Campaign, the Baltic Campaign, and the Waziristan War.

And, in the Andaman Islands Campaign, about which Newark tells us nothing, they won three VCs.

British India had been considering the development of the Andaman Islands, in the Bay of Bengal, as a Penal Colony, since the late 18th century. It did so as a matter of urgency in the late 1850s, needing somewhere to hold the large number of captives that remained after the wholesale slaughter, by means of which the ‘Mutiny’ was suppressed and India was brought to a due sense of obedience to its conquerors.

The Viceroy, the Earl of Mayo, graciously visited the Andamans in 1872 as the symbol of civilisation which the British had brought to the Islanders. But the natives were surly and fixed in their ways, and they killed him. But they could do nothing about the Penal Colony—the Concentration Camp—into which the islands had developed.

About forty years later, V. D. Savarkar was given a life sentence in the colony. His crime was thought crime. He had described the Mutiny as an Indian war of independence.

One of his jailers was an Irish nationalist:

“Look here’, said he, ‘I am not an Englishman. I am an Irishman’. He pretended to be as frank with me as I was with him. I intervened, ‘But I would not have hated you for being an Englishman. I have spent the best years of my life in England, and I am an admirer of the virtues that characterize an Englishman’. ‘I tell you that I am an Irishman’, he replied, ‘to let you know that I also have taken part in activities like yours for the liberation of Ireland. I was young then as you are now. But since that time I am a changed man. Look here, I tell it to you as a friend’, he continued, ‘you are young and I am pretty old in years. I have seen many more winters than you have’. I smiled and interrupted him, ‘And don’t you think that, perhaps, may be the reason of the change that has come over you? Not increasing wisdom but dwindling energy?’ The man seemed non-plussed and he retorted, ‘You are a lawyer and I am a layman of little education. But you are a prisoner, and I am the gaoler of this prison. So don’t reject my advice as useless. Murders are murders, and they will never bring independence’. Of course, I know it, but may I ask you, why don’t you convey this to the Sinnfeiners in Ireland? Besides, who told you that I favoured murders?’ He, then, changed the subject...” (*The Story Of My Transportation For Life*, pp84-5) □

British Geopolitics and the Balkan Wars

– An Irish perspective

by Pat Walsh

[This article is the text of a paper read by Pat Walsh at a conference held in the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, during May 2011. The title of the conference was: ‘Lasting Socio-Political impacts of the Balkan Wars’ and it was organised by Prof. Hakan Yavuz.

Many of the academic contributions to the conference have been published in the book: ‘War and Nationalism - The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Socio-political Implications’ edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi and published by Utah University.]

Britain is perhaps not always seen as a main actor in the Balkan Wars. However, there are reasons for a reassessment of this view if one takes a geopolitical view of the wars, particularly the geopolitical view that was prevalent in British Imperial circles at the time.

In Britain today the Balkan Wars are not seen as having any direct connection with the Great War that followed. They are seen as isolated and localized events and largely the internal product of a troubled region. Because history is written by the victors the standard Western view is therefore very different from the view from Turkey where continuity between these conflicts is apparent.

In this paper I would like to explore such continuity through the writings and activities of two Irishmen (albeit Anglo-Irishmen) in relation to the Balkan Wars.

Roger Casement and James Bouchier are two Anglo-Irish figures from the early twentieth century who have connections with the Balkan Wars. But after that, as I shall explain, the similarities between them end.

Sir Roger Casement was a British consul in Africa and South America who was knighted for his work on behalf of the Empire. But he became disillusioned with Imperial policy, developed into an Irish patriot and was hanged by the British as a ‘traitor’ to the Empire in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising in Dublin, during the Great War. His connection with the Balkan Wars was to write a geopolitical analysis in 1913 that is extremely interesting, not least because it so accurately described the place of the First Balkan War in the Imperial power politics that led onto the Great War. In it he also predicted the course of policy taken by the Triple Entente that threatened the Ottoman Empire from that point in time.

James Bouchier, on the other hand, was apparently instrumental in helping to bring about the Balkan alliance that attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1912/13. Like Casement he was born in Ireland - but he would be more accurately described as an Englishman from Ireland, like the Duke of Wellington or Lord Kitchener. He was described by his biographer as the “*diplomatist who has broken up the Turkish Empire in Europe*” because of his efforts in acting as a facilitator for the Balkan alliance against the Ottomans - although acting in an ‘unofficial’ capacity in this.

Sir Roger Casement wrote ‘*The Problem of the Near West*’ in March 1913 toward the end of the first Balkan War. ‘*The*

Problem of the Near West’ is part of his only book, ‘*The Crime against Europe*’ (1), which is a collection of articles written between 1911 and 1914 about British Foreign Policy and how, according to Casement, it was leading to war against Germany. Casement had developed the view that the British Empire was intent on stopping Germany emerging as a commercial competitor and sea-power and would fight a European war, if necessary, to do so.

Casement was writing as the outcome of the First Balkan War was still unclear:

“That war is still undecided as I write (March 1913), but whatever its precise outcome may be, it is clear that the doom of Turkey as a great power is sealed, and that the complications of the Near East will, in future, assume an entirely fresh aspect.” (p.100)

Casement placed the Balkan War in the context of Britain’s attempts to stop German commercial expansion into the Ottoman Empire, by utilising the nationalist impulses of the Christian Balkan countries against the Turks. He saw the result of the war and the expulsion of the Ottomans from most of South-Eastern Europe, as having placed a barrier, once and for all, in the way of German activity in the Near/Middle East - or “*The Near West*,” as he called it. He believed that this should have satisfied British fears of a German ‘colonisation’ of the region, but reasoned that, knowing Britain, it would not satisfy her. Britain, argued Casement, would only be satisfied with the total destruction of Germany as a commercial and maritime rival. He concluded, therefore, that the Balkan war was merely the first stage in a process that would result in an offensive against Istanbul and Anatolia.

At the same time, the result of the Balkan War, Casement argued, was an encirclement of German commercial activity that she could only break by turning increasingly to the seas, by building a bigger fleet, and, therefore, placing the Germans on a collision course with England. So Casement saw the Balkan War as not resulting in a satisfying of British interests in the region with regard to Germany but, in fact, as intensifying the process that would lead to a much larger war.

Casement saw German commercial expansion in the Balkans and Ottoman territories as a useful outlet for German energies, which would distract Germany from competing with England on the Seas - a project Casement knew would not be permitted by Britain without a general war. But the whole purpose of British policy became, according to Casement, to bottle up German energy and encircle it, creating a kind of pressure-cooker effect that would either produce revolution within the German State itself or produce destruction from without. And Germany, because it needed to participate in the world market without fear of economic strangulation by the Royal Navy, was therefore forced back to the Seas and into inevitable conflict with England.

It had been a long-standing view of British naval strategists that Germany was vulnerable on the seas because her commerce was forced to travel across them and her food and vital materials

came into her ports via the oceanic waterways, controlled by the Royal Navy. It was reckoned that by 1900 Germany had become incapable of feeding her rising population. And plans had been drawn up by the Royal Navy to utilise this weakness in the form of a blockade of Germany to destroy her commerce from around this date. Therefore, in preventing another source of overland commerce for Germany, the Balkan War was, according to Casement, a very helpful thing for Britain - forcing Germany toward the seas again.

To protect its expanding merchant navy and vital supplies Germany needed a bigger navy. But the seas were controlled by Britain, who could not permit such a development. So, according to Casement, Germany was being lured into an inevitable conflict with the controller of the seas. And that would not only lead to the destruction of Germany but also to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, which had been developing links with the Germans - unless, of course, Germany could win a war.

The centrepiece of German involvement in the Ottoman Empire was the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. This was seen by a number of commentators (2) as a major cause of the Great War. This was because Britain looked at it and feared the economic and strategic advantages it would provide to Germany, the rest of continental Europe and Asia in trade rivalry with England. The Royal Navy controlled the global market by ruling the sea. It was feared in England that if the Berlin to Baghdad Railway was built and became fully operational trade would increasingly go across land and be beyond the guns of the Royal Navy. That would mean that Germany would not only become commercially dominant within the Eurasian heartland but also become safe from Royal Navy blockade, which had, historically, been the primary means of British warfare against European rivals to its power and prosperity.

It was also feared that the Railway could potentially transport goods at a lower cost, giving the Germans a commercial advantage over Britain in the Eastern markets where German business was already threatening long-standing British trade (3). And there might even be the development of a great customs union - a kind of early European Community, with Germany at its head - that would prosper outside of the global market that Britain had established for its own benefit and which the Royal Navy policed.

Casement argued that German commercial expansion into the Balkans “*would have offered a safety valve, and could have involved preoccupations likely to deflect the German vision from ... the Western highways of the sea.*” (p.101)

Interestingly Casement's view is mirrored in a book published in 1916 by Percy Evans Lewin of the Royal Colonial Institute. Lewin's ‘*The German Road to the East*’ describes how German economic expansion was forced toward the East by Britain's dominating position on the sea to the West. Lewin argued that the whole of Germany's sea commerce came out of a small triangle of which Heligoland formed the centre. From there it passed through the narrow waters between Denmark and Norway which could be easily blocked by the British fleet. Ninety-five per cent of it went through the English Channel, and the only alternative route around the Orkneys also took it through an area controlled by the Royal Navy. And even if it successfully managed to negotiate these routes it would run into British sea power again at Gibraltar.

From both Casement's and Lewin's positions the value of an overland route for German trade is apparent.

At the same time Casement dismissed the view, prevalent in some British Imperial circles that Germany was following a colonial policy similar to England's: “*An occupation or colonisation of the Near East by the Germanic peoples... was never a practical suggestion or one to be seriously contemplated... Germany, indeed, might have looked for a considerable measure of commercial dominance in the Near East... but it could never have done more than this.*” (p.101)

Casement suggested that this was geopolitically impossible, writing:

“The trend of civilized man in all great movements since modern civilization began, has been from East to West, not from West to East. The tide of the peoples moved by some mysterious impulse from the dawn of European expansion has been towards the setting sun. The few movements that have taken place in the contrary direction have but emphasized the universality of this rule... The Crusades furnished, doubtless, the classic example...” (p.101)

In his article Casement quoted one of the most well known Imperial commentators of the time, Mr. Frederick Harrison, who wrote approvingly of the Balkan War in the *English Review*, of January 1913: “*Even a local and temporary triumph of Austria over Servia cannot conceal the fact that henceforth the way south-east to the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea is barred to the Germans.*” (p.102)

Casement, himself, commented on the British geopolitical view of the Balkan War:

“That is the outstanding fact that British public opinion perceives with growing pleasure from the break up of Turkey. No matter where the dispute or what the purpose of conflict may be, the supreme issue for England is ‘Where is Germany?’ Against that side the whole weight of Great Britain will, openly or covertly, be thrown. German expansion in the Near East has gone by the board, and in its place the development of Greek naval strength in the Mediterranean, to take its stand by the Triple Entente, comes to be jauntily considered, while the solid wedge of a Slav Empire or Federation, commanding in the near future 2,000,000 of armed men is agreeably seen to be driven across South-eastern Europe between Austro-German efforts and the fallow lands of Asia Minor.” (p.102)

Then Casement made a prophetic statement that the Balkan War was only the start of a planned advance of the *Entente* powers across Ottoman lands which would take them into Anatolia itself when the appropriate moment arrived:

These latter (i.e. lands of Asia Minor) can safely be left in Turkish hands yet a while longer, until the day comes for their partition into ‘spheres of influence,’ just as Persia and parts of China are to-day being apportioned between Russia and England.” (p.103)

Sir Roger Casement's view is significant because in many respects he was an insider and someone who understood the thrust and workings of British Imperial policy intimately. The fact that he was able to accurately predict the course of events beginning with the Balkan War and culminating in the partition of Ottoman Anatolia by the Western powers was because he was a ‘renegade’ from Imperialism and had gone over to the anti-imperialist position.

Casement's article also draws attention to the new ‘ethical’ basis of foreign policy held by the Liberal Government in England, which had a strong Christian ‘moral’ dimension.

He noted how the joining together of the Christian states and the expelling of the Ottomans from Europe was seen in Nonconformist English Liberal circles as a 'divine judgement': "This happy consummation... has fallen from heaven, and Turkey is being cut up for the further extension of British interests clearly by the act of God. The victory of the Balkan States becomes another triumph for the British Bible; it is the victory of righteousness over wrong-doing." (p.103)

Although at this time England was becoming increasingly lax in its Christianity the governing Liberal Party had a strong Nonconformist Protestant character which, since the time of Gladstone, had always shown great sympathy to the Christians in the Balkans. Gladstone had made famous his desire for the Moslem Turks to be driven out of the Balkans "*bag and baggage*" and this phrase was increasingly referred to in Britain from 1912 to 1922 by those wishing to limit Ottoman power in the region.

Casement, however, did not see this moral Christian impulse as the driving force of Imperial policy but as a kind of ethical veneer on the core values of British policy in exerting its power against potential competitors. He saw the Balkan Christians as mere pawns in Imperial power politics and wrote:

"The true virtue of the Balkan 'Christians' lies in the possibility of their being moulded into an anti-German factor of great weight in the European conflict, clearly impending, and in their offering a fresh obstacle, it is hoped, to German world policy... Hemmed in by Russia on the East and the new Southern Slav States on the South-east, with a vengeful France being incited on her Western frontier to fresh dreams of conquest, Germany sees England preparing still mightier armaments to hold and close the seaways of the world..." (p.104)

Casement's analysis is confirmed by British Imperialist activity from 1912 onwards and particularly in its repeated attempts to enlist all these Christian Slav States as fighting forces against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey. It is particularly accurate in relation to the Greek State. This activity led to British military interference in Greek neutrality and the Greek tragedy in Anatolia after the government under Venizélos, installed in Athens through Allied force, was enlisted as a 'catspaw' to bring the Turks to accept the Treaty of Sèvres.

On this point, the American author, Joseph Starke, argued in 1921 that Britain had utilized the inherent instability of the Balkans region to further its interests in preparing the ground for the Great War on Germany. In '*Light and Truth after the World Tragedy*' he wrote:

"England is directly responsible for this exasperating and baffling state of affairs. By nourishing in these peoples, under the impulse of Gladstone's humanitarian eloquence, an inordinate sense of importance quite beyond their deserts and the nationalistic possibilities of the situation as it stood at that time, she directly encouraged their restlessness and violence, increased the racial jealousies between them and interfered with the natural evolution of these related countries to a strong and united Slavic state under Austrian guidance - the fertile scheme of the murdered prince Francis Ferdinand." (p.39)

The achievement of the Ottomans in managing these, what Starke called, "*wreckage peoples*" of the Balkans was put into perspective during the twentieth century when the Balkans passed out of the Ottoman sphere and into the realm of Christian European influence. But, as Starke contended, the Balkan region

might still have remained stable if the other great Empire in the region, Austro-Hungary, had been allowed to stabilize it.

It is interesting that Casement marks the Balkan Wars as the point at which the fate of the Ottoman Empire was sealed because when Turkey entered into the War in November 1914 it was argued in Britain that she had made the fateful choice herself – in a kind of act of suicide. Casement's insight is revealing in that it locates the Balkan Wars within a part of a desired process designed to achieve the demise of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire on England's part.

Casement, perhaps alone amongst Western writers, subscribes to the view that the Balkan Wars represents the start of a ten year war launched against the Ottoman Turks from the West. In this he is very different from the standard Western view that has largely seen the Balkan Wars forgotten in the shadow of the Great War that came later.

The alliance that Britain entered into with Russia in 1907, therefore, was the single most important event that made a British war on Turkey inevitable.

The alliance with Russia was obviously the main factor that spelled trouble for the Ottoman Empire. But what was it that made this alliance so important to Britain that she overturned her traditional foreign policy of preventing Russia from having Constantinople?

The reason is connected to the fact that Britain is an island nation and it was primarily a sea power. It did not have a large army and it had been traditionally opposed to military conscription. Therefore it would have been impossible for Britain to have defeated Germany by itself. Therefore, it needed the large French army and the even larger Russian Army to do most of the fighting on the continent for it. The Russian Army was particularly important and it was described in the English press as a 'steamroller' that would roll all the way to Berlin, crushing German resistance by its sheer weight of numbers.

The problem for Britain was that the Russians (unlike the French who wanted to recapture Alsace/Lorraine after their loss to the Germans in 1871) had no real reason to fight Germany. Therefore, something substantial had to be promised to the Czar for his help in destroying Germany. That something was his heart's desire, Constantinople.

The Balkan Wars represented the beginning of this process. They certainly came about as one of the consequences of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Without the restraining forces of England and France, Russia saw itself as having a much freer hand in the Balkans and saw its way down to Constantinople clearing. And all restraints were removed from the various Balkan nationalisms by the ending of the historical antagonism of the 'Great Game' between England and Russia in favour of the Great War against Germany.

Casement argued that the Balkan War played a part in the isolation and encirclement of Germany that the *Entente* Powers were promoting prior to the European War. But there is also evidence supporting the view that British diplomacy, at least in an 'unofficial' capacity, was partly behind the Balkan War.

Such events are usually accomplished through quiet diplomacy and are never officially recognized as official acts of state, for good reason. There are also precedents for them being accomplished on a 'freelance' basis by private individuals (One thinks of the Jameson Raid prior to the Boer War).

But there is actually a book devoted to another 'Irishman' who, it is claimed, acted as England's agent in this, and, apparently, accomplished wonders in that respect.

The 'Inner History of the Balkan War' by Lt.-Col. Reginald Rankin, Special War Correspondent of *The Times* was published in early 1914, and is dedicated to James David Bourchier. Lt.-Col. Reginald Rankin called Bourchier "*the unattached diplomatist who has broken up the Turkish Empire in Europe*" on the opening page of his book. Quoting *Who's Who* of 1913 the author has this description of Bourchier's background, which reveals him to be 'Anglo-Irish' rather than 'Irish': "*Was for some years Assistant Master at Eton; in 1888 acted as Special Correspondent of The Times in Roumania and Bulgaria and has subsequently represented that journal in South-Eastern Europe...*" (p.1)

The bulk of Lt.-Col. Reginald Rankin's book is made up of articles written by Bourchier and published by *The Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily News*, *Fortnightly Review* and other periodicals in England. But Chapter I of this book, entitled *James David Bourchier*, describes the rise to power of the Young Turks, Bourchier's growing hostility toward them, and his role in organizing the Balkan Alliance, which expelled the Ottoman Empire from Europe.

Rankin notes that "*The behaviour of the Young Turks in Macedonia in 1910 convinced Bourchier that only a resort to arms could free the subject Christians from an intolerable persecution.*" (p.7)

Bourchier and his biographer seem to have shared the anti-Semitic mindset of many in the British ruling class at the time and blamed much of the situation in the Balkans on what they called "*the Jew-inspired Young Turks*". Rankin suggested that the "*silence*" of the press over Macedonia

"was due largely to the influence of the financiers and Jews who control the European Press and whose interests are wrapped up in the preservation of Turkey. The Young Turk movement started in Salonika, a Jewish town, and from the first Jews were at the back of it." (p.8)

What is clear from any reading of ambassadorial correspondence and other material (One thinks of the dragoman Gerald Fitzmaurice and Ambassador Lowther, for instance) is how many within British ruling circles were concerned at the so-called 'power of the Jew.' This was because many in the Imperial ruling elite had formed the notion that the Jews were a dangerous element in international affairs (4). It was reasoned that because they had no country and no national existence they were internationalists of a disruptive kind. It was noticed that Jews were prominent in both international finance and international socialism. Many British Imperial civil servants and writers saw them as being associated with German commercial success and even as the 'hidden hand' behind the Young Turks, many of whom came from the great Jewish city of Salonika. This was a popular view within powerful circles in England even before the Great War.

The solution to this 'Jewish problem' for Britain later presented itself in the form of the Zionist objective in which Jews could be made into a national people within British-occupied Palestine no longer disrupting the international affairs of the British Empire.

Here is Rankin's description of the contribution of Bourchier to the creation of the Balkan War:

"Bourchier, with a knowledge of the conditions prevailing in Turkey and in the Balkans, on the one hand, and at the councils of the Great Powers, on the other... realised that the only remedy was a combination of the free nations, kinsman of the oppressed peoples, either to bring pressure on the Young Turks... or to put them out by force. He came to this conclusion at the end... of 1910... Bourchier turned his attention to the... possible solution to the problem. What forces could the four states of the Balkans - Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro - command for the purpose of bringing pressure, of one kind or another on the oppressors of their co-religionists and kinsmen?... Here was the germ of the Balkan League, the first cause of the war which drove the Turks out of Europe after nearly five hundred years... a calculation simmering in the brain of an unofficial Irishman...

