

# Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”  
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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## Editorial

### Germany

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Germany is the problem state of the European Union. The Union could not exist without it, but finds it difficult to take on coherent political existence because of it.

Other European peoples know what they are. Or, at least, they are what they are, and their existence is not shot through with existential uncertainty. The Italians revel in being Italian and do not give too much thought to the morrow. But what are the Germans today but the tradesmen of Europe—careful and conscientious, but without spirit? They live in families and produce durable and reliable goods. It is not long since, when undertaking to build a house, they would select trees from the forest to be made into the furniture. Perhaps they still do it—at any rate in spirit. It is positively mediaevalist. But they will not, in the necessary political dimension of modern life, insist on the virtues of the medievalism in which they aspire to live.

They had, in the post-War era, made local economic arrangements between banking and handicrafts that were conducive to the preservation of a mediaeval way of living. They were content with it. But the European Union, within which they had enfolded themselves, insisted, under British influence, that their local economic arrangements were obsolete, if not corrupt, restrictions on the free competition of each against all. And it gave way and made these local economic arrangements illegal. It set about destroying itself by legislating against what made it itself—but the habits of centuries die hard, and Germany somehow, despite its legislation against itself, remained itself. It is still the handicraft workshop of Europe, producing reliable goods on a monstrous scale for a market that extends far beyond itself.

Britain in those days—Socialist Britain, if the Labour Party is socialist—had a Minister for Competition in Europe. He was Kim Howells—Arthur Scargill's revolutionary lieutenant of just a few years earlier, but now the Minister For Free Capitalism in Europe.

British economic expertise is in financial services. Finance is the freest form of capital. England had once, for a few generations, been the Workshop of the world, the Banker of the world, and the Naval master of the world. It lost its predominance in all three spheres because of the damage it suffered in its two unnecessary wars on Germany—which it chose to fight as World Wars—and now specialises in Finance under the American umbrella.

Britain joined the European association for the purpose of curbing its development and establishing financial hegemony over it. It succeeded in some particulars, but in general it failed. And it failed because of the handicraft culture that is ingrained in German life and that persisted beneath all political regimes and ideologies.

It failed with the consolidation of the Euro. It was in danger of declining into a marginal European state—an outsider state within Europe, neither the one thing or the other—and that did not accord with its idea of itself.

Its idea of itself was forged in 1531, when it broke with Europe by declaring itself an Empire, meaning a world unto

itself which would progressively encompass what lay beyond itself.

The breach took the superficial form of a religious Reformation, but it was primarily a political event. The Reformation of religion came after the political breach. It was a Reformation devised by the State for a purpose of state. It was neither Lutheran nor Calvinist because it was not an autonomous religious development at all.

It took the form of a kind of Protestantism because it was found impractical to retain a Catholicism separated from Rome as the religion of the new Empire. Borrowings were made from Continental Protestantism in the construction of a new Church that was an integral part of the State and that lay under the authority of the Government both in doctrine and organisation.

(An upsurge of spontaneous religious enthusiasm, mainly Calvinist in form, upset the state system in 1641, and led to the establishment of a theocratic Republic in 1649, but the order of politically-directed religion was restored in 1660 and was never again questioned.)

England celebrated the 500th anniversary of Luther's defiance as if it was a watershed event in its own history, even though everybody who knew anything knew that English Protestantism had a different origin and was a religion only in the most slender sense. But Luther's *Theses*, being well-known, serve as a convenient marker for the breach with Rome—with Europe—with the European significance of Lutheranism left aside as irrelevant. And that spurious Reformationism probably helped to tilt the balance in the Brexit referendum.

The reason for Brexit was explained most informatively by Damien Green when he was Minister. The consolidation of the Euro gave cohesion to the European Union, and it implied further European development that Britain could not prevent. That development would marginalise Britain as an EU member. The longer it remained within the EU, the more difficult it would be to withdraw and a point would be reached when Britain would no longer be itself.

He did not need to ask what would Europe be if Britain did not exist as Britain. It was Britain's duty with relation to Europe to keep Europe Free. European *freedom*, which depended on Britain to maintain it, meant keeping Europe divided and in conflict with itself. Britain had again and again over the centuries kept Europe in conflict with itself by "*balance-of-power*" interventions which prevented the rise of any hegemonic power within Europe. British hegemonic influence, exercised from the outside, kept Europe volatile.

The calculation behind Brexit was not merely that Britain could not risk losing itself by attempting to further disrupt Europe from within, but that, by leaving the EU and regaining its own freedom of action, it would deprive it of a focal point against which to develop, and would encourage others to recover their sense of national destiny.

And it would leave Germany isolated and disoriented.

England and Germany have a shared history. That is how we are encouraged to see the matter of the relationship between Ireland and Britain by our Oxbridge-trained academics. Britain tried to break up Irish life by punitive laws and totalitarian

actions and, when the Irish nevertheless established independent government in 1919, the British launched a terrorist war against it. And all of that constitutes a *shared experience* that we should cherish.

So Germany is bound to Britain by the intimate experience of being trapped into two wars by it, being beaten in both, and thus being saved from itself by it.

The last embrace was the aerial bombing of Dresden in February 1945. Aerial bombing is the bombing of civilians in undefended cities in a way that will cause fire-storms to engulf whole neighbourhoods. Such bombings are not done as measures considered necessary to avert defeat. They could not be done while the enemy is fighting fit. They could only be done when the enemy is defeated in substance.

What was the purpose of the Dresden bombing? The English historian, Andrew Roberts, who disdains academic evasions and euphemisms, said on BBC Radio's *Any Questions* some years ago that the purpose was to burn the message into the German mind that Germany must never in future refuse to do what Britain wants it to do.

That message did not get through at once. But it seems to have got through to Angela Merkel.

The wartime generation did not learn it. And, most of all, the wartime generation that was also a generation of the previous war did not learn it. In short: Chancellor Adenauer did not learn it.

There was continuity between the Hitler regime and the Adenauer regime—greater continuity than there was between the Kaiser's regime and the Weimar regime.

The reason for this was not that Adenauer had any part in the Hitler regime. One of Hitler's first acts was to remove him from his Office as Mayor of Cologne and leave him to stew in a Convent. The reason was that Adenauer had experienced the British Occupation after 1918, and had closely observed the British handling of Germany in defeat and reconstruction, and was determined that, as far as it was within his power to do it, British influence in German affairs after 1945 should be thwarted.

He had seen British influence exercised through the Social Democracy in the 1920s and it was his purpose in life after 1945 to put the Social Democracy into second place. His political instrument for doing this was the Christian Democracy, which he founded from remnants of the old Catholic Centre Party, combined with disillusioned elements of the German Protestantism which, lacking the internal resourcefulness of Catholicism, had been unable to hold itself apart from the Nazi regime.

Adenauer, who refused to be Chancellor in Weimar Germany, survived the Nazi era in the stratum of Catholic resistance—a passive resistance that did no more than exist and wait. (The active Catholic opposition was crushed quickly: Fritz Gerlach was, I think, one of the first journalists to be killed.) Adenauer then emerged and put into effect as Chancellor the political approach that he had practised as Mayor of Cologne.

The Catholic Church is universal in doctrine and structure. That was one of the reasons given by Protestant England for attempting to destroy it in Ireland by a system of Penal Laws that were more far-reaching than the Nuremberg Laws. The Protestant religion is properly nationalist—so it was said. And the national religion of Ireland was Protestant for a century and a half—the nation being for that purpose, not the mere populace that was in thrall to Roman idolatry, but the civilised stratum that lived in a religion of its own making: a national religion therefore. However, the Irish populace, though reduced to a kind of serfdom by the British colony that was placed over them, and was the official nation, survived the long British dictatorship as Catholics.

When being subjected to the systematic regime of British Protestant dictatorship, the Irish were Irish, just as the Spanish were Spanish and the Italians Italian. They were not defined by being Catholic. *Catholic* was one of the many things that they were. And the national culture within which they were Catholics dated from pre-Christian times and included an opinion that the Christianity which it absorbed was not an unmixed blessing.

The Nazi dictatorship—a popular dictatorship—lasted a dozen years. The Anglo-Protestant dictatorship lasted more than ten times that long, was not popular, and was not developmental in any of its effects, as the Nazi dictatorship undoubtedly was. It was entirely destructive in its effect on everything Irish except their nominal Roman Catholicism. At the end of that century and a half of the Anglo-Protestant regime, the Irish were no longer Irish as the Spaniards were Spanish, but they were more Roman Catholic than they had been when the dictatorship began. They were destroyed as Irish to a very considerable extent. It was through the resourcefulness of Catholicism that they survived.

In a piece of writing by Nietzsche posthumously published by his sister (which Joe Keenan thinks is a forgery), it is remarked that, when a Professor at Basle University announced that he had become a Roman Catholic, his academic colleagues responded as if he had said he had become a monkey and was going to live in the Zoo. That was the only possible response by minds formed on the Socratic principle that the unexamined life is not worth living, and that the proper business of the intellect is to pull life apart for a critical examination of its bits and pieces. But, half a century after Nietzsche, it was Roman Catholicism that kept Europe functional in the aftermath of the second totalitarian war raised up against it by Britain, by enabling Germany to avert a repeat of the chaos of the aftermath of the previous war, and providing common ground for concerted action with Italy and with substantial elements in Benelux.

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(The term “*totalitarian war*” was used extensively in an Oxford Pamphlet in 1939, in a series of pamphlets setting the scene for the war. The author was Sir William Beveridge, who a few years later devised the amended version of the Poor Law that became the Welfare State, but which in the initial Beveridge structure retained much of the spirit of the Poor Law. Beveridge’s Pamphlet, *Blockade And the Civilian Population*, was a defence of the Naval Blockade of 1914-1919 which caused some hundreds of thousands of German civilians to die of the effects of starvation. Beveridge denied that there was any meaningful distinction between the Army and the general population. Totalitarian was normal war for the British war propagandists in 1939, before things went so badly for them in May 1940 as the result of defeat in an old-fashioned battle between Armies.)

I don’t know how Roman Catholicism works in these matters. I grew up until my early twenties in a community in rural Ireland that was entirely Catholic in religion, simply taking it for granted, but not subordinating everything in life to it in the Puritanic mode now attributed to it by Ruth Dudley Edwards in the *Sunday Independent*, which has switched from extreme religion to extreme anti-religion within living memory.

I participated in the stage-management of religion in a minor way up to the age of 12 or 13, when I became a sceptic in the matter of belief. Then all through my teens I was surrounded by believers and people who did not make a point of disbelieving. I failed in a bid to become a professional footballer, became a labourer instead, and through books that I came across in rural farm-houses I wandered off into philosophy—German, French, and whatever Spinoza was.

What was going on in my head had no point of contact whatever with what was going on in the Colleges and Universities. And it was not interfered with by priests or people, though it was well known what I was up to.

Such interference as I experienced did not come from the backwardness of the countryside. It came from the progressiveness of the middle class of the cities which began conducting missions against the easy-going, tolerant, interesting life of the countryside. I left under the provocation of that interference. It never crossed my mind to go to an Irish city. I had had a brief experience of life in Cork City and Limerick City and it struck me as being arid. And the reason I went to London was because of the British Museum. I had tried to get a copy of Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good And Evil* by post through a bookshop in Cork. It refused to get me a book with such a title. If it had tried to get it, I think it would have found it was out of print. But it refused on principle to sell such a book.

Observing the way of the world through my teens—the world being well known to us in Slieve Luachra—I had concluded that the slogan of *good and evil* was a very bad framework for understanding and I wanted to get to the root of it.

It was in London that I first experienced the tedium of the Protestant Sabbath—a day when there was no work to do and nothing else was allowed to be done either, until the cinemas opened towards night fall. Fortunately I happened to go to a piece of it—Holloway/Finsbury Park—that was largely inhabited by West Indians and Irish, and to get a job as bus conductor in a garage that was likewise West Indian/Irish. It was almost like being at home—but with the British Museum down the road.

Gradually I got to know some English intellectuals. They naturally took me to be a Catholic since I was Irish—and I found that their notion of Catholicism was so ignorant, so bizarre—so similar to that of the lapsed Catholic *ersatz* intelligentsia in

Ireland at present—that it was brought home to me that in terms of historical culture I was Catholic.

There is no such thing as pure intellect. The intellect is a late sprouting in a mind carefully nurtured by influences of a very different kind during the years when it is made functional in the human world, and it never detaches itself from those influences.

Kant was officially an Enlightenment philosopher. He tried to grasp the world in the totalitarian mode implicit in Protestantism until he came under the influence of the rival scepticisms of Hume and Rousseau. Rousseau was his salvation—Rousseau, the Genevan Protestant who went around the corner to Savoy, took the Catholic soup, and took issue with the rationalist superficiality of Voltaire.

His *Pure Reason* led to the asking of questions that cannot be answered sceptically. Did the world have a beginning, or was it always there? Either answer is unthinkable. And likewise with Free Will and a couple of others. So, under the influence of Rousseau’s *Vicar Of Savoy*, Kant turned from the world of scientific cosmology to the world of human experience, the world of *Practical Reason* in which human life is lived—in which it must be lived, regardless of Enlightenment pretensions—in which alone it can be lived.

The epic poem of Protestantism, *Paradise Lost*, written by Cromwell’s Secretary of State, John Milton, has nothing human in it. Dante, the author of the epic Catholic poem, the *Divine Comedy*, was exiled from Florence by the Papist democracy of the city, because he supported the Empire against the Papacy, and the poem bustles with human life—and has a poet of pagan Rome as a central figure.

A BBC interviewer asked, in connection with the recent visit of the Pope to Ireland, if it was not the case, as many suggested, that Roman Catholicism infantilised the Irish. There is certainly a great deal of infantilism about, but it seems to me that the cause of it is the mindless way in which the would-be elite of the media rejected Catholicism under external influence, of which the influence of Oxbridge patronage on Irish academic life is a major cause.

When I moved from Slieve Luachra to London in the mid-1950s, I did not feel that I moved from an infantilised populace to an intellectually mature populace. I found that there was very little one could talk about with the English, and that opinion in England was effectively standardised and compartmentalised. Discussion consisted of blocs of opinion being batted to and fro.

England understood the world in stereotypes. And its own inner life was stereotyped too. It was dull. But it was very effective politically, both for operating the two-party democracy at home and for acting on the world.

Democracy seems to function best with a stolid populace, with a narrow range of fixed opinions, that shapes itself into two parties that do not take their differences from each other too seriously, and that allows itself to be guided in serious affairs of state by a ruling class.

According to Plato’s dialogue, *Menexenes*, Athenian democracy—as explained by Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles—was effectively an aristocracy. And so was English democracy from the time I began to take an interest in it until the 1960s.

I read about the Nuremberg Trials at the time in the papers, and I heard them discussed. Ireland refused to make itself available to Britain for the War. It was sceptical of professed British motives for launching the War. It was authentically neutral in the War—not spuriously neutral, as is now asserted.

The Trials were seen to be Show Trials—and I discovered later that a senior American Judge refused to take part in them because they were conducted under Lynch Law. And I recall the feeling of satisfaction when Goering, though under the strictest supervision while waiting to be hanged, cheated the hangman by poisoning himself.

The Trials were treated as spurious, not because it was not believed that the Germans had done nothing dreadful in the war, but because it was well known that those who had set themselves up as judges and juries to try them had also done dreadful things both in that war and in previous wars.

The law under which the Trials were held did not exist before the War. And the precedent set by the self-appointed Judges in their previous wars, and even in that War, was not allowed to be pleaded by the Germans in defence. So, people who had experienced British law in Ireland a generation earlier, and who had since then taken some part in establishing authentic law for themselves, treated the Nuremberg Trials as bogus.

The justification of Nuremberg by those who agreed that it was not conducted in accordance with authentic law was that the process inaugurated International Law, that would henceforth be binding on the world, and would ensure that no people would ever be ridden over roughshod again.

But, within a couple of years, the British Government—a Labour Government—was making war in Malaya by means of Concentration Camps, tortures, movement of populations, and the fostering of racial antagonism. The Malayan independence movement had to be crushed mercilessly because Britain just had to have Malayan rubber and tin.

There was no actual possibility that Britain might be prosecuted under the new system of International Law for its actions in Malaya. The United Nations system gave Britain immunity from prosecution. Britain, which took part in the establishing of the system of International Law that was to apply Nuremberg Law to the world, exempted itself from the system. But it chose not to call its actions in Malaya a war, but an Emergency.

Then in the 1950s there was the war in Kenya. Britain had seized Kenya/Uganda a couple of generations earlier, expropriated the tribal lands, cleared them for colonisation, and reduced the native population to a kind of serfdom. The Zionist movement was formed about that time and was searching for a territory for Jewish nationalist colonisation. The British Government offered it the ethnically-cleansed region of Uganda—a land without people for a people without land. But the Russian element in Zionism rejected Uganda and insisted that only Palestine would do—thereby demonstrating that the Zionist object was not quite the acquisition of a “*safe haven*” for Jews.

The Uganda region was colonised with British subjects from India and Kenya was colonised by actual British. In the early 1950s the native populations began to be organised as a national movement. (One of the first issues of contention that provoked this development was the determination of the Imperial Government to put an end to the tribal custom of female circumcision.)

When the native movement took on a definite form, and seemed to have the potential of undermining the white British colony some time in the future (as the Catholic Association did in Ireland), the Government decided to crush it, by exterminating it if necessary. The natives, regardless of the United Nations *Declaration of Human Rights*, were decreed to be savages, and there were no limits to what the forces of civilisation might

properly do to savages. Torture camps, Concentration Camps, Indoctrination Camps, and murders were all freely deployed in the cause of civilisation.

It was barely concealed from the British public that this was being done in its name (after all, ‘national service’ blooded the wider population), but the British public bore the White Man’s Burden stoically for many years. Eventually a settlement was made with a British-educated native, Jomo Kenyatta, who was in prison as the leader of the savages, and the property of the British colonists (on the best land) was protected as a veneer of native rule was established on British conditions.

Kenyan who had been tortured tried to bring actions for damages under all the beautiful new laws established by the United Nations, but there was no Court that would hear them. The British Government, that conducted the whole affair, said that such things were entirely the concern of the Government which it had put in place in Kenya—a Government that included people that the British regime had manhandled. This was absurd of course—just as absurd as attributing to the Irish Free State responsibility for the Black and Tan terror to which the personnel of the Free State had been subject before they agreed to become a Free State and to make war on their colleagues who did not see their way to engaging in that act of transubstantiation.

It was absurd, but it was legally effective in exonerating the Empire, and it was politically effective to a remarkable degree. The Successor States of the Empire, established by the Empire, were allowed to come into being on the condition that they took on responsibility for what the Empire had done in their territories.

The courts at what had been the heart and brain of the Empire refused to entertain cases being brought on the ground of universal human rights and realistic responsibility for the breach of them. The Law did not operate in that medium of vulgar outrage. And Britain, until long after its entry to the European Union, knew nothing about universal human rights—except as a propaganda slogan against an enemy in wartime.

But then the extremely improbable happened. A descendent of one of those resentful Kenyans became President of the World—President of the United States—after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Obama had a word in certain ears. And suddenly the august British legal system found that those Kenyans had legal standing after all in their claims for damages for personal injury. The cases were brought to trial. No defence was offered—which meant that no evidence was heard, no nasty details of torture reached the public domain. There was no trial. Compensation was paid. The well-behaved media reported the bare fact that this had happened and did not dwell on its implications.

But the fact stands that Britain did plead guilty to mass torture in the suppression of an assertion of Kenyan nationality in actions carried out a dozen years after the Nuremberg Trial.

Another American, Caroline Elkins—I don’t know if she had any connection with Obama—published books about the British war against the Mau Mau, a war in which the possibility of extermination was freely contemplated, and about detention, torture and brainwashing of the Kikuyu population in Concentration Camps, which the author oddly calls *Gulags*. What she describes is what anybody with a sense of British realities knew very well at the time that it was happening. What is sensational about her books is that they subject these happenings to rigorous academic treatment of a kind that is inconceivable in Ireland in its ‘revisionist’ phase, and that England only makes an occasional gesture towards.

A couple of hundred thousand killings were carried out in the course of bringing the Kikuyu to heel and bringing them to an understanding of the position they must adopt. What were those killings? Were they not murders?

They were administrative measures. But, as far as I recall from reading Pollock & Maitland and Dicey long ago, British law does not include anything called 'administrative law'. It has only the Common Law, which it makes a great thing of. But it expected that it should be understood informally that, in the acquisition and conduct of an Empire, certain things must be done which were not suitable for treatment by law. However, that region, in which the Executive power of the State could act freely beyond the Law, should not be formally exempted from the Law by the Law.

According to Dicey, actions undertaken by the Government beyond the law in emergency circumstances were sometimes given blanket legality by Parliament after the event. But I do not know that anything of that kind was done by Parliament in the case of the killings and tortures in Kenya. In its latter stages the carry-on in Kenya became contentious in Parliament, raised by Barbara Castle of the Labour Party and Enoch Powell of the Tory Party. Imperial common-sense, which had served the state well for a couple of centuries, was reaching the end of its tether. The Law—something bearing at least a faint resemblance to it—was in future to be applied generally to all that the State did in the world. So what does that make of the killers for the Empire in Kenya who acted on State authority without regard for the Law? Were they murderers?

It seems to me that their status was rather like that of the SS.

What did all of those killers and torturers, who acted beyond the Law on the authority of the Executive Power of the State, do when their work in Kenya ended? What had their precursors in Malaya done? What had the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries done?

I assume that most of them returned home and settled down as good citizens.

About ten years ago the Irish media under revisionist (i.e. British) influence embarked on a witch-hunt for Continental fascists who had settled in Ireland after the War and become good citizens. Ireland was guilty of Neutrality during the War, and had compounded the offence by admitting some Europeans who had been involved in the War as Fascists or as collaborating Nationalists of various kinds, and had let them settle down as useful citizens instead of branding them with infamy. The foremost of the witch-hunters was Cathal O'Shannon, who contrasted them with himself, who had gone to England to do his bit in the Anti-Fascist War.

The way O'Shannon did his bit was to join the RAF and take part in the liberation of Burma (Myanmar).

But the liberation of Burma was actually a reconquest of Burma for the British Empire, to save it from the Burmese who had declared independence with the support of Japan.

Japan went to war under the slogan "*Asia for the Asians*".

It had been Britain's ally in the 1914 war. It had been the protector of the British Empire in the East, and had established an Empire of its own on the mainland by agreement with Britain.

The United States in 1918 saved Britain from virtually certain defeat in the war it had launched on Germany and, in the aftermath, it demanded that Britain should end its Treaty with Japan—else it would end Britain's dominance of the world's seas by building a superior Navy itself. Britain agreed. The Japanese Treaty was not renewed when it became due in the

early 1920s. And Japan, a Victor in the Great War, was racially slighted at the Versailles Conference.

It was taken as a matter of course to be America's *Manifest Destiny* to conquer, and subjugate, and ethnically cleanse by means of genocide, the whole Continent to the Pacific, and then it was equally evident that it was its destiny to command the Pacific.

Japan had been living contentedly within itself for a few hundred years, but the US decided that it could not be allowed to sulk any longer with relation to the civilisation that was being enforced on the world. It sent warships to Japan with an ultimatum that it must wake up and engage with the world. Japan got the message: it became capitalist, got itself an Empire, and made an alliance with Britain.

But then the US decided that it was its destiny to make war on Japan. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was in its way. Britain was ordered to end it, and did so. Thereby it rejected Japan as a friendly Power and marked it down as enemy—that is how these things work.

