

Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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Sinn Fein and The Armenian Question

Brendan Clifford

Belief in dogmatic assertions, with penalties imposed on disbelief, has shifted from religion to politics in the course of my lifetime. When I was young, religion had a stable dogmatic structure. I did not find it believable, but I realized that the subject matter of dogma was of a kind to which belief and disbelief were the appropriate modes of thought. It did not have to do with ascertainable fact. But the subject matter of the new dogmas of the secular era is ascertainable historical fact. The new dogmatism requires that the factual investigation of certain historical events should be set aside and its place taken by belief about those events.

The events which are the subjects of these secular historical dogmas are the exterminations of peoples.

The extermination of a people has been called a genocide since the middle of the 20th century, but it has existed from time immemorial.

The sacred Scriptures of the Jewish and Christian religions include the books of Deuteronomy and Joshua, which might be called the Books of Genocide.

God ordered the Jews to conquer Palestine and destroy its people. And it can hardly be said that the Book of Joshua is irrelevant to the affairs of the 21st century AD.

The attempted extermination of the Jewish people by the German State during its invasion of Communist Russia, between the Fall of 1941 and early 1945, was the occasion for the adoption of a genocide law—or something that pretended to be a law—by the United Nations. What the German State did was declared to be a crime, even though there was no law against it when it was being carried out.

What was called *international law* before Britain launched its Great War in 1914 was nothing more than Agreements made between particular states, or grand declarations of principle made by a number of states at Geneva or The Hague. Woodrow Wilson, before he became President of the United States, declared that these things did not deserve the name of Law, and that international law did not exist.

At the end of that War, the League of Nations was set up by the Congress of Victors, meeting at Versailles. The Victors were four Empires—the British, French, Italian and Japanese—and the United States. The Empires rewarded themselves for being victorious. The territories of all four were expanded by agreement between them, and defeated states were plundered, had territory taken from them, and were humiliated by being made to confess that they were evil. And the Victors set up a world structure, the League of Nations—but only those who admitted that the Imperial re-division made at Versailles, by the Victors in the War, and the humiliating punishment of the losers, were just and lawful were admitted to the League.

President Wilson took part in the founding of the League of Nations, but the US Legislature refused to sign the Versailles Treaty. Communist Russia likewise had nothing to do with it. The League, therefore, was little more than an arrangement made between the victorious Empires. And whatever principles it stood for did not apply within the realms of those Empires.

The delegates of the independent Irish Government, elected at the General Election of August 1918 were locked out of the Versailles Conference by Britain, while delegates of the Jewish Agency were brought into the Conference because Britain had decided to introduce a Jewish colony to Palestine and establish a Jewish state which would serve British interests against the Arab world.

The Versailles Conference broke with the precedent of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, at the end of the Wars against Napoleon, and of the Conference at the end of the previous War against France a hundred years before that. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) was negotiated with the same French Government against which Britain had made war, and the Treaty of Vienna (1815) was negotiated with the successor Government to Napoleon.

In 1919, however, the defeated Powers (Germany, Austria and Turkey) were not allowed to take any part in negotiating the Peace Settlement. The German Kaiser had gone into exile and a Republican Government was established in Germany, but the victorious Allies would have no truck with it. And the war on Germany was continued for about 8 months after the 'Armistice' of November 1918. It was only after the Armistice that the Royal Navy got access to the Baltic. Until then it was possible for Germany to trade across the Baltic with Scandinavian countries. The Royal Navy put a stop to that in November 1918, knowing that its food blockade was already causing starvation in Germany. Deaths from starvation increased sharply during the first six months of 1919.

Germany, after the unification of 1871, had followed the British pattern of development within an international division of labour. Britain had become incapable of feeding itself in the early 19th century. The Royal Navy had been built for conquest, but was then justified by Britain's need to keep its sea lanes open in order to feed itself. It adopted the rule that the Royal Navy must be larger than any other two Navies combined.

When Germany launched itself on a similar line of development, Britain watched it carefully, and the publications of the ruling class were reporting by 1900 that German capitalist development had outrun its native sources of raw materials, and that Germany could no longer feed itself without large-scale food imports.

Britain, with an Empire strung out across the world, and with world agriculture supplying its industrial population with cheap food, thought habitually in geo-political terms: its ruling class did, and relevant details were fed into the mass-circulation press.

Germany did not have a ruling class accustomed to treating the world as a hinterland which served it—indeed, not having a ruling class at all in the sense that Britain had—it did not seem to realize the predicament that its capitalist development on British lines had got it into until after Britain had seen it.

The last British Imperial expansion by means of an openly declared war of conquest leading to the acquisition of territory by right of conquest, was the Boer War of 1899-1902. It appears a small war to hindsight, and even in its time it hardly seems such a great war that it was necessary for Britain to interfere with German trade with the Boer Republics during it. The Kaiser, it is true, did not break off relations with the Republics when Britain made war on them—but neither did he become the guarantor of their continuing independence or declare war on Britain for breaching international law against them.

However Britain did interfere with German shipping as part of its blockade of the Boers—and Germany began to realize, what Britain already knew, that it was placing itself under the power of the Royal Navy. So it set about getting itself a Navy to protect its trade—and Britain wasn't having that.

There actually was a movement within Britain immediately after the end of the Boer War which might have made it unnecessary for Britain to wage a war of destruction on Germany: the Imperial Preference movement. Insofar as it is remembered it is associated with the name Joseph Chamberlain, who has an undeservedly bad reputation in nationalist Ireland.

Chamberlain was a successful manufacturing capitalist in Birmingham in the 1880s. He had built up his own business, and in the course of doing so he began to wonder why wage-workers put up with the conditions that capitalism subjected them to. He concluded that capitalism could not continue for long unless what we now call the welfare state was set up underneath it as a safety net. He pioneered social welfare reform as a Liberal in Birmingham.

But the Liberal Party was committed to the ideology of complete Free Trade in the market as the recipe for general harmony and would not agree to imposing restrictions on it by interfering with the rights of employers or by enabling workers to live without being employed. Chamberlain therefore linked up with the Tories, who were in a kind of pre-capitalist mode at the time. The link-up produced the Unionist Party, which was the major British Party from about 1890 to the early 1920s—when the merger was completed and the name Conservative began to be used for the Party.

Chamberlain was very much for the conquest of the Boer Republics and their assimilation into the Empire. But when that was accomplished he seemed to stand back and look at the Empire as he had looked at Capitalism around 1880, and he reached the similar conclusion that things could not continue indefinitely as they were.

He therefore suggested that the Empire should be consolidated rather than expanded indefinitely. He wanted to establish an Imperial Preference which would consolidate the existing Empire into an economic section of the world, on which a political Federation might be established, leaving other Powers to do similarly in other regions.

There was a dispute about this within the Unionist Party—which British historians have consigned to oblivion. The leader on the Tory side of the Unionist Party, Arthur Balfour, did not support Chamberlain's proposal, but neither did he oppose it decisively.

The Liberal Party, however, categorically rejected the idea of limiting the Empire by the establishment of Imperial Preference, ending the era of world free trade. And many from the Tory side of the Unionist Party went over to the Liberals on the issue. The Liberals won the 1906 election as the Free Trade party.

The practical meaning of Free Trade in the circumstances was ongoing Imperial expansion in one form or another. Capitalist free trade on a global scale outside an Imperial framework is not a practical possibility, and this was acknowledged by the rise to dominance within the Liberal Party of the Liberal Imperialist tendency, which took control after the 1906 Election and immediately began preparing for war on Germany.

Diplomatically, the preparation for war included the forming of an alliance against it with two Empires which had ambitions which could only be realized through the defeat of Germany, or its ally, Austria.

France had an irredentist claim against Germany over the region of Alsace-Lorraine. This region, which was of mixed German and French population, and had previously been part of Germany, returned to Germany in 1871 as a consequence of the defeat of France in the war it had launched against Prussia in 1870 with the object of disrupting the process of unification that was going on in Germany. The failure of its aggression accelerated German unification instead of retarding it.

Britain had fought three major wars against France in the 18th and early 19th centuries. In its planning for war, Britain treated France as Enemy No. 1, simply because it was the strongest Power in Europe. The defeat of France in 1871 diminished France as a Power and enhanced Germany, and the strong economic development of Germany after 1871 left no doubt

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in the British mind around 1900 that it had displaced France as Enemy No. 1.

An ‘understanding’ between Britain and France was established in 1905. It did not have the explicit form of a Treaty for action against Germany, but both sides acted militarily on the understanding that that was its purpose. Detailed planning was done in secret for the placing of a British Army in pre-arranged position in the line in France on short notice. And it was done on the British side by officers who were prominent in the “Curragh Mutiny” against Home Rule early in 1914, which made it necessary for the Government to back down.

It was also not made explicit that France’s reason for allying itself with “perfidious Albion” against Germany was irredentist. But everybody who was involved knew very well that that is what it was.

The great enemy of the British Empire in Asia was the Tsarist Empire, whose expansion was bringing it to Afghanistan. Russia was defeated by Japan in 1905. Britain thus encouraged it to look for expansion in the West rather than the East. The Tsar had long had his eye on Constantinople (now Istanbul), capital of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Britain had previously opposed Russian expansion in this direction, and in the Crimean War had formed an alliance with France against it, but now it encouraged Russian ambitions.

France made a Treaty with Russia. Britain did not make a Treaty with either of them, but had “*understandings*” with both of them, leaving it free to manipulate both, and judge opportunities for intervention.

Disrupting German economic development was not Britain’s only purpose in making these “*understandings*”. It had also marked down Arabia as the next addition to the British Empire. It had gained effective possession of Egypt. Its Indian Empire had expanded along Southern Persia (Iran), leaving Northern Persia to the Tsar, with a weak Persian state as a buffer zone between the two. And it had made a secret agreement with a Sheikh across the Persian Gulf. Its purpose was to establish a continuous land Empire from Egypt to India.

War on Germany and Austria would only achieve France’s irredentist object of conquering Alsace-Lorraine. The primary Russian object, Constantinople, required that the War be extended to the Ottoman Empire, as did the second of Britain’s objects.

Britain, France and Russia had before 1914 looked on the Ottoman Empire as something to be broken up and shared. Their disagreement was only over the share-out. But Germany had for a generation been helping the Ottoman State to modernize itself. The Kaiser saw a strong Moslem state as a necessary part of a world order. German capital undertook the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad—which would have far-reaching economic and administrative consequences. American writers during the period of American neutrality reckoned that it was this German assistance to the Ottoman State, which went against Britain’s plans for the Empire, that was Britain’s basic reason for bringing about the Great War.

Turkey had a Treaty with Germany, but it declared itself neutral in the European War. This meant that the British and Russian interests required that it be provoked into conflict with them.

Britain began the provocation of Turkey even before declaring war on Germany. Turkey, eager for peace with both sides, had undertaken military development in alliance with Germany and naval development in alliance with Britain. It had placed an order for two warships with Britain, paid for by popular subscription in Turkey. These were ready for delivery in July 1914. Turkish crews were being trained on them. But Britain confiscated them.

Other incidents followed during the next three months, until an occasion for a Russian declaration of war on Turkey was found. This was followed immediately by a British declaration of war and the invasion of Mesopotamia by Britain’s Indian Army, while Russia attacked from the North.

The Armenian population of Turkey, which had at times been on close terms with the Young Turk movement that had taken over the Ottoman Government, was caught in two minds by the War. Russia called on it, as a Christian community, to rise against the infidel, while Constantinople offered it a substantial area of formal autonomy if it recognized Ottoman sovereignty. The Armenian leadership chose to act on its religious dimension, and belief in the good faith of the Third Rome in the Kremlin. It came out in rebellion, in conjunction with the Russian invasion. The Ottoman State, now under attack at three points by two Empires, each more powerful than itself, ordered the Armenian population to remove itself out of the region of the Russian advance.

Many Armenians died in the course of the deportation from a variety of reasons; including hunger and cold and attacks by Kurdish bandits.

The Turkish Army offered an unexpected power of resistance. It was expected to collapse at a touch but in the event it had to be broken by three years of hard fighting. In 1919 the Turkish Government was presented with a humiliating Treaty to sign, and the Greeks (who had themselves been forced to declare war on Turkey by British invasion and the establishment of a British puppet-Government) were exhorted by Britain to invade Anatolia and reap the fruits of victory.

But then a powerful resistance movement arose, which repudiated the imposed Treaty and defeated the Greek invasion.

In these circumstances, an Allied cry went up that the deportation of the Armenian population that had allied itself with the Russian invasion had been an attempt to exterminate the Armenian people—what we now call Genocide.

Sean Crowe, Sinn Fein’s spokesman on foreign affairs has now taken up that cry. He called on the Dublin Government to give official recognition to “*the Armenian Genocide*”. When the Government did not heed the call, he said:

“I was disappointed by the stance taken today by Government parties who voted against a motion calling on the Government to officially recognise the Genocide at the Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee. Their majority on the Committee ensured the motion didn’t get passed.”

He said:

“There is overwhelming oral, written, and diplomatic evidence that the actions of the Ottoman Empire against Armenians was genocide.”

If he has such evidence, he should produce it. If what he has is assertions, emanating from the secret British wartime Propaganda Department at Wellington House, he should discard it.

The Ottoman Archive fell into British hands when Britain occupied Istanbul in 1919 and held it until at least 1922. Britain, with control of the Archive, could not substantiate its war propaganda in trials for War Crimes committed against the Armenians.

These proposed prosecutions were taken very seriously by Britain. The process was instigated and overseen by the British Attorney-General, Gordon Hewart, who was to become Lord Chief Justice in 1922. Hewart found that the Armenian Patriarch could supply no evidence, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul could provide nothing, the U.S. State Department had nothing. The Attorney General concluded that

“it seems improbable that the charges made against the accused will be capable of legal proof in a Court of Law” (PRO-FO 371/6504/E.8745, 29/7/21)

The Foreign Office replied

“it appears that the chances of obtaining convictions are almost nil... It is regrettable that the Turks have been confined as long without charges being formulated against them...” (PRO-FO 371/6504/E.8745, 3/8/21).

After that the hundreds of Turks interned in Malta, including the 50 or so detained for war crimes against the Armenians, were held as political hostages and subsequently released.

All documents relating to the failed prosecutions are now contained in the British archives. The famous Blue Book of James Bryce and the Ambassador Morgenthau reports, often cited as the key evidence to back up their assertion, are among the files. But despite all this information, cited as factual evidence by the many who have never actually read it, the British Attorney General, with all such evidence at hand, decided that no prosecutions could be achieved.

In fact, those accused were retried for a second time, with the same result. No evidence for guilt. Lord Curzon, in May 1921, attempted to press for a law-suit on wholly political grounds, with a legal case being incapable of being carried, but the Attorney General told him there was insufficient grounds, even for a show trial. There was no proof of intent that could be brought against the Committee Of Union and Progress (the Ottoman Government of the time) and therefore the prosecutions were abandoned with the defendants released from internment. And I am willing to bet that most people did not know that the Pope, Benedict XV, had urged the British to release the chief suspects, or at least treat them better! (The evidence for this is in the British archives at Kew)

There are, in fact, no judicial or historical grounds for what is termed the “Armenian Genocide”. It is merely an assertion. No International Court has ever found for such a thing and historians are extremely divided over the issue. It is mindlessly repeated that “most historians” agree on the “Genocide” label being applied. But when has this ever been quantified? And if such an exercise is ever completed how meaningless it will be. This “majority” is, if it actually exists, made up of those from the Anglosphere, predominantly from the Armenian diaspora, and some career-minded Westerners, with a few guilty Turks

thrown in (the Roy Fosters and Trinity College Workshops of Turkey, like Taner Aksam).

The over-whelming number of Moslem historians who have written about it are unconvinced due to lack of evidence. They are backed up by a number of American historians who have done serious investigations, chief of whom is an Irish-American, Prof. Justin McCarthy.

They are supported by the evidence in the completely open Ottoman archives - whilst the British archive’s material is heavily restricted to historians and the Armenian archive is closed shut! What does that tell us?

The Sinn Fein spokesman says:

“If we do not accept what happened in the past we cannot learn from the mistakes and move on. Collectively we must ensure that we oppose the manipulation of history...”

But what Sean Crowe is doing is participating in the British manipulation of history.

This probably comes from Sinn Fein’s success in disentangling the Northern Ireland tangle, which was designed to mislead, and concentrating on the essential thing in it. It rejected persuasive encouragement towards a local war of communities and kept the State—the British State: the one and only State in the Six Counties - central to the conflict: until the State changed the relationship of communities it had set up in 1921, making a phase of structured political conflict possible. What Sinn Fein has done since the mid-1970s can only be appreciated fully by somebody who lived through it.

It succeeded against the British State. But Britain does not surrender in the face of failure—it adapts, discards its initial position, and massages failure into success. It can do this because, as a State, it has no principles, though its propaganda is skilled at simulating principle to serve political purpose.

Though the credit for averting the communal war encouraged by a number of Secretaries of State belongs entirely to the Sinn Fein leadership, Sinn Fein has been accused of perpetrating genocide. That accusation had a Whitehall source. If Sinn Fein had faltered, it would now be known to the world as a genocide movement that was stopped.

It did not falter. And it did not suffer a loss of will when the State dragged its heels on the implementation of Ceasefire terms twenty years ago. Resumption of military action after a long pause convinced the State that it had to make a deal. And it doesn’t do these things half-heartedly. Michael Collins was bowled over by British recognition and flattery—and his Sinn Fein was turned into a parody of itself in a few months.

The present Sinn Fein has been subjected to recognition and flattery but has not been bowled over—even though it developed in the political culture of West Belfast, which had remained persistently Redmondite for half a century after Redmondism was brushed aside in the South.

But success against Britain—involving informal political relations even while the formal relationship was military—could not have failed to make a change to the understanding

of what Britain was. It is both charming and brutal and can be whichever policy requires.

The British decision to re-structure the North brought Sinn Fein into a kind of relationship with the Unionist community that no other nationalist party had ever achieved. And the Redmondite underlay of West Belfast culture facilitated forms of joint action on such things as The Somme.

And then Sinn Fein, on the basis of its achievement in the North, entered Southern politics effectively. But it did so at a moment when Fianna Fail rejected the national political orientation of its founders, and there was a strong resurgence of Redmondism in the political culture of the state. Sinn Fein's experience in the North did not prepare it for this.

Britain's purpose in setting up Northern Ireland as the means of effecting Partition in 1921, instead of governing the Six Counties as part of the democracy of the state, can only have been to exert an influence on political development of the South by holding out the illusion that there could be unity if the South restricted its development as an independent state.

And now Sinn Fein, whose view of Britain must be very different from what it was forty years ago, is making its way in an Irish Republic whose view of the world has been remade under British influence in recent times.

Danny Morrison said, in the early 90s, as far as I recall, that if only Sinn Fein got a fair deal in the North, it would show that it could outdo all the revisionists in the South in revisionism. It remains to be seen if things go that way.

The 1916 Proclamation made a point of aligning itself with "*gallant allies in Europe*". Those allies were Germany, Austria and Turkey. And of these the staunchest was Turkey. Germany, under pressure of the Royal Navy's starvation blockade, bowed the head, humiliated itself by making a false confession of war guilt, creating the situation in which Fascism flourished. Austria was pulled apart and made into a series of mutually hostile, internally unstable, anti-Semitic states.

Turkey rebelled against its imposed Treaty, forced Britain to abandon the Greek Army it had sent to conquer Anatolia, and that led to the fall of the War Coalition in Britain.

The disabling effect on Imperial policy of defeat by Turkey was undoubtedly why it was possible for Irish Independence to be established under the Irish 'Treaty'. It was not the script that did it. It was the severe damage inflicted on the British Imperial will by Turkey.