So it came about that during the winter of 1910-11 Bourchier had long talks with M. Venizélos, the Greek Prime Minister, and the two men discussed the scheme of a defensive, and then offensive, alliance between the Balkan States against the Turk. Events marched rapidly in favour of the project. The difficulty in achieving secret unity and cooperation between nations whose sole common ground was their hatred of the oppressor, gave way before the blundering rancour of the Jew-inspired Young Turks...

The pressure put on Bulgars and Greeks alike caused a rapprochement between the peasants of the two races. Warfare between them, almost chronic in the past, ceased between them... This... naturally strengthened the hands of Venizélos and Bourchier. At this time the latter was striving to bring about a Greco-Bulgarian alliance, which the other states might subsequently join...

M. Venizélos is a very old friend of Bourchier, and their talks... that were to change the face of Europe for all time, were not held in the official atmosphere of council chambers; they met in various places and made a pilgrimage to the tomb of Byron at Mesolonghi... At last one day in 1911, the decisive step was taken... Venizélos told Bourchier that he had finally approved the draft treaty of an alliance with Bulgaria against Turkey. Thus did Bourchier achieve his purpose that will make his name ever famous... Some months later Bourchier went to Sofia and... persuaded the Bulgarian Government to fall in line with Greece... Bourchier had not left Serbia out of the hunt. At the end of December 1911 he went to Belgrade and broached his plan to M. Milovanovitch, the Foreign Minister. He urged on him the idea of a combination between the Balkan States... In due course, the Serbo-Bulgar Treaty was signed a week or two before the Bulgar-Greek Treaty.

Bourchier went back to England in July 1912 and at that time the Balkan League was practically formed... He had done his part in the great task... for the futures of the peoples his statesmanship was to liberate... At last on September 30 the four States mobilised simultaneously...

The four States, temporarily united by the force of his genius, by common respect for his abilities, and by common knowledge of his devotion to their cause, sank their ancient differences; allied themselves; simultaneously made war; conquered the Turk and drove him out of Europe... Vast tracts of territory have changed hands; millions of people have changed their rulers; a power and a creed that at one time threatened to dominate Europe have been practically evicted. Christianity has triumphed over Islam, civilization over barbarity; the European has proved himself a better man than the Asiatic; the

apple of discord has been lifted out of the reach of the Great Powers;... Fifty years hence, or much less, the Crescent will not float over Constantinople...

The names of Byron, of Gladstone, of Bouchier, will be remembered and treasured in the hearts of millions... The statues that will rise in the Macedonian towns will be time-bound witnesses to the love and admiration which the unofficial Irishman... excited in the hearts of the people he liberated.” (*The Inner History of the Balkan War*, pp.11-21)

There is no hard evidence that Bouchier was acting on behalf of the British State in helping to bring about the Balkan alliance. But he was acting within the general thrust of British policy in the area, was never censored for his activities, but rather feted for them. The establishment of Christian Slav buffer-states between Germany/Austria and the Ottoman territories was a geopolitical objective of British Imperial policy, according to Casement and a general reading of English commentaries from this period confirms as such.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 did not lead *directly* to a Great War because the other parties to the Triple *Entente* - England and France - had no interest in seeing Russia capture the Straits without bringing Germany into the conflict. As the French historian Alfred Fabre-Luce concluded in his 1926 book, *The Limitations of Victory*:

“England’s representatives had been instructed, ever since 1909, at all costs to prevent the eastern crises from becoming general; and in 1914 she still maintained this point of view, as she refused to intervene until France and Belgium were drawn into the conflict. ‘Our idea,’ Grey said to Cambon on the 29th July, ‘has always been to avoid being drawn into a war for a Balkan question.’” (pp. 97-8)

England required German involvement in a European War to bring about her demise as a competitor. So a Balkan War was useless to England unless Germany could be involved in it. Germany could only become involved through the intervention of Austria, and the Hapsburg’s attitude in the Balkans after 1909 was largely concerned with the preservation of order among the diverse nationalities inhabiting the Empire, to ensure survival. A much greater provocation would be necessary to bring about Austria’s entry into any conflict in the Balkans, something that occurred in 1914. Fabre-Luce, considering the understanding England had with France to go in to a war with Germany and the preparations the military men had made for this war, put it like this:

“There was only one doubt in the midst of all this optimism: under certain circumstances, public opinion, which is the final arbiter of English policy, might refuse to sanction intervention... Now, if the many repercussions of the alliances are carefully considered, they lead to the paradoxical conclusion that nothing but a Balkan conflict, in which, however, neither France nor England would be directly interested, could have brought about a combined Triple Entente offensive... It was consequently necessary for Germany to be indirectly involved in the quarrel. This was also essential in order to be sure of Russia’s co-operation...

On the other hand, it would not have done for the claim to Constantinople to have appeared responsible for the conflict, for this would have been risking an Anglo-Russian conflict, even before Austria’s hostility had been raised or Germany intervened... Their (Russia’s) only chance of inducing England

to recognize their right to Constantinople was to formulate it after the outbreak of a war waged in common for another cause, at a moment when anxiety for victory was the chief concern and made the most painful concessions easy between allies (This is, in fact, what happened in 1915).

Here, then, we have the whole Triple Entente interested in Balkan crises. This was something new, and it brought about an analogous change in the policy of the enemy group, whose alliance was correspondingly firmly cemented, its centre of gravity being similarly shifted to the east.” (*The Limitations of Victory*, pp.158-9)

That is an important insight into why the Ottomans found it difficult not to become drawn into the European conflict in 1914. The *Entente*’s special interest in the Balkans as the site of ‘detonation’ for a war on Germany shifted the centre of gravity of the conflict eastward.

If Russia had taken Constantinople in 1913 as a result of a Turkish collapse, the Czar would have had little motivation for joining in a war with Germany. And since a war with Germany was necessary for the French recovery of Alsace/Lorraine and the general destruction of German power, desired by Britain, then Britain and France used diplomacy (in conjunction with Germany) to end the Balkan conflict, for another day, and prevent it leading to a Russian takeover of Constantinople.

Sir Edward Grey’s conducting of affairs in relation to the Balkans in 1913 is sometimes cited as an example of Britain’s peaceful intentions in Europe. But it was more the case that the 1913 situation in the Balkans did not provide a suitable ‘detonator’ for the European conflict to achieve the overall objectives of the *Entente* vis-à-vis Germany.

The Balkans remained important, however, as the one area over which a European war might be provoked and at the same time ensure that a Russian mobilisation against Germany could take place, so that the general conflagration necessary to ensure the German and Ottoman destruction could be brought about. Its purpose in the general scheme of things was akin to a detonator.

Additional Notes:

- (1) Athol Books (Belfast) 2004 Reprint
- (2) See, for example, Professor Maurice Jastrow (1917) ‘The War and the Baghdad Railway’, p.99; Frederic Howe (1919) ‘The Only Possible Peace’, pp.146-53; Charles Woods in ‘New York Times’ January 9, 1918 for example. Woods, in particular, had a large output on the subject and conducted speaking tours to the U.S. to gain American entry into the war.
- (3) See, for example, Richard Coke (1925) *The Heart of the Middle East*, p.130.
- (4) See, for instance, the classic of British geopolitics by Sir Halford Mackinder (1919) *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, pp. 173-4; Elie Kedourie’s *Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews*, Middle Eastern Studies, January 1971, pp. 95-102, for a review of the output of the British Foreign Office; E.H. Benson’s *Crescent and Iron Cross* (1915), Chapter IV, for a propagandist version linking Jews and German power; Also *The Round Table*, March 1918 for the Chatham House version. My book *Britain’s Great War on Turkey – An Irish Perspective* extensively deals with this aspect in the creation of Palestine (pp. 268-288) □

Starving the Germans: The Evolution of Britain's Strategy of Economic Warfare During The First World War—The French Connection, Part 4

By Eamon Dyas

[The story so far: Prior to 1914, France and Britain are giving each other a free hand respectively in independent Morocco, and in Egypt, to the exclusion of German commercial interests.]

French colonialists and the destabilisation of Morocco.

In the meantime the colonial party continued to pursue its agenda and, together with powerful allies in the *'bureaux'* at the Quai d'Orsay and significant elements in the French army, set about 'repositioning' the question of Morocco as a French Protectorate. Finance, as always, was a major factor in the initial softening-up process and, despite the traditional criticism by the French colonialists of French business's failure to become more active in empire building, it was French financial institutions that paved the way in the destabilisation process. Although in many cases the actions of these institutions were merely the result of their natural drive for easy profits, in a number of cases those in charge used finance as a means of destabilising the existing Government of Morocco as a prelude to its annexation.

The beginning of the end began with the creation of a financial dependence of the Sultan, Abdulaziz-ben-Hassan, upon European financial institutions. In the year 1893 he borrowed £800,000 from French, Spanish, and British financial syndicates. By the summer of 1904 he had managed to pay off these loans but only by consolidating them through contracting a much heavier liability with French banks alone. This 1904 consolidated loan, facilitated by Etienne's Comité du Maroc, amounted to £2,500,000 at an interest of 5 per cent and was to all intents and purposes imposed on the Sultan by the then French Foreign Minister, Delcassé. The interest on this loan was to be secured by setting aside 60 per cent of Moroccan customs receipts, thus giving France control over customs to that extent until the loan was repaid. In 1905 and 1906 the Moroccan Government entered into a number of smaller loans and liabilities. A proportion of these small loans was required to purchase arms and ammunition from the French weapon manufacturer, Le Creusot, to equip the Sultan's army as it was forced to deal with an increasing number of tribal risings along the Algerian border, most of which had been encouraged and paid for by French colonial elements on the Algerian border.

Then came the 1906 Act of Algeciras which was a definite setback for the colonialist party as the main component of that Act as far as their ambitions were concerned was the guarantee of Moroccan independence and integrity. Among the Powers Germany was the leading and, as it turned out, the only defender of the guarantee of continued Moroccan independence. However, British support of the intransigent colonialists during the negotiations leading up to that Act ensured that some of the terms of the Act continued to provide the essential ingredients guaranteeing the continued political instability of the country. This, combined with the corrosive effect of its financial commitments to French institutions, provided the toxic mix which eventually destroyed Morocco's ability to defend her independence: -

"The passing of the Act of Algeciras has turned out to be a doubtful triumph for German diplomacy, but at one time it seemed as if it was destined to upset France's ambitious dreams, and to put back the clock of Moroccan conquest for many years. But although France was obliged to agree to the provisions of the Act, she obtained certain special privileges by the support of England, which have given her a great advantage over her rivals, and have enabled her to override the whole spirit of the Act, and to come forward as the Power whose interests are paramount in Morocco. The Algerian frontier being coextensive with that of Morocco, she reserved the right to treat independently with Marzhen on all questions arising over the delineation of the frontier line. As her natural line of adventure in any aggressive action against the Moors is through Algeria, she can turn this to great advantage. Those clauses in the Act dealing with the policing of the coast towns by a force raised from amongst the Moors, but drilled and commanded by foreign officers, have also been turned by France to good advantage. No clauses in the Act were the subject of more vehement dispute than these. Germany wished the officers and instructors to be drawn from all the nations. France declared, on account of her special interests in Morocco and the proximity of her colony, Algeria, that she should have the sole right to drill and organise the police. Finally a compromise was agreed upon, and the care of the police was confided to the mixed force of French and Spanish officers, having a Swiss colonel as inspector-general." (The Passing of the Shereefian Empire, by E. Ashmead-Bartlett. Published by Dodd, Mead, and Co. of New York and William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1910, pp.17-18).

By the time of the negotiations of the Act of Algeciras it was obvious that British support for French claims on Morocco did not constitute simply a passive acceptance of these claims but that such support was in fact an active support by which she used her influence and resources to bolster French colonial claims whenever such support was required. But this was only forthcoming insofar as her own interests were not compromised. For that reason her 'solution' to the Moroccan question also sought to ensure that any French presence in Morocco would not threaten Britain's important naval base at Gibraltar. Hence, the role allocated to Spain as Britain's gatekeeper.

Despite the behaviour of the colonialist party, the main body of French political opinion (that represented by those sceptical of British support in the event of war) was committed to the Act of Algeciras. Between 1906 and the eventual destruction of Moroccan independence in 1911, the French Chamber of Deputies passed resolution after resolution upholding the terms of the Act. Edmund Morel lists the dates of some of the occasions when the Chamber passed supportive resolutions as 6 December, 1906; 12 November, 1907; 24 and 28 January 1908; 19 June, 1908; 23 December 1908; 10 January 1909; 23 November 1909; and 24 March 1911 (Morocco in Diplomacy, by E.D. Morel. Published by Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1912, footnote to page 112). Even though many political figures from the sceptical wing of French politics shared the ambition for French control of Morocco they considered it possible to attain this gradually and in tandem with German support

through abiding by the terms of the Act of Algeciras. Between this position and the extreme colonialist there were several gradations which vacillated between the two poles. What provided these intermediate positions with a volatility was the failure of the international community to establish a clear boundary between what was expected of French behaviour and what was acceptable under the terms of the Algeciras Act and the main responsibility for this uncertainty rests with British support for the extreme French colonialist position before, during and after the Act of Algeciras. In the meantime, every attempt by Germany to assert the terms of the Act in the face of French colonialist infringement was interpreted by Britain as a hostile move.

The terms of the Act of Algeciras guaranteeing the independence of Morocco began to be compromised almost immediately by the action of French colonialists whose sentiments commanded strong support in the French army and elements in the Navy. Under the terms of the Act, the French security presence in the country was restricted to the role of supplying police instructors and officers commanding a Moroccan police force in the port areas only. Consequently, the presence of French troops or sailors on Moroccan soil was deemed to be a breach of the Act. Nonetheless, the elements in the Army and Navy sympathetic to the colonists used every opportunity to put French troops on the ground on the basis that the more this happened the more a de facto situation of a French military presence would have to be acknowledged by the wider international community.

The first opportunity for engaging this tactic was after the murder of Dr. Emile Mauchamp, a French doctor residing in Marrakesh, on 22 March 1907: -

“France had immediately used this regrettable incident as a pretext for invading Moorish territory and occupying the town of Udja and the neighbourhood, situate just over the Algerian boundary. There she had remained (despite frequent pledges to evacuate the place), the first step in the process of infringing the integrity of Morocco.” (Morel, op. cit., p.42).

If the Mauchamp incident represents the first infringement of Moroccan territorial independence by France what happened in Casablanca less than five months later has been described by a British journalist and eye-witness as follows:

“The loss of Morocco’s independence will surely date from the destruction of the town. Casa Blanca was the most prosperous of the Moroccan ports. . . the appalling suddenness of the disaster will be realised when it is remembered that on July 30, 1907, the inhabitants of the town were leading their usual peaceful existence, and on August 5 nothing but a heap of smoking ruins remained, and the survivors were desperately holding their own against a horde of bloodthirsty fanatical Arabs. Yet the catastrophe might have been avoided, for it was directly caused by the hasty, ill-timed action of the officers and crew of a small French cruiser—the Galilée. The commander, Ollivier, exceeded his instructions, and officially got himself into hot water; but in reality, his action has done more to bring about the speedy realisation of French ambitions in Morocco than any other single event.” (Ashmead-Bartlett, op. cit., pp.20-21).

This action is here represented as a chance event which fortuitously served the interests of the war party colonialists. But fortune or coincidence had nothing to do with it. The single

event which set in train the formal annexation of Morocco as a French Protectorate in 1912 happened on 4 August 1907, a year after the Act of Algeciras which was designed to prevent this happening. This event was in fact of considerable importance but like the rest of the pre-war Moroccan question, has been relegated to the far recesses of post-war British history of the First World War and very little has been written about it (at least in the English language). Even at the time, the only newspapers which made any genuine attempt to comprehend what was happening were German newspapers and the socialist press in France. Its coverage in *The Times* and the Government press in Britain as well as the French colonialist papers blatantly distorted the event in ways which concealed the moral bankruptcy of the French colonialists and the British Government’s position in supporting such action. As far as *The Times* was concerned it was not content to simply provide a completely fallacious account of what happened but it went on to ridicule and cast aspersion on the German press which dared question the legal and factual basis of the French naval action at Casablanca:

“Germany and the French Action

(from our correspondent.)

Berlin, Aug. 8.

A series of Berlin telegrams which appear in successive issues of the *Cologne Gazette* at intervals of a few hours sufficiently indicate the careful attention with which the developments in Morocco are being followed in German official quarters. From the tone of the latest of these communications it is evident that the bombardment of Casablanca has caused a certain amount of surprise. While the situation admittedly dictates reserve on the part of the Powers which have so far not directly suffered from the fanaticism of the Moors, it would seem nevertheless as if the Note which the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, presented to the German Foreign Office yesterday is accepted only as a provisional explanation of the measures adopted at Casablanca. Assurances of German sympathy and moral support, especially if the work of organising the police is taken in hand without delay, have already been given, and the pledge is repeated. But, according to the Rhenish organ, there is an impression in well-informed quarters that ‘the sudden bombardment of Casablanca was a purely military incident which came as a surprise to those who are responsible for the conduct of French policy. Moreover, the cause and also the details of the bombardment are not yet quite clear.’ In this connexion it may be noted that only yesterday the Rhenish journal received from the same quarter a perfectly adequate and succinct account of the events which provoked the bombardment.

The well-informed journal seems tempted to believe that the bombardment of Casablanca might give rise to developments which might eventually lead to a breach of the Algeciras Convention, and ‘here and there it is even suggested that the incident is not regarded by the French as inopportune.’ Nevertheless the terms of a telegram with regard to the notification of the Powers by France, which is circulated by the French Telegraph Agency, are interpreted to mean that, ‘notwithstanding this incident,’ the French Government is determined to adhere to the Algeciras Convention. ‘For the present, therefore,’ it is added, ‘even sceptical judges of the situation believe that M. Clemenceau’s assurance that France would settle the incident as pacifically as possible and without unnecessary bloodshed was seriously meant.’ (The Morocco Outbreak: Germany and the French Action, *The Times*, 9 August 1907, p.3).

The German Government took the view that the bombardment of Casablanca was a rogue military incident

undertaken by a naval commander acting on his own initiative. This appears to have been the basis of the explanation provided to the Government by the French Ambassador to Berlin, Jules Cambon. Recognising that the bombardment of Casablanca was an issue which could possibly derail Franco-German relations, the French Government was eager to assure Germany that the incident did not have any endorsement from the State. The bombardment was in fact the result of a scheme undertaken by elements of the French colonial party and the German Government had the good sense to view it as such and refused to respond in a way that would have involved a rift with the French Government.

The British press and Government, on the other hand, chose not to see any divergence between the actions of the naval commander and the wishes of the French Government. Consequently, it invested the actions of the naval commander with all the authority it would command if it had in fact resulted from a directive emanating from the authority of the French Government. This sent out two important messages. Firstly, it diminished the legitimate French Government of its proper legal standing in its relationship with the maverick colonialists, and secondly, it provided the status of legitimate authority upon such colonialist-inspired actions in a way which was designed to generate Franco-German antagonism in the hope of provoking a German escalation of the situation.

The significance of Casablanca.

An analysis of the events at Casablanca in 1907 provides an insight into how the complex nature of French politics at this time were played out. The events leading up to the bombardment began in 1906, the years of the Act of Algeciras. As has been pointed out earlier, under the terms of the 1904 loan from the French banks to the Moroccan Government, 60 per cent of customs duties became the property of the French banks until such time as the capital sum was repaid. This provided an incentive for French investment to improve the harbour facilities at Casablanca, which at this time was an important albeit under-developed port capable, in the eyes of French investors, of accommodating more traffic with a commensurate increase in customs revenue. Consequently:

“In 1906 a French company obtained a concession for the construction of harbour works at Casa Blanca, for, although the port had a valuable import and export trade, there were no quays, docks or breakwaters at which vessels could unload or find shelter from the periodical storms and heavy rollers of the Atlantic. In March 1907 the work on the port commenced, and in order to transfer the stone necessary for the construction of the breakwater, a light railroad was constructed along the sea-front to a point some 500 yards beyond the outer walls of the town. The Arabs of the interior took immediate exception to this line, which they regarded as a direct menace to the independence of their country. They were further incited by the rails skirting the old Moorish cemetery outside the town, and regarded this as a deliberate insult to their dead.” (Ashmead-Bartlett, op. cit., p.22.).