In 1941 Britain had lost the War that it declared in 1939, and was hanging on—"*standing alone*" is the propaganda way of putting it—waiting for something to turn up, but safe behind the world-dominating Navy, which it still had, thanks to its surrender to the USA over the Japanese Treaty. It hoped the United States would join it in the War on Germany, and would save it again, as it had in 1918. But public sentiment in the USA was strongly neutralist with relation to the British War, and the President had in the Election pledged that there would be no more engagement in these crises that Britain generated in Europe.

American thoughts were on Japan. President Roosevelt issued an ultimatum that Japan must relinquish certain possessions that were necessary to it—or else.

And Britain seconded the ultimatum.

Japan responded by bombing the American fleet, that was located a thousand miles from home, and by rolling up the British Empire as far as India, under the slogan *Asia For The Asians*.

The British backing of the American ultimatum was suicidal. Britain had no issue with Japan to warrant a war with it. But it was in the British interest to spread war around the world, to encourage war everywhere, in the hope that something would somehow come to its aid in the war that it had launched but had no hope of winning with its own resources.

It was of course the German/Russian War, which began before the Japanese ultimatum, that saved its face. And the American/Japanese War was merged in propaganda with the Anglo/German War, which by this time had become in substance a German/Russian War. It was presented as a war against the aggressions of the Powers of the Anti-Comintern Pact—even though Japan never joined Germany in the war on Russia.

Britain's backing of the Japanese ultimatum lost it its Asian Empire but gained it the USA as an Ally. But that was not what caused Germany to be defeated. It was Russia that defeated Germany. What the US did was hustle Britain back on the Continent in time to meet the Russian advance in Germany.

A Burmese state was established under Japanese auspices. Cathal O'Shannon helped to destroy it and restore British Imperial authority. But the restored Imperial authority was a veneer over the surface of things. Within a couple of years Britain had to recognise Burmese independence under the

Fascist collaborator, Aung San—who Churchill, now in Opposition, said should be tried as a War Criminal.

The Japanese advance stopped at the border with India, although there was a strong movement in India that would have asserted Indian independence in alliance with Japan. But the main body of effective Indian opinion declared neutrality and bided its time.

And, after the war, De Valera was feted in India by Nehru as another statesman who had refused to take part in Britain's catastrophic war.

But that was long ago when Ireland was another country. Contemporary Ireland tramples on that Ireland and pleads war guilt as masochistically as Germany itself.

The post-Nuremberg torturers and murderers from Malaya and Kenya returned to the life of peaceful citizens under the law. They had done their duty as required of them by the State. They did what they did in the service of the State, and all but a handful of anti-social eccentrics no doubt had a good conscience about it. The individual who lives his own life, in complete independence of his human surroundings, is either a God or a Monster—wasn't it Goethe, one of the few Good Germans, who said that?

Modern life is lived in the State—which, viewed from beyond itself, was accurately described by Nietzsche as "*the coldest of all cold monsters*". And these monsters live in a relationship of natural wrath towards each other—didn't Spinoza, another Good Man, a Dutch Jew and therefore close to being a Good German—say something to that effect.

There is no empathy between these monsters. They are sealed books to each other. But it is within each of them that human life flourishes. And the attempt to abstract human life into a generality over-riding the framework of states, with rights that over-ride the rights developed within a state, where does that lead? To the mayhem of Iraq, and Libya and the would-be mayhem of Syria.

Hegel was not a Good German. He praised Prussia for having become a modern political body. In the Germany of petty-kingdoms, in which the surrounding states fought their wars, the Hohenzollerns, exiled from their petty-kingdom in southern Germany, constructed the State of Prussia on reclaimed land in the North. And Prussia expanded, picking up bits and pieces here and there, not by military conquest, but because it was a State. And it began to take part as a State in the wars that were fought by the surrounding states. And Hegel praised it for being a State. And Germany united as a nation-state around Prussia when France attempted in 1870 to scotch the national development of Germany by making war on Prussia.

Prussia, the long-term ally of Britain, was marked down as a potential enemy when France failed to crush it in 1870. If France had won, it would have continued to be the enemy of mankind but, when it failed, and because it failed, the German force that resisted it began to take its place.

The vanguard element of English liberalism, the Christian Socialist movement, identified Germany as the new enemy straight away in the early 1870s. British Governments made the change more cautiously over the next thirty years, waiting to see if the new German state would consolidate itself as a stable political power covering the region of Europe between France and Russia, where there had for centuries been a miscellany of petty kingdoms, incompetently governed by the standards of the modern state.

The new German state proved to be stable politically. The petty Kings took their place within it as local authorities under the Emperor, who as head of the state had to be an Emperor because in the hierarchy of the state—and all states have hierarchies—he had Kings under him.

The German state bore the flimsy appearance of being a feudal structure. If it had been so in substance, England would not have demonised it. But it was obvious that it was in substance a modern nation-state, competently but tolerably governed from its political centre, and that it was the framework of a strong development of national economy.

It changed what Europe was politically, simply by existing as a viable state over the vast region where war-games used to be played. There were real borders where there used to be a semblance of borders, and within those borders there was centrally-directed political power, and the scattered industriousness of the Germans cohered into a strong national economy.

That was when England invented the stereotype of "*Prussianism*" as militaristic, aggressive and domineering. And the war of Prussian defence against French aggression, which provoked the unification, was transformed into a war of Prussian aggression by use of Bismarck's "*Ems Telegram*" summarising a message from the King of Prussia to the Emperor of France, subtly altering it in a way that obliged France to behave as it did. That far-fetched story was made persuasive by British expertise in propaganda. A highly educated Dubliner, with an interest in European history, W.J. McCormack, took issue with some remark I made about the Franco-Prussian War, and it appeared that he had a genuine belief that Prussia made war on France.

The stereotype of Prussianism devised after 1871 flatly contradicted the earlier view of Prussia as weak, tentative and hesitant, as expressed in a *Times* editorial:

"an overvigorous domestic rule is attended by a foreign policy feeble almost to futility. Prussia is always leaning on somebody, always getting somebody to help her, never willing to help herself; always ready to deliberate, never to decide; present in Congresses, but absent in battles... She has a large army, but notoriously one in no condition for fighting... No one counts on her as a friend; no one dreads her as an enemy. How she became a great Power history tells us; why she remains so nobody can tell"

(This contemptuous summing up of Prussia ten years before the Franco/Prussian War was expressed in a *Times* editorial on 6th November 1860).

The stereotype has now been bought by post-Hitler, post-Adenauer Germany, which abases itself before England, and thus establishes a political vacuum at the heart of the European Union which depends on Germany for its economic existence.

Adenauer restored viable German statehood very quickly in the Western Occupation zones by countering British influence, aligning Christian Democracy with the United States, establishing a substantial continuity of state personnel between the Nazi system and the new Federal State, and imposing a blanket ban on public employment of citizens of the new German democracy who were adherents of the force that had actually brought down the National Socialist regime—Communism. And he refused to recognise the existence of the state formed in the Communist Occupation Zone, which had to take in the bulk of the Germans ethnically cleansed from Eastern Europe on United Nations authority.

Adenauer could act in this way because he knew from experience what the Versailles Treaty was, what Weimar Germany was, and how differently Britain had handled Weimar

in the twenties from the way it handled Hitler until 1939. And because his political movement, Christian Democracy, was incomprehensible to British political understanding and had held itself apart from National Socialism.

It could be argued—it was argued—that Christian Democracy was a kind of Fascism. Much of what was called Fascism in Austria was Christian Social. It devised a form of Austrian patriotism after the Empire was destroyed, and it opposed merger with Germany—supported by Mussolini—until British collaboration with Hitler undermined it. And some of it emigrated to England and took part in the war on National Socialist Germany when Britain suddenly decided to have one. And, within post-War Germany, the Bavarian region of Christian Democracy bore a strong resemblance to what in Austria had been called Fascism.

What Adenauer did was a remarkable exercise in statesmanship in its time. What he did no longer suffices for today. and it appears today that the Christian Democracy of Angela Merkel has altogether lost contact with the spirit, or culture, or ideology, or historical perspective, which enabled Adenauer to do what he did. As far as I know, what he did cannot even be described by contemporary German history. The political blank that is Germany is therefore the central problem of the European Union.

Germany today begins to resemble the Germany that Holderlin in the early 19th century saw when he returned from abroad—a geographical expression inhabited by craftsmen. □

Brendan Clifford

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## The ICC acquires jurisdiction over the crime of aggression

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### By David Morrison

On 17 July 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC) acquired jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, an historic development, you might think, which could lead to individuals responsible for actions similar to the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 being prosecuted by the Court in future.

In reality, the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is very limited – initially, it is able to prosecute an individual for aggression committed by one of only 35 states, most of them unlikely aggressors, and then only if that state hasn't opted out of the Court's jurisdiction in respect of aggression, which it can do at any time by a simple declaration. It's unlikely that there will ever be any prosecutions.

### The Rome Statute

The ICC began operations on 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute of the Court having been adopted on 17 July 1998 at an international conference in Rome. Then, 120 states voted in favour of the Statute and 7 against (including China, Israel and the US) with 21 abstentions.

Originally, the Statute defined (in Articles 6, 7 & 8) three offences – genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – for which ICC may be able to prosecute individuals.

But, absent a referral by the Security Council (of which more later), the Court has no authority to prosecute unless a state grants it that authority by becoming a state party to the Statute. Then, the Court can prosecute individuals for these offences committed

in that state's territory by any individual, and

by nationals of that state anywhere in the world

(unless the case is already being prosecuted under domestic law).

Under (a), the ICC prosecutor has been able to investigate possible war crimes committed by US service personnel in Afghanistan, which is a party to the Statute, even though the US is not (and even though it is US policy to prevent the ICC trying any US nationals).

Under (b), the ICC prosecutor has been able to investigate possible war crimes committed by British service personnel in Iraq (for example, killing or abusing civilians) even though Iraq is not a party to the Statute.

Under Article 12(3) of the Statute, a state may also make a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court without becoming a party to the Statute.

Today, 123 states are parties to the Statute, including Ireland, the UK and every other state in the EU, but around seventy in

the world are not, including the US, Russia, China and Israel [1].

### The crime of aggression

From the outset, it was intended that the Rome Statute would include a fourth offence – the crime of aggression – but agreement to do so wasn't reached at the original conference in Rome in 1998. However, in June 2010 a definition of the crime itself, and a procedure for prosecuting it, was agreed at a Review Conference of the state parties to the Statute in Kampala.

The Rome Statute (Article 8 *bis*) now defines the crime of aggression as:

“the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” where “act of aggression” means “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”.

Examples of such acts include:

“The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;”

“Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;”

“The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;”

“An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;”

So, armed action against another state such as the US/UK invasion of Iraq in March 2003 amounts to aggression as defined in the amended Statute (under 1 above), as does the US/UK/France bombing of Syria on 14 April 2018 (under 2). It also appears that the following Israeli actions constitute aggression:

the military occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza (under 1),

the annexation of East Jerusalem (under 1),

the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights (under 1), and

the regular military attacks on Syrian targets today (under 2).



## Who can the ICC prosecute for the crime of aggression?

ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is very limited, for a variety of reasons, as we will see.

First, absent a Security Council referral (of which more later), the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if the alleged aggressor and the victim of the aggression are both state parties to the Statute. This is made clear in Article 15 *bis* (5), which states:

“In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State's nationals or on its territory.”

In other words, the Court cannot prosecute

when the alleged aggressor is not a party to the Statute, or

when the alleged aggression takes place on the territory of a state that is not a party to the Statute.

Second, at any time a state that is a party to the Statute can declare that it doesn't accept the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the crime of aggression. Article 15 *bis* (4) of the Statute says:

“The Court may ... exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.”

So, a state contemplating military action against another state can insure its leaders against being prosecuted for the crime of aggression by making such a declaration in advance.

Third, the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is restricted to those states that have formally accepted the aggression amendments to the Statute adopted at Kampala in 2010. This severe restriction was agreed by the Assembly of State Parties at its meeting last December when it activated the crime of aggression (see below).

At that time, only 35 out of the 123 state parties to the Statute had ratified or accepted the aggression amendments [2]. These are:

Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay

Very few of these states are likely to commit aggression. More likely aggressors, such as the UK and France, both of which are parties to the Statute, are noticeable by their absence.

(Ten of the twenty-eight states of the EU, including the UK and Ireland, have not accepted or ratified the aggression amendments. This is surprising given the EU's consistent support for the ICC and its policy of promoting the extension of its jurisdiction to every state on earth. This was formally established by EU Council decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011, which states that “the Union is convinced that universal accession to the Rome Statute is essential for the full effectiveness of the ICC”. The decision committed the EU and its member states to “make every effort to further this process by raising the issue of the widest possible ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the Rome Statute and the implementation of the Rome Statute in negotiations”. The EU seems to have abandoned this policy now that the Statute includes the crime of aggression.)

### Assembly of State Parties in December 2017

The Kampala Review Conference agreed that the Court would be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after 1 January 2017, providing

30 state parties had ratified or accepted the Kampala amendments and

the Assembly of State Parties had voted to activate the crime by a two-thirds majority at least.

On 29 June 2016, the ICC announced that Palestine had become the thirtieth state to have ratified the amendments. This paved the way for the activation to take place at a meeting of the Assembly of State Parties in December 2017.

Prior to this meeting, a number of state parties, with the UK and France in the van, argued that the Court should not be able to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a state or on the territory of a state with respect to the crime of aggression unless that state had accepted the aggression amendments (see Annex II here for paper to that effect by Canada, Colombia, France, Japan, Norway and the UK [3]).

After considerable argument, the Assembly of State Parties accepted this principle and it was incorporated into the resolution activating the Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (beginning on 17 July 2018) [4]. The resolution, which was passed by consensus, confirmed

“that the amendments to the Statute regarding the crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Review Conference enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendments one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance” and

“that the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments”

The introduction of this principle means that, at present, only 35 of the 123 state parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime of aggression. Furthermore, as we have seen, any or all of these 35 can refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime of aggression at any time by simply lodging a declaration to that effect with the Registrar.

If the present circumstances had existed in March 2003, it would not have been possible for the Court to prosecute any individual for the US/UK aggression against Iraq, first and foremost because Iraq is not a state party to the Statute. And even if it had been a party, no US national could have been prosecuted because the US is not a party to the Statute and neither could a UK national because the UK has not ratified the aggression amendments.

### Deferral by the Security Council

The ICC likes to portray itself as an international judicial body, whose actions are free from political interference. This is simply untrue since the Security Council has a significant role in its operations.

First, the Security Council can defer an investigation or prosecution. This power is enshrined in Article 16 of the Statute, which says:

“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”

Theoretically, therefore, this allows the Security Council to defer an investigation or prosecution indefinitely. However, it is unlikely that a deferral resolution would pass even once, since it needs at least nine Council members to vote in favour and none of the five permanent members to vote against and thereby veto the resolution. To the best of my knowledge, this power has never been exercised.

### Referral by the Security Council

The Security Council can impose Court's jurisdiction on states that have chosen to reject it by refusing to become a party to the Statute. This is provided for in Article 13 of the Statute, which states that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if:

"A situation in which one or more of such crimes [that is, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression] appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;"

In the light of this, it is difficult to view the Court as an independent judicial body, the jurisdiction of which states can choose to reject, as many states in the world, including the US, Russia, China and Israel, have done. On the contrary, its jurisdiction can be extended by the Security Council to states that have chosen to reject its jurisdiction, a body which, it is worth noting, includes members who themselves have rejected its jurisdiction.

Of course, this cannot happen to veto-wielding members of the Security Council, who have chosen not to become a party to the Statute – since they can block an attempt by the Security Council to extend the Court's jurisdiction to their territory. So, China, Russia and the US, which have chosen not to become parties to the Statute, will never have ICC jurisdiction extended to their territories. And neither will Israel, since the US can be relied upon to use its veto to block it.

An international court with universal jurisdiction is fair (but impossible to achieve in the world as it is today). An international court, the jurisdiction of which states can choose to accept, has a semblance of fairness. But an international court, like the ICC, the jurisdiction of which can be extended by the Security Council to some states that have chosen not to accept its jurisdiction but not to others, is grossly unfair.

### **Sudan and Libya**

Sudan was the object of a Security Council referral in March 2005. Then the Council passed Chapter VII resolution 1593 "to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court". On that occasion, three states – Philippines, Russia, Tanzania – which are not parties to the ICC and don't accept its jurisdiction voted to impose its jurisdiction on Sudan. That is blatant hypocrisy.

As a result of this referral, the ICC charged the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, with genocide and other Sudanese nationals with lesser charges. None of them have been taken into ICC custody so that they can be tried.

Libya was the object of Security Council referral on 26 February 2011. Then the Council passed Chapter VII resolution 1970 "to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court". Amongst those states who voted for this referral were 5 states – China, India, Lebanon, Russia and the US – who are not parties to the ICC and don't accept its jurisdiction. This is blatant hypocrisy.

As a result of this referral, Colonel Gaddafi, his son Saif and his head of security, Abdullah Al-Senussi, were indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity. Colonel Gaddafi was killed; Saif, who is alive and well in Libya, is still being sought for trial by the ICC; and the ICC consented to Al-Senussi being tried by Libyan courts, which has taken place and he is now under sentence of death in Libya.

### **Past investigations**

Since it began functioning in 2002, the ICC has secured only three convictions – against Germain Katanga, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi

In all, the Court has issued indictments against 34 individuals for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan was also indicted for genocide. All

of those indicted are from Africa. However, only 10 of these have been handed over to the Court for trial (of which three have been convicted). The rest are either still fugitives or dead.

The ICC has often been accused of singling out Africa for its prosecutions. It is true that of the ten situations under investigation by the Court nine are in African countries. The ten, in chronological order of the investigations beginning, are *Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Central African Republic II and Georgia*

However, the ICC itself initiated the investigations in only two of these situations (Kenya and Georgia). Five of them (Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali and Central African Republic II) were referred to the ICC by their governments and two (Darfur and Libya) by the Security Council). And Côte d'Ivoire voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. So, the ICC can hardly be accused of choosing to prosecute Africans only – in reality, the choosing was largely done by state governments seeking to prosecute their own nationals.

### **Preliminary examinations**

Preliminary examinations by the Court are also ongoing with regard to events in *Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, Palestine, Greece and Cambodia, and Ukraine* [5].

The purpose of these examinations is to enable the ICC Prosecutor to decide whether to proceed to a full investigation, which might eventually lead to the indictment of individuals.

The Palestine investigation presents a novel challenge for the ICC. There, for the first time, the ICC Prosecutor will be faced with the possibility of indicting individuals for actions carried out on behalf of a state, namely Israel, in the Palestinian territories it has occupied since 1967, a state that has powerful friends in the world and is sure to move heaven and earth to resist the prosecution of its agents. Members of Hamas and other Palestinian paramilitary groups may also be prosecuted.

The ICC Prosecutor accepted Palestine's offer of jurisdiction on 1 January 2015 and opened a preliminary examination into the "situation in Palestine" on 16 January 2015 (see ICC press release, 16 January 2015). Over three years later this preliminary examination is still going on.

Will individuals eventually be indicted? Possibly. It is difficult to see how the ICC Prosecutor can avoid the conclusion that Israelis responsible for settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are guilty of war crimes – since, according to Article 8.2(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute, "the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" is a war crime. However, even if individuals are indicted, it's unlikely that they will ever face trial in The Hague, since the ICC cannot try people in absentia – and, since Israel is not a party to the ICC, it has no obligation to hand people over to the ICC for trial.

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## De Gaulle and Lemass on the UK and Europe

by Manus O’Riordan

Seán Murphy had a continuous involvement, from 1938 to 1950, as Ireland’s Minister to three different Frances - the Third Republic, Vichy and the Fourth Republic. But there was more than one hiccup involved in his transition from one France to another. In September 1944 Ireland recognised General de Gaulle’s Provisional Government as both the *de facto* and *de jure* Government of France and Murphy set out from Vichy to Paris in order to present his credentials. But he was rebuffed by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault’s officials. However, Bidault was, in turn, overridden by de Gaulle himself. In 1991, Ireland’s Institute of Public Administration published a collection of essays entitled *De Gaulle and Ireland*, and edited by Pierre Joannon, Honorary Consul General of Ireland in the South of France. He provided the following account:

“During World War II, Eire joined the neutral camp. It was a question of wanting to be neutral anyway, of having no other choice in the circumstances, of a desire to affirm sovereignty and a reluctance to fan the embers of the civil war that had ravaged the country in 1922 and 1923... Thus, while Ireland withdrew into benevolent neutrality - Northern Ireland, which remained an integral part of the United Kingdom, participated fully in the war between the Allies and the Axis powers... It was therefore understandable that Free France should offer a warm tribute to that northern part of Ireland... The bias for Ulster was paralleled by the disfavour into which neutral Ireland was plunged in the first days of the liberation of France - a disfavour made bluntly plain to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Dublin government by the new staff of the Quai d’Orsay. But General de Gaulle’s attitude was rather different.”

On October 6, 1944, “the President took the trouble” to send the following note to one of his advisers:

“(1) **Why was the Minister of Ireland, M. Murphy, received so ungraciously?** (2) I would like to have M. Bidault’s opinion on the question of our relations with Ireland, to which I think we should attend as a matter of importance. **Following his visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Irish Minister complained about uncomplimentary remarks on Irish neutrality which had been made in his presence.** (My emphases – MO’R). He had also been given to understand that the Provisional Government of the French Republic (GPRF) could not admit the principle of his continued stay in Paris as Irish Minister. The Irish government expressed surprise at the manner in which its envoy had been received despite the fact that the French Minister in Dublin had been fully accepted and recognised as the representative of the GPRF.”

Pierre Joannon observed and commented:

“What led to this absence of resentment (of Irish neutrality) on the part of the General, wrong-footing the Foreign Ministry, and this clearly expressed desire to see ‘*care and importance*’ attached to the relations with a country snubbed by the victorious Allies and, when all was said and done, negligible in terms of power and influence? Surely it was the clear realisation that, in the troubled post-war world, France could not afford to deprive itself of support, from whatever source. ‘*We shall all need our friends after the war*’, General de Gaulle said to the Irish diplomat (Murphy) at the end of an extremely cordial private audience. This confidence was wisely placed, to judge from de Valera’s remarks to France’s ambassador, to the effect that Ireland considered France ‘*a counterweight to*

*overwhelming British influence*’ and a rallying point for the ‘*small powers*’.” (pp 3, 4 and 44).

Minister. Murphy would send the following report to Dublin on his “*extremely cordial private audience*” with de Gaulle (All emphases are mine – MO’R):

“I was received by General de Gaulle on Saturday, March 24th (1945), at the Hotel de la Résidence in what was described as ‘a private audience’.

“I found the General in manner rather cold. His voice is rather harsh and he speaks very deliberately. He rarely looks at you. He stares straight in front of him. He seemed to me to look older than when I saw him in November, though he appeared much less nervous.

“When I sat down, having shaken hands and presented my respects, he said ‘*I understand, Minister, you have been in France since 1938*’. I replied that that was so. Whereupon he said ‘*You should be able to form a better opinion on things in France than most people*’. I said that I certainly would not flatter myself to that extent.

“I then said that I was charged by my chief, Mr. de Valera, to present to him his best wishes for his personal wellbeing and to transmit his hopes to see France very soon retake her place amongst the great nations of the world.