Irish Republicans once acknowledged the service that Turkey did the world then. It is not something that Britain wanted to be remembered so Ireland forgot it. But there is now no excuse for not knowing about it. Pat Walsh has gone into the history of it in detail—and also into the history of Redmondite West Belfast.

If the death of a large number of people is to be described as Genocide, there are better grounds for describing the Irish Famine—and other Famines caused by British action in the world—as Genocide than there is for describing the movement of the Armenian population, which was in rebellion in alliance

with the invading Russian Army, away from the path of the Army, as Genocide. The British Government, in peacetime, in command of a World Empire, might have caused the Irish—living in an economy destroyed by Britain and remade to serve British purposes—to be fed when the potato failed.

The situation of the Turkish Government with relation to Armenians was entirely different. Their leaders had rejected a proposal for self-government made to them by the State to which they owed allegiance, and had instead gone into active alliance with a foreign state whose object was to destroy the Ottoman Empire and annex Istanbul. □

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Ireland and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

By David Morrison

On 20 November 1959, on the initiative of Ireland, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing that the UN Disarmament Committee consider the feasibility of an international agreement under which the nuclear-weapon powers would not hand over control of nuclear weapons to other states, and non-nuclear-weapon states would not manufacture such weapons [1].

For the next decade, Ireland was to the fore in seeking international agreement on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led in 1968 to the drawing up of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (aka the NPT) [2] and it was formally proposed by Ireland.

Ireland is proud of the part it played in the process that led to the formulation of the NPT and it regards itself as a keeper of the faith on the issue. However, in the one instance (in 2008) when it had an opportunity to prevent the erosion of the international non-proliferation regime, it gave in to US pressure to give nuclear-armed India special privileges (see below).

Ireland has also got illusions that the NPT is an instrument for nuclear disarmament, when in reality it gave international endorsement to the continued possession of nuclear weapons by five states – the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, France and China – and provided them with a mechanism to apply pressure on other states not to acquire nuclear weapons.

NPT a bizarre treaty

The NPT is a bizarre treaty which places diametrically opposite obligations on states that became parties to it. Thus, the five states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time were allowed to join as ‘nuclear-weapon’ states and keep their nuclear weapons, whereas other states that didn’t possess nuclear weapons had to join as ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ states and were forbidden to acquire them.

Article IX (3) of the Treaty defines a ‘nuclear-weapon’ state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967”. By this definition, the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, France and China qualified for this extraordinary privilege (and Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s extraordinary privilege).

What is more, this extraordinary privilege cannot be taken away from them without their consent because, under Article VIII (2) of the Treaty, no amendment of any kind can be made to the Treaty without the consent of each of the ‘nuclear-weapon’ parties. This means that each of them is also in a position to veto any proposal to amend the Treaty to grant the same privilege to any other state.

States other than these privileged five have to join the NPT as ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ states and, under the treaty, are forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons and all the nuclear facilities must be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This means that to join the NPT today India, Israel and Pakistan would have to give up their nuclear weapons. These three states stayed out of the NPT so that they would be free to develop nuclear weapons without breaching any international obligations, and they are highly unlikely to give them up in order to join.

The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and was signed on that day by 62 states. But only three ‘nuclear-weapon’ states – the US, the UK and the USSR – signed at that time. China and France did not sign until 1992. Today, 191 states are parties to the Treaty, 5 as ‘nuclear-weapon’ states and 186 as ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ states, the latest signatory being the State of Palestine in February 2015 (see UN Office for Disarmament Affairs website [3]).

(The ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ state signatories include North Korea, which signed as a ‘non-nuclear-weapon’ state in 1985 but withdrew in 2003, having developed nuclear weapons contrary to Article II of the treaty, though its withdrawal has not been formally accepted and the UN still lists it as a party to the treaty.)

Only 4 UN member states are not NPT signatories: India, Israel and Pakistan – and South Sudan, which became a member state in July 2011.

Flanagan on NPT

Article VIII (3) of the NPT requires that a Review Conference on the treaty’s operation be held every 5 years, if a majority of the parties to the NPT request it. The Ninth Review Conference was held in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2015. Prior to representing Ireland at the conference, Foreign Minister Charlie Flanagan had an article in the Irish Times on 27 April entitled *It is vital we prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons* [4].

In it, he claimed that the NPT “has been effective in stopping countries that don’t have nuclear arms from developing them”. It is difficult to justify that statement given that when the NPT came into force in March 1970 only five states possessed nuclear weapons but now with the addition of India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan that number has grown to nine.

He went on to say that the NPT “has not achieved its other major goal, which is the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons”, as if the NPT requires its ‘nuclear-weapon’ state parties to give up their nuclear weapons. But it doesn’t really: Article VI merely requires them to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the

nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, in other words, to talk about nuclear disarmament. There is no commitment to nuclear disarmament per se, let alone a commitment to do it by a prescribed date. And it’s inconceivable that any of them would have signed up to a treaty that laid down a date by which nuclear disarmament had to be completed.

The NPT was initially scheduled to last for 25 years, at the end of which a conference of the signatories was to be held to decide whether to extend its operation. One might have thought that given the failure of the ‘nuclear-weapon’ parties to disarm in the previous 25 years there would have been a concerted effort by the other parties to refuse to extend the NPT’s life unless a disarmament completion date was specified. But the Review and Extension Conference took place in 1995 and made the treaty permanent without a date being specified.

(*)

The UK is in the process of upgrading its Trident submarine-based system for delivering its nuclear weapons.

In 2007, the Labour Government at the time published a White Paper, *The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent* [5], which made a case for the UK retaining its nuclear weapons. It said that the UK needed nuclear weapons “to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means” (Paragraph 3-4).

More recently, on 18 June 2012, UK Minister of Defence, Conservative Philip Hammond, justified the continued possession of nuclear weapons to the House of Commons in the following terms:

“The possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent has ensured this country’s safety. It ensured that we saw off the threat in the cold war and it will ensure our security in the future.” [6]

In the light of this uncompromising justification for retaining its nuclear weapons it is inconceivable that the UK is going to give up its nuclear weapons any time soon. And neither are the other four ‘nuclear-weapon’ signatories to the NPT.

US-India nuclear deal

Is it likely that those states outside the NPT with nuclear weapons – India, Israel and Pakistan – will disarm?

One source of pressure on them to disarm and join the NPT has been that since the 1970s international rules have been in place to prevent them from importing nuclear material and equipment. This has made it very difficult for them to develop extensive nuclear power programmes.

The introduction of these restrictions was triggered by India’s first nuclear test in 1974, which revealed that India had a nuclear weapons programme. India had used plutonium produced in a reactor supplied by Canada for civil purposes to make nuclear weapons. In response to this, in 1975 a Nuclear Suppliers Group of states was established. Today, this Group

has 49 members, including Ireland, and is supposed to take its decisions by consensus.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group introduced rules banning the export of nuclear material and equipment to states, like India, whose nuclear facilities were not all subject to IAEA supervision. These restrictions don’t apply to ‘non-nuclear weapon’ state parties to the NPT, since they are required to subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision.

This state of affairs continued until 2005 when, in order to curry favour with India – and boost US sales of nuclear material and equipment to India – the Bush administration negotiated a nuclear deal with it, which has led to it, and it alone, being exempt from these rules. To put this into effect, the US pressurised the states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group into making an exception for India at a meeting on 6 September 2008. Ireland acquiesced in this exception being made.

As a result, the ban on India importing nuclear material and equipment, which has been in operation for over 30 years, has now been lifted. In other words, a ban which was put in place in 1974 because India developed nuclear weapons using a reactor imported for civil purposes has now been lifted without India having to give up that programme or its nuclear arsenal.

Ireland gives in to US pressure

This was the most significant breach in the international non-proliferation regime for a generation – and the Fianna Fail Government gave Ireland’s consent to it in September 2008. Deputy (now President) Michael D. Higgins made sustained efforts to prevent the Government taking this step. On his proposal in January 2007, for example, the Oireachtas Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously passed a motion opposing any exception for India in the existing rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group [7].

Defending Ireland’s support for the exception on 5 November 2008 [8], Foreign Minister Micheál Martin declared that “India is the largest, most populous, and economically most significant country in south Asia” with “a distinguished tradition of parliamentary democracy, responsible government, respect for pluralism and human rights and a vibrant independent media” – and an arsenal of nuclear weapons to which Ireland is opposed, he might have added but didn’t for obvious reasons.

In effect, India is now the 6th internationally endorsed ‘nuclear-weapon’ state in the world – while remaining outside the NPT. The five official nuclear powers enjoy two privileges:

- (1) they are not subject to sanctions, economic or otherwise, because of their possession of nuclear weapons systems, which they can modernise and enhance at will, and
- (2) they are free to import nuclear-related material and equipment without having all their nuclear facilities subject to IAEA inspection.

Today, India also enjoys those privileges – in part, thanks to Ireland.

(For my earlier writing on the US-India deal, see <http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/india/>)

Flanagan on Iran

Flanagan also wrote in his *Irish Times* article that “it is vital that we prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, as in Iran”. This implies that Iran has or had a nuclear weapons programme, which without the pressure applied to Iran by the US and its allies, including Ireland, would have yielded nuclear weapons.

In fact, despite more than two decades of trying, no western intelligence agency managed to produce hard evidence that Iran was trying to develop nuclear weapons – and the IAEA never found any evidence in Iran’s nuclear facilities of the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes, and all of its nuclear facilities are under IAEA supervision and have been for many years.

(I suggest that anybody who still believes that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme reads *Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare* [9] by US investigative journalist Gareth Porter. It demonstrates beyond peradventure that this is a myth based on intelligence that was either misinterpreted or simply false.)

Flanagan began his article by welcoming “the progress made towards resolving the long-running issue of Iran’s nuclear programme” adding:

“This would represent a significant achievement and a major step forward towards the peaceful resolution of a long-running dispute which has had the potential to destabilise further an already volatile region.”

However, it is worth noting that this “long-running dispute” was made in Washington: it arose because, with the support of its allies, including Ireland, the US attempted to prevent Iran having uranium enrichment facilities on its own soil, which is its “inalienable right” under Article IV(1) of the NPT. The present US Secretary of State, John Kerry, acknowledged that several years ago – in an interview in the *Financial Times* in 10 June 2009, he said: “They have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that purpose” (see *US senator opens Iran nuclear debate* [10]). And he went on to describe the Bush administration’s “no enrichment” approach to negotiations as “bombastic diplomacy” that “wasted energy” and “hardened the lines”. Had the US and its allies, including Ireland, accepted Iran’s right to uranium enrichment like John Kerry from the outset, there would have been no dispute at all, let alone a “long-running” one.

As Peter Osborne and I pointed out in our book *A Dangerous Delusion: Why the West is Wrong about Nuclear Iran* [11] published in 2013, a settlement on the nuclear issue could have been reached with Iran in 2005, when negotiations were going on with the EU3 (UK, France and Germany). Then, in exchange for the EU3 agreeing to its right to enrichment, Iran was prepared to put in place unprecedented measures – over and above the safeguards required under the NPT – to reassure the outside world that its nuclear programme was for peaceful

purposes. A settlement wasn’t reached because the US insisted that Iran must not have uranium enrichment facilities on its own soil – and the EU3 shamefully acquiesced.

Almost a decade later, a deal became possible because the US did a U-turn and accepted Iran having enrichment on its own soil – and this U-turn was dutifully followed by its allies, including Ireland. The US policy reversal is understandable: since 2005, it expended an immense amount of political capital dragooning the world into applying political and economic pressure on Iran in an attempt to force it to cease enrichment. But, these efforts failed abysmally: in 2005, there were no centrifuges enriching uranium in Iran; today, more than 19,000 centrifuges are installed, around 10,000 of which are operational.

Middle East WMD Free Zone

An NPT Review Conference is counted as a success if a consensus declaration emerges at the end of it, normally a very long and largely vacuous declaration. By that measure, this year’s Ninth Review Conference, which ended on 22 May, was not a success – a final declaration was not agreed. The sticking point centred once more on holding a conference to discuss the creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East.

This proposition started life at the Fifth Review Conference in 1995. Then, a resolution was passed calling for the creation of “an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems” [12]. It also called for all states in the region to accede to the NPT as soon as possible. This resolution was co-sponsored by the US, UK and Russia.

This Conference was also the NPT Extension Conference, which made the NPT permanent. Agreeing to this resolution was the very small price that the ‘nuclear-weapon’ states had to pay for making the NPT – and therefore their internationally endorsed possession of nuclear weapons – permanent.

The 1995 NPT resolution calling for a WMD free zone in the Middle East was reaffirmed at the Sixth Review Conference in 2000, though, needless to say, there was no progress whatsoever towards its implementation. The Seventh Review Conference in 2005 failed to agree a final declaration, a sticking point being the lack of progress on implementing the 1995 resolution. The Bush administration refused to put its name to any declaration which involved additional measures to induce Israel to give up its nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT.

The Obama administration was anxious to avoid a similar outcome at the Eighth Review Conference in 2010. This time, a coalition of the 118 states in the Non-Aligned Movement, led by Egypt, lobbied strongly for progress on this (and other) issues. In order to achieve a final consensus declaration, the US had to agree to “a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”, to quote from the conference final document [13] (p30).

Specifically, in a resolution on the Middle East, the Conference agreed that

“The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution [the US, UK and Russia], in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a

conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;”

The resolution also specifically called for Israel to accede to the NPT as a “non-nuclear weapon” state, which would require it to give up its nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards (p29/30). (Israel attends NPT Review Conferences as an observer, even though it isn’t a party to the NPT.) Iran’s nuclear activities weren’t mentioned in the resolution, at a time when it was regularly being accused of developing nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US put its name to the declaration.

However, the Conference never took place, despite Finland agreeing to hold it and Jaakko Laajava of Finland being appointed as facilitator to work out an agenda, among other things. Obviously, Israel didn’t want the conference to take place and the resolution’s prescription that it should be held “on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region” gave Israel the means of preventing it being held – Israel insisted that a wide range of Middle East security issues be on the agenda and the Arab League, acting on behalf of its Arab neighbours, refused to agree. The US, one of the three conveners of the conference, called it off in November 2012 on the grounds that “states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference” [14].

Fast forward to this year’s Ninth Review Conference, where the sticking point was again arrangements for holding the conference. Egypt took the lead in proposing that the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, take over responsibility for convening it and that it “could be held without agreement on an agenda or discussion of regional security issues” [15]. These proposals were supported by the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement. The US refused to have the Egyptian proposal included in the final declaration from the Review Conference, so no declaration was agreed.

Where do we go from here?

There is very little likelihood that any of the nine nuclear-armed states in the world today will give up their weapons in the foreseeable future.

But will other states acquire them? States that possess nuclear weapons are not subject to “humanitarian intervention” by the US and its allies. As President Putin wrote a few years ago:

“All this fervor around the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea makes one wonder how the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation emerge and who is aggravating them.


“It seems that the more frequent cases of crude and even armed outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries may prompt authoritarian (and other) regimes to possess nuclear weapons. If I have the A-bomb in my pocket, nobody will touch me because it’s more trouble than it is worth. And those who don’t have the bomb might have to sit and wait for ‘humanitarian intervention’.

“Whether we like it or not, foreign interference suggests this train of thought.” [16]

The acquisition of a functional nuclear weapons system requires a considerable effort and a state will only embark on this task if it feels seriously threatened. The lesson for the US and its allies is obvious.

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Near Unanimity and Sharp Divisions at the EESC:

For Stronger Eurozone Cohesion —

Against the Proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

By Manus O’Riordan

A May 2015 report from Manus O’Riordan, Member for Ireland, Workers’ Group, European Economic & Social Committee (EESC)

At a meeting of the EESC Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion held on May 6, there was overwhelming support for a Draft Opinion entitled “Completing EMU: The political pillar”. This was drawn up by a Study Group of which I was a member, and the joint *rapporteurs* were Carmelo Cedrone of the Italian Workers’ Group and Joost van Iersel of the Dutch Employers’ Group.

The Draft Opinion maintained *inter alia*:

“Following six years of financial and economic crisis it looks more difficult than ever to predict the economic and social future. Given the geopolitical and economic challenges, only a solid EMU will ensure future-oriented stability... The EESC realises that decisive steps cannot be taken overnight, but two elements have to be duly taken into account: a. Europe cannot afford to put decisions off for years; and b. a first prerequisite is an agreement across the Eurozone about the principles of necessary economic policies to be carried out by effective governance...”

We need a coherent system of the European Council, national governments, the European Parliament, national parliaments, and the European Commission, that reflects democratic legitimacy, accountability and transparency, and that is able to act effectively in the interest of citizens and economic actors. It has become clear that the current system of rules underpinning the EU, and particularly the euro area, has created confusion on the legal, institutional and democratic fronts. A new approach is therefore needed. Given the political and economic dynamic, the EU can no longer maintain its current institutional architecture. For this reason, the Committee deems it essential to deepen the process of integrating the euro area. With this in mind, the Committee would like to present a roadmap comprising the following steps:

1st step:

- (1) Stable Eurogroup president;
- (2) Making the Interparliamentary Conference operational;
- (3) “Parliamentarisation” of the euro area (EP Grand Committee with all members from EMU countries).**

2nd step:

- (4) EMU Legislative Affairs Council;
- (5) An EMU executive (government) (currently Eurogroup and Commission);
- (6) Strengthening the powers and remit of the Interparliamentary Conference (EP and national parliaments)....

The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and its subsequent developments, together with the disastrous consequences for the real economy and European society, have provided a wake-up call for all those who believed up to that point that the architecture of EMU would continue to function more or less satisfactorily and that spill-over effects would harmoniously promote convergence between the Member States... The financial and economic crisis turned into a continuing economic downturn with striking economic imbalances between national economies. Large parts of the EU are in a far from enviable situation of low growth and faltering employment six years later. The economic and social consequences speak for themselves. Notwithstanding all progress the EMU remains incomplete. The situation is very complex. Despite hopeful signs of recovery, economic stagnation and lack of job creation and poverty are prevailing in a number of countries, most of which is due to various deep-seated causes that have become more visible and accentuated during the crisis: history, traditions in governance (or the lack of it), diverging growth paths, different economic and social structures, and different external policies... With the EMU primarily dominated by intergovernmental decision-making and technocratic management, lack of democratic legitimacy and credibility has a serious impact that also heightens contrasts between the partner countries... In each State and across the EU, the issue of democracy constitutes a serious weakness (we need only consider the role of the Troika in the new system of economic governance). The relationship between representatives and those they represent continues to evaporate: a reality that has been highlighted by the crisis. Hence the urgent need to address this issue as part of the process of completing economic and monetary union across its four means or pillars of integration: banking union, fiscal union, economic union (which, in the Committee’s view, should include social union) and, finally, political union...

The primary arena for representative democracy within economic and monetary union is the European Parliament, which includes members from the countries that have joined the single currency or are preparing to do so. To ensure the profile, consistency and effectiveness of the work of those MEPs, the EESC suggests creating a permanent body within the EP that would bring them together. Its purposes would be to underpin the accountability of the single currency’s governance institutions and, at the same time, establish a public space for dialogue and consultation, drafting and voting on texts on economic and monetary matters to be submitted to the Assembly for decision and ensuring that the principles of solidarity and sincere cooperation are equally taken into account in implementing EMU policies. The consolidation of representative democracy within EMU would not be complete if the method of decision-making were not to take account of the dual legitimacy – national and European – that is essential in the *sui generis* system that is the European model.”