Accounts of whether the railway skirted or went through the Moorish cemetery differ (Morel, op. cit., states that it went through the cemetery) but in any case the location of the rail tracks offended Islamic sensibilities. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the local Chaouia tribesmen were also incensed by the appointment of official French Comptrollers to the customs displacing local officials in the

process. All in all it was a situation which required tact and sensitivity and one in which, at least for the initial period of its planning and early period of its operation, senior French officials should have been present to negotiate the issues of local concern. This appears not to have been the case. At the time of its most sensitive impact on local concerns when the railway was beginning to operate along the sensitive area of the Muslim cemetery the French Consul, M. Malpertuy, was on leave in France and the Vice-Consul, M. Maigret, was absent in Gibraltar. The only French representative in Casablanca at this most time was M. Neuville, a young inexperienced attaché who had been drafted in from Tangier a few weeks before. Aside from the lack of senior official French representation in the city there was also no proper police force in place. It seems that a year after the terms specifying the role of the French in training and commanding the local police had been laid down under the terms of the Act of Algeciras, the French had not got round to the provision of a such a force in Casablanca, the country's most important port—a fact commented on by the German press when the drama unfolded. The local representative of the Sultan and Governor of Casablanca was Si Bou Bekr Ben Bouzid, and although he had a group of militiamen at his command, the absence of a French-led police force placed him in an invidious position *vis à vis* the sensibilities of his fellow countrymen. As the tension in the city increased, the consuls from the other nations, as a Consular body, signed a petition and sent it to the French Legation at Tangier expressing their concerns including the replacement of Ben Bouzid by someone better placed to deal with the tribesmen. The request was forwarded to the Marzhen at Fez by the *Corps Diplomatique* where it was met with a dismissive response. Thereafter the French *Corps Diplomatique* at Tangier dropped the matter, not even bothering to recall the Casablanca Vice-Consul from Gibraltar:

“Such was the position of affairs on Sunday, July 28, when a deputation from the eleven Chaouia tribes arrived before Casa Blanca, entered the gates of the town, and asked for an interview with Ben Bouzid. They were shown into the Governor's presence, and immediately laid their demands before him. These were – the instant cessation of the harbour works, and the immediate dismissal of the French Customs officials. The unfortunate Ben Bouzid was quite at a loss how to reply to their demands. A short time previously a deputation had waited on the Caid of Rabat and delivered to him a similar ultimatum. The reply of this bold official is worth recording: ‘Quite so; let us drive out the French by all means. I am with you. But the Sultan owes them eighty million francs: we must pay them first. I supposed you have brought the money with you?’ But Ben Bouzid was not cast in such a heroic mould, and, wishing to gain time, he compromised with the deputation, telling them to return a day later to receive his reply.” (ibid., pp.24-25).

Ben Bouzid had promised a response to the demands of the tribal leaders on 29 July but the day came and went and on the 30 July with the ongoing operation of the railway and harbour works acting as a continuing affront to the locals the western workers on the project were attacked in the course of a riot and nine workmen were killed with many more injured. Among the nine persons killed were three French nationals as well as nationals from Spain and Italy.

On the evening of the riots a boat left Casablanca for Tangier with despatches from the French junior attaché, Neuville, to the Marquis St. Aulaire, informing him of the events of the day and requesting immediate assistance. St. Aulaire (we'll hear more about him later) sent a cable to the Foreign Office and ordered the French third-class cruiser Galilée which was on permanent

duty off Tangier, to leave immediately for Casablanca. In the meantime, this is Ashmead-Bartlett's account of what happened in the town before and immediately after the arrival of the *Galilée*: -

“Meanwhile, on July 31, Moulai el Amin, the Sultan's uncle, charged with the maintenance of peace in Chaouia, who was camped a few miles outside the town, hearing of what had passed, entered the gates with his troops and immediately proceeded to restore order. From the first this old Caid displayed the warmest sympathy with the Europeans, and was unceasing in his efforts to safeguard and protect them. He took the government out of the hands of the feeble Ben Bouzid, and by a strategy cleared the streets of the bands of marauding Arabs. He caused it to be announced that there was to be a great meeting of the tribesmen at a point outside the town to decide what step should be taken to drive the French into the sea and to loot the town. By this simple ruse the majority of the disreputable characters were placed on the other side of the wall. The gates were promptly manned, and all who attempted to enter with arms in their hands were immediately shot. So great, however, was the panic among the Europeans, especially among the French, against whom the animosity of the Arabs was solely directed, that it was considered safer to embark the whole French colony on board the British steamer *Demetria*, which was anchored off the port. This was done by the evening of the 31st. It is not pleasant to relate that many Frenchmen chose to take shelter on this vessel when they would have been better and more honourably employed in assisting their comrades in the defence of the town. By the evening of the 31st complete order had been restored, and the majority of those implicated in the murder, to the number of thirty, were securely lodged in the town jail, and the Moorish officials were quite prepared to deliver them over for trial and punishment. In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, the *Galilée* arrived off the port full of anxiety to play a role in the punishment of the rebellious town. Neuville immediately went off and informed the Commander Ollivier on the true position of affairs. He told him that order had been restored, that the town was securely in the possession of Moulai el Amin, and that for the time being everything was quiet. Ollivier and his subordinates wished to land bodies of sailors for the protection of the French and other consulates. Neuville warned him that such an action might lead to the most disastrous results, and would certainly cause another fanatical outburst. If large parties of armed French sailors were seen in the streets, the soldiers of the Moulai el Amin would probably make common cause with the tribesmen, and a general massacre of the foreigners would follow.

The Commander went ashore and had a meeting with the other Consuls, all of whom were unanimous in declaring that if the French attempted a landing without sufficient forces to hold the entire town, it would lead to an outbreak which might result in a complete massacre of all the Europeans and the complete destruction of their property. They drew up a memorial to this effect, dated August 1, which was signed by all the Consuls and handed to Ollivier, who reluctantly returned to his ship. Thus he and his officers were obliged to acquiesce with extreme reluctance in an arrangement which robbed them of the glorious role they had hoped to play. It was, however, decided to land half a dozen sailors as a protection to the French Consulate, and also to act as signalmen. In order to lull suspicion these men were brought ashore without arms and walked to the Consulate arm-in-arm, singing songs as if on leave, whilst their rifles and their ammunition were brought ashore hidden among boxes of food, and also conveyed to the Consulate. From August 1 to August 4 no event of any particular interest or importance occurred. The town remained absolutely tranquil, and the tribesmen who had

gathered outside the wall also seemed to have retired or to have dispersed. In fact, Mr. Charles Hands, the special correspondent of The Daily Mail, told me that he had walked with Mr. Edmond Fernau for a considerable distance outside the town, neither of them carrying arms, and they were not molested in any way. Thus all might have gone on peacefully until the arrival of the French ships and the French troops, who were being collected to punish the murderers and to inflict a salutary lesson on the surrounding tribes, had it not been for the misplaced ambition and excitable character of the officers and crew of the French cruiser *Galilée*. (ibid., pp.32-35).

The *Galilée* had been on duty off the coast of Morocco for the previous three years as a display to the world of the peculiar nature and special interest of France in Morocco. During this time the cruiser had been called to several incidents provoked by colonialists intent on using such incidents to prove the inability of the Sultan to govern the country. However, when the cruiser arrived at these situations they had already been successfully resolved, sometimes from loss of momentum and sometimes by the intervention of the Sultan's forces—experiences which showed the opposite of what the colonialists were claiming. Again, Ashmead-Bartlett describes the way which French colonialist attitudes pervaded the officers and crew of the *Galilée* and the difficulties they had in controlling their own brand of fanaticism:

“When they first came to Morocco on duty they looked upon the service with favour, for the savage character of the Moors and the frequent disturbances along the coast all seemed to point to opportunities to acquire distinction, promotion, and that vague mystic, indefinable *la gloire* so beloved by all Frenchmen. But for three years these early dreams failed to materialise. Time and time again on rumours of trouble the *Galilée* had been hastily despatched to one of the Moroccan towns until she had visited all in turn. The guns had been got ready, the ammunition hoists cleared, and every officer had continually been led to believe that the longed-for day in which he might display his prowess had at last arrived. But so often their ambitions had been doomed to disappointment, and the *Galilée* always returned to Tangier having accomplished nothing, her officers and crew felt humiliated and the butts of some malignant fate. Therefore, when the news reached Tangier on July 31 that nine Europeans, including three Frenchmen, had been killed, the crew of the *Galilée* no longer doubted that the day which was to compensate them for the dull years and continual disappointments had at length dawned. They looked forward to bombarding the town, to landing armed parties, to clearing the streets and rescuing distressed women and children of all the nations. Their disappointment and their anger can be well imagined, when, on their arrival before the distressed port on the morning of August 1, they were greeted by their own Consular representative, M. Neuville, with the special request that they would not fire a single shot or disembark a single sailor for fear of arousing those smouldering fires of fanaticism which they had been sent to quell. Day by day as they lay off the port and complete tranquillity ruled in the town, the rage, annoyance, and disappointment of the officers and crew grew to white heat. . . . However, all remained tranquil until the afternoon of the 4th, when M. Maigret, the Vice-Consul, who had arrived from Gibraltar, went on board to consult Ollivier on various steps which should be taken when the expected reinforcements, *la force imposante*, which had been promised, arrived to take over the town.” (ibid., pp.37-39).

After leaving the *Galilée*, Maigret arrived at the Consulate building in Casablanca to find a letter from the Sultan's uncle, Moulai el Amin stating “I am willing, now that order has been

restored, to hand over the keys of the town to the French, who can land and take possession of its defences.” The manner in which the following operation was conducted could not but have been designed to provoke the Sultan’s forces under the command of Moulai el Amin. The French Vice-Consul informed the commander of the *Galilée*, Ollivier, of the requirement for an armed party to land at the port at 5am the next morning and immediately informed the foreign Consuls. He also sent a highly provocative response to Moulai el Amin telling him that the gates to the port must be thrown open, and if resistance was offered to the landing party, or if a single shot was fired, the warships would immediately bombard the town. It somehow conspired that the Vice-Consul’s provocative note to Moulai el Amin did not reach him until 4am providing him with one hour’s notice - insufficient time to inform all his troops of what was required. At 5am the landing party, adopting the most aggressive tactics, stormed the port gates which were manned by three of the Sultan’s troops and, on meeting brief resistance

“. . . rushed through the door and quickly shot or bayoneted the Moorish soldiers and any other unfortunates who happened to be looking on. From the Water Port to the French Consulate is a distance of only 250 yards, down narrow streets with four turnings, and there were two other guards of soldiers placed there by Moulai el Amin to protect the goods of the merchants. These men, hearing the shots, naturally loaded their rifles, and as the head of the French column appeared they directed an ill-aimed fire at it which did but little harm. Any other Moors who happened to be about, and who carried arms, also fired, thus adding to the general confusion, and two Frenchmen were hit. Labaste, the second-in-command, was shot in the chest; and a sailor, who was wounded in the arm, subsequently suffered its amputation. But, apart from these three casualties, all the killing was done by the Frenchmen. There have been published in the French press graphic accounts of this little band of heroes forcing their way through the narrow streets, surrounded by thousands of savages, and being shot at from every window, wall, and housetop. But all this belongs to the realms of the imagination. The French having disposed of the soldiers, who offered no resistance, killed every living soul they encountered along the 250 yards of narrow streets, and some sixty men, women, and Moorish children fell victims to their savage onslaught.” (ibid., pp.44-45).

This was immediately followed by the French Vice-Consul giving the pre-appointed signal to the *Galilée* to begin the bombardment of the town.

“. . . Ollivier and his crew saw the longed-for opportunity for which they had waited patiently for three years at last within their grasp. It cannot be said the French displayed much consideration for the remainder of the Europeans, for no warning was given them of what was about to take place, and whilst the French Consulate was securely guarded and defended by a garrison of seventy men, the houses and the Consulates of the other nationalities were simply at the mercy of the fanatical mob, and undoubtedly would have been taken had not the Arabs been more intent on looting than on risking their lives in attack.” (ibid., pp.45-46).

It is hard to see any other purpose for the bombardment of the town beyond the creation of a situation where the Sultan’s forces, which had restored order and were in the process of preparing to peaceably hand the reins to the French authorities, would abandon their allegiance to him and transfer it to the tribal leaders. This is precisely what happened. The diminishing

authority of the Sultan was dealt a fatal blow by this French colonialist action and the result was a mayhem which spread out from Casablanca to the wider country justifying an ever increasing French military presence in the country in breach of the Act of Algeciras. But, as has been stated before, this was not simply the result of the action of over-zealous sailors. Although they were part of the situation they were only tools used for a larger purpose. That purpose as a conscious strategy on the part of the French colonialist war party is more or less admitted by the Count de St. Aulaire. It appears that the official and unofficial documentary evidence covering this event is rather sparse but the private papers of the Foreign Minister, Pichon, throw some light on the event and the consequent attitude adopted by Clemenceau after these events:

“What emerges very clearly from these documents is Clemenceau’s determination to keep control of events in Morocco in the hands of the government, and to avoid being dragged into dangerous courses by the initiatives of the local French representatives and military commanders. The necessity for this insistence on keeping men on the spot on a tight reign emerges clearly from the recollections of the comte de St. Aulaire, then a junior diplomat in Morocco. He congratulates himself for persuading the commander of a French warship on patrol outside Casablanca to land a detachment of French sailors to restore order in August 1907, without waiting for authorization from Paris, in order to face the government with a *fait accompli*.” (The Making of French Foreign Policy during the First Clemenceau Ministry, 1906-1909, by D. R. Watson. Published in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 86, No., 341, October 1971, p.778).

To describe St. Aulaire as a junior diplomat is pushing it a bit. He was in fact the *chargé d’affaires* in Tangier to whom Neuville, the junior stand-in attaché at Casablanca, reported in the aftermath of the initial killings and riots of 30 July. St. Aulaire was a committed colonialist who believed that Pichon was a prisoner of the majority in the French Chamber on the question of Morocco which was dominated by the policy of the socialist group. His object was to sabotage that policy in a manner which ensured that the resultant momentum would eventually lead to a French takeover of Morocco. But of course none of this could have been done by one man, even if what he did had the sympathy of St. Aulaire’s boss, M. Regnault, the French Minister at Tangier—both men sharing aggressive French colonialist attitudes. The entire circumstances leading up to and prevailing in Casablanca between late July and early August 1907 could not have been better designed to provoke outrage from the tribal leaders and the wider Arab population. From the point of view of the French colonialists the strategy was successful in the sense that it generated widespread instability throughout Morocco and the final triumph of French ambitions in the region. Thousands of Moors were killed in Casablanca alone and the French army went on to overrun the extensive Shawiya district beyond. French troops continued to occupy Casablanca, Rabat and the Shawiya district and despite frequent public pledges to evacuate, never did.

Clemenceau’s government was then placed in the quandary where it could not withdraw from the positions thus gained as it was doubtful if it had the authority among the occupying forces to do so, as much of these forces consisted of non-regular members of the French army. According to Ashmead-Bartlett the occupying forces included:

“One squadron of *Chasseurs d’Afrique*, French cavalry enlisted especially for service in Algeria; one squadron of

Spahis, native Algerian cavalry, having French officers in command; one hundred native Arabs of the Sahara, specially raised for service in the present war: they provide their own horses and have their own chiefs. On their arrival at the front each man was given a carbine and sabre, and three French officers were attached to command them in the field and to drill them in camp. Two field batteries, Nos 12 and 18, of the latest pattern, quick firing, capable of discharging twenty shots per minute; these two batteries were brought up to war strength by the addition of a section of mountain-guns carried on mules, four in all. In addition to the artillery there were four *mitrailleuses*, also carried on mules. The infantry consisted of six battalions of about eight hundred men each, three of the famous Foreign Legion, and three of Tirailleurs or Turcos, recruited from Algeria, and having native as well as French officers.” (Ashmead-Bartlett, op. cit., p.56).

Even if Clemenceau decided to meet the issue head on and demanded the withdrawal of French forces from Morocco it is unlikely, without a similar call from Britain, that he could survive the political fallout from any power struggle that arose consequent upon such a demand. So confident had the French colonialists become that they even forcibly removed a number of French Legionnaires from the protective custody of the German Consul in Casablanca. Five members of the French Foreign Legion, taking advantage of the dubious legality of a foreign military presence on Moroccan soil under the terms of the Act of Algeciras, deserted during the campaign. These included three German nationals, a Russian and an Austro-Hungarian. As they were being moved from the German Consulate to a boat to take them to Germany they were forcibly removed from the official German escorting party with physical violence and the threat of arms. Germany demanded an apology from France and France instead proposed arbitration. Germany agreed to arbitration but demanded that the apology come first. This secondary crisis did not end until mid-November 1907 when it was agreed that the case be referred to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague (the court’s typical ruling was that both sides were in the wrong). As to Britain’s position on the issue:

“For a while France was within an inch of war, and with a good chance of British participation. Esher noted in his journals, 5 November: ‘I have never known a more anxious day. I was at the Defence Committee for many hours,’ and, on 12 November: ‘On Saturday last it looked like war. . . . [the French] never asked or attempted to enquire whether we were going to their assistance. In point of fact, Asquith, Grey, and Haldane had decided to do so’.” (Esher, vol. II, p.356, 359, quoted by Marder, op. cit., p.150).

It was only the good sense of Clemenceau that ensured a peaceful resolution but no thanks to Britain. Instead of backing the calls from the French Government for a negotiated settlement Asquith, Grey and Haldane were only too eager to back the more extreme position and meet the cause of war more than half way. Despite the provocation of the original action (and the subsequent incident of the Foreign Legion deserters) the events failed to drive a division between France and Germany. The latter showed by her actions that she understood the forces operating in French politics at this time and was also aware of the danger to German-French relations of an over-reaction. Of course Britain, having banked on these events destroying the emerging co-operation between France and Germany, continued to provide uncritical support for the actions of the French colonial party even though she knew that such action did not have the approval of the French Government or the

French Parliament (see editorial in The Times of 7 August 1907 for a typical response).

However, in the aftermath of the Casablanca incursion of 1907 there was still a long way to go before France could publicly proclaim Morocco as a French Protectorate. The sovereignty of Morocco continued to be recognised by all the signatories to the Act of Algeciras, although Britain and the French colonialist party continued in their attempts to undermine that sovereignty. In France, public sentiment, encouraged by the colonialists and acting on a completely false account provided by the colonialist press of what had happened in Casablanca, began demands for Moroccan reparations – demands that the Government was forced to act upon:

“The financial strangulation of Morocco had thereupon been resumed. France presented the Moorish Government with a bill of £2,400,000 for the expenses she had incurred by her own conduct in seizing Moroccan territory and killing thousands of the Sultan’s subjects. A further bill was presented embodying the claims for compensation for losses suffered by European and Moorish merchants through the bombardment of Casablanca! Morocco had to pay that too!” (Morel, op. cit., p.43).

When the dust settled the French Government eventually reduced the demand to £522,784.

As far as Morocco was concerned, the French military incursion resulting from the Casablanca incident and the subsequent tribal uprisings represented the end of the reign of Abdul Aziz as Sultan. His brother, Mulai-el-Hafid, was proclaimed Sultan by tribal leaders at Fez on 4 January 1908 resulting in a civil war between the contending parties until the forces of Abdul Aziz were decisively defeated by his brother’s forces in August 1908. But even then: -

“The Powers, acting upon the advice of France and Spain, refused to recognize Mulai until he had secured control of the whole country and given his adhesion to the treaty of Algeciras and his promise to observe all the other official obligations of Morocco. After considerable delay, he was induced to accept the inevitable and was officially recognised as Sultan in December 1908, but it was not till February 1910 that France was able to secure from Mulai-el-Hafid a treaty recognizing her special interests in Morocco and agreeing to accept her assistance and loans in order to place his government on a stable basis.” (The New Moroccan Protectorate, by Norman Dwight Harris. Published in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1913, pp.247).

This was then the signal for French and Spanish financial institutions to press the new regime into a new financial arrangement:

“Almost at once international finance, used by the French Government as a convenient lever, had dug its talons afresh into now dying Morocco. (Spain also undertook a small campaign against the tribes near Melilla and presented a bill for £240,000.) France had pressed the Sultan to contract another loan. After innumerable intrigues all liabilities contracted since the consolidated French loan of 1904 were merged into a £4,040,000 loan—secured upon various sources of Moorish revenue including the remaining 40 per cent of the Customs—by an international syndicate in which France held the lion’s

share. Morocco's indebtedness to Europe by the autumn of 1910 was thus £6,520,000!

“This loan, like the previous one, was literally forced upon the Sultan. It was negotiated outside the Sultan altogether, insult being added to injury through the nomination by France as so-called guardian of Morocco's interests of . . . a Coptic journalist! Mulai-Hafid refused to ratify the agreement, and only yielded in the face of a French ultimatum. The French interest in the loan was 40 per cent, the German 20 per cent, the British 15 per cent, the Spanish 15 per cent, the balance being distributed among other countries. . . . The remaining 40 per cent of the Customs, certain harbour dues, and the tobacco monopoly were mortgaged as security for the bondholders – thus depriving the Moorish Government of all its resources save those which it might succeed in raising by direct taxation.

The loan itself the Sultan could not touch, for it was already earmarked to pay off Morocco's previous debts.” (Morel, op. cit., pp.44-45).