“**To that he replied that he was ‘very touched’ by Mr. de Valera’s messages and he asked me to transmit his thanks and his good wishes. Ireland and France, he said, had always been friendly. There was no reason for quarrel between them. He hoped that, after the war, the economic and cultural relations between the two countries would become closer. We shall all need our friends after the war. He expressed his great admiration for the Taoiseach and the manner in which he had kept his country neutral.**

“I then asked him what were his hopes of the San Francisco Conference. He said with a sad smile ‘*Of course, there will be a document. The atmosphere is not good; not nearly as good as in 1919. There is great rivalry amongst the United Nations. We don’t know where we stand. England*’, he said, again with a smile, ‘*is always England. I don’t think for an Irishman I need add any more. America, as far as President Roosevelt is concerned, is very interested in the affairs of Europe and the East. It is difficult to know to what extent his views are shared by the American people. I personally think they don’t know what they want, but I think that the possibility of their retiring from European affairs, as they did in 1920, is not to be excluded. Russia is another question mark. I had hoped that, when Russia had cleared her country of Germans and arrived on her 1939 frontiers, she would be satisfied and start rebuilding her own country. But, with the turn events have taken in Poland, Roumania, Hungary and Finland, it is hard to know when or where her appetite will be satisfied. The whole situation is very confused and far from satisfactory. The relationship between the Allies is very different from that in 1918, so that the future is full of possibilities.*’

“I then asked him if he foresaw the end of the war in months or weeks.’ I don’t like to make predictions’, he replied, ‘but I should say months. The Germans are still strong and will fight very hard. From the French point of view, we are not in any hurry. In fact, months would suit us better than weeks. In six months’ time, we hope to have an army almost as large as the British in Europe. This will be of considerable assistance to

us in regulating a number of questions which will have to be decided after the war has ended in Europe.’

“He then, without any lead from me, talked of the situation in France. He said that, as he was sure I was aware, the situation was very difficult from every point of view. France had suffered first of all the defeat of 1940. Then she had to undergo four years of occupation and the disastrous effects of French policy during that period. After that she had to endure the inevitable destruction and suffering which liberation entailed. But, notwithstanding all that, he was confident that France would overcome all her difficulties. He was convinced that, whatever the differences of opinion between Frenchmen on the question of ways and means for the re-establishment of France (*redressement*), there was unity on the fundamental point that her re-establishment must be accomplished and that what France held must be defended against all comers.

“The General then said he was very happy to make my acquaintance, which I took as a signal to depart, and added that I probably knew a number of officials in the Foreign Office who would, no doubt, help me in my mission, which he felt sure would be accomplished in the best interests of both countries.

**“One could say, on the whole, that the interview was cordial. I thanked the General for his cordial reception and took leave of him. He had me conducted to my car by one of his Aides, and, when I arrived at the door, I found that the guard had been turned out and presented arms. He apparently intended by that to give some official touch to what was otherwise a private audience.**

“My general impression of the General at close range is that he is rather cold in manner, possibly due to shyness; that he is of a nervous temperament and that he is rather touchy. He gives one the impression that he considers he has a mission towards France. I can imagine that he might be very difficult in negotiations.”

- Seán Murphy, Paris, 26 March 1945. Read by the Taoiseach, April 26th, 1945.

(See [https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=AiF\\_Up\\_-Y9o](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=AiF_Up_-Y9o) for the Pathe News film of de Gaulle’s visit to de Valera in 1969.)

That de Gaulle “might be very difficult in negotiation” was, of course, borne out by the report - entitled “*European Union. Emphatic ‘No’ by de Gaulle. The General gives his reasons*” - which was published by the UK *Guardian* newspaper on 28 November 1967:

“General de Gaulle, on his own testimony, has never said that he wanted to see Britain enter into the Common Market stripped naked. At the start of his press conference at the Elysée Palace, he was asked whether he had made that remark so often attributed to him. He denied it. For a beautiful creature, he said, nakedness was natural enough: for those around her, it was satisfying enough. ‘But I have never said that about England.’ At the end of the press conference, he spelt out in detail his reasons for remaining opposed even to the opening of negotiations for British entry. The recent report of the Brussels Commission, he said, had shown clearly that membership of the EEC was incompatible with the economy of Britain... It was incompatible with restrictions on the removal of capital from the country and with the state of sterling, which had been thrown into prominence by the devaluation and the loans which had proceeded and accompanied it. All these things prevented Britain joining the solid, interdependent and assured society of the EEC. To say that, in spite of all these things, Britain might enter, would mean the explosion of the Community which they had begun to build... What she (France) would not consent to was any association with Britain, which would mean the destruction of the Europe which they had begun to build - a Europe independent of a monetary, political and financial

system which was foreign to her. In sum, before Britain could hope to become a member of the Community, she must undergo a fundamental and radical transformation.”

It was in 1948 that de Gaulle had expressed his vision of Europe to Georges Pompidou, as follows: “Supporting America at any price is not a cause! If only there was something in Europe! Europe has always been the *entente* between the Gauls and the Teutons. We will need at some point to place our hopes in Germany, hope that she can create a European mystique... I don’t mean that one needs to build a Europe against America, nor against Britain, nor against Russia, but one does need to create a Europe.” (As quoted by Max Hastings in *The Sunday Times*, this June 3).

Seán Lemass served as Taoiseach from 1959 to 1966. One biographer, John Horgan, related: “In August 1961 Ireland applied for full membership of the EEC, and for some fifteen months, until de Gaulle vetoed the British application, this was at the forefront of Lemass’s economic and foreign policy.” (*Seán Lemass - The Enigmatic Patriot*, 1999 edition, p 190). Another biographer, Bryce Evans, further related: “At a meeting chaired by Lemass and attended by four ministers on 27 April 1961 the decision was taken that if Britain applied to join the EEC, Ireland would too... The limitations of the British market for Irish agriculture strengthened Lemass’s determination to gain admission to the EEC... These concerns were blown out of the water when de Gaulle vetoed British, and with it Irish, entry to the EEC. Warily, Lemass returned to bilateral talks with the Tory government in 1963.” (*Seán Lemass - Democratic Dictator*, 2011, p127). Horgan brought to light how the British Establishment viewed that Taoiseach in 1963, as “an anonymous British Foreign Office official, drawing up a profile of Lemass in advance of trade negotiations, remarked that he was rumoured to be of Jewish origin and that ‘his appearance does not belie this fact’.” (p 125).

Lemass was not, in fact, “of Jewish origin”, but of French Huguenot descent. Not that he cared a damn about his ancestry, unlike de Gaulle, who was rather proud of the fact that his grandmother Julia was a McCartan, whose County Down ancestors were among the Jacobite Wild Geese who, in the wake of the victory of William of Orange, had fled Ireland and offered their services to France. Such considerations had no bearing on how Lemass viewed de Gaulle, of whose personality he gave a pen picture in a 1967 taped interview that was not radically different from the personality portrayed in Sean Murphy’s 1945 report. Lemass recalled:

“I could not get to know de Gaulle at all. De Gaulle was always on stage, always conscious of the fact that he was appearing before the television camera of history. I only met de Gaulle once. I had little difficulty in maintaining a conversation with him, no difficulty in understanding what he asked even though it came through an interpreter and he could understand my point of view. He obviously wanted to understand and had the capacity to understand it, which meant I had no problem with personal relations. There was no chemical reaction, it was quite the reverse.”

This is taken from what are known as “the Lemass tapes”, a series of interviews conducted in 1967 by Fianna Fáil Executive member Dermot Ryan, with the tapes being subsequently deposited with UCD Archives by the Lemass family. This June 2, the *Irish Times* published excerpts from a set of these interviews, as edited by Ronan McGreevy. What they have to say on Irish history and politics is the subject of an article written by me for the July issue of *Irish Political Review*. But of particular interest for this article is the excerpt headed “*Sean Lemass tapes: Britain sought to ‘destroy’ Common Market*”. Under the subheading of “Harold Macmillan and the United Kingdom’s EEC membership”, Lemass observed:

“I do not think that either MacMillan or any member of the British government ever fully understood that they could not be half in and half out of the EEC. They had to make up their minds whether Britain was to be a part of a united [Europe](#) and, if so, they would have to resign themselves to the fact that they could not have a special relationship with the US which would give them rights and privileges against their Common Market partners or try to maintain the Commonwealth preferences. MacMillan did not realise that indication of vacillation on Britain’s part would discredit its application in the eyes of de Gaulle. As a result, I think he was surprised by the de Gaulle veto.”

Under the subheading of “British attitudes to Europe”, Lemass’s further reflections in 1967 concluded:

“I do not think they had any other idea initially in relation to the Common Market, except to destroy it. Even when

they recognised they were not going to succeed in breaking it up, their application for membership was probably inspired by the idea that they could slow down its development in some way and perhaps change its character. It is only in the last few years that the British have realised that they are not going to succeed in these policies. They have come around – if their public declarations are indicative of their attitude – to accepting the whole idea of European economic integration. Yet they still have the imperial frame of mind as shown by their Commonwealth prime ministers’ conferences. Of what real importance is the Commonwealth? I do not think it has any significance whatsoever, but it certainly has prevented the British from thinking of themselves as a completely European country.”

Not much different from de Gaulle’s own assessment! *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!* (“The more it changes, the more it’s the same thing!”) Hence Brexit! □

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## Britain’s Balance of Power Policy: a Frenchman’s view.

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### A review of *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* By Georges Clemenceau. Harrap & Co 1930.

#### By Cathy Winch

England has a balance of power policy in Europe to stop any one country dominating the Continent and making it a serious rival.

Clemenceau called it England’s ‘old policy of strife on the Continent’.

Yet, this policy does not seem to create in French politicians like Clemenceau either resentment or the will to defeat it.

Clemenceau (1841-1929) was prime minister and war minister during the First World War, opposite Lloyd George. He was a *jusqu’aboutiste* [hardliner] in the war, like Lloyd George, rejecting vigorously any suggestions of a negotiated peace. He was strongly anti-Catholic and also greatly opposed to socialism and trade unions, implementing repressive measures against trade unions and breaking strikes with the help of the military.

He was an anglophile; spending several years in America, and marrying an American, he was a fluent speaker and writer of English. He spent time in England, where he had friends. A whole academic article is devoted to Clemenceau’s three main relations in England, and a third of this article is devoted to the Maxse family. (George Clemenceau and the English, by R.K. Hanks, *Historical Journal*, CUP 2002.)

The influential Maxse family were Francophile and anti-German, and Clemenceau sympathised with them fully, contributing information to Leo Maxse’s *National Review*. Pat Walsh in his book *Imperial Ireland* describes Leo Maxse:

‘the foremost anti-German writer in England at the turn of the century. At that time he stood out. But this was only because he was ahead of his time.

He was not an isolated propagandist in any respect. There was a great interlinking within Imperial governing circles. The Cecils were the great governing family of England since the Elizabethan era. Maxse’s sister was married to the Prime minister’s son Edward Cecil. She married Alfred Milner on Cecil’s death. Maxse was also a member of the Coefficients dining club with Edward Grey, Haldane, Milner and Leo Amery.’ p328

In 1929 Clemenceau wrote a book describing his despair at the way England and America treated France at the Versailles peace conference and after. The book was *Grandeurs et Misères d’une Victoire*, (Plon 1930) translated as *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (Harrap & Co 1930). In this book, written shortly before his death, he said that from the moment the Armistice sounded England reverted to her balance of power policy:

‘To be quite candid, there was no serious opposition to the harshest clauses of the Armistice, except among our British allies, who were applying themselves heartily to the task of sparing Germany—fearing nothing so much as that the balance of power might too markedly swing over to the advantage of her ‘ally’, France.’ p112

Clemenceau recounts that in 1921, meeting Lloyd George in London, he said to him:

‘I have to tell you that from the very first day after the Armistice I found you an enemy to France.’ ‘Well, rejoined Lloyd George, *was it not always our traditional policy?*’ p. 113

Joking is the English way of telling the truth. Clemenceau took the joke at the time, but 8 years later when writing his last book, the memory of it rankled.

Clemenceau continued:

‘Great Britain has not ceased to be an island defended by the waves, which is why she believes herself obliged to multiply causes of dissension among the peoples of the continent, so as to secure peace for her own conquests. This policy has brought her many a day of triumph, in opposition to us.’ p. 113

Yet, just after WW1, what was the alternative?

‘Were we to remain with Mr Lloyd George under the domination of the ‘traditional British policy’ which consists in keeping the continent of Europe divided for the benefit of the islander, which has led to the present condition of anarchy, and threatened to engulf us in them?’ p. 186

At the Versailles peace conference, France wanted reparations and guarantees against a new German attack, i.e. a border on the left bank of the Rhine.

France was made to give up the idea of a new border, and the reparations agreed were later drastically reduced. Clemenceau said:

‘After seeking for security in a better frontier, we had given up this strategic guarantee in exchange for the promise of Anglo-American military aid, which had been offered us as an

exchange, and which was taken from us without compensation.’ p183

‘Everything that ensued showed that the *rapprochement* with the enemy was among the plans of our quondam allies, who, without troubling overmuch about the inevitable repercussions, allowed Germany to organize the violation of all the Articles of the Treaty without calling her to account for it.’ p244

Clemenceau blamed America too for France being left defenceless and poor after the war:

‘Our allies, disallied, have contributed largely to this result, and we have never done anything to deter them. England in various guises has gone back to her old policy of strife on the continent, and America, *prodigiously enriched by the war*, is presenting us with a tradesman’s account that does more honour to her greed than to her self-respect.’ p. 22

‘America does not even dream of apologizing for launching out into a financial exploitation of Europe as a sort of economic colony. p. 252

Addressing America, he said:

‘You made a great and heroic gesture, and the battle called on you to pay but a mere comparative trifle of shed blood, in return for which you have had a prodigious recompense in gold, without parallel in history, owing to the stupendous development of your industries while ours were being systematically destroyed. p. 283

How does Clemenceau account for this inability of France to resist these betrayals? His explanation is an absence of will on the part of French statesmen, and a superior will on the part the English and American. For Clemenceau, ‘The leader who can fight his corner best is the one who, without empty talk, shows the strongest and most tenacious will.’ p191

And he gives brief portraits of the British delegation at Versailles, as men of strong will:

Mr Arthur Balfour ‘the most courteous of adamantine men,’  
Mr Bonar Law ‘wholly British,’

Lord Robert Cecil ‘a stubborn mind banged, barred and bolted against arguments,’

Lord Milner ‘extreme gentleness and extreme firmness’ p138

‘Then, moving about in the heart of this crowd with an amiable smile, the real master of ceremonies Maurice Hankey, secretary of the British delegation, dragging along after him a huge leather satchel, overflowing with papers. p141 (see Pat Walsh on Maurice Hankey, the real master of ceremonies in *Lord Hankey: How We Planned the Great War*:

‘Lord Maurice Hankey gave unparalleled service to the State he served over more than three decades. He was much more than just a Senior Civil Servant. It would be no exaggeration to say that he kept the British State together over a generation.

‘The Supreme Command’ (1961) by Hankey is the most complete inside description of Britain’s Great War on Germany. It contains details of the planning for that war by the person who oversaw it, coordinated it and put it into operation from August 1914.’

In contrast, Clemenceau described himself trying to negotiate with Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House:

‘Their sentiments of uncompromising independence were known to me. At the first sign of any unwelcome pressure they would have been up in arms. [...] I took care to speak to neither the one nor the other of the Poincaré suggestion

[annexation of the Rhineland] for fear of turning them against me. p228

Clemenceau and Marshall Foch accused each other of weakness in their dealings with the allies. During the war Foch was Generalissimo, top of the allied command but could not get general Pershing to engage his troops under French or British command. Foch explained: ‘One does not command [Haig or Pershing], one makes suggestions.’ Clemenceau was outraged at this attitude. In 1919-20 it was the turn of Foch to be outraged at Clemenceau’s inability to broach the subject of the Rhineland with Woodrow Wilson.

Yet it would have been impossible for Clemenceau to turn his back on England and defeat the balance of power policy by making friends with Germany. England may have been ‘historically our oldest enemy’ but their rivalry was one of more or less equals, and you can hear the note of admiration in the following sentence:

‘For centuries France and Great Britain have disputed the possession both of the civilised continents and of those yet to be civilised. The history of England has been a stupendous account of lasting conquests.’ p188

In contrast, Germany is repulsive:

‘Deutschland Über Alles! Germany above everything! [...] Not only does she make no secret of her aim, but the intolerable arrogance of the German aristocracy, the servile good nature of the intellectual and the scholar, the gross vanity of the most competent leaders in industry, and the widespread influence of a violent popular poetry conspire to shatter throughout the world all the time-honoured traditions of individual, as well as international, dignity. p100

Needless to say, Germany is the aggressor of 1914:

‘... this war, prepared, undertaken, and waged by the German people, who flung aside every scruple of conscience to let it loose, hoping for a peace of enslavement under the yoke of a militarism destructive of all human dignity. It is simply the continuance, the recrudescence, of those never-ending acts of violence by which the first savage tribes carried out their depredations with all the resources of barbarism. p100

So France had to continue to be subject to the balance of power policy, since the alternative, making an ally of Germany, was unthinkable.

There was another reason for this continued subservience. Clemenceau was thinking ahead to the next conflict, and he calculated that France would need to borrow money to wage that war. And the only possible creditors were England and America:

‘If France were to be attacked again, huge financial resources would be required to maintain the war. Where can they be found?’ ‘For these loans she could only apply to two countries, England and America.’ p332

So there you are: France is a victim of the balance of power policy, but nothing can be done about it. France might soon be in need of a vast amount of money, and only England and America can provide it. Better not show our resentment too much. Besides, the English and the American are civilised men, compared to our neighbours across the Rhine.

Consequently, in his concluding pages, Clemenceau tempers his attacks: England and America only helped Germany ‘unwittingly’:

‘Grown rich on the War, America is, if we can believe the experts, setting out to ruin us by intercepting, for the benefit of her budding *nouveaux riches*, the sums that we are to receive as reparations for the damage caused by Germany. At the same time she is a thorn in the side of England, who can no longer aspire to the dominion of the seas under the pretext of ‘freedom’. All the new Central Europe is in a state of turmoil as a result of the recrudescence of violent activity on the part of a Germany who, with the *unwitting* help [emphasis added] of the English and the Americans, is preparing to start on another criminal venture before she has expiated the last. Thus the Americans will have come to Europe merely to establish the Danzig corridor for the benefit of the Poles, and then go back to the banks of the Mississippi, there to wait—in sheltered calm—and see what will be the result for France.’ 362

This situation was not inevitable. There were men in England and in France who looked to Germany as a positive modern development. Pat Walsh gives an example on the French side in *Imperial Ireland*:

‘In 1894, the French foreign Minister was Gabriel Hanotaux. Hanotaux was a keen historian and had a good sense of European affairs. His objective was an alliance between France, Germany and Russia, so that a Continental Europe bloc of industrial and economic development could grow within the peace, stability and prosperity which had developed since 1971.’ p337

And on the English side:

‘Prior to the Boer War, Salisbury, as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, pursued a policy of friendship with Germany, which had continuity with the old social and military links existing between the two countries, and Joseph Chamberlain’s great foreign policy scheme was an Anglo/German/American alliance’. p328

There was an alternative to the balance of power policy, but it did not prevail, despite efforts on both sides of the Channel.

Why did it not prevail? Personal feelings of sympathy or antipathy cannot account for it on their own. The economic development in Europe created an industrial proletariat and increased the population. To cope with this, the choice was between establishing colonies on the one hand as a source of cheap food and an outlet for emigration, or establishing a system of social security. Pat Walsh again in *Imperial Ireland*:

‘Germany followed a road of capitalist development that was fundamentally different from that pursued by the British and American states. Germany had no overseas empire to speak of. And having no territory to populate, it had from the start to make social provision for civilised living for its masses within German territory. To do so, it began to develop a State along socialistic lines out of its traditional feudal forms. Germany’s working class found its ‘*place in the sun*’ in Germany, in the social arrangements that made the German worker a willing participant in the social-democratic economy and the most prosperous country in Europe by 1910. [...]

‘The type of liberal free market industrial capitalism that existed in England never developed in Germany. Conversely, the state interference, subsidy and social security characteristic of the German system would have been anathema to the English bourgeoisie.’ p336

And it would have been anathema to most of the French bourgeoisie too.

The English balance of power policy was more than a desire to avoid a strong rival become stronger. It was a desire to

stop continental countries from developing their economies in cooperation with each other:

‘Britain’s balance of power strategy in Europe aimed to prevent agreements that might strengthen understanding between the European nation states, enable to peacefully co-exist, and provide them with a stable political environment in which commercial power and prosperity might develop. Connecting the central European railway system of French, Germany and Austria-Hungary to the Trans-Siberian Railway between Russia and China and to the Berlin to Baghdad line linking Germany to the Gulf would have meant an integrated European economic development and an end to British balance of power manoeuvres. If Hanotaux, Witte or Bismarck had been successful, the British geopolitical strategy would have failed.’ *Imperial Ireland* p341

Clemenceau contributed to the success of the British strategy; military colonial conquests, war and alliance with the greatest empire in the world held more attractions than social security and railway building in peace and harmony with the rest of the world. His anti-socialism and his desire for military glory led him to throw in the lot of France with that of England. The alliance with England led to disaster for France, first in the Great War and then in the dangerously unstable remodelling of Europe in the Versailles Treaty, leading to the Second World War and the disaster of the occupation. □

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# British Policy and the Events in Baku of March 1918

by Pat Walsh

(The following paper was presented to an academic conference of Azerbaijani, Russian, Turkish, Georgian, Ingush, German and U.S. academics on the centenary of the events in Baku, Azerbaijan, 1918.)

Looking at the March massacres in Baku in 1918 one can only see those killed as victims of a series of events which began in 1907 and which culminated in the Great War of 1914. British understandings of the situation in late 1917-early 1918, that its Great War on Germany and the Ottoman Empire had produced, play a fundamental part in what happened in Baku. British policy had a major part in the tragic events and Britain's changing relationship with both Russia and the Armenians impacted on the lives of the people in the area in a catastrophic way.

However, when looking at the period it is important to try to remove the course of subsequent events in 1918. To get into the minds of those who made important decisions of life and death it needs to be understood that the internal collapse of Germany, less than a year on, was not foreseen. It was thought that the Great War would probably go on until 1919 or 1920 at least. The outcome of the War at that moment was in the balance and it was certainly not the case that an Allied victory was inevitable in any time soon.

## Background 1907-14

There was a revolution in British Foreign Policy, conducted by Sir Edward Grey and the Liberal Imperialists, between 1906 and 1914. This revolution in effect produced the Great War that made what happened in Baku in 1918. The 1907 agreement between England and Russia that prepared the way for Britain's Great War on Germany and the Ottoman Empire was the seminal event in this process. At the time the 1907 agreement did not seem to indicate the catastrophic effects of the process it would lead to. It appeared to be largely a settling of affairs between Britain and Tsarist Russia, particularly with regard to the carving out of interests in Persia, which protected the Persian Gulf and British Indian Empire from Russian expansion. However, the 1907 agreement represented a fundamental break in British Foreign Policy as part of a strategic re-orientation that led to the World War.

England had acted as an ally of the Ottoman Empire for most of the century before the Great War, determined to preserve the Ottoman State as a giant buffer zone between its Indian Empire and the expanding Russian Empire. It was part of what was known as the 'Great Game' in England that "the Russians should not have Constantinople" and access to the Mediterranean.

What completely overturned British relations with Ottoman Turkey was the emergence of Germany as a commercial rival around the end of the 19th Century. Britain had since 1688 practiced a 'Balance of Power' policy with regard to Europe. Over centuries it had built its Empire by promoting Europe's division and by giving military assistance to the lesser powers against any power that might be emerging on the continent. Whilst Europe was preoccupied with war England was able to get on with its business of expanding its Empire across the rest of the world.

