

# Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”  
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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## Editorial: A Bit Of History

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Amongst the reasons given why it would be a good thing to set up a Jewish State in Palestine, clearing away the native population to make space for it, was that this would undermine anti-Semitism by putting an end to the anomalous condition of the Jews as a nation without a territory of its own, dispersed amongst the other nations, without a national Government that could be held accountable. If there was a Jewish nation state towards which the dispersed Jews gravitated, the sinister appearance given to the Jews by their distinctiveness among the nations of which they did not form an integral part would be dispelled—if they were constituted into a territorial nation under a State which was publicly responsible for them. But that is not how it has worked out. The way the state was founded, and the way it has been conducted, without definite borders, for three generations, has become the major source of disapproval of Jewish-nationalist politics—and that disapproval is now described as anti-Semitism.

A condition of the existence of the Jewish State in the way that it chose to develop is that it should be a military superpower in the Middle East region with the ability to obliterate all the surrounding states which are mere territorial nation-states confined to their localities, not commanding vast influence beyond their borders, as the Jewish State does.

The formation of the Jewish state did not end the Jewish diaspora. The diaspora continued alongside the state, and the state became dependent on the active influence of the diaspora in support of it.

The rationalistic assumption that the establishment of the Jewish nation-state would attract to it the Jews who felt a sense of nationality, leaving other Jews to become integrated members of the nationalities amongst which they found themselves, did not work out. The way things worked out was that the state did not exert a strong gravitational pull on the diaspora after it was established. Jewry was not normalised by the establishment of the territorial Jewish state. Instead, the State and the Diaspora constituted a political unity, reinforcing one another.

The state was constructed in a predominantly Arab territory. Despite the great Jewish ethnic cleansing of 1948-9, there remained a considerable Arab population in the territory of the State. In 2018 the Jewish Government of the Jewish state introduced the principle that Jews were entitled not to have Arabs for neighbours. This caused a ripple of concern in Liberal England, where the sentiment that the white man was entitled not “to have a nigger for a neighbour” had only recently been overcome. That concern was countered by a Zionist campaign against an alleged rise of Anti-Semitism encouraged by the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn. Jewish publications urged the Jews to prepare to leave England if Corbyn became Prime Minister.

No evidence was presented about the alleged upsurge in Anti-Semitism. It was sheer propaganda invention. And there seemed to be no longer any eminent Jewish figure in British public life who would apply liberal-democratic standards to the conduct of the Jewish State, or make a reasonable assessment of the position of Jews in English life.

Corbyn’s offence was that he refused to define as anti-Semitic the hostility to the Jewish State of Arabs who had been conquered by it and who were being marginalised by it. Some of his former associates, who had campaigned with him

over the years on racial issues, suddenly emerged as Jews and supported the charge of anti-Semitism against him—Dame Margaret Hodge, for example.

At the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, when the construction of a Jewish State was put on the agenda of Imperial politics, it was opposed by many eminent Jews on the grounds that it could be realised only through the revival of religious/racial fundamentalism. And that is proving to be the case.

The formation of a Jewish state might be imagined by gentiles as a light-hearted Imperial ideal—as it was by the British Labour Party between the Wars—but Jews who considered the project realistically, in concrete circumstances, had some sense of what it would actually involve. The case for it might be presented to liberal opinion in a festoon of debating points, but the doing of it could only be the work of people for whom some transactions between Moses and God retained contemporary reality.

The restoration of a Jewish State in the 20th century could, in practice, only be Biblical.

It was authorised by the League of Nations in 1919, and then again by the United Nations in 1945, but it could not in practice be realised through Enlightenment ideology. Its manifesto would be neither Locke’s *Second Treatise* nor the *Communist Manifesto*, but *Deuteronomy* and *Joshua*. Without *Deuteronomy* and *Joshua*, and their position in Jewish as well as Christian culture, the enterprise would hardly be conceivable. What God ordered Joshua to do with the inhabitants of Palestine would have to be done again. It began to be done while the Nuremberg Trials, outlawing such things, were being held.

There was nothing secret about the doing of it, and yet it was as if it had been done in secret. The fact of it did not register on European understanding.

Europe was not a functional entity at the time. It was a place without structure and without responsibility. Germany did not yet know what it was to be. France was remaking itself under a returned *émigré* Government which was both repudiating the elected Vichy regime in ideology, and continuing it in substance. Christian Europe was Britain for the moment. Britain had ‘won the war’ and was a free agent. It was also the Power that had put the project of the Jewish State in motion. And its national culture was a culture of ‘the Book’. Whether it believed or did not believe, it was saturated with the culture of ‘the Book’. In its Parliamentary Revolution it had voted to enact the Laws of Moses as English law but was prevented by Cromwell’s dictatorship. It had *Deuteronomy* and *Joshua* in its make-up, giving events in Palestine in 1947-8 the familiar sense of something already known.

The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was an exceptional Trade Union boss, who had built his Union from the ground up, and was little touched with middle-class culture. He saw with unbiased working-class eyes what the Labour Party under liberal-intellectual leadership had committed itself to in Palestine, and he tried to minimise the damage to the native population. He was branded an anti-Semite, and his assistant at the Foreign Office, the high-flying liberal intellectuals, Richard Crossman, turned venomously against him and became an ultra-Zionist.

Bevin was disabled as Foreign Secretary with regard to Middle East Affairs. An attempt was made to assassinate him by Zionists of which history takes little notice. The Jewish population built up in Palestine under the British administration made war on Britain, to which it owed its existence, and waged war by unrestrained terrorist methods. Britain promptly forgot about its guarantees to the Arab population and threw in its hand.

The Jewish State set about an ethnic cleansing of the Arab population from the region the United Nations had awarded it, and it immediately spread out beyond that region. Britain then belatedly deployed its Army in Jordan to stop the Jewish State from overrunning the whole of Palestine. This minimal defensive effort in support of the Arab majority in Palestine was presented by the Jewish nationalist propaganda as an unprovoked Arab war on the Jewish State authorised by the United Nations.

Richard Crossman declared himself to be an Anti-Semite and became a hero of the Jewish State, Israel. His reasoning was that, as he was not a Jew, he was necessarily an Anti-Semite. By his own account, he put this view of the matter to the Zionist leader, Weizmann, and Weizmann agreed.

Weizmann became for Crossman what Marx and Lenin were for other Left Labour intellectuals. He was a diligent apostle. And it cannot be said that he misrepresented Weizmann's view, which was the authoritative Jewish-nationalist view, when he said that all non-Jews are Anti-Semitic by nature and that the only remedy is confession.

With regard to the large-scale ethnic cleansing of Arabs carried out in 1948-9, Crossman's criticism was directed at the British Government for not having done it by Imperial action, and leaving it to the Jews to do it for themselves.

The British Labour Party today seems to be in much the same state of mind in this matter as it was in the late 1940s, when it allowed Ernest Bevin to be branded an Anti-Semite. The difference today is that the hate figure is a Left-liberal,

where Bevin was a sensible, unpretentious working class Trade Unionist power-house of the Right, who had been chosen by Churchill to run the country while Churchill ran the War, and who laid the foundations of the Welfare State as Churchill's Minister of Labour and then let others take the credit under the post-War Labour Government.

It is possible that Corbyn is unaware of what happened in the Labour Party in 1948. He is in the line of anti-Bevinites—Bevan, Foot, Benn. Bevanism dominated Labour ideology until Blair, and Bevin had no place in it. But Corbyn today is branded an Anti-Semite on much the same grounds that Bevin was in 1948.

Blair regretted what he saw as the breach that happened in what he saw as "*the radical movement*" a century ago—the formation of a Labour Party separate from the Liberal Party. That happened because the Liberal Party over-reached itself with the World War it launched in 1914, but he did not dwell on that. If the Liberals had not split under the stress of a War that they had caused but could not cope with, and if the dominant faction had not formed a tight Coalition with the Tories, it seems unlikely that a Labour Party would have become the second Party in the state. But the Liberal split happened, the Asquith Liberals were destroyed in the 1918 Election, and the newly constructed Labour Party emerged in second place to the War Coalition.

The defeated Asquith Liberals then went over in large numbers to the Labour Party, in order to help it to become a 'responsible' party of the established system.

The breach with Liberalism was largely confined to formal structures until Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, when the war declared on Germany in 1939 ended in defeat in France, and Churchill refused to make a settlement, even though he had no hope of winning unless some other Great Power could be got as an ally, and he handed domestic government over to Bevin for the duration.

Lib-Labism had substantial continuity, even after a Labour Party had formally displaced the Liberal Party as the second party. And, with regard to the formation of a Jewish State, Labour simply carried over the Liberal position.

## A Jewish State As British Colony

The Jewish State which was to be established—or which was to be restored two thousand years after the first was destroyed—was envisaged as a British colony within the Empire. The major publication on the subject was *England And Palestine: Essays Towards The Restoration Of The Jewish State* by Herbert Sidebotham (Constable 1918).

Sidebotham was a *Manchester Guardian* journalist.

He took it that the Jews were the same people as the people whose State Rome had destroyed in 70 AD, and that they would behave in much the same way as they had then. He did not condemn Rome for putting down the Jewish State. British Liberalism had become comprehensively Imperial in its assumptions since Gladstone died a generation earlier. It saw the British Empire as the Roman Empire reborn, and it judged Roman actions sympathetically in accordance with realistic Imperial standards.

Sidebotham judged that Rome had sufficient reason to put down the Jewish State, which was an unruly source of disorder in its world. It was disorderly because it was independent, and had to conduct its own relations with neighbouring states. But that would not be the case with a Jewish State restored as a British colony, and protected from itself by Britain.

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“The Turks are an alien oligarchy in almost all parts of their Empire, and even if their rule had been enlightened and progressive no violence would be done to the population in dispossessing them. Indeed the principle of nationality requires their dispossession. Nor is there any indigenous civilisation in Palestine that could take the place of the Turkish except that of the Jews, who, already numbering one-seventh of the population have given to Palestine everything that it has ever had of value in the world. How far is the ideal of a Jewish State in Palestine consistent with the interests of the British Empire? Or, rather, let us first ask what these British interests are, and only then, if they are found to be consistent with the creation of a Jewish State, to admit these ideal considerations as the allies of our military and political interests. This procedure will insure us against the undue influence of considerations that may be under the suspicion of being sentimental. At the same time it is well to recognise at the outset, that the most uncompromising *Real-Politik* will not leave out of account the emotions and ideals which are the most potent springs of human action. These ideal considerations must, therefore, have their place in any calculations of British policy...” (p175).

[Sidebotham’s figure of one-seventh for the Jewish population in 1917 is a gross propaganda exaggeration. Realistic estimates put it at less than half of that. Jews may have amounted to seven per cent of the total population rather than one-seventh. And they consisted largely of pilgrims moved by pious sentiment rather than by colonising ambitions. The rule of the Ottoman Empire—“*the Turks*”—maintained a harmonious religious diversity in the Middle East. It did not allow colonial settlements, nor did it set the different religions against each other by fostering nationalism. That was the British contribution to the life of the region.]

“Egypt has been called the Achilles heel of the sea-Empire of Britain. Everywhere else, with two exceptions which are apparent rather than real, the British Empire is unconquerable except by a Power which has wrested from us the command of the sea. In Canada, it is true, we have an enormously long land frontier with the United States, but the United States is hardly as yet a great military Power... India, too, has a great land frontier, but it is the best natural frontier that is to be found anywhere in the world... It is not so with Egypt, where the most vital spot in our whole arterial system may be exposed to the attacks of a great military and unfriendly Power. The danger is not one that in the light of the experience of this war needs labouring now; the only wonder in most minds is that so few realised the magnitude of the danger before the war. The reason, of course, was that until a few years ago it hardly occurred to any one to regard Turkey as an enemy. Egypt was not thought to be in any danger... Turkey was conceived rather as a buffer state against aggression from the land side. The situation is now completely transformed. Between Turkey and Russia, our old rival in the East, there was no possibility of alliance. Between Turkey and Germany, our new rival, this alliance is an accomplished fact” (p177-8).

“Whatever the results of this war, it is likely to leave us with a land frontier such as we have never had before in our history... Even if we do not create a new province of Mesopotamia, we must at least keep our hold on the Persian Gulf and its coast line... The fact has to be faced that the old formula of not increasing our military responsibilities by extension of our frontiers no longer stands in much relation to the facts... But that extension must be conditioned by sound political conceptions... The most remarkable fact in the organisation of the British Empire is that though this country rules over peoples of alien race far

more numerous in relation to our own population than any other country has ever attempted to rule, it does so with an army much smaller. Two advantages have prevented the Indian Empire from being a military burden proportionate to its size. The one is its incomparable natural frontier. The other is the system of buffer states on the one frontier of India, the North West, which is exposed to attack. Of those buffers the most important is, of course, Afghanistan. Neither Egypt nor the Persian Gulf has either of these advantages. But if we extend our frontier, we may at any rate on the side of Egypt acquire one of these advantages—a good buffer state. A good natural frontier cannot be made by artificial means, but prescient policy may erect in front of Egypt an ideal buffer state.”

[Britain was in the 19th century the diplomatic defender of Turkey against the Russian ambition of getting Constantinople (Istanbul) as a warm water port. After the Russo-Japanese War, that was won by Japan, Britain reached an understanding with Russia about destroying the Ottoman Empire and sharing its territory, Russia getting Constantinople and Britain getting the Middle East in order to connect its Indian Empire with Egypt, across Arabia.]

“Clearly, then, ...what we would seem to require for the better and less burdensome defence of Egypt is a State to do for this frontier what Afghanistan has done for India... For the buffer system has, on the whole, worked extremely well in India... The great war on the Indian frontier... in 1807 turned on whether or not it was desirable that there should be a secondary buffer between the administrative frontier of India and Afghanistan, or whether the actual frontier of India should be extended up to the borders of the Ameer’s dominion. These problems would not arise in any political arrangements that we might make in Palestine the better to secure our defence of Egypt. When we acquired responsibility for India the buffer states of Persia and Afghanistan already existed, and the exact determination of the limits of their independence was a somewhat delicate question. But in Southern Syria the buffer state is, at present, non-existent, and would have to be artificially created, and being our own creation there would be no doubt about its international status. It would from the outset be in close political dependence on the British Crown, in fact an integral part of the British Empire...”

“...It is a curious fact that no other nation in Europe, either now or in the past, has known our distinction between “Colonial” and “Imperial” policy. Colonial policy in the strict sense, meaning the government of a country inhabited by people of the same origin as the people at the central seat of government, is hardly known in Europe. What Europe calls colonies are either mere “plantations”, as they used to be called in England, *succursales* of the central firm, or Imperial possessions, like India. We alone among nations have known how to combine the Greek idea of a colony, a daughter state, reproducing in other conditions the mentality of the mother state, with the Roman ideal of political unity. *Imperium cum libertate*, elsewhere a paradox, is with us so much a truism that the boldness and originality of the conception are rarely realised. But even England has only transformed the paradox into political commonplace in countries of temperate climate which are colonised by men of her own race. In Asia the problem is still unsolved... To extend the area of British rule into Southern Syria, which is the conclusion to which our argument would seem to be leading, would, if its government were to be like that of India, be a great increase in our burdens, though one that it might be necessary to assume. On the other hand, if this extension were to be on the colonial pattern and the new

territory were to be inhabited by people at the same stage of political development as ourselves, the increase of territory so far from being a burden would be a source of added strength. Again, great as has been the assistance of the colonies to Britain, they have taken comparatively little interest in the welfare of those parts of the Empire like India which are governed and do not govern themselves. The reason is partly difference of race and political development, partly geographical remoteness. But a genuine colony or dominion in Southern Syria would associate a British dominion for the first time in the current work of Imperial organisation and defence.