Morel, not being privy to subsequent information when he published his book in 1912, inaccurately places the blame for this on the French Government whereas in fact the situation was far more complicated on account of the manipulation of the situation by Etienne's colonial party. In any event, the terms inflicted on the new Sultan were punitive demanding as they did that the Moroccan Government forfeit all its customs revenue as well as other sources of State income as security to the international bondholders supplying the new loan - effectively ensuring the inability of the Moroccan state to function with any form of independence. □



This map, from a 1913 German school atlas, entitled 'Africa, political map' shows French, Spanish, Italian and British possessions in North Africa. Spain has Moroccan territory opposite Gibraltar (Ceuta and Melilla), France has Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, Italy has Tripolis (Libya) and Britain has Egypt.

The map also shows the Ottoman Empire, with the city of Salonica, extending North of Greece to the Adriatic coast. The Ottoman Empire is contiguous in its North-West corner to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, as well as with Serbia and Bulgaria. The Austro-Hungarian Empire in its South-Western corner contains Trieste.

Social Democracy and the Shaping of Germany, 1945-49 - Part 2

By Philip O'Connor

This is the second instalment of a series of extracts from a thesis written at Trinity College Dublin in the early 1990s. It is based on the extensive studies that appeared in Germany during the previous decades on the history of the German labour movement at national and local level, on published memoirs, on interviews with some surviving Social Democratic Party (SPD) officials and politicians of the time, and particularly on the records of the SPD, the trade union movement and Allied occupation powers, as well as the personal papers of many former leading actors, found in a range of archives in Germany.

2. The exile SPD office and the party in the Reich 1933-40

The exile SPD office in Prague – the “SoPaDe” – consisted of several members of the pre-June 1933 SPD Executive Committee and a few of its officials, notably its secretary Fritz Heine. It held a mandate from the last SPD “Annual Conference” (*Parteitag*) to represent the party abroad. But the *Reichskonferenz* of the party in Berlin on 19 June had distanced itself from the “exile executive” and established a new National Executive for the *Reich*. Three days later the state banned the SPD. But the relationship of the “exile executive” with the party in the *Reich* was thus ambiguous from the start and its legitimacy was to be continually challenged.¹

The SoPaDe suffered various splits and defections, constantly challenged by groups claiming that the “old party” was dead and advocating alternatives to traditional SPD politics. But, by insisting on its “mandate” and claiming to be the only “legitimate” SPD executive body after the suppression of the party in Germany, it managed to survive these challenges. Its position was strengthened by the underground network of an estimated 2,000 former party officials inside Germany which maintained some contact with it and recognised it in this sense. But activists especially of the party’s youth movement, the Sozialistischer Arbeiterjugend (SAJ), and of many left wing groups that had split from the party both before and after 1933, formed the majority of the actual organised underground resistance movement within Germany and advocated (and practised) a revolutionary politics towards the Nazi state. The SoPaDe sought to accommodate to these activist strands while maintaining its loyalist base, and this was reflected in an increasing radicalisation of its programme. This very much—and quite consciously—mirrored the stance of the party when it had been banned under the “Socialist Laws” of the Bismarck years.² But while moving to advocate the need for an overthrow of the regime, it never compromised its legitimacy in traditional social democratic eyes by abandoning central tenets of social democratic doctrine, such as allegiance to the sovereignty and integrity of the “German Republic”. In particular it rejected any accommodation to Nazi, neo-nationalist or Bolshevik politics.³

In January 1934 the Prague “executive” – the SoPaDe – issued its programme – “The Struggle and Aims of Revolutionary Socialism”. It denied the legitimacy of the dictatorship established by Hitler and called for its overthrow through the type of revolt by civil society that had characterised events in 1918-19, though with itself as the “revolutionary party” at its head. The movement would embrace all democratic elements, as well as Communists and other groups in the labour

movement. While war might destroy the “despotism” first, the SPD would stand firmly against any dismembering of Germany or any infringement of its freedom to develop democratically and economically. The revolution would see a rebirth of the labour movement and would result in the creation of a true socialist “German Republic”.⁴

While this programme might seem fanciful when viewed with hindsight today, the Nazi state remained in fact quite fragile initially, and certainly until its foreign policy successes of 1935-36 when the army had been restored, a naval agreement reached with Britain allowing for a massive expansion of the *Kriegsmarine* and the Rhineland re-occupied with the acquiescence again of Britain. Through its networks of former SPD officials and couriers, it produced very detailed weekly reports on conditions in Germany—the famous *Deutschlandberichte*—which were widely distributed internally as well as to an international audience. These reported on oppositional behaviour and the suppression of social unrest by the regime. The Nazi “German Labour Front” attempted to establish its legitimacy with the working class in 1934 and 1935 by holding free works council elections. Despite great manipulation, however, a majority of workers refused to elect the NSBO candidates promoted by the Nazi movement and in 1936 this experiment in fascist democracy was discontinued. Despite the creation of full employment and the maintenance by the state of the essential social welfare system of the Weimar years, working class attitudes to the regime remained initially distinctly reserved. The reports also detailed the persecution particularly of the Catholic Church, and the many acts of defiance by local priests and congregations. They also covered the moves by the state to persecute the Jewish community and deprive it of its civil rights.⁵

But the economic boom, the achievement of full employment and the foreign acceptance of the respectability of the regime stabilised the system from the mid-1930s. Even the apparatus of terror was relaxed considerably. The legal system was employed to dissolve the unofficial concentration camps of the Nazi paramilitaries and many thousands of prisoners held in 1933 were rapidly released. Some camp guards were even prosecuted for brutality towards prisoners. While the suppression of active political opponents was pursued ruthlessly and brutally, the revamped camp system by 1937 held barely 10,000 prisoners.⁶ Many in the bourgeois classes believed that foreign policy concerns would continue to see a softening rather than a radicalising of the regime. Hans Globke, later Konrad Adenauer’s chief Secretary of State throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, was a functionary in the Ministry of Justice who – as East German publications later revealed – was involved in the drafting of the Nuremberg Race Laws. But he believed at the time that the highwater mark of Nazi radicalism had passed and, much like the famous jurist Carl Schmitt, was convinced that the regime would gradually liberalise through the influence of the judicial and constitutional system and through a need for international acceptance.⁷

In these conditions, the calls by the SoPaDe in Prague to organise clandestine resistance to the state evoked little response within Germany. Most sought to make their peace with the regime or to cling to their economic existence by going as unnoticed as possible. One leading social democrat advised his son-in-law that “if your career is important to you and

you don't want to be penniless, then join the party (NSDAP) and pay your dues".⁸ Thousands of SPD civil servants, public administrators and judges sought to avoid the consequences of the Law Restoring the Professional Civil Service by renouncing their party affiliation and joining the NSDAP.⁹ The mayor of Brunswick broke with the SPD, he declared, so as to avoid "the odium of [being seen as] nationally unreliable".¹⁰ Others repudiated the "seditious activities of the emigrants", as a Nuremberg SPD official put it, as they had "always supported the state" and had been "particularly concerned to win over the workers for the idea of the state".¹¹

The view of the state that this betrayed ran deep in the SPD. The former socialist trade union leader, Wilhelm Leuschner, hoped as late as 1936 to be able to exploit internal conflicts in the regime to enable a revival of the old General Federation of German Trade Unions with state support, and the militant SPD leader Julius Leber (who was to be executed along with Leuschner following the bomb plot in 1944) wrote from prison in 1936 that the Nazis should be "given a chance to solve the social question" that the social democrats had been unable to master in the Weimar years.¹² Carl Severing, a prominent Weimar-era SPD leader and Minister in the democratic Prussian governments of the 1920s, acted on behalf of a group of former SPD leaders in 1935 in cooperating with the Nazi Foreign Ministry in support of the referendum for the re-incorporation of the Saar into the *Reich*, openly attacking the oppositional position of the SoPaDe.¹³

Those that rallied to the SoPaDe were core groups of activist officials of the old party districts (*Bezirke*) and its paramilitary republican formation, the *Reichsbanner*. These had watched bitterly the governmental "corruption" of the SPD during the 1920s and blamed this for the humiliating capitulation of 1933. In July 1932, and again in early 1933, they had waited in vain for "the signal" to launch a general strike and armed defence.¹⁴ The first fight of the militants loyal to the SoPaDe, therefore, was against their own party establishment. On 11 May 1933 an underground meeting of party officials in Württemberg linked with the SoPaDe sought the 'expulsion' of the old leaders for their 'capitulation' to the Nazis. This meeting was organised, typically, by the *Reichsbanner* militant, Kurt Schumacher, and the Stuttgart party secretary and later leader of the left wing group *Neubeginnen*, Erwin Schoettle.¹⁵ The bitterness of their rebellion was expressed vividly in a leaflet entitled *The Party is Dying* which was printed illicitly:

"The working class could have taken the material devastation, . . . but the behaviour of so many of the party's leaders, the cowardly desertion of so many party officials, the lame appeals to legality by so many party stewards, the resignations from public bodies by so many elected representatives, the mass flight from the party by so many civil servants – this reversal of the swamping of the party by these same people in 1918 – it was these terrible disillusionments which first broke the solidarity of the party's supporters and caused the spiritual collapse that led to the dissolution of the party from within, and which seems to rule out the possibility of the Social Democratic Party ever re-emerging in the same form it has existed to date." [*emphasis in original*].¹⁶

Similar SPD groups formed in the metropolitan centres of most Districts, encompassing a network of about 2,000 former officials from a party that once had nearly two million members. These eagerly embraced the formulae coming from Prague for a "total revolution against the total fascist state" by a "united working class" and the return to traditional socialist ideals. They also formed links – sometimes very cautiously –

with other underground left wing circles which had begun to cooperate with the SoPaDe.¹⁷

But this movement was largely reduced to inactivity by 1936. The activist resisters were quickly rounded up or denounced and imprisoned, while the inactive retreated to private life. By 1939 most had lost any contact with the SoPaDe. Its members were increasingly outsiders in Nazi Germany, adopting what Schumacher would later describe as the "*Rumpelstiltskin tactic*" of surviving the Nazi era as a silent "community of conviction" ("*Gesinnungsgemeinschaft*"), immunised against the 'Führer Myth' and the popular allure of Nazi socialism by the strength of their own traditionalist Marxist faith.¹⁸ Their importance lay in their continued adherence to their traditional Kautskyist convictions and in the contacts, however inactive, which they maintained with one another until 1945.¹⁹

But, apart from this network of district officials linked to the SoPaDe, the politics evolving in Prague was often met with incomprehension among social democrats in Germany. Many former party officials in 1945 rejected the idea that they should have "*undertaken something against the Fatherland*".²⁰ Some social democrats drafted into "probationary" battalions for war service resented the implication that they were "*unfit to serve the Fatherland*" through service in the regular *Wehrmacht*.²¹ Fear of betrayal and arrest led many to break with Prague²² while others found it increasingly '*difficult to take the misjudgements and theoretical disputes of the émigré SoPaDe seriously*'.²³

A socialist who returned in 1945 as an agent of the US Army, Werner Hansen, reported that most former party officials he met believed that illegal activity would have been "senseless", arguing that "*if we hadn't been cautious and kept quiet, there would have been no one left for the reconstruction.*" Hansen knew that this rationalisation masked an ambiguous reality. But he was shocked that it seemed "*beyond the comprehension of these people that individuals and organisations who stand for an idea can only prove themselves by fighting for it and, in certain historical situations, by putting their lives on the line for it*".²⁴ Most social democrats had in fact been paralysed by the social success of the "Hitler Myth". A SoPaDe loyalist later summed up his typical experience: "*Though a portion of our comrades remained true to the socialist cause, very many were to disappoint us, and particularly regrettable was the fact that large sections of our (i.e. SPD) youth became Nazis.*"²⁵ Even some young members of small militant groups – such as the ISK – went over to the Nazis and, although this was unusual, in one case two former ISK journalists became Nazi propagandists.²⁶ But the fact is that the economic and social policy successes of the regime greatly undermined the initial widespread hostility to it among ordinary SPD members. The experiences of employment, social security and social mobility as well as "national integration" overwhelmed older patterns of class solidarity and oppositionism.²⁷ The former Prussian SPD Minister, Carl Severing, could later, with considerable justification, describe Ley's "Strength through Joy" (KdF) movement for providing cheap holidays for workers as "*an imitation of institutions which I had created a quarter of a century earlier in Bielefeld*".²⁸ This thinking even impinged on exile politics, where a substantial circle rebelled against the SoPaDe line in the mid-1930s and advocated a blending of socialism with German nationalism.²⁹

Former senior SPD politicians and many of the old party establishment stayed aloof from the left and the SoPaDe linked circles. They maintained their own informal networks through ruses such as choral societies (e.g. the Berlin *Liederfreunde*), or based themselves around small businesses as in the time of the Socialist laws. These party "elites" remained true to their traditional constitutional convictions despite some initial ambiguity towards the 'National Revolution'.³⁰ The socialism

3.1 Survival and Re-grouping: “The Union of German Socialist Organisations in Great Britain”

By the time the Germans occupied the rump of the Czech state in March 1939 and the SoPaDe “exile executive” had been forced to move to Paris, and then to London, the activist socialist underground in the *Reich* had been silenced, and the SoPaDe network had withdrawn to a quietist existence and was on the point of extinction. Of the “exile executive”, most of its members had moved to the USA where, not least due to a ban on party political activity, they formed the “German Labor Delegation”, and renounced any claim to leadership of the old party. Others defected from the party following political schisms to pursue other avenues of politics. Continuity with the 1933 exile group of the SPD was precariously maintained by the small group brought to London with British Labour Party assistance, which by 1940 consisted just of Hans Vogel, a junior National Executive member who had taken over as Chair on the death of Otto Wels, and two younger officials, Erich Ollenhauer and Fritz Heine.

Ollenhauer, leader of the SPD youth movement, the SAJ, had been elected to the Executive in 1931 as a candidate supported by the leadership in an attempt to deflect the rebellious mood among younger SPD members at the “immobility” of the party in the face of the Nazi threat. He maintained a vast network of contacts among former SAJ officials, including many who had defected to breakaway splinter parties such as the Socialist Workers Party of Germany (SAPD). At first greeted with scorn by the left as a creature of the leadership, he earned a growing respect for his diligent work coordinating the underground SoPaDe network in the *Reich* from Prague in the 1930s. Heine, a junior official of the Executive in central office in Berlin, also earned a reputation for diligence, bravery and hard work during the Prague exile. The tiny SoPaDe group in London thus represented a certain generational handover to a younger leadership, while just about maintaining the near fiction of legitimacy as the “exile SPD executive”.³⁸

In London, the SoPaDe aligned its position with the Western powers, embracing the Anglo-American declaration of war aims embodied in the “Atlantic Charter” even before official US entry into the war. It advocated the restoration of a “democratic Germany” allied with the West, and laid its claim from the start to being the legal leadership of a revived post-Hitler SPD. The main area of its very limited influence was its connection with the British Labour Party, though its usefulness to the latter from the point of view of prosecuting the war was considerably reduced by its loss of contacts within the *Reich*. This influence declined further with stances it took against emerging Allied policy towards Germany. It was equivocal about post-war German disarmament and firmly opposed any changes to Germany’s post-war frontiers. It reacted to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union with alarm at the prospect of an advance of Soviet power into Central Europe and never openly supported the Soviet war effort.³⁹ Before information on the Nazi massacres of Jews became known, it refused to embrace the Zionism popular in British labour. The SPD, Vogel wrote, would reverse all anti-Jewish discriminatory legislation but, as he confided to a comrade, “*much would depend on the behaviour of the German Jews themselves*,” who “*must let it be seen by their social and political actions that they only support progressive and democratic forces in Germany*”.⁴⁰ The SoPaDe was threatened with complete isolation when, in late 1941, Friedrich Stampfer, the former editor of the influential party paper *Vorwärts* who became the leading former SPD figure in the USA, visited London and, in meetings with Foreign Office

of these circles had been severely tested in the Weimar years, and many had lost their convictions in the traditional Marxist economic programme. Drifting to a quietist form of Christianity rather than the revived Marxism on offer from the Prague émigrés became a widespread phenomenon among the former leading strata of the SPD, in a trend reinforced by regular contact with similarly excluded circles of former politicians from the old Democratic and *Zentrum* parties as well as groups of anti-Nazi conservatives and traditional nationalists.³¹

These circles (including in this case Schumacher) had never accepted the “war guilt” clause of the Versailles Treaty—which was supported by the more radical left—and the horrendous consequences for Germany that had flowed from it. They never abandoned their endorsement of the German state and the necessity of a *Realpolitik* of state. Many of them openly supported the referendum for the re-integration of the Saar into the *Reich* and later even the *Anschluss* of Austria and the incorporation of much of the Czech Sudetenland into Germany – both of which were opposed by the exile SoPaDe for anti-fascist reasons. The leader of the exiled Sudeten German social democrats spoke for many when he explained in 1940: “*If England wants a second Versailles Treaty, so be it ... She will learn we will never sign such a peace ... I have many connections with Sudeten and German workers and they all agree on one thing: it is better to have a Hitler than a dismembered Germany*”.³²

It was these nationally and State-minded old leadership circles who again—contrary to the positions adopted by the exile SoPaDe—became closely connected with the military and diplomatic opposition to Hitler. Along with surviving circles of trade union leaders within Germany loosely organised by Wilhelm Leuschner, together with Christian and Liberal former trade union leaders, these former SPD leadership circles were regarded by the 1944 bomb plotters as the essential group for taking over the civil administration of Germany on the removal of the Nazis in the event of the coup succeeding.³³ The existence of these networks ensured that Julius Leber and Wilhelm Leuschner were earmarked for leading government posts and led to a fundamental redrafting towards working class interests of the programme of the national-conservative plotters. The underground Communist Party (KPD) leadership was also approached, as the plotters knew that a new German national state would have to accommodate to the interests of the Soviet Union, which had emerged as a world power. Both Leber and the key military planner, von Stauffenberg, were motivated in their visions of a post-coup state by the “Prussian socialist” concept of the nationalist alliance of army, state and labour in the First World War.³⁴

Unlike these former SPD governmental and trade union leadership circles, the groupings of officials within Germany that had maintained contact with the SoPaDe ‘exile executive’ until the end of the 1930s—and indeed the émigré circles themselves—were not involved in the 1944 plot at any level and were largely hostile anyway to the ‘Generals’ Plot’. It is hardly surprising that they were caught unawares by the coup attempt, and this again indicates the extent to which communications between former strands of the party had disappeared. Schumacher, for example, knew nothing of it³⁵ and after the war publicly denounced it as an act of desperation “*motivated by the concern [of reactionaries and militarists] for the fate of their class and property*”, and in that sense similar to the Soviet-sponsored wartime ‘Free Germany’ movement among prisoners of war.³⁶ As he confided to the SoPaDe at the end of the war: “*If it had succeeded it would only have resulted in civil war*”.³⁷

3. The exile SPD groups and the Anglo-

officials and Labour leaders, set out SPD demands on German sovereignty which were interpreted by the British as proposals for a negotiated peace.⁴¹

In early 1941 the SoPaDe agreed under Labour Party and Foreign Office pressure to participate in a loose “*Union of German Socialist Organisations in Great Britain*”. The Soviet-German Pact of August 1939 had thrown the “United Front” anti-fascism of the Left into disarray and greatly weakened the well organised Communist emigration, which needless to say was not invited to join. The other groups involved were left groups which, despite their small size, were young, energetic and far more cosmopolitan than the old SPD. They tended to be well connected and enjoy the sympathy of intellectual circles in British Labour, and this was a major reason for Hans Vogel’s willingness to cooperate with them. There were 160 registered SPD members in Britain, 20 of the International Socialist Struggle League (ISK), about 50 of the Socialist Workers Party of Germany (SAPD) and 20 of the group *Neubeginnen*. The “Union” also included—at Labour Party insistence—the 400-strong “Group of German Trade Unions in Britain”.⁴² The loose alliance with the remnant “SPD exile executive” was acceptable to the smaller left groups (which had advocated a United Front with the KPD until the German-Soviet Pact) due to the relative youth of the SPD men. “*We here in Britain*,” Werner Hansen of the ISK wrote to a colleague, referring to Ollenhauer and Heine, “*are lucky in having two representatives of this organisation [i.e. the SPD – PO’C] who have more or less realised that the party of the future cannot be reconstructed on old traditions alone*”. British war aims included the restoration of Czechoslovakia and the undoing of the *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria and so did not want exile representatives of either the Austrian SPÖ or the Sudeten-German SDAP involved in the ‘Union’. The ISK regarded the agreement by the SPD men to go along with this as a sign of that they were tactically ‘astute’.⁴³

The smaller groups in the “Union” were a colourful assortment.