This was at once a call for greater democratic accountability, but also a clear statement of intent that a semi-detached EU member such as the UK could have no part in decision making for an EMU which it refused to join. As Joost van Iersel put it: The Euro is the currency of the EU itself. It is not those inside the Euro who should be seen as the exceptions, but those outside it by way of opt-out, namely, the UK. (The Danish opt-out is more nominal than real). The Section voted 70 in favour of the Draft Opinion, with just 10 abstentions and only a single vote against.

If there was near unanimity at this meeting, the opposite had occurred at a meeting of the EESC's Section for External Affairs on April 23, which met to discuss a Draft Opinion entitled "Investor protection and investor to state settlement in EU trade and investment agreements with third countries." The *rapporteur* was Sandy Boyle of the Workers' Group, a former President of the Scottish TUC. This Draft Opinion highlighted all that is most dangerous in current TTIP negotiations, stating, *inter alia*:

"Conclusions:

1.1 FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) is an important contributor to economic growth and foreign investors must have global protection against direct expropriation, be free from discrimination and enjoy equivalent rights as domestic investors.

1.2 A state's right to regulate in the public interest is paramount and must not be undermined by the provisions of any IIA (International Investment Agreement). An unambiguous clause which horizontally asserts this right is essential.

1.3 ISDS (Investor State Dispute Settlement) elevates transnational capital to that of a sovereign state and enables foreign investors to challenge the right of governments to regulate and determine their own affairs.

1.4 The EC (European Commission) consultation on ISDS in TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) highlighted a marked division between the views of the broad business community and those in the vast majority of responses from the rest of CS (Civil Society).

1.5 Concerns exist over the powers invested in a panel of three unaccountable, private attorneys, to adjudicate and make binding decisions on areas of fundamental public interest. The system lacks transparency and has no right of appeal.

1.6 The original concept behind ISDS has long since departed. It has now become a hugely profitable outlet for a small number of specialist investment law firms who dominate the business.

1.7 Certain specialist legal firms are now promoting ISDS an important up front risk mitigation tool when entering into investments. In some prominent cases it has become a lobbying tool where the very threat of litigation creates a regulatory chill which inhibits legislators pursuing legitimate public interest policies. There is also concern that it has attracted speculative investment by hedge funds, etc.

1.8 More and more liberal interpretations are made on what constitutes indirect expropriation and taxpayers are obliged

to pay compensation for public interest policies that allegedly limit profits.

1.9 Although CETA (the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement with Canada) provides some modest improvements to the current system, these fall well short of what is required to assuage public fears. ISDS remains an imbalanced, highly expensive process accessible mainly to multinationals, which reins in democracy and puts a government's right to regulate at risk by providing foreign investors with rights beyond those enshrined in national constitutions and above those enjoyed by domestic investors.

1.10 Role swapping between arbiters and counsel is a clear conflict of interest which CETA fails to tackle. This reaffirms the view that ISDS is not a fair, independent or balanced method for the resolution of investment disputes.

1.11 The EESC welcomes the EC objective of eliminating "frivolous claims". It is important that the parties to the agreement have the protection of a general political filter which allows them by agreement to block a claim from proceeding to arbitration.

1.12 Investors should be encouraged to see Treaty based dispute resolution as a last resort and to seek alternative methods such as conciliation and mediation. Private insurance and contract based protection are appropriate means whereby foreign investors can minimise their risk.

1.13 The need for FDI protection varies from country to country. In countries with a democratically functioning mature legal system free from corruption, investment disputes should be dealt with by mediation, domestic courts and State to State resolution. These components are present in EU, US and Canada and the current high levels of transatlantic investment flows show conclusively that the lack of ISDS provision does not impede investment. The EESC therefore concludes that an ISDS provision is not necessary in TTIP or CETA and is opposed to its inclusion.

1.14 ISDS has the potential to derail both TTIP and CETA. The EC needs to consider if continuing to pursue this politically sensitive and publicly unpopular objective is a sensible and correct way forward.

1.15 There is a clear message emerging from developing countries that ISDS is an unacceptable mechanism which will be strongly resisted by an increasing number of important global players. If an alternative system is not found, it will become more difficult to incorporate IP into future agreements with countries where it is most needed.

1.16 There are considerable EU treaty-related and constitutional law concerns regarding the relations of ISDS ruling with the EU legal order. Private arbitration courts can also make rulings which do not comply with EU law or infringe the CFR. For this reason, the EESC feels that it is absolutely vital for compliance of ISDS with EU law to be checked by the ECJ (European Court of Justice) in a formal procedure for requesting an opinion, before the competent institutions reach a decision and before the provisional entry into force of any IIAs, negotiated by the EC.

Recommendations:

1.17 If a catch all solution for resolving investment disputes is to be found, it cannot be based on a modest revamping of the current, ISDS system which has a very low level of public support.


1.18 At a time when all G7 States are engaged in advanced negotiations on comprehensive trade and investment deals there is a unique opportunity to find a credible system which marries the legitimate interests of investors with the rights of a state.

1.19 If a unitary authority is to be the way forward, it should not be composed of private attorneys, must be more accessible to SMEs and have a built in right of appeal.

1.20 The EESC strongly urges the EC to consider the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) proposals for Reform of ISDS and concludes that the establishment of an International Investment Court provides the best solution to ensure a democratic, fair, transparent and equitable system.”

Discussion on this Draft Opinion in the Section amounted to out and out class struggle. The Employers’ Group put down amendment after amendment in pursuit of their naked class interests and were only thwarted by virtue of the Workers’ Group winning over a majority of the Other Interests Group (agricultural, environmental etc). On some amendments the margin of victory was quite small, 5 to 4, on others 3 to 2. When all fractious Employers’ Group amendments were defeated, and it came to a vote on the Draft Opinion as a whole, more of the Other Interests Group came on board, and it was carried by 57 votes to 29, with 6 abstentions.

The Employers’ Group was both furious and ferocious. At the EESC Plenary Session on May 27, they presented a complete counter-opinion and succeeded in alienating almost the whole of the Other Interests Group. Out of a total EESC vote of 310, only 94 voted for the counter-opinion, there were 25 abstentions, and a solid 191 votes against. When it came to voting on the original opinion authored by Sandy Boyle of the Workers’ Group, while the total votes cast had fallen back to 284, the votes in favour came to 199, there were 30 formal abstentions, and the Employers’ Group bloc voting against had shrunken back to 55. It had been a shabby performance by the Employers’ Group, with an even shabbier result for them, and with some of their members correspondingly shamed into abandoning ship. □



Irish Catholics and the British Empire

Eamon Dyas

Irish Catholics and British military needs

In 1792 a Catholic Relief Bill which attempted to introduce the vote for Catholics was kippeded of any reference to such a reform by its opponents who ensured that reforms would be restricted to their right to leasehold of land. Aware of the opposition to such measures, less than a year later, on 4 February 1793, the Chief Secretary of Ireland Robert Hobart, introduced another Catholic Relief Bill, but this time it had the full support of the Government at Westminster in pushing it to fruition as an Act of the Irish Parliament. The main reform that this Act introduced was to give the vote to Roman Catholics and to open up the legal and civic professions to them. However the Act did not overturn the ban on Roman Catholics becoming Kings Counsels, Judges or Governors, and Sheriffs and sub-Sheriffs. Nonetheless, for those Roman Catholics intent on a military career the new Act introduced something very important. Section VII of that Act stipulates:


“And be it enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for papists, or persons professing the Popish or Roman Catholic religion, to hold, exercise, and enjoy all civil and military offices, or places of trust or profit under his Majesty, his heirs and successors, in this kingdom; and to hold or take degrees or any professorship in, or be masters, or fellows of any college, to be hereafter founded in this kingdom, provided that such college shall be a member of the University of Dublin, and shall not be founded exclusively for the education of papists or persons professing the popish or Roman Catholic religion”

In other words, it provided for Roman Catholics to hold officer commissions in the Militias even though it continued to limit their advancement to the position of Colonel.

The timing of the 1793 Bill was not accidental. It was introduced only a few days after France had declared war on Britain and it has to be viewed in the context of Britain's war preparations. This and the 1792 Act provided Irish Roman Catholics with the right to acquire land leases, the vote, and the opportunity to make a career in the professions, including the military. By so doing the British Government sought to ensure that the emerging Roman Catholic middle class of Ireland was given a vested interest in defending the Crown. What the British feared in the 1790s was the possible radicalisation of the Irish Catholic middle class through the influence of ideas from France and from Irish Dissenters. The reforms of the 1790s

were designed to ensure that this danger was neutralised (how real this danger was became evident in 1798).

However, such was the complex system of laws that underpinned and permeated the British State and its relationship to the Irish people since the Glorious Revolution that one or two Acts in themselves could not nullify all the obstacles to Catholic advancement that existed in terms of their relationship with the state. The different legislative arrangements between Dublin and Westminster meant that legislation emanating from the Dublin Parliament was restricted in its application to Ireland while that emanating from Westminster sometimes held sway and sometimes deferred to existing legislation in terms of its application to Ireland; this caused on-going confusion. Questions of oaths and declarations relating to the Monarchy and the Legislature provided another area of complication.



In April 1798 an incident occurred relating to the Royal Prerogative which showed how problematic it was for the British State to extricate itself from the anti-Catholic nature of its legal structures even when the state sought to advance its interests by the enactment of legislation ostensibly favourable to Catholics. At that time, just prior to the Act of Union crisis, Lord Petre offered to raise a corps of Volunteers at Ingatestone in Essex and he proposed that the new corps be commissioned and commanded by his son. The usual procedure in such instances required the commission request to be sent for the King's approval and signature. Unfortunately the Petre family were well-known English Roman Catholics and the King, on receipt of the application for the commission, ruled that this fact prohibited him from approving the application, as he could not legally do so. In response to the argument from those supporting Petre's case that there were already many Roman Catholics officers in corps of volunteers and even in the regular Army the king replied

“that it might be so, but that it was without his knowledge, that there was a great difference between taking away and giving a commission but that He had not knowingly offended and would not himself offend against the Law or be the cause or means of offence in others.” (Report from the Duke of Portland to William Windham, Secretary of War. Quoted in *Roman Catholics holding Military Commissions in 1798*, by J. R. Western. Published in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 276, July 1966, p. 429).

Those mainly concerned with military appointments at this time, including two government secretaries, were thereby compelled to accept this situation but to make the best possible case for ensuring that Roman Catholics would continue to have a route to military commissions. This settled on the legal opinion that the only obstacle against Roman Catholics holding a military commission was that they be known as Roman Catholics to the King prior to his granting a commission (see Western, p.430) and if such knowledge only reaches the King after he had signed their commission the commission would retain its validity. In this instance the King was interpreting his role in the state in a way which, at the time, he felt was consistent with his responsibilities to the constitution.

By the end of the 18th century, even though their co-religionists in Ireland enjoyed a more accommodating environment as a result of the 1793 Act, the Test Act continued to be an obstacle against Roman Catholics in England becoming officers in the militias. However, even in England, by this time it was not an insurmountable obstacle as evidenced of the existence of Catholic officers. The reason why, if one could escape the attention of the King, this was possible was because by this time the Test Act was not rigorously administered. But while the servants of the King may turn a blind eye or a deaf ear to knowledge of the Catholic religion of an officer seeking a military commission, the King, as the ultimate custodian of the tenets underpinning the Glorious Revolution, could not in conscience share a similar indulgence.

“The Test Act, unlike the Act of 1689, entrusted the administering of the oaths to the law courts. Nobody was obliged or even empowered to summon the officers to take them; it was the purely personal responsibility of each officer to take them; it was the purely personal responsibility of each officer to appear and he could go either to Quarter Sessions or to any of the courts at Westminster. (Western, p.431). On the Petre case, the attorney and solicitor-general could only say ‘that there may be ground for contending that advising his Majesty to grant a commission to a known Catholic is a Misdemeanour, which may be subject to parliamentary animadversion, supposing it not to be an Offence directly punishable by any proceedings in the Ordinary Courts of Justice.’ Lord Petre brushed aside this feeble argument and attacked the only solid part by asking ‘what authority beyond report have they to say my son is a known Roman Catholic – have they any legal method of proving him to be such – How can they therefore know he will not qualify when he is legally called upon so to do. These were the points that his ‘legal opinions’ were indeed to prove.

Evasion was almost legalized by the Acts which each year indemnified all who had not taken the oaths and gave them until Christmas to do so. Prosecutions (an informer stood to gain £500) were possible only from then until the next Act was passed. From 1790 this was usually in March or April. Pass the Act earlier or give more time for taking the oaths, and protection became complete.” (Western pp.431-432).

Thus it was, in the case of its military needs, that the British State was compelled to ensure it provided an escape route for those Catholics who happened to become ensnared by its own anti-Catholic laws; that escape route was provided by the lax implementation of the Test Act and by the provision of annual Acts indemnifying those who were unlucky enough to fall foul of that and other Acts. In defending itself at times of an

existential threat the British State needed to call upon the human resources of Irish Catholics and to ensure their allegiance the state was compelled, at the end of the 18th century, to relax the anti-Catholic laws that were the basis of its foundation as a state in the 17th.

Yet these things could not be done by a simple turn of a switch. Protestant opposition to such relaxations and reforms remained powerful in England and in Ireland. But the Protestant opposition in Ireland was less problematic to the British State’s pragmatic requirements in the late 18th century than the Protestant opposition on mainland Britain. This was because Protestantism did not exist in any form of organic relationship with the functioning society in Ireland, unlike the situation in Britain. In England the Protestant opposition did exist in an organic relationship with the surrounding society and, all things being equal, such opposition could have ensured that any relaxation of the anti-Catholic laws were successfully defeated. However, for the British State in the 1790s all things were not equal as it faced the existential threat from France. Consequently, the state was able to convince, by one means or another, the main elements of the Protestant opposition in England to acquiesce in its reform of the anti-Catholic laws but only because it was sold as part of the state’s strategy for dealing with the military threat from France and not because they saw it as a means of rectifying an injustice against Catholics.

Because the reforms were targeted at the plight of the Irish Catholics they left the Catholics on mainland England in the position of an after-thought. These reforms also presented the Protestants of England with something of a contradiction. From their perspective the main threat to their Protestant state came from the Catholic Irish and not from the insignificant English Catholic community. Yet, it was the section of the Catholic population which posed the biggest threat (the Catholic Irish) that were being offered relief from the anti-Catholic laws originally enacted to protect the state from the threat of Catholicism! On the other hand that section of the Catholic population which offered no threat (the Catholic English) remained subject to these laws. This remained the case on the mainland until the courts and the legislature caught up with events in the wake of the Irish reforms. It was this dichotomy that meant the moratorium against English Catholics holding a commission in the military (albeit, particularly after the 1793 Irish legislation, more lax in its application) continued until 26 February 1828 when the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts meant that the moratorium was officially abolished for those serving in the Army and Navy.

More to Irish than being Irish

In the meantime Irish Catholics managed to join the ranks of English regiments in increasing numbers. Between 1793 and 1815 it has been estimated that 159,000 Irishmen were integrated into English regiments (see: *Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: suborned or subordinate*, by Peter Karsten. Published in Journal of Social History, Vol.17 no. 1, Autumn 1983) the majority of them being Catholic.

What the reforms of the 1790s represented was the opportunity for Irish Catholics to make a career in the military. However it took a while for the opportunities opened up to Catholics to become a reality in terms of access to the British Army and even then only to certain types of Catholics:

“The Irish militia raised in the 1790s were, by law, to be ‘officered by the landed gentry,’ and appropriate property qualifications were specified for each officer rank; but by 1814 the ‘militia’ had virtually become regulars, and to quote a contemporary account, ‘the commissioned officers of the [Irish] militia regiments are no longer men of rank and fortune.’ The ‘fatigues of regular duty’ had induced the more economically fortunate patriots of the 1790s ‘to quit,’ and their places had ‘been taken by young men who have made the service a profession. But these young men have no fortunes now to which they can retire,’ or so this account from the *Freeman’s Journal* explained in 1814 when peace prompted the disbanding of most Irish units and many sought commissions in the regular establishment.” (Karsten, p.35).

So, during the latter part of the 18th and early part of the 19th centuries, a military career was being opened to Irish Catholics but those who could take advantage of it needed to be of the landed gentry – a segment of society in which Irish Catholics were grossly under-represented. This ensured that they would remain only a small component of those Irish who would occupy the position of officers – a situation that would remain the case throughout the 19th century as far as the British Army was concerned.

“The Irish officer in the regular nineteenth century British Army was, of course, generally an Anglo-Irish Protestant, though there was a fair sprinkling of Catholic gentry left whose sons managed to obtain commissions.” (Karsten, p.35).

But alongside the disparity of the small number of Irish Catholic officers compared to Irish Protestant officers went the further disparity of the over representation of Irish Catholics in the ranks of the ordinary soldiers.

“In 1830 no less than 42.2% of all non-commissioned officers and men throughout the British Army were Irish, a figure far out of proportion to their numbers in the United Kingdom. By 1868 the famine and migration had cut into Ireland’s population and the percentage of Irishmen in the British Army was down to 30.4% but this was still out of proportion to Ireland’s numbers, and she was the only national group in the United Kingdom to be over-represented in the Army. In that year, 1868, the proportion of Roman Catholics in the British Army stood at 28.4%, suggesting that most of the Irish soldiers were Catholics.

Irish recruiting continued at a high level. In 1871 some 4.38% of all eligible Irishmen (15-54 years of age) joined the British Army, whereas only 2.09% of eligible Englishmen joined. By 1890, the decline in Irish population with migration of Irish youth reduced the percentage of Irishmen to 14.5%, while the percentage of Roman Catholics remained at 18.7%, suggesting that many nominally ‘English’ or ‘Scottish’ recruits (like James Connolly), were, in fact Irish Catholic migrants.” (Karsten, p.36).

The average Irishman joining the British Army during this time was typically a Roman Catholic struggling to make a living on a regular basis with few other options open to him. But despite his numerical presence in the Army, as a Catholic of his class, his chances of advancing to the realms of the officer class were non-existent despite the formal relaxation of the legal prohibitions on members of his religion occupying

such positions. Those Roman Catholic Irish in possession of land and an education could have taken advantage of the new opportunities; but they were not many and less likely to see the need to join the British Army and so were relatively under-represented among the officer class. The Irish in the officer class came by and large from the Protestant Anglo-Irish community who joined the British Army not from economic necessity but because “they were defending Britain’s glory and their own farms, families and Protestant religion” (Karsten, p.34).

This demographic profile of the Irish in the British Army remained more or less the same throughout the 19th century but towards the end of that century there was evidence of a relative increase in the number of Irish Catholics among the officer class. However, it has to be said that they remained grossly under-represented not only among the officer class generally but even among the wider (inclusive of the Protestant and Anglo-Irish) number of those officers who could claim to have been born in Ireland.

The relationship between the Catholic Irish and the British Army began to change just before the First World War. By this time “the percentage of Irish troops in the army had fallen to a level matching closely the percentage of Irish in the population of the United Kingdom” (see: Terence Denman, *The Catholic Irish Soldier in the First World War: the ‘racial environment’*, published in *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 108, November 1991, p. 354). Then at the beginning of the First World War a further change in the characteristic of Irish Catholic recruiting to the British Army became apparent. Within a year or so after the start of the war, for the first time, the Irish Catholic population constituted an under-represented percentage of the British Army. After the initial burst of enthusiasm following Redmond’s call to arms to the Irish Volunteers:

“Irish Catholics were under-represented at the recruiting office. The predominantly Protestant province of Ulster contained 31% of available manpower in the years 1914 to 1916, but provided 51% of all who enlisted between the outbreak of war and October 1916. The predominantly Catholic province of Connaught contained 15% of available Irish manpower, and provided only 4% of all enlistments. One War Office report suggested that this discrepancy was essentially due to ‘the general disinclination of the farming class . . . to join the colours,’ and it is certainly true that Connaught was more agrarian than Ulster, with 73.9% of the former’s workforce agriculturally engaged, and only 46.5% of the latter’s. But the predominantly Catholic province of Munster possessed a workforce roughly comparable to that of Ulster, with 51.3% of its workforce in agriculture, and it was also under-represented at the front. Some 22.5% of available Irish manpower lived in Munster, but it contributed only 16.2% of the island’s volunteers.” (Karsten, p.34).