During the 19th century Britain's traditional opponent in Europe was France and her traditional rival in Asia was Russia. These Powers were viewed as the main rivals to British power

in the world. However, England had come to the conclusion that Germany was the up and coming power. It was decided to overturn the Foreign Policy of a century and to establish alliances with England's traditional enemies, France and Russia, so that Germany could be encircled and then when war came about Britain would join the conflict and destroy Germany as a commercial rival. Although this process was begun under the Unionist Government of Arthur Balfour the prime movers in the revolution in British Foreign Policy were a Liberal Imperialist cabal within the leadership of the British Liberal Party.

The alliance that Britain entered into with Russia in 1907 made a Great War on Ottoman Turkey inevitable because of why Britain needed Russia against Germany. Britain was an island nation and primarily a sea power. It did not have a large army and it had been opposed to military conscription. It would have been impossible for Britain to have opposed Germany by itself. Therefore, it needed the large French army and the even larger Russian Army to do most of the fighting on the continent for it in any future war with Germany. The Russian Army was particularly important because it made for the crucial second front that would encircle Germany and make a British naval blockade effective. The Tsar's Army was described in England as the 'Russian Steamroller' that would roll all the way to Berlin, crushing German resistance by sheer weight of numbers.

The problem for Britain was that the Russians (unlike the French who wanted to recapture Alsace/Lorraine after their loss to the Germans in 1871) had little real reason to fight Germany. Therefore, something had to be promised to the Tsar for his help. That something was his heart's desire, Constantinople.

## The Situation in the Caucasus in 1917

During the Great War on Germany and the Ottoman Empire the original plan agreed between London and St. Petersburg was for the British to occupy Baghdad and the Russians to converge on Mosul to form a continuous front to the East of the Ottomans! The collapse of Britain's eastern ally under pressure of fighting the Great War changed all that. A political vacuum began to appear in the region with the melting away of the military forces of the Tsarist State.

After the Tsar's abdication and the resignation of his Viceroy in the Caucasus the region was initially left to its own devices to reconstruct itself. It first attempted to do this on socialist/non-Bolshevik lines with Soviets centred in Tiflis and Baku. It did this through the Transcaucasian Commissariat. The essence of this was Menshevik with socialists directing the bourgeois revolution as a part of the Russian State. The Transcaucasian Commissariat intended the region to remain a part of Russia. The Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd was condemned and loyalty was pledged to the Provisional Government. When the Bolsheviks issued their *Declaration of the Rights of Peoples* encouraging self-determination the Transcaucasian Committee ignored it on the basis that nationalism was a reactionary development.

The problem was that the Transcaucasian Committee set themselves apart from the new nucleus of Russian development and as a consequence encouraged separatist tendencies within itself. By signing the Erzincan armistice as an independent

1 Allen, W.E.D., and Muratoff, P (1953) *Caucasian Battlefields*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 385.



entity and resisting the Bolsheviks Transcaucasia was made a place apart and thrown into the melting-pot to be fought over by the Imperialist powers. However, at the same time the Transcaucasian Committee resisted becoming an independent state and representing itself at Brest-Litovsk, turning down an invitation from the Ottomans. Instead it negotiated with the Ottomans informally. Not until April 1918 did it proclaim Transcaucasia an independent Republic, with a cabinet exercising executive powers. But by then the chain of events and development of forces which encouraged its break-up had gathered too much momentum to stop.

The Transcaucasus Committee was primarily concerned with constructing unity in face of external threat and maintaining internal order in an area where a multitude of peoples lived. The British saw early on that each group - Georgians, Armenians and Azeris - were likely to split apart at an opportune moment and protect the interests of their own community.<sup>2</sup> The Transcaucasus Committee was provisional in nature, and the National Councils that had already been established by each of the three groups were viewed by the British as more likely to provide the nuclei for future national development.<sup>3</sup>

Enver Pasha attempted to support the Idea of a Caucasus state as a buffer zone against Armenian expansion. It would contain Armenian energy, block off Russian influence and subsume the Georgians, Armenians and Azeris in a state big enough to be of political consequence.

The Ottoman Third Army had at this moment been worn down by 4 years of fighting and the famine of 1917 and had been weakened by large amounts of desertions. In early 1917 only a Russian advance deeper into Ottoman territory was expected. Even after the February Revolution the Russian Army of the Caucasus had held its lines easily in the summer of 1917 when Russian armies began to collapse elsewhere.

The Russian collapse had other important effects. With the disintegration of the Tsarist army around 200,000 Armenian soldiers returned from service at the various fronts to the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks themselves brought back and armed 100,000 Armenians to resist the Ottoman advance that had been triggered by Lenin's revolutionary defeatism.<sup>4</sup> The Russian army of the Caucasus, which had numbered around 320,000, left the vast bulk stores of its weapons and ammunition to the Armenians, under the command of General Andranik. The Armenians were never so well armed and equipped and able to independently assert their strength at the same time that the Ottomans had been weakened by 3 years of war and a devastating famine in Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

As the Russian Army began to disintegrate around Lenin's Decree of Peace in November 1917, an Ottoman advance into the Caucasus became both possible and necessary.<sup>6</sup> It was possible to recapture Ottoman territory lost to the Tsar's armies not only from 1914 but also from the wars of 1878. It was also necessary to secure the safety of the Moslem population that now found itself without the protection of the Tsar's armies and at the mercy of the Armenians. There had been no prospect of an Ottoman advance until Lenin's *Decree on Land* invited the peasant soldiers home to claim their farms and dispersed the Russian forces in the Caucasus. This forced on an armistice

2 CAB 24/45/GT 3957, 16 March 1918.

3 FO 371/3300/10284/W/38, 16 January 1918.

4 Sean McMeekin (2010) *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, Allen Lane, London, p. 330.

5 Antranig Chalabian (2009) *Dro*, Indo-European, Los Angeles, p. 77.

6 Sean McMeekin (2010) *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, Allen Lane, London, pp.319-21 and pp.330-1

signed on December 18, 1917 between the Ottomans and the Caucasus representatives.<sup>7</sup>

This was the unexpected situation that confronted the British in late 1917 in the Caucasus.

Britain had not shown interest in the Caucasus region prior to the Great War. It was firmly within the Russian sphere of influence and Britain was a maritime power rather than a land power, incapable of penetrating this far inland. Lord Salisbury had once warned the Armenians that they should forget about attempting to draw in foreign powers through provoking Ottoman retaliation after Insurrection because the Royal Navy could never "climb up the Mountains of Taurus"<sup>8</sup>. That was a very important fact that became forgotten a couple of decades later when the Armenians started to place their faith in British assistance for salvation.

Britain was certainly interested in the perceived mineral wealth of the Caucasus and especially the oil in Baku<sup>9</sup> By 1900 the Baku wells accounted for half the world's supply<sup>10</sup> and the switch over to oil powered battleships by the Royal Navy made Baku a valuable prize for British exploitation. However, large military forces would have been required and the area was firmly in Russian hands. This was explicitly conceded by Sir Edward Grey in 1907 when Northern Persia was formally agreed by Britain to be part of the Russian zone of influence.

In the Treaty of London in 1915 Britain agreed to Russian control of Constantinople and complete control of Northern Persia in return for British occupation of the buffer zone above its own Southern Persian zone that had been agreed in the 1907 agreement with the Tsar.

In 1917-18 the primary purpose of British strategy in the Caucasus was not the obtaining of oil but the restoration of the Caucasian front, left vacant by the Tsarist ally, against the Germans and Ottomans. Anything achieved beyond that, including the oil, would be a bonus for the British.

## The New Drang nach Osten

The collapse of its Russian ally raised all sorts of fears in Britain about the infamous German *Drang nach Osten* that had obsessed the English for more than a decade, since the controversy about the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. This Railway was regarded as the centrepiece of the unwelcome German involvement in the Ottoman Empire. The Baghdad Railway had been viewed with great alarm for over a decade in London. Many thought it a major cause of the War because Britain saw the economic and strategic advantages it might provide to continental Europe and Asia and became worried about its effect on British predominance. At this time the Royal Navy controlled the world's markets by ruling the seas. It was feared that if the Berlin to Baghdad Railway was built trade would increasingly go across land and be beyond the guns of the Royal Navy. It was also feared that the Railway would transport goods at a lower cost, giving the Germans a commercial advantage over Britain in the East. And there might develop a great customs union with Germany at its head, that would prosper

7 Sean McMeekin (2010) *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, Allen Lane, London, pp.321-2.

8 Robert Taylor (1975) *Lord Salisbury*, Penguin, London, p.168

9 Reynolds J. Francis, Allen L. Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller, eds. (1916) *The Story of the Great War: History of the European War from Official sources (8 vols.)* P. F. Collier & Son, New York, p. 288.

10 John P. McKay, *Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883-1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy*, *Slavic Review* 43, no. 4, Winter 1984, p. 606.

outside of the global market that Britain had established for its own benefit and which the Royal Navy policed.<sup>11</sup>

Britain determined to stop the Railway achieving a port at the Persian Gulf. It was the British policy to prevent any power establishing a trade route at this point because England was obsessed with the security of the 'jewel in its crown,' India. For this reason, a local tribal leader was encouraged to detach his territory from the Ottoman Empire and establish his own principality called Kuwait, guaranteed by Britain, so that the Baghdad Railway could be prevented from having a terminus and a means of shipping goods further on.

When the Germans saw how important this issue was to Britain they decided to make concessions and offered Britain a stake in the Railway. However, these concessions proved to be too late because anti-German feeling had been built up in England and the process of strategic reorientation and organizing for war had already begun.

In 1916 Noel Brailsford of the Union of Democratic Control published *Turkey and the Roads of the East* attempting to dismiss these fears to counter support for an expansion of the British Empire in Asia Minor. By that time the Bagdad Railway seemed to have been dealt a fatal blow by the British invasion of Mesopotamia and Palestine. However, by late 1917 and the collapse of Russia the issue had re-emerged in new form, this time with the Caucasus as its vital point.

The *Drang nach Osten* was a German economic development Britain wished to block but it was also seen as being now connected with an ideological movement described as Ottoman Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism.

The British believed that the Young Turk Ottoman Government were driven by two ideological motivations: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism.<sup>12</sup> Arnold Toynbee produced an extensive study of Pan-Turanianism for the Foreign Office in November 1917.<sup>13</sup> It suggested that the C.U.P. had become Pan-Turanian after the losses of the European areas suffered by the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars. Toynbee suggested that Pan-Turanianism was a main objective of the war for the Turks. It was potentially powerful and wide-reaching because it could encompass Magyars, Bulgarians, various peoples of the Caucasus, Northern Iran, Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. The Bolshevik takeover in Russia made such a project possible as it had never been in the past, due to the collapse of the strong Tsarist State. Germany supported it for the mutual benefits it would bring, and a new Berlin-Bukhara Railway could replace the Berlin-Baghdad Railway which had been prevented by the British conquest of Mesopotamia. Toynbee wrote: "*The Berlin-Baghdad Railway may die but the Berlin-Bokura line through Asia Minor and Northern Persia will live. This is the new German ambition... this all-land route would be a direct menace to the British position in the Persian Gulf and would seriously threaten India from the west and north west.*"<sup>14</sup>

The British Cabinet Eastern Committee established to deal with the Transcaucasus region began to receive detailed regular and detailed reports on Pan-Turkic movements in the region.<sup>15</sup> It was believed that realising the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian objectives would be complemented by adding the Baku oil

11 There are numerous commentaries on the threat of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in British Imperial writings. See M. Jastrow, *The War and the Baghdad Railway*, pp.194-5. G. Lowes Dickson (1917) *The European Anarchy*, pp.101-3. Frederic Howe (1919) *The Only Possible Peace*, pp. 146-53. Also, Sean McMeekin (2010) *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, Allen Lane, London.

12 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 40, 1 November 1917.

13 FO 371/3060/226241/W/44, 28 November 1917.

14 FO 371/3060/226241/W/44, 28 November 1917, Supplement on Report on Pan-Turanian movement

15 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

fields to the Ottoman economy and the territory would be easily absorbed given the similar language and culture of the peoples.<sup>16</sup>

It was, however, more likely geopolitics<sup>17</sup> or the necessities of adapting to the changing war situation that actually drove the Ottomans eastward. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism were more instruments of policy rather than the cause.<sup>18</sup> The British feared that not only would the Germans control the Ukraine and Crimea as well as the Black Sea, but the Caspian Sea would be secured if they reached Baku. The extensive Transcaucasian Railways which the Russians had built, and which was feared as much by the British as the Berlin-Baghdad scheme before the War<sup>19</sup> would now come into the possession of the Germans.<sup>20</sup>

Balfour, summing up all of these fears wrote to Lord Reading:

"Germany is trying to weaken us by reducing the Middle East and through it India to the same

condition of disorder as she has reduced Russia. She hopes to do this by... Pan-Turanian propaganda, backed by Turco-German military force. Their agents are already endeavouring to stir up Persia, Turkestan and Afghanistan. The Turks have now captured Batum and if they capture Kars, as seems probable, they will be masters of the Caucasus and their road towards Central Asia and India will be open. Unless this movement is checked it is bound to have far-reaching effects..."<sup>21</sup>

The British, however, although feeling threatened by both these movements, also viewed them as fundamentally contradictory and purely opportunistic<sup>22</sup> employed simply to expand the Ottoman territories to the East as they lost ground in the West. Britain believed that Pan-Islamism was particularly dangerous because it threatened the great Musselman Empire of British India. And both led the Ottomans naturally to Baku.

Then there was the economic threat from the Germans:

"It was all part of the German *Weltpolitik* to oust us from these lucrative markets of the Middle East, and to secure for German shipping a monopoly of the Gulf carrying trade. With the German-controlled Bagdad Railway approaching completion, one shudders to realize what would have been our fate economically, if the sea-borne trade of Basra and Koweit had passed under the flag and into the hands of the enterprising Hun."<sup>23</sup>

This was one of the major reasons for the Great War itself, from a British perspective.

It was being suggested in England that Germany had reoriented the direction of its *Drang nach Osten* towards the Caucasus. The capture of Baghdad by the British in the spring of 1917 had denied the Germans the original objective of their Railway and they had diverted their route eastward instead. This complemented the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian project of their Ottoman allies. As Major General Dunsterville later wrote:

16 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

17 Michael Reynolds (2011) *Shattering Empires*, Cambridge University, Cambridge, p. 219.

18 Reynolds, *Buffers, not Brethren*, Past and Present, Vol.203, May 2009, p. 140.

19 See for example David Fraser (1909) *The Back Door to India; the Record of a Journey: Along the route of the Baghdad Railway*, Blackwood, Edinburgh, pp.318-34.

20 FO 371/3300/49453/W/38, 18 March 1918.

21 FO 371/3327/69398/W/38, 20 April 1918.

22 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

23 Major M.H. Donohoe (1919) *With the Persian Expedition*, Edward Arnold, London, p. 18

“One of the big items in the deep-laid pre-war schemes of Germany for world-domination was the absorption of Asia Minor and the penetration into further Asia by means of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. When Baghdad was taken by the British in March 1917, and the prospect of its recapture by the Turks appeared very remote, the scheme for German penetration into Asia had to be shifted further north and took the obvious line BERLIN-BAKU-BOKHARA.”<sup>24</sup>

The Cabinet Eastern Committee report at the end of November suggested that “The Berlin-Baghdad Railway may die, but the Berlin-Bokhara line through Asia Minor and Northern Persia will live. This is the new German ambition.”<sup>25</sup>

The British believed that the German reorientation meant that Georgia was going to provide the new axis. The oil pipeline from Baku to Batum and the main rail line running parallel to it, ran through the Georgian capital of Tiflis. The Georgians were understood to be conveniently pro-German. British Intelligence reports began to concentrate on understanding the political situation in Georgia.<sup>26</sup> The original objective of the Dunsterville’s mission when it set out from Baghdad in January 1918 was to proceed to the Georgian capital of Tiflis and to support pro-British elements in an attempt to win over the Transcaucasus to the Allied cause. However, the Ottoman/German advance with the collapse of the Russian front made this impossible and Dunsterville’s objective had to be changed to Baku.

This is significant because during the Great Game Britain had been fearful of the Russian development of the Bokhara route and now it seemed that the Germans were about to step into the breach of what the Russians had left.<sup>27</sup>

Contained in one of the reports is a speech made by Oskar von Sydow, Minister of Commerce, in the Prussian House of Deputies in which Sydow explained German policy:

“The war was made economically necessary for Germany by the ‘encircling’ policy of the Entente, and that from the first it had been conducted by England in a manner to destroy German trade and industry... In conclusion, he said that if Germany was ever to recover, peace must give her security from every point of view especially in the matter of raw materials. The economic war aims were at least as important as the general war aims. The most important thing for Germany was the supply of raw materials, and the guaranteeing of an outlet for her manufactures.”<sup>28</sup>

This is quite an accurate description of the German predicament brought on by the British policy that launched the Great War. The strategy of blockading Germany by sea and encircling her by land posed a great threat to not only Germany’s ability to wage its defensive war but to feed its population. The collapse of Tsarist Russia and the opening of the Ukraine and Caucasus were a godsend to defeating the Allied siege of Europe.<sup>29</sup>

The British saw the economic value of Transcaucasia for Germany as enormous. The Baku oilfields which were calculated to be producing around 9 million tons of output in

24 Major General L.C. Dunsterville (1920) *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, Edward Arnold, p. 1.

25 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

26 CAB 24/32: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on Georgia, 19 November 1917.

27 See for example George Curzon (1889) *Russia in Central Asia*, Longmans, London, pp.151-5 and Demetrius Charles Boulger (1879) *England and Russia in Central Asia*, W.H. Allen, London, pp.171-91

28 CAB 24/148: Western and General Report 60, Part II, 20 March 1918.

29 Alfred E. Zimmern (1922) *Europe in Convalescence*, Putnam, London, pp.15-16

1915<sup>30</sup> were believed to have the potential of trebling German oil supply if captured.<sup>31</sup> There were also great supplies of wool, cotton, copper, manganese and timber in the region – all targets for the Royal Navy Blockade of Germany whose efforts would be nullified. Ten years of war planning by the Committee of Imperial Defence and Royal Navy Intelligence would be for nought if the Germans could break the Blockade by breaking out East.

Highly detailed reports and memoranda began to concentrate on supplying British policy-makers with information about the German threat to Transcaucasia and the potential resources it could acquire there.<sup>32</sup>

Lord Curzon, who headed the Eastern Committee, told the War Cabinet:

“We must look at the Caucasus as one of the greatest sources of supply of materials essential to Germany that exists in the world. It is a country of great economic value. The natural product of cereals is very great; there is an immense amount of threshed corn preserved there in stacks; there are mines of silver, lead, copper, and manganese, capable of being developed to a greater extent than anything previously attained. On the eastern shores of the Black Sea tea is already cultivated and is capable of much wider development, and when you get towards the western shores of the Caspian you come to Baku and to Grozny on the railway line that runs to Petrovsk, and you find at these two places the most valuable oil wells in the whole of Asia.”<sup>33</sup>

The fact that Lord Curzon had been appointed by Lloyd George as Chairman of the Eastern Committee to assist the Government in formulating their policy in Asia is a matter of great significance. Curzon had a long-standing interest in Persia and had made visits to the Caucasus in 1888 and 1889. Long before he had been a famous Viceroy of India, indeed ever since he was a boy at Eton, George Curzon, had had a policy in mind for the region to the North West of British India. He had once called it a “glacis” after the killing ground that existed outside the ramparts of a castle.<sup>34</sup> This was the zone which Britain needed to maintain and in which death and destruction should occur at a safe distance from the British Empire in India.

Curzon felt that Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, was not as concerned as he should be about the Caucasus and was too concerned with his Zionist project. He also felt that Churchill was so anti-Bolshevik that this blinded him to the importance of Russia as a buffer to the Germans, no matter whose management it was under. Both Balfour and Churchill thought Curzon obsessed with the Caucasus and Persia.<sup>35</sup>

Curzon had in mind a chain of buffer states stretching from the northern confines of India to the Mediterranean to serve as this glacis or screen, giving protection against attack to India and the great arterial line of communication between Britain, Australasia and the Far East.<sup>36</sup> For Curzon the source of the threat did not matter. For most of his life it had been Russia and now it was Germany. In fact, in the true tradition of the Balance of Power policy now that Germany had become the foremost threat to Britain Curzon said that every effort must be

30 FO 371/3301/107255/W/38, 6 June 1918.

31 FO 371/3334/114499/W/38, 23 June 1918.

32 CAB 24/54: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda: Note by the General Staff on the Caucasus and its value to Germany, 8 June 1918.

33 CAB 23/43: Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 25 June 1918.

34 Earl of Ronaldshay, *Outskirts of Empire*, Blackwood, Edinburgh, p.322

35 Gilmour, *Curzon*, p.514

36 Earl of Ronaldshay (1928) *Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol III, Ernest Benn, London, p.209

made to re-create Russia “even though it may take ten years or twenty years” as a bulwark against German penetration toward India.<sup>37</sup> Interestingly this policy is contained in a speech made to the Imperial War Cabinet on 25 June 1918, 7 months after the Bolshevik takeover of power.

Curzon in emphasizing the danger from Germany pointed to what he took as the long-standing nature of German interest in the region. The Kaiser had made a celebrated visit to the Turkish capital and Palestine just before the turn of the century and had threatened to preserve and revive the Ottoman Empire as one of the great civilizations of the world. Kaiser Wilhelm had begun to help develop the infrastructure and military of the Ottomans and all the strands of German policy were to be woven together with the Berlin-Baghdad Railway which was “to place at the disposal of Germany the resources of Asia Minor and to take the Germans by easy stages to the head of the Persian Gulf and the frontiers of India”.

Curzon emphasized that Britain had managed to block the main intended line of German advance through its conquests of Mesopotamia and Palestine, which were not “side shows” in the Great War but geopolitical imperatives, campaigns undertaken “for direct military and political advantages of the most obvious nature.”<sup>38</sup> Curzon argued that Britain should never cease to understand that Germany could afford to give up all her military gains in the West for her ambition and opportunity in the East. That was the vital front in the Great War and resources needed to be provided to defend the most important part of the British Empire, India. That had already been done to an extent through the cordon of forces deployed from the Persian Gulf up to the Caspian Sea.<sup>39</sup>

All these British obsessions with German world dominance and Turanian expansionism seem ridiculous now. However, they should not be seen as insignificant because of their absurdity. These beliefs, held in late 1917-18, within the most powerful and influential sections of the British ruling class were taken as the basis for action and they had real consequences for the peoples of the region, as we shall see.

### Arming the Armenians

Britain could not win the Great War with its original allies. By late 1917 its allies, Russia and France, were in varying states of collapse. Britain itself had been militarily and financially drained by 3 years of attritional conflict. So England had to continually widen the War, encouraging others to participate, in order to win it, no matter what the consequences for other parts of the world and the short and long-term damage to relationships between peoples drawn into the conflict. Whilst the War would end one day the effects of the drawing in to conflict of various peoples against each other were to have unfortunate consequences lasting generations.