Neubeginnen had originated as a conspiracy of former communists in the SPD aimed at influencing it in a Leninist revolutionary direction. It achieved a pivotal role in the activist socialist underground within Germany and evolved into a left-wing social democratic agitation group both independently and within the SPD. Stafford Cripps financed the *Neubeginnen* in Britain and its uncompromising anti-fascism led it to become well connected with the rising Labour Party foreign policy elite, notably Philip Noel-Baker, Patrick Campbell, Richard Crossmann, Patrick Gordon-Walker and Harold Laski. Its leading figure was Paul Sering (‘Richard Löwenthal’), later a prominent post-war SPD politician. It even had ‘permanent representatives’ attached to Labour Party head office (Karl and Evelyn Anders [‘Anderson’]) and several members worked on Aneurin Bevan’s team of advisors. It initially enthusiastically supported the British alliance with the Soviet Union. Several leading *Neubeginnen* figures who had acted as SoPaDe couriers into Germany in the 1930s became involved through Labour Party contacts in BBC propaganda work and in more covert activities with the Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE) under Richard Crossmann.⁴⁴

The Socialist Workers Party of Germany (SAPD) was the product of a more conventional “leftist” revolt in the SPD in 1930. By 1932 it had 25,000 members, a number of elected politicians in particular regions in Germany, had absorbed many other left-wing splinter groups and was dominated by radicalised former SPD youth movement activists. It had agitated in Germany for a “United front from below” against the Nazi threat, and was generally close politically to organisations connected with Leon Trotsky.⁴⁵ Among other socialist émigrés it was

regarded as “*somewhat dogmatic*” and “*lacking in outstanding figures*”,⁴⁶ although Walter Dorn, a German working for US intelligence, was equally unimpressed with the exile SPD leaders in Britain, describing them as “*loyal party men*” but hardly “*outstanding political figures*”.⁴⁷ Although bigger than *Neubeginnen*, the SAPD, led in Britain by Paul Walther, was much less well connected, its friends being generally among the “Popular Front” orientated Labour Party left. It did however have connections with MI5 and was possibly involved in some covert work for it.

Radically different to both of these groups was the International Socialist Struggle League (ISK). *Neubeginnen* and the SAPD were products of the crisis period which saw the rise of the Nazi Party from 1929 and agitation for a united front of the left (including the KPD) to confront it. The two groups represented a radical and traditional attempt alternatively to synthesise Bolshevik and social democratic politics and organisational forms. The ISK for its part arose during the relatively tranquil mid-1920s, formed by a group of youth activists expelled from the SPD in 1925. Its politics were a mixture of socialist tradition and the cult of ‘willpower’ that characterised the youth rebellion of the Weimar era. It had an exotic personal code based on abstinence and vegetarianism and its politics have been described as elitist and activist, deduced from Kantian concepts by a Göttingen philosopher, Leonard Nelson. Despite never having more than a few hundred members in Germany, it exercised a marked influence on socialist politics in the major cities of Northern Germany. Militant yet unorthodox in socialist terms, it was substantially uninfluenced by Marxism, viewing itself as an activist development of ‘western ethical philosophy’. It viewed politics as a matter of moral force, and promoted a concept of class leadership based on character and moral will. Its members were mostly working class intellectuals and it had a base in the trade union movement, where it merged well with strong tendencies that sought to break free of party political control by the SPD. During the 1930s it maintained a network within Germany of clandestine ISK led trade union groupings which were linked to the worldwide International Transport Workers Federation (ITF). It managed to maintain underground links within the *Reich* far longer than any other exile group and, like *Neubeginnen*, it had a much wider range of influential contacts in British Labour circles than the SoPaDe.⁴⁸

The “Union” also included – at Labour Party insistence – the “Group of German Trade Unions in Britain” (LDG). This had been set up under TUC auspices and enjoyed “excellent relations” with the TUC and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).⁴⁹ It was dominated by younger trade unionists who had been critical of what they regarded as the authoritarian traditions of the old German trade union federation, the ADGB, and included many important socialists who played little active role in exile politics otherwise: Fritz Eberhard, the former leader of the ISK underground in Germany, Hans Jahn and Walter Auerbach of the ITF, which was to become extensively involved in Allied covert operations, Gerhard Kreyszig in the secretariat of the WFTU, as well as others such as the trade union lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund and the economist E. F. Schumacher, who established independent reputations for themselves in their specialist fields in Britain and acted as policy advisors to various British Government bodies.⁵⁰

The creation of the “*Union of German Socialist Organisations in Great Britain*”, although a “loose grouping”, thus brought a wealth of intellectual talent and contacts to the tiny and beleaguered remnant “exile executive” of the SPD, and opened channels of political influence with the Allies, without displacing the legalist role the SPD group regarded as of such major importance in the future.

Endnotes

1 Matthias, 'Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands', in Matthias/Morsey (eds.), *Das Ende der Parteien*, 1960, 101-278; Hoegner, *Flucht vor Hitler*; Hans-Ullrich Wehler, *Der Weg in die Katastrophe*, 1987.

2 See note 25 below.

3 Edinger, *Sozialdemokratie und Nationalismus*, 1967 for a balanced history of the SoPaDe. On the left wing resistance movements, Foitzik, *Zwischen den Fronten*, 1986, Mehringer, *Waldemar von Knoeringen*, 1989. On SoPaDe and the internal resistance, Seebacher-Brandt, *Erich Ollenhauer*, 1984; On the left wing resistance, Link, *Geschichte des ISK*, 1964, and Drechsler, *Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAPD)*, 1965. Very useful for the debates in exile is the *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*. 1934-1936.

4 *Prager Manifest der SoPaDe – Kampf und Ziel des revolutionären Sozialismus. Die Politik der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*. Pargue 1934.

5 *Deutschlandberichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1934-1940*. Reprinted in full by Verlag Petra Nettelbeck, Zweitausendeins, Frankfurt am Main, 1980.

6 Krauschnik, *Anatomy of the SS State*.

7 Charles Williams, *Adenauer. The Father of the New Germany*. 388;

8 Josef Simon, quoted by Simon Treu, letter to Hoegner, 2.1.1946, IfZ-ED. 120 [NL. Hoegner], Bd. 210.

9 See collection of petitions by former SPD civil servants who had joined the NSDAP seeking to rejoin the SPD in 1946. IfZ-ED. 120 [NL. Hoegner], Bd. 210. On the phenomenon in general, von Freyberg et al, 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie', 195 ff.

10 Karl Böhme, ON-Braunschweig, to Fraktion der SPD, Landtag Niedersachsen, 22.6.48, quoting his letter of 5.9.34 to the Nazi authorities and other "incidents". AsD-Best. Ollenhauer, Mapped K5. See similarly the case of the former secretary of the SPD in Stolp, Pommerania, Konrad Hoffmann, in his correspondence with Otto Ostrowski, AsD-NL. Ostrowski, Box 22B. Werner Hansen, who returned to Germany with the American Army reported that almost a quarter of the 45 surviving SPD officials with whom he established contact in Cologne in April 1945 had come to some arrangement with the Nazis – Heidorn, 'Bericht an Eclair', 20.4.45. AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 56.

11 Thus Martin Treu, SPD mayor in Nuremberg, in a letter to the Nazi authorities, 22.7.33. This, and other material on Treu, in 'Ruhm-Köhler an die Militär-Regierung', 15.6.45, Martin Treu an die Militärregierung, 7.12.45, and Treu to Hoegner, 22.12.45, IfZ-ED.120 [NL. Hoegner], Bd. 210.

12 Hans Mommsen, '20 July 1944 and the German Labour Movement', in idem, *From Weimar to Auschwitz. Essays in German History*, Cambridge, 1991, 189-207.

13 Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2, 'In Auf und Ab der Republik', Cologne, 1950, 406 ff.

14 This is well documented, though somewhat apologetically, in Albrecht, *Schumacher*, 27 ff. See also Hans Mommsen, 'Social Democracy on the defensive: The Immobility of the SPD and the Rise of National Socialism', in idem. *From Weimar to Auschwitz*, 49-71.

15 On the rebellion by the officials in Württemberg and the expulsion resolution, see Schumacher to Denker, 16.9.45, AsD-Best. Schumacher, Mapped 93/J4, Keil to Schumacher, 6.2.46 and Schumacher to Denker, 21.1.46, in ibid. Mapped 95/J3. On Schumacher as a SoPaDe loyalist, Albrecht, *Schumacher*, 32 f., and Fritz Heine to SPD-Unterbezirk Essen, 22.3.47, AsD-Best. Schumacher, Mapped 96/J54. On similar conflicts at local level elsewhere, Albrecht Leim, *Antifaschistische Aktion: Die Stunde "Null" in Braunschweig 1945*, Brunswick, 1978, 86 ff., and Jürgen Schadt, Wolfgang Schmierer, *Die SPD in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte*, Stuttgart, Berlin, 1979, 197 ff.

16 The leaflet was impounded by the Gestapo before it could be circulated. Text reprinted in Schadt, Schmierer, *SPD in Baden-Württemberg*, 198.

17 Frank Moraw, *Die Parole der "Einheit" und die Sozialdemokratie. Zur parteiorganisatorischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Orientierung der SPD 1933-1948*, 31 ff.; Mehringer, *von Knoeringen*, 80 ff.

18 Fried Wesemann, *Kurt Schumacher. Ein Lebel für Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, 57. See also William Sheridan Allen, 'Die sozialdemokratische Untergrundbewegung: Zur Kontinuität der subkulturellen Werte', in Schmädke, Steinbruch (eds.), *Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus*, 849-866; Mommsen, 'German Society and the Resistance to Hitler', in idem. *From Weimar to Hitler*, 208-303, here 221.

19 Karl Kautsky advised the formation of groups of five "as under the Socialist Laws" and this advice was largely followed by these loyal groups – see Kautsky, 'Was nun? Betrachtungen zum 5. März', *Internationale Information*, vol. 10, 10.3.1933, and Stanislaw Trabalski's speech to the Leipzig SPD conference in 1945, 'Erster Bezirksparteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, am 26. August 1945 im Neuen Rathaus in Leipzig', 2-3, AsD-Best. Ostbüro, Schilling-Archiv.

20 Klaus Meyer to Willy Eichler ('Bericht aus Kassel'), 6.8.45, in AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 59.

21 Thus Egon Franke in an interview with the author, 24.9.89. Franke, a former Federal Minister, had been secretary of the SPD Hannover District. He served for two years at the front with *Bewährungsbataillon 999*.

22 A Berlin SoPaDe contact later wrote "naturally we often wondered if the comrades in emigration had really taken all the security precautions required" – Walter Löffler to Ollenhauer, 22.4.46, AsD-Best. Ollenhauer, Mapped 75. Similar doubts led the Saxon underground network to break off contact with Prague (Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 143).

23 Thus the SoPaDe contact in Münster/Wf., quoted in Gisela Schwarze, *Eine Region im demokratischen Aufbau. Der Regierungsbezirk*

Münster 1945/46, Düsseldorf, 1984. 122. For similar attitude in the Dresden SPD, Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 131, 495. On the break-up of the Berlin SoPaDe underground network by Gestapo spies, 'Auszüge aus einem Brief vom Sommer 1946 an ... Willi Eichler über meine illegal Tätigkeit von 1932-1938', HBS-NL. Böckler, Kasten 14.

24 Heidorn, 'Bericht an Eclair', 20.4.45, AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 56.

25 Rudolf Friedhof to Hans Vogel, 6.8.45, AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 59. In Kassel several leaders of the young socialists (SAJ) went over to the NSDAP in 1933 – Grete Eichenberg to Eichler, 28.4.47, AsD-NL. Eichler, Mapped ISK-Korr. 1946-52, Do.-Fla.

26 One report from 1945 Cologne described a former ISK activist as having become "a real Nazi" while another reported the role two former activists as journalists with the Nazi propaganda machine (409.06 and 417.12).

27 See the excellent three-volume oral history study, Lutz Niethammer and Alexander von Plato (eds.), *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930-1960*, Bonn, 1986.

28 Severing to Ollenhauer, 4.12.45, AsD-NL. Severing, Mapped 300.

29 This issue was extensively debated among former Executive members in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, published in Karlsbad between 1934 and 1936. Several of the proponents of this position later split with the SoPaDe and abandoned the SPD.

30 See in general P. von zur Mühlen, 'Sozialdemokraten gegen Hitler', in Richard Löwenthal, Patrik von zur Mühlen (eds.), *Widerstand und Verweigerung in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945*, Bonn-Berlin, 1984, 57-75; Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2, 420 ff.; Moraw, *Parole der "Einheit"*, 42 ff.; For a local example, H-J. Priamus et al, 'Faschismus und Widerstand', in *Sozial und Demokratisch. Ein Lesebuch zur Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Bewegung in Gelsenkirchen*, ed. Heinz-Jürgen Priamus et al, vol. 1, Gelsenkirchen, 1988, 205 ff.. Some of these businesses even flourished. A former mayor of Bremen, Karl Petersson, established an export-import agency that was so successful that he did not return to politics after the war – Pattersson to Max Brauer, 29.9.47, in StaaH, NL. 622 [Fam. Brauer], Sgn. 1.

31 The conversion to Christianity of Wilhelm Sollmann – former head of the SPD group on Cologne City Council, city *Reichsbanner* leader and member of the SPD National Executive, was particularly striking. See his correspondence with Erich Rossmann in 1946, in BA-NL. 11 [NL. Rossmann], Bd. 7. Max Brauer, ex-Mayor of Altona, was another. Although already a practising Lutheran, it was only in exile that his religious convictions moved to the fore in his politics – see the material in StaaH-NL. 622 [Fam. Brauer], Bd. 10, and Brauer's statement to the Lutheran Church, 3.9.1952, in *ibid.*, Bd. 8. Erma Blancke wrote to Eichler from the US: "Brauer has been successful in leading [many] old social democrats back to the Church" (letter, 23.5.46, AsD-NL. Eichler, Mapped ISK-Korr. 1946-52 Bl. That this movement permeated the entire former leadership strata of the SPD, see Rossmann to Karl Germer, 13.1.48, BA-NL. 11 [NL. Rossmann], Bd. 12, Löbe

to Sollmann, 24.1.46, AsD-NL. Löbe, Mapped 24, and Hansen's comments on socialists who had "embraced Catholicism" under the *Third Reich*, Heidorn, 'Bericht an Eclair', 20.4.45, AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 56. On joint circles with Christians, Democrats and Nationalists, see Severing *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2, 420 ff., 437 ff.; M. Schneider, 'Zwischen Standesvertretung und Werkgemeinschaft: Zu den Gewerkschaftskonzeptionen der Widerstandsgruppen des 20. Juli 1944', in Schmädke and Steinbach (eds.), *Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus*, 520-532. Also the wartime contacts between Centre Party and Christian SPD figures in Rhöndorf, referred to by Hansen, 'Bericht an Eclair', 20.4.45, AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box. 56.

32 Quoted in Glee, *Exile Politics*, 49. On attitudes to the Saar and Sudetenland, Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2, 435 ff. On Schumacher views on the First World War, Kurt Schumacher, *Der Kampf um den Staatsgedanken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, PhD thesis 1925, republished with an introduction by Herbert Wehner, Stuttgart, 1974.

33 On the trade union network, Gerhard Beier, *Die illegal Reichsleitung der Gewerkschaften 1933-1945*, Cologne, 1981. For an aspect of this under-researched network at local level, note the Hannover group headed by Albin Karl: Karl, 'Von der Untergrundbewegung', MS, HBS-NL. Karl. On SPD involvement in the post-coup plans, Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, vol. 2, 435 ff.; For Hesse, Emil Hank, *Die Tragödie des 20. Juli 1944*, Heidelberg 1946, 48 ff.; for West Saxony, Thae, 'Mein Freund Heinrich [Fleissner] – Trauerfeier am 27. April 1959 im Südfriedhof, Leipzig', in AsD-Best. Ostbüro, Archiv Schilling; For 'New Socialist Party' involvement in the Ruhr, F. Knigge, 'Bericht', 12.6.45, in AsD-Best. IJB/ISK, Box 57. See also the interesting Hertz-Henk correspondence 1946-48 in 560.01.

34 See esp. Mommsen, '20 July and the German Labour Movement', in *From Weimar to Auschwitz*.

35 Albrecht, *Schumacher*, 88; Edinger, *Schumacher*, 70.

36 'Politische Richtlinien für die SPD', 25.8.45, in *Kurt Schumacher: Reden, Schriften, Korrespondenzen*, 256-286, here 275.

37 [Richard Löwenthal]: 'Persönliche Eindrücke vom Schumacher Besuch – Vertraulich!', AsD-Best. Schumacher, Mapped 8/Q18.

38 On the SoPaDe in Britain see esp. Röder, *Deutsche sozialistische Exilgruppen in Grossbritannien* (1968) and Glee, *Exile Politics* (1982). On the US, Radkau, *Emigration in den USA* (1971). A useful documentary collection from the Stampfer papers is *Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland* (1968), and an indispensable source, though, as will be seen, suppressing vital information, *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration*, vol. 1 (1986).

39 Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer*, 344 f.; Glee, *Exile Politics*, 99 ff.; Röder, *Exilgruppen*, 103 ff.

40 Hans Vogel to Leon Kubowitski, 6.1.44, in AsD-SoPaDe-Emig., Mapped 142. For the generally reserved attitude of the SoPaDe on the "Jewish Question" and British Labour support for establishing a state in Israel, Glee, *Exile Politics*, 174 ff.

41 Glee, *Exile Politics*, 107 ff.

42 'Gemeinsame Sitzung mit den Vertretern von SAP, NB, ISK und Gewerkschaften, März 1941', AsD-SoPaDe-Emig., Mapped 4; Vogel to Rinner, quoted in OSS Report, R&A No. 1568, 'The German Political Emigration, 3 December 1943', by Walter L. Dorn, reprinted in Söllner, *Zur Archeologie der Demokratie in Deutschland*, vol. 1, 1986, 63-90, here 72. On the formation of the "Union", also Glees, *Exile Politics*, 91 ff.; Röder, *Exilgruppen*, 90 ff.

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45 Drechsler, *Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*; Röder, *Exilgruppen*, passim.

46 Interview with Susanne Miller, Bonn, 29.7.1990; Interview with Fritz Heine, Bad Münstereifel, 3.9.1990.

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50 See the relevant biographies in *Biographisches Handbuch*. For the Gottfurcht-Rosenberg circle, which originated among white collar trade unionists, was mainly Jewish and was critical from the start of plans for a simple restoration of the old ADGB, see Beier, 'Die illegale Reichsleitung', in Löwenthal, *von zur Mühlen, Widerstand und Verweigerung*, 1984, 25-50, here 34 f. □

Commemorating Kilmichael

(Continued from p. 38))

The British don't commemorate the Germans, Turks and Irish rebels killed during the 'Great War' – nor do we expect them to. Americans don't erect monuments to the Redcoats killed by Washington's army. British soldiers killed in the Indian Mutiny aren't celebrated by Indians. Those killed fighting the Mau Mau aren't commemorated in Kenya. Indeed as the recent apology to the Kenyans demonstrates, it is more common for the British to make apologies for their past colonial misdeeds than for the colonised to honour their colonisers. In Ireland we seem intent on moving the opposite direction.

We can't ignore the presence of the auxiliaries at Kilmichael and pretend it was a bloodless ambush. But there is a significant difference between recalling someone's place in history and celebrating them through commemoration. The significance of the Kilmichael ambush and the debates about the war are too nuanced and complex to be adequately explained in a few lines on a plaque.

Museum

If those intent on developing the ambush site want to foster a deeper understanding of our history, the €100,000 they want for the scheme would be better spent renovating a farmhouse as a Kilmichael museum. This would give greater scope to explore and debate the history and controversies from that time. If a museum were established within walking distance

of the ambush site, visitors could go to view the battlefield without spoiling its integrity. A museum would also benefit the local economy, through seasonal employment and sustainable tourism – benefits the proposed re-development is unlikely to bring.

During the 'decade of centenaries,' we need to have serious debates about our history. We need to ask hard questions, and be prepared to abandon comfortable fables in favour of difficult facts. Today Irish people are free to commemorate whoever they want – but we need to consider whose memory we are celebrating and why. We should also keep in mind who won this freedom for us – and how it was won.

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Egypt – July-August 2013

by David Morrison

Elections Results

The Muslim Brotherhood has come out on top in every test of popular opinion in Egypt since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. The following elections took place in late 2011 and 2012:

Egypt has a bicameral parliament consisting of

(1) A Lower House called the House of Representatives (or the People's Assembly), which is a legislative body

(2) An Upper House called the Shura Council, which is a consultative body

Elections to both were held from November 2011 to March 2012

The Presidential elections in June 2012

The referendum on the constitution in December 2012

Egyptian population: ~85 million; Electorate: ~52 million

Four articles on Egypt, by David Morrison:

Egypt: Election Results

Egypt: Drawing Up The Constitution

Egypt: The Old Regime Strikes Back

Egypt, The USA And Saudi Arabia

The Parliamentary elections

A pre-election Al Jazeera report (*Explainer: How do the elections work?*, 15 November 2011, [1]) describes the electoral system for the two parliamentary bodies.