In fact the First World War represented a further milestone in that over the period of its duration, the Catholic Irish represented less than half of the number of Irish recruits that joined the British Army. According to Denman (op. cit., p.354) of the 140,000 Irish that volunteered only 65,000 were Catholic Irish.

The majority of these First World War Irish recruits came from the two distinct Irish communities which could be relied upon to come to Britain’s aid. These Irish communities did so not necessarily from any poverty-related motivation but because they possessed a real and personal identification with the values

and culture that was represented by the British Crown. These included the Protestant community in the north of Ireland and those from the Protestant Anglo-Irish community in the south. I have not seen any research into the ratio of officers to ranks from among the northern Irish but it could certainly not have been anything as disproportionate as the ratio between Catholic Irish officers to the numbers of Irish Catholics in the ranks. The relative lack of Irish Catholic officers was compensated for by the presence of Protestant Anglo-Irish officers as an excessively represented percentage of their own community. Karsten provides the following insight into the background of this type of officer:

“ . . . evidence regarding a more concrete group of Irish volunteers, members all of the Irish rugby football community, does exist. These men organised their own military company as a component of a regular regiment, the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. They saw particularly bloody action at Gallipoli, and one of their ranks published a memoir of the group, *The Pals of Suvla Bay*. The appendix of this tome offered brief biographies of each volunteer, including his secondary school and university, and it is evident from this that ‘the pals of Suvla Bay’ were almost all educated in Protestant prep schools and in either (Protestant) Trinity College or (disproportionately Protestant) Queens University, Belfast.” (Karsten, pp.34-35).

Although there were Irish Catholic officers in the British Army during the First World War, in the majority of cases, the ordinary Irish Catholic soldier was officered in the British Army either by members of the Anglo-Irish community or by English officers.

There is no doubt that the late 18th century relaxation of the prohibitions against Catholics joining the military was a highly successful move on the part of the British State. The numbers consequently made available to enhance the ranks of the Army were critical not only in military actions abroad but also in maintaining order and control within Ireland itself. But for all their numbers in the hundred and more years after the relaxation of the prohibitions against Catholics becoming officers, the Irish Catholic officer would continue to be a relative rarity even up to the time of the First World War whereas direct entry into the officer corps was always a relatively easy option for members of the Protestant Anglo-Irish community.

Throughout the nineteenth century the reason for this was not the presence of any legal obstacle but the inherent anti-Catholic culture of British society – or more precisely, the inherent anti-Irish Catholic culture of British society – a culture that persisted right up to the First World War. Denman describes the attitude towards the Irish Catholic soldier that emanates from this culture in terms that compares it with the attitude towards the black soldiers that fought in the French Army during the war:

“To give the matter a wider perspective we can look at the generalisations made about the black soldiers recruited by France during the First World War from her west African colonies, notably Senegal. *Les tirailleurs Sénégalais* were believed to possess ‘the wild impulsiveness’ (*l'impétuosité sauvage*) which made them ideal ‘shock troops’ (*troupes de choc*) for delivering the ‘crucial attack’ (*choc final*), because of their ‘fierce ardour for hand-to-hand combat (*fougueuse ardeur au combat corps à corps*). Yet they were often criticised for their alleged lack of discipline and cohesion in battle; and patronised for their supposed limited intellectual capacity and

their childlike qualities. Such comparisons reveal interesting parallels with the ‘colonial’ attitudes towards the Catholic Irish in the British army. For the generalisations made about Catholic Irish soldiers – recklessness, negligence, credulity – too easily complemented claims that the Irish were incapable of organising their political life in a responsible way. As one observer wrote astutely in 1916: ‘those who most doubt the Irishman’s capacity in civil affairs are often the readiest to admit his fury and prowess in battle.’” (op. cit., p.364).

It is no wonder that Irish Catholics were viewed as unsuitable material for the officer class and those who were accepted achieved that status either because they managed to ape the behaviour and attitudes required by the military establishment or because the prevailing circumstances made the contingency of accepting Irish Catholic officers an absolute necessity.

Generalising about the Irish

But the relaxation of the anti-Catholic laws at the end of the 18th century included a lot more than military provisions. The resultant opening up of the professions, combined with the increasing opportunities in imperial administration created by the needs of an expanding empire, ensured that as the 19th century progressed there appeared to be growing areas where Catholics could play a role in empire-building. The extent to which Irish Catholics took advantage of these opportunities has led to the claim that it constitutes evidence of an evolving commitment to the British Empire by the Irish Catholic population. But to fully appreciate the significance of Irish Catholic behaviour towards the British Empire during this period it needs to be seen in the context of the political and administrative needs of Britain and its growing empire. The relaxation of the legal prohibitions on Irish Catholics developing careers within the British military and civil establishment was but one component in developing an environment where they could be harnessed to the needs of the state as that state experienced military and logistical challenges in the course of its expansion. Just as events in the eighteenth century provide an example of how Britain’s military needs dictated a relaxation of the barriers to Catholics making a career in the military so does nineteenth century India provides an example of how Britain’s imperial needs dictated a relaxation of the barriers to Catholics making a career in the imperial civil service. And just as the inherent anti-Catholic nature of British society made this problematic in terms of its inability to ensure an equitable representation of Irish Catholics among the officer class of the Army so the same inability of the wider society to accommodate Catholics in the higher regions of imperial civic administration ensured the ultimate failure in creating a discrimination-free environment within the structures of the civil administration.

The problem for Britain was that the relaxation of its anti-Catholic legal structures was not the result of any newfound enlightenment pushing up from the general population. In pursuing these reforms the state was merely serving its own requirements. In other words the reforms were not the result of any significant dissipation of the anti-Catholic nature of Britain as a society. This meant that the results of the legal reforms enacted by the state in the latter part of the 18th century were not fully successful because they were diminished whenever they came up against the continuing prevalence of anti-Catholic sentiment within the wider society. While the relaxations of the anti-Catholic laws represented the legal form of an enlightened state the substance of the society was not carried along with it and consequently Catholics and particularly Irish Catholics

continued to be viewed as second class citizens despite what the law stated or what new opportunities were opened by the reforms.

However within its own terms and in the areas that it controlled the state was compelled to pursue the implications of its reforms and this meant that in its governing structures certain concessions were made to Catholics. In the case of the evolving military needs of the state we see this is exemplified by the provision of Catholic chaplains in 1802 and the exemption of Catholic soldiers from Church of England military parades.

While the implications of the state's relaxation of the military prohibitions were easily accommodated without involving the wider society (and thereby coming up against the anti-Catholic culture) the facilitation of Catholics within the administrative machinery of state was not so easily accommodated as it involved educational institutions embedded in the wider society. As the industrial revolution generated the urbanisation of British society and ever more complex relationships developed between businesses, people and government, there emerged the need for an ever-expanding civil service. But alongside this there emerged the need for a more complex machinery for dealing with the needs of empire administration.

The establishment of the Civil Service Commission through a Government Order in Council on 21 May 1855 brought in its wake the modernisation of the British Home Civil Service. Shortly before this however, and in advance of the British government assuming formal control over India in 1858, the British establishment decided to remove responsibility for conducting the Indian Civil Service from the East India Company and to establish a new arrangement over which Parliament would have more control. Until the middle of the century the directors of the East India Company more or less ran India through their system of patronage to what was called 'writerships'. Individuals nominated through the patronage system had to pass a simple examination before being admitted to the Company's training college at Haileybury where they spent two years studying law, political economy and Indian languages. The nominees then went to India where they had to undertake more tests in Indian languages before being allocated a position in what effectively constituted the British administrative machinery in India. Until the changes brought about by the Government of India Act of 1853 this was the system by which the majority of the civil administrators in India were appointed.

The Government of India Act of 1853 abolished this arrangement and stipulated that it should be replaced by a system of appointments through open competitive examination. In 1854 a committee, chaired by Thomas Babington Macaulay, was established to draw up a scheme to put the necessary changes into effect and the man charged with implementing the new arrangements was Sir Charles Wood (later the first Viscount Halifax and at this time president of the Board of Control). It is worth noting that less than a decade earlier, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Charles Wood had been a leading opponent of spending relief during the Irish Famine, believing that direct intervention by the British government would do little to promote the structural changes required for the modernisation of Irish society.

In his capacity as president of the Board of Control Sir Charles Wood oversaw the first open competition to the Indian Civil Service in 1855 and by 1856 the last group of East India

Company nominated entrants began their courses at Haileybury. The changes he introduced also involved the setting of age limits for taking the new competitive exam and after 1857 these were set at between 17 and 23 years of age.

All of this of course had implications for the universities and like their British equivalents, Irish universities by the second half of the 19th century were consciously designing their curricula to provide their students with the necessary skills for empire administration through their response to the requirements of the Indian Civil Service. However, it would be a mistake to see the administrative positions within the Indian Civil Service as merely an exotic equivalent of administrative positions in the Home Civil Service. Although they came into existence at around the same time, the modern Indian Civil Service was a much different animal than the Home Civil Service. A good account of how the two Civil Services operated was provided by Vincent Arthur Smith in a lecture he gave at Trinity College Dublin on 10th June 1903. Smith had been himself a member of the Indian Civil Service and went on to become Reader in Indian History and Hindustani at Trinity. His lecture was entitled, "*The Indian Civil Service as a Profession*" and this is his explanation of how the ICS differed from the Home Civil Service: -

"The Indian Civil Service is very different [from Home Civil Service - ED]. It is a compact, organised body consisting of about nine hundred specially selected and highly trained officers, with duties and privileges defined by statute. The highest official in India, the Viceroy, is not ordinarily a member of the Service, nor, on the other hand, is a single clerk included in its ranks. The Indian 'civilian,' the man lawfully entitled to write the letters C.S. or I.C.S. after his name, may in the course of his service be many things successively, or all at once, but, whatever he may be or become, he can never, even in his most junior and 'griffin' days, be a clerk.

The young man, therefore, who thinks of entering the narrow gate which leads to the Indian Civil Service, and feels a distaste for the kind of employment ordinarily associated with the idea of the Home Civil Service, need not fear that, if he goes to India, he will ever be called upon to do the work of a clerk. The call of duty may summon him to hunt down a gang of brigands, defend a fort, lay out a cholera camp, frame the Imperial budget, or do many other things not specially provided for in his early education; but, whatever may befall him, he will never be asked to perform the routines of an office clerk.

The moment he arrives in India, the young 'civilian,' to use the current Anglo-Indian term, will find himself figuring in the Gazette as an Assistant Magistrate and Collector, lawfully empowered to inflict a month's hard labour and fifty rupees fine upon his erring fellow creatures. . . . [after the first year or two - ED] In his magisterial capacity, he is empowered and required to try, sitting by himself, all offences except those of the most heinous kinds, and may sentence an offender to two years hard labour and a fine of a thousand rupees. He investigates the most heinous crimes which he is not empowered to try, and, if necessary, commits the accused persons to a higher Court. As a revenue officer, he deals with many intricate matters concerning the land, such as boundary disputes, the determination of fair rents, and so forth, as may be required by the law prevailing in the province where he serves. As an executive officer, he soon discovers that nihil humani a se est alienum. Everything connected with the general administration concerns his immediate chief, the District Magistrate; and the young assistant may be called upon to aid his chief in any of

the branches of the multifarious duties imposed upon the head of the District.

After some years of this sort of work - more or less according to luck - he will probably be asked to elect between the judicial and executive lines of employment. The man who likes a quiet life probably will prefer the dignified, if monotonous duties of the Bench, and, as a matter of course, will become a District and Sessions Judge, with unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction, subject to the control of the High Court of his province. If he is exceptionally able or lucky, or, still better, is both, he will himself obtain a seat in a High Court, have a good time, and ultimately retire with an extra pension.

But the young officer who is active, energetic, and ambitious will generally incline to choose the more exacting tasks of the executive line. He will then by virtue of seniority, sooner or later, become the chief magistrate of a District, and the local representative of His Majesty and the Government of India for all purposes. The 'District,' I must explain, is the unit of administration in India, and means a big tract of country, fifty or a hundred miles across, inhabited by a vast population, numbering generally from a million to three millions. The post of District Magistrate, although one attainable in the ordinary course by the rank and file of the Service, is, perhaps, the most interesting appointment which an officer holds in the course of his career; but it usually implies hard work and much wear and tear. A successful District Officer may expect to be selected for the high post of Commissioner of Division. The Commissioner stands between the District Officer and the provincial government, and exercises a general supervision over the affairs of several districts constituting a 'Division.' In the province where I served, the average population of a division was about seven millions. The most fortunate of the officers in the executive branch of the Service may look forward to attaining one or more of the high dignities of Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant-Governor of a province, Resident at the Court of a great feudatory, or member of the Viceroy's Cabinet.

Among the miscellaneous appointments open to members of the Indian Civil Service, and in some cases reserved to them by law, may be mentioned the office of Inspector General of Police, Director of Public Prosecution, Accountant-General, and Secretary in either the Government of India or a provincial government.

The brief outline which has been given will, I hope, suffice to indicate in a general way the nature of the various and multifarious duties entrusted to the Indian Civil Service, and to show how widely they differ from those ordinarily performed by members of the Home Civil Service." (*The Indian Civil Service as a Profession*, A Lecture delivered at Trinity College, Dublin, on June 10th, 1903 by Vincent A. Smith, Indian Civil Service (retired); Reader in Indian History and Hindustani in the University of Dublin, pub. Hodges, Figgis, & Co., Ltd., Dublin 1903, pp.5-9).

This then was the position, powers and responsibilities of those who, on passing the Indian Civil Service examination, were appointed 'civilians' within that service. It was a powerfully unique position within the administrative structure of the British Empire but it required significant sacrifices on the part of those willing to embark on such a career. The distance and resultant isolation from family and friends as well as the

climate and threat from disease meant that, despite its inherent and obvious advantages to those with the inclination, it was not always easy to fill the available positions with the right calibre of candidate.

The changes to the East India Company system initiated by Sir Charles Wood were designed to ensure a more efficient administrative system in India that was under the direct control of the Crown but the new system was to have the unforeseen effect of presenting new opportunities for the middle class Irish and in particular for those middle class Irish Catholics who sought a career in the administration of empire.

The prevalence of patronage in the old East India Company system meant that Irish Catholics had a limited opportunity to gain appointments but with the reform of the system that introduced an appointment system based on merit their chances were much improved. In fact, the new reforms meant that Irish candidates generally (Protestants and Catholics) were now presented with new opportunities. This meant that like their British equivalents, Irish universities by the second half of the 19th century were consciously designing their curricula to provide their students with the necessary skills for empire building through their response to the requirements of the Indian Civil Service. The result was that: -

"the Irish turned out to be the real beneficiaries of the reforms. Where less than 5% of Haileybury appointees between 1809 and 1850 had been born in Ireland, no less than 24% of those recruited between 1855 and 1863 had been educated at an Irish university. In contrast, the corresponding numbers of Scots had fallen from 13% to 10% while the English element slipped from 54% to 51% (the remainder were born outside the United Kingdom, most of them in India). In 1857, when Ireland's population was 20% of the United Kingdom, Irish universities supplied no less than 33% of the ICS recruits selected that year. Wood's reforms had an immediate and pronounced impact on the prospects of Irishmen to win posts in the administration of India. For the first time in its history, Ireland had sent a disproportionate number to govern Britain's principal and most valued possession. (*The Irish Raj: Social Origins and Careers of Irishmen in the Indian Civil Service, 1855-1914* by Scott B. Cook. Pub. in Journal of Social History, Spring 1987, p.510).

However, these developments would not have been possible if the Irish universities had not responded quickly and appropriately to the new scenario. It is not surprising that Trinity College, Dublin led the way as it traditionally supplied the educational requirements of the Protestant ascendancy, many of whom went on to serve the British Empire. Within a few years of the introduction of the new ICS the university established chairs in Sanskrit and Arabic and introduced courses in zoology - all subjects which were part of the ICS exam. Even earlier it had changed its curriculum to enable medical students to compete for positions in the Indian Medical Service (IMS), a sister organisation of the ICS. Because of this, TCD, besides London University, was among the first in the United Kingdom to equip its students for the competitive exam requirements of the ICS.

The Queen's University did not lag far behind. It did not take long for its constituent colleges of Belfast, Cork and Galway to respond to the needs of the ICS open competition examination. This is not surprising either, as, unlike Trinity

which was heavily endowed, Queens was a secular non-denominational government funded institution and, with the exception of Belfast, none of its constituent colleges possessed any significant endowment underpinning. As the recipient of direct government funding the Queen's university would be more sensitive to official requirements by way of education. Belfast soon came close to emulating the oriental languages programme offered by TCD and then Cork began to offer courses in Indian history and geography as well as Hindu and Muslim law while Galway offered courses in the history and geography of India.

But in Britain the success of the Irish universities became a cause of concern among those who oversaw the new system of ICS recruitment. While one of the objects of the new arrangements was to introduce an element of meritocracy into the service, the arrival of significant numbers of Irish recruits was not necessarily viewed as a welcome development: -

“Even in the earliest years of competition (1855-58), the success of seventeen Irish students, including young men from Dublin, Belfast, Cork, and Galway universities, was regarded as a dangerous omen.” (Fourth Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1859, p.339. Quoted in *The Problem of Recruitment for the Indian Civil Service During the Late Nineteenth Century* by Bradford Spangenberg. Pub. in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Feb. 1971, p.345)

The record of the Irish universities in supplying successful candidates for the ICS exam also proved to be more than a temporary phenomenon. By 1867 the numbers graduating to the ICS from Irish universities equalled those graduating from the combined universities of Oxford and Cambridge and by 1870 even surpassed the output of those universities: -

“The products of Irish universities were Wood's especial *bêtes noires*. Irishmen showed a fairly constant interest in the competition. The proportion of candidates educated at Irish universities declined but not to anything like the extent of the Oxford and Cambridge decline. Between 1855-9, 18.2% of all candidates were from Irish universities; between 1860-5, 16.8% and between 1866-74, only 8.6%. This decline appears to have coincided with the lowering of the age limit. The Irish rate of success followed an entirely different pattern to that of men from Oxford and Cambridge. Nearly a quarter of the selected candidates in the first five years came from Irish universities. Between 1860 and 1865, 22.1% were Irish university men. Between 1866 and 1874 the proportion fell to 12.4%.” (*Open Competition and the Indian Civil Service, 1854-1876*, by J.M. Compton. Pub. in *The English Historical Review*, April 1968, p.278).

Within a few years of the new arrangements the system of recruitment was proving to be unsatisfactory to its architects in terms of the type of recruits that were coming their way. Wood became Secretary of State for India in 1859 and his response was to reduce the upper age limit from 23 to 22.

“Two objectives lay behind the reduction of the maximum limit in 1859 [the actual year which this change took effect was 1860 - see “*The Indian Civil Service List for 1880*” by Alfred Cotterell Tupp, Madras, 1880 pp.46-47 - ED] from 23 to 22: first, men in their 23rd year who had already graduated would not likely ‘be much tempted by the prospect

of an appointment which will withdraw him at once from the distinction. . . he looks for at home. By lowering the limit, it might be possible to lure men into the ICS just prior to or immediately after graduation before they were drawn away by more attractive careers at home. Second, the year subtracted from the maximum age limit would allow time for the special acquisition of relevant Indian knowledge not provided in the usual university curriculum. (Spangenberg, op cit. p.342).