The British War Cabinet decided to provide financial assistance to Armenian forces at its meeting on 7 December.<sup>40</sup> British Military Intelligence asked General Shore in Tiflis to provide the money required for the organisation of Armenian forces. General Shore met with Andranik to discuss the logistics of this process and reported that he would be able to set up a force of 10,000 from Ottoman Armenians and this would require a sum of 5 to 10 million roubles.<sup>41</sup> Andranik told Shore that if Britain and Russia supplied weapons and munitions,

he would be able to expand the Armenian force to 20,000.<sup>42</sup> General Shore was then authorised by his superiors to promise the leaders of Armenian forces arms, ammunition and financial support.<sup>43</sup>

On 21 December 1917 the British War Cabinet in a secret Memorandum urged the establishment of an Armenian state as “the only barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China, and provide Germany with a weapon of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad Railway”. The Caucasus was defined as “most vital from the point of view of British interests”.<sup>44</sup>

Sir Mark Sykes minuted that “the Armenian question is the real answer to Pan-Turanism just as free Arabia is the answer to Turkish Pan-Islamism”.<sup>45</sup> It was noted that three things were required to meet the German/Ottoman challenge in the new situation of Russian collapse: 1. Money 2. Armenians and 3. Allied Occupation.<sup>46</sup>

The melting away of the Russian armies in the Caucasus and Lenin’s refusal to continue the war on behalf of the Tsar’s ally, Britain, presented a difficult problem for the British. They would have to improvise a new policy to rescue the situation they had not counted on.

This was the unknown. Arthur Balfour’s niece later summed up the concern that was developing in London:

“It was a world which had been thrown into chaos by the fall of the Russian Empire, and now presented a fresh set of political and economic problems for all belligerents. No European really knew what forces might be gathering in the vast territories where Bolshevik rule was not established - in the Ukraine - in the Caucasus - in Siberia - nor what influence they might have upon the War in Europe. It was vital to discover, but at the turn of the year the searchers at Whitehall had not delivered very precise information...”<sup>47</sup>

Lord Robert Cecil wrote to his Uncle, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour on 8 January 1918:

“As for the Caucasus, the position is absolutely chaotic, or at least the accounts of it that reach us are of that description. In South Caucasus the difficulty is that the Tartars, and possibly the Georgians, think that have now an unrivalled opportunity for exterminating the Armenians... We are engaged in trying to find money to help the Armenians to organise an Army, and at the same time to persuade the Georgians and Tartars to reserve their massacring temper for the Turks...”<sup>48</sup>

This note showed how ignorant Britain was of the situation in the Caucasus. There were no Tartar inclinations to massacre the Armenians - precisely the opposite was the case, as was soon to be demonstrated. British Policy was being based on the stereotypes they had developed over a generation about the “terrible Turk” and “ravished Armenia”. The dominant racialist

42 FO 371/3016/235937, General Shore to DMI, 10 December 1917.

43 FO 371/3018/236815, 14 December 1917. FO 371/3018/237859, 16 December 1917.

44 David Lloyd George, *War Memories II*, pp. 1550-1

45 FO 371/3063/220908/W/44, from Sir H. Rumbold to FO, 19 December 1917.

46 FO 371/3283/4022/W/38. 7 January 1918.

47 Blanche E.C. Dugdale (1930) Arthur James Balfour, 1906-1930, National Book Association, London, p.187

48 Ibid p.188

37 Ibid, p.211

38 Ibid, p.210

39 Ibid, pp.211-13

40 CAB. 23/4, War Cabinet, 294, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, 7 December 1917.

41 FO 371/3016/235937, General Shore to DMI, 10 December 1917.

narrative about the peoples of the region that had emerged from the 1870s in the Anglosphere was being used to justify a dangerous policy that would indeed make one group “think that have now an unrivalled opportunity for exterminating”. That group was the one which Britain now armed.

So Britain began to desperately fund and attempt to organise the Armenians as their new front against the German/Ottoman drive into the Caucasus. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary informed the Foreign Office that the Armenians were to be encouraged to buy weapons and ammunition from the retreating Russian forces and provided with the funds to do so by the British Government. Payments were made by the British from a financial board through the existing Russian Staff, rather than directly to the Armenians.<sup>49</sup> British Officers were also sent to organise these forces into an army.<sup>50</sup> A series of communications were thereafter sent between London, Tehran and Tiflis, to drive this process.<sup>51</sup>

10 Million Pounds Sterling was needed to create this new army.<sup>52</sup> The logistical problem was to get the monies to the Armenians. Two methods were used: Firstly, local agents drew Bills on the authority of the British Treasury and Foreign Office. Secondly, Roubles were purchased abroad and taken to Transcaucasia by courier. The British Consul at Tiflis drew money through Barings Brothers amounting to 250,000 pounds. The Imperial Bank of Persia was instructed to buy up all available rouble notes and pay 1 million roubles to the Armenian Committee and to use 3 million roubles for the purchase of arms and ammunition.<sup>53</sup>

Ranald MacDonell, a British Intelligence Officer who led the British Mission in Baku became paymaster to the Armenians transporting personally millions of Roubles via Baku from Tehran to Tiflis over a period of months, to pay the Armenian forces.<sup>54</sup> He reported to the Foreign Office that he was able to assemble 2 Divisions of Armenians, an Assyrian Division, 1 Russian Division and a mixed nationalities division composed mostly of Greeks.<sup>55</sup> Nothing could be made of the Georgians who were reported to be either pro-German or pro-Bolshevik.

MacDonell later described the offers of Armenian support in October 1917 when a group of influential Armenians from Tiflis, visited Sir Charles Marling, British Minister at Teheran. This deputation wanted to get into touch with the British Foreign Office and find out what were the aims of the British Government in the Caucasus, and whether the Armenians could “rely on British support and if so to what extent.” The Armenians maintained that their own people would remain at their posts and, with the new forces that they hoped to form would be able to guard the frontier and avoid a Turkish invasion.<sup>56</sup>

MacDonell stated that:

*“The (Armenian) deputation, according to their own statements, was informed that the British Government intended to support in every way possible i.e. morally, financially, and with material all elements who were willing to continue fighting the enemy and work for the good of the common cause. Further that every*

49 FO 371/3657/27502. L465. 5 December 1918.

50 FO 371/3016/230983/W/38. 5 December 1917.

51 FO 371/3018/236459/W/38, 13 December 1917, FO to Tehran. FO 371/3018/237859/W/38, 23 December 1917, FO to Tiflis. FO 371/3016/234179/W/38, 8 December 1917, FO to Tiflis.

52 FO 371/3283/4022/W/38. 7 January 1918.

53 FO 371/3284/75611/W/38. 30 April details British support given to Armenians.

54 Peter Hopkirk, *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*, p.264

55 FO 371/3657/37175/W38. 8 March 1918.

56 FO 371/3657/37175/W/58 8 March 1919, including Major A. R. MacDonell’s report on his activities between September 1917 and August 1918 in the Caucasus.

*moral support and sympathy would be given to the aspirations of the Armenian people.”*<sup>57</sup>

MacDonell noted:

“On my arrival at Tiflis most of the Russian Army had already left the front and was devastating the surrounding country on their way back into Russia. General Lebbidinsky was still the Commander in Chief of the Russian Army on the Caucasian front and General Averianov Officer Commanding the troops in the conquered territories, in other words the Armenian Army in Armenia. The Armenian troops still remained on the front, and it was hoped that we should be able to form a volunteer army of sufficient strength to hold the frontier and keep the conquered territory. The actual figures suggested were 2 Armenian Divisions...”<sup>58</sup>

Britain also attempted to co-opt local Moslems in this force. The driving force behind this was Sir Percy Cox in Persia, along with Captain Noel in the Caucasus. The idea was to use Islamic Fundamentalist propaganda in conjunction with the House of Saud’s support for the war against the Ottomans.<sup>59</sup> A dispute about the wisdom of such a move followed. Arnold Toynbee argued against any British attempt to provoke a schism in Islam to fuel a jihadi movement as being counter-productive in the longer term.<sup>60</sup> A British official in Cairo also counselled against such a move:

*“I fear that the typical long-bearded Shiiks with Patriarchal ideas and an intimate knowledge of the Quran who will probably be selected, will stand little chance as propagandists among the Tartars, with their Bolshevik ideas or compound with Turkish propagandists.”*<sup>61</sup>

Lord Hardinge noted the concerns but suggested that the idea might be better than doing nothing. The British Government, in fact, sanctioned the scheme However, it was rendered inoperable with the advance of the Ottoman army into the region.

Britain would have utilised both Azeris and Georgians as cannon fodder against the Ottomans as well. However, both were reluctant to fight alongside the Armenians for various reasons. The Georgians tended toward support for the Germans. The Azeris had managed to ambush a Russian train in January 1918 and seize 15,000 rifles, which allowed them to spurn British overtures and gave them the possibility of pursuing an independent course.<sup>62</sup>

An alternative Azeri development to the Armenian militarisation could not take place. Unlike, the Armenians the Azerbaijanis had not been told by the West that they were a nation, destined to arise from the surrounding peoples with a special case for nationhood. There were also few Azeris in the Russian army of the Caucasus. Despite a general conscription in 1886 the Azerbaijanis were not drafted because the Tsar distrusted them and imposed a tax on them instead. The Russian Army had no separate Moslem regiments, so the Azerbaijanis were militarily undeveloped as opposed to the Armenians, who were highly militarised in both regular Russian forces and irregular Dashnak bands. In many ways, the Azerbaijanis’ position was similar to the Irish Catholics, an unarmed and unmilitary people, opposed by the Ulster Protestants, a highly militarised people, armed both formally and informally by the British State and given their own Division in the British Army. All the military advantages lay with the Armenians, despite being much few in number in the region.

57 FO 371/3657/27502. L465. 5 December 1918.

58 FO 371/3657/27502. L465. 5 December 1918.

59 FO 371/3300/3644/W/38. 7 January 1918.

60 FO 371/3300/3651/W/38. 7 January 1918.

61 FO 371/3400/41977/W/44. 7 March 1918.

62 Peter Hopkirk (1994) *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*, Murray, London, p.263.

MacDonell was anxious to keep information about the funding of Armenian military forces away from the Azeris. Unfortunately for British designs the Armenians who were in receipt of monies could not help themselves from boasting to the Georgians and Azeris of the funding they were receiving, and this had a great effect on stirring up tension. The Armenians boasted that “*the primary object of the British mission was to help them*”<sup>63</sup>

However, the Armenian units of the dissolving Russian army now began to reconstitute themselves into an Armenian militia representing the interests of the purely Armenian section of the population. This militia, which was by no means a coherent body, began engaging in sporadic massacres and tax extortion activities against Moslem villages. Even Alevi Kurds who had been hostile to the Ottomans and who had assisted Russian forces in the past began to ask for Ottoman protection against the Armenians. Russian consuls themselves lamented the lack of protection the state could provide for the inhabitants. The Provisional Government had exacerbated the situation by allowing 150,000 Armenians to return home to the region.

The British suppressed news of these Armenian massacres of Moslems to the outside world and claimed they were enemy propaganda. Nubar Pasha was privately urged to restrain his people<sup>64</sup> In February 1918 Arnold Toynbee, who had produced the Blue Book alleging Turkish massacres of Armenians, urged the British authorities to take steps to stop the Armenians and at the same time to launch counter-propaganda against the allegations.<sup>65</sup> Special attention was given to how these reports would be received in United States and it was decided to deny the truth of them, although their validity was admitted privately.<sup>66</sup> Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, told the Americans that the “*whole story of Armenian massacres against the Muslims was based on hearsay*”<sup>67</sup>

But British faith in the Armenians was shaken, not only by the problematic massacres of Moslems but also by their increasing desire to look after their own local interests, not only as a people but with their own particular interest, as distinct from *Magna Armenia* and the British War effort. Andranik was said in a War Office report to the Foreign Office to be “*surrounded by traitors and betrayers*” making for unreliable allies.<sup>68</sup> The Russian Armenians had deserted the Turkish Armenia defence under General Andranik and had returned to the Caucasus to fight there.<sup>69</sup> The British failure to support the Armenians was put down to the fault of the Bolshevik Revolution, which then enabled London to wash their hands of the Armenian problem<sup>70</sup> and to attempt to pass it on to President Wilson and the United States.<sup>71</sup>

Magna Armenia was an insane project. Insanity can only come to be effective in catastrophe. The Great War provided the appropriate catastrophe. But even the great catastrophe of the Great War could not make insanity bear fruit on this occasion. Insanity came to grief and brought catastrophe for all concerned.

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63 Ranald MacDonell (1938) *And Nothing Long*, Heinemann, London, pp.220-40

64 FO 371/3301/131359/W/38.

65 FO 371/ 3400/36460/W/44,

66 FO 371/3400/37581-18/W/44, March 14, 1918.

67 *ibid.*

68 FO 371/3284/75611/W/38. 30 April 1918.

69 Antranig Chalabian (2009) *Dro*, Indo-European, Los Angeles, p. 84.

70 FO 371/3284/75611/W/38. 30 April 1918.

71 See Pat Walsh (2017) *The Armenian Insurrection and the Great War*, Manzara, Frankfurt, pp. 338-41

The Liberal Anglosphere encouraged the insanity of the Greater Armenia project and strengthened the Dashnaks in pursuance of it. A smaller, more compact, Armenian state was possible, much like what ultimately came about. However, even this had to be accomplished through extensive ethnic cleansing of local Moslem inhabitants and the taking of traditional Azeri lands – the Erivan Khanate – in its foundation. And one manifestation of this is what happened in Baku in March 1918.

### The British and the Bolsheviks

Britain being a primarily maritime power and having been severely stretched by 3 years of warfare could not send large scale military forces to the Caucasus to pursue its policy. It had to rely not only on the Armenians but also on its ideological enemy, the Bolsheviks, and even had to construct a temporary alliance of convenience with them in the Caucasus.

The other aspect of the British plan involved the sending of an expeditionary force led by General Dunsterville from Baghdad, via Baku to Tiflis, to bolster local resistance to the Ottoman advance through a British commitment and presence. Dunsterville's original mission was to organise the training of the mainly Armenian forces around Tiflis.<sup>72</sup>

In February 1918, after the collapse of the talks at Brest-Litovsk, which Trotsky attempted to draw out to play for time, and a workers revolution in Europe, where the Ottoman army advanced into the Caucasus. The Ottoman army should have faced resistance from the Armenian army of over 20,000 standing in its way but the mainly Russian Armenians instead of fighting for the territories they claimed for Magna Armenia devoted their energies to attacking Moslem villagers as they fled the Ottoman forces. There seemed to be a plan of ethnic cleansing to clear the territory of Moslems to make an Armenian state possible. Only the small size of the Armenian army and the advance of the Ottoman forces prevented it being more successful.

The Transcaucasian *Seim* attempted to defy the conditions agreed at Brest-Litovsk at peace talks with the Ottomans at Trabzon. By this time the Ottomans had retaken Kars, Ardahan and Batumi in any case and the *Seim*'s denunciations of Brest-Litovsk were meaningless. The delegation claimed it was part of Russia but denied the Bolshevik right to represent Russia at Brest-Litovsk and refused to accept the legitimacy of the agreed terms.

At the same time the Bolshevik platform at Brest Litovsk in negotiating with Germany involved deluging the world with propaganda about self-determination which could only have had the effect of stirring up nationalisms, particularly in Russia's territories like the Caucasus. Rosa Luxemburg viewed this as a big mistake. She thought that Lenin, in attempting to use slogans against the Provisional Government was encouraging nationalisms to develop which could only be anti-socialist and cause later problems.

Lenin's January 11 Decree endorsing self-determination for 'Turkish Armenia' and the arming and training of Armenian legions had the effect of convincing Enver that the Russian leopard had not changed its spots, despite the Bolshevik peace propaganda.

Brest Litovsk was finally signed on 3 March 1918 after the Germans convinced the Bolsheviks they meant business. Lenin threatened to resign if his comrades did not assent to the Treaty being signed. He may have assumed that the Germans would win when he finally signed the peace treaty so as to protect the Bolshevik State and allow it to concentrate on its internal enemies. If the Bolsheviks had taken the alternative course and lasted out against Germany for another 8 months things may have been very different for the world.

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72 FO 371/3284/75611/W/38. 30 April 1918.

It is important to understand that the Bolsheviks did not become enemies of Britain from the moment they had taken power in October 1917. Bruce Lockhart's book, *Memoirs of a British Agent*, makes that clear. This is a presumption based on later events. After all Liberal England had made an alliance with the Tsarist autocracy to fight Germany. In late 1917 they still needed the Russian State, no matter under what management, to finish the job, or at least hold the line, until the Americans arrived in numbers. The event that turned British policy against the Bolsheviks occurred when Lenin decided to take Russia out of the Great War on Germany by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 1918 was actually the high point for British hopes regarding the Bolsheviks, according to Lockhart, before their hopes were dashed by Lenin.<sup>73</sup> A Bolshevik armoured train leading 9 other trains with 10,000 men helped escort the British toward Baku as they abandoned Tiflis in front of the Ottomans advance.<sup>74</sup>

The British Foreign Office had been informed that Trotsky agreed with the policy of using the Armenians to fight the Ottoman forces. Trotsky had been a great admirer of the Dashnak leader, Andranik, since he encountered the Armenian irregular who was fighting in the Balkan Wars. Trotsky wrote gushing reports about the 'Armenian Hero' as a journalist reporting the wars.<sup>75</sup>

The British contacted Trotsky to ask if he could facilitate Dunsterville's mission.<sup>76</sup> It was only local Bolsheviks who disagreed with Trotsky helping the British Imperialists who blocked Dunsterville's first mission and made it a failure.<sup>77</sup>

The Germans had sent Lenin back to Russia to sabotage the Russian war effort and he duly obliged.<sup>78</sup> It seems to have been understood in Germany that England had engineered the first Russian Revolution in February in order to prevent the Tsar making a separate peace with Germany.<sup>79</sup> Lenin's decision to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk peace deal with Germany was crucial. Other factions outside the Bolsheviks wanted to continue the war, as did many of the Bolsheviks, like Bukharin. Trotsky the Foreign Minister, wanted a neither peace nor war position. But the Russian signing of Brest-Litovsk determined that the Russian State would be Bolshevik and Leninist. This was because once Germany was conceded to and the war was called off this ended coalition government in Russia and single party Bolshevik government, led by Lenin, became the norm.

However, the British, as late as April 1918, still believed that they could turn the Bolsheviks from class struggle to re-joining the ranks of the Entente against Germany. As the British Foreign Secretary pencilled in on a note from Russia: "What we must if possible get them to do is to postpone the anti-bourgeois millennium until they and we have beaten the Germans."<sup>80</sup>

At that point the Russian Civil War began, and Britain gave up on influencing the Bolsheviks and began intervening on

73 R.H. Bruce Lockhart (1932) *Memoirs of a British Agent*, Putnam, London, p.250

74 Peter Hopkirk (1994) *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*, Murray, London, p.267.

75 David Pearce (1980) *The Balkan Wars 1912-13: War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, Monad, New York, pp.248-52.

76 FO 371/3404/67063/W/38. 30 March 1918. From Bruce Lockhart to Foreign Office.

77 FO 371/3284/75611/W/38. 30 April 1918.

78 Sean McMeekin (2010) *The Berlin-Baghdad Express*, Allen Lane, London, pp.327-8.

79 Major General Max Hoffmann, *War Diaries and other papers*, Naval and Military Press, London, p.176.

80 Blanche E.C. Dugdale (1931) *Arthur James Balfour, 1906-1930* National Book Association, London, p.189

the Tsarist side in the civil war. Brest Litovsk also provided the legal framework for the Ottoman armies to advance into Transcaucasia.

Baku was thrown into flux by a series of events including the collapse of Tsarist authority, the disintegration of the Russian army, the Bolshevik coup, the arming and arrival of large bodies of Armenians, and the expectation of British Imperialist intervention.

Baku was the only major stronghold of the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia. It was important for the oil industry that had developed over the previous three decades and had something of a proletariat which had developed out of it. Around a quarter of a million lived there of three peoples - Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Russians. There was a large temporary workforce resident in Baku, mostly Russian. The Azeris were the predominant permanent element of the population in the town and surrounding country.

At the end of March, the Baku Bolsheviks allied themselves with the Armenians to repress the Azeri Musavat Party and the 'March Events' in Baku occurred. Stepan Shaumyan, who was appointed Commissar for the Caucasus by Lenin and who led the commune in Baku was an Armenian who combined his Bolshevism with anti-Moslem proclivities. Certainly, under his authority a substantial amount of ethnic cleansing of Azeri villages occurred in early 1918.

Shaumyan had another interest in pursuing an ethnic war against the Azerbaijani Moslems, completely against socialist principle. He had been appointed to act as head of a provisional government of an Armenian state as part of the Bolshevik 'On Armenia' Decree.<sup>81</sup>

On March 2 Shaumyan made a speech condemning the Musavat Party for attempting to secede from Russia. He had been stung by the victory of the Musavat in the elections to the Baku Soviet. There is evidence from a letter signed by both Lenin and Stalin, that the Bolsheviks had concerns about Shaumyan's Armenian-Nationalist deviation. The letter, in March 1918, told Shaumyan that Comrade Kobozev was being sent as Extraordinary Commissar to Baku and urged him to develop an accommodation with the Moslems and grant autonomy if necessary. The object was to fortify Bolshevik power in Baku by winning round a sizeable section of Muslims. Any confrontation with local inhabitants was unnecessary and counter-productive. However, Shaumyan did not act in accordance with the letter, if he received it before the end of March, and acted instead in an Armenian ethnic-nationalist manner against the Moslems.<sup>82</sup>

The Azeris were unwilling to fight with the Bolsheviks for a number of reasons. Firstly, they saw the Bolsheviks as merely the expansionary Russian State in new form, particularly since the Pravda Decree, *On Armenia*.<sup>83</sup>

Secondly, the leader of the Bolsheviks was an Armenian with a clear anti-Moslem agenda. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks had been using the Armenians, arming and organising them as a military force, and if the Bolsheviks were driven out what would be left was a serious threat to Moslem existence in the area.

However, the Bolshevik/Dashnak force was primarily an alliance of convenience against the Moslem majority. Over two-

81 Richard G. Hovannisian (1967) *Armenia on the road to Independence, 1918*, Univ. of California, Berkeley, p.100.

82 Azerbaijan Republic Political Parties and Public Movements State Archives, copies fund № 453.

83 Michael Reynolds (2011) *Shattering Empires*, Cambridge University, Cambridge, p. 178.

thirds of the 20,000 strong anti-Azeri forces were Armenian and the Armenian element from the Russian Caucasus Army was the best trained element. The Armenian force was indispensable to the Bolsheviks who did not have the support necessary to impose themselves on the Moslem majority inhabitants.

The Armenians initially declared neutrality in the power struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Musavat and deployed for self-defence, hoping to see both forces weakened in the conflict, leaving the city for their taking afterwards. However, as soon as the conflict began the Dashnaks ordered their forces into battle. The Azeris, who had taken the Armenian neutrality in good faith, were taken by surprise by the turnabout in their position. After Bolshevik gunboats had decimated the Moslem quarters of the city Lenin urged Shaumyan to call a ceasefire. The Armenian forces availed of this to carry out a large massacre of the Moslem population.

British Foreign Office reports note that the Armenians, after initially declaring neutrality, availed of the Bolshevik assault on the Musavat to kill over 8,000 Tartars and massacre 18,000 in Elizavetpol.<sup>84</sup> It was reported that the Tartars had suffered substantial losses and a large proportion had been driven out of Baku.<sup>85</sup>

The March events temporarily strengthened the Bolsheviks in Baku. Azeri political power was crushed and the Armenians weakened. The Armenian forces were absorbed into the Baku Red Army and the remainder disbanded. The Baku Council of People's Commissars was set up on 25 April and declared itself the first Soviet government in Caucasus. The Armenians had a much different agenda than the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks did not want British intervention whereas that was the primary aim of the Armenians.