Lower House: House of Representatives (aka People's Assembly)

Al Jazeera report (*Muslim Brotherhood tops Egyptian poll result*, 22 January 2012, [2]) gives a clear summary of the results.

Figures below are taken from Wikipedia *Elections in Egypt* [3].

Bloc	Votes (millions)	% of total votes	Seats	% of total seats
Democratic Alliance for Egypt	10.1	37.5	235	47.2
Islamist – Salafi	7.5	27.8	~123	24.6
Other	9.5	36.7	~140	28.1
Total	27.1	100.0	498	100.0

Notes:

1. Democratic Alliance for Egypt bloc was led by the Brotherhood's Freedom & Justice Party but contained non-Islamists (for example Al-Karama – Dignity Party). The Freedom & Justice Party won 213 out of the bloc's 235 seats.

2. Islamist – Salafi bloc was led by the Al Nour party, which got 107 out of its 123 seats

3. Turnout ~54%

4. The military appointed 10 members, making a total of 508 seats in all

5. On 14 June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), whose judges are Mubarak appointees, declared this election to be invalid (CBS News, *Egypt court rules entire parliament illegally elected, orders body to dissolve after unconstitutional vote*, 14 June 2012, [4])

Upper House: Shura Council

Figures below are taken from Wikipedia *Elections in Egypt* [5]

Bloc	Votes (millions)	%	Seats	%
Freedom & Justice Party	2.9	45.0	105	47.2
Salafi Al Nour	1.8	28.6	45	24.6
Other	1.7	26.6	30	28.1
Total	4.7	100.0	180	100.0

Notes:

1. The Shura Council is a consultative body having 270 members, with a third (90 members) appointed, initially by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), then by the President.

2. The consultative nature of the body probably accounts for the very low turnout (less than 10%) in the elections which were held after those for the House of Representatives

3. The electoral system used for the Council was the same as that for the House of Representatives, but it was not declared “illegal” by the SCC in June 2012. It was declared “illegal” a year later.

4. The constitution adopted in December 2012 made the Council into a legislative body, in the absence of a duly elected House of Representatives – so that there was (potentially) a functional system of government with a president and legislature until new elections were held to the House of Representatives.

5. Before this constitution came into effect President Morsi appointed 90 members to the Council

Presidential elections (1st round 23-24 May 2012, Runoff 16-17 June 2012)

Candidate	Party	Votes	%	Votes in runoff	%
Mohamed Morsi	Freedom and Justice Party	5,764,952	24.78%	13,230,131	51.73%
Ahmed Shafik	Last Mubarak prime minister	5,505,327	23.66%	12,347,380	48.27%
Hamdeen Sabahi	Al-Karama – Dignity Party	4,820,273	20.72%		
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh	Ex-Muslim Brotherhood	4,065,239	17.47%		
Amr Moussa	Former Mubarak foreign minister		11.13%		

Notes

1. Ahmad Shafik was the last prime minister appointed by Mubarak and served for a month,

resigning a few weeks after him. Like Mubarak, he was a former head of the air force. He now backs the coup. Shafik was originally barred from standing under a law, passed by the newly elected House of Representatives, excluding leading members of the old regime from standing. However, on 14 June 2012, the Supreme

Constitutional Court, declared the law unconstitutional, thereby paving the way for him to stand in the runoff election. On 14 June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court also declared the election to the House of Representatives to be invalid.

2. Hamdeen Sabahi was a leading secular opponent of the Mubarak regime, who like many of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership was imprisoned several times: he describes himself as a Nasserite. In the House of Representatives elections, the Al-Karama was part of the Democratic Alliance for Egypt bloc led by the Brotherhood’s Freedom & Justice Party. He now backs the coup.

3. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh left the Brotherhood to stand in the election at the time when the Brotherhood’s position was that they were not putting up a candidate.

4. Amr Moussa was long time head of the Arab League. He now backs the coup.

5. Mohammed ElBaradei didn’t stand in the election. He backed the coup, but has since chickened out.

in Cairo and its environs failed to endorse the constitution

Referendum on the Constitution (15 & 22 December 2012)

Figures below are taken from Wikipedia *Elections in Egypt* [6].

	Votes	% total votes
Yes	10,693,911	63.83%
No	6,061,011	36.17%

Notes:

1. Turnout: ~33%
2. Out of the 27 governates in Egypt, only three

References:

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- [3] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Egypt
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- [5] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Egypt
- [6] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_constitutional_referendum,_2012 □

Egypt: Drawing up the Constitution

by David Morrison

The Constitution was to be drawn up by a 100-member Constituent Assembly selected by the Parliament elected in January 2012. In March 2012, the Parliament chose a Constituent Assembly.

The fact that no rules were laid down for the selection of the Assembly gave ample scope for non-Islamist elements to argue that it was overloaded with Islamists and seek, and get, court intervention.

The Assembly's operation was suspended by the Cairo Administrative Court on 10 April 2012 (see BBC report *Egypt court suspends constitutional assembly*, [1]).

Rules for electing the Assembly, which diminished the Islamist representation were agreed between the parties on 8 June 2012 (see BBC report *Egypt parties end deadlock over constitutional panel*, [2]).

A new Assembly was chosen (I think, can't find any record), but legal threats to its existence continued. See, for example, Guardian report *Egypt constitution decision referred to country's highest court*, 23 October 2012 [3], which said:

“An Egyptian court has referred the decision on whether to disband the panel writing the country's new constitution to the highest court – a new twist in a dispute over the charter that could herald a showdown between Islamists and the top court's secular judges.”

A constitution was eventually drawn up on 28 November 2012 after most of the non-Islamists walked out (see New York Times article, *Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite Objections*, 28 November 2012 [4]).

There was a very interesting (and surprising) Guardian editorial on this at the time (7 December 2012, [5]), which summed up the situation accurately and concisely:

“As the crisis in Egypt develops, it is becoming increasingly clear what it is not about. It is not about the proposed constitution, many of whose provisions opposition members put their signatures to, before changing their minds and walking out of the drafting committee. Negotiations on the contentious clauses have been offered and rejected. Nor is it about the date of the referendum, which the Egyptian justice minister, Ahmed Mekki, offered to postpone. Again, this was rejected. Nor even is it about the temporary but absolute powers that the Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, assumed for himself – which will lapse the moment the referendum is held whatever the result.

“Urging the opposition to shun dialogue, Mohamed ElBaradei said that Morsi had lost his legitimacy. So the target of the opposition National Salvation Front is not the constitution, or the emergency decree, but Morsi himself. What follows is a power battle in which the aim is to unseat a democratically elected president, and to prevent a referendum and fresh parliamentary elections being held, both of which Islamists stand a good chance of winning. Morsi, for his part, is determined that both polls be held as soon as possible to reaffirm the popular mandate which he still thinks he has.”

The constitution was approved by referendum by almost 2 to 1 and came into effect on 26 December 2012.

An unofficial English translation of the Constitution is at [6].

A Voice of America article *Egypt's New Constitution: How it Differs from Old Version* (25 December 2012, [7]) sets out it differs from the Mubarak constitution (I haven't checked the accuracy of this).

Note that **Article 2:**

“Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation.”

hasn't changed.

Extracts from the Voice of America article:

On Role of Islam

Both constitutions designate Islam as Egypt's official religion and Islamic law, or Sharia, as the main source of legislation. They also obligate the state to “preserve” traditional family values based on Islam.

But in a key difference, the 2012 charter defines the principles of Sharia for the first time. It says those principles include “evidence, rules, jurisprudence and sources” accepted by Sunni Islam, Egypt's majority religious sect.

The new document also gives unprecedented powers to Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam's most respected religious school, by saying its scholars must be consulted on all matters relating to Sharia. The 1971 charter did not mention Al-Azhar.

On human rights

Both documents say detainees must not be subjected to any “physical or moral harm,” and must have their dignity preserved by the state. In a new protection of rights, the 2012 charter bans all forms of human exploitation and the sex trade.

On women's rights

Both documents commit the state to helping women with the financial costs of motherhood and the balancing of family and work responsibilities. But they differ on the issue of equality between men and women.

The preamble of the 2012 constitution says Egypt adheres to the principle of equality “for all citizens, men and women, without discrimination or nepotism or preferential treatment, in both rights and duties.”

The new document's main section also contains two articles barring the state from denying equal rights and opportunities to citizens. But those provisions do not explicitly bar discrimination against women.

The 1971 constitution included one article that required the state to treat women and men equally in the “political, social, cultural and economic spheres,” provided that such treatment did not violate Sharia.

Another article explicitly prohibited gender discrimination.

On freedom of expression

Both charters guarantee the freedom to express opinions orally, in writing or through images, and the freedom of the press to own news organizations and publish material independently.

In a major change, the 2012 document guarantees the freedom of belief for the “divine/monotheist religions” - a reference to Islam, Christianity and Judaism.

It says followers of those faiths have the right to perform religious rituals and establish places of worship “as regulated by law.” The previous constitution made no mention of the rights of any religions other than Islam.

In another difference, the new document contains an unprecedented ban on “insults” toward the prophets of Islam.

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[5] www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/07/egypt-tug-of-war-editorial

[6] www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated

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□

Egypt: The old regime strikes back

By David Morrison

In January 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood won 37.5% of the vote in the elections to the House of Representatives (and the Salafi Islamists got 27.8%). Ever since, there has been a concerted effort by the Egyptian military to undo the result, aided by the judiciary appointed in the Mubarak era and by secular liberals like Mohamed ElBaradei. The military coup of 3 July 2013 was the culmination of eighteen months of a failed effort to disempower the Muslim Brotherhood by other means.

The following is a summary of significant events as part of that effort:

House of Representatives (aka People's Assembly) election invalid

In June 2012, two days before the presidential runoff election, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) declared the House of Representatives election invalid.

(See CBS News, *Egypt court rules entire parliament illegally elected, orders body to dissolve after unconstitutional vote*, 14 June 2012, [1] and Al Jazeera, *Egypt court orders dissolving of parliament*, 14 June 2012, [2]).

The ostensible reason for this is given below. To understand it, we need to know about the electoral system for the House of Representatives. To quote from a pre-election Al Jazeera article (*Explainer: How do the elections work?*, 15 November 2011, [3]):

“The convoluted electoral rules combine elements of both majoritarian [first past the post] and proportional-representation systems.

“One-third of the People's Assembly - 166 MPs - will be elected using a majoritarian system, in which each district is assigned two representatives. Candidates running for these seats can be members of political parties, or they can be independents. ...

“The other two-thirds will be elected using party-list proportional representation. Districts will be allotted between 4 and 12 MPs under this system. Egyptians will then vote for lists put forth by parties or alliances (such as the Muslim Brotherhood-led Democratic Alliance). The lists are “closed,” which means voters cannot influence their ordering.”

The electoral law was created by the Supreme Council of the Armed Force (SCAF), which was governing authority in Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak and prior to the election of a President in June 2012. Here's a description from *Next Steps Toward Egypt's 2013 Elections* [4] (from the Carnegie Institute for Peace *Guide to Egypt's transition*):

“The current Parliamentary Elections Law of 1972 (law no. 38/1972) and the Law Regulating the Exercise of Political Rights (law no.73/1956) and their amendments will govern the upcoming parliamentary elections. Both laws were revised

multiple times by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) prior to the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections.

“The most significant SCAF revision made to the Parliamentary Elections Law was instituting a mixed electoral system. It allowed for two-thirds of the 498 elected members to be chosen by closed party lists in proportional representation districts and one-third by a first-past-the-post system in individual districts.

The mixed electoral system called for by many of Egypt's political parties and approved by the SCAF barred independents from running in proportional representation districts, but allowed party members to compete in both proportional and individual districts. In its June 2012 ruling on the constitutionality of the SCAF revisions to the Parliamentary Elections Law, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court found that the law was unfair and thus unconstitutional due to the unequal treatment of party members and independents.

“The constitutional basis for the current mixed electoral system that will be used in the March 2013 elections is enshrined in article 231 of the 2012 constitution. This provision sought to preempt the possibility that the SCC would find the elections law unconstitutional again, based on the two third-one third distribution of seats between proportional and individual districts. Despite this effort, the existing parliamentary elections law must still be amended to address issues raised in the June 2012 ruling.”

(This was written in January 2013 after the new constitution had been approved and in anticipation of a rerun of the parliamentary elections in March 2013).

In the event, the candidates who ran in the third elected by first past the post were mostly members of political parties. A lower court ruled, after the election was held, that this was unconstitutional because it breached “the principle of equality” since independents were barred from running in one of the two sections but members of political parties were not. (By definition, it is impossible to elect non-party independents under a party-list system).

This ruling of the lower court was endorsed by the SCC on 14 June 2012, which made it clear in its explanation of the ruling that “the makeup of the entire chamber is illegal and, consequently, it does not legally stand”.

One might have thought that since the election of two-thirds of the House of Representatives had not been found to be unconstitutional, the reasonable thing to do was to rerun the elections for the third the election of which had been found to be unconstitutional. But no, the SCC declared the makeup

of entire chamber “illegal”. At a stroke, a power base for the Muslim Brotherhood had been removed.

Lest anybody gets the notion that this decision by the SCC had anything to do with law, just remember that the post-coup “interim president” of Egypt is none other than the President of the SCC, Adly Mansour (who was Deputy President of the SCC in June 2012). By taking up the role of “interim president”, he backed constitutional vandalism on a grand scale – the overthrow of a constitutionally elected, and first democratically elected, President of Egypt (and his subsequent detention) and the suspension of the constitution that was endorsed by the Egyptian people six months earlier by a majority of almost 2 to 1 – and his colleagues on the SCC haven’t uttered a squeak about it.

The action of the SCC in June 2012 has one thing in common with its inaction in July 2013 – the objective of both was to do political damage to the Muslim Brotherhood.

(Ironically, Adly Mansour who has served on the SCC since 1992, was appointed President of the SCC by President Morsi in May 2012 and had taken up his post on 1 July 2012 – see BBC profile, 4 July 2013, [5].

You can see what a sensible and fair minded man he is from the following extract from the BBC profile: “The most glorious thing about 30 June is that it brought together everyone without discrimination or division’ he said. The revolution, he said, must go on so that ‘we stop producing tyrants.’”)

Law barring old regime figures from standing cancelled by SCC

On 14 June 2012, the SCC performed another important task on behalf of the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood by declaring unconstitutional a law passed by the newly elected Parliament which prohibited members of the old regime from contesting elections. This paved the way for the last Mubarak Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafik, to continue to run for president and contest the runoff election with Mohamed Morsi a couple of days later. He lost, but not by much. Had he won, the Muslim Brotherhood would have lost power completely.

(See CBS News, *Egypt court rules entire parliament illegally elected, orders body to dissolve after unconstitutional vote*, 14 June 2012, [1] and Al Jazeera, *Egypt court orders dissolving of parliament*, 14 June 2012, [2]).

Presidential powers reduced by SCAF

On the election of the president, supreme power in Egypt was scheduled to pass from SCAF to the president. However, on 17 June 2012, before the result of the presidential runoff election was known, SCAF issued a “constitutional declaration” limiting the president’s powers on his coming into office and keeping power in its own hands to a greater extent.

(See BBC article, *Q&A: Egypt’s new constitutional declaration*, 18 June 2012, [6] and Ahram Online, *English text of SCAF amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration*, 18 June 2012, [7])

To quote from the BBC article:

“... the Scaf has restored to itself legislative powers in the light of the dissolution of parliament and has complete control over all army affairs.

“The Scaf will also play a significant role in the constituent assembly that will draft the country’s new constitution.

“The new president will be able to form and fire a government, ratify and reject laws, and declare war but only after the approval of the Scaf. ...

“In the light of the dissolution of parliament, the Scaf has restored to itself legislative powers. The Scaf also has complete control over all army affairs. This includes the budget, the appointment of commanders and the extension of their service.

“Until a new constitution is enacted, the head of the Scaf has all powers - laid down in the laws and statutes - of the general commander of the armed forces, the minister of defence.”

Morsi attempts to reverse parliamentary dissolution

Mohamed Morsi became president on 30 June 2012. On 8 July, in an attempt to reverse the dissolution of the People’s Assembly, he reconvened it, but also promised new elections to it.

(See BBC report, *Egyptian President Morsi reverses parliament dissolution*, 8 July 2013, [8]).

This didn’t succeed.

Morsi cancels SCAF’s constitutional declaration and dismisses Tantawi

On 12 August 2012, President Morsi cancelled the “constitutional declaration” made by the SCAF on 17 June 2012, which meant, inter alia, that he took control over military affairs from the SCAF. Given that he had been elected unlike the SCAF, this was a reasonable thing to do.

He retired Field Marshall Tantawi, the head of the armed forces (and of SCAF) and defence minister (for two decades), and replaced him in both positions by General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. He also retired Chief-of-staff General Sami Annan.

(See BBC report, *Egypt leader Morsi orders army chief Tantawi to resign*, 12 August 2012, [9]).

The military acquiesced in this – perhaps because they didn’t think they could resist action of the newly elected president, which had popular backing:

“Thousands of Egyptians celebrated the announcement on Sunday night in Cairo’s Tahrir Square that played home to the protests that ousted Mubarak.” (Al Jazeera report, *Crowds in Cairo praise Morsi’s army overhaul*, 12 August 2013, [10])

Morsi makes a “constitutional declaration”

On 22 November 2012, President Morsi made a “constitutional declaration”, which sought to

1. make presidential decisions immune from challenges in court, and

2. protect the Constituent Assembly (which was in the process of drawing up a constitution) and the Shura Council from judicial disbandment - in June 2013, both of these bodies were declared unconstitutional (see below).

(See Egypt Independent article, *Politicians divided on Morsy's new constitutional declaration*, 22 November 2012, [11]).

The president's objective was to avoid constitutional chaos. He wanted to get a new constitution adopted, which included a provision to make the Shura Council a legislative body on a temporary basis until new elections were held to the House of Representatives. And until the constitution was adopted (and the Shura Council became a legislative body), he wanted the power to make legislation himself without the courts overturning it. Given that he was democratically elected, these were reasonable steps to take on a temporary basis to avoid constitutional chaos.

At that time, the Constituent Assembly was still drawing up a constitution for approval by referendum. The disbanding of the Constituent Assembly would have aborted this process – and with that the possibility of the Shura Council becoming a law making body. Obviously, the disbandment of the Shura Council would also have left Egypt without a legislative.

Morsy appointments to Shura Council

After the new constitution came into effect on 26 December 2012, Egypt had (potentially at least) a functioning system of parliamentary government, an elected president and a Shura Council that had been given legislative authority by Article 230 of the new constitution, pending new elections to the House of Representatives.

The elected two thirds of the Council had a Freedom and Justice Party majority (105 seats out of 180). Immediately, prior to the new constitution coming into effect, Morsy appointed 90 members to the Council under powers in the old constitution originally exercised by the SCAF. He seems to have made considerable efforts to appoint people from across Egyptian society, including members of the secular opposition:

“The list included members that represented 17 political parties (12 of which were previously unrepresented in the council), constitutional and legal experts, eight women, and 12 Coptic Christians, said presidential spokesperson Yasser Ali.

“He added that there were also eight members representing Egyptian churches, five members representing Al-Azhar and two from those injured in the revolution.

“The list included diverse representation to several segments of Egyptian society from different areas such as representatives of civil society groups, professional and labour syndicates, academics, legal experts, athletes, Sinai and Matruh tribal elders, and Sufi order leaders’, said Ali.

“Morsy also appointed four retired military generals, including Major General Adel Morsy, former Chief of Military Justice.”

(See Daily News Egypt article, *Morsy appoints 90*

members to Shura Council, 23 December 2012, [12])

Note that members of El Baradei's National Salvation Front (NSF) refused to serve:

“The National Salvation Front, Egypt's largest opposition bloc, refused the appointment of any of its members to the Shura Council.

“The Front views the appointment of its members to the Shura Council at this point in time to be a form of bribery’, said Abdel Ghafar Shokr, chairman of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party and NSF member, during a press conference.

“NSF also released a statement saying, ‘The NSF does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the current Shura Council as it was elected by only seven percent of voters.’”

(Note also over the ensuing months the NSF kept making outrageous demands and threatening to boycott the parliamentary elections if they didn't get their way. See, for example, Egypt Independent article *ElBaradei: NSF won't take part in elections unless demands are met*, 22 April 2013 [13]:

“Dostour Party founder and National Salvation Front leader Mohamed ElBaradei warned that despite previous assurances, the NSF would not necessarily participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections without clear guarantees for their integrity — otherwise, they would be a mere ‘fake democratic circus’, he said on Monday.

“Speaking at a news conference with the NSF and the Free Egyptians Party, ElBaradei said: ‘We will not take part in elections without a response to our demands of appointing an independent prosecutor general and forming an unbiased coalition government.’”