The 1860 changes did not cause a dramatic reduction in the Irish candidates. Between 1855 and 1859, 18.2% of all candidates came from Irish universities and after the changes the figures from 1860 to 1865 shows a marginal decline to 16.8%. The second phase of changes to the recruitment exams did however make a significant impact. In 1866 the eligible age was further reduced from 22 to 21 and this, together with changes in the points system, had an impact which the earlier change did not have.

“The most important cause of the decline in the number of Irish recruits, however, was adjustments in the recruiting process itself. The main architect of the first instalments of adjustments was Wood. In 1864 [this appears to be incorrect as the year in which the change was introduced was 1866 - see “*The Indian Civil Service List for 1880*” by Alfred Cotterell Tupp, Madras, 1880, pp.46-47 - ED] he lowered the maximum age at which candidates could compete, from 22 to 21, and redistributed the number of points attached to various exam subjects. Both measures were clearly intended to reverse a disturbing trend that appeared in the statistics of the social profiles of many recruits. Instead of drawing the Oxbridge scholar-gentleman, the exams seemed to have enticed men from ‘. . . obscure corners of society, boorish, contemptible and disgusting’, that is to say, those sent up by the London crammers and the Irish universities. The latter were fast acquiring a reputation for swamping the ICS with their student-candidates. The *Saturday Review*, that weekly conscience of popular Toryism, grew alarmed at the potential Hibernization of the ICS and speculated on the likely implications of Irishmen governing Indians. . . . It concluded that the Irish were ‘unfit to govern a strange country’ and pressed for reform of the recruitment system.” (Cook, op cit. pp.512-513).

Wood manipulated the points system, which underpinned the assessment procedure for the exams, to ensure that the prospects of English public schools were enhanced by allocating a greater numerical weight to those subjects in which they traditionally excelled. Part of the purpose of this was to restrict the numbers of Irish although he admitted: -

“It is difficult to say this in public, for I should have half a dozen wild Irishmen on my shoulders and as many middle class examination students, but that makes all the more reason for not giving in to anything which might lead to similar results.” (Quoted in Scott B. Cook, op. cit. p.513).

The reduced exam age did not adversely affect the numbers of Irish candidates mainly because Irish students matriculated at the earlier age. However, the alteration to the points system had a significant impact on the number of those who passed the exam. Wood reduced the points allotted to Arabic and Sanskrit by a quarter. As these were subjects in which the Irish universities excelled it is not surprising the change would have a disproportionate impact on the rate of success among Irish candidates. The points change translated into a decrease of 250

points in a tabulation where the number of points separating the highest from the lowest successful candidate was usually under 1,000 points. The actual impact of the change is reflected in the fact that between 1856 and 1864 the percentage of Irish candidates passing the exam was never less than 33%. After 1865 this figure never exceeded 26% and for most of the late 1880s it hovered around 20%. Even allowing for the increase in the overall number of candidates between 1856 and 1870 and the fact that the ratio of passes to overall candidates fell absolutely, it was nonetheless the case that the Irish success rate fell more significantly than was the case generally.

A further decline in the 1880s was more probably the result of the later changes to the recruitment examination introduced by Lord Salisbury who reduced the upper age limit for taking the exam to 19. As Irish university students rarely completed their degrees before they were 20 and could not afford or had not the will to undertake the journey to England to attend the crammers which specialised in grooming candidates for the exam, the Salisbury changes effectively discriminated against potential Irish recruits. This resulted in the fact that the 1880s was the worse decade for Irish recruitment when the share fell to 5%. However a slight improvement occurred in the 1890s which probably arose because of an easing of the terms of competition for university candidates (resulting in an increase which meant that from then until 1914 the percentage of Irish recruits hovered around the 5-10% rate).

But what does any of this tell us about the relationship between the Irish people and their commitment to, and role in the management of, the British Empire from the middle of the 19th century to the start of the First World War? To some it constitutes evidence of a growing allegiance on the part of the Irish people to the British Empire – a relationship that was thrown off its natural course by the developments in Ireland after 1916 and it is being interpreted in this manner by certain elements in the academic community.

Irish Catholics in the Indian Civil Service.

Scott B. Cook's study, *"The Irish Raj: Social Origins and Careers of Irishmen in the Indian Civil Service, 1855-1914"* (op. cit.) is the most exhaustive study of the relationship between Ireland and the imperial administration of India and provides much useful information about Irish recruitment to the Indian Civil Service. Cook sets his study of the Irish in India in the context of the 'modernisation' of Irish historiography which claims that areas like sociology, economics, demographics and social studies have been long neglected as mere appendages of political history. Cook believes that his uncovering of the extent of Irish involvement with imperial administration of India constitutes a hidden and previously unacknowledged level of support for the British connection among the Irish people:

"One of the more persistent distortions of modern Irish history has arisen from a preoccupation with political themes of resistance, struggle and confrontation. Not only has so much historical talent and energy been lavished on political history, but much of the best of it - including works by Lyons, Tierney and McCaffrey - has contributed to the portrayal of Irish history as a chronology of resistance and reaction to British dominion, punctuated by a number of momentous flash-points of conflict: the repeal movement, land wars, aborted rebellions and the like. Admittedly, reliance on this format has diminished in recent decades, but it is unlikely to disappear. In fact, the paradigm of confrontation has worked so well for political history that

it has frequently been imposed on studies whose focus is not avowedly or even primarily political. . . .

. . . . Between 1800 and 1922 Ireland was formally though imperfectly integrated into the United Kingdom. Like Scotland and Wales, it enjoyed Parliamentary representation but unlike the other Celtic regions, Ireland had its own police and civil administrations headed by a viceroy. This constitutional patchwork recognized to some degree the wide array of religions, cultures and ethnic groups in Ireland, each of which offered a different view on the link with Britain. Of the various Irish responses, the most common, contrary to what most of the historical literature has stressed, was that of support: a broad category encompassing conscious and active collaboration as well as acquiescence in laws, values and social structures that were partly shaped by British hegemony. Yet the dynamics, circumstances and limitations of Irish support and the social conditions which sustained it have received little attention from historians. Perhaps this is because support is of less intrinsic interest than resistance, or because the writing of Irish history has been obsessively crisis-oriented. Or, possibly, it is because for the majority of Irish men and women, support for the British connection did not survive the dislocating events of 1916-21." (Scott B. Cook, op cit. pp.507-508).

To sustain this position Scott is compelled to adopt a very peculiar methodology which seems to face two ways at the same time. While he provides some interesting statistics the conclusions he draws from them are based on subsuming the distinctions between Anglo-Irish and Protestant and Irish and Catholic under the generic description of "Irish" which in the context of his avowed aim to reveal levels of empire loyalty among the general population becomes somewhat meaningless. Although loyalism was normally a characteristic of the Protestant population there is no doubt that there was also an element within the Catholic community which identified with empire. However, the extent of this cannot be ascertained by the provision of statistics based on the number of Irish people involved in empire building. If one uses statistics which are based on a blending of the Protestant and Catholic populations to indicate levels of loyalty, the effect is to disguise the extent to which loyalism permeated one community and exaggerates the commitment to empire of the other. All of this sits very uncomfortably with one important table that he does provide (see below). Instead of basing his analysis on the relevant statistics provided in this table, Cook struggles with a conclusion that is based on statistics that instead are based on the vague (in this context) category of "Irish" in almost all of the other tables he supplies.

There can be no real surprise at the level of Anglo-Irish and Protestant support for empire as all this is historically known. What is central to Cook's thesis however is that significant levels of support also applied to the Catholic community. In this sense the most important statistics in his study is his Table II (below) which provides the relative numbers of Protestants and Catholics who joined the ICS between 1855 and 1914: -

See table opposite.

Relative numbers of Catholics and Protestants who joined the Indian Civil Service 1855-1914

Denominational Affiliation of Irish Civilians, 1886-1914

Years Recruited	Protestants		Catholics		Total no.
	no.	% of Irish	no.	% of Irish	
1855-64	49	92%	4	8%	53
1865-74	59	89%	7	11%	66
1875-84	25	80%	6	20%	31
1885-94	22	73%	8	27%	30
1895-1904	44	75%	15	25%	59
1905-14	32	71%	13	29%	45
<hr/>					
1855-1914	231	81%	53	19%	284*

*One civilian in the ICS in 1886, Lord Henry Ulick Browne, had been appointed in 1851. He was a member of the Church of Ireland.
[Scott B. Cook, op cit. p.516]

Leaving aside the lack of an explanation as to why these chronological segments are used (beyond the fact that they divide into equal spans of years - 9 years in each case but then why not 5-year spans?), the statistics are interesting if not earth-shattering. Presumably Cook uses the 9-year span because it provides the best examples for confirming his central thesis. Despite this and although the numbers of Catholics recruited to the Indian Civil Service shows an increase over time the figures do not bear out any claim that this was to any extent significant. A mere 53 Catholics joined the ICS between 1855 and 1914. Seen in the context of the numbers of Catholics in Ireland this is far from justifying its description as evidence of anything substantial in the community.

Likewise, the fact that Irish Roman Catholics joining the Indian Civil Service is at its highest percentage during the period 1905-1914 could be construed as something significant if it was not for the fact that this is a percentage figure and not an absolute number (in fact the absolute number declined from 15 in the previous period to 13). The more likely explanation is that the period showing this increased percentage also coincided with a decrease in the number of Protestants living in Ireland – thereby ensuring that there would inevitably be a statistical rise in the percentage of Catholics to Protestants in any measurement that is based on their combined totality.

Despite this however, Cook does raise the interesting issue of Catholic support for empire - a fact that nobody would deny existed. Where differences do arise is in establishing the extent of this support, why it existed and what it represented.

When Cook reveals the undoubted discrimination against the Irish generally among the English architects of the ICS he fails to identify the source of that discrimination properly and he does this because of his reluctance to give due importance to the political dimension. He would rather position that discrimination in terms of an anti-Irish sentiment than an anti-Catholic one as this enables him to jump between two arguments depending on which best suits his thesis at any one time.

Cook seeks to establish a central premise that the British Empire provided the neutral ground on which nationalists and unionists could find a common cause in empire building. To do this he needs to have the Irish viewed as a single entity where the experiences of Protestant and Catholic are similarly based and therefore capable of a similar outcome. Or, as he puts it:

“transferred from the parochial to the imperial setting, a local and an imperial patriotism could flourish side by side. They had different reference points, one to a specific bond with

Great Britain, the other to a network linking together a global political and economic system. The vision in which nationalism and imperialism were in some way reconciled was shared by a prominent section of the Irish Parliamentary Party - by Isaac Butt, C.S. Parnell, John Redmond, Frank O'Donnell, Alfred Webb and others. To varying degrees, these men acknowledged the advantages of empire to Ireland, recognizing, at least, the possibility of congruence between Irish nationalism and an overarching British supra-nationalism (though few would have so expressed it) and working toward reforming the empire from within. Perhaps the greatest irony of all was that the Irish nationalists and Irish civilians [the members of the ICS were known as 'civilians' - ED] each certified the articulated and unspoken claims of the other. Nationalists were, of course, concerned with achieving self-government for Ireland while civilians worked to maintain the British presence in India. But it was the nationalists, by expressing their willingness to live within the empire, who could, if the British allowed them to, insure continued participation in imperial affairs by a Home Rule Ireland. Similarly, by ably discharging their functions, the Irish civilians were continuously providing living proof of the Irish ability to govern." (Cook, p.522).

Undoubtedly there were many in the Irish Parliamentary Party who were not averse to the British Empire but this is not the conclusion that Cook is ultimately pursuing as the existence of such a sentiment within Irish nationalism does not in itself provide definitive support for his thesis. What Cook is positing is the case that, between 1800 and 1922, the main Irish response to the British connection was one of support for Britain and he points to the attitude of some Irish nationalists towards the British Empire as evidence of this. But all that does is confirm the existence of a body of Irish nationalists who looked favourably upon the British Empire. It does not confirm Cook's central argument which claims the existence of widespread Irish support for British rule between 1800 and 1922. His main contention appears to be that between those years there existed "a broad category [of Irish opinion - ED] encompassing conscious and active collaboration as well as acquiescence in laws, values and social structures that were partly shaped by British hegemony." Certainly, for the majority of the period in question, the Irish acquiesced in the laws and social structures that had been shaped by British hegemony but it is questionable whether there was a shared system of values, unless values are defined as the most general human ingredients that enable any society to function. The Irish certainly did not share those values that emanate from religious belief and religious belief during the period in question was the central source from which individuals gleaned their value system.

What do the Irish people's collaboration and acquiescence in laws and social structures that had been shaped by British hegemony indicate? A population's collaboration and acquiescence can represent that population's trust in their rulers or it can represent the ability of the might and power of their rulers to impose such acquiescence. In itself it does not indicate anything. Everything is reliant on the historical context. A population's quietude under a given rule can be a sign of respect or fear and over certain periods it can oscillate between the two. What is important is the forces that define the ruled and rulers and the historical behaviour of those forces over time. The fact that the majority of the Irish people during this period sullenly accepted, or acquiesced and collaborated with British rule does not mean that they supported it. The fact that they consistently voted for a political party that stood for a dilution of British rule shows that this was not the case certainly from the second part of the 19th century. Then there is the fact that periodically their

sullen acceptance of British rule flared up into open rebellion - all of which must indicate something inherently incompatible between those elements that defined the ruled and the rulers. Any collaboration and acquiescence during this period cannot with any legitimacy be viewed as evidence of a shared sense of destiny.

This is not to say that the Irish would not have been capable of supporting British rule under certain circumstances. But the nature of British society and culture at this time ensured that it could not have been possible in the Britain that then existed. The Britain of that time was incapable of governing Ireland in a way which could generate the required support among the majority of the Irish people. The reason for this was that Britain remained an inherently Protestant state that was incapable of accommodating the Irish as an inherently Catholic people. To ignore the incompatibility that this generated is to miss the central element on which any real understanding depends.

Generalising about the Irish in India.

Despite all his useful research and analysis, Cook is compelled to deny the potency of this incompatibility as his argument is reliant upon a conflating of Protestant and Catholic Irish in a way which refuses to view the British State as an active ingredient in the relationship between them. Rather the British State is seen as a kind of parental referee which seeks to redirect the mutual antipathy of its Protestant and Catholic Irish into the more constructive activity of empire building. He acknowledges a separate basis for the prejudice against the Anglo-Irish and Irish Catholic in the British imperial administration viewing the former as a kind of social snobbery while admitting religious bigotry as the basis for the latter. In articulating the examples of the different types of prejudice directed against the Protestant Anglo-Irishman Sir Louis Dane (1856-1946), who held various high positions in the administration of India and the anti-Catholic prejudice against Peter O'Kinealy (1848-1914) who became Advocate-General of Bengal, Cook goes on to say:

"This instance might appear to suggest that anti-Catholic Irish prejudice was more effective than that levelled at the Irish Protestant. But while anti-Irish Catholic feeling may have achieved a greater emotive intensity, it did not necessarily result in greater discrimination as the cases of two civilians illustrate." (p.518).

Thus, while Cook acknowledges the existence of prejudice in the British establishment he views it in terms of an anti-Irish prejudice suffered by both Protestant and Catholic Irish alike, albeit emanating from a different motivation. It is this shared victimhood status that enables him to gloss over the extent of actual discrimination in India. By depicting the situation as "all Irish together" he fails to undertake the necessary exploration that would form a more enlightening exercise.

He also highlights the distinction between prejudice and the apparent lack of discrimination flowing from that prejudice in the following terms:

"The Irish experience in India reveals two features of the larger imperial system. First, whatever unofficial resentment there may have been toward Irishmen, the ICS was a fair employer; if it was not exactly unconscious of, or wholly indifferent to a civilian's background, at least it was not prepared to penalize him for it. This situation may well have been dictated by the

imperatives of governing a large area with an insufficient number of administrators.” (p.520).

So it seems that the Indian Civil Service, although it may have shared an anti-Irish prejudice of the British establishment, did not permit such prejudice to take on the form of actual discrimination against the Irish in India. Cook admits that this was not necessarily the manifestation of an enlightened attitude but more one of expediency – of the needs dictated by having to govern such a large area with so few people. He points to the statistics that show the presence of Irish people in positions of authority within the British Indian administration as evidence of fairness and absence of discrimination:

“statistical evidence suggests that the Irish group as a whole was successful in obtaining many of the positions most desired by civilians. In the mid-1880s, the Irish element peaked at 15% of the ICS which then numbered around 1,000. In 1886, exactly 100 Irish civilians were assigned to the Bengal Presidency which employed 615 officers, of whom 231 occupied what were classed as superior positions ranging from provincial secretaries to district magistrates and collectors. Sixty-two (or 27%) of those superior posts were held by men either born or educated in Ireland. As these positions would normally have been held by senior officers (those with at least 20 years of service apiece), a better comparison would be between Irish and non-Irish veteran officers. Of this group, the Irish comprised 24% (68 out of 279 officers) which indicates that their share of superior provincial posts was roughly proportionate to their share of experienced officers. Assuming that the Irish were as competent as any other ethnically-defined element, they were promoted at a fair and reasonable rate.” (pp.519-520).

But the first thing that strikes one from this is the fact that the description of “Irish” makes no distinction between Protestant and Catholic Irishmen – surely the breakdown of these figures according to these categories of Irish is critical to forming an accurate impression of the manner in which the different types of prejudice actually translated into discrimination. Reference to the numbers of Irish people occupying different ranks in the ICS does not take us very far in understanding the manner in which prejudice became discrimination in the career advancement of Irish Roman Catholics. It is an historical fact that the main sensibility that triggered anti-Irish prejudice in the British establishment was its anti-Catholicism. While some elements of the English establishment may indeed have looked down their noses at the Anglo-Irish, it is more likely that discrimination in the ICS recruitment policy would only become apparent when viewed in the context of the careers of the Irish Catholic members of that body.

At the very least it has to be said that Cook’s case remains unproven. But he fails to see it as such and instead makes over-zealous claims that somehow the limited number of Irish candidates interested in advancing a career in the Indian Civil Service is tantamount to Irish middle class support of British rule and the imperial system.

“... the experience of those late 19th century Irishmen is that the Irish middle classes were not irretrievably hostile to the British connection or to the imperial system. As the competition figures show, Irish interest in empire prior to the First World War was genuine if ultimately conditional. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that among the Catholic and less well to do sections of the Irish population, such interest remained into the 20th century, even as the employment opportunities for them increased at home.” (Cook, op. cit., pp.521).

Similarly, the existence of Irishmen in positions of authority within the Indian Civil Service is used as evidence of a non-discriminatory regime – a claim advanced without any evidence of how the Irish Catholics fared at the hands of that regime in comparison to the fortunes of the Anglo-Irish. Instead there is the sleight of hand of throwing both Irish Catholics and Anglo-Irish onto the same side of the statistical scales in order to ensure it falls in one direction only.

Cook goes on to say that the Irish Catholic population continued to express a support for the British connection and the empire up to the eve of the First World War. By the First World War there is no doubt that the British State would have been better served if it had been capable of accommodating the Irish Catholic population. But this proved impossible as the on-going popularity of separatist sentiments and the continuing loyalty of the people to the Irish Parliamentary Party testifies. The fact that John Redmond, at the start of the First World War, arbitrarily broke with the anti-Imperial position of his party from the time of the Boer War, does not indicate much in terms of the broader sweep of history. Indeed within a couple of years of the start of the war we see Redmond being incapable of sustaining his pro-British position amongst the Irish people. The haemorrhage of Irish support for Britain at this time occurred despite Britain going through a greater threat to its existence than was the case in its war against France in the late 18th and early 19th centuries when it could be claimed that there was more Irish support for the British cause.