Shaumyan dressed up the massacre in the language of class struggle to please his masters and justify his actions. However, by using the Armenians to repress the Moslem majority the Bolsheviks completely alienated the Azeris. Many fled the city and waited on the Ottoman Army as their saviours. The Bolsheviks and Armenians became dependent on British Imperialism and the despatch of a British Expeditionary force under General Dunsterville. British Intelligence Officers in the city prepared the ground for the demise of the Bolsheviks and a British/Armenian defence of the city.

The British decided to ally with the Bolsheviks and Armenians and defend Baku with Dunsterville's expeditionary force. "If the Armenians get the upper hand it may be possible for General Dunsterville to effect something" said Colonel Pike's report from Tiflis<sup>86</sup> This suggested that the British believed that ultimately it would be the Armenians, who the Bolsheviks in Baku had become dependent on, who could be relied upon to open the gates to the British forces and ultimately displace the Bolsheviks altogether. Thus, the Dunsterforce which had originally been assembled to block the Ottomans before the Caucasus now headed to Baku to stop the Ottomans at the Caspian Sea and secure the oil wells for the British Empire.


Ronald MacDonell, the British vice-consul of Baku in 1918 later recorded his view of the March events in a report for General Dunsterville:

"... trouble started between the Bolsheviks and Musselman over the disarmament of a Musselman ship and culminated in the March massacres. The Armenians joined hands with the Bolsheviks and the Musselman was practically turned out of Baku, not a single Musselman of any importance remaining.

"As may be imagined this added fresh fuel to the hostile feeling felt against us by the Musselman of the Caucasus. Even Russian Officers asked us, half in jest, how much the British Government paid to carry out such a successful campaign and rid Baku of the Turkophile elements.

"At the time I protested before the Armenian National Council, and still maintain that they made one of the biggest mistakes in their history when they supported the Bolsheviks against the Musselman. The whole of the blame for this policy must be laid at the door of the Armenian Political Society known as the Dashnachtsasoun... Without Armenian support the Bolsheviks in those days could never have dared to take action against the reactionary Musselman."<sup>87</sup>

Although MacDonell was truthful in his allocating blame for the massacre of 12,000 people to the Armenian Dashnaks he was being disingenuous in avoiding responsibility on behalf of his own government. It could not have been believed, given the record of the Dashnaks, that the British Government could use them as mere instruments of a policy. The Armenian Dashnaks had their own fundamental objective of clearing territory of Moslems to establish their Greater Armenia and the fact cannot be avoided that the British facilitated them in this, in pursuance of what MacDonnell himself called "the common cause" □



### The Events Of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia in the Context Britain's Great War on the Ottoman Empire

Pat Walsh

Athol Books 2013

The events that occurred in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 should be located in a broader context than simply that of Turk against Armenian. Both Turks and Armenians were, after all, actors in a much wider drama that was unfolding in the world and any judgement about their actions can only be made with the knowledge that they were caught up in circumstances that were not of their choosing and were largely beyond their control.

Available as paperback or ebook

84 FO 371/3301/121658/W/38. 11 July 1918.

85 FO 371/3301/122337/W/38. 11 July 1918.

86 FO 371/3284/66538/W/38. 15 April 1918.

87 FO 371/3657/27502. L465. 5 December 1918.



**'In Year Zero, a contribution to the history of the German Press' (V) Hans Habe (1966)  
(Translated by Angela Stone for IFA)**

**CHAPTER FOUR  
EISENHOWER, MILITARY OFFICERS AND  
NSDAP**

Today, more than twenty years after Year Zero, it is with mixed feelings that I consider the Germans' reaction to the atom bomb of Hiroshima.

The reporters of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* and the American opinion researchers established that the dropping of the atom bomb primarily prompted a feeling of relief. The Germans were aware that, had they followed Hitler's slogans for a few months longer, they would have suffered the same fate as the Japanese. There was little to see in terms of humanitarian feelings. In general, the prevailing opinion was that the war would soon be over in the Far East too, and the western Allies would then devote greater attention to the construction of Germany. The fact that it was the Americans, not the Russians, who possessed the atom bomb, also contributed to the feeling of relief. Twelve per cent of those we interviewed wondered why a superior power like the US had not dropped the atom bomb "over the Soviet Union at the same time". There was nothing to see of any kind of moral outrage against the Americans, like that which manifested around twenty years later, around the time of the Vietnam War.

The first issue of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* was published. In this issue I made a blunder that cost me many sleepless nights.

**HEINE, KERR AND THE ANSCHLUSS**

As my bedtime read, I carried around the book, '*Es sei wie es wolle, es war doch so schön*' by Alfred Kerr for the duration of the war. Now, as we were preparing the first issue, the message came through from Düsseldorf that the town of Heinrich Heine's birthplace wished to carry out their belated acknowledgement of their greatest son through the erection of a memorial. The wonderful speech that Kerr had made for the unveiling of the Heine-memorial on 13 August 1926 in Hamburg came to my mind. On the spur of the moment, I decided to send the speech laid out in the book to print, furnished with an epigraph. The next morning, as I read the newspaper line by line, I noticed – it had never occurred to me before – that Kerr used the following words to celebrate the sculptor of the Hamburg statue: "*The creation of our great master Lederer, this German-Austrian, who had long ago found the Anschluss; which Bismarck's incomparable memorial column of this glorious town also created...*"

There it was, in black and white, in the Berlin newspaper of the Americans, that there was a 'German-Austrian' who - long before Hitler - had extremely commendably appeared to 'find' the '*anschluss*'. I could have understood it if my superiors had banned me to the Devil's Island.

Nothing of the sort happened, which is why I mention this episode. You cannot fight a war today with weapons alone, you also need to possess a dictionary. None of my direct superiors could understand German, and only one of my indirect superiors could understand German. By the time the newspapers we published were interpreted by a linguistic team in Paris, they were as old as only a newspaper can be. Newspapers – forgive my comparison – are like dogs; they age seven days in one day. That means that myself and my small team were imposed with an almost superhuman level of responsibility over these

months. If there was an opposite of the 'recipients of orders' then that is what we would have been.

Before the foundation of *Die Neue Zeitung*, the newspapers that we published in Augsburg and Braunschweig, in Kassel and Heidelberg, in Frankfurt and Stuttgart, but also the *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin, had all been experiments: as such, they had no similarities with each other.

What did we know about the German reader?

I entertained doubts on the scientific value of opinion polls even then. A good journalist is not least a good journalist because he instinctively apprehends the public. The danger of misjudging the public, is not as great as the danger of bowing down to the public unconditionally. Nevertheless, I did not close my mind to the reports that our Intelligence Service forwarded to certain chosen people. It is from one of these classified reports - which carries the date of 12 August 1945, issue 81, but which has long since lost its qualification as 'confidential' - that I would now like to quote some passages in condensed form:

*'OPINIONS TOWARDS THE ALLIES. – The least popular are undoubtedly the Russians. Still today, 92 per cent of those surveyed regard the Russians as an 'inferior' nation. The Germans cannot, and do not want to, understand that they were defeated by the Russians 'as a matter of fact'. There are noticeable feelings of revenge here. Most Germans openly hoped that the Russians would be forced into constructing destroyed Germany. To our question: 'Had you assumed that the western Allies together with the Germans would lead a war against the Soviets?' 72 per cent answered confirming this ... In the next place, are the Americans (us). It is astonishing that in general there are more hostile feelings towards us than there are towards the French and English. A psychological evaluation of the opinion survey reveals that this relates back to two reasons. Firstly: it is universally believed that the English and French were 'forced' into the war, whereas the Americans entered the war against the Reich voluntarily. It is assumed that the French and the English would behave 'as is usual after a war', whereas it is 'suspected' that the Americans would impose their way of life (democracy) over the German people. Secondly: the notion that we led a 'Jewish war' is still dominant ... The English are credited with a certain 'correctness'. Also contributing to their relative popularity, is the idea that they are not as 'rich' as we are: an element of jealousy is dropped. The most popular are the French 'hereditary enemies'. Probably because it is assumed that the French are the easiest to deal with.*

**NATIONAL SOCIALISM.** – There is a dominating tendency to blame individuals, especially Hitler, for all of the atrocities of the regime. Obvious contradictions become apparent here. A cross-checking of the opinions reveals that even among those who could still be seen as National Socialists, 84 per cent are distancing themselves from Hitler as an individual. On the other hand, 53 per cent of those surveyed explained that Hitler had 'known nothing' of the atrocities in the concentration camps.

**ANTI-SEMITISM.** - Latent anti-Semitism comes across in all of the polls. There also seems to be a motivating feeling whereby the respondents consider themselves free of any National Socialist sympathies. Especial significance comes from the answer to the question: 'Do you believe that Germany would have lost the war if the Jews had not been persecuted?'

64 per cent of the respondents explained that the persecution of the Jews was 'critical' in the German defeat. Many of the respondents expressed extremely deprecating views towards the anti-Jewish measures of the Reich. Nevertheless, their anti-Semitic sentiment is peculiar in this respect, as they are convinced of the 'power' of the 'Judaism of the world'.

**POLITICS.** - In more than 90 per cent of the respondents there is seen to be a political fatigue. This is due chiefly to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Germans are convinced that politics will be decided over the heads of Germans in the future. 73 per cent of the respondents do not believe in a German home rule within the next 15 years. In response to the question: 'Why don't you want to be informed of politics?' 67 per cent answered: 'Because politics leads to war.' The opinion that the economic fresh start is 'meaningless in any case' is often represented.

**PRESS.** - The 'American newspapers for the German population' are more popular than one would have liked to assume. A survey in Berlin showed that 91 per cent of the readers of the 'Allgemeine Zeitung' regard it as a 'reputable newspaper'. In contradiction to this, in response to the question of whether the 'American newspapers publish the full truth' 66 per cent answered negatively. One thing that is clear is the popularity of our newspapers in comparison to the National Socialist press. 84 per cent of the respondents explained that the National Socialist press 'constantly lied', 15 per cent thought they had 'not always' written the truth, only 1 per cent believed the Hitler press kept basically to the truth. The question regarding the layout of the American newspapers was answered differently depending on the region. On average, it shows 59 per cent of the readers agree with the makeup, 36 per cent have various objections- 'too sensational', 'not enough reading material', 'wagging finger', 'not enough local news' - whereas 6 per cent reject the journalistic layout without further reasoning.'

This report -one of many that landed on my desk - was, like other similar intelligence reports, appended with the remark that all results from the opinions polls were to be taken 'with a grain of salt', as 'opinion research is something new to the Germans and they approach it with extreme reservation, even when the opinion researchers are German. In 85 per cent of cases the respondents are afraid that their answers could be used against them.'

I was at a bit of a loose end with these reports, which the headquarters attached great importance to. Two things, however, were clear to me: we couldn't make any totalitarian newspapers, and we couldn't return to the type of newspaper from Weimar. Anything else was an experiment. For that reason I had to dare to do something historically new for newspapers. Our technical abilities did not allow us to print different texts in our temporary 16 newspapers - with a total edition at that time of 8.5 million copies, the greatest information group of the world had a total of less than 20 editorial members of staff. With the exception of the little local news and the slim notices of regional governors, all of the newspapers were the same. That could have looked like just the kind of *Gleichschaltung*, or coordination, that I wanted to avoid at all costs. So I sat in Bad Nauheim with the specimen books from 8 to 16 printers on my desk and arranged the same texts in 16 different typographic forms. Next to 'broadsheet' newspapers we published 'tabloids', next to city newspapers, provincial papers, without crucially changing the content - an experiment purely in newspaper technique that showed that it was not only the writing but also the form that played a crucial role for the press.

### **BLACK MARKET- EVEN WITH TEETH**

The experiment also had another, deeper meaning. We actually knew just as little about German journalists as we knew

about the German reader. At that time we seriously believed that those who had written and edited for the Nazi press could be eliminated for all time - the idea that later just the most brave propaganda-company-columnists should occupy leading positions would have seemed absurd to us. The new generation of German journalists, however - they had to be found first, if not 'discovered'. So we squinted with one eye at the reader, with the other we looked at the future journalists: the diverse newspaper forms should then be 'demonstrated' to them.

If you want to judge everything with some objectivity, then you have to forget what today is read into in the efforts of the 'army group press'. We did not have any hidden agendas, our only intention was to publish newspapers which brought the news from all over the world, to open the tales of the Third Reich, to reintroduce Germans to men like Thomas Mann and discoveries like penicillin and explain, in at least a partly comprehensible way, the unavoidable defeat of Germany. We made newspapers, nothing else. We had our work cut out for us dealing with an army who wanted to produce everything apart from newspapers. And we only published the newspapers for as long as it took the licencing groups, which were independent from us, to get into contact to say that German publishers had been found. In Stuttgart, our *Stuttgarter Stimme* only appeared three or four times, if I recall correctly.

The *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Berlin was definitely a longer lifespan than all of the other 'American' newspapers apart from *Die Neue Zeitung*. This was not only self-evident because of the significance of Berlin, but also because in Berlin we were confronted with a new situation: we found ourselves in competition. Under the leadership of the extremely talented Peter de Mendelsohn (today a respected author and radio commentator in London) the English newspaper publisher marched into Berlin and, what more, on the other side of the Brandenburg gate, the Russians published their *Tägliche Rundschau*.

I did what I found most difficult: after Wallenberg and I had given a face to the *Allgemeine Zeitung* I let my most valuable employees, supported by two of my best men, Peter Wyden and Eric Winters (now a paper manufacturer in New York) go back to the former capital of the Reich. It's true that the material Wallenberg received daily from Nauheim was the same as the material that all the other newspapers also received - for example Walter von Molos' historical demand to Thomas Mann that he return to Germany, or the feature from Frank Thiess, in which the word 'internal emigration' was formed -, but we agreed that Wallenberg would use the material at his discretion, considering whether his own material could be added to it.

Wallenberg made a brilliant newspaper that made the institutions of the other occupying powers look provincial in comparison. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* grew and grew, so that Wallenberg couldn't manage with his American staff and had to decide to call in German employees. In this age of improvisation, this also happened without approval from above: we simply took it upon ourselves to give the German junior staff a chance. Now a group of prominent German journalists - for example Peter Bönisch, editor-in-chief at the Springer *Bild-Zeitung* - they all started at the *Allgemeine*. Not all of them have forgotten what they learnt there.

This was only 20 years ago but still these are times that one could hardly conceive of today. On that account, one episode is significant, which I recorded in my Berlin diary.

One day, my non-commissioned officer brought me a package that had arrived with the military post from Frankfurt. The sender was a sergeant in Frankfurt whose name I didn't recognise. I want to call him Jim Smith. The considerable package was addressed to me personally. When I opened it and slid my hand into the satchel, a cold shiver ran through my

spine: my hand was full of - teeth. We shook the contents of the gruesome delivery onto the table - there were at least two hundred teeth.

About a week later, a Berlin dentist reported to me. I want to call him Müller.

"I've come to pick up the teeth", explained Dr. Müller, after I had greeted him.

"What teeth?"

"The false teeth that Sergeant Smith sent me, of course."

It turned out that Sergeant Smith had been stationed in Berlin, where he had eagerly taken part in the black market. His extremely lucrative business consisted of sending for false teeth - goods in short supply and which were very valuable - and then selling them to Dr Müller and other German dentists. Now Smith had suddenly been relocated to Frankfurt and he didn't know where to redirect these affected 'goods' in the meantime so that they could get to Dr. Müller. I was the only American in Berlin whose name he knew - from the publishing information of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. The idea that I wouldn't be inclined to join this business, had apparently not occurred to Smith.

As I later came to find out, my own chauffeur took part in the black market. He ran a flourishing trade in watches, which he sold to the Russian soldiers. They were convinced that a watch had to be round with a black clock face in order to run accurately, so my driver sent for those Ingersoll watches from America, which not only met the Russians expectations, but were also available for 90 cents in every drug store. On the downside, the Russians learnt quickly: they had heard something about rubies and checked studiously for the number of rubies in the watches. The 'mickey mouse watches', however, did not contain any gemstones. And so my chauffeur always sent for a bottle of red nail varnish to be included in the delivery: with the help of the nail varnish he conjured lots of 'rubies' in the watches, as the Russian soldiers desired.

The whole of occupied Germany was a ship of fools. I can't blame the historians when they say that our improvisations in the area of the press were somewhat peculiar.

Autumn came, and with Autumn, our biggest experiment in Year Zero: the foundation of *Die Neue Zeitung*.

In Washington it was decided to create a large, nationwide newspaper which would also continue to exist after the licensing of all the other papers. They had tasted blood. The confidential reports which reached Washington from Germany spoke of the extraordinary success of the 'American newspapers for the German population'. Among the German licensees were men like Theodor Heuss and Heinrich Knorr, who received the licence for the Heidelberg *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung*, and Curt Frenzel, who would go on to build the *Augsburger Allgemeine* into one of the most important newspapers of Germany. Likewise it was said that the new publishers were grateful to the Americans but thought to form their newspapers in pleasant independence. The United States needed a voice in the 'new' and mysterious country, a voice that was all the more necessary when the Russians ruled their newspapers dictatorially and the cold war gradually began to take shape, even if it was hardly visible.

I was left the choice of where the nationwide newspaper should be published. I chose Munich.

I had a few reasons for this. The most important of these was that the printing house of the *Völkischer Beobachter* on Schellingstraße was not too badly damaged and was the only printers that was capable of producing a newspaper of national significance and distribution. We had created the *Münchener Zeitung* there straight after the occupation of Munich, which should now merge into *Die Neue Zeitung*. Munich was also the suitable town because of its situation not far from Frankfurt,

where, by that time, the military governor, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had arrived in his headquarters in the undamaged IG-Farben-building - it was wittily named the 'GI-Farben-house'. And not far from Frankfurt again, in Bad Homburg, was where the general staff from the former psychological warfare, now the information service, had set up their residence under General McClure. Finally, the psychological aspect also played a certain role: I considered it as symbolic for our victory over National Socialism that the voice of America should sound from the 'capital of the movement' and from the house of the *Völkischer Beobachter*.

I had planned a feature article from General Eisenhower for the front page, which would appear as an exception in two languages - German and English. I considered this appropriate for many reasons, but I also wanted to win the General over to this project.

### **THE MATCHSTICKS OF GENERAL MACARTHUR**

I did have grounds to speculate over the vanity of the high generals, and one episode speaks for this, an episode I have to mention even if it interrupts the chronological course of events.

From day one of the war, it proved itself immensely difficult to convince the military officers of the necessity of a warfare that was based on the superiority of an idea rather than the superiority of weapons. The fiercest enemies of psychological warfare were General Bernard Montgomery on the British side, and Douglas MacArthur on the American side. The war in the Pacific Ocean was already well advanced, when in the Far East not even a single leaflet had been dropped, and there was still no voice of propaganda sounding over the radio. In Washington a 'powwow' was called together - but the question of how we could defeat the enemy was not on the agenda, instead it was the question of how the ideas of psychological warfare could be 'sold' to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, General MacArthur.

At this conference, which I took part in, C.D. Jackson had the brilliant idea to 'buy General MacArthur over' through the invitation to collaborate. We proposed to him that we drop millions of flat matchstick packages in Japan - the Japanese were suffering from a critical shortage of matchsticks and would undoubtedly grab these items. On one side of the booklet there would be a bust photograph of the General, depicted with his famous sentence: 'I shall return'. On the other side there would be a demand to the Japanese, the editorial of which we would leave to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

Immediately, MacArthur responded to the idea of the matches with sparkling approval. Indeed, he even thought of something revolutionary for the reverse side. It should portray the general 'in full figure'. Needless to say, the match 'leaflets', were printed and dropped over Japan. I do doubt that they won over a single Japanese person to the cause of the Allies, but they did win MacArthur over to the cause of psychological warfare. From then on we had no more difficulties with General MacArthur.

General Eisenhower declared himself ready to grace *Die Neue Zeitung* with his name. I was summoned to the IG-headquarters in Frankfurt.

General Eisenhower functioned very differently here than when he was among his soldiers, where I had observed him for years. His monologue lasted for nearly two hours, very seldom interrupted by me. The famous Eisenhower smile was nowhere to be seen. He did not enquire about anything and did not seem to want to make an influence over 'his' newspapers: either he thought that you could achieve peace through improvised commands, just as battles had been won, or the defeated people were so strange to him that he dodged one of the opportunities (if not the only opportunity) for an indirect impact on German public opinion.

While he dictated - in his own version the article would have taken up 20 pages - I observed the theatrics of his gestures. His steps nearly always traced a consistent figure of eight on the thick carpet, but as soon as a train of thought reached its climax, the Governor got close to his armchair, into which he let himself fall at the same moment, where he sat until he finished the final sentence. It was as if through this movement he wanted to place an unambiguous point behind his sentences: so, now I have said it and so it is. I had to suspect even then that Eisenhower saw himself in the White House.

As it is sometimes difficult not to write satire, one can allow me to quote two passages from the Eisenhower explanation as it appeared on 18 October in *Die Neue Zeitung*:

*'De-nazification', it stated, 'will be carried forward by all possible means. Not only party members will be affected, but also all who, in one way or another, have profited by National Socialism. Nowhere are there any 'irreplaceable' National Socialists. Nazism must be destroyed and all members of the Nazi party and its affiliated organisations must be eliminated from their positions.*

*Militarism, along with Nazism, must be destroyed. Physical de-nazification of Germany will in the future never again force the world war into war. Military ideas must be erased from the German mind. For all civilised nations on this earth, aggression is immoral; the Germans, however, have to be educated to this self-evident truth.'*

So spoke the later president of the United States, the Governor of occupied Germany, the General of the armies, Dwight D. Eisenhower - the very same whose policies just seven years later entrusted Foster Dulles and forced young Germany into uniform. *Difficile est satiram non scribere?* But no. *Impossibile est satiram non scribere.*

A few days later I experienced first-hand how Eisenhower envisioned the 're-education' - a radically military re-education and, on top of that, improvised, which did not come into realisation solely thanks to a handful of intellectuals and emigrants in uniform, so paradoxical is the story.

After I had submitted the leading article in manuscript, I was ordered back to Frankfurt. A major general received me there, who told me that Eisenhower - due to the 'gross adulteration' of his words - had originally intended to court-martial me. Had I misunderstood the anti-military tendencies of my supreme commander? Should he have decided to take a milder approach towards the 'members of the NSDAP and their associated organisations?'

I squinted across the desk at my manuscript which lay in front of the general. One single word was marked in red: my 'Forgery' could hardly have been that bad.

"You have written", said the General, in a somewhat milder voice, "that the Germans should be a '*Volk von Pionieren*' (a nation of pioneers). The General never said that. Don't you know that the word '*Pioniere*' reminds us of our forefathers? The Germans can never be pioneers, they can be peaceful workers at the most. The word '*Pioniere*' is to be replaced by 'peaceful workers'."

The correction was completed and the path for *Die Neue Zeitung* was clear. This meant saying goodbye to Bad Nauheim.

The departure was not without some melancholy. I stood for the last time in front of Villa Thielemann, from which Europe's biggest and most strange group of newspapers was governed. It was a villa of the turn of the century, its constructor had not anticipated anything evil. The window of my room was open. There, behind the top curtains, I had often spent 16 hours of the day. My move in had been carried out so suddenly that I didn't even have time to get the piano belonging to the villa's owner removed from my room. Sometimes, at two in the morning,

Lieutenant Zinner (brother of the husband of Elisabeth Bergner) would sit at the grand piano and play Wienerlieder. Now the first German Newsagency, under the aegis of *Dena* (later *dpa*), moved into the rooms which looked over the lovely spa gardens of Bad Nauheim.