Muslim Brotherhood blocked from holding parliamentary elections in 2013

If Morsy had been dedicated to taking all power into Muslim Brotherhood hands, which is the accusation constantly made about his presidency, he would not have made the appointments to the Shura Council that he did. Nor, since the Freedom and Justice Party has overall control of the only legislative body in the state (the Shura Council), would he have been anxious to hold elections to the House of Representatives, which would then become the main legislative body and in which the Freedom and Justice Party couldn't hope to have overall control, even if it was as successful as in the previous elections to that body.

But Morsy tried to hold elections to the House of Representatives. He issued a decree that they be held on dates starting on 22 April 2013. But, on 7 March 2013, Egypt's administrative court ordered the cancellation of the presidential decree and ordered that the law governing the elections be referred to the SCC for review. The reason given by the court for cancelling the decree was that “the Shura Council, Egypt's upper house of parliament, did not return the amended electoral law to the Supreme Constitutional Court for final review before passing it”.

(See Al Jazeera article, *Egypt court suspends legislative vote*, 7 March 2013, [14])

current formation as acting legislature until a new House of Representatives is elected.”

The Constituent Assembly had finished its job of writing a constitution.

The electoral law under which the 2011-12 parliamentary elections was going through a process of amendment. Here’s what *Next Steps Toward Egypt’s 2013 Elections* [4] (from the Carnegie Institute for Peace) says about the process in January 2013:

“The presidency and cabinet drafted amendments to the elections law that they submitted to the Shura Council following a ‘national dialogue’ aimed at reconciling political factions after polarizing protests against President Morsi in November 2012. But the dialogues have attracted limited participation from the opposition. The council is now set to pass the amended draft. ...

“The 2012 constitution requires that the law be reviewed by the SCC. The court is expected to review the amended elections law sometime in late January or early February of this year.”

The SCC reviewed the electoral law passed by the Shura Council and required amendments (see Ahram Online article, *Constitutional court rejects articles in draft parliamentary elections law*, 18 February 2013, [15]). The Shura Council adopted the amendments – but didn’t return it to the SCC for further review. That’s why Egypt’s administrative court ordered the cancellation of the presidential decree on 7 March 2013.

On 25 May 2013, the SCC declared Saturday four articles in the parliamentary electoral law unconstitutional, in addition to another nine in the law regulating political rights.

(See Ahram Online article, *Egypt’s HCC [aka SCC] deems 4 articles of parliament elections law unconstitutional*, 25 May 2013, [16]).

On 23 June 2013, the Shura Council approved the SCC’s amendments to the electoral law, which was sent back to the SCC to ensure they were appropriately implemented.

(See Daily News Egypt article, *Shura Council agrees on SCC election law proposals*, 23 June 2013, [17])

So, over six months, the Muslim Brotherhood president and the Muslim Brotherhood controlled Shura Council tried to hold elections, which would reduce their power in the legislature, and were thwarted by the SCC. This was not the action of a movement that wished to hold all power in their own hands.

SCC deems Shura Council and Constituent Assembly unconstitutional

Finally, on 2 June 2013, the SCC ruled that “the Shura Council and the Constituent Assembly were formed unconstitutionally”.

(See Daily News Egypt article, *SCC deems Shura Council and Constituent Assembly unconstitutional*, 2 June 2013, [18])

However:

“The SCC, headed by Judge Maher El-Beheiry, postponed the dissolution of the Shura Council until after elections for the House of Representatives. The decision to postpone the dissolution was based upon article 230 of the new constitution, which states that the Shura Council is to remain in its

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Egypt, The USA And Saudi Arabia

By David Morrison

US warned against military coup

A couple of weeks before the coup, the US Ambassador, Anne Patterson, met the opposition leadership and warned against a military takeover and was heavily criticised by them for doing so:

“Egypt’s National Association for Change (NAC) has criticised comments by US ambassador to Cairo Anne Patterson regarding the Egyptian army and opposition protests on 30 June. At a meeting with political parties and NGOs on Tuesday, Patterson said the US would not welcome the return of the army to power as an alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

(See Ahramonline article, *Egypt opposition group criticises ‘blatant interference’ by US ambassador*, 18 June 2012 [1])

Given Patterson’s warning, I don’t see how it can be said that the US instigated the coup, though I expect they will go along with it. I think the crucial factor in the coup proceeding was Saudi political support and their promise to make up any shortfall in aid from the US as a result of it proceeding. It looks as if the Saudis acted against the wishes of the US. US law is very clear – US funds to Egypt should be withdrawn, but maybe a way will be found around it.

The opposition attempts to defend the coup as democratically valid are just pathetic - the Brotherhood have come top in all three popular elections that have taken place since the overthrow of Mubarak. A parliamentary election was in the offing – if the opposition really have 22 million signatories to their petition (and had 17 million on the streets on 30 June), they should have been able to win a parliamentary election by several miles, which would have enabled them to curtail Morsi’s powers dramatically – and may even have put them in a position to unseat him by constitutional means.

Opinion polls cast doubt on support for coup

An opinion poll by an organisation called the Egyptian Centre for Media Studies and reported by Middle East Monitor casts doubt on support claimed for coup.

“Opinion has revealed that most people in Egypt are opposed to the removal of President Mohamed Morsi from office. Only 26 per cent support the coup, with 63 per cent against it; 11 per cent of respondents did not give an opinion.”

(See Middle East Monitor article, *Report shows that most Egyptians oppose Morsi’s removal*, 11 July 2013, [2])

A poll taken a month later suggested that opposition has risen:

“A recent field study indicates that the number of Egyptians opposed to the overthrow of Dr Mohamed Morsi as President has risen to 69 per cent. Only around 25 per cent of Egyptians

support his current detention, while 6 per cent prefer to keep their opinion to themselves.”

(See Middle East Monitor article, *Study shows opposition to Morsi ouster rises to 69%*, 18 August 2013, [3])

US law is absolutely clear – US aid should have been cut off

Article 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act [4] says:

“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.”

A clause in the 2011 omnibus bill strengthens the provision, excluding from American aid any nation experiencing a “coup d’etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role.” [5]

Kerry says Egyptian military may have averted civil war (Reuters, 17 July 2013, [6])

“Kerry repeated the U.S. position that it has not yet made any decision, saying it would take its time, consult its lawyers and get all the facts.

“‘This is obviously an extremely complex and difficult situation,’ Kerry told reporters in Amman, adding that he would not ‘rush to judgment’.

“‘I will say this: That what complicates it, obviously, is that you had an extraordinary situation in Egypt of life and death, of the potential of civil war and enormous violence, and you now have a constitutional process proceeding forward very rapidly,’ he added. ‘So we have to measure all of those facts against the law, and that’s exactly what we will do.’

Kerry says Egypt army ‘restoring democracy’

Kerry interviewed by Hamid Mir of Geo TV in Pakistan, 1 August 2013 [7]

QUESTION: Thank you very much for giving us time. My first question is about your commitment with democracy. The U.S. believes in democracy, U.S. is a champion of democracy all over the world. But why U.S. is not taking a clear position on military intervention against the democratically elected government of President Morsy in Egypt?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, it’s a very appropriate and important question, and I want to answer it very directly. The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom were afraid of a descent into chaos, into violence. And the military did not take over, to the best of our judgment so – so far. To run the country, there’s a civilian

government. In effect, they were restoring democracy. And the fact is –

QUESTION: By killing people on the roads?

SECRETARY KERRY: Oh, no. That's not restoring democracy, and we're very, very concerned about, very concerned about that. And I've had direct conversations with President Mansour, with Vice President ElBaradei, with General al-Sisi, as have other members of our government. And I've talked to the Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, so I've been in touch with all of the players there. And we have made it clear that that is absolutely unacceptable, it cannot happen.

US decides not to decide if there was a coup

The US administration eventually decided that the law didn't require it to make a determination as to whether it was a coup or not – and if they don't make a determination then aid can continue to flow to Egypt. The actual words from US State Department spokesperson, Jen Psaki, on 6 August 2013 were:

“We have determined that we do not need to make a determination.” [8]

Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi (New York Times, 10 July 2013, [9])

“The streets seethe with protests and government ministers are on the run or in jail, but since the military ousted President Mohamed Morsi, life has somehow gotten better for many people across Egypt: Gas lines have disappeared, power cuts have stopped and the police have returned to the street.

“The apparently miraculous end to the crippling energy shortages, and the re-emergence of the police, seems to show that the legions of personnel left in place after former President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011 played a significant role – intentionally or not – in undermining the overall quality of life under the Islamist administration of Mr. Morsi.

“And as the interim government struggles to unite a divided nation, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mr. Morsi's supporters say the sudden turnaround proves that their opponents conspired to make Mr. Morsi fail. Not only did police officers seem to disappear, but the state agencies responsible for providing electricity and ensuring gas supplies failed so fundamentally that gas lines and rolling blackouts fed widespread anger and frustration.”

Peter Hitchens: Before we Bomb Syria, Shouldn't we Seek Proof of Guilt? (Mail on Sunday, 25 August 2013, [10])

“If you want absolutely proven atrocities, all you need to do is look at Egypt, where the new military government, lawlessly installed by violence, has openly engaged in several severe massacres of ‘its own people’, in most cases unarmed and defenceless. Yet because these massacres were done with bullets, or for some other reason I can't fathom, no cruise-missile attacks on Cairo are currently proposed. Ask yourself about this. The contrast couldn't be clearer. Known, undeniable mass-murders, of which there is no doubt, and whose culprits are known and undisputed, bring no outrage. An alleged mass-

murder, whose culprit is not proven, is the subject of huge outrage.”

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Irish Mercenaries in Syria – a Report

Gearoid O Colmain:

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/irish-mercenaries-training-syrian-death-squads/5346204>

“In its weekend supplement devoted to geopolitics French daily *Le Monde* published 8 March, 2013 a report entitled “*Syrie : à Atmé, entre révolution et désenchantement*” – “Syria: Atme, between revolution and disenchantment”- Christophe Ayad, a regular embedded journalist with NATO's mercenary forces in Syria, reports on the mixture of despair and chaos that reigns in rebel controlled territory.

One of the rebels tells the French reporter that “three former soldiers of the Irish military elite” provided training to Syrian rebels.

It is claimed the Irish soldiers were acting as “independent mercenaries”. These “former soldiers of the Irish military elite” are acting in violation of international law. ...”

Connolly on Germany: Our Gallant Allies in Europe

By Pat Muldowney

It may in the long run not avail us to maintain a two-ship power against Germany if we allow Germany to maintain a two-school power against us. The more perfect social organization of the German people, their stronger national consciousness, and, above all, their fuller equipment in school and college for the practical duties of life and citizenship --- these are the more formidable advantages in the secular struggle for survival and supremacy than the mere piling up of mechanical armaments. (British Diplomatic and Consular Reports, 1913 Cd. 7048, pp. 72-73. The two-power standard was the British policy of maintaining a number of battleships at least equal to the combined strength of the next two largest navies in the world.)

The first modern statement of Irish foreign policy is in the 1916 Proclamation: *[Ireland] now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.*

This is usually interpreted as a statement of alliance with Germany, which was the strongest of the anti-Triple Alliance powers. It is interpreted in an apologetic manner - after all, the autocratic Kaiser Bill (Wilhelm II) was just an earlier version of the evil dictatorial Fuehrer Hitler, wasn't he? And after the Rising a supposed "German Plot" was the reason given for a crackdown on the independence movement.

Meanwhile official Ireland had joined Britain's war effort. The "foreign policy" reasons for doing this included a Catholic policy - a small Catholic country, Belgium, had been attacked and over-run. In contrast, the Irish independence movement aligned itself with the premier Protestant power, Prussia. Prussia was the core of the German Reich which had done the attacking and over-running.

The 19th century had seen yet another major war in which the small German states were the "sandbox" or battlefield where Napoleon and other powers fought for supremacy. Under the leadership of the strongest German state Prussia, Germany (excluding Austria) united to form a single regime called the German Reich or Empire.

Over a couple of centuries the Prussian state religion of Lutheranism had developed into a form of civilisation known as "German Kultur". The Pietist movement in Lutheranism fostered an attitude of seriousness, spiritual self-improvement, and "good works" in the form of service to the needy. This self-critical mentality grew into a spirit of research and investigation - of "de-bunking" - beginning with scriptural exegesis including study of ancient languages, developing into linguistic science, and culminating by the end of the nineteenth century in the systems of scientific and technological research and development which were then adopted in varying degrees by the rest of the world. Nietzschean-style de-bunking is another manifestation of this mentality.

In some other countries the Reformation eventually reduced to "Become richer!". In Germany it evolved into "Become better!". Pietism/introspection/improvement led also to a great flowering of art, literature and music. And under the influence of Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany and king of Prussia, Bismarck's German policy was harnessed to social improvement, education and general welfare:

There is a great significance in the impression which foreign workers got in studying Germany's social legislation ... [English] commissions visited Germany, some of them composed of working-men. Guided by representative Germans, Socialists among them, they visited the industrial districts, factories, benevolent institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were astonished at all the things they saw. At the farewell dinner given them the English leader of the working-men's deputations turned to Bebel, and made this concluding remark: 'After all we have seen of what is done in Germany for the workers, I ask you : are you people still Socialists?' And the Englishman remarked to a German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed, after long fights in Parliament, in putting through one-tenth ... (Wilhelm II, *My Memoirs*, 1922).

Catholic Germany - less nationalist and more universalist than Lutheran Prussia - also manifested social improvement. Pope Leo XIII issued the social encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, advocating human dignity, social solidarity and the common good:

"...the labor of the working class—the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength, in the cultivation of the land, and in the workshops of trade—is especially responsible and quite indispensable. Indeed, ... it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of working men that States grow rich ...The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government."

Social developments in pre-Great War Catholic Vienna are described in *Karl Lueger: the Life and Work of a Municipal Socialist*, Belfast Historical and Educational Society, 2002.

Germany possessed few natural resources. It became rich and powerful by taking care of its main resource - its people - as it still does to this day.

In a famous photograph of Irish Citizen Army outside Liberty Hall during World War 1 a prominently displayed banner reads – *'We serve neither King nor Kaiser, but Ireland'*

On the other hand, the 1916 Proclamation reads:

"Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory."

According to the excellent history of the Party on display at the Labour 2012 Centenary Conference in Galway, *'the proclamation of the republic was written by Connolly and printed in Liberty Hall. Connolly was also appointed Commandant-General of the Rising.'*

So how is the declaration of neutrality in the Liberty Hall banner to be reconciled with the Proclamation's declaration of alliance with the Central European Powers in the Great War?

Well, Connolly speaks for himself on this. His explanation makes perfect sense.

In an article published on 15 August 1914, Connolly wrote as follows in *Forward*, a publication of the Independent Labour Party in Glasgow:

A Continental Revolution

“And now, like the proverbial bolt from the blue, war is upon us, and war between the most important, because the most Socialist, nations on earth. And we are helpless. What then becomes of all our resolutions, all our protests, of fraternisation, all our threats of general strikes, all our carefully-built machinery of internationalism, all our hopes for the future? Were they all sound and fury signifying nothing? ...

Is it not clear as the fact of life itself that no insurrection of the working class, no general strike, no general uprising of Labour in Europe could possibly carry with it or entail greater slaughter of Socialists than will their participation as soldiers in the campaigns of the Armies of their respective countries ...

I am not writing in captious criticism of my Continental comrades. We know but little about what is happening on the Continent ... But believing as I do that any action would be justified which put a stop to this colossal crime ... I feel compelled to express the hope that ere long we may read of the paralysing of the internal transport service on the Continent, even should the fact of paralysing necessitate the erection of socialist barricades ... Even an unsuccessful attempt at Socialist Revolution by force of arms ... would be less disastrous to the Socialist cause than the fact of Socialists allowing themselves to be used in the slaughter of their brothers in the cause. A great Continental uprising of the working class would stop the war ...

On 22 August 1914 Connolly wrote in similar vein in *Forward*:

A Martyr for Conscience Sake

[Noting that Socialists throughout Europe seemed to be protesting against the war but then agreeing to fight it, Connolly wrote:]“... what does it mean? It means that the Socialist parties of the various countries mutually cancel each other, and that as a consequence Socialism ceases to exist as a world force and drops out of history in the greatest crisis of the history of the world, in the very moment when courageous action will most influence history ...

We know that not more than a score of men in the various Cabinets of the world have brought about this war ... and that all the alleged ‘reasons’ for it are so many after-thoughts invented to hide from us the fact that the intrigues and schemes of our rulers had brought the world to this pass. All Socialists are agreed upon this. Being so agreed, are we now to forget it all ... because some twenty highly placed criminals say our country requires us to slaughter our brothers ... The idea outrages my every sense of justice and fraternity. I may be only a voice crying in the wilderness, a crank amongst the community of the wise; but whoever I be, I must, in deference to my own self-respect, and to the sanctity of my own soul, protest against the doctrine that any decree of theirs of national honour can excuse a Socialist who serves in a war which he has denounced as a needless war ...”

This is consistent with the “*neither King nor Kaiser but Ireland*” neutrality line. And the note of desperate disappointment is understandable.

The socialist movement had, in the preceding generation or two, pushed through huge advances in all spheres. The ruling elements in each of the central and western European countries had enacted major reforms. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, for instance, the new Liberal government of Asquith introduced the Old Age Pensions Act in 1908. (In a

phrase of the period, to some of the beneficiaries the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George was “*the greatest Irishman that ever lived*”!)

But in August 1914 the rhetoric of international solidarity between the national components of the European socialist movement turned out to be just rhetoric.

What did Connolly want? What might he have meant by an *attempt at Socialist Revolution by force of arms*, as he called it?

Jim Larkin’s ITGWU showed what could be accomplished by strike action by inhibiting the movement of British troops during the War of Independence. A general strike of transport and munitions workers in 1914 would have had powerful effects on the belligerent governments. Could it have led on to seizure of state power by the strikers? Could they have formed their own militias like the Irish Citizen Army?

It is possible that a transport and munitions strike would have been suppressed by overwhelming military force, the participants interned, and their leaders executed as fifth columnists in the pay of other governments.

But, just like Ireland’s 1916 Rising, a powerful example would have been given to the population at large, putting a brake on the belligerence of governments, and perhaps eventually bringing about the cessation and return to the *status quo ante* which Pope Benedict XV proposed, and to which the Central Powers actually agreed. (It was Britain which, accustomed to actually winning its many wars – mostly against herders, farmers, hunters and fisherman who lacked proper modern weapons – forced a fight to the finish and consigned millions more to perdition.)

In fact Connolly did not simply give up and retire from the fray in 1914. His moment of disillusioned despair was temporary. He took stock of the situation and prepared for action.

In Larkin’s newspaper, *The Irish Worker* (29 August 1914), Connolly characterised the war as “*the war of a pirate upon the German nation*”:

The War upon the German Nation

“Foremost and most successful European nation in this endeavour to escape from the thralldom of dependence upon England’s manufactures stands the German nation. To this contest in the industrial field it brought all the resources of science and systematised effort. Early learning that an uneducated people is necessarily an inferior people, the German nation attacked the work of educating its children with such success that it is now unreservedly admitted that the Germans are the best educated people in Europe. Basing its industrial effort upon an educated working class, it accomplished in the workshop results that this half-educated working class of England could only wonder at ... It was determined that since Germany could not be beaten in fair competition industrially, she must be beaten unfairly by organising a military and naval conspiracy against her ... remember that the war found England thoroughly prepared, Germany totally unprepared ... The British capitalist class has planned this colossal crime in order to ensure its uninterrupted domination of the commerce of the world.”

The week previously, in *The Irish Worker*, 22 August 1914 (*America and Europe*), Connolly took issue with the idea put out by British and Home Rule papers that American public opinion was practically unanimous on the side of Britain and its allies, telling his readers that American opinion was almost universally hostile to Britain. Native-born Americans were suspicious of Britain. The Irish in America were hostile to Britain. And the immigrants from Central Europe, notably Jewish and German immigrants, were hostile to Russia and on the side of Germany: “*The German press is the most powerful*

press in America not printed in the English language”, and it was read not only by Germans, but by Hungarians, Poles, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slavs, and Jews.

“One may be sure that the German journalists [in the then-massive U.S. German-language press, presumably] have kept well to the front the fact that the German Government offered to concede all that the British Government had asked for in the matter of Belgium, and had even asked the British Government to name its own terms of neutrality, and that the British Foreign Minister concealed this fact from the Parliament when speaking before the declaration of war.” The Jews were “surely one of the most influential of the races represented in America ... Particularly is this true of the eastern states, and in the commercial and journalistic world.”

And the Jewish press would be at least hostile to Russia. (In the *Irish Worker* of 12 September 1914, Connolly, in *Friends of Small Nationalities*, quoted New York Jewish newspapers, in German and Yiddish, as declaring Germany and Austria to be the least anti-Semitic nations in Europe.)