Some home truths

As a further argument for the growing affinity of the Irish Catholic population for Britain Cook provides some interesting statistics.

“At home, Catholics were encroaching on the traditional preserves of the Anglo-Irish Protestant community. Between 1850 and 1910, for example, the share of Catholic lawyers rose from 28% to 44%. By 1911, Catholics held nearly 60% of the Irish civil service posts, over 33% of the judgeships while nearly half of all physicians were Catholics. [Daly, Social, 111; and Population of Ireland (Census) for 1911: Parliamentary Papers: 1912-3, CXVIII, 9. Quoted as Note 46 on p.527, Scott B. Cook, op. cit.]

What is more astonishing than the fact that Catholics occupied these positions is the fact that between 1793 (the year when the legal profession was officially opened up to Catholics in Ireland) and 1910 (a period of 117 years) Catholics still only accounted for 44% of the legal profession in Ireland despite the fact that at that time they constituted over 70% of the population. Similarly, it is surely worthy of comment that in 1911 they only constituted 33% of the judges and under 50% of the physicians. Can this be seen as evidence of an environment which would command the growing affinity of such a population with the regime under which this outrageous situation had evolved? Or, alternatively, should it be viewed, in the context of the subsequent history, as the environment in which the population which was the victim of the regime responsible for this situation, would inevitably rebel?

Of course it could be claimed that the British State could not be held directly responsible for this entire situation and there may be an element of truth in that claim. After all, even though the state had a say in the appointment of judges it had no direct say in the way in which lawyers, doctors or physicians became

qualified. Such discrimination could be said simply to be the result of the class system which had evolved in the peculiar manner in which it did in Ireland by the early years of the 20th century. This meant that at this time the Anglo-Irish Protestant community continued to inherit the privileges it gained hundreds of years earlier. However, those privileges were based on the actions of the English State in its colonization of Ireland and in the way in which it instituted the anti-Catholic Penal Laws over hundreds of years. The anti-Catholic prejudice that created and sustained this situation was also something from which the state could not entirely extricate itself from blame and indeed, showed very little effort in eradicating by the time of the First World War.

But let us look at the Irish Civil Service. Like the Indian Civil Service the Irish Civil Service differed from the British Home Civil Service. Although it did not possess the same range of powers and responsibilities as did the Indian Civil Service it did possess a level of independence that was similar to the ICS and its higher officers held more authority than was the case in the similar ranks in the British Civil Service. Where it also differed from the Indian Civil Service was in the fact that its senior positions were not subject to open competition. This meant that the inherently anti-Catholic environment was somewhat self-sustaining. Even when Catholics occupied high positions the tendency was to preserve the existing system of recruitment rather than change it to one that might be more favourable to Catholics generally: -

“Although there had been a very strong connexion between the Irish universities and the Indian civil service in the mid-nineteenth century, this linkage failed to transfer to the Irish civil service. Few Class 1 opportunities were declared open to public competition, most positions being filled by promotion or transfer. Clerks with a monopoly of access to the upper positions were unlikely to press for change in the wide patronage powers of the lord lieutenant and the desirability of open competition for the Irish civil service was still argued about before the MacDonnell commission in 1913. . . . Even large departments such as agriculture and technical instruction had a small number of Class 1 posts. This seemed to reflect policy, for T.P. Gill [a Catholic Home Ruler - ED], its secretary, attached more importance to ‘rearing and breeding than to subsequent education’ and considered that higher positions should be filled by internal promotion of bright schoolboy entrants.’ W.J.M. Starkie [an Irish Catholic – ED], the resident commissioner of national education, though anxious to recruit first class clerks, had none in his office either, and believed that there were few first-class clerks in Ireland.” (*The Chief Secretary’s Office, 1854-1914: a bureaucratic enigma*, by Kieran Flanagan, pub. in Irish Historical Studies, Nov. 1984).

In fact only 35 first-class clerks were serving in the 23 offices listed in the memorandum prepared for the MacDonnell Commission in 1913. The fact that these posts were normally filled through internal promotion and transfer ensured that the vast majority of those holding such posts were Protestant. Even when it became policy to encourage more Catholics to fill such posts it proved difficult to implement.

“The first direct recruitment from the Class 1 pool only came in 1904, and that was an accidental result of MacDonnell’s reorganisation scheme for the office [Sir Antony MacDonnell had been a member of the Indian Civil Service and was Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces before being appointed Under-Secretary for Ireland in 1902 - ED].

Faced with the opportunity to appoint two new officers, MacDonnell sought clerks with Irish business experience working in the Dublin offices. He noted that of the two selected ‘one was a protestant and one a catholic’ and stated that he ‘wished thus to divide the patronage’. The protestant candidate was sanctioned by the Treasury but the other was rejected. But MacDonnell made a painful discovery that ‘the intention was that I should get a clerk from outside the public service altogether, i.e. by open competition’. It was also found that the office had no right of selection over the candidate, who could nominate any office he wished. Sir James Dougherty, the assistant under-secretary, wrote to the civil service commissioners indicating that they would like an Irishman. The successful candidate was English, educated at Marlborough and Oxford. He lasted a year in the office before being nominated for the Colonial Office. After this the pattern of transfer and promotion from within the civil service continued, two notable appointments being George Chester Duggan [who was to go on to help establish the civil service of Northern Ireland - ED], transferred from the Admiralty in 1908, and Joseph Brennan [who later became head of the Irish Free State civil service - ED], transferred in 1911 from Customs and Excise. (Flanagan, op cit., p.221).

Overall, it would seem that even when pragmatic considerations dictated that the British state reach out to the Irish Catholics the inherent anti-Catholic nature of British society ensured that such actions could never be wholly effective in making life better for the recipients. Consequently, the social advances of the Irish Catholics remained painfully slow and took place at a pace that failed to keep up with a growing antipathy towards Britain. There is evidence of the existence of support for the British connection and empire among some Irish Catholics in the late 19th century but it is dangerous to form any general conclusion based on such a thing. After the land reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century there was some movement of the population away from antipathy towards Britain but to interpret that as anything more than inertia would be a mistake. It was certainly possible for the Irish Catholics to be won over more fully to the British connection at this time if the British State had proved itself capable of offering more to the rural and urban Irish Catholics but the social structure which had been established on the back of the Penal Laws proved to be impervious to the rate of change that would have been required even if the British State has shown an inclination to exert such a change - and there is no evidence that it was ever so inclined. What was left to the Irish Catholic population was either to continue to wait on the painfully slow progress towards its liberation from British rule, or to take the matters into its own hands.

To sum up, initially the late 18th century relaxation of the anti-Catholic laws was introduced because the State required manpower in its army to fight the French but also, in terms of opening up the professions, to harness the emerging Catholic middle class to the State. These measures were introduced for pragmatic reasons and not because of any enlightened acknowledgement of the need to eradicate an injustice emerging in the wider society. It is not clear how many Irish Catholics with the relevant qualifications wished to join the British military as officers as result of the reforms of the 1790s (and it has to be acknowledged that the Irish Catholic upper class at this time was not very extensive). But whatever their number the prevailing anti-Catholic sentiment both inside the military and outside in the wider society would have constituted an inhibiting factor for many. Recruiting to the ranks was an easier

thing. For a start there was a ready made resource of poor Irish to tap into and joining the ranks in many cases simply involved joining groups of your own class and religion whereas the officer corps had a distinct and “other” quality about it for the individual who may have sought entry.

As the 19th century progressed there was some dilution in the anti-Catholic sentiment in Britain but it remained a powerful force. Again, when the State required personnel to administer India this prejudice continued to play a part as witnessed by the

manipulation of the entry requirements to discourage too many Irish being successful in the ICA examination.

By the time before the First World War there was a growing self-confidence amongst the Catholic middle class and the extent to which their reaction to how their progress had been stifled in the previous 100 or more years assumed a more coherent form. When the First World War revealed the British commitment to Home Rule to be illusory the outcome was more or less inevitable. □

TTIP — Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

Cathy Winch

TTIP is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, currently being negotiated between the EU and the USA, in parallel with WTO negotiations, also still in progress. The EU and the US got together to negotiate on trade among themselves after the latest round of WTO negotiations became blocked between BRICS countries and EU-US at the so-called ‘Doha round’ in 2001.

TTIP aims to smooth EU-US trade relations by removing tariffs and removing ‘non-tariff’ barriers to trade, that is, regulations that don’t apply to all countries equally.

Tariffs are low at the moment, except in some cases eg German cars, Italian fashion and footwear, French cheese and Scottish knitwear pay a lot. The ‘below 4%’ figure for tariffs is an average.

Non-tariff barriers are regulations to do with safety, labour rights and the environment; for example on food safety that means that EU and US won’t import each other’s beef, the EU because the US allow growth hormones to be added to cattle feed, and the US because of the risk of BSE. Another example is different safety tests for cars, drugs and soft furnishings. There is a case for harmonising these tests: everyone has the same interest in cars, drugs and soft furnishings being safe whether imported or not. If cars have to undergo two sets of tests, cost mount up. Foreign non EU-US manufacturers wanting to export also have to deploy two sets of tests in order to export to both US and EU. It is anomalous that industrialised countries should have different safety standards: a safe car is a safe car.

Corporations can already sue governments for changing regulations in the life time of a contract, this is investment protection and it is included in TTIP as the State Investor Dispute Settlement mechanism (ISDS).

Negotiations have taken place in secret, but this is necessary when complicated and sensitive matters are involved. On the subject of beef for example, US public opinion is presumably still reeling from shock and disgust over BSE and won’t hear of British beef, even though reason (and exporters) could tell them the scare is over. You don’t want the press whipping opinion on this again. Besides, details of the industrial manufacture of food don’t bear looking into, for example the level of allowed disease among factory farmed animals. There are many sensitive topics. Harmonising regulations means harmonising regulation also within the 50 American states, for example on the distribution of alcohol, and presumably each state is deeply attached to their own way of doing things. On

such topics negotiations conducted in perfectly good faith and with everyone’s welfare at heart could still understandably be conducted in secret.

Trade will expand as a result of TTIP, and the rest of the world will benefit as they supply expanding Western manufacturers.

The treaty will have to be ratified by the European Parliament and Congress, and then by individual countries’ parliaments.

This is the case for.

Deregulation

The case against points out that harmonising ‘non tariff barriers’ to trade means in practice harmonising regulations to the most minimal.

A general principle is that the strongest party in a partnership is the one that imposes its standards, and at the moment the US are the strongest party, culturally, militarily and in foreign policy. And we can see that they already impose their standards in some areas.

For example the EU wanted to ban 31 pesticides that use Endocrine [hormone] Disrupting Chemicals (EDCs) linked to cancers in men, but finally gave up in response to US pressure. The EU wanted to put high tariffs on Canadian tar sands oil, via the Fuel Quality Directive, in order to discourage this type of oil production, but Canada stopped them.

Broadly speaking Europe stands, as regards food safety by the principle of precaution and puts the onus on companies to prove that a new substance or procedure is safe before allowing it. The US do the opposite and permit new substances and procedure until they have been proved unsafe. An example is Genetically Modified Organisms, allowed in the US but not in Europe. But here again Europe finds it difficult to resist; while not growing GM crops themselves in any quantity, Europe imports most of its animal feed from the US, which means that European meat contains GMOs.

It is not just that regulations are harmonising to the lowest level; it is also that deregulation is taking place.

On electronic data, Wikileaks have found one clause that would make it impossible for governments to specify that civil servants use Open Source software that is, not Microsoft

software; given that Microsoft (and other American companies) have spying inbuilt in their software there is every reason to use Open Source.

It is discoveries like these that make people deeply suspicious of these treaties. This is not just aligning regulations, but making up new regulations to restrict the freedom of governments to put limits on corporation activities.

ISDS

ISDS is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism. This has proved the most controversial point, as Manus O’Riordan reports in one discussion on the subject at the European Economic and Social Committee in June IFA. It gives corporations the right to sue governments if they introduce legislation that would cause a limit on profits eg regulations to do with safety, the environment, or labour laws. The court case would be heard in a non permanent supra-national court of business lawyers acting as judges in a parallel legal system over which governments have no control. Modifications have been suggested, eg making the courts permanent. Nevertheless this would restrict governments’ ability to legislate, see the complete argument on this in Manus O’Riordan’s report on p. 11 of this issue of IFA.

These legal procedures of corporations against states are not new, but they were used in bilateral agreements or against emerging countries, for example the attack against Egypt for raising wages. But now Western corporations will be attacking Western governments.

This is to prevent changes in policy, for example reversing privatisation. But there is another reason; TTIP attempts to force open markets that were closed up to now, for example by the ‘Buy American’ and ‘Small Business Act’ that protect municipal services in America. But when and how is this opening going to take place? ISDS will be the means by which corporations open these markets, by taking the government to court and having these laws declared illegal.

Martin Wolf in an article on TTIP (*Financial Times* 12 May 2015) says there is no risk of the US bullying the EU, because ‘in trade, they are equally matched’. Perhaps they are in trade, but the US have a very strong reputation regarding the strength and experience of their legal profession; the US will have the legal clout to open up markets, but the Europeans won’t. Veolia may be a giant corporation, based in France and eager to gain contracts to run American municipal services as they run English ones, but their chances of winning against the US to gain access to the US municipal services seem far from guaranteed.

Foreign policy, TPP and TISA

Perhaps the US and the EU are ‘equally matched in trade’, but the US are leaders in foreign policy, eagerly followed by Europe, and they are superior militarily, which counts for something even in trade.

Their policy is to isolate Russia and China, and Europe is adopting their hostile stance towards Russia. TTIP is part of this policy of isolation, since it excludes Russia, and the Pacific equivalent treaty excludes China.

TTIP must be put in context of two other major trade treaties being negotiated at the same time.

TPP is similar to TTIP, but on the Pacific side: the Trans-Pacific Partnership between the US, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam started negotiations in 2005, and is still not agreed, mainly because of Japan’s insistence on protecting its agriculture (the 5 sacred elements) and disagreements on copyright law and patenting of medicines.

That potential treaty excludes BRICS countries.

TISA is the Trade In Services Agreement, being negotiated since 2013 between the US and EU and 23 countries (including Turkey, Mexico, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Taiwan and Israel, but excluding BRICS countries).

This would set up rules for e.g. licensing financial services, telecommunication, e-commerce, maritime transport and professionals moving abroad temporarily to provide services.

Employers versus the rest of the population

At the EESC Committee Manus O’Riordan reports that ‘Discussion on this Draft Opinion in the Section [on ISDS] amounted to out and out class struggle. The Employers’ Group put down amendment after amendment in pursuit of their naked class interests and were only thwarted by virtue of the Workers’ Group winning over a majority of the Other Interests Group (agricultural, environmental etc). ... The Employers’ Group was both furious and ferocious.’

TTIP is being negotiated by employers and lawyers. There have been hundreds of meetings negotiating TTIP; other interest groups such as trade unions have attended through invitation just 3% of these.

At a time when the EU has lost what political independence it had, and when trade unions are not fulfilling their role in defending the interests of the population, it seems that entering into a secret agreement with the US giving them power to impose their standards and their goods even more than they do now is the last thing needed. There are rumblings of discontent in the European Parliament, and the presidential elections in the US in 2016 may disrupt proceedings. Senate has refused to grant ‘Fast Track’ to the President, that would have resulted in Senate voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the Treaty and not discussing the detail. A vote scheduled for 10 June in the European Parliament was postponed in order not to reveal dissension. Nevertheless it will be put forward with a promise of jobs and may well be accepted. None of the main parties in Britain, in Ireland or in France is against it.

Martin Wolf of the *Financial Times* thinks that TTIP will have positive but modest results but his conclusion (12 May 2015) is that this trade deal must not become an alternative to the WTO, because that would undermine global rules, and that China must not be pushed out. He points out that there are risks. He says:

“On balance, the benefits of the TPP and TTIP will probably be positive, but modest. But there are risks. They must not become an alternative to the WTO or an attempt to push China to the margins of trade policy making. They must not be used to impose damaging regulations or subvert legitimate ones. Tread carefully. Overreaching could prove counterproductive even to the cause of global trade liberalisation.”

Because the Treaties specifically exclude Russia and China and the BRICS countries (which the WTO does not), and because they restrict labour laws, they should be resisted. But also because of these reasons they risk being adopted. The Western population is being encouraged to fear Russia and China, and they fear for their jobs. The treaties perhaps won't be presented openly as a good thing to thwart the 'enemy', but they will be presented as providing jobs at home. Since no strong political party presents the case against, it is left to well meaning internet pressure groups to do it.

One pressure group in England is '38 Degrees', who have had public meetings, distributed leaflets, organised petitions, put ads in the papers, and sold a pamphlet by John Hilary, executive director of the charity War on Want, called 'The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership' published by The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Brussels Office (http://rosalux.gr/sites/default/files/publications/ttip_web.pdf), The publication is sponsored by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

This pamphlet states clearly:

"The main goal of TTIP is, by their own admission, to remove regulatory 'barriers' which restrict the potential profits to be made by transnational corporations on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet these 'barriers' are in reality some of our most prized social standards and environmental regulations, such as labour rights, food safety rules (including restrictions on GMOs), regulations on the use of toxic chemicals, digital privacy laws and even new banking safeguards introduced to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis. The stakes, in other words, could not be higher.

In addition to this deregulation agenda, TTIP also seeks to create new

markets by opening up public services and government procurement

contracts to competition from transnational corporations, threatening to introduce a further wave of privatizations in key sectors, such as health and education."

Sinn Fein and TTIP

Sinn Fein has issued a discussion document on TTIP (http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2014/TTIP_Final_Doc_Small.pdf) (prepared by Matt Carthy, MEP) outlining their concerns, which are:

1. Weakened democracy,
2. 'Prolonged and substantial' unemployment.

TTIP, according to the EU commission, is likely to being 'prolonged and substantial dislocation of EU workers'. The EU commission explicitly recognises the concern and advises EU member states to draw on structural funds such as the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to support the unemployed. [But] These funds were not put in place to permit governments intentionally to make sections of their workforces redundant.

Trade with the US is already flourishing, and does not need a boost.

3. Threats to Irish Farmers
e.g. beef
4. Food safety risks
5. Threats to the environment
(fracking, tar sands)

But their conclusion is just that a transatlantic trade treaty would be good, but it must be more transparent, and respect the rule of law and the ethos on which the EU was founded. That means either go ahead (with improvements), or stop (as no improvement could make it safe). The risks they have outlined should rule out TTIP; why don't they rule it out? Their conclusion is much the same as Martin Wolf's of the FT, that is, TTIP is probably a good thing, as long as some safeguards are respected.

The Sinn Fein document draws on the pamphlet written by John Hilary mentioned above.

This pamphlet concludes firmly that the Treaty should be rejected. Why can't Sinn Fein do the same?