My staff were sent ahead to Munich. The only person still in Nauheim was my old friend Arthur Steiner, with whom I had started my journalistic career as an 18-year old at the editorial team of *Wiener Sonn- und Montagszeitung*, and who had now been rushed from London to my aid (today he is New York editor of the magazine *Quick*). My command-car waited in front of the hotel Bristol. We drove to an improvised airfield, where single-engine planes had set off to bring the manuscripts to the various German towns. I got us to pull to a stop and expressed my thanks to the flying staff of our group.

## **ON THE PREMISES OF THE VÖLKISCHER BEOBACHTER**

A new chapter begins with my arrival in Munich - in every respect. In every respect, the serious side of life began in this moment: on one hand the journalistic struggle for the favour of the public, on the other hand was that which today people disapprovingly call 're-education', on one hand the direct contact with Germany, on the other the battle against the excesses of the occupation policy, on one hand the path from psychological warfare to peaceful mental construction, on the other the psychological warfare against the authority who are increasingly arrested in their military thought. It is self-evident that a 'stylistic inconsistency' is visible here - the anecdotal must step into the background, the historical narrative which attempts at truth stepped in their rights.

An impatient crowd of journalists awaited me in the former capital of the movement. This first proper editorial team sat down, in equal shares, Germans and Americans together, although it was difficult to employ German journalists, as they all had to be 'investigated' by the American secret services. Nevertheless, there was one man in this editorial team for whom I did away with the embarrassing screening, overstepping my competencies as usual. This member of staff was called Erich Kästner.

I came to Germany with the hope and the resolution of finding the poet idol of my youth and of helping him to resume his due place in German literature. Kästner and his faithful companion, Luiselotte Enderle, left the country at the end of the war and moved to Austrian Zillertal. I sent a jeep with some army rations to Mayrhofen - and now Erich Kästner sat opposite me.

It was both a great and a shameful moment, because I had to offer the revered poet a 'job', ask whether he had a roof over his head and whether he owned more than a tatty jumper; it was also shameful as I was in fact American, but I also wanted to make clear to him that I wasn't a 'real' American, whereas he was in fact German, but believed he had to make it clear that he couldn't be classed as the typical 'German'.

Incidentally, these embarrassments were quickly bypassed and Erich Kästner, supported by Luiselotte Enderle, took over the leadership of the feuilleton, which would very quickly become exemplary for the German press.

Culture is a strange thing: everyone thinks they know about it, and, at the drop of a hat, culture becomes everyone's 'concern'. While our superiors virtually neglected to look after the politics of *Die Neue Zeitung*, I had to fight a relentless battle for our arts section. This battle occasionally took on grotesque forms. I would like to report on one almost unbelievable story.

The senior generals and I were in agreement that *Die Neue Zeitung* should demonstrate ad oculos the blessings of American democracy for the Germans. But the senior generals

also wanted to transplant American culture to Germany, or what they understood American culture to be. And as military officers think that you can best handle everything mechanically and through regulation, I received the instruction to print at least two American authors for every one German author in the arts section of *Die Neue Zeitung*.

This was just as much of a crude nuisance as it was virtually impossible. Certainly, there was a number of outstanding American authors who were forgotten or unknown in Germany, who we should present to the German reader, also I did not have such lofty ideas of American culture as most Europeans did. But then there was the whole of German-speaking literature, which had not had its say for 12 years. It seemed more important to me to create a platform for Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Stefan Zweig, Alfred Polgar, Hermann Kesten, Oskar Maria Graf, Alfred Kerr, Erich Maria Remarque, Lion Feuchtwanger, Franz Werfel and countless other representatives of exile literature. And there were the young Germans, who sat the whole day and half the night in Kästner's editorial office with their novels, novellas, poems, with their paintings and sketches. Should they be disappointed just because I complied with a 'should'?

One day I was ordered to Bad Homburg. General McClure was angry. A couple of American bureaucrats with German language abilities had investigated *Die Neue Zeitung* in a highly embarrassing analysis and determined that I had printed over 74% 'Germans'. It would probably have come to a serious clash had I not discovered John Steinbeck and Carl Sandburg on the list of the 'Germans', which occupied a considerable place in our feuilleton.

"General, sir," I said with silent victory, "your analysis is not accurate. John Steinbeck, born in California, is one of the most important novelists today, next to Hemingway and Faulkner, and, with regards to Sandburg, we don't need to mention the Lincoln biographies."

The General was in a quandary. "Right, right," he said quickly, "but Sandburg and Steinbeck have German names - the Germans will think they are Germans."

And so lectured, but not converted, I returned. In the General's honour, it should be said that he sent his 'evaluation team' packing and that we could at least freely control and prevail over our arts section for a while.

Certainly, culture is the German seismograph which shows all storms. My intense dealings with the arts section of *Die Neue Zeitung* didn't always bring me pleasant insights.

I only had to speak to Erich Kästner in order to see the devastation that National Socialism had caused. Even such an important, keenly interested man like Kästner had not managed to look over the walls of German prisons. I remember that I handed him over an article by Arthur Köstler - he hadn't heard of the author of *Darkness at Noon*. All the exile literature that had been published in the last decade was hardly even known to him by reputation, other than a few exceptions, such as the works of his personal friend, Hermann Kesten, who I held in high esteem.

Another concerning phenomenon was the subcutaneous but, even at that time, observable resistance against the emigrants. Kästner was certainly not aware of his subconscious defense but even he was not free of resentment. If it was only about publishing authors who were repressed in the Third Reich, then the feuilleton of *Die Neue Zeitung* would stand open to him, but the first, actually false, news of the intended return of the poets in exile - Thomas Mann in particular - was taken up with distinct nervousness. People preferred the exiles to open the chasms of the newspaper rather than the gates of Germany. People loved Kafka, but not Thomas Mann - Kafka was dead. The few authors of the 'inner emigration' now wished - after

all, not incomprehensible - to harvest the fruits of their honest stance, and, if at all possible, didn't wish to have to share with those who had returned home.

## BLACKLISTS

Significant for this phenomenon is an enigmatic article that Erich Kästner published on 14 January 1946 in *Die Neue Zeitung*. I did not think of stopping his publication. In this article Kästner took a stance against the homecoming of Thomas Mann. He wrote:

*'Who first came to the idea to call him over the ocean among our rubble? In addition to this, is that he is an old man and still wants to write important books for him and for himself. How could he do that among our difficulties which people screamed in his ears? And on top of that, is the fact that he can appeal and make a better case for Europe and for Germany, which he does not hate, rather loves, when he is in America than if he were in his former fatherland. It would be foolishness to call him. We should much rather ask him by all means to stay in America!'*

The chasm between emigration and the new Germany was not the only chasm. In December 1945, *Die Neue Zeitung* believed two events had to bring a common denominator. On one side, there were stormy demonstrations in Karlsruhe at a Brecht performance, and in Augsburg, art lovers stormed an exhibition of modern art - and on the other side of the spectrum, women who used lipstick were almost pummeled on the trams. I believed that I was only able to meet the requirements of my task as a 're-educator' by protesting against both occurrences. In my commentary, *Freiheit des Geschmacks* (Freedom of taste) I wrote:

*'It would be overheated exaggeration to imply that all people today who dislike Bert Brecht, modern art or made up lips are evil Nazis. Neither Bert Brecht nor lipstick divide the world into two camps, and so it follows that, for example, the writer of these lines conceives an extreme hatred towards the poems of Bert Brecht, but in no way despises beautifully painted lips... They are so deeply arrested in the spirit of the Third Reich that they panic when confronted with any womanly fashion or any artistic school of thought that dissatisfies them... Whatever they don't like, they now want to abolish with the whistling of bullets, as it was earlier abolished with decrees. First they have to learn that in a democracy, bad things disappear through a natural expulsion process. Without decrees. But also without bullets.'*

The cultural life stirred. As Picasso and Matisse were labelled as 'degenerate' in the Third Reich, most feuilleton editors of the licenced newspapers paid homage to the ultra modern. That brought up the question for us, how could we shun the extreme, without being guilty of artistic revisionism.

The 'blacklists' caused us considerable grief. These lists were delivered to us free from the military government. Save for one, which I found unremarkable - it was otherwise an extraordinary potpourri which included the names of Hans Friedrich Blunck, Arnolt Bronnen, Rudolf Herzog, Hanns Johst, Heinrich Hauser, Alexander Lernet-Holenia, Wilhelm von Scholz and Edwin-Erich Dwinger - I refused to publish these rash judgements. Instead I published 'The Whitelist' of German Culture' - much to Bad Homburg's horror - which was published as soon as 25 October 1945. From the 'blacklist', which constituted of 610 names, I published only the names of a few prominent figures: Giesecking, Knappertsbusch, Jannings, Jünger and Sieburg as well as the former opera conductors Elmendorff and the former president of Reichsmusikkammer, the Nazi State Music Institute, Dr. Peter Raabe. As this list filled me with doubt and contradicted the spirit of *Die Neue Zeitung* and the instructions to unconditionally accept the word of the military government, we published a verbose response from Knappertsbusch. "My

*slate is clean,”* wrote the great conductor. *“I would like to come face to face with all the people who accuse me of anti-Semitic remarks.”* Thus began the rehabilitation of the great artist.

### **MILLIONS OF REFUSED SUBSCRIBERS**

The success of *Die Neue Zeitung* exceeded all expectations. The circulation amounted to two and a half million – it was the largest circulation of a European newspaper after the London-based *Daily Mirror*, and the highest circulation that a serious newspaper has achieved to this day. Although the production of the paper was back up and running, we did not have unlimited amounts of newsprint at our disposal, so we had to decline a further three and a half million subscribers. A whole department was solely dedicated to writing letters of apology to the throng of customers.

We allowed ourselves to see the house in Schellingstraße as a heartland of freedom. It was also an island. Germany lay in ruins. When I drove from my house near the Waldfriedhof to the editorial office I saw women standing in front of the grocery shops in long queues. Men hung like umbels from the running boards of the trams. The shop windows of the few shops that had opened their doors were empty; here and there a single object was displayed in touching misery. Grey was the colour of the German condition. But under the grey surface life stirred, and nowhere else was this embryonic existence more visible than in the house of *Die Neue Zeitung*.

Here, especially, the non-fraternisation policy, the inhumane pest cordon, which invented a kind of sickness in the soldier's brain, was implicitly suspended. It was not a rare event that senior American officers would have to wait for an hour in the reception area of Hans Wallenberg's office, or in the long corridor outside my office, because Wallenberg and I were receiving German guests. That did not mean however, that we were especially 'pro-German', quite the contrary, we were immune to previous or future National Socialists and so could speak objectively with the 'new Germans'. A continual stream of visitors poured into the editorial office of *Die Neue Zeitung*. A page that had been ripped out of my diary which my secretary at the time had put aside for me, showed the following peculiar assortment: 'Prince Konstantin of Bavaria, Ernst Hecht (master glazier, wants to repair the window of Mr. Kästner), publisher Kurt Desch, Lord Mayor Dr. Scharnagl, General Taylor (planning a *Readers Digest* in Europe), an actress who doesn't want to give her name (because of the blacklist), Mr. Ernst Lackner (has a complaint regarding eviction), Axel von Ambesser, Karl Bloch (complaint regarding Aryanisation of his business), Friedrich Domin (actor), Lieutenant George K. David (brings information across the black market), Mr. James Clark (wants to discuss a radio programme), Siegfried Seiffert (has unpublished poems by Haushofer)'.

The contact with German life put us in a more optimistic mood than we actually should have been, as events later showed. The mood of our German visitors - especially when intellectuals were concerned- was almost euphoric. Hardly any of them had any desire to be connected to the hard life of the day, although it had become perfectly apprehensible. They wanted books and asked how they could secure foreign theatre plays, reported of intellectual circles which had taken shape, looked for contact with foreign friends, planned exhibitions, were invited to discussion evenings. There were Saturday evenings where I visited four or five different flats: if there were two bottles of wine between the ten or twelve guests then this was considered a luxury. The housewives mostly decorated damaged apartments with flowers. When I returned home to the grey town on a grey morning, life in the new Germany appeared to me in the brightest colours.

The editorial of *Die Neue Zeitung* also gained the same impression - no end to the illusions! - from the flood of reader's

letters which reached us. The mailboxes, which appeared under the title of The Free Word, received up to 8,000 reader's letters a day. How hard it was for me with these mailboxes, is clear from my internal instruction: *'better to let go of the lead article than the mailboxes!'*

A history of Germany in Year Zero let itself be written from the letters which we published; but they also showed how my colleagues interpreted the term of freedom. Here are some letters that stand for thousands.

On 1 November 1945 *Die Neue Zeitung* published a letter by the writer, W.E. Süskind. The author finds that in one of the drawings we published by the great English cartoonist, Low, which showed the German man and the German woman rolling up their sleeves, were portrayed in 'too beautiful' a light, where the composition was concerned. He went on to say: *'Are the man and woman not a bit too heavily styled as beautiful and blond and almost 'stereotypically German' (for our eyes)? Is that not a stylisation into harmless attractiveness, which is always served to us again and again when it is about grim, bitter serious, in no way pleasant things? Or does it allow itself faith in the future, construction, serious confidence - does all of this positivity only let itself be portrayed with a train to beautification...?'*

On 15 November 1945 Robert Schneider, Prien am Chiemsee, wrote:

*'On 5 November my eight-year-old boy was ran into from behind on his way to school and was hurled into the street. He bore serious injuries from this and as such died two hours later... All the same, witnesses observed that the American driver drove on in the fastest manner. One can hardly call such conduct human.'*

On 3 December 1945, Alfred Freiling complained about the restaurants:

*'Meagre dishes, like cabbage and potatoes, with an actual purchase value of about 7 pfennig, cost around 70 pfennig in the restaurants. Almost all dishes cost ten or fifteen times their purchase value. Whoever wants to be full has to pay 6-7 reichsmark daily and the average earner cannot afford that.'*

On Christmas day 1945, Karl Simon, Kulmbach:

*'The strongest pillar of the reconstruction will be placed by the rows of soldiers and career soldiers. They are ready to help with the reconstruction in every way and prove this daily through their deeds. The introduction of the Nazi-agent controllers in the army casts a distinctive light on the fact that not all career soldiers agreed with the Nazis.'*

On one particular article, the reaction was unexpectedly large. In response to my feature article *Misunderstood Solidarity* I received over 10,000 letters, a few of which I published in the article, *Enforced solidarity?* - subsequently 13,000 letters arrived. I had written:

*'There is still the disappointment towards Americans who only wanted to negate away from a fool. Lots of Germans expected and greeted the Americans as liberators. They are mainly disappointed on account of three reasons - first, because the Americans do not behave as liberators, but as conquerors; second, because in the process of cleaning up they undeniably commit mistakes, mistakes of the too much and the too little; and third, because they did not, as expected, give the productions process a leg up straight away... But the most crucial point is this: the National Socialists tried to identify themselves with Germany, and to identify Germany with National Socialists. If someone were to see things from an outside perspective, then one could not blame them for believing the inner truthfulness of this identification. Only when the iron curtain was lifted from Germany, did the possibility emerge for America to determine whether there really were 'two different Germanys'. The fact*

that even today America still doesn't see clearly in that respect - seven months after capitulation - if nothing else, is a turning back to the suddenly awakened solidarity of white and black, to the confused attempt of the 'other Germany', to do what it didn't do in twelve years, namely, to identify with Germany, as the world watched with a shudder.'

From the perspective of twenty years the following lines seem still more shocking:

'In Germany there is a new kind of solidarity. It is the solidarity of the good people with the party members, the former enemies of National Socialism with the former supporters of the Hitlerdom... Many good Germans now believe they must extend a hand to the beaten National Socialists. The idea that the National Socialists, if they had have won, would never have expressed such sentimentality, does not come to their consciousness for one moment... This state of confusion can only be remedied if the Germans learn that solidarity is not a virtue in itself. It always depends with whom one is in solidarity.'

It is no wonder - I say this without pride, hardly with content, that *Die Neue Zeitung* did not achieve its political aim, as successful as it was. It is no wonder that a year afterwards W. E. Süskind wrote in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: 'Generally one can say that this journalist, who, as far as we know, is neither American nor German by birth, quite clearly does what was the prerogative of the prophets all along: he does not tell the respective environment what they want to hear. In his newspaper, he has told us Germans some bitter and cold truths and certainly has not flattered German sensitivity. Quite the opposite, he also seems to touch on things across the pond in America, which would not necessarily be received as pleasant...'

Süskind did not know how right he was. While *Die Neue Zeitung* vibrantly resonated in Germany, where one had feared the Morgenthau-plan, it caused an astoundingly adverse reaction in American circles.

#### VISIT FROM BAD HOMBURG

Unfortunately, the great clash with the headquarters did not follow until Hans Wallenberg returned from Berlin. He had fulfilled his task there, which was to lead the *Allgemeine Zeitung* to the licencing of the *Tagesspiegel*, and I was happy not to have to bear the burden of the responsibility alone any longer. However, Major Wallenberg had personally experienced the Soviet atrocities, and had heard about eyewitness reports of the behaviour of the Russians in Silesia and in the Sudetes. We said to ourselves that our whole democratic occupation policy would fall on deaf ears unless we distanced ourselves from the Russians. Wallenberg wrote a sharply-worded commentary about Russian behaviour.

A commentary about Russia: it can certainly not be denied that we went a bit too far in our suicidal independence. After an editorial conference, during which the superficial hatred of Russia was discussed, hatred which had taken hold everywhere and was thoughtlessly preached about by Germans as well as Americans, we decided to intervene journalistically. On the front page of our newspaper on 21 December 1945 a feature article by Hans Wallenberg appeared under the title *About the Scapegoats*, which concluded in the following way: "'The Russians are to blame for everything.'" Does this sentence not sound very similar to another sentence: "The Jews are to blame for everything." The victor makes such a magic bullet of the question of guilt suspicious and distrustful. It reminds him that the facade redyed, the spirit is not changed. He understands if many Germans, and often not the worst, measure the guilt of others as he does; but he doubts the good beliefs of those who want to get off lightly at the cost of the others who are in the same boat. He does not put his confidence in the great escapist before the Lord.'

People did not read *Die Neue Zeitung* anywhere near as superficially in Washington, Frankfurt and Bad Homburg for this kind of blatant deviation from official policy to go unnoticed. A colonel was dispatched to Munich in order to put us on trial. □

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## Manifest Destiny - The US role in the 'Rape of Russia'

EXTRACTS FROM F. William Engdahl's *Manifest Destiny: Democracy as Cognitive Dissonance* (Mine Books, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2018).

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*Manifest Destiny: Democracy as Cognitive Dissonance* is about US efforts to infiltrate the democracy of other countries in order to undermine their existing governments and political arrangements. In the light of US hysteria over the - by comparison very marginal - Russian efforts to influence the US Presidential election, it is a timely contribution to the debate - or it would be if a serious debate on these matters was taking place in our society.

The book concerns in the first instance the activities of the 'National Endowment for Democracy', formed to assume a large part of the role previously exercised by the CIA which had - in the 1970s - come under uncomfortably close public scrutiny (a strange interlude in US history when such things were possible):

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The US Congress had been forced by pressure of public opinion to set up two committees—the Church Committee under Senator Frank Church and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives—to examine the charges of illegal CIA covert operations. Among the charges were that the CIA had illegally compiled dossiers on American citizens and infiltrated domestic American political groups that opposed

the US war in Vietnam. To add to the public impression of genuine government concern to reform the out-of-control agency, President Gerald Ford named his vice president, Nelson Rockefeller, a former CIA–White House liaison under President Eisenhower, to head up a third—supposedly independent—1975 Rockefeller Commission investigating CIA illegal activities. Notably, before the Rockefeller Commission report was released to the public, a deputy White House chief of staff named Dick Cheney deleted eighty-six pages detailing CIA assassination operations. The Rockefeller report was not honest as vice president, Nelson Rockefeller headed up a doctored whitewash of CIA crimes during the 1970s. Nonetheless, even news of sanitized CIA scandals had a devastating impact on US covert operations around the world. In an effort to continue the same regime change operations but without the CIA stigma—should they be revealed as CIA backed—CIA Director Casey and a small group at the CIA and National Security Council created something known as the NED.

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In the words of an early NED backer, neoconservative Joshua Muravchik of the CIA-linked Freedom House, the idea of the NED was to create "a second layer of insulation between the

recipients of US government money and the US government. . . Funds that originate in the US Treasury but are distributed by an independent private agency not tied to any particular US Administration are more acceptable.”

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*NED daughter organizations included the National Democratic Institute, chaired in 2016 by Madeline Albright ... For working with conservative groups abroad the NED has the National Republican Institute chaired by US Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee. The NED also has affiliated the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) linked to the large US AFL-CIO trade union federation which has a long history of working intimately with the CIA since the 1950's. Finally the last of the NED affiliates is the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). The official purpose of the CIPE, which works closely with the US Chamber of Commerce, claims that it “strengthens democracy around the globe through private enterprise and market-oriented reform,” with a focus on “anti-corruption” investigations, often used to target opponents of Washington policy abroad.*

Engdahl's book discusses US destabilising initiatives in Poland, Russia, China, Yugoslavia in general and Serbia in particular, Georgia, Ukraine and the Middle East ('where the prize ultimately lies'). We reproduce here extracts from the two chapters concerning Russia and the fall of the Soviet Union: 'The Rape of Russia: the CIA's Yeltsin coup d'état' and 'Soros and the Harvard boys join Yeltsin and the KGB' (subheadings in what follows are our own, the rest is from Engdahl):

CHAPTER THREE: The Rape of Russia: The CIA's Yeltsin Coup d'État

The role of George Bush Sr.

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Through Executive Order 12333, a national security directive drafted by then vice president Bush and signed by Reagan, Bush had made sure he was in charge of all Reagan-era US foreign and national security operations after 1981. People close to CIA Chief Bill Casey said that as President, Reagan had little interest in foreign policy. The true role of Bush in the Reagan years was well hidden, however. When Bush's son George W. Bush took office as President in 2001, one of his first acts was to sign Executive Order 13233, an extraordinary act that cited “national security” as grounds to conceal records of past presidents, especially his father's activities during the 1990 and 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist Eastern Europe states. Consequently, those records are no longer accessible to the public.

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When President Jimmy Carter forced the early retirement of 800 CIA agents, many of them loyal to former CIA Director Bush, they regrouped as a private intelligence and business network, a kind of covert “deep state,” informally calling itself “the Enterprise.” This network, active for Vice President George H.W. Bush in the Iran–Contra affair, was used by Bush, now as US president, to loot and deform all of communist Eastern Europe and, ultimately, Russia under their asset, Boris Yeltsin.

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In 1987, in a desperate attempt to calm growing social unrest over the deteriorating Soviet economy, Gorbachev permitted Soviet citizens to own dollars. It was a disaster of untold dimension. Overnight, a huge black market for dollars grew and the ruble became de facto worthless inside the Soviet Union. Russians, forbidden to travel to the West, were fed the illusion that everything in America was “bigger and better.” Secret, prohibited shortwave broadcasts from the US State Department's Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty out of Munich

fed those illusions of an American capitalist paradise. The majority of Russians believed, for the most part, nothing could be worse than life under Soviet communism with the chronic shortages in the shops, endless queues, and lack of basic goods, let alone of luxury goods. They were soon to realize they were dreadfully wrong. It could be worse.

[...]