“Nothing is more certain than that if Palestine became part of the British Empire it would never be colonised in any real sense by the sort of Englishmen who have made Canada and Australia. The only possible colonists of Palestine are the Jews. Only they can build up in the Mediterranean a new dominion associated with this country from the outset in Imperial work, at once a protection against the alien East and a mediator between it and us, a civilisation distinct from ours yet imbued with our political idea, at the same stage of political development, and beginning its second life as a nation with a debt of gratitude to this country as its second father” (p181-6).

“Throughout the argument has concerned itself mainly with material arguments, but it is now free, after reaching the conclusion that a *Real-Politik*, a rational British egoism, would find its satisfaction in the creation of a new Jewish State under the British Crown, to acclaim as allies those ideals which, from caution, not from conviction, the argument began by excluding from consideration, and these ideals are indeed the rods of Moses which swallow up all the other rods. We began this war on behalf of the conceptions of international law and justice whose most conspicuous violation at the time was the invasion of Belgium... But great as the ideal of relieving Belgium from the invader may be, the ideal of restoring the Jewish State in Palestine is comparably greater, as a new birth is a greater thing than recovery from a sickness... Before the magnitude of this war, most ideals seem to shrink in size. But one ideal is the peer even of this war in magnitude and grandeur. It is the ideal of the restoration of the Jews to a country which, small and poor as it is, they made as famous as Greece and as great as Rome.” (p200)

Happily, the project comes into no opposition with any principle or theory of English politics, and all the objections that have so far been raised arise rather out of misunderstanding of the Zionist ideals...

“*Objection 1* “Why should we trouble our heads to set up a nation in a country for which it is not fighting itself...”

“This objection... is based upon a complete misunderstanding of this war as it affects the Jewish people. It is emphatically not true that they are holding apart from this war, watching it as disinterested spectators... On the contrary, for the Jews this has been one of the most tragic and cruel wars in the whole of their history. For the Jews, being of all nations and of none, have in this war fought in the armies of all the nations. For them it has been a civil war, a terrible destruction of what lies nearest to the heart of the idealistic Jews, their conception of nationality...”

“*Objection 2*. “The Jews are a recalcitrant people; they were hard to manage by all the Empires to which they belonged in the past, and they will be difficult subjects as members of the British Empire.”

“This objection undervalues the distinction between the British Empire and all other empires. Alone among the Empires of history the British Empire has known how to reconcile the freedom of national development with beneficial union and loyalty to a common ideal... The Jews of Palestine in the Empires of the ancient world were a conquered people... But a Jewish State set up at the end of this war would be composed not of a conquered people bearing a grudge against the victors but of a people receiving a recompense for the cruel wrongs of history... The Jewish State at the return from captivity was a theocracy and between a theocracy and a secular government there is never a possibility of real and perfect reconciliation. A spiritual and secular power have never existed side by side in perfect amity unless their spheres were rigidly marked off one from the other, and that was impossible under the old Jewish theocracy. There is no chance that these past errors will be repeated, for the inspiration of the modern Jewish Zionist movement is on its political side purely secular. This is not to say that the religious enthusiasm of the Jews is not, especially in Russia, one of the motives for desiring a return to Jerusalem, but for the modern Jew there is no chance of his ever allowing the spiritual power to obtain political predominance.”

“*Objection 3*. “Jews will not fight for their country in Palestine. They will be always quarrelling with neighbours and expecting the protecting or suzerain Power to rescue them from their difficulties.”

“But surely there is no race which has done more fighting for the soil of Palestine than the Jews. There is no national type which has been more tenacious of its individuality... How soon the Jews in Palestine will be able to take the responsibility for their own self-defence would depend almost entirely on the amount of emigration...”

“As for the non-Jewish races in Palestine, their interests will be the special care of the protecting Power...; nor is there any reason to fear that the Jews would wish to repeat the errors of the past.”

“*Objection 4*. “Jews will not go to Palestine. They are too comfortable here; they are a super-civilized race, and not the stuff out of which pioneers in a new and rough country are made.”

“On the contrary, the Jews are one of the greatest colonising races in the world. The fact that they can adapt themselves to a civilisation without losing their identity does not negate their power to create a very distinct and definite civilisation of their own...” (p202-207).

“The Arab tends to feel towards the Jewish restoration in Palestine much as the Anglo-Saxon and Norman elements in England would feel to a proposal to restore the Welsh to their ancient primacy in Britain... It is not, however, necessary that Judaism should be the established State religion in Palestine, though as the Jewish population grew it would naturally tend to be the dominant religion. Religious freedom and equality should be one of the articles of the constitution... Neither Christianity nor Mohammedanism has any future as a propagandist creed... Indeed, neither religion can afford at such a time as this to place itself in opposition with the principle of nationality fertilised with all the blood that has been shed in this war...” (p211).

“The present frontier in Egypt is clearly unsatisfactory, and even those who oppose the project of establishing a cis-Indian suzerainty from Cairo to the Persian Gulf are ready to admit that some extension of the Egyptian frontiers may be

necessary... The argument against further extending British military responsibility is an exceedingly strong one..., but it is one that needs to be applied with caution. Looking back on British Colonial history in the 19th century we are constantly struck by the extreme costliness of the extreme reluctance once common to both political parties to extend the area of British sovereignty. South Africa is a notorious example... There was a time when we might have extended our rule over the Orange Free State, not merely without opposition but at the actual invitation of the people... Instead, by contracting the area of British sovereignty they made and deepened divisions against Nature and geography—divisions that had to be removed later at the cost of a terrible war. The chief cause of these blunders was our refusal to distinguish between the principles applicable for the Imperial system of government... and a colonial system” (p219).

“The fact that Jerusalem, the capital of Judaism, was also a capital of a Dominion of the British Empire, and won by British arms, would give this country a great and beneficial influence in every country of the world where there is a community of Jews. They would owe everything to England.” (p223).

“The re-peopling of Palestine by the Jews must be a gradual process...” (p230).

“It is not easy to suggest forms of government until one knows exactly what the future international status of the country will be, but in any case there will be at first something analogous to what is known in the British Empire as Crown Colony government, whether Palestine is a colony of the British Crown or a colony of some international body...” (p233).

“...it is desired to establish a predominantly Jewish civilisation in the country without doing injustice to the large Arab population which is already there... It is desired to encourage Jewish immigration by every means and at the same time to discourage the immigration of Arabs, and this double result is to be accomplished without a suspicion of tyranny or oppression. Too often in the past the entry of a new civilisation into a country where another civilisation already exists has been followed by the complete wiping out of the lower or weaker race. Such a solution is unthinkable in Palestine. Moreover, it seems likely that the foundation of the Jewish State will be simultaneous with the foundation of an Arab Empire. Ill-treatment or oppression of the Arabs in Palestine would have immediate effects on the external relations between Palestine and its great neighbour on the East. These relations must be friendly, and a liberal and enlightened policy towards the Arabs of Palestine is, therefore, the first condition of peaceful progress. The protection of non-Jewish races will naturally be the principal concern of the protecting Power... This is the more important because the avowed policy of the new Palestine will be to make it into a Jewish State and the least excess of zeal might very easily cause the gravest injustice and compromise the relations of Palestine to the Arabs...” (p236).

“The East has hitherto been the home of the Imperial as distinguished from its Colonial System of Great Britain. A new Jewish State arising in Palestine will break down this distinction: it will clothe the hard structure of an Empire proper with the softer lineaments of a free commonwealth. The Eastern Mediterranean will be endowed with a new racial and political type. The Semitic Empires in which the world’s civilisation was cradled will find their modern counterpart, but free from the vices and dangers which ruined them in their

former existence. A new Mediterranean will appear between Syria and the Euphrates...

“In this new Eastern world the political and commercial Jew will be the chief fact, and the possession of a State of his own will break the fetters that have hitherto cramped his genius. Hitherto the condition of his material success has been the power of assimilating himself to a civilisation not his own.

“Mere assimilation will no longer be a duty... The qualities that have made him enemies when he lived in an alien civilisation will, in a new Eastern civilisation, become his distinguishing virtues...

“...The colonists of Palestine, though most of them no doubt will come from Russia, will be drawn in a greater or lesser degree from all the nations of the world. It is impossible to imagine a nation so constituted ever becoming a disturber of the peace, a mere pushing candidate for the material blessings of the world, an intriguer in the quarrels of Europe, or an aggressor on the rights of his neighbours. It will necessarily be a pacific and international force...

“A Jewish State that is a dominion of the British Empire or is under international guarantee would be saved from the dangers that ruined it in the past. Of these its powerful foreign enemies were not perhaps the most fatal to its welfare. It is a hard thing to say, but had the Jewish State under the Romans been faithful to the policy of Herod there is no reason why it should have been destroyed by Rome. The chief cause of the quarrel between Rome and Palestine was the rivalry between the interests of the Church and the interests of the State. The Jewish nation began as a theocracy, continued as a kingdom, and after the return from the Captivity become once more a theocracy, though a theocracy more bigoted than the old, surrounded by still more powerful enemies, and in consequence narrower and more intolerant. The period of the Macabees in which the Jewish State attained its greatest military glory was politically most unprogressive... The treatment of its Arab neighbours by the revived Jewish State was possessed by a cruelty only possible to religious bigots. The same spirit of fanaticism, the same clerical hatred of compromise, ruined the chances of a second restoration under the Roman Empire. In this respect there is not the smallest chance of history repeating itself. The attitude of the Jews on the question of the relation of Church and State is now definitely Erastian, and that in spite of the fact that the possession of a common religion has been the chief bond of union between the Jews of various countries. That the Jewish Church will be a great power in the land is certain, but its sphere will be the lives of the people, educational and cultural, not political...

“...The prowess of the Macabees and the marked friendliness of the founder of the Roman Empire to the Jews gave them the best chance they have ever had in their history of doing something—a chance which they unfortunately threw away...” (240).

Sidebotham reasoned that a Jewish State founded as a Colony of the British Empire would not behave as the independent Jewish State had behaved because of British influence acting on developments which he supposed had occurred in the outlook of the Jewish nation. He would possibly have been right if the course of world affairs had been as he assumed they would be. His assumptions appear absurd in retrospect, but they were reasonable enough when he was writing the book in 1917.

He assumed that there would be a major Arab State in the Middle East, aligned with Britain. It seemed to be British policy in 1917 that there would be. An Arab Army had been raised, and was making war on Turkey under British leadership, on the strength of an undertaking that Britain would recognise

an Arab State in place of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. An agreement between the Arab State and Britain to set aside an area to be a Jewish Crown Colony was conceivable. But Whitehall had no intention of facilitating, or allowing, the formation of an Arab State. The declaration of an Arab State in Damascus at the end of the War was put down forcibly by France, with which Britain was obliged to share the Middle East. And a declaration of independence by the concocted nation-state entity of Iraq was put down by Britain itself. The Arab Middle East was Balkanised while the foundations of a Jewish colony in Palestine were being laid and high political status was accorded to the Jewish Agency.

Sidebotham assumed that British victory would result in an expanded British Empire, purposefully governed, which would be the dominant force in world affairs. (Nonconformist Liberalism had become eagerly Imperialist.) But the stuffing had been knocked out of England by the strength of the German resistance. It had to raise an army of millions by Conscriptio to keep its War going, even though its boast had been that, unlike the Europeans, it fought its wars by voluntary effort.

Conscriptio made democratisation inevitable. The democracy proved to be unwilling to do for Imperial peace-making what it had done for Imperial war-making. The Army demobilised itself the moment the War was won, leaving the Government without the means of conducting orderly and purposeful government of the expanded Empire. A generation of Imperial drift set in, with bombing and gassing used as shortcuts in policing and tax-gathering.

Germany was brutalised by an intensified Starvation Blockade applied for most of a year after the end of the War. It was plundered and humiliated. Then Britain saw that this was making France dominant in Europe again and it began to undermine the regime of restriction that it had imposed on Germany. When Hitler asserted German independence in 1933, Britain became his collaborator in breaking the Versailles system. It probably hoped to direct him against Soviet Russia, but pretty well everything it did since launching its reckless wars on Germany and Turkey in 1914 turned out wrong.

In a sudden reversal of policy, it precipitated another war on Germany over the trivial issue of Danzig. It conducted the War half-heartedly, giving Hitler some easy victories. It lost the War in June 1940 but refused to make a settlement, and accused France of treachery because it tried to make a settlement. It did not need to settle because the Royal Navy still had world Naval dominance, and Hitler was an admirer of the British Empire. By doing some bombing it maintained a war situation in Europe, hoping for a German/Russian War. That happened in June 1941. The Russian Armies were pushed back by the German assault. If they had broken, as the British and French Armies did, we would now be living in a different world. But the Russian Armies held and Germany was crushed by them within four years. However, it was in those four years that what is called The Holocaust—the large-scale killing of Jews—occurred.

Jewish colonisation of Palestine under British rule had been going on slowly, but Jews were still very much in the minority, even though Britain made war on Palestinian resistance, in conjunction with the Jewish settlers, in 1936.

In the aftermath of the World War, the now-expanded Jewish Colony declared its independence, and launched a terrorist war against Britain in support of it. When Britain surrendered, the ethnic cleansing of Arabs began. And the new Jewish State bore a very strong resemblance to the one the Romans put down.

The usual defence of it is that the 2nd World War proved that a *Safe Haven* for Jews was necessary. But, if the Jews had depended for survival on the Balfour Declaration, they would have perished—as many other peoples under British rule have perished.

Two and a half million Jews were saved by Communist Russia by evacuation eastwards from the path of the German advance. It had nothing whatever to do with Palestine. It had to do with what many regarded as the Jewish bias of the Communist movement.

The Jews saved by the Soviet Union are the source of the bulk of the Jewish population in the world today. And the Jewish Colony was armed by the Soviet Union for its War on Britain in 1947. But the Jewish State promptly aligned itself with the United States in the Cold War against Communism, and it is protected by the United States against the sanction of the ‘international law’ of the United Nations that is sometimes applied against others.

The meaning of the term *Anti-Semitism*, as used in the campaign against the British Labour Leader, is very different from what it was before the British Empire constituted the Jews into an official nation in the structure of the world, with rights on Palestine that were prior to the rights of the inhabitants of Palestine. It used to mean a feeling of antipathy towards Jews simply because they were Jews. It now means in practice criticism of the Jewish State because of what it does in the way of ongoing colonial activity and ethnic cleansing.

The Chief Rabbi in Britain has said frankly that, while it is theoretically possible to criticise the Jewish State without being Anti-Semitic, it is not possible in practice.

The language of Jewish victimhood has been carried over from the era before the formation of the Jewish State to the era in which the Jewish State is the dominant armed force in the Middle East, able to obliterate all its neighbours with nuclear weapons.

Jewry as a collective body is today, in the dichotomy applied to Germany in 1933-1945, not a victim but a perpetrator. In the formulating of the charge of Anti-Semitism against the leader of the Labour Party, it is implicitly denied that Jews have any collective existence politically as Jews. They are individual members of the British political body with particular religious beliefs and disbeliefs, just like Baptists or Catholics or Hindus are, and the attribution of collective national responsibility to them is Anti-Semitic. But that is the condition of things that was abolished in 1917. Before 1917 it was Anti-Semitic to attribute national existence to Jews: after 1917 it was Anti-Semitic to deny that they were a nation—and a nation with national rights in Palestine prior to the rights of the people who were living there.

Before 1917 the Jews were in fact nationals of the various states in which they lived, and their involvement in the Great War was as nationals of those states. Zionism was a fringe movement which asserted the same thing as the gentile Anti-Semites: that the Jews were themselves a nation and could never really be nationals of the nation-states in which they lived.

The *Balfour Declaration*, and its adoption by the League of Nations, established Zionism in official hegemony over Jewry as a whole and the realisation of that hegemony has been an ongoing process ever since. The recent coming out of Lady Hodge as a militant Zionist, denouncing the Labour Party as institutionally anti-Semitic, and targeting Jeremy Corbyn—

with whom she campaigned against racism for decades as a Labour ultra-Leftist—astonished colleagues who had never thought of her as anything but English.

Menachem Begin (or was it Ben Gurion: it matters little which it was) said that Jews who were not Zionists were “*rootless cosmopolitans*”, and the Zionist movement has worked relentlessly at making them feel this.