Comments on the Transatlantic Treaty

Feargas O'Raghallaigh

Sinn Fein sees itself as a potential party of government as well as being 'of the left' as it were. It is to my mind in this regard also approaching its (self-assigned) role on both counts in the mould of the British Labour Party. First it must not be seen as other than 'credible' - which is to say acceptable - even if only grudgingly and with great suspicion - by the establishment and its media organs (particularly). And second, it must with reference to the first point, maintain an appropriate balance in its 'left' stance between being 'responsible' and yet 'of the left'. This narrows the ground. While the position of the liberal market model and globalisation has never been weaker intellectually and in practice it has also never been stronger in the political sphere. Sinn Fein as much as the

British Labour Party (ignore the purported or asserted existence of an Irish Labour Party) cannot work up an answer to this, simply cannot say that the emperor has no clothes. They keep getting triangulated by the political establishments - pushed to the right and to conformity. All then they are left with is a bunch of social and personal stuff bundled under labels such as 'equality' and so on - real issues but reduced to gibberish. Same Sex Marriage was to me classic in this regard.

TTIP is the same. 'Free trade' is a 'good' thing. Snookered!

I think that the TTIP has proceeded as a project misrepresenting itself as 'free trade'. It is not and one

can now clearly see never was actually though I have to say at the outset I saw it as pretty much an exercise in a free trade project. Even the most serious advocates of free trade do now see the TTIP as being something very different to another 'round' in the tradition of the GATT rounds. It is very different indeed from the GATT process - and for the worse actually in many ways. Sinn Fein (as much as the British Labour Party) cannot see this, they are not following the story and if they were even, are intellectually incapable of grasping the issues and arguments.

In New Zealand the issue is the TPP and it is much the same story - though in the TPP case it DID start out as a small free trade scheme, with the US actually excluded (it was initiated by New Zealand actually). But then the US saw the potential of this little initiative and captured and twisted it and so we now have a corrupted TPP and it is rolled into very big US and multinational corporate agendas which dominate everything and actually utterly swamp the free trade aspects.

There is not a peep from New Zealand Labour even though there is enormous ground level opposition and much fear as to what the TPP represents particularly in relation to Big Pharma but also the investor-state issue. Labour here is silent for much the same reason British Labour is and Sinn Fein is flaky, even whiffy. The left is defeated on economic policy and sees itself to be so and is in defensive retreat against a constant enemy. It is remarkable and it used to be the other way round - and should actually be so now but ...

I do think however that if TTIP was a living, real thing for ordinary people in Catholic Northern Ireland - something real relating to governance of the place - then for Sinn Fein it would be a different story, real as opposed to academic as they see it. If it were a felt governance issue in the communities in which the party is rooted then of course it would be very much a focus of attention and action - and indeed negotiation with government. This is not to say that there are no real issues, of course there are but they are deemed difficult. For example the privatisation of public services, the implications for drug procurement in public health services - and indeed the investor state issue. Here in New Zealand as I understand it opponents to the TPP have managed to connect with elected officials or representatives on local authorities. They would claim to have done so significantly and while they might be over-egging the pudding a bit it seems to me that they have to some degree. The medication question and Pharmac have also connected enormously as far as I can see. People see Pharmac as theirs and having delivered in a tough world dominated by Big Pharma.

I would not overstate the situation here. For example New Zealanders do see their massive farming industry to be constrained in its access to many Asian markets and see the TPP as in some way a key in this regard. Here they see the impact of their free trade agreement with China (they are the only western country with such a treaty and

its impact has been and continues to be unimaginable to anyone living in the northern hemisphere. This truly is another world down here and China is everything - in the most concrete and everyday ways imaginable and real.

Reverting for the moment to my Northern Ireland point and Sinn Fein, and going a little tangential at the same time, I was doing a bit of an exercise, personal research the other day. I was simply playing around with the question why industrial democracy never took root in Britain. One thing that did crop up was a pamphlet from I think 1948/49 advocating industrial democracy for Britain written by a Harold Clay. I went in search of said man and discovered that he was in 1914 a senior figure in the Leeds Labour Party and active in what was a major issue in Leeds in 1914, rack renting by private landlords.

There was a rent strike by tenants and virtually every aspect of working class organisation - unions, trades council, the party and so on - were engaged. Clay was apparently prominent, particularly as a spokesman. The strike was defeated - but by court orders and injunctions with the courts totally supporting the landlords seeking evictions and related orders.


My point is that such activity today on the part of the comparable officials and bodies is pretty much unimaginable, and I think for three reasons. First, the comparable bodies (unions, district and trades councils and the like including local party branches) have withered away at the local level we can debate how and why, I simply make the point. Second, all of these bodies such as they are today, are what I would describe as 'professionalised', distanced from memberships (which have all shrunk to almost nothing). And third, and perhaps most important, the top echelons (whether in unions and the like or in the relevant parties) have actually become part of government or otherwise, detached and irrelevant. One looks here on the one hand at Irish Labour's disaster with water charges - enforcing what was and is patent lunacy in the name of being 'in government.' One looks on the other at British Labour's general election: it seems to me to have been brought by its leaders to the point of actual collapse within the political arrangements of Britain. It simply cannot say 'no' and counter the entire thrust of Tory public spending policy on the ground of 'being responsible'.

Many years ago we had an approach and a terminology in relation to southern politics (specifically in relation to national wage bargaining). It was always to see the need depending on calculation and assessment, to be 'sensibly irresponsible'. Sensible irresponsibility, questioning and deep abiding scepticism in all things rather than a cretinous seriousness ... □



Nato and Warsaw Pact members, 1989.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, plus East Germany, were members of the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia was classed as ‘other Communist country’.



This map shows the expansion of NATO eastwards.

The 12 original members (1949) were UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy (+USA and Canada).

Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, Spain in 1982, former East Germany in 1990, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia joined in 2004.

The map does not show Albania and Croatia joining in 2009.

Ireland is non-aligned, like Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and some countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Extracts from President Putin's Direct Line Q&A

Vladimir Putin's annual Direct Line Q&A session with the Russian people took place on 16 April 2015. It lasted over 4 hours and saw the Russian president take questions on a wide variety of topics from rural transport and the sale of milk to primary schools to Ukraine and Russia's relations with its neighbours and the wider world. In all apparently 3 million questions were received. Here are some extracts from the Q&A [1]:-

UKRAINE

Q: At a meeting with business people you said, according to media reports, that, during the long night-time talks with Petro Poroshenko, Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande in Minsk, at some point Poroshenko literally said the following: "Take Donbass. I don't need it." Did this really happen?

P: No, it never happened. We discussed measures to recover economic and social welfare in Donbass. There are many problems there. And we see that the current leaders in Kiev are not willing to recover either the social welfare system or the economy of Donbass. This is true, and we talked a lot about this. This is included in the Minsk Agreements; the papers that were signed by Ukrainian authorities are legally binding.

Unfortunately, nothing has been done. As we know, Donbass is completely blocked up. The banking system is not operating. Social benefits and pensions are not being paid. We talked a lot about this, including with Mr Poroshenko.

I have also said in public that, okay, there are people there who are upholding their rights with arms in hand. Whether they are right or wrong in doing this is another matter But there are also people who have nothing to do with all this. They have earned a pension, in part, by working in independent Ukraine for 20 years and they have a right to it. They have nothing to do with the hostilities or struggle of these armed people for their rights. What do they have to do with all this? Why don't you pay them? You are obliged to do this by law. But they are not being paid. To sum up, there are grounds to say that the current Kiev authorities are cutting Donbass from Ukraine themselves. This is the gist of the grief and tragedy and this is what we spoke about.

Q: If Kiev has already devalued the Minsk Agreements, and if it is actually pressing for war, how can a dialogue with Mr Poroshenko continue at all? He is telling you one thing, then another thing to his compatriots and still another thing to his Western partners. How can any dialogue be conducted in this case?

P: Well, we do not choose our partners, but we should not be guided by likes or dislikes in our work. We must be guided by the interests of our country and we will proceed from this. ... I think that the current Ukrainian leaders are making many mistakes and they will see negative results, but this is the choice of the President and the Government.

For a long time, I have been trying to talk them into not resuming hostilities. It was Mr Turchinov who first started

hostilities in Donbass. Then Mr Poroshenko got elected. He had a chance to resolve things peacefully with the people of Donbass through negotiations. So we tried to persuade him. I say "we" meaning the Normandy format participants [France, Germany and Russia]. To be sure, I certainly tried to persuade him not to begin hostilities and to at least try to agree on things, but to no avail, as they resumed military operations.

It ended badly the first time and the second time. They tried again a third time, and it ended tragically for the Ukrainians again, particularly, for the Ukrainian army. I believe it was a huge mistake.

Such actions drive the situation into a dead end. But there can be a way out. The one and only way out of this is to comply with the Minsk Agreements, conduct constitutional reform, and resolve the social and economic problems facing Ukraine and Donbass, in particular.

Certainly, we are not going to intervene. It is not our business to impose a particular behaviour on Ukraine. But we have the right to express our opinion. Moreover, we have the right to draw attention to the need to implement the Minsk Agreements. We want them to be implemented and we are waiting for all our partners, including the Ukrainian leaders, to do so.

Q: There are lots of similarly harsh questions. People are asking why Russia offers discounts on gas to Ukraine, why it supplies cheap electricity and cheap coal to Ukraine and extends loans to it, but is not treated the same way in return? How do you respond to that?

P: You know, the political situation in any country can change, but the people remain. The Ukrainians, as I mentioned earlier, are very close to us. I see no difference between Ukrainians and Russians, I believe we are one people. Someone may have a different opinion on this, and we can discuss it. Perhaps, this is not the right place to go into this issue now. But we are helping the Ukrainian people, first and foremost. This is my first point.

Second, we are interested in the Ukrainian economy recovering from the crisis, because they are our neighbours and partners, and we are interested in order and stability along our borders, and want to build and develop economic contacts with a partner that is well-off. Suppose we give them gas discounts, if we know that their economy cannot afford to pay full price under the contract – we don't have to do this of course, but we still think it is the right thing to do, and we can accommodate. The same holds true for electricity, coal and other deals.

Incidentally, look, we agreed with the Ukrainian leadership in November or December 2013 to provide a loan to that country. We planned to buy \$15 billion worth of their bonds, but technically, it was a loan, that is, we were to lend \$15 billion, plus a \$5 billion discounted loan for road construction through

commercial banks. Now look what Ukraine has negotiated from its partners: \$17.5 billion for four years.

We offered price cuts on gas, and we did reduce the price on the condition of regular payments and settlement of prior debts. We cut the gas price dramatically, and now they increased it by over 300 percent.

Our past cooperation, all the ties that remained, have been broken. We have difficulties here [in Russia], but their situation is beyond difficult. Major industrial companies halt production, they lose competence in high-tech industries such as rocket engineering, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding and nuclear

the Donbass issue is high on the agenda. As I said, we are expecting the Ukrainian authorities to fully comply with the Minsk Agreements. First of all, and the process is already being talked about, it is necessary to create working groups within the framework of the Minsk negotiations and begin working on certain areas. These include political reform, its constitutional part, the economy and the country's borders. The work must begin now. There is no time for discussion. Practical implementation is necessary.

Unfortunately, so far, we only see continuing attempts to influence and pressure instead of a genuine willingness to resolve the issue by political means.



power. I think these are really hard consequences. I do not understand why they did this.

But events are unfolding the way they are, and we will make every effort to restore relations with Ukraine. This is in our interests.

Q: *Ukraine believes that Russia is its archenemy, but at the same time consistently demands natural gas discounts and other benefits. Under what conditions, realistically speaking, is normalisation of relations between Moscow and Kiev possible?*

P: This is not an easy question although we could elaborate on the unity and brotherhood of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. I often do this. I have to.

The conditions are simple. At this point, Russia is not expecting anything from Kiev officials except one thing. They must see us as equal partners in all aspects of cooperation. It is also very important that they observe the legitimate rights and interests of Russians living in Ukraine and those who consider themselves Russian regardless of what their passports say. People who consider Russian their mother tongue and Russian culture their native culture. People who feel an inextricable bond with Russia. Of course, any country cares about people who treat it as their motherland (in this case, Russia). This is nothing extraordinary.

Let me repeat, we are willing to fully improve relations with Ukraine and will do what we can on our side. Of course,

But I believe there is no other way but a political resolution. And everybody must realise this. We will be working hard on this.

RELATIONS WITH THE US

Q: *Could you specify the conditions under which it will be possible to normalise the relations with the West as a whole and with the United States in particular? Second, what policy measures to counter radical nationalism do you consider effective? And third, do you admit the issue of xenophobic patriotism exists in our country?*

P: I'll start with the last question. You are placing patriotism and xenophobia on the same shelf. But I think these are two different things. Patriotism means to love your homeland, while xenophobia is to hate other nations. These are worlds apart. I wouldn't mix apples and oranges.

As for radical nationalism, we have always fought it and will continue to fight it. I always say that nationalism is a very dangerous phenomenon that can have a destructive effect on the integrity of the Russian state, which has developed as a multinational and multi-confessional society.

And lastly, on the conditions for normalising relations with the West. It was not Russia who soured these relations. We have always advocated maintaining normal relations will all states, both in the East and in the West. The main condition for restoring normal relations is respect for Russia and its interests.

I said at one of the previous Direct Lines that some large powers, superpowers that have laid claim to exceptionalism and see themselves as the only centre of power in the world, do not need allies. What they need is vassals. I am referring to the United States. Russia cannot live in this system of relations. It not only cannot maintain these relations, it can't live like that. Everyone must understand this. We are always open to cooperation. We have never stopped our cooperation. Isn't it a fact that in the 1990s we opened up [to the West] and expected the same attitude towards us? But we received a harsh response when we tried to assert ourselves and to uphold our interests and views.

Remember what happened in the early 1990s, how the West applauded Boris Yeltsin. But when he announced our stance on Yugoslavia, they set the dogs on him. I won't repeat here the obscenities that were hurled at him then. When we uphold our interests and take an independent stance, all the real intentions [of the West] reveal themselves.

But this doesn't mean we should sulk or take offence, or move back and keep aloof. I have always said, and I will say again: we want to cooperate, we are ready to cooperate, and we will do this despite the stance taken by the leaders of some countries. But if they refuse, we'll cooperate with those who want to work with us, with those businesses that are not afraid of political bark, the people working in culture and education, because this cooperation doesn't end. As for the attempts to harm us through sanctions, they are being made but they are not very effective.

Q: Can you say it in so many words whether or not our troops have been in Ukraine?

P: I can tell you outright and unequivocally that there are no Russian troops in Ukraine. By the way, during the last conflict in south eastern Ukraine, in Donbass, it was the Chief of Ukraine's General Staff who put it best by stating in public at a meeting with his foreign colleagues: "We are not fighting against the Russian army." What more can be said?

Q: What has caused the failure of Russia's Ukraine policy given, first, that Russia had such a huge edge compared to other countries due to historical ties with Ukraine? Second, Russia invested about \$32–33 billion in Ukraine, while the United States invested only \$5 billion, which Victoria Nuland acknowledged. Why did we fail on the Ukrainian track?

P: You know, we were not the ones who failed; it was Ukraine's domestic policy. That is where the problem lies. It is true that Russia helped Ukraine even when we were going through challenging times. How? By supplying hydrocarbons, primarily gas and oil, for a protracted period with a huge discount compared to world prices. This went on for years. It is true that this assistance — this tangible economic support — is without exaggeration worth billions of dollars. We were actively cooperating, to say the least. I hope that in some areas cooperation can still resume. Apart from cooperation projects, we have had broad and diversified trade and economic ties.

What happened? People simply got sick and tired of poverty, stealing and the impudence of the authorities, their relentless greed and corruption, from oligarchs who climbed to power. People got fed up with all this. When society and a country slide into this position, people try to look for ways out of the situation and, regrettably, sometimes address those who offer simple solutions exploiting current difficulties. Some of the latter are nationalists. Didn't we have the same in the 1990s? Didn't we have this "parade of sovereignties" or nationalism that flared up so brightly?

We have had all this. We have been through all this! And this takes place everywhere, so it happened in Ukraine. These nationalistic elements exploited the situation and brought it to the state that we are witnessing now. So, it is not our failure. This is a failure within Ukraine itself.

Q: But haven't we missed the start of the process of Ukraine's alienation from Russia?

P: You have made a Freudian slip. You said we missed Ukraine's alienation from Russia but there was no alienation. Ukraine is an independent state and we must respect this.

We alienated all this ourselves at one time when we made a decision on the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the early 1990s. We made this decision, didn't we? We freed them from us but we took this step. It was our decision. And since we did this, we should treat their independence with respect. It is up to the Ukrainian people to decide how to develop relations.

When Ukraine had a previous crisis, also fairly acute, Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko came to power after a third round of presidential elections that was not envisaged by the Constitution. This was a quasi-coup. But at least they did it without arms and without bloodshed. By and large, we accepted this and worked with them but this time it came to a coup d'état. This is something that we cannot accept. Such a growth of extreme nationalism is inadmissible.

We must respect other countries and develop relations with them accordingly. As for what happens in these countries, this is not something we can control because these are sovereign countries and we cannot become involved — interfere in their affairs, which would be wrong.

For example, we are developing relations with Kazakhstan and Belarus within the Eurasian Economic Union. What is the idea of such associations? It is not to drag them over to us — not at all. The idea is that the people in our countries should live better and our mutual borders should be open.

What does it matter where ethnic Russians live, here or in a neighbouring state, over a state border, if they can freely visit their relatives, if their living standards are improving, if their rights are not infringed upon, if they can speak their native tongue, and so on. It doesn't matter where they live if all of these requirements are honoured. If we see that people have a decent life there and are treated accordingly.

This is the type of relations that we are developing with Kazakhstan and Belarus, as well as with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. We really want this to continue. This is the main thing, and not trying to keep [your neighbour] in your sphere of influence. We are not going to revive an empire; we don't have this goal in mind, contrary to what some people claim. This is a normal integration process. The world is moving along the integration path, including Latin America and North America — Canada, the United States and Mexico — as well as Europe. And this process is underway in Asia as well. Yet we are being accused of trying to revive the empire. It is unclear why? Why are they denying us this right?

I want to say that we have no plans to revive an empire. We have no imperial ambitions. However, we can ensure a befitting life for Russians who live outside Russia — in friendly CIS countries — by promoting interaction and cooperation.

WESTERN SANCTIONS

Q: But still, how long will all this last, meaning the sanctions? As long as in Iran?

P: After all, Russia is not Iran. Russia is bigger; its economy is bigger and by the way much more diversified than Iran's. ... As for how long we will have to endure the sanctions, I would put the question differently. This should not be about enduring anything – we must benefit from the situation with the sanctions to reach new development frontiers. Otherwise, we probably would not have done it. This goes for import substitution policies, which we are now forced to implement. We will move in this direction, and I hope that these efforts will foster the development of the high-tech sectors of the economy with higher growth rates than previously seen.

The Russian market was too crowded for domestic agricultural producers, especially after our country joined the WTO. But now we are able to clear it up. It is true that this had a negative impact in terms of food price inflation. So in this respect we will have to put up with it for some time, but domestic agricultural output will inevitably grow, and it will grow, especially on the back of the government support measures that are in place.

I am aware of the discontent among agricultural producers. They are probably in the studio and will have an opportunity to ask some questions. We will discuss it, but it should be noted that the support is there. Domestic production and food security are extremely important, and we will seek to ensure them. Would we have taken these counter actions or not without the sanctions? The answer is no. But now we are doing it.

SUPPLY OF S-300 AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM TO IRAN

Q: Some people in Israel are saying, as you may have heard, that if the S-300 systems are sent to Iran, Israel would take its own measures, including arms sales to Ukraine. I would like to know what you think about this.

P: Indeed, we signed this contract way back in 2007. In 2010 it was suspended by a presidential executive order because of the problems over the Iranian nuclear programme [2]. This was really the case, but today we can clearly see – and you understand it well, as an experienced person – that our Iranian partners are demonstrating a lot of flexibility and an obvious desire to reach a compromise on their nuclear programme.

In effect, all participants in the process have announced that an agreement has been reached. Now they only have the technical details to deal with, and they will complete this before June. This is why we made this decision. ... But if someone fears that we have started cancelling the sanctions, apparently our colleagues do not know that the supply of these systems is not on the UN list of sanctions. We suspended this contract absolutely unilaterally. Now that there is obvious progress on the Iranian track, we do not see why we should continue imposing this ban unilaterally – I would like to emphasise this again.

As for the list of sanctions envisaged by the UN resolutions, we will of course act in unison with our partners. We have always cooperated with this, and I would like to stress that we have made a large contribution to the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Moreover, our companies made this equipment. It is expensive – worth about a billion dollars (\$900 million). Nobody is paying our companies for these systems. ... So we have to ask: why should we take the loss?

But the situation is improving and this equipment is not on the sanctions list. I think that on the contrary, our Iranian partners should be encouraged to continue in the same vein. In addition, there is one more aspect to this problem.

You mentioned the position of our Israeli partners. I must say, in our military arms exports we have always focused on the situation in the region in question – most importantly, in the Middle East. Speaking of which, we are not the Middle East's largest arms supplier. The United States provides many more arms to the region and takes a much greater profit.

Well, just recently, Israel expressed concern over our exports of the same S-300 missiles to another country in the region [3]. They stressed that if successful, this arrangement could result in big changes, even geopolitical changes, in the region because the S-300 can reach Israel from that country's territory even though it is not an aggressive weapon. But as one of my counterparts said, none of Israel's planes will be able to take off. And this is a serious problem. We consulted with our buyers. Our partners in one of the Arab countries were quite understanding about the issue. So we cancelled the contract altogether and returned the advance payment of \$400 million. We are trying to be very careful.

As far as Iran is concerned, it is a completely different story that does not pose any threat to Israel whatsoever. It is a solely defensive weapon. Moreover, we believe that under the current circumstances in the region, especially in view of the events in Yemen, supplies of this kind of weapon could be a restraining factor.

DEATH OF BORIS NEMTSOV

Q: What do you think about the way the investigation is moving along and is there a chance that we will learn who ordered this heinous murder?

P: [Boris Nemtsov] was a harsh critic of the Government in general and me personally. That said, our relations were quite good at the time when we talked to each other. I have already made a statement regarding this issue. I believe a killing of this kind is a shame and a tragedy.

How's the investigation going? I can tell you that it took the investigators from the Federal Security Service and the Interior Ministry a day or maybe a day and a half at most to uncover the names of the perpetrators. ...

The question of whether those behind the murder will be found remains open. Of course, we will find out in the course of the work that is currently being done.

Notes:

[1] The full text is at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49261>

[2] On 17 April 2015, President Obama said that the S300 sale to Iran had been "suspended" at the request of the US and he expressed surprise that the suspension had lasted so long "given that they were not prohibited by sanctions from selling these defensive weapons" – <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/17/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-renzi-italy-joint-press-confe>.

[3] This seems to be referring to the decision to halt S300 delivery to Syria in August 2014 – see <http://www.janes.com/article/41819/russia-cancels-syrian-s-300-deal> □

Letter to History Ireland May/June 2015

By Pat Walsh

Sir,

Could I congratulate you on publishing the article by Altay Cengizer entitled *'The Road to Gallipoli - a Turkish Perspective'*. It was a greatly informative account that provided much needed historical context for the Gallipoli tragedy. A few years ago I had the pleasure to hear the Ambassador speak at Collins Barracks and he made many of the same arguments to a greatly appreciative audience.

I would, however, like to take issue with two other points made in the same issue of History Ireland regarding a connected subject - that of the 1915 Armenian killings. In Sidelines, Tony Canavan writes that *"the significance of the genocide is that when Hitler planned to exterminate the Jews he cited the Armenian case as an example of how a state could get away with mass murder."*

Firstly, it should be said that whilst it is often repeated that Hitler asked: *"Who remembers the Armenians"* there is no valid evidence that he actually said such a thing! The *Times* of 24 November 1945 in an article entitled *'Nazi Germany's Road to War'* cites Hitler addressing his commanders at Obersalzberg on August 22

1939, saying: *"Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians."* The article does not claim that Hitler is talking about exterminating the Jews but, in fact, creating *lebensraum*/living space for German colonisation in Poland on the eve of his assault.

However, there is also substantial doubt over the authenticity of the document which was presented to Louis Lochner of the Associated Press containing the quote. The original document containing it (L-3) was submitted to the Nuremberg Tribunal but withdrawn as evidence in accordance with Rule 10. The person who found the discarded document in the US National Archives, Carlos Porter, noted that the document was probably a forgery since the original German was incorrect in a number of grammatical ways and it had unusual vocabulary. The typewriter used was not a German one, having no capacity for accents and suspicious spaces existed within the composition.

The Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the document as evidence against the Nazis in favour of two other official versions found in confiscated German military records.

Neither of these, which have detailed notes of the address, contain the Armenian reference. One is authored by Admiral Hermann Boehm, Commander of the High Seas Fleet. In addition, a third account by General Halder was used to prove consistency with the other two accounts used as evidence and this again makes no mention of the Armenians.

This strongly suggests that the Armenian reference was added later by someone who wished to associate Hitler with the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire. We know from


the Roger Casement experience that forgeries are powerful weapons and paper never refused ink!

One further thing I would like to take issue with was a sentence in your editorial, namely:

"The Armenians... incited to rebellion by the Entente, and by Russia in particular, paid a terrible price and a new word gained common currency - genocide."

This, whilst true in terms of incitement, cannot be true in relation to the use of the term *"genocide"*. This word was not used until 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The word was coined by the Polish Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, to deal particularly with the recent systematic killing engaged in by the Nazis. It, therefore, did not gain *"common currency"* after the Great Calamity suffered by the Armenians and was never applied to this event despite British Parliamentary Blue Books and large scale war propaganda being issued by the secret information department of Wellington House (which came about on the suggestion of our own T.P. O'Connor) against the Turks.

I think this is important so that history and propaganda are not blended together as they so often have been in relation to these unfortunate and catastrophic events. □



Raul Castro — Speech at 7th Summit of the Americas

Key remarks by Army General Raul Castro Ruz, President of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the 7th Summit of the Americas, Panama city, April 10-11, 2015.

His Excellency Juan Carlos Varela, President of the Republic of Panama, Presidents and Prime Ministers, Distinguished Guests

I appreciate the solidarity of all Latin American and Caribbean countries that made possible Cuba's participation in this hemispheric forum on an equal footing, and I thank the President of the Republic of Panama for the kind invitation extended to us. I bring a fraternal embrace to the Panamanian people and to the peoples of all nations represented here.

The establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on December 2-3, 2011, in Caracas, opened the way to a new era in the history of Our America, which made clear its well-earned right to live in peace and develop as their peoples freely decide, and chart the course to a future of peace, development and integration based on cooperation, solidarity and the common will to preserve their independence, sovereignty and identity.

The ideals of Simón Bolívar on the creation of a 'Grand American Homeland' were a source of inspiration to epic campaigns for independence.

In 1800, there was the idea of adding Cuba to the North American Union to mark the southern boundary of the extensive empire. The 19th century witnessed the emergence of such doctrines as the Manifest Destiny, with the purpose of dominating the Americas and the world, and the notion of the 'ripe fruit', meaning Cuba's inevitable gravitation to the American Union, which looked down on the rise and evolution of a genuine rationale conducive to emancipation.

Later on, through wars, conquests and interventions that expansionist and dominating force stripped Our America of part of its territory and expanded as far as the Rio Grande.

After long and failing struggles, José Martí organised the 'necessary war', and created the Cuban Revolutionary Party to lead that war and to eventually found a Republic 'with all and for the good of all with the purpose of achieving 'the full dignity of man.'

With an accurate and early definition of the features of his times, Martí committed to the duty '*of timely preventing the United States from spreading through the Antilles as Cuba gains its independence, and from overpowering with that additional strength our lands of America.*'

To him, Our America was that of the Creole and the original peoples, the black and the mulatto, the mixed-race and working America that must join the cause of the oppressed and the destitute. Presently, beyond geography, this ideal is coming to fruition.

One hundred and seventeen years ago, on April 11, 1898, the President of the United States of America requested Congressional consent for military intervention in the independence war already won with rivers of Cuban blood, and that legislative body issued a deceitful Joint Resolution recognizing the independence of the Island 'de facto and de jure'. Thus, they entered as allies and seized the country as an occupying force.

Subsequently, an appendix was forcibly added to Cuba's Constitution, the Platt Amendment that deprived it of sovereignty, authorized the powerful neighbor to interfere in the internal affairs, and gave rise to Guantánamo Naval Base, which still holds part of our territory without legal right. It was in that period that the Northern capital invaded the country, and there were two military interventions and support for cruel dictatorships.

At the time, the prevailing approach to Latin America was the 'gunboat policy' followed by the 'Good Neighbor' policy. Successive interventions ousted democratic governments and in twenty countries installed terrible dictatorships, twelve of these simultaneously and mostly in South America, where hundreds of thousands were killed. President Salvador Allende left us the legacy of his undying example.

It was precisely 13 years ago that a coup d'état staged against beloved President Hugo Chavez Frías was defeated by his people. Later on, an oil coup would follow.

On January 1st, 1959, sixty years after the U.S. troops entered Havana, the Cuban Revolution triumphed and the Rebel Army commanded by Fidel Castro Ruz arrived in the capital.

On April 6, 1960, barely one year after victory, Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory drafted a wicked memorandum, declassified tens of years later, indicating that 'The majority of Cubans support Castro...An effective political opposition does not exist; the only foreseeable means of alienating internal support [to the government] is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship ['] to weaken the economic life of Cuba...denying it money and supplies to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.'

We have endured severe hardships. Actually, 77% of the Cuban people were born under the harshness of the blockade, but our patriotic convictions prevailed. Aggression increased resistance and accelerated the revolutionary process. Now, here we are with our heads up high and our dignity unblemished.

When we had already proclaimed socialism and the people



had fought in the Bay of Pigs to defend it, President Kennedy was murdered, at the exact time when Fidel Castro, leader of the Cuban Revolution, was receiving his message seeking to engage Cuba in a dialogue.

After the Alliance for Progress, and having paid our external debt several times over while unable to prevent its constant growth, our countries were subjected to a wild and globalizing neoliberalism, an expression of imperialism at the time that left the region dealing with a lost decade.

Then, the proposal of a 'mature hemispheric partnership' resulted in the imposition of the Free Trade Association of the Americas (FTAA), --linked to the emergence of these Summits-- that would have brought about the destruction of the economy, sovereignty and common destiny of our nations, if it had not been derailed at Mar del Plata in 2005 under the leadership of Presidents Kirchner, Chavez and Lula. The previous year, Chavez and Fidel had brought to life the Bolivarian Alternative known today as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America.

Excellencies;

We have expressed to President Barack Obama our disposition to engage in a respectful dialogue and work for a civilized coexistence between our states while respecting our profound differences.

I welcome as a positive step his recent announcement that he will soon decide on Cuba's designation in a list of countries sponsor of terrorism, a list in which it should have never been included.

Up to this day, the economic, commercial and financial blockade is implemented against the Island with full intensity causing damages and scarcities that affect our people and becoming the main obstacle to the development of our economy. The fact is that it stands in violation of International Law, and its extraterritorial scope disrupts the interests of every State.

We have publicly expressed to President Obama, who was also born under the blockade policy and inherited it from 10 former Presidents when he took office, our appreciation for his brave decision to engage the U.S. Congress in a debate to put an end to such policy.

This and other issues should be resolved in the process toward the future normalization of bilateral relations.

As to us, we shall continue working to update the Cuban economic model with the purpose of improving our socialism and moving ahead toward development and the consolidation of the achievements of a Revolution that has set to itself the goal of 'conquering all justice.'

Esteemed colleagues

Venezuela is not, and it cannot be, a threat to the national security of a superpower like the United States. We consider it a positive development that the U.S. President has admitted it.

I should reaffirm our full, determined and loyal support to the sister Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the legitimate government and civilian-military alliance headed by President Nicolas Maduro, and to the Bolivarian and chavista people of that country struggling to pursue their own path while confronting destabilizing attempts and unilateral sanctions that

should be lifted; we demand the repeal of the Executive Order, an action that our Community would welcome as a contribution to dialogue and understanding in the hemisphere.

We shall continue encouraging the efforts for the Republic of Argentina to recover the Falklands, the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and supporting its legitimate struggle in defense of financial sovereignty.

We shall maintain our support for the actions of the Republic of Ecuador against the transnational companies causing ecological damage to its territory and trying to impose blatantly unfair conditions.

I wish to acknowledge the contribution of Brazil, and of President Dilma Rousseff, to the strengthening of regional integration and the development of social policies that have brought progress and benefits to extensive popular sectors, the same that the thrust against various leftist governments of the region is trying to reverse.

We shall maintain our unwavering support for the Latin American and Caribbean people of Puerto Rico in its determination to achieve self-determination and independence, as the United Nations Decolonization Committee has ruled tens of times.

We shall also keep making our contribution to the peace process in Colombia.

We should all multiply our assistance to Haiti, not only through humanitarian aid but also with resources that help in its development, and, in the same token, support a fair and deferential treatment of the Caribbean countries in their economic relations as well as reparations for damages brought on them by slavery and colonialism.

We are living under threat of huge nuclear arsenals that should be removed, and are running out of time to counteract climate change. Threats to peace keep growing and conflicts spreading out.

As President Fidel Castro has said:

'the main causes rest with poverty and underdevelopment, and with the unequal distribution of wealth and knowledge prevailing in the world. It cannot be forgotten that current poverty and underdevelopment are the result of conquest, colonization, slavery and plundering by colonial powers in most of the planet, the emergence of imperialism and the bloody wars for a new division of the world. Humanity should be aware of what they have been and should be no more. Today, our species has accumulated sufficient knowledge, ethical values and scientific resources to move forward to a historical era of true justice and humanism. Nothing of what exists today in economic and political terms serves the interests of Humanity. It cannot be sustained. It must be changed.'

Cuba shall continue advocating the ideas for which our people have taken on enormous sacrifices and risks, fighting alongside the poor, the unemployed and the sick without healthcare; the children forced to live on their own, to work or be submitted to prostitution; those going hungry or discriminated; the oppressed and the exploited who make up the overwhelming majority of the world population.

Financial speculation, the privileges of Bretton Woods, and the

unilateral removal of the gold standard have grown increasingly suffocating. We need a transparent and equitable financial system.

It is unacceptable that less than ten big corporations, mostly American, determine what is read, watched or listened to worldwide. The Internet should be ruled by an international, democratic and participatory governance, particularly concerning its content. The militarization of cyberspace, and the secret and illegal use of computer systems to attack other States are equally unacceptable. We shall not be dazzled or colonized again.

Mister President

It is my opinion that hemispheric relations need to undergo deep changes, particularly in the areas of politics, economics and culture, so that, on the basis of International Law and the exercise of self-determination and sovereign equality, they can focus on the development of mutually beneficial partnerships and cooperation in the interest of all our nations and the objectives proclaimed.

The adoption in January 2014, during the Second Summit of CELAC in Havana, of the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Peace Zone made a transcendental contribution to that end, marked by Latin American and Caribbean unity in diversity.

This is evident in the progress we are making toward genuinely Latin American and Caribbean integration processes through CELAC, UNASUR, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, ALBA-TCP, SICA and the ACS, which underline our growing awareness of the necessity to work in unison in order to ensure our development.

Through that Proclamation we have committed ourselves 'to have differences between nations resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, and other ways consistent with International Law.'

Living in peace, and engaging in mutual cooperation to tackle challenges and resolve problems that, after all, are affecting and will affect us all, is today a pressing need.

As the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Peace Zone sets forth, 'the inalienable right of every State to choose its political, economic, social and cultural system, as an essential condition to secure peaceful coexistence between nations' should be respected.

Under that Proclamation we committed to observe our 'obligation to not interfere, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of any other State, and to observe the principles of national sovereignty, equality of rights and free determination of the peoples, 'and to respect ' the principles and standards of International Law] and the 'principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.'

That historic document urges 'all member states of the International Community to fully respect this Declaration in its relations with the CELAC member States.'

We now have the opportunity, all of us here, as the Proclamation also states, of learning 'to exercise tolerance and coexist in peace as good neighbors.'

There are substantial differences, yes, but also commonalities which enable us to cooperate making it possible to live in this world fraught with threats to peace and to the survival of the human species.

What is it that prevents cooperation at a hemispheric scale in facing climate change?

Why is it that the countries of the two Americas cannot fight together against terrorism, drug-trafficking and organized crime without politically biased positions?

Why can we not seek together the necessary resources to provide the hemisphere with schools, hospitals, employment, and to advance in the eradication of poverty?

Would it not be possible to reduce inequity in the distribution of wealth and infant mortality rates, to eliminate hunger and preventable diseases, and to eradicate illiteracy?

Last year, we established hemispheric cooperation to confront and prevent Ebola, and the countries of the two Americas made a concerted effort. This should stimulate our efforts toward greater achievements.

Cuba, a small country deprived of natural resources, that has performed in an extremely hostile atmosphere, has managed to attain the full participation of its citizens in the nation's political and social life; with universal and free healthcare and education services; a social security system ensuring that no one is left helpless; significant progress in the creation of equal opportunities and in the struggle against all sorts of discrimination; the full exercise of the rights of children and women; access to sports and culture; and, the right to life and to public safety.

Despite scarcities and challenges, we abide by the principle of sharing what we have. Currently, 65 thousand Cuban collaborators are working in 89 countries, basically in the areas of healthcare and education, while 68 thousand professionals and technicians from 157 countries have graduated in our Island, 30 thousand of them in the area of healthcare.

If Cuba has managed to do this with very little resources, think of how much more the hemisphere could do with the political will to pool its efforts to help the neediest countries.

Thanks to Fidel and the heroic Cuban people, we have come to this Summit to honor Marti's commitment, after conquering freedom with our own hands proud of Our America, to serve it and to honor it 'with the determination and the capacity to contribute to see it loved for its merits and respected for its sacrifices.'

Thank you. □



The Armenian Insurrection And The Great War

Including two pamphlets by “Armen Garo”

By Pat Walsh


Belfast Historical & Educational Society 2015

The Great Calamity that engulfed the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 has been narrowed down to a single question: Was the Young Turk Government in Istanbul guilty of Genocide? But the tragedy of the deaths of great numbers of Armenians, Turks and Kurds is inexplicable if confined solely to this. And it obscures important historical questions around the issues of instigation and betrayal that should be raised around these events. So a context is required to explain what really happened to produce such a disaster.

That context is the Great War and the Armenian Insurrection. The Armenian Insurrection is described by a leading figure in it, the Dashnak revolutionary Dr. Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), in writings long since forgotten. These put a very different complexion on the events of 1915. They describe a great moment of decision when the very existence of a people was gambled in the struggle for a Great Armenia, carved out of Ottoman territories in which the Armenians

constituted a small minority. His two pamphlets reprinted here reveal that the 1914 Ottoman offer of an autonomous Armenian State was rejected by Armenians when what they thought was a better offer came from America, Britain and France.

The price was that they fight the Ottomans. They gambled and lost, bringing disaster on the Armenian people.



Also included is a commentary by Pat Walsh on the origin and development of ‘the Armenian Question’ and its culmination and final resolution in the catastrophic events in Anatolia brought about by the Great War. This reveals the instrumental part played by the Liberal Anglosphere in foisting dangerous notions of historic destiny on the Armenians and then a fraudulent war that encouraged them to destruction. When remembering the Armenian Great Calamity what should be sought is not only the truth, but the whole truth.