The Bush administration's attack on the post-communist Russian Federation, dubbed “Operation Hammer,” had four distinct covert elements.: 1) the CIA would secretly finance the August 1991 generals' coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev; 2) they would use their secret financial war chest to destabilize the ruble; 3) they used corrupted Russian Gosbank national bank officials to organize the theft of the country's official gold reserves; 4) and they began a systematic takeover of strategic energy, raw materials, and high-tech state military industries in the Soviet Union via IMF-dictated privatization operations run by Yeltsin's finance minister Yegor Gaidar. Gaidar worked in league with Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs and other friends of billionaire hedge fund speculator George Soros. Bush's Operation Hammer used estimated tens of billions of dollars of illegal funds—funds not authorized by the US Congress—to bring down the Soviet Union.

Assembling the money

The funds reportedly came from a secret CIA war chest of undisclosed gold seized from Japan after World War II. That Japanese looted war booty was buried between 1942–1945 in Japanese-occupied Philippines for security. The gold was buried there on orders of the Emperor Hirohito in the event of Japan's losing the war.

[Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, *Gold Warriors: America's Secret Recovery of Yamashita's Gold*, Verso Press, 2005]

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Marcos, no longer of use to Washington, was driven from office in a CIA putsch that used the newly created NED [National Endowment for Democracy] as a cover to funnel millions of dollars to Marcos's opponent, Corazon Aquino, for organizing mass street demonstrations.

[...]

The operation included Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Adnan Khashoggi, the mysterious CIA-linked Saudi arms dealer who had been helping Marcos secretly sell the stolen Japanese gold. After forcing the exile of a defeated Marcos to Hawaii, Bush arranged for the Marcos gold to be deposited in special accounts at several select international banks—Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), UBS of Zurich, and Banker's Trust, later to become part of Deutsche Bank.

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Barrick Gold was established in 1986 as American Barrick Resources and listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

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The Marcos gold, laundered through Barrick, was to serve as collateral for the creation of billions of dollars of financial securities used to buy up priceless assets of the former Soviet state at pennies on the dollar.

[...]

In 1992, in one of Bush's parting acts as president, he arranged for the US government to give Barrick the mining rights for Nevada gold deposits on US government lands, independently valued at \$10 billion, for the nominal sum of \$63 million. President George H.W. Bush had “arranged for an exception” that would allow Barrick to use its own assessors to determine the value of the deposits. Soon after leaving office,



Bush himself was named to head the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold.

Corrupt KGB Generals and their “Kids”

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In the course of the Yeltsin years, as opposition grew inside Russia, more than 300 senior KGB officers, including generals, were smuggled into the US, where they were given life pensions by the US government. Others fled to Israel on Israeli passports they were given.

In the late 1980s, well before they staged a fake coup d'état that pushed Yeltsin to the top in 1991 as the leading opposition figure to Soviet chief Mikhail Gorbachev, Philipp Bobkov and Alexei Kondaurov, two corrupt KGB generals secretly working with Bush CIA networks in the West, sponsored several clever, ruthless and ambitious young Russian entrepreneurs and arranged for them to work with a group of US financial “consultants” out of Switzerland who would teach them the fine arts and secrets of international money laundering. Bobkov and Kondaurov handpicked four ambitious young Russians who would become the first Russian “oligarchs” in Yeltsin’s “wild west” free market Russia in the 1990s. Their names were Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alex Konanykhin, Boris Berezovsky, and Roman Abramovich. Boris Berezovsky, forty-two years old at the time, was the senior member of the young entrepreneurs. Khodorkovsky was twenty-four, Konanykhin was twenty-two, and Abramovich was also twenty-two. They thus became known within the Bush CIA circles as the “kids.”

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Yeltsin rewarded Konanykhin by granting him a banking license to found the first Russian bank with an international currency-trading license, the Russian Exchange Bank.

[...]

Khodorkovsky’s Menatep Bank was another front operation for the money-laundering operations run by rogue KGB Generals Philipp Bobkov and Alexei Kondaurov, operations sanctioned personally by President Boris Yeltsin.

Subversion of the Soviet banking system.

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Beginning in 1987, Gorbachev, who had desperately sought ways of reforming the Soviet economy, had been convinced by his KGB generals to allow a touch of Western market economy for KGB-selected young communist “entrepreneurs” chosen from the Communist Party’s Komsomol youth organization. The young entrepreneurs began small companies in the USSR that were allowed to establish partnerships with Western businessmen. KGB officers usually headed the small companies, typically trading computers and such items bought from the West. Importantly, in terms of what was to happen after 1991, those enterprises had the rare privilege of getting hard currency cash, US dollars, from the Soviet State Bank. The relevant point was who those Western financial or business partners committing crimes for the rogue KGB generals were. In the beginning of the Yeltsin operations in the early 1990s, two banks played a major role. One was Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C. The second was the Republic Bank of New York of Edmond Safra, which joined the looting and money-laundering Russian operations some months later.

[...]

Jonathan J. Bush at the time was head of J. Bush & Co., which provided “discreet banking services” for the Washington, D.C.–embassies of unnamed foreign governments. Jonathan Bush went on in 1997, in the midst of the Yeltsin plunder orgy, to sell his J. Bush & Co. to Riggs Bank in Washington. Bush was made CEO of a new entity called Riggs Investment, based in Connecticut, as the looting of the Russian Federation under Yeltsin’s second term was in high gear.

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four Riggs Bank CIA-linked shadowy figures—Beese, Krongard, Jonathan Bush, and Keel—would join with a secretive Geneva financial operation called Valmet S.A. to form a Riggs joint venture called Riggs Valmet S.A.

[...]

Riggs Valmet S.A., legally incorporated in the offshore Isle of Man, was established to set up shell companies and accounts to hide and launder money, initially for companies controlled by Bank Menatep’s Khodorkovsky, Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky, and other select “kids” of the corrupt Soviet KGB generals. The Geneva arm used the offshore bank’s secrecy on the Isle of Man to further hide the paper trail.

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By 1994, the closest partners, or “clients,” of Riggs Valmet were Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Menatep Bank and Runicom S.A., a Swiss-registered arm of the giant Russian Sibneft Oil which, in turn, was then under the control of Roman Abramovich and his then partner, Boris Berezovsky, as well as the Moscow-based RKB bank.

[...]

From 1989 to 1991, Leonid Nevzlin was president of Bank Menatep and, until 1996, vice chairman of the board. In November 1995, Bank Menatep took part in a crooked mortgage auction that resulted in its takeover of the oil company Yukos, part of the Bush Operation Hammer plan to grab control of major Russian energy assets. In 1996, Nevzlin became vice president of Yukos, which was then 78 percent owned by Menatep. Another partner of Khodorkovsky’s money-laundering Bank Menatep was Konstantin Kagalovsky, who was named deputy chairman of Bank Menatep in November 1994. Conveniently, Kagalovsky was also Russia’s representative to the International Monetary Fund between 1992 and 1995 and was married to Natasha Gurfinkel Kagalovsky, a former senior vice president of Edmond Safra’s money-laundering Bank of New York.

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Along with Abramovich and Berezovsky, a third partner in Runicom S.A. was Leonid Dyachenko, son-in-law to President Yeltsin.

[...]

In November 1991, just three months after the fake August 1991 KGB generals’ coup against Gorbachev was used to propel little-known Soviet official Boris Yeltsin to the fore as champion of democracy and of a new Russia, Viktor V. Gerashchenko, Chairman of the Presidium of Gosbank, the state bank of the USSR, made a shocking brief announcement to the Russian Duma, or parliament. Of an estimated 2,000 to perhaps 3,000 tons of Gosbank state gold reserves then worth \$35 billion at the market price, less than 400 tons could be accounted for. He told the shocked members of parliament that he had “no idea” what happened to the missing gold. That, of course, was a lie. After 1989, as head of Gosbank, Gerashchenko had created an offshore entity, Financial Management Co., known as FIMACO, based on the island of Jersey

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The firm was a subsidiary of the Eurobank of Paris or Banque Commerciale pour l’Europe du Nord, which was 78 percent owned by Gerashchenko’s Russian Central Bank. Gerashchenko’s FIMACO funneled billions of dollars of Russian hard currency (mainly dollar) reserves out of Russia during the Yeltsin era as the first chairman of the post-Soviet, independent Central Bank of Russia.

Enter George Soros

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Riggs Bank was quickly solidifying banking relations with a couple of the old CIA hands from the Iran–Contra arms-for-drugs operation, Swiss bankers Baruch “Bruce” Rappaport, a shady financier born in Haifa to Russian émigré parents, and Alfred Hartmann, his partner. Through this group, George Soros was also enlisted to open a new front against the ruble. In turn, Rappaport and Hartmann included the Bank of New York and, from Israel, the Eisenberg Group, tied to the Israeli Mossad. Rappaport, a business associate of Reagan’s CIA director, Bill Casey—the man who created the idea of the private National Endowment for Democracy as a front for dirty CIA operations—also owned a major share of Edmond Safra’s Bank of New York. Further, Rappaport created a joint Swiss venture with Safra called the Bank of New York–Inter Maritime Bank. That Bank of New York–Inter Maritime Bank operation was named in 1999 by US federal investigators as being “possibly one of the biggest money-laundering schemes in the United States.” President George H.W. Bush knew Rappaport quite well from Rappaport’s role in helping set up the notorious CIA money-laundering Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), registered in Luxembourg with head offices in Karachi and London.

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In 1997, Rappaport was also conveniently named as Ambassador to Yeltsin’s Russia by the government of Antigua, the scenic Caribbean Island where his Swiss American Bank, Ltd., had a banking license. Antigua became a major destination for Russian oligarchs’ looted money.

[...]

Soros was a major backer in the takeover of Russia’s Svyazinvest telecommunications giant. In 1994, the London Guardian would comment, “Soros’s extraordinary role, not only as the world’s most successful investor but now possibly, fantastically, as the single most powerful foreign influence in the whole of the former Soviet empire, attracts more suspicion than curiosity.”

It was at this stage that Jacob Lord Rothschild, scion of the famous banking family, joined Soros, Rappaport, and the Menatep’s Khodorkovsky as silent backers for major Russian privatization deals. In 2003, when the Russian state arrested Khodorkovsky for money laundering and tax evasion in the Menatep buyout of Yukos Oil, sending him to prison, Khodorkovsky revealed that he had signed over his shares in Yukos to Lord Rothschild just before going to prison. Rothschild, along with Henry Kissinger, sat on the international advisory board of Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia, a “charitable” foundation used to fund anti-Putin, “human rights” NGOs in Russia.

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In September 1991, Vladimir Scherbakov, the last First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, was told to form something called the International Foundation for Privatization and Private Investment with two other partners. In 1990, just before the dissolution of the USSR, Scherbakov, a mere forty years old, was also head of the Soviet economic planning agency, Gosplan, a strategic post to put it mildly. The second partner of Scherbakov’s International Foundation for Privatization and Private Investment has never been revealed. The third partner was the now notorious Austrian firm Nordex Energy GmbH, connected to Yeltsin’s “favorite banker,” Oleg Boyko. Boyko and his OLB Group had dealings with, among others, the Colombian cocaine cartel—who financed the “Democratic” Party organization of Yegor Gaidar,

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22 Konanykhin and his wife left Russia in 1992 for the US, and in 1999, as Putin became acting president succeeding

Yeltsin, was granted political asylum in the United States. By then he held Russian, Italian, and Argentine passports. Menatep cofounder and first president, Leonid Nevzlin, occupied various high-ranking positions at Group Menatep subsidiary, the Yukos Oil Company, and conveniently held an Israeli, as well as Russian passport. Former KGB general Alexei Kondaurov became Head Analyst at Yukos, and a current member of Russia’s State Duma for the Communist Party. Kondaurov’s KGB partner, General Phillip Bobkov, officially retired in 1991 and organized a private security service which included thousands of his former KGB colleagues, in the Media Most company of Russian oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky, founder of the Russian Jewish Congress and business partner in 1989 with the blue-blood Washington corporate law firm, Arnold & Porter. The entire archive of 5th KGB department was taken to Media-Most.

CHAPTER FOUR: Soros and the Harvard boys join Yeltsin and the KGB

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In November 1991, Chubais became a minister in the Yeltsin cabinet, where he managed the portfolio of Rosimushchestvo—the Federal Agency for State Property Management, which Yeltsin decreed to be the agency responsible for devising Russia’s privatization of the state companies. Gaidar and Chubais worked in league with George Soros, the Wall Street speculator and “colleague” of the CIA front the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Soros, in turn, brought Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs, architect of the Polish “economic shock therapy” and other of his American “friends” to Yeltsin

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All actions of Yeltsin were guided by Yeltsin’s CIA and KGB handlers, notably KGB Generals Philipp Bobkov, Alexei Kondaurov, and Yeltsin’s personal bodyguard, General Alexander Korzhakov. This was the cabal which, in coordination with George H.W. Bush and his CIA old boys, staged the phony KGB “coup” attempt against Gorbachev that propelled Yeltsin, with the support of mainstream Western media, as the new Russian champion of democracy. In December 1991, four months after that fake coup, Yeltsin, then president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic—the largest federated “republic” within the Soviet Union—met with the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus and signed what was called the Belavezha Accords,

[...]

As part of the Belavezha Accords agreement, the newly created Russian Federation took legal title to all state assets of the former USSR, now nonexistent, and assumed all foreign debts of the USSR. Yeltsin was told to name a thirty-two-year-old friend of George Soros named Yegor Gaidar to become his economics czar.

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Gaidar was then taken to Poland by the Soros circles in order to study the Polish “shock therapy” model,

[...]

Larry Summers

Gaidar was instructed and guided by the US Treasury from a new Clinton Administration that had taken office in January 1993. The key person at the Treasury for the ensuing Gaidar–Chubais looting of Yeltsin’s Russia was a former Harvard economist named Larry Summers. Summers used the powerful influence of the US Treasury to funnel International Monetary Fund (IMF) dollars to the cash-hungry Yeltsin government, advising Yeltsin and Gaidar that Russia must open to unrestricted imports if they wanted to receive the IMF and other Western loans.

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In 1991, just months before joining the Clinton Treasury, Summers had been chief economist at the World Bank. There, Summers had named his former Harvard student Shleifer, a Russian-born American citizen, as World Bank “adviser” to the Yeltsin government. Soon after Summers became Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration in early 1993, Shleifer would join Jeffrey Sachs’s HIID [Harvard Institute for International Development] in Moscow as Project Director.

[...]

Sachs was named Director of HIID in 1995. Sachs’s HIID received USAID grants for the institute’s “work” in Russia from his former partner, now at the Treasury, David Lipton.

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Summers brought in yet another Harvard boy, a former World Bank consultant of Summers named Jonathan Hay. In 1991, while still at Harvard Law School, Hay had also become a senior legal adviser to Chubais’s GKI state privatization agency. In 1992, Hay, a lawyer, was made the HIID’s General Director in Moscow.

[...]

Both Hay and Shleifer were “protected” by Washington, despite having to pay multi-million dollar fines when, in 2006, the US District Court in Boston fined them personally \$2 million and Harvard University \$26.5 million for their Russian illegal activities. Summers—who by then had left Washington to become Harvard President—was forced to resign on the revelation of his role in the Moscow HIID scandals in 2006. Before he left, however, Summers managed to get Shleifer named to an endowed Harvard professorship chair. Hay later resurfaced as founder of the Ukrainian branch of the Polish “free market” Centre for Social and Economic Research (CASE) during the CIA coup d’état in Kiev in 2014.

The privatisation scheme

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The Harvard–Chubais privatization scheme which began in 1992 was as simple as it was criminally fraudulent. It was proclaimed by Yeltsin in August 1991 by presidential decree, bypassing a hostile Duma. Anatoly Chubais, as head of the state GKI state property agency, issued 150 million “vouchers” to each and every Russian citizen. In turn, citizens could invest their voucher in a share in a Russian privatized state company or shop or sell it at an established market price pegged to the US dollar. As most Russians were concerned when, if ever, the next pension payment would be paid or where jobs could be found in the collapsing industrial economy that was a predictable result of the Sachs–Harvard–Chubais shock therapy, millions simply sold their vouchers for cash. Vouchers could be bought or sold on every street corner in Russia in June 1992. They were traded at new Moscow “commodity exchanges” set up by Harvard’s Jonathan Hay and the USAID monies channeled via the HIID. Voucher investment funds sprung up everywhere to gather citizens’ vouchers by the millions.

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Nearly six hundred voucher funds obtained forty-five million vouchers. The largest, calling itself First Voucher, collected four million vouchers.<sup>13</sup> At the stated price for the vouchers, Chubais and his Harvard boys had de facto valued the entire Russian economy—which included the world’s largest nickel company; some of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, including Sibneft and Gazprom; RUSAL, the world’s largest aluminum company; vast gold mines and numerous high-tech defense companies—at a total that was less than the market value of the US General Electric company.

[...]

This was how Bank Menatep’s Mikhail Khodorkovsky got a 78 percent share of ownership in Yukos, worth about \$5 billion, for a mere \$310 million. It was how Boris Berezovsky got Sibneft, another oil giant worth \$3 billion, for about \$100 million.

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Khodorkovsky gained control of more than one hundred companies before getting control of the giant Yukos Oil.

1993: The scheme in danger

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By 1993, pressures were growing from all sides, including the Duma. The population was demanding action. The Supreme Soviet, the Russian upper house, was drafting a bill that would freeze the entire privatization process. The opposition was becoming so great that Chubais ultimately had to rely largely on Yeltsin’s presidential decrees, not parliamentary approval, for implementation. Harvard HIID’s Moscow man, the CIA’s Jonathan Hay, and his HIID associates drafted many of the decrees. As USAID’s Walter Coles, whose office funded the Chubais privatizations via HIID, described it, “If we needed a decree, Chubais didn’t have to go through the bureaucracy.”

[...]

as opposition threatened to get out of hand, Yeltsin felt forced to agree to a national referendum on the entire privatization process. The date was set for April 25, 1993.

[...]

Soros funneled \$1 million, a huge sum in Russia at the time, to offshore accounts set up for Chubais’s use to buy media exposure. Yeltsin survived the referendum by a slim 52 percent, and the privatization of major Russian industrial companies went forward.

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The US–French–British Versailles reparations of 1919 were almost humanitarian, in comparison to what was done to Russia in the 1990s under Yeltsin’s stewardship.

The 1996 election

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Following the Russian Communist Party’s success in the December 1995 Duma elections the International Monetary Fund in Washington—de facto controlled by the US Treasury—made an extraordinary \$10.2 billion loan to the Yeltsin government. In that loan, \$1 billion was secretly intended for the campaign to keep Yeltsin president in the 1996 elections. Tape recordings later made public of conversations between President Bill Clinton and Yeltsin showed that in return for the US support, Yeltsin would exempt longtime Clinton supporter, campaign donor, and Arkansas-based Tyson Chicken’s exports to Russia—then a \$700 million annual business—from a threatened 20 percent import tariff increase. The corruption was seemingly unbounded.

[...]

Gaidar’s re-election fund also funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars, a fortune in the time of hyperinflation of the ruble, to major Russian journalists to write fraudulent articles in praise of Yeltsin and discrediting Zyuganov. During the 1996 pre-election campaign, polls showed that Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov would defeat Yeltsin. The Russian population rightly felt cheated and humiliated. Yeltsin’s support was less than 4 percent.

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The fact that the Yeltsin oligarchs had gotten a near monopoly on Russian TV and print media made it possible to tilt the vote to Yeltsin 54 percent.

Devaluation of the ruble

On pressure from the Clinton Treasury, especially from Deputy Secretary Larry Summers, the IMF made a \$22.6 billion Russian bailout to save the financial assets of their bankers and oligarchs, not to save the ruble. With the IMF money in the pipeline, Soros wrote a prominent guest article in the London Financial Times where he stated, "The meltdown in Russian financial markets . . . has reached terminal phase. Bankers and brokers who had borrowed against securities could not meet margin calls and forced selling swamped both the stock and bond markets." Given Soros's financial market reputation as an uncanny and unusually well-informed trader, Western investors led a panic exit from ruble GKO bonds and Russian stock shares. Trading on the Russian stock market was suspended amid growing fears of debt default, devaluation of the ruble, banking collapses, or a combination of all three. Then on August Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko and the Russian Central Bank jointly announced a devaluation of the ruble, a suspension of trading in government GKOs, and a ninety-day moratorium on the repayment of ruble-denominated foreign debt.

[...]

Things begin to improve - Primakov

In a desperate bid to calm opposition, the Yeltsin cabal named a highly respected outsider to head the government, Yevgeny Primakov—a former head of the KGB foreign intelligence successor, SVR, and former foreign minister—as the new prime minister. Primakov soon went after the most powerful Yeltsin oligarch, Boris Berezovsky. On April 5, 1999, prosecutors and armed men in camouflage and black masks raided Berezovsky's companies in Moscow, and an arrest warrant was issued for Berezovsky for his involvement in a scam involving Aeroflot ticket sales. In May 1999, members of the state Duma tried to impeach President Yeltsin. The impeachment vote failed. It was rumored that votes had been bought by the Kremlin at \$30,000 apiece.

Clearly the political tide was turning in Russia. When Prime Minister Primakov learned of the illegal US bombing of Serbia in March 1999, he was aboard a Russian jet en route to Washington for meetings. He ordered the pilot to immediately return to Moscow in what came to be called in the Russian media the "Primakov loop." Back in Moscow, Primakov vehemently protested that Yeltsin and the Russian government must act to support the Serbs. Yeltsin responded by firing Primakov some weeks later, using the economy as excuse. On June 11, 1999, the Russian military rejected the Kremlin's capitulation to the NATO bombing of Serbia and ordered Russian troops to seize the airport in Pristina, Kosovo. Yeltsin had lost control over his own military. This was the beginning of what would become a silent coup. With little choice, Yeltsin's administration agreed to require the foreign ministry to coordinate its activities with the military and security apparatus that Primakov had headed.

and Putin

On August 10, 1999, Yeltsin fired Prime Minister Sergei Sefhashin and replaced him with Vladimir Putin, an unknown former KGB officer who had spent the Cold War in Dresden in communist East Germany. Putin briefly had been head of the FSB and otherwise seemed to be a man with little prior political experience other than a short time as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. Berezovsky, Gusinsky, and the other Yeltsin oligarchs believed they could "do business" with the novice Putin. They made a major error. According to informed reports, Putin gave Yeltsin the ultimatum to resign or face serious consequences, an offer he apparently could not refuse. Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, naming Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as acting president until the March 2000 elections. By then, the CIA and their undesirable NGOs had wreaked untold damage on Russia and the Russian people.

Once in office as president on December 31, 1999, Vladimir Putin made clear to the oligarchs he was not intending to be their man. Following an electoral victory in June 2000, Putin called to the Kremlin the eighteen most powerful oligarchs, those who had made staggering fortunes at the expense of Russia. He denounced the shocked oligarchs by calling them creators of a corrupt state through backroom deals and insider ties. Soon after that, Putin's Kremlin launched criminal cases against media and banking oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky of Media-Most, the financial-industrial group Interros headed by Vladimir Potanin, and Sibneft, an oil company controlled by Roman Abramovich, as well as businesses connected with Boris Berezovsky.

The Russia Putin inherited

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Farm production had declined by a staggering 63 percent as state support for large farms ended. Investment into the economy decreased by 92 percent. More than 70,000 factories were closed down. That led to Russia's producing 88 percent fewer tractors, 76 percent fewer washing machines, 77 percent less cotton fabric, 78 percent fewer TVs, and on and on. In a country that had been without unemployment under the Soviet era, thirteen million people lost their jobs under Yeltsin's "free market" Russia. Those who still had work had their wages cut in half.

Two of Engdahl's sources:

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David E. Hoffman, *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, New York, Public Affairs Press, 2001 □

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