There have always been Jews in the British Labour Party who were known to be Jews—who made a point of being Jews—but who applied liberal-democratic standards to the conduct of the Jewish State, recognising that there was in fact a special relationship between Jews everywhere and the Jewish State—if only because Jews everywhere had rights in Palestine that were prior to the rights of Palestinians. Gerald Kaufman was perhaps the best known of these. The Zionist movement didn’t like them but had to tolerate them.

A conjunction of events connected with Brexit has brought about an atmosphere in which it is no longer felt necessary to tolerate them. The Kaufman generation has died out and anyone who now tried to say in public life what he said would be a “*self-hating Jew*”. (Several of Kaufman’s speeches on the Jewish State were reprinted in the October 2018 issue of *Labour Affairs*.)

Jews are not universally liked in British life, neither are Catholics (not to mention Moslems!) The origins of the British State lie in anti-Catholicism. The BBC keeps a watchful eye on the Catholic world and dwells lovingly on its scandals. But the Jewish State is in origin a British creation, as is the mess of the Middle East that was brought about by the imposition of the Jewish State. The BBC is discreetly but effectively anti-Catholic. It must be so if it is to be British. And, in order to be British, it must be essentially protective of the Jewish State, comprehensively so of its origins, and largely so of its actions.

But there is a strain of strong anti-Semitism in British high culture, and it won’t go away. T.S. Eliot has not been denounced and taken off the shelves. The British State has no intention of losing itself through its sponsorship of Zionism.

The Tory Party is happy to have the Labour Party characterised as an Anti-Semitic Party, not only by ultra-sensitive Jews but by Blairites trying to regain control of the Party. It does not say that the advice given by Zionists magazines that the Jews should leave Britain for safety if Jeremy Corbyn becomes Prime Minister is groundless and irresponsible scaremongering. Why should it? It is good party-politics at the moment, and in British public life there is nothing higher than party politics.

When there was a Tory feeling that there were too many Jews in the Government, the way it was said was the Public School way. “For example, when Brittan was forced to leave the Cabinet during the Westland affair — when ministers were divided over how best to rescue a troubled helicopter firm — the Right-wing Tory backbencher John Stokes crudely said Brittan should be replaced by a ‘red-blooded, red-faced Englishman, preferably from landed interests’.” (Daily Mail 31/10 2014)

An elderly Jewish woman, Jenny Manson, Co-Chair of the *Jewish Voice for Labour*, spoke in support of Labour MP Chris Williamson, who was suspended from the Party for saying at a public meeting that the Party leadership was conceding too much to the agitation about Anti-Semitism:

“I think it’s become such a fear about Israel and talking about Anti-Semitism—they’re not necessarily linked—that people are just not saying anything any more. And Chris Williamson is

one of the few people who actually says what he thinks. When you think about other issues, even Brexit, there is no stopping people. We know every night on the radio and in the flesh that people are saying what they think. And they’re not being told, because they said it, they must be xenophobic, they must be racist. But not on Anti-Semitism. There’s been almost a silence from everybody. Chris Williamson has been brave and look how he’s being treated for being brave...” (*Newsnight* 27<sup>th</sup>. Feb.).

In an interview broadcast on *Radio Ulster* the following morning she said her life had been threatened as a “*Capo*”. The Capos were Jews in the Extermination Camps who sought survival by shepherding other Jews to the slaughter.

There was no public outcry about this.

Zionism is absolute nationalism which knows no restraints. It must be so in order to continue and secure its conquest and colonisation of Palestine.

The fact that the Jews in Palestine are not victims but perpetrators was given striking expression by Isaac Deutscher, a Polish Jew who was not a Zionist but became sympathetic to it, who said he was shocked to find that the Jews had come to be regarded as “*the Prussians of the Middle East*”. That was his anti-German way of putting it. He might just as well have said that Israel was constructing itself on the pattern of the Macabees.

Nationalist Ireland has some responsibility in all of this. During the past generation it has all but repudiated the Sinn Fein development that ousted the Home Rule Party in 1918 and made John Redmond the great lost leader who showed the right path. Redmond, with 80 seats at Westminster and holding the balance of power, gave unconditional support to the Liberal Party to make war on Germany. He was silent in the face of the *Balfour Declaration*, which was a gross breach of the principle of national self-determination for which the War was allegedly being fought—a thing which Balfour admitted.

The various stages in this working out of the Balfour Declaration will be dealt with in a future issue.

**Brendan Clifford**

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Notes from article ‘A Debate on Nations’ p17.

(Notes continue p. 15 and 24)

1: Etudes sur les nationalités.

2: And we say the same of England, pace Lord Hugh Cecil, who declared in the House of Commons in April last that “no one is idiot enough to believe in English nationality at present.”

3: We shall use this term throughout in the sense of “the sum of those qualities which distinguish a nation,” i.e., which make it the nation that it is. See Godard: *The Ethics of Patriotism*, p. 20.

4: *The Open Secret of Ireland*. Similarly Walter Bagehot: *Physics and Politics* (Kegan. Paul, new ed., 1905) – “But what are nations? What are these groups which are so familiar to us and yet, if we stop to think, so strange. . . . ? The question is most puzzling though the fact is so familiar, and I would not venture to say that I can answer it completely.”

5: Op. cit., p. 86.

6: Besides these influences which are approximately fixed and constant, there are a host of others - education, the theatre, the press, the ballads of a people, national sports, a national capital, and so on.

7: *L’imagination dans ses fantaisies et ses rêves se colore de la teinte même du pays.*” Lucien Roure, S.J., *Doctrines et Problèmes*.

8: Essay on Lord Clive: “People cannot change their abodes, pass from an island to a continent, from the 50th degree of N. latitude to the tropics or the Southern Hemisphere, from an ancient community to a new colony, from vast manufacturing cities to sugar plantations, or to lonely sheep-walks in countries where aboriginal savage tribes still wander, without changing their ideas and



# What the Press Hides From You About Venezuela

## David Morrison

Below is a list of articles on the current crisis in Venezuela –the articles by Media Lens and its US equivalent FAIR are particularly informative.

UNHRC report by Alfred de Zayas.

Eric Zuesse, Off-Guardian, 9 February 2019

<https://off-guardian.org/2019/02/09/what-the-press-hides-from-you-about-venezuela/>

**Report of the Independent Expert [Alfred de Zayas] on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order on his mission to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador**

*“36.The effects of sanctions imposed by Presidents Obama and Trump and unilateral measures by Canada and the European Union have directly and indirectly aggravated the shortages in medicines such as insulin and anti-retroviral drugs. To the extent that economic sanctions have caused delays in distribution and thus contributed to many deaths, sanctions contravene the human rights obligations of the countries imposing them. Moreover, sanctions can amount to crimes against humanity. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. An investigation by that Court would be appropriate, but the geopolitical submissiveness of the Court may prevent this.”*

UN Human Rights Council, 18 August 2018

<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/239/31/PDF/G1823931.pdf?OpenElement>

Western Media Fall in Lockstep for Cheap Trump/Rubio Venezuela Aid PR Stunt

Adam Johnson, FAIR, 9 February 2019

<https://fair.org/home/western-media-fall-in-lockstep-for-cheap-trump-rubio-venezuela-aid-pr-stunt/>

Italy Saves Europe’s Dignity over US Bullying of Venezuela Strategic Culture, 8 February 2019

<https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2019/02/08/italy-saves-europe-dignity-over-us-bullying-venezuela.html>

In Venezuela, White Supremacy Is a Key Driver of the Coup Greg Palast, Truthdig, 7 February 2019

<https://truthout.org/articles/in-venezuela-white-supremacy-is-a-key-driver-of-the-coup>

US revokes Venezuela visas, rejects dialogue with Maduro Yahoo (AFP), 7 February 2019

<https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-revokes-venezuela-visas-rejects-dialogue-maduro-223647175.html>

Juan Guaidó: The Man Who Would Be President of Venezuela Doesn’t Have a Constitutional Leg to Stand On Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 7 February 2019

<http://www.coha.org/juan-guaido-the-man-who-would-be-president-of-venezuela-doesnt-have-a-constitutional-leg-to-stand-on/>

Did Venezuela’s President Really ‘Steal’ the 2018 Election from an Unknown Who Didn’t Run?

Joe Emersberger, Venezuela Analysis, 7 February 2019

<https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14305>

Venezuela - U.S. Aid Gambit Fails - War Plans Lack Support Moon of Alabama, 7 February 2019

<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/02/venezuela-us-aid-gambit-fails-war-plans-lack-support.html>

Saker Interview with Michael Hudson on Venezuela

Unz Review, 7 February 2019

<http://www.unz.com/tsaker/saker-interview-with-michael-hudson-on-venezuela/>

## Venezuela Blitz – Part 1: Tyrants Don’t Have Free Elections

Media Lens, 5 February 2019

[http://medialens.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=892:venezuela-blitz-part-1-tyrants-don-t-have-free-elections&catid=57:alerts-2019&Itemid=252](http://medialens.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=892:venezuela-blitz-part-1-tyrants-don-t-have-free-elections&catid=57:alerts-2019&Itemid=252)

## Venezuela Blitz - Part 2: Press Freedom, Sanctions And Oil

Media Lens, 5 February 2019

[http://medialens.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=893:venezuela-blitz-part-2-press-freedom-sanctions-and-oil&catid=57:alerts-2019&Itemid=252](http://medialens.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=893:venezuela-blitz-part-2-press-freedom-sanctions-and-oil&catid=57:alerts-2019&Itemid=252)

Italy gags EU on Venezuela crisis

EU Observer, 5 February 2019

<https://euobserver.com/foreign/144091>

What’s the Deal with Sanctions in Venezuela, and Why’s It So Hard for Media to Understand?

Alexander Campbell, CEPR, 4 February 2019

<http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/what-s-the-deal-with-sanctions-in-venezuela-and-why-s-it-so-hard-for-media-to-understand>

The U.S. Helped Push Venezuela Into Chaos — and Trump’s Regime Change Policy Will Make Sure It Stays That Way

Mark Weisbrot, The Intercept, 2 February 2019

<https://theintercept.com/2019/02/02/venezuela-us-trump-sanctions/?comments=1#comments>

*Juan Guaidó is the product of a decade-long project overseen by Washington’s elite regime change trainers. While posing as a champion of democracy, he has spent years at the forefront of a violent campaign of destabilization.*

Dan Cohen and Max Blumenthal, *The Grayzone*, 29 January 2019

<https://grayzoneproject.com/2019/01/29/the-making-of-juan-guaido-how-the-us-regime-change-laboratory-created-venezuelas-coup-leader/>

## **The Dirty Hand of the National Endowment for Democracy in Venezuela**

Eva Gollinger, Consortium News, 28 January 2019

<https://consortiumnews.com/2019/01/28/the-dirty-hand-of-the-national-endowment-for-democracy-in-venezuela/>

## **Venezuela: What Activists Need To Know About The US-Led Coup**

Popular Resistance, 27 January 2019

<https://popularresistance.org/venezuela-what-activists-need-to-know-about-the-us-led-coup/>

## **Venezuela crisis: Former UN rapporteur says US sanctions are killing citizens**

Michael Selby-Green, Independent, 26 January 2019

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-us-sanctions-united-nations-oil-pdvsa-a8748201.html>

This from the Oriental Review could be added to the above list: - <https://orientalreview.org/2019/02/06/venezuelas-collapse-is-a-window-into-how-the-oil-age-will-unravel/>

Peter Brooke

While also stressing the role of US sanctions and the neo-liberal policies that preceded Chavez coming to power, it gives some idea of the internal reasons for Venezuela's difficulties. It seems Venezuelan oil

'is not conventional crude, but unconventional "heavy oil", a highly viscous liquid that requires unconventional techniques to extract and flow, often with heat from steam, and/or mixing it with lighter forms of crude in the refining process. Heavy oil thus has a higher cost of extraction than normal crude, and a lower market price due to the refining difficulties. In theory, heavy oil can be produced at below break-even prices to a profit, but greater investment is still needed to get to that point.'

It worked in the Chavez period because the price of oil was so high but:

'Instead of investing oil revenues back into production, Chavez spent them away on his social programmes during the heyday of the oil price spikes, with no thought to the industry he was drawing from—and in the mistaken belief that prices would stay high. By the time prices collapsed due to the global shift to difficult oil described earlier—reducing Venezuela's state revenues (96 percent of which come from oil)—Chavez had no currency reserves to fall back on. 'Chavez had thus dramatically compounded the legacy of problems he had been left with. He had mimicked the same mistake made by the West before 2008, pursuing a path of 'progress' based on an unsustainable consumption of resources, fuelled by debt, and bound to come crashing down. 'So when he ran out of oil money, he did what governments effectively did worldwide after the 2008 financial crash through quantitative easing: he simply printed money. 'The immediate impact was to drive up inflation. He simultaneously fixed the exchange rate to dollars, hiked up the minimum wage, while forcing prices of staple goods like bread to stay low. This of course turned businesses selling such staple goods or involved at every chain in their production into unprofitable

enterprises, which could no longer afford to pay their own employees due to hemorrhaging income levels. Meanwhile, he slashed subsidies to farmers and other industries, while imposing quotas on them to maintain production. Instead of producing the desired result, many businesses ended up selling their goods on the black market in an attempt to make a profit. 'As the economic crisis escalated, and as oil production declined, Chavez pinned his hopes on the potential transformation that could be ushered in by massive state investment in a new type of economy based on nationalised, self or cooperatively managed industries. Those investments, too, had little results. Dr Asa Cusack, an expert on Venezuela at the London School of Economics, points out that "even though the number of cooperatives exploded, in practice they were often as inefficient, corrupt, nepotistic, and exploitative as the private sector that they were supposed to displace." 'Meanwhile, with its currency reserves depleted, the government has had to slash imports by over 65 percent since 2012, while simultaneously reducing social spending to even lower than it was under IMF austerity reforms in the 1990s. Chavistan crisis-driven 'socialism' began with unsustainable social spending and has now switched to catastrophic levels of austerity that make neoliberalism look timid.'

Meanwhile Venezuela suffered a severe drought:

'Venezuela generates around 65 percent of its electricity from hydropower, with a view to leave as much oil available as possible for export. But this has made electricity supplies increasingly vulnerable to droughts induced by climate change impacts. 'It is well known that the El-Nino Southern Oscillation, the biggest fluctuation in the earth's climate system comprising a cycle of warm and cold sea-surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific Ocean, is increasing in frequency and intensity due to climate change. A new study on the impact of climate change in Venezuela finds that between 1950 and 2004, 12 out of 15 El-Nino events coincided with years in which "mean annual flow" of water in the Caroni River basin, affecting the Guri reservoir and hydroelectric power, was "smaller than the historical mean." 'From 2013 to 2016, an intensified El-Nino cycle meant that there was little rain in Venezuela, culminating in a crippling deficit in 2015. It was the worst drought in almost half a century in the country, severely straining the country's aging and poorly managed energy grid, resulting in rolling blackouts.'

One thing that is not explained is that under these circumstances there is bound to be a substantial left wing opposition that would still not tolerate US interference. Guaido's party is a small minority in the National Assembly. He is only President because they have an arrangement by which four parties take turns. 'The opposition' can't be united and there must surely be a substantial non-Maduro opposition to Guaido but we never seem to hear about it. The COHA article in David's list does address that question - <http://www.coha.org/juan-guaido-the-man-who-would-be-president-of-venezuela-doesnt-have-a-constitutional-leg-to-stand-on/>

The Perry Anderson article on Brazil in the current London Review of Books is well worth reading. □

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## Britain versus Russia: Battle for the Caucasus 1918-20 (Part One)

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### Pat Walsh

At the end of 1918, as a result of its Great War victory, Britain had control of a vast area stretching eastward from Istanbul into Anatolia, the Caucasus and Transcaspia. Behind this area a great belt of land running east from Palestine, through Mesopotamia and into Persia lay in England's hands, to do what it wished with. In front of this Britain was supplying and supporting various military forces that were disintegrating the Russian State through Civil War. The Great War of 1914 had not only succeeded in destroying Germany, and the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires but it had also seemingly won Britain the Great Game of a century of geopolitical rivalry with Russia.

But in less than two years Russia was back in the Caucasus and Transcaspia and was pressing down on British Persia. And Russia was no longer Tsarist but Bolshevik Russia.

This extraordinary turn of events does not figure in the history books of the Anglosphere. So it deserves some attention and explanation.

### Russia in the Caucasus

Transcaucasia (modern day Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) or the Caucasus (including also the Mountain state of Dagestan) had been part of the Russian Empire for only a century before the Great War of 1914. Prior to that catastrophic event the region south of the Caucasus mountains, between the Black and Caspian Seas, had been under Ottoman and Persian influence for centuries and had been the preserve of a number of local rulers.

However, by the time of the Great War the Southern Caucasus and Transcaspia were firmly in Russian hands. The Tsarist State had expanded across the Caucasus mountains in the early 19th Century, driving back Turkish and Persian influence and absorbing the territories of local Khans. By a Proclamation in 1783, Catherine the Great had placed much of Georgia under Russian suzerainty. After losing the war of 1826-1828 with Russia, Persia surrendered all territories to the north of Aras river. In 1813 the rest of Georgia, along with about half of Azerbaijan, was taken by the Tsar in the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchay (leaving most Azerbaijanis to this day in modern Iran). Although it took until 1864 to pacify the area, in less than half a century Russia had become master of Transcaucasia.

The Russian State moved across the Khirghiz steppe in the 1840s and had conquered the Khanates of Bokhara, Kokand and Khiva by the 1870s. This made the entire Caucasus and Transcaspian regions a Russian domain by the 1880s with Tsarist forces appearing in Merv, within reach of Afghanistan, to the north east of the British Indian Empire.

However, Russian attempts at colonisation of the Caucasus largely failed and settlers returned to Russia. Russia had to settle for using the Christian Armenians as a colonial element. Over a million Armenians were settled in the Southern Caucasus during the 19th Century. However, the Armenians

only really had their religion and the fear of being engulfed by the Moslem majority to bind them to the Russians. The Russian attitude to the Armenians was to direct any nationalism they developed westward toward Ottoman Armenia and use them as instruments in any expansionary policy of the Tsarist state in that direction.

Economic development and integration into the Russian Empire, which began after the Tsarist conquest had a considerable impact on the development of the Southern Caucasus. The construction of Russian railroads from Poti via Tiflis to Baku was particularly significant and the area was connected to the main Russian railway system when the line from Rostov to Baku was opened in 1900. These developments brought Northern Persia into the Russian sphere by the latter part of the 19th Century, something that concerned Britain greatly.

The first oil wells were drilled at Baku in 1869. The city became the richest single oilfield in the world and was invaluable to the Russian economy. At the time of the Great War 8 million tons of oil were produced in Baku, with most consumed in Russia itself. Only a small amount was pumped through a pipeline to Batum and exported.

In 1923 Clare Price wrote this informative description of the Southern Caucasus. It sets the scene for the geopolitical struggle that took place between Britain and Russia between 1918 and 1920 over influence in Transcaucasia.

“East of the Black Sea... the British writ did not run. Here between the Black Sea and the Caspian is the ancient barrier of the Caucasus Range, below which the Trans-Caucasian plateau forms a bridge both to the back of the Ottoman Empire and to Persia. Below the blue peaks of the Caucasus Range lay Tiflis, the capital of the Georgian Kingdom midway between the Black Sea and the Caspian, with the Turkish village of Batum on the Black Sea shores and the Tartar village of Baku on the Caspian. Turks and Tartars were both Moslem, but the old Georgian Kingdom was Orthodox and, extending in a broad belt down through the Ottoman provinces in eastern Asia Minor were most of the Armenians.

Expanding Russia was not long in bursting the barrier of the Caucasus Range. More than a century ago, it swallowed the Georgian Kingdom, snuffed out the eight little Tartar chieftains around Baku and found itself in contact with the Armenian Catholicos and the eastern fringes of the Ermeni community in the Ottoman Empire. In further accord with its policy of undermining that Empire, it availed itself of the presence of the Armenians in the usual imperialist manner and, in its war of 1876 against the Sultan, it drove its way deeply into his eastern provinces, transferring the Armenians from Ottoman to Russian sovereignty as it went.

Its objective was the great bay of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean which was to free it of its Black Sea jail, a scheme which Great Britain recognized by secretly taking over

the “administration” of Cyprus from the Sultan. The treaty of San Stefano stopped the Russian advance hundreds of miles short of Alexandretta and in front of the new Ottoman frontier, Russia developed Kars into a great fortress as a base for its further advance toward Alexandretta when opportunity offered.

Having seized Batum from the Sultan, Russia continued the consolidation of Trans-Caucasia under its own provincial governors and stamped the entire region with the unmistakable imprint of a Russian economic regime. It pierced the barrier of the Caucasus Range with a military highroad to Tiflis, which it prolonged as a railroad to Kars and the Armenian center of Erivan. It drove its railways past the east end of the Caucasus Range to make a Russian railhead and a Russian Caspian port of Baku, around which lay one of the greatest oil fields in the world. It developed the village of Batum into a fortified Russian port on the Black Sea and with its Trans-Caucasian railroads from Batum via Tiflis to Baku, it made Batum the gate to the Caspian for all the Western world. Long before, it had driven the Persians from the Caspian, making a Russian lake of that inland sea, and Russian steamship lines from Baku to Enzeli, the port of Teheran, now made Batum the world’s gate to the Persian capital.

From the Trans-Caucasian bridge, the Russian march toward the sea forked into two directions. The direction in which the Russian Armies of 1876 turned, was toward Alexandretta on the Mediterranean. The other direction was indicated later when a railroad was carried from Kars to the Persian frontier, whence it was to be continued when requisite to Tabriz and Teheran. This might have exposed the Persian Gulf to Russia, but the Government of India had already made the Gulf more British than the Mediterranean. The Gulf had become a land-locked British lake whose narrow door-way into the Indian Ocean was dominated by the potential British naval base of Bunder Abbas. If Russia had succeeded in reaching the Gulf through Persia, a Russian port on its shores would have been imprisoned by Bunder Abbas, as the Russian Black Sea ports were already imprisoned by Constantinople and the Russian Baltic ports by the Sound. For the time being, the Russian Trans-Caucasian railhead on the north-west frontier of Persia awaited events.” (The Rebirth of Turkey, pp.40-2)

## The Great Game

The Southern Caucasus region was too far inland to be part of the Great Game between Russia and Britain – the great geopolitical struggle of the 19th Century. This was because Transcaucasia was beyond the reach of Britain’s primary weapon of war, the Royal Navy, and therefore beyond contest with the Tsar’s armies. For more than a century the Russians had sought a warm water port for access to the oceans and Britain had checked her everywhere.

Britain had acted as an ally of the Ottoman Empire for most of the century before the Great War in order to block the Tsar from the Mediterranean. During this period Britain was determined to preserve the Ottoman State as a giant buffer zone between its Empire and the expanding Russian Empire. It was part of what was known as the Great Game in England that “the Russians should not have Constantinople” and the warm water port that this would have given them. It was for this reason that England fought the Crimean War. Later on in the century the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli rolled back the Treaty of San Stefano that the Tsar had imposed on the Sultan and saw to it that renegotiations produced the much less advantageous

Treaty of Berlin. This helped preserve the Ottoman Empire against another attempted Russian expansionism in the region.

Russia’s increasing influence in Northern Persia prompted Britain to put an obstacle in front of the Tsar by establishing a presence in South East Persia, protecting the Persian Gulf from Russian encroachment. It was a vital concern of Britain’s Indian Empire that the Tsar was blocked from getting port facilities there. Persia was part of what Lord Curzon, when Viceroy of India, referred to as “the glacis of India” in the course of an important speech to the Legislative Council in Calcutta made on 30 March 1904:

“India is like a fortress, with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces, and with mountains for her walls on the remainder; but beyond those walls, which are sometimes of by no means insuperable height, and admit of being easily penetrated, extends a glacis of varying breadth and dimension. We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends; but if rival and unfriendly influences creep up to it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene, because a danger would thereby grow up that might one day menace our security. This is the secret of the whole position in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and as far eastwards as Siam. He would be a short-sighted commander who merely manned his ramparts in India and did not look out beyond; and the whole of our policy during the past five years has been directed towards maintaining our influence, and to preventing the expansion of hostile agencies on this area which I have described.” (Earl of Ronaldshay, on the Outskirts of Empire in Asia)

A glacis is the killing ground on the approaches to a Medieval fortress.

During the 19th century Britain’s traditional enemy in Europe had been France and her traditional rival in Asia had been Russia. However, in the early years of the 20th century England gradually came to the conclusion that Germany was the coming power to be opposed. Therefore, in the interests of the Balance of Power policy which Britain had practiced for centuries to keep Europe at bay it was decided to overturn the Foreign policy of a century and to establish alliances with traditional enemies, France and Russia, so that Germany could be encircled and then destroyed as a commercial rival. The alliance that Britain entered into with Russia in 1907, therefore, was the single most important event that made a British war on the Ottoman Empire inevitable as a consequence of the War on Germany.

Britain was an island nation and it was primarily a sea power. It did not have a large army and it had been opposed to military conscription. Therefore, it would have been impossible for Britain to have defeated Germany by itself, particularly since its major weapon, the Naval Blockade, required a siege to be constructed and a cutting off of resources to the east of Germany.

In 1907 England made an agreement with Russia over Persia, partitioning the country into 3 zones of influence, with the Tsar taking the Northern part, the British controlling the South East and an intermediate “neutral” zone in between. This was part of the Anglo-Russian Convention which settled affairs with the Tsar, suspended the Great Game of Imperial rivalry, and set the two Powers on course for War on Germany and by implication, the Ottoman Empire.

George Curzon, who had been Viceroy of the Indian Empire, felt that Sir Edward Grey had been too generous in this concession to the Russians. He felt that the neutral zone might permit the Russians reaching the Gulf in South West Persia. However, the Liberal Imperialists, who were re-orientating British Foreign Policy in preparation for a Great War on Germany – and by implication on the Ottomans because of the Tsar's ultimate objective of Constantinople – felt the concession was necessary to gain the Tsar's "Russian Steamroller" – the vital military force that could bear down on Berlin from the East and encircle the Germans, making a British Sea Blockade effective.

## Russia's Fateful Decision

Tsarist Russia was ready for war in 1914. It was a long-standing expansionary state with further ambitions of expansion – particularly down to the Dardanelles. It immediately went on the offensive on all fronts – Austro-German and then Ottoman. The Russian Steamroller steamed ahead until it was stopped and then it began to roll back, with devastating consequences to those behind it.

After Britain had made the European war of July 1914 into a World War by joining it and expanded its conflict zone to global proportions it supported the Tsarist War effort with nearly 600 million pounds in loans. As in previous wars fought on the European continent, in pursuit of the Balance of Power, British finance was an important element in sustaining conflict to the required attritional level that the enemy could be ground down.

The Armenians were the only people of the Caucasus who engaged in quasi-independent military action during the Great War – simultaneously supporting the Tsarist War effort and also engaging in insurrection against the Ottomans for their own purposes. The Georgians served in the Tsarist armies on the same basis as other Russian subjects. The Azerbaijanis were largely excluded from military service by the Tsar and remained the most unmilitarised element in the region. They were not disloyal to the Tsar as the Ottoman Armenians were to the Sultan but they remained largely apathetic to the war, getting on with their lives as best they could.

The Great War did not intrude into the Caucasus until the collapse of the Russian lines brought it there in early 1918.

However, in the course of Britain's Great War on Germany its ally Tsarist Russia, and not Germany or the Ottoman Empire, began to collapse in the attritional War. Germany and Turkey proved much more resilient than anticipated and Russia was not industrialised enough for the production of war materials that a long war of attrition entailed.

The enormous British loans were paid back by the Tsarist regime with an enormous shedding of blood by the Russian masses until the amount of this blood, particularly expended in the offensives of 1916, resulted in a collapse of Russian morale.

It was the Tsar's decision to ally with Britain and continue fighting the Great War to a conclusion, under pressure from Britain, that put paid to Imperial Russia.

Tsarist Russia was not the declining decrepit state that it is often portrayed as, after 1917. It was seen as the advance guard of Western Civilisation in Asia and its "civilising mission" was

admired as much as the consequences were feared in England. In the decades prior to the decision to go to War, the Russian economy was in very good shape and the fastest growing in the world. New railways were being laid at a tremendous rate. Between 1900 and the War, iron and coal production more than doubled and Russian grain fed much of the European continent. It had a vigorous intellectual life which produced Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. There was a great flowering of cultural life in the last decades of the Romanovs.

But the great gamble of acting as England's cannon fodder to secure Constantinople in the Great War ended in disaster for Russia.

By early 1917 it was clear to Britain that the Tsarist State had begun to exhaust itself as an instrument of War on Germany. The Tsar propelled the Russian nation to War from the time he made an alliance with Britain in 1907. The Russian Army lost confidence in the Tsar's direction of the War and turned to the Duma to construct a new social order from which the War could be continued. Prince Lvov became Prime Minister, but soon handed over the reins of power to Kerensky.

The February Revolution was welcomed in Britain as a means by which Russia might continue the Great War. And there was indeed a brief surge in the Russian War effort as a result of the Revolution.

But it proved to be a dead cat bounce when Kerensky failed to exert authority over the state. He failed to make the bourgeois democratic revolution. This let in the Bolsheviks, who had the will to power to construct a new social order and govern the Russian State.

The Provisional Government owed its existence to the Russian military elite, which was committed to the War, and was being funded by Britain to continue it. The War should have been called off at that point but how could the Provisional Government go against the Army to which it was beholden?

The continuation of the War and the failure of the Provisional Government to stabilise the state resulted in anarchy. Out of the anarchy came the Bolsheviks, a purposeful party which enacted a coup d'état in order to curb the anarchy and save the state.

The important factor in the Caucasus was the half million strong Tsarist army occupying territory deep within the Ottoman state. The Tsarists, Armenians, Social Revolutionaries and Menshevik socialists wanted to preserve this army and wage the War to the bitter end. The Bolsheviks succeeded in disorganising this army through the formation of illegal party cells. Only after October and the Bolshevik takeover did the Caucasian front begin to crumble.

After Kerensky had failed to rejuvenate the Russian War effort the Allied governments hoped that the Bolsheviks could be "persuaded" to remain in the War, either through pressure or as a result of getting poor terms from Germany in the peace negotiations. The British feared that the Germans could nullify the Royal Navy Blockade and turn the War in their favour by exploiting the resources of the Ukraine and Caucasus.

If the Bolsheviks had been prepared to continue the War there is little doubt that Britain would have supported a Soviet Government with everything and more that it had provided to

the Tsar. Bruce Lockhart's mission was a serious British attempt to come to terms with the Bolsheviks to achieve this objective.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed by the Bolsheviks was seen as a Russian betrayal of the War against Germany. Britain asserted that Russia had no right to secede from the War, no matter what popular support such a decision was based on. If Russia was not going to continue to wage War Britain was going to invade and occupy its territory with military forces and continue to wage that War for it.

The British maintained relations with the Bolshevik regime, while beginning to support forces opposing the Bolsheviks in the hope that a new Russian ally would emerge from the Revolution to resume the War on Germany.

A couple of months after the Bolshevik coup Britain began to intervene in Southern Russia. This intervention was to last until the summer of 1920 when Lloyd George finally decided to give up the ghost and abandon the forces Britain was supporting to their fate. By that time Germany and the Ottoman Turks had been defeated for over a year and a half.

In December 1917, the British War Cabinet voted to support the anti-Bolshevik Don Cossack General, A.M. Kaledin and others in Southern Russia. Robert Cecil, Undersecretary to Balfour at the Foreign Office sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on 3 December stating that "no regard should be had to expense and you should furnish to Cossacks and Ukrainians any funds necessary by any means you think desirable". Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, issued a similar order to his attaches in the region. The War Cabinet stated on December 14 that "Any sum of money required for the purposes of maintaining alive in South East Russia the resistance to the Central Power... should be furnished... so long as the recipients continue the struggle" (Richard H. Ullman, *Intervention and the War, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921*, Vol. I, p.46, p.52)

These arrangements were kept secret from the Bolshevik government, with which the British Government was still dealing, and the Russians were assured that England was "not interested in internal Russian affairs" or "counter-revolution" (ibid, p.53).

The British adopted a policy of encouraging separatist movements and the establishment of an alternative "Russia" independent of Petrograd, consisting of the Cossack regions, the Ukraine and Caucasus – which contained much of the oil, coal and corn needed by the state to function. Extraordinarily, Britain's diplomatic service in Russia was employed to attempt to subvert the government which provided it with protection.

It is important, therefore, to understand that the British intervention in Russia in 1918 was neither an anti-Bolshevik operation or another round in the Great Game against Russia. It was primarily designed to force Russia to continue the Great War it had enlisted in to fight, no matter what its political character.

It took the massacre of the Romanovs in July 1918 to make the point that the Bolsheviks meant business and there was no going back for anyone.

The July 1918 British landings at Archangel and other Allied interventions in Siberia proved too small to either encourage the Russian masses to stay in the War or overthrow the Bolsheviks and replace them with a government that was willing to continue Britain's Great War. Britain and France were under pressure from the German armies that Lenin – in order to gain a breathing space for Socialism to bed down – helped the Germans release from the East. They could not spare the 2 or more Divisions it was felt were necessary to abort the Bolshevik development at birth.

## **The Caucasus Vacuum**

The situation in the Caucasus in 1918 was different to that in the rest of the Russian Empire.

Lenin had issued a Decree on Land that resulted in the melting away of the Tsarist armies on Germany's Eastern front. In the Caucasus, however, Lenin was prepared to continue the Russian War to ensure the continued possession of the Baku oilfields, which would be essential for Soviet industrialisation, and the success of the Communist project. Industrialisation – a process usually performed by capitalism – was taken as being vital to the survival of the Communist State in a world of Capitalist industrialisation which was then becoming global. The Bolsheviks required a reconstituting of the front in the Caucasus to protect Baku, a Bolshevik hold-out in an area of separatists, Mensheviks and Whites, from the Ottomans.

There was, as a consequence, a temporary confluence of interest between British Imperialism and Bolshevik Russia in early 1918.

Britain's policy with regard to the Caucasus, after the Russian Revolution, was also aimed at reconstructing a Caucasian front against the Ottomans and Germans, in order to stop a drive to the East by the enemy, through the vacuum left by the initial melting away of Tsarist forces during late 1917.

Long before the Great War the German "Drang nach Osten" had been the nightmare of British observers of the East. The Great War had been fought partially to stop the German Berlin-Baghdad Railway reaching a port in the Persian Gulf and now the Great War itself had opened up the possibility of eastward expansion by leading to the collapse of one of the Allies that England had lured into fighting it!

The Pan-Turanian nightmare of Britain also became seen as a possibility in London because of the melt-down of Britain's Tsarist ally, with the chance that the Turks would link up with the Azerbaijanis and the Moslem world beyond, in Transcaspia. Transcaspia along with Persia, to the South of the Caucasus, was part of Lord Curzon's "Glacis of India". Britain was also always fearful of a general Moslem rising in its great "Mussulman Empire" sparked off by any successful development of independent Moslem states.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty seemed to preclude an Ottoman advance into the Caucasus but an Ottoman surge was facilitated when the mainly-Menshevik government of the Transcaucasian Commissariat refused to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Bolsheviks had concluded with the Germans. The Ottomans were thereby released from the German/Ottoman acceptance of territorial agreements in the Treaty and enabled to advance

eastwards toward the Caspian (Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp.86-117).

Britain supported the Menshevik-dominated Transcaucasian Commissariat – composed of an uneasy alliance of Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis – which had seized the arms of the Bolshevik garrison at Tiflis. The Transcaucasian Commissariat became the de facto authority in most of the Southern Caucasus, refusing to recognise the Bolshevik government of Russia in Petrograd. Britain also encouraged everyone and anyone to man the front in the Caucasus to prevent such a development. This included both the Bolsheviks and the Armenian Dashnaks as well as an assortment of socialists and anti-Bolshevik Russians.

The Bolsheviks, after collapsing the Tsarist lines in late 1917, now sought to reconstitute the Russian line to defend the Baku Soviet and the oil that was needed for the Russian State. Over 80 per cent of Russia's oil came from the Baku oil fields and since the survival of the Bolshevik state depended on industrialisation it was indispensable to Lenin (Huseyn Tosun, *Developments in Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Revolution*, IRS Spring 2018, p.102).

In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty Lenin had conceded to Germany and taken Russia out of the ranks of the Entente. But in the Caucasus the anti-nationalist Bolsheviks collaborated with the ultra-nationalist Armenian Dashnaks in order to hold onto Baku, resulting in a massacre of 12,000 Moslems in the city in a few days in March 1918. This was despite the fact that the Bolsheviks had agreed, in the 1st Article of Brest-Litovsk Supplementary agreement with the Ottomans to demobilise and disband Armenian forces (Rahman Mustafayev, *From Imperial Province to Parliamentary Republic*, IRS No. 1, 2010, p.7)

In the Caucasus Britain put aside its ideological hatred of Bolshevism for the same end. British agents financed, armed and trained an Armenian army with Russian weapons and they worked with Trotsky to form a common front against the Ottoman advance into the Caucasus. Armenian bands with Tsarist weapons, financed by Britain, roamed the countryside destroying Moslem settlements and massacring their inhabitants in pursuit of expanding the territory of a future Armenian state. Britain turned a blind eye to these activities, suppressing news of such events in the outside world, in the interests of the "Great War for Civilisation".

At the same time, however, the British worked to overthrow the Bolshevik leadership in the Baku Soviet and replace it with more reliable allies. If the Bolsheviks had consented to the British Imperialist intervention at Baku the British Government, no doubt, would have worked with them against the Ottoman forces in defending the city. However, Stefan Shaumyan, the Bolshevik leader of the Baku Commune, after contacting Lenin and Stalin, decided that letting General Dunsterville's expeditionary force defend Baku was too dangerous to agree to, since it opened the possibility of an alliance between the British and Armenian Dashnaks in Baku, fatal to the Bolshevik presence.

An alliance of non-Bolsheviks, including Mensheviks, Left SRs and Dashnaks managed to oust the Bolshevik leadership of the Baku Soviet after secret contact was established by the Armenians with Dunsterville's forces en route to the city. Shaumyan and the Bolshevik Commissars left on ships and were all murdered on the shores of the Caspian by anti-Bolsheviks with embedded British agents.

Both in Baku and in Archangel, in North Russia, the British military interventions were preceded by coup d'états, encouraged and supported by the British, who were then invited to intervene by these new friendly regimes. The Bolsheviks learnt well from the British Imperialists.

The British policy culminated in the lost battle of Baku, where a conglomeration of non-Bolshevik Soviet Communists, Socialists, White Russians, Armenian Dashnaks and British Imperialists stood unsuccessfully against an Ottoman and Azerbaijani army, who took the city in September 1918 and established the Azerbaijani capital there. Dunsterville's forces deserted the city just before its fall, blaming the Armenians for their poor fighting ability in failing to hold a defensive position against only a slightly larger attacking force.

At no time did General Dunsterville fight Bolshevik forces, unlike Major-General Malleon who, to the east of the Caspian, with his British Indian army in alliance with local forces made war on the Bolsheviks.

However, in only two months, the Ottoman presence in the Caucasus was ended by Britain's victory in the Great War. For the first time, the British were masters of Transcaucasia. □

(The notes below continue from p.8)

habits and ways of thinking, nay, without somewhat modifying in the course of a few generations their physical type." Seeley: *Expansion of England*, p.15.  
9: Buckle: *History of Civilization in England*, goes far in this direction. For a criticism of his views see Xénopol: *La Théorie de l'Histoire*, pp. 196 seqq.

10: Hence, possibly, the now irreducible differences between white and black and yellow races.

11: Bagehot: *Physics and Politics*. And he concludes – "Climate is clearly not the force which makes nations, for it does not always make them, and they are often made without it." p.86.

12: Fouillée: *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1904.

13: "Le caractère différent de la civilisation allemande, française, anglaise, italienne, espagnole, s'explique, dans sa partie irréductible, seulement par l'élément de la race." Xénopol: *La Théorie de l'Histoire* (Paris), 1908, p. 171. Precisely the same conclusion had been reached by M. Souffret in his study, *De la disparité physique et mentale des races humaines*, 1882, p.306.

14: Cf. the works of Topinard, Lapouge, de Quatrefages, Gumplowicz, Boesche, Van den Gheyn, Klapproth, Reinach, etc., etc.

15: *Race Prejudice*, translated by Florence Wade Evans (Constable), 1906.

16: *The Saxon and the Celt*.

17: Finot, op. cit., p. 316. Note that for him the milieu includes "climacteric conditions, composition of soil, social, political, and intellectual life, and the material comforts."

18: "La consideration ethnique n'a été pour rien dans la constitution des nations modernes." E. Renan: *Qu'est ce qu'une nation?*

19: *Ibid.*, p. 318. Robertson thus expresses his conclusions: "We ought to look for the differences of national culture and well-being in institutions, political and other, and for the cause of these in preliminary conditions of environment, natural and political - in anything, in short, rather than in primordial and perpetual qualities of race." Op. cit., p. xiii: "The question of race is insoluble. . . . We can never reach any real knowledge of race characters or types, or original racial speech.

20: It is legitimate, then, to speak of the English race and the French race, but only if by these expressions we mean two well defined national types having each its own qualities and defects, its peculiar temperament. Cf. Legrand, *L'Idée de Patrie*, p.47.

21: "Il faut nous émanciper de la servitude ou de la fatalité du sang. Ce n'est pas la race qui dans l'histoire a créé la patrie mais bien plutôt la race française est la créature de l'histoire de France." Brunetière: *Discours de Combat*. "Nationality exists and has nothing in the world to do with race." G. K. Chesterton: *Heretics*.

22: *Physics and Politics*, p. 70.

23: *Keltic Research*, by William Byron Nicholson, Bodley Librarian in the University of Oxford. (Frowde), 1904.

24: *Essays: Nationality*.

25: Chesterton, *Heretics*. Cf. Mr. Dooley in *Peace and War*; *On the Anglo-Saxon*.

26: *Historical Essays*, 3rd Series.

27: L. Roure, S.J., *Doctrines et Problèmes*.

28: L. Legrand, *L'Idée de Patrie*.

29: *English, Past and Present*. Theodore Meyer, S.J., in an important work, *Institutiones Juris Naturalis*, says that the thing upon which above all others

# Coming to terms with Lenin's Socialism in one country: more from the London "Times" on the Russian Revolution.

**Manus O'Riordan**

The December issue of this magazine carried the interview conducted by the London *Times* with Trotsky in December 1917. "Britain at War" is indeed the appropriate online heading employed by *The Times* (UK) for its continuing "On this day" series, since the official ending of Britain's War on Germany on November 11, 1918, was followed not only by its War on Ireland, but also by the continuation of its War of Intervention against the Russian Revolution, one eagerly championed by *The Times* itself. But, as the following editorials show, its initial triumphalism would later be tempered by a grudging realisation that Lenin's Socialism in One Country would be consolidated.

## **(1) Allied policy in Russia - Editorial, *The Times*, 19 December 1918:**

The demand has been raised that now Germany has ceased to fight we should immediately withdraw our troops from Russia and leave Russians to settle their own affairs. For some reason that we have never been able to understand, the critics of our Russian expedition have spoken and written as though its inception were due to an extra dose of original sin in British foreign policy. In fact, as Lord Milner points out in a letter today, British troops are only a small part of the total Allied troops in Russia, we and our Allies went there, not in order to interfere in Russian internal politics, but because the Bolsheviks, whatever their intentions, were in fact helping the enemy. Their action condemned thousands of British soldiers to death and captivity on March 21 and the following dark days. They betrayed both Rumania and Armenia. They attacked the Czecho Slovaks, whom we were in honour bound to protect. Our intervention has justified itself by results. Let all this be granted, the critics say, but why should we now stay? The answer is that we cannot betray our friends in Russia. "How can we," writes Lord Milner, "simply because our immediate purposes have been served, leave them to the tender mercies of their and our enemies before they have had time to arm, train, and organise to be strong enough to defend themselves? It would be an abominable betrayal, contrary to every British instinct of honour and humanity."

In other words, we are in Russia in discharge of our moral obligations, and while we shall not outstay their discharge, we cannot repudiate them as the Bolsheviks repudiated their moral obligations towards us. Besides, have not we and the United States both engaged to do what is possible to rehabilitate Russia? What is the use of our pretending to settle the peace of the world if we leave in Russia this great running sore? We do not presume to say what sort of government the Russians shall have. But we must have some guarantees that it shall be a free government and not dependent on Germany, that our loyal friends in Russia shall not be punished for their friendship, and that there shall be reasonable liberty in the country and not a tyranny that shall be a focus of political disease, as the Ottoman Empire was.

## **(2) Lenin-Trotsky quarrel - Editorial, *The Times*, 25 January 1919:**

There is no doubt as to the existence of an internal crisis in the affairs of the Bolsheviks. The report that Lenin was recently arrested by his Bolshevik opponents and released after a few hours' detention appears now to be true. At any rate, if it did not happen it might easily have done so, for the division in the Bolshevik camp is becoming both more definite and more bitter. One party is headed by Lenin, the other by Trotsky, Peters, Radek, and Zinovieff. Both parties realize that the failure of Bolshevism in Germany must produce a desperate situation for Bolshevism in Russia, but they advocate different means of

meeting the emergency. The Trotsky and Peters party believe in heroic measures. They would take every possible step to irritate foreign opinion and force foreign military intervention, both in Russia and in Germany. This would force the Entente Governments to adopt the extremely unpopular policy of postponing demobilization; and it would place a large number of more or less discontented troops at the mercy of Bolshevik propaganda. Lenin, on the other hand, apparently realizes that the Entente Governments are not likely to allow themselves to be led into this trap: that, if they mean to fight Bolshevism, they will probably fight it, not by means of intervention, but by the equally effective and, for them, much less embarrassing, method of an economic boycott and that a policy of compromise, first with the non-Bolshevist parties in Russia, and then with the rest of the world, offers his Government its only real chance of survival. Like his opponents, he desires to precipitate world revolution but he is inclined to be sceptical as to its likelihood, and believes, at any rate, that the only way to bring it about is to maintain at all costs the Russian Revolution. In his view, the mere existence of a proletarian Government in Russia will offer the rest of Europe an example more powerful than any propaganda. Moreover, if example fails to produce the desired effect, something, at least, will have been achieved if the Revolution in Russia can be consolidated. He is willing to bargain, and pay, if necessary, a high price for the toleration which is all he demands of the Governments of the rest of the world.

## **(3) Strength of the Bolsheviks - Editorial, *The Times*, 28 January 1919:**

The Bolshevik forces in North Russia must be stronger than we were led to suppose, for towards the end of last week they were able to compel the retirement of some advanced units of the Allied troops based on Archangel. The Allies hold a semi-circular front, with their flanks resting on the coast. Their farthest point inland was just beyond the small town of Shenkursk, west of the Dwina and about 180 miles south of the coast base. Shenkursk and the country around it were chiefly held by American and Russian forces, who have lately been hard pressed by Bolsheviks in superior numbers.

Last week the Bolsheviks, after a three days' bombardment, delivered a strong attack, which forced the Allies to fall back on Shenkursk, and afterwards to evacuate the town. New positions have been occupied a little farther north, and there is not the smallest reason for anxiety. The most notable point about the episode is that it is an indication of the growing military strength of the Bolsheviks in certain areas, but it may be assumed that the numbers employed on both sides were comparatively small. Elsewhere the Bolsheviks have undoubtedly made a certain amount of progress. Troops brought by them from Turkestan have captured Orenburg, on the eastern frontier of European Russia, and well to the north of the Caspian. This unexpected exploit greatly diminishes for the present the hope of effecting a junction between Admiral Koltchak's Siberian Army and the strong forces under General Dentkin operating between the Northern Caucasus and the Sea of Azov. The Siberian Army, now almost exclusively Russian, is aligned along the lower western slopes of the Urals; but in addition to its isolation, it is also suffering from lack of equipment and arms. It is clear that the Bolsheviks are steadily penetrating into the Ukraine.

The various Bolshevik movements suggest that they are not in the least inclined to suspend hostilities, as the Paris Conference demands; but this assumption must be considered in relation to the reported growing cleavage between Trotsky, who wants to go on fighting, and the far abler Lenin, who perceives that the only hope for the Soviet Republic is to drop truculence and to assume for now a more conciliatory attitude.



# A debate on nations and nationality from “Studies: an Irish Quarterly Review.”

## Vol. 1, No. 3 (Sept., 1912)

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### WHAT IS A NATION?

“Privileges [the provisions of the Government of Ireland Bill] which, I think, if Ireland be a nation are not nearly enough, and which if Ireland be not a nation, are far greater than you ought ever to have given.” Mr. BALFOUR, in the House of Commons, 15th April, 1912.

“Irish Nationality, as they [the Irish Party] would have it, can never be anything but shameful to themselves and dangerous to the Empire. Let them feel the real pride of true citizenship in the great nation to which we and they belong.” Lord HUGH CECIL, in the House of Commons, April 15th, 1912.

“The open secret of Ireland is that Ireland is a nation.” Prof. T. M. KETTLE, in “The Open Secret of Ireland.” p. 170. (Ham-Smith), 1912.

“I have always maintained that in every relevant sense of the term Ireland is a nation.” Mr. ASQUITH, in the Theatre Royal, Dublin, July 19th, 1912.

The word nation is one very glibly used in common speech and in the journalistic literature of the day. Its users, moreover, are untroubled by, any consciousness that the idea which this word claims to express presents special difficulties of definition. Yet it seems to be somewhat of a puzzle to the dictionary makers, and to be a still greater puzzle to serious writers on political economy and kindred topics. We see this, at one time by the strange variety of definitions which they give, at another by their despair of being able to give any adequate definition at all. Thus Mr. Asquith, in the speech above quoted from, confessed that to avoid difficulties he thought it well to refrain from a definition. The writer of the article “Nation” in Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy thinks that “there is no generally received definition of a nation.” And not to mention the numberless and various meanings given by the average dictionary, we find among recent writers definitions that differ radically – from Anatole France’s “community of memories and hopes,” to the definition put forward by Eugène Richard, [1] “a body of men organised socially, in order to realise the best expression of the moral law.”

Must we then give up trying to define a nation, and say that it is a word without any reality at the back of it, or merely such reality as the speaker of the moment chooses to put there? What then, it might be said, becomes of your “national” aspiration “Ireland a Nation”? You do not so much as know the meaning of your words. And, of course, this has been said. But, after all, may we never apply a term to an object before knowing the definition of the term? If it were so, we should find ourselves perpetually in the somewhat embarrassing position of a man who should be debarred from speaking of a given quadruped as a dog until he was able to describe the precise physiological peculiarities that distinguish the canine species from all others. No, we call France a nation, [2] and we are right, even if we are not very clear as to what a ‘nation is. Nationality,[3] it has been often said, means for the body politic what personality means for a man. And the two notions are equally elusive. “They have,” says Prof. Kettle, “this in common that, although by, through,

and for them the entire pageant of our experience is unfolded, we are unable to capture either of them in a precise formula. That I am a person I know; but what is a person? That Ireland is a nation I know: but what is a nation?” [4]

It is not of vital necessity to have an answer to this question. We think, however, that it is of interest and importance. And though we cannot hope to reach a definition which shall be final and decisive, yet we may hope to show that the idea may be expressed in terms which shall apply to all those groups of human beings which men have agreed to call nations, and to those only.

We must preface our inquiry by the following very useful observation of Bagehot, “Nations as we see them are the produce of two great forces, one the race-making force which acted in antiquity and has now wholly, or almost, given over acting, and the other the nation-making force, properly so called, which is acting now as much as it ever acted.” [5] We deal here with the second only. The main influences which contribute to form a nationality are more or less as follows:- (1) The physical environment, (2) race, (3) language, (4) custom, (5) religion, (6) common interests, (7) history and the men who have made it, (8) a national government.[6]

Let us deal briefly with each.

And first as to the *physical environment* or milieu. Its influence on the development of a people is manifold. The climate of a country, its configuration, the nature of its soil and of its products, its geographical position - all these combine to affect a people’s physical constitution, determine its occupations, and so react upon its mental characteristics and its outlook upon life. Its skies and landscapes colour one’s imagination,[7] so that Wordsworth could say -

“There lives not form nor image in my soul  
Unborrowed of my country.”

Change a people’s environment and you change the prevailing type. The Englishman in India remains an Englishman, but by long residence he acquires an incrustation of new qualities and characteristics that constitute him a type apart. Reading Macaulay’s description of the returned nabob,[8] one can scarcely realise that this strange being first saw the light in some sleepy village of Somerset or Yorkshire. So, too, the French Canadian is already a type far removed from the Frenchman of Europe, the Spanish American from the Spaniard of the Peninsula. This result is largely due to the influence of the physical environment though other causes, no doubt, have been at work.

But the importance of this influence has been exaggerated, by certain anthropologists, to the point of absurdity.[9] It is possible that, in uncivilised countries, and, in the case of countries now civilized, at that remote epoch when man carried on a hand to hand struggle with the forces of nature, this influence may be reckoned vastly more important. [10] But in the formation of the great nations of to-day it can have played but a subordinate part. The English immigrant lives in the same climate as the Australian or the Tasmanian, but he has not become like these races, nor is it likely that a thousand years will make him so. Distinct races have for centuries lived side by side in the same

environment - witness the Albanian and the Greek in Turkey - yet have not drawn appreciably nearer to a common type. "We find like men in contrasted places and unlike men in resembling places." [11] It is with reason that M. Fouillée concludes - "It is absurd to attribute to environment a preponderating share in the formation of national character. Environment modifies the animal, man shapes his own environment." [12]

In recent times, chiefly during the past forty years, anthropologists and sociologists have produced a truly vast body of literature dealing with the connection between national character and race. Having grouped the races out of which modern society has been evolved into various classes and labelled them Celt, Teuton, Slav, Latin and the rest, they have proceeded to frame for each of these original "races" an ideal and typical physiognomy and mentality. Then they have gone on to trace through history the influence of their several physiognomies and mentalities - so constituted on the destinies of the various racial types. [13] They have seen in the history of "Celtic" races the 'inevitable working out of the racial characteristics of the "Celt," and so of the "Teutons," and the rest. Not content with this, many of these writers have carried their investigations into the future, and have foretold the destinies of the nations in the ages that are yet to be. [14]

Many of these conclusions, by dint of repetition, have become axiomatic, and have even passed into common speech. We have almost accepted the decadence of the "Latin" races and the cureless political incapacity of the "Celt": we have bowed to the "superior" races. It is because upon the track of the theorists and of the men of science have come the Journalist and the politician, and these have turned the theories to good account. But the whole structure is little better than a vast cloud-castle - a veritable Nephelococcygia - built by the scientific imagination upon thin air. Such an assertion must inevitably seem too sweeping. But I think that the impartial reader who will study the criticisms of these theories contained in the works of Jean Finot [15] and J. M. Robertson [16] will cease to think it exaggerated. Considerations of space make it impossible to do more than set down in the briefest way their conclusions. The chief of these are as follows: - (1) The words Celt, Teuton, Latin have, at the present day, in the study of national characters, no significance whatever, and whether they had or had not any ethnical significance in the past is now practically unascertainable. (2) "It is impossible to attribute immutable psychological qualities to certain peoples, or races. Their virtues or their vices are only the effect of historic circumstances and of the influence of the milieu." [17]. (3) "Modern nations have been formed [18] outside, and very often in spite of the conceptions of races." [19] In other words, it is the historic nation working in given conditions in a given environment that has produced the types that we see to-day, [20] and has wrought them into the social amalgam that we call a modern nation. [21] The briefest consideration of the formation of nations will convince us that, as a fact, not one of the great modern peoples is of even approximately unmixed blood. Let us take France and England. "France," says Bagehot, "is justly said to be the mean term between the Latin and the German races. A Norman, as you see by looking at him, is of the north; a Provençal is of the south, of all that is most southern. You have in France, Latin, Celtic, German, compounded in an infinite number of proportions: one as she is in feeling, she is various not only in the past history of her various provinces, but in their present temperaments." [22] Yet, this is only part of the case, for M. Finot enumerates countless other elements that have gone to make up the present French nationality.

As for England, not to mention the diversity of tribes found within her borders by Caesar, she has been wholly or partially

occupied in historic times by Britons, Romans, Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes, and Normans, with a plentiful sprinkling of French, Irish, and Scotch. All these elements the vigour of her national life has welded into the homogeneous nation that we see to-day. But her claim to be by race predominantly Anglo-Saxon can scarcely be said to be established historically. A recent writer tells us that there is as much Celtic blood in Yorkshire or Sussex as in North Munster or Leinster. [23] . Nowadays we accept a man that is a true patriot without troubling about the origin of his blood, nor even about the place of his birth. Mr. Birrell has expressed it all after his own fashion. "What is a nation? It is not blood, it is not birth, it is not breeding. A man may have been born at Surat and educated at Lausanne; one of his four great grandfathers may have been a Dutchman, one of his four great grandmothers a French refugee, and yet he may himself remain, from his cradle in Surat to his grave at Singapore, a true-born Englishman." [24] We need scarcely call to mind "that roaring whirlpool of America into which a cataract of Swedes, Jews, Germans, Irishmen, and Italians is perpetually pouring." [25]

The easiest test of differing nationality as well as the most obvious distinguishing mark of different nations is *language*. "To the grouping of races and nations," says Freeman, [26] "language is the best guide. Nay, for practical purposes, it is the one and only test. We define a nation primarily by language." But language is not merely a superficial mark of distinction between nations. Its influence goes deeper. It has been well called "the intellectual blood of a people." [27] For it is more than a stock of words and phrases. "The dictionary of a people is not merely the vocabulary of its forms of speech; it is also the storehouse of its ideas." [28] That is to say, it embodies, preserves, and transmits the forms of thought peculiar to a nation, the proverbs that crystallize its mentality, the legend lore of a heroic past, the phrases that have made history. *Le style c'est l'homme* has become a commonplace. *La langue c'est la nation* might be said with equal justice. As Archbishop Trench said, in speaking of the English language:-

"A nation gradually shapes and fashions its language to be the utterance of its inmost life and being." [29] It is not surprising therefore, that, other causes not preventing, the men who shape their speech by this common tongue, should tend also to shape their thoughts in common, and to vibrate in unison. M. Brunetière is not exaggerating matters when he says: "To speak the same tongue is necessarily to think, to associate and combine one's ideas in the same way, it is to feel together, to experience the same impressions from the same things." [30] A nation that gives up its language is disinherited, it foregoes the legacy of its past, it forfeits its birthright; nay, to change the metaphor, it goes perilously near to losing its soul. "The last tragedy for broken nations is not the loss of power and distinction, nor even the loss of that independence which is so vital to the common weal. . . . The last tragedy and the saddest, is when the treasured language dies slowly out, when winter falls upon the legendary remembrance of a people." [31]

Yet it would be foolish to think that with the language all is lost even to the possibility of a national resurgence. A distinctive language is, indeed, the best safeguard of a distinctive nationality, but it is not an essential constituent of a distinctive nationality. Nations are not mere linguistic groups. A glance at modern nations shows us, on the one hand, peoples speaking the same language divided up, not merely into different states, but into different nations of the speakers of German, some are Swiss, some Austrian, some Russian, and some, until lately, were among the best citizens of France and, on the other hand, the citizens of a single nation are divided between several languages - the Belgians between Flemish and

French, the French between French and Breton and Basque. Thirdly, there are several unmistakable and vigorous nations which have no language peculiar to themselves. It is so with Switzerland, which borrows its three official languages from three neighbouring nations. It is so, too, with the United States, which is none the less one of the most striking examples of the power of a language to weld into some sort of oneness even such a jumble of races as is to be found, to-day within its borders.

By custom as a nation-building force, we mean that code of law, unwritten and traditional, which rules the habits of a people, and, by long iteration, furrows deep traits in its character. When you cross the border, you find the simplest things of life, and some of the most important, done in ways that to you are unfamiliar. From its usages of dress and food to its marriage customs and its laws of inheritance, scarcely anything is quite like that to which you have been used. And many of these traditions are immemorial. Few people escape their influence, which is akin to that, of fashion. You may despise them, but - one must live. The force, or rather the tyranny, of such customs often quite irrational - is naturally vastly greater in primitive societies, but their influence is felt even in the most civilized.

It is certain that in early times the influence of a national religion was generally very great. Love of country was almost identical with loyalty to the national religion. A man fought, *pro aris et focis*, for "the ashes of his Fathers and the temples of his gods." And many writers have seen in the national religion - even in our own days - not only the chief bond that holds together a nation, but the chief element of its nationality. Thus, according to M. le Bon, himself an *incroyant*, "religion has always constituted the most important element of the life of peoples." [32] Sir John Seeley says much the same - "Religion seems to me the strongest and the most important of the elements, which go to constitute nationality." [33] And Joseph de Maistre would practically identify patriotism with the religion of a country. [34] All this is, no doubt, true of those religions which are made by a people after its own image, and so are products of its peculiar mentality. We are witnesses to-day of the power of Mohammedanism to bind its votaries into a kind of national exclusiveness. But we cannot think that the Christian religion is of itself an influence that makes or deepens racial differences. So long as the unity of Christendom lasted, we believe that the idea of a common Christianity was stronger than that of loyalty to separate nationalities. The enemies of Christianity were, so to speak, the national enemies of all. But when this unity was broken by the Reformation, churches, national in a new sense, sprang up, and the characters of the nations have since been strongly coloured by the complexion - often the outcome of seeming chance of their national churches. Spain, no doubt, owes many of its national traits to its Catholicism, the Scandinavian nations to their Lutheranism, while Newman has pointed out how profoundly its peculiar type of Protestantism has affected the character of the English people.

We recognise, therefore, the part that a national religion plays in the formation of national character. But the experience of modern nations has shown the absurdity of the notion that there can be no national unity without religious unity, or, at least, a dominant religion, that difference of religion prevents devotion to a common country. Not to call to mind instances so obvious as England and the United States, we see in Switzerland the man of Lucerne as good a Swiss as the man of Zurich, in Germany the Catholic Bavarian as loyal a German as the Protestant Prussian. [35]

*Common interests* are evidently a strong bond of cohesion for a group of men. When a number of people discover that they

have common interests and needs, a natural impulse is to form an association or a society or a company or a club. Yet, they may have no other bond of union. But when men live together in one country, speak one tongue, share in a common temperament, a variety of common interests, not material only - for a nation, as Renan says, is not a Zollverein - but moral and intellectual also, is certain to spring up. The recognition of these common interests is a new bond of union, and when a people comes to realise that these interests of the nation may, at certain moments, be above the interests of the individual, when to sacrifice on occasion the individual to the general good becomes in their eyes a worthy and a noble thing, then is a people in a fair way to deem itself a nation. This is, perhaps, what Mr. T. M. Healy meant when, in the House of Commons, he defined a nation as "something for which a man will die."

*History.* "C'est par les racines qu'il plonge dans le passé qu'un état puise la sève qui l'aide à se prolonger dans le présent et dans l'avenir." [36] A nation looks back upon its past as a lesson for its national life in the present, and as a justification of its continued national life in the future. Common memories are the nourishment of patriotism, the foundation of national consciousness. These things are almost commonplaces, but they need reiteration. "The Fatherland," said a distinguished French preacher, [37] "is the patrimony of memories that unite us to our fathers and unite us in our fathers" - unite us by the consciousness of a common gratitude, and also of a common origin. And another great French preacher has put the same thought into an eloquent page, which I shall not venture to translate:-

"La Patrie c'est encore et principalement cette chaîne radieuse de nos longues et illustres traditions; sillon éclatait de toutes nos gloires nationales, traversant les siècles qu'a vécu la nation et illuminant des plus purs rayons toutes les hautes cimes de notre histoire. C'est qu'en effet la Patrie, ce n'est pas seulement tout ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui, c'est encore et par dessus tout ce qu'elle était hier et avant-hier; car la Patrie n'est pas comme un homme; sa vie n'est pas d'un jour; elle vit de longs jours et ces jours ce sont des siècles." [38]

This solidarity in time, as it has been called, [39] is no mere sentiment, or, if a sentiment, it is one that is strong enough to hold together in unity of nationhood men that have little else in common. Thus the Swiss have no unity of language, nor of race, nor of religion; their government is most decentralised, their country is divided into well-marked regions, that differ in almost every respect, and are well-nigh cut off from mutual intercourse. But the nation has common memories. It has not forgotten Morgarten and Sempach, where it overthrew the Austrians, nor Grandson and Morat, where it ruined Charles the Bold. [40] Nor must it forget the still more crucial struggles, both internal and external, in the midst of which it weathered, the nineteenth century. So, too, the three Imperial Eagles that divided the *disjecta membra* of the fallen Polish State could neither destroy the people nor tear up the pages of her history. [41] They cannot debar her during the long night of her captivity from dreaming of the days when she vindicated her right to live against Russian and German and Swede, and became the bulwark of Christendom against the Turk. With these, no doubt, are mingled many bitter memories, memories to be wept for, but also to be used as lessons that must not be forgotten in the day of her deliverance. M. Brunetière [42] sums up in a sentence most of what we have said: "There is no Fatherland without a long history, which is at one and the same time its stay, its justification, the source of its life, and of 'its perpetual rejuvenation.'"

And as nations are held together by common memories, so they are united by the common hopes and aspirations that

spring from those memories. If Poland remembers her past, it is because she hopes for a future that shall be worthy of it.

Of the influence, apart from their actual achievements, of the heroes, legendary and real, of a people, upon its history, its character, and its life, suffice it to say that it has been recognized as one of the great formative forces of history. Considerations of space forbid us to say more.[43]

The influence of a *national government* in giving unity and cohesion are obvious enough. It is a central, tangible something to which the most scattered outposts of the nation look as the guardian and champion of the national interests and of the national life itself, and further, if it be a democracy, as the expression, as far as a unanimous expression is possible, of the national will. It is thus, from one point of view, a kind of national brain, from another the heart of a nation, from which life, healthful or the contrary, radiates to its extremities.

We here come up against a question, the answer to which is of great importance to our 'inquiry. Is the possession of a national government an essential constituent of a nation, can there be a nation without national government? It is certain that without a government of its own, a nation if such it can be called is truncated, that its means of corporate action are minimised, that its chances of living on as a distinct unit of mankind are much endangered. But does it, by thus partially losing control of its own destinies, cease to merit the name of nation. Is statehood, necessary to nationhood? [44]

If the answer be yes, what name, then, shall we reserve to designate a great body of men, living within the same borders, one in memory, in hope, in characteristics, who, though deprived of statehood, continue to think and even act together, to be fired by the same enthusiasms and the same hatreds, and who never cease to aspire after a separate national life of their own It is not a province for a province does not do these things.[45] It is not a simple geographical expression. It has been suggested that such a people be called a nationality.[46] But this is properly an abstract term, and has already specific meanings of its own. It means either the belonging to a certain nation, as when we inquire as to an immigrant's nationality, or the complexes of the qualities which make a given nation what it is.[47] On the other hand, if we refuse to give the name of nation to a body of people having, the above characteristics, we identify nationhood with statehood, not only in the concrete reality where they are commonly identical, being but two aspects of one thing, but in the abstract also. Yet this, we believe, is generally admitted to be incorrect. A State has been well described as – "The juridical being, the collective organism which the nation, a *pre-existing* moral person, constitutes for the purpose of assuring its independence and satisfying its needs." It is in times of national calamity, or of civil strife that men see most plainly that the nation is more than its government. A people may smash a dozen governments in a few decades and yet remain identical with itself. Two governments may be set up within the same state by rival claimants to rule, and the nation still live. Nay, without loss of nationhood, government can for a time cease altogether, and give place to anarchy. Poland is a nation, but not a state. Austria is one state, but it contains at least two nations.

To look back, therefore, upon the road we have traversed, what are our conclusions? We have not indeed *proved* anything definitely. We have merely endeavoured to argue, as plausibly as might be, that no one of the elements we have examined, taken severally, is essential to the existence of a nation, with the sole exception of a certain historical basis. We conclude that none of these must necessarily enter into its definition. It is time that

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we should set forth our own conception of what constitutes a nation. A nation, then, for the present writer, is a large [48] body of men, living together in a common territory [49] in organized social relations, and held together in a peculiar kind of spiritual oneness. [50] There is nothing mystic in this oneness, no more than in that which binds the members of the same family. It is compounded of two elements: Firstly, common memories of historic things wrought in common and suffered in common in the past, and secondly the actual consent to carry on that common life, as a distinct people, master of its own destinies, shaper of its own future. [51] This spiritual oneness has been called by various names the "national consciousness," a "sense of nationality," *l'idée de Patrie*, and so on. There can be no precise and final formula. Let us for a moment yield place to a writer who has said all this far better than we can say it:-

"What is it that makes us English folk truly one people? Not the bare fact that for a thousand years and more we have lived together between the Cheviots and the Channel, but because, between the Cheviots and the Channel, we have found a common work, and wrought out a common life, because the wasteful discipline of war, fruitful co-operation in peace, long fellowship in suffering and endeavour, and comradeship in many a fight for freedom, have overcome the differences which first armed Northumbria against Mercia, Wessex against West Wales, Saxon against Dane, and both against Norman. . . . It is because of these past victories of developing brotherliness over the particularism of class and province, that we who live to-day upon English ground are all fellow-citizens in one free common-wealth, partners in a common industry, inheritors of a common tradition, sharers in a common hope. We are a nation because, in some sufficing measure we have *grown together into unity of life* . . . because the mutual helpfulness of man to man has made this English land of ours truly our home, and because, within that home, we, as members of one family, have become knit together by common interests and by common work, by common purposes and by common hopes, by common sanctities and by common ideals." [52]

Some of us might read this fine page with a certain glow were we to substitute - and may we not do it? - another name for that of the country about which it speaks.

We must end, and it will be with another eloquent page, culled this time, strange to say, from the writings of one [53] who, in so many respects, we cannot but believe, strayed far from the ways of truth and goodness, yet who could write as few others of his time:- "To have had common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to be ready to do more, these are the essential conditions for being a nation. A man loves in proportion to the sacrifices he has gladly made, to the evils he has suffered. A man loves the home that he has built up and which he is handing on to others. The Spartan song: 'We are what you were; we shall be what you are,' is in its simplicity the hymn of every fatherland. In the past a heritage of glory and of regrets to share, in the future the same programme to work out; to have suffered, joyed, hoped together . . . we understand that in spite of differences of race or tongue . . . Man is slave neither of his race, nor of his language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers, nor of the trend of mountain-chains. A great assemblage of men, hale of mind and warm of heart, create a *moral consciousness that is called a nation*. And, so long as this moral consciousness proves its strength by the sacrifices which it claims, it is legitimate, it has the right to be." [54]

The application of these general principles to the specific case of Ireland must be reserved for another occasion.

STEPHEN J. BROWN, S.J.

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## THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY

The opening years of the nineteenth century witnessed the last of the many fruitless attempts to bind together certain of the heterogeneous elements of Europe into a united whole. The closing years of the same century has seen the failure of this experiment. Like the component parts of a highly complex chemical compound (which, because of its very complexity, is in a state of unstable equilibrium), the separate nations composing the Empire of the First Napoleon have fallen apart by a natural process, and have once more assumed their normal existence as simple national entities. This process was twofold, and consists not only in the segregation of the dissimilar, but also in the amalgamation of states having a natural affinity. The third decade of the century saw the separation of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, the fifth, the unification of Italy; both phenomena were essentially identical.

Before attempting to define these natural sociological groups known as nations, we must pause to note the distinction between national *existence* and national *consciousness*. First, let it be noted that intensity of consciousness is in no manner correlated to intensity of vitality; a vigorously growing oak tree is undoubtedly more "alive" than a dying philosopher, however "self-conscious" the latter may be; thus Greece, at the pinnacle of her glory, was all but nationally unconscious, and only attained self-realisation when well-nigh in *articulo mortis*. On the other hand, an independent observer can recognise the individuality of a being altogether unconscious of its own existence - as our philosopher would have recognised the existence of the oak. In like manner "Italy" was regarded by the States of Europe as a national entity centuries before the days of Cavour.

The birth of national self-consciousness in most cases partakes essentially of the nature of a sudden *awakening*, an awakening resulting from shock. This shock, however, must be of such magnitude as to present itself in the guise of a national peril in contradistinction to a danger only directly touching some isolated section of the country. This first vaguely stimulated consciousness is generally given intensity and concrete expression through the genius of a single individual, or a small group of individuals, but their work is almost always preceded by the strong stimulus already noted. Regarding the nature of this stimulus, history has proved that foreign aggression is by far the most potent.

A recent writer in this review (S. Brown, S.J., "What is a Nation?" (Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Sept., 1912), has added an interesting contribution to the problem under consideration. He distinguishes eight "*main influences which contribute to form a nationality*," and these he enumerates as follows:- (1) Physical environment, (2) Race, (3) Language, (4) Custom, (5) Religion, (6) Common Interests, (7) History, and the men who have made it, and (8) A National Government. But, having analysed these eight elements with considerable insight and skill, he comes to the conclusion that none of them can be regarded as absolutely essential to our conception of "a nation," with the single exception of the seventh, viz., History.

The present writer finds himself compelled to dissent from both these views. Whilst recognising the last six elements on Father Brown's list as strong stimulants to national consciousness and solidarity, he hopes to prove that they cannot be truly said to "*contribute to form a nationality*"; that they are, in fact, non-essential, either severally or collectively, to national existence, and that this statement applies to history equally with the rest. But he will, on the other hand, seek to show that the first two elements on the list, viz., "physical environment" and

"race," are together essential to, and universally present in, all nations, whether these have attained to self-realisation or no.

To now consider these two elements of nationality in the order in which they are taken by Father Brown, we will first turn our attention to the question of Country, or "physical environment," as he prefers to call it. This subject he treats, if one may say so, in too materialistic a spirit. He discusses influence of climate, geographical position, and such like questions, and arguing that, since these have but comparatively little effect upon emigrants, on the one hand, and that adjacent "nations" have frequently identical physical environments, on the other, he concludes that this element of environment has but little to say to "nationality." With all this the present writer is in perfect agreement, and that is the reason why he prefers to use the word "country" rather than the more precise and definite term employed by Father Brown. The problem is a transcendental one, and must be candidly recognised as such. A "country" is something more than the sum total of its physical characteristics. Browning has expressed this idea as applied to music very perfectly in his famous line:-

*"Not a third sound, but a star."*

A country, even an uninhabited one, possesses an "atmosphere" distinctively its own, and different from the atmosphere of even its closest neighbour.

The second element essential to the constitution of a nation is a predominant *race*. No nation which we know of is now composed of a single race, but in each a *predominant* race actually exists. This predominant race may itself be a compound product, resulting through the fusion of several distinct races - but a *fusion*, be it noted - the race must be a true synthetic product, not merely a mixture.

Given, therefore, a predominant race permanently located in a definite territory, and we have the two essential elements which go to form a nation, and from these elements a nation will sooner or later evolve, provided that they are mutually compatible. But the process of this evolution requires a certain time (though infinitesimal in comparison with that necessary for the evolution of an organic species), and a certain number of generations of the predominant race must be bred in the chosen territory before the nation appears, and, when it does appear, its people will themselves have formed a new race resembling, yet differing from the original parent race. These facts are well exemplified in the case of the British Colonies. To the Continents of North America and Australia there emigrated, at different times, sections of the British race - the "predominant race" of our argument (itself a synthetic race of highly complex character). This race, under the influence of its new habitats, has evolved into two new distinct races differing from each other, and also from the parent stock. These two new races have now become *nations*, in the case of Australia, as yet unconscious (albeit signs of awakening consciousness are not entirely lacking even here). The case of the American nation is particularly valuable in that its origin is more recent than that of any other, and its evolution may be traced in the minutest detail from its very birth. Here, as has been said, the "predominant race" was the metamorphosed original British-Colonial stock, combined with a large percentage of Irish blood; but this was soon supplemented by an influx of members of other European nations, notably pure Irish and Germans. These latter, however, neither formed new races, nor did they remain distinct and individual, but, on the contrary, they became absorbed and assimilated by the original predominant (metamorphosed British-Colonial) race; but, owing to the numerical strength of these new elements, they, in their turn, exercised a certain modifying effect upon the predominant race itself, so that it was in time superseded by, or transmuted into, a yet more complex

synthetic product the American nation as we know it at the present day.

The case of America, although it throws a flood of light upon our problems, is, in certain respects, unique, in that the character of the original "predominant race" had hardly time to become fixed before the influx of foreign elements began, and these in such numbers as to almost equal the former. Ireland, however, provides us with a perfect example of the characteristic power possessed by all true nations of assimilating new elements. In this case, the "predominant race" - the Gaels - had reigned supreme in the island for upwards of 2,500 years before the first foreign element (the Danes) made its appearance; the characteristics of the Gaelic race had, therefore, had ample time to become very definite and firmly established, with the result that this race has been able to completely assimilate such dissimilar elements as Danes, Normans, English, and Dutch, with comparative little modification in its own original individuality.

We now recognise the two essential physical elements which go to compose a nation to be (1) a country and (2) a predominant race inhabiting that country; and we have further seen that the distinguishing characteristic of a true nation is its power of absorbing and assimilating foreign elements into its being. We are now, therefore, in a position to attempt a definition of a nation, which may be formulated thus:-

*A Nation is a race of human beings dwelling within a limited geographical area, and possessing an individual character which distinguishes its members as a whole from those of all other nations, and possessing the power of completely assimilating foreign elements dwelling permanently within its boundaries.*

(Note: By "permanently" is here meant "for several generations." An individual may, of course, dwell the greater part of his life in a foreign country without losing his original nationality.)

Having arrived thus far, we will now examine briefly the other six elements which, according to Father Brown, contribute to form a nationality. A distinctive *language* is undoubtedly the chief medium of national self-expression and self-realisation, but it cannot in any sense be said to be necessary to national *existence*.

When Ireland to all practical purposes lost her language, she lost with it many precious things now only being slowly and partially regained, but she did not lose her *nationality* - true, she lost a strong safeguard to that nationality - and the decay of the native tongue left her largely unprotected against the modifying effects of the numerous foreign influences to which she was subjected. Anglicisation, as the combined results of these anti-national influences are collectively termed, was well-nigh impossible, so long as the medium of English thought was unknown to the bulk of the Irish people, but, as soon as this medium became the common language of the nation, English customs and modes of thought were able to make headway. At the same time, the new language was used as an unfamiliar vehicle by the Irish themselves, and but imperfectly expressed the spirit of the race; thus, for a period, the Irish nation became to a great extent dumb, whilst *pari passu*, the spirit of England became more and more articulate in the land. As time went on, however, the Irish nation succeeded, to a great extent, in bending the strange language to its requirements, as it had absorbed the original speakers into its organization. Although an unsatisfactory medium of national expression compared with the Gaelic tongue born in the same cradle as the race itself the Anglo-Irish language spoken in Ireland at the present time has been so modified as to express, with a considerable degree of facility, the spirit of the nation; the like being true, in a more

limited degree, of the English spoken in America. It must be admitted, therefore, that a change of language in this case has had but little or no *direct* influence in altering or modifying the nation. This will be readily seen if we compare, the present-day Irishman with his English contemporary, on the one hand, and with his own Gaelic-speaking ancestor of, say, three centuries back, on the other, for it must be at once admitted that in essentials he approximates far more closely to the latter type than he does to the former.

As to *Custom*, it must be regarded as the fruit rather than the seed of nationality; it is but another form of expression of nationality vitality. But custom may change, and may even disappear, and "the nation" still retain its individuality. Customs are of value as the outward and visible sign of national existence; as language is the liturgy, so custom is the ritual of nationality, but it is the living spirit of the nation that gives to each its significance.

What has been said of Custom is equally applicable to *Religion*. All history goes to show that this particular element of national life may be changed again and again, and indeed, as in the case of France, almost eliminated, without causing any profound alteration in the character of the nation *per se*. Thus the Irish nation passed from Paganism to Christianity with little or no change in the essentials of its nationality, while the English nation passed through even greater religious vicissitudes with equally little effect. But we need not labour this point further, as our author freely admits the fact.

*Common Interests*, considered from the point of view adopted by our author, certainly tend to accentuate the consciousness of, and thus strengthen a nation, but it must be borne in mind that they may act in precisely the opposite manner. The "common interests" of the proletariat of all European countries are far more intense and vital than those of the proletariat and the aristocracy, plutocracy, or bureaucracy of the same country. This is recognised fully by the Syndicalists, many of whom, not shrinking from the logical conclusions of their own doctrines, preach quite openly and unequivocally the gospel of anti-patriotism.

*History* is an element of nationality to which Father Brown attributes considerable importance; indeed, he goes so far as to say that "no one of the elements we have examined, taken severally, is essential to the existence of a nation, *with the sole exception of a certain historical basis*." One is not quite sure what he means by "existence" in this instance. If he would say that the possession of an historical tradition is a necessary condition of vigorous national life, we are in the main in agreement; but the distinction must be clearly drawn between national growth and life, and national *birth*, for that a nation can come into existence without possessing, so to speak, a pre-natal history, is proved beyond dispute in one case at least - that of America. The first shot fired at Bunker Hill was the first line written on the virgin page of American history, and it was likewise the first articulate cry of the new-born nation. Indeed, it often happens that the histories of which many nations are proud, and justly proud, are in their earlier phases actually ante-national, as, for example, the history of Italy, up to the end of the eighteenth century, which is simply the record of fratricidal (and one may also add matricidal) war between the individual States now merged into one as the Kingdom of Italy.

The State must be clearly distinguished from the nation. As art and religion are but the concrete expressions of phases of a nation's spiritual life, so the state is only the outward and visible manifestation of its political life.

In the case of many nations, the state has fundamentally altered its character again and again, leaving the nation itself intact; indeed, as in the case of religion, every nation continues to experiment more or less consciously until it at length hits

upon the form of state which most fully expresses its spirit. The changes in the character of the state may be intensely violent, as was the sudden swing from Monarchism to Republicanism in France, or they may be gradual, as in the almost imperceptible transmutation of an absolute into a limited monarchy in England; but, sudden or gradual, these political changes have but little or no effect upon what may be termed the national ego. Nay, further, a nation may be even divided into several independent and at times mutually hostile states, without in any way impairing its intrinsic unity: Switzerland at the time of the Sonderbund.

But, whilst the idea of the state is more or less contained in that of the nation, the Imperial ideal is distinctly opposed to that of nationality. The facile argument of the Imperialist, that the nation bears the same relation to the Empire as the state (political unit) and the province (territorial unit) does to the nation, is based on entirely false analogy. For, whilst the state and the province are more or less arbitrary sub-divisions of a homogeneous whole, the Empire is, in its essence, a forcible binding together of dissimilar units.

The different states or provinces of a nation may be compared to the limbs of a body, but the separate nationalities which go to make up an Empire should be likened to a number of animals of different species prisoned in one cage. They may be confined together for generations, but they will never merge into a single species, and at whatever period, no matter how remote, the cage falls to decay as history proves it must fall these separate species will take up their own natural mode of life where they left it.

Imperialism, carried to its furthest limits, brings us to the ideal of the World State; which to some is a pious aspiration, whilst to others, including the present Writer, it is a fantastic nightmare, but which few indeed, whether friends or foes, regard as lying within the region of practical politics. But between the Empire and the World State there lies an intermediate conception which is, by a certain section of thinkers, considered to be capable of actual realisation; this is the ideal of an United Europe. The supporters of this idea do not, of course, recognise the predominance of a present nation, even in the role of a beneficent despot, as do the Imperialists, but rather picture the United States of Europe as forming a single giant nation after the model of the United States of America. These United Europeanists base their contentions upon an argument founded upon an essentially false biological analogy. They would reason somewhat thus: - The whole species *Homo Sapiens* may be compared to the whole species *Canis Familiaris*. The five great divisions of the human race may likewise be compared to five varieties of the canine species, but when we come down to the sub-divisions of these divisions, to take, for example, the sub-division of the Circassian race into French, German, etc., the differences are so insignificant that we may compare them fairly to the differences between a pack of fox hounds in Cork and a pack of foxhounds in Kildare. This argument seems plausible enough, but the fallacy lies in the fact that when we enter the region of anthropology, we must to a great extent abandon the standards which have guided us in our classification of the lower animals. The nervous and mental dissimilarities in the human species are so profound, whilst the corresponding physical differences are so slight, that the recognised morphological methods of classification prove altogether too coarse for the purposes of anthropological research. In short, when we come to consider the human species, after having made a primary rough division into a few physically well marked types, we find that, beyond these, the fundamental differences between race and race exist almost entirely on the psychical plane, and that, whilst two members of the simian species possessing widely distinct physical characteristics show little or no mental

differences, two individuals representing different races of the human family, though indistinguishable by any physical standard, nevertheless display most marked and characteristic psychical differences.

These considerations are entirely overlooked or ignored by the United Europe enthusiast, who recognises no barrier, other than the political one, to the realization of his ideals; but the fact nevertheless remains that, subtle and elusive as these spiritual distinctions between race and race may be, they are as real and insuperable as any on the physical plane, even though they are of such comparatively recent development. We can understand this better by taking an analogy from the science of mineralogy. The ruby and the sapphire belong both to the same mineral species, Corundum. They are identical in chemical composition, hardness, refraction, and all other physical properties, save only that one contains a minute trace of colouring matter which makes it red, whilst the other contains an equally minute trace of colouring matter which makes it blue; in each and every respect other than this the two stones are identical, but, nevertheless, by no means known to science can the ruby be transmuted into the sapphire, or the sapphire into the ruby. Here, then, we have a perfect analogy of the difference between two single nations. Identical perhaps in origin, similar in all their most obvious physical and mental attributes, they, nevertheless, possess a subtle difference which is utterly indestructible. And one may here pause to note that, as in the case of the Ruby and the Sapphire, it is not their similarities, but this very subtle difference, that give nations their supreme value.

To put the whole matter briefly, the Nation is one of the great "constants" in the human equation, whilst the Empire and the State are but ephemeral and accidental phenomena. It is, as has been said, something transcendental; as a manifestation of the life force, it rises superior to the axioms of geometry, for in the case of the nation, as in that of all other vital phenomena, the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts.

As Father Brown says, the essence of a nation is manifested in "a peculiar kind of spiritual oneness," and he quotes Rabier with approval when that writer speaks of "that community of will, of desire, of soul, of consciousness, from which is born what may be called the soul of the Fatherland." But Father Brown will not admit that there is anything transcendental in this community of will, desire, and consciousness. "There is," he says, "nothing mystic in this oneness." He seeks to explain it. "It is compound," he tells us, "of two elements: firstly, common memories of historic things wrought in common and suffered in common in the past; and secondly, the actual will to carry on that common life, as a distinct people, master of its own destinies, shaper of its own future." But this is really no explanation, but merely a restatement of the problem; to say that a common will dominates the people of a nation does not bring us any nearer to the heart of the mystery; nay, it makes that mystery more profound, for the simple reason that this "common will" successfully exercises its influence over whole classes having little or nothing else in common. It is a fact too obvious to need demonstration, that, taken broadly, the interests of similar classes in different nations are far more closely allied than those of different classes in the same nation; there is, for example, infinitely more in common between the miner in England and the miner in France, than between the English miner and his master; nevertheless, the syndicalist effort to realise an international confederation of the proletariat, a confederation which, if it ever came to pass, would ring the knell of nationality, has proved in practice a hopeless failure.

Let us then candidly recognise this, too, as one of the great mysteries which lie beyond our ken. When we would seek to grasp the innermost heart of the secret of nationality we find our way barred by that dark portal behind which so many other

mysteries lie hidden; life and love, and the sense of beauty, and death.

Of the structure and functions of nations we know something; we can say that this is essential, and that that is not, that the state expresses its mind, and art its soul; we know that, like all other living organisms, a nation is subject to gradual change and modification; but of the vital principle which combines such dissimilar elements as a geographical area, a human race, a political organization, a religious creed, and a historical memory, into a living entity, such as the Irish or the French nation, we know nothing.

C. J. O'HEHIR.

"Studies: an Irish Quarterly Review", Vol. 2, No. 7 (September 1913) □

Please find footnotes for part 1 p.8, 15, 24.

the existence of a nationality depends is the native language, and that if that disappears in all probability the nationality will disappear along with it. Pp.304 and 306.

30: Discours de Combat.

31: Fiona McLeod: The Winged Destiny.

32: Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples (Paris), 8e. éd., 1907. He continues; "With a new religious idea there is born a new civilisation. . . . All political and social institutions have been founded on religious beliefs. . . . From the political point of view what constitutes the irresistible strength of religious beliefs is that they are the only factor which can for a moment give to a people an absolute community of interests, feelings, and thoughts. Thus the religious spirit at one blow takes the place of those slow hereditary accumulations which form the soul of a nation."

33: Expansion of England, p.261.

P 34: Oeuvres, t. I., p.408. See also Mgr. Freppel : Sur le caractère religieux du patriotisme (1858), and Bossuet, Politique de l'Écriture Sainte, Article VI. De l'amour de In patrie. See also an article in the June number of Studies on "Nationalism and Religion in Ancient Judea," by Rev. J. A. Hartigan, S.J.

35: The subject is more fully treated in Legrand: Idee de Patrie, ch. VIII. "The Catholicism of to-day is tending more than ever before towards international brotherhood."

36: L. Legrand: L'Idee de Patrie, p.58.

37: Abbé Stéphen Coubé.

38: R. P. Félix, S.J., Le Patriotisme

39: In an article "Sur l'Idée de Patrie," by F. Marguet in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1904, pp. 857-896.

40: Readers of Scott's Anne of Geierstein will not forget its vivid presentment of the national struggle of Switzerland.

41 "The partition of Poland was the event that forced the idea of nationality upon the world." Stubbs: Mediaeval and Modern History, p. 236.

42 Discours de Combat.

P 43: See Bagehot: Physics and Politics, p.90.

44: We consider control of its own destinies, autonomy (which does not of necessity mean complete independence necessary to the integrity of a nation. We merely ask whether such autonomy be necessary to its very essence.

45: "Lancashire is not a "Question." Lancashire is not a "Question" because Lancashire is not a nation. Ireland is a "Question" because Ireland is a nation." T. M. Kettle: The Open Secret of Ireland. In any case it is surely necessary to have some word to distinguish Poland from Brittany, White Russia, or Galicia.

46: So the writer of the article "Nation" in Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy, 1908 (new. ed.). Similarly the International Webster.

47: Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, ed. by Prof. Baldwin (Macmillan), 1902. L. Legrand, op cit.]

48: This largeness is very relative, but we would scarcely call nations the people, say, of San Marina, Andorra, or the Isle of Man.

49: The Jews have been referred to as a nation, but, we think, not rightly.

50: Footnote d necessarily a spiritual unity - that and nothing more, but certainly and necessarily that." Hakluyt Egerton: Patriotism.

51: This is the conclusion arrived at by Renan in his remarkable study, Qu'est ce qu'une nation? (1882). Similarly Rabier: Psychologie, p.501, says (I translate), "All the conditions of patriotism, community of territory, of language, of race, of religion, of historic memories, of hopes, only go to establish that community of will, of desire, of soul, of consciousness, from which is born what may be called the soul of the Fatherland." The writer in Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy adopts Renan's conclusions, but seems to require a national government.

52: Hakluyt Egerton: Patriotism (George Allen), 1905. Legrand, op. cit., reaches the same conception of the Patrie. According to him, it calls for "une communauté de compréhension, de volonté, et de vibration."

P 53: Ernest Renan. He says elsewhere:- "Le noeud qui lie ensemble toutes les générations d'un même peuple, c'est la même manière d'entendre et de pratiquer l'existence collective, c'est l'harmonie des sympathies et des

(Continued from p. 25)

*Beobachter*, newspaper of the NSDAP, would come out with the headline "Roosevelt and Churchill Agree to Jewish Murder Plan[of Germany]!"

And Goebbels didn't have to add a single embellishment or lie to any of those. The whole of Germany knew, in stark terms, that with defeat came only annihilation: it was no longer about the Führer, nor about the Reich, but about Germany itself, and even the most vigorous communist, if he was a patriot, had little choice but to obey the call of the Fatherland just as readily as the most fanatical Nazi. As Lieutenant Colonel John Boettiger would go on to say, the plan had been worth thirty more divisions to Germany.

But the plan stayed. Despite claiming he had no idea of the devastation it would unleash, despite his claims of not being bloodthirsty, Roosevelt did nothing about the plan. Then he died, to be replaced by Truman.

Truman officially declared the Morgenthau Plan null and void, replaced by JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff directive) 1067 to dictate occupational policy in Germany. On 10th May 1945 he signed it, and the same day, Morgenthau would remark that he hoped nobody would realize that it *was* the Morgenthau Plan, because that is what it was, only under a different brand name.

For two long years, Germany starved under the rebranded Morgenthau Plan, under the guidance of the 'Morgenthau Boys', as they were called: Treasury officials 'loaned' to Eisenhower to oversee the implementation of JCS 1067. For two years the Allies dismantled most traces of heavy industry from Germany. This is also where our fourth hero enters the story: General Lucius Dubignon Clay, deputy to Eisenhower, and a man who understood the sheer idiocy and callous cruelty of the matter while his superior Eisenhower freely distributed copies of Morgenthau's book 'Germany Is Our Problem' to occupation officers. Lucius' own words summed up the affair best:

There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand.

For two years, Lucius Clay and his backers fought against JCS 1067. Their efforts were finally rewarded on 10 July 1947, with the repealing of JCS 1067 and its replacement by JCS 1779, focused on European economic recovery. On the same day the 'Morgenthau Boys' collectively resigned.

The horror of the Morgenthau Plan and its thirty million dead, supported to varying degrees by Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Churchill and many others, and halted by the efforts of Lucius Clay, George Marshall, Cordell Hull, Henry Stimson, Anthony Eden, Lewis Douglas, Lewis H. Brown, Mackenzie King, Herbert Hoover and many other forgotten heroes, was finally no more.

Cem Arslan, Amateur military historian and armchair general □

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antipathies c'est la poursuite d'un meme but." p.80.

54: Vico, an Italian writer cited by Lecky in his "Democracy and Liberty," Vol. I., p. 475, defines a nation as "a natural society of men, who, by unity of territory, of origin, of customs, and of language, are drawn into a community of life and of social conscience." We have not yet met with a better definition, to our way of thinking, than this.

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### **The Events Of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia in the