America and Europe concludes:

“Finally, as a word of warning this week. Do not let anyone play upon your sympathies by denunciation of the German military bullies. German military bullies, like all tyrannies among civilised people, need fear nothing so much as native democracy. Attack from outside can only strengthen tyrants within a nation. If we had to choose between strengthening the German bully or the Russian autocrat the wise choice would be on the side of the German. For the German people are a highly civilised people, responsive to every progressive influence, and rapidly forging the weapons for their own emancipation from native tyranny, whereas the Russian Empire stretches away into the depths of Asia, and relies on an army recruited from amongst many millions of barbarians who have not yet felt the first softening influence of civilisation.”

Connolly was not the only observer taking this position. In *The War Against Europe* (pamphlet, September 1914, New York edition), Roger Casement wrote:

“England fights as the foe of Europe and the enemy of European civilization. In order to destroy German shipping, German commerce, German industry, she has deliberately plotted the conspiracy we now see at work. The war of 1914 is England’s war. For years she has been plotting how she could, without danger to herself, destroy the peaceful menace of German prosperity. A few more years of peaceful expansion by Germany and the chances of success would be less if not quite gone. Since August 1911, the sole object of British foreign policy has been to put Germany in a false position and to arrange for the blow to be struck by other hands – by hired hands.

“Today we see the triumph of British diplomacy. Russia and France have been nerved up to the task. The sword has been drawn against Germany, and England ... enters joyfully into a struggle that while it shall never touch her shores, or interrupt or lessen a single English meal, must end in the laying waste of Germany and the annihilation of the only European people who had shown themselves capable of serious competition in the peaceful arts of commerce and industry. In order to achieve this crime England is prepared to hand Europe over to Russia. Herself a non-European power she cheerfully contemplates Europe dominated by an asiatic Power ...

“In this war Germany fights not only for her own life – she fights to free the seas and if she wins she fights to free Ireland ... The fight may be fought on the seas but the fate will be settled on an island. The crippling of the British fleet will mean a joint German-Irish invasion of Ireland and every Irishman able to join that army of deliverance must get ready today.”

Military domination of eastern Europe by Russia actually came about thirty years later, in very different circumstances. In the light of actual events (German defeat of Russia in the Great War), it may be a bit difficult to see what Casement, who had been a prominent insider in the British diplomatic corps, was getting at in his 1914 pamphlet.

In the Allied theory of the impending Great War, Britain would help France to hold the Germans on the western Front, while “the Russian streamroller” would overwhelm the eastern front by pouring its inexhaustible Asiatic hordes of human cannon fodder into the heart of Central Europe.

Making this happen required removal of the British military veto on Russia’s heart’s desire, the warm-water Mediterranean port of Constantinople, birthplace of Russian Orthodox religion and culture: “Czargrad”. Throughout the 19th century Britain had opposed Russia’s designs on Turkey, and fought its last but one war (Crimea) against armed white people in defence of Turkey (and the Middle East/Afghanistan) from Russian pressure on the vulnerable western flank of Britain’s Indian Empire.

But now the steamroller of Russian autocracy was to be deployed against socialist Europe.

A brutal, if brilliant, war strategy. Sure enough, secret treaties ceded Constantinople (and ‘Turkish Armenia’ and ‘Kurdistan’ and ‘Persian Azerbaijan’ to Russia, while, in rest of the Middle Eastern carved-up, France was awarded territory between the new British Middle Eastern territories and the expanded Russian Empire, to serve as the buffer against (post-War) Russia that Turkey had been throughout the 19th century. (Not to mention awarding Palestine to the Zionist movement.)

The full facts and full horror of this were not totally evident in 1914. The secret treaties had yet to be formalised. But the broad outlines and intentions could be discerned, just as NATO machinations can be observed today.

Connolly was well-connected to the European socialist movement, and he had lived in America. There is not scope here to assess the details of the geopolitical analysis of himself and Casement, and how historic enmities were overturned out of the blue, and turned into alliances. (“*We are at war with East-Asia. We have always been at war with East-Asia.*”)

These days we are told we must choose between Boston and Berlin, between German welfare capitalism and the financial piracy of Wall Street and the City of London. Indeed, Berlin itself has had to choose between Boston and Berlin. Germany’s lurch towards Boston a decade or so ago fed steroids to the Celtic Tiger and gave it its fatal heart attack.

But in regard to King and Kaiser in 1914, Connolly’s choice of Berlin’s welfare capitalism over London’s finance-capitalist-militarist piracy gets support from an unlikely source.

On 19 February 1916, in his newspaper, *The Workers’ Republic*, under the heading *The German State*, Connolly published part of the concluding chapter of *Socialized Germany* by Frederic C. Howe.

Frederic Clemson Howe (1867–1940) was a member of the Ohio Senate, Commissioner of Immigration of the Port of New York, and President of the League for Small and Subject Nationalities. His book on Socialized Germany can be read in full at <http://archive.org/stream/socializedgerman00howeuoft#page/n7/mode/2up>

Howe was very much on the Anglo-Saxon side, and represented President Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. (In another book <http://archive.org/stream/whywar00howe#page/232/mode/2up> (*Why War*, 1916), Howe gave his views of the true origins of the Great War.) Howe’s *Socialized Germany* book is essentially good advice to the

Allied side on how they needed to get their act together in order to keep Germany down.

Unlike Howe, Connolly was not an Anglophile. Connolly's dream of joint European Socialist action against war was dead. He had done his utmost to get better wages and conditions, housing, health care, pensions, and all the rest, so that people did not have to live like animals.

But the catastrophe had occurred. The William Martin Murphys, the Redmonds, the bishops, the newspapers, and the rest, had endorsed and encouraged something far worse than unemployment, low wages, miserably housing and diet. They were shovelling the people that Connolly had worked for into trenches to **die** like animals. They were screaming for the slaughter of young men who had never done any harm to Ireland or its people.

What is the use of jobs, wages, pensions if you are dead at 20?

But Connolly had the Irish Citizen Army, and he prepared to actually do something about the catastrophe. The Socialist movement failed to act in 1914. But Connolly did not sit around in despair, thinking longingly of what might have been, and now could never be. He took action in 1916. Did he achieve anything?

At the very least, the Rising changed the rules of the game, in Ireland and perhaps more widely. The Military Governor Lord French arrived with many of thousands of troops, with plans at the ready to conscript 100,000 young men, so they could be forced at gunpoint into the war and then shot dead if they refused to kill other young men. But Conscription was averted, and tens of thousands of lives were saved. Ireland has not gone to war in other countries since then. It has dipped its toe in the water by sending a few soldiers to Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether Connolly's legacy is completely lost.

And what about Connolly's "*gallant allies*" in the Rising? His gallant *socialist* allies? Here is an extract from the part of Frederic Howe's book published by Connolly in 1916:

"Fatherland" signifies many things to the German; it has many other meanings than patriotic attachment. And all of the activities described in the previous chapters form part of German Kultur as the Germans use the term. Kultur is not limited to educational and aesthetic things. Kultur includes history and traditions, politics, statecraft, and administration; it includes state socialism, social legislation, the conservation of human life, and the promotion of the well-being of the people. All of the individual and collective contributions which Germany has made to the world form part of Kultur as the German understands the word. These contributions are colossal. And they are largely social.

This emphasis on human welfare is one of the remarkable things about the German idea of the state. Almost all of the achievements enumerated have been brought about in the short space of a generation. The greatest advance is coincident with the reign of William II. Bismarck laid the foundations of the structure, but his work was horizoned by the conditions of his generation and the unification of the empire. It remained for William II to give unity to the work by harmonizing the landed aristocracy and the commercial classes with humanism in legislation, and by calling to his aid the scientific thought of the nation and identifying with the state the contributions of the universities and technical schools, the scientists and artists, the educators and the business men.

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□

DEV VERSUS CHURCHILL ONLINE

By Manus O'Riordan

One searches in vain for a recording of Churchill's May 1945 broadcast on BBC, in which he attacked Ireland's wartime neutrality and to which de Valera made his famous reply on 16 May. On the RTE website at www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/681-history-of-rte/684-rte-1940s/289798-eamon-de-valeras-response-to-winston-churchill/ one can at least have the privilege of listening to Dev's reply in full.

The BBC website is, however, of absolutely no assistance in accessing a recording of the particular piece of Churchillian bombast to which Dev was replying.

Contrary to many assumptions, this attack was **not** made during Churchill's short V-E Day broadcast on 8 May, which is featured by the BBC at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/8/newsid_3580000/3580163.stm and click also on www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDVY0z3oO_E as well as on www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq-zjE1yfDM for other postings of that speech.

Accessing the newspapers of the time, however, clarifies that it was during a quite different BBC radio broadcast, delivered on the following Sunday, 13 May, that Churchill made his attack on Ireland. See www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/13May45.html for the full text of that broadcast, as provided by the Churchill Society website.

Site for Athol Books:

<http://www.atholbooks.org>

Commemorating Kilmichael

The Kilmichael Ambush Site Should Not Commemorate Auxiliaries

Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc

[Reprinted from the Website www.theirishstory.com where it appeared as an opinion piece on 17 August 2013. The author had written an earlier opinion piece 3 September 2012 “To Remember or to Commemorate”, on the RIC Memorial]

THE Southern Star recently reported on an approved planning application to redevelop the Kilmichael Ambush site. This application includes a plaque naming the RIC auxiliaries killed, and has been described as a ‘suitable commemoration for both IRA volunteers and auxiliaries.’

Unsurprisingly, this plan has produced strong opposition. This controversy raises important questions about who we should commemorate.

Commemoration is a political act. Communities make decisions on who to commemorate based on their current political values. This year saw hundreds of suffragette commemorations – there were none to remember those who campaigned against giving women the vote. This is because society now accepts women are entitled to equal rights. The Dublin lockout commemorations will honour the workers who fought for decent working and living conditions. There are no plans to similarly honour William Martin Murphy and the Employers Federation because it’s accepted that workers have the right to join a trade union, and that those who struggled to secure that right were justified in doing so.

Traditionally the same approach was taken regarding War of Independence commemoration in southern Ireland. The traditional view was that when Irish republicans launched their campaign for independence they were justified in doing so, and fought a ‘clean’ campaign against the British forces. Of course the conduct of the war was far more complex than this – but claims by the historian Peter Hart’s about the IRA’s ‘dirty war’ went to the opposite extreme and were frequently exaggerated or oversimplified. Hart’s work was promoted by those who sought a reassessment of the British forces’ role in the war and called for them to be formally commemorated – a process which has now begun.

The proposed redevelopment at Kilmichael is set to cost €100,000 in public funds. Surely it is wrong for semi-state bodies to spend public money commemorating those who fought to prevent the emergence of an Irish state, and sought to deny Irish people what we now accept are fundamental democratic rights?

Independence

Recession has refocused Irish minds on the importance of fiscal independence. ‘Autonomy’, ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’ are now political buzz-words employed by politicians stressing the importance of reclaiming these rights.

If these freedoms really are that important, why would we commemorate and celebrate the memory of those who fought to deny them to our forefathers?

It would be natural for the British to want to commemorate those who fought to keep Ireland under British rule. However, few Britons are eager to do so. British histories, school texts and military museums gloss over the conflict or ignore it entirely. British memorials naming soldiers killed in ‘peace time’ do not mention those killed in Ireland. The British don’t commemorate these troops because they are not proud of the appalling reputation they earned in Ireland.

The auxiliaries, in particular, have one of the worst track records. The auxiliaries were involved in the Bloody Sunday massacre at Croke Park in November 1920. A week later auxiliaries killed two Galway brothers who were in the IRA, Pat and Harry Loughnane, and left their charred bodies so disfigured that there was nothing left of Harry’s face except his chin and lips. The auxiliaries were also responsible for the burning of Cork, which caused £3 million damages, left two locals dead, and 2,000 others unemployed. In March 1921 Limerick’s mayor, George Clancy, and his predecessor, ex-mayor Michael O’Callaghan, were assassinated by auxiliaries.

C Company

‘C Company’ – the unit of the auxiliaries ambushed at Kilmichael – also carried out reprisals. Two weeks before Kilmichael, an auxiliary from C Company shot dead Jim Lehane, an innocent civilian. Lehane’s killer celebrated by getting drunk and proclaiming that shooting Irishmen was the ‘one way of teaching them manners’. The auxiliary in question was Cadet Guthrie, who escaped the IRA at Kilmichael only to be killed a few hours later. Another member of C Company, without any provocation, shot dead Cannon Magner and his travelling companion Timothy Crowley.

It is interesting that people from southern republican/nationalist backgrounds have been prominent in organising commemorations for the auxiliaries. This is possibly the result of post-peace process politics and ‘parity of esteem’. Alternatively it may spring from the ‘delusional’ and ‘warped sense of nationhood’ that Geraldine Moane, senior lecturer in psychology at UCD, has stated is a legacy of Ireland’s colonial experience.

Regardless, if Irish people commemorate those who fought to deny our forefathers the rights we now cherish, surely it will be ‘political correctness’ taken too far. Once we stop asking what people fought for, and whether their actions were justified, we will have reduced history to a bland equation where there is no context, morality or sense of right and wrong.

(Continued p 23)

War And Peace, A World State And The Part Of Small Nations

by Éamon de Valera and Jan Masaryk (*Irish Times* report, 2 November 1944)

“ONLY WORLD STATE WOULD GUARANTEE PEACE” – MR. DE VALERA

[This is the *Irish Times* report of the speeches of Eamon de Valera and Jan Masaryk on 2 November 1944 in Dublin, presented by Manus O’Riordan in the June issue of *Irish Foreign Affairs*, in an article entitled “‘Emergency Czechmate’ or Wartime Dialogue? Dev, the ‘Irish Institute’ and the Masaryk Affair”. In this, Manus O’Riordan described how the British influence in the ‘Irish Institute’ tried to make use of Masaryk’s visit to Ireland in 1944.]

Speaking at the inaugural meeting of the College Historical Society in Trinity College, Dublin, last night, Mr. de Valera said: “I cannot see a solution to wars in our time, because I believe that the only solution which would guarantee peace is a universal World State.”

He said that until such a coercive power was at the disposal of a central world authority, with world police to prevent aggression of all kinds, there could not be an effective instrument to maintain peace.

Dr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, said that the preponderant strength of the Great Powers who were bearing the main burden of the present struggle need not cause any concern to the small nations.

Mr. de Valera, who was proposing a vote of thanks to the Auditor, Mr. M. B. Yeats for his paper, “The Small Nations”, said that it must have been particularly gratifying to Mr. Yeats to have attracted distinguished representative of another small nation, which had suffered so cruelly in the war. He hoped that that country’s agonies would soon be ended.

He was afraid that, in the conditions of the world, as they had been, and were likely to continue for some time to come, it was not possible to build up an organisation which could really guarantee peace, not to speak of an organisation which could give peace, and, at the same time, leave to small nations the liberty and independence to live their own lives in their own way under conditions which they required.

NO OTHER HOPE

The reason he said he did not see a solution in our time was that he believed that the only solution which would guarantee peace was one of a universal World State. He believed that until such a coercive power was at the disposal of some central world authority – which could be used to prevent aggression of all kinds – they would not, and could not, have an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace. From the point of view of maintaining peace, he saw no other hope.

He believed if it were possible to get the nations of the world to agree to the setting up of such a central authority, and put at the disposal of that authority the nations’ forces, so far as the small nations were concerned, it would be a far better solution – that was assuming that the police power would be only the sort exercised by the ordinary States of a century ago, before the work of government became complicated. If that police power were given the power of seeing that whatever powers passed were obeyed, and the rights of individual States maintained, the solution, from the point of view of small States, would be a better one than some of the solutions that had been proposed.

The auditor was right when he said that small nations had no responsibility for any failure of the League of Nations. The failure of the League was due to the fact that great Powers, to which leadership was given in the League, part of the time failed to see eye to eye. Their policies began to diverge, with the result that a large number of States were thinking in different directions and forgetting the need to hold together, as they had held previously, when they wanted to achieve certain objects. The power of the League to maintain peace then vanished.

The thing to guard against was that it might be necessary to wage war in order ultimately to gain peace. If States having the power to prevent aggression or punish aggressors were to be effective, they must be willing to prevent war.

One of the defects of Geneva was that States which had been set up in an organisation to maintain peace and order should go to war. The difference between war for the maintenance of order and peace against an aggressor and a conflict between States was very great. If an organisation set up to maintain peace broke the peace by going to war against an aggressor it was acting as a police force. Even though such force might be necessary for a time, the position was that a salutary lesson was taught. Such a lesson would be respected.

On the other hand, if the nations stood aside and allowed wars to take place, the wars would no longer be regarded as punishment, but merely wars for power. When one talked about the maintenance of peace it must be remembered that it might be necessary that powers that had the forces to use them in wars for the maintenance of peace.

The democratic character of the League was to some extent at fault for its inability to take action when action should have been taken, but there had been a suggestion of a swing round from democratic to dictatorial form of organisation. What was being submitted now was dictatorship of the Great Powers. He did not think, as far as ultimate peace was concerned, that that offered a great deal of prospect. He believed that it would lead to a still greater divergence of policy. There would likely be greater divergence in future than at Geneva.

He would prefer the democratic ideal of Geneva from the point of view of small nations. He believed that the Geneva organisation could have been made effective, but not until it

was understood what a big responsibility it was for any state, no matter how great, to take upon itself the initiation of a great war.

What was largely responsible for the position which developed at Geneva was the natural hope that things might right themselves if action was not taken. Small nations in their present position could not do very much effectively. In fact, they could do little more than “kick for touch” at the present time, but the great nations could play a very important part – however he might feel with regard to the prospects – for the effective building up of an organisation for the maintenance of a lasting peace.

PART OF SMALL NATIONS

Dr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, seconding the vote of thanks, said they were now on the threshold of a new chapter in the history of the planet. It was good and useful that the sons and daughters of small nations should take stock once more and try to see how they could serve the best and be served the best.

“Those who concern themselves with the destiny and the lot of small nations must”, he said, “bear in mind two things: it has never been possible to destroy small nations or incorporate them into larger units by mere force. In spite of their inconsiderable numerical strength, small nations are distinguished by a remarkable power of resistance. Even though they temporarily weaken and succumb to superior strength, they bestir themselves again as soon as either a favourable political situation or some trend of thought, sweeping through the world irrespective of political frontiers, creates conditions favourable for their reappearance on the world stage.”

“There is a second proposition which we can formulate as follows: Small nations have rarely contrived to create for themselves such guarantees of security that they need not seek the support of large units. This holds good in politics, in economics, and partially so in cultural matters. These two basic ideas, merely as fundamental mathematical theorems, will guide us, both in our historical retrospect and also when we consider the position of small nations in the post-war world.”

NEED NOT FEAR GREAT POWERS

“Anyone who can consider a course of action upon which the interests of small and great nations would meet without friction or encroachment on either side, will achieve a considerable advance in the endeavour to bring about a permanent, honest balance of power and permanent peace. History shows that the attempt to find such a course involves enormous difficulties, and that, of the solutions which have been tried through the centuries, there is not one which has proved completely satisfactory and has embodied itself in permanent forms.”

Dr. Masaryk spoke of the necessity for a system of collective security among small nations as a defence against aggressive policy by a powerful neighbour. The security and peaceful development of small nations after this world war would depend on whether an attempt was made to discover a workable method for enabling small nations to proceed on their way unmenaced in their interests by large, powerful units.

“Any discussion about the position of small nations in the world which will emerge from this gigantic struggle would be imperfect if it took account only of political and economic problems. Small nations, and particularly those which have temporarily lost and then recovered their independence, value highly their share in the political and economic development of the world, but they realise that the centre of gravity of their activity and the main source of their strength lie elsewhere.”

IRELAND RENOWNED

“Ireland”, he said, “though small in size, achieved renown in western and central Europe during the seventh and eighth centuries, not through powerful rulers, but through the monks who spread Christian doctrine, taught people to write and acquainted them with the mediaeval literature, which was created chiefly in the monasteries.”

M. Masaryk mentioned such names as W. B. Yeats, Synge, Dr. Douglas Hyde, George W. Russell and Bernard Shaw, and referred to the triumph of the Irish theatre as concrete proofs of spiritual values emanating from a small nation, and mentioned the names from his own country of Karel Kapek and the poet, Brezina.

“It is in the depths of the inner life”, he commented, “that the real losses and gains take place. It is there that are situated the real battlefields, not marked on any maps, but which, nevertheless, decide the destinies of myriads.”

The small nations, he proceeded, would maintain their position in the world if they took their stand upon spiritual activities, moral staunchness of courage, and if they relied more upon the resources of the spirit than upon physical strength. There was a certain similarity between the revivalist movement embodied in the Gaelic League, so ably guided by Dr. Douglas Hyde, and the activities of the Czech leaders during the nineteenth century, when, due to the Germanising drive of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech language was gradually disappearing as a scientific, cultural and literary medium.

In conclusion, he expressed the wish that the people of Éire and Czechoslovakia should know each other better and more intimately when the war was followed by a joint effort towards a decent peace. □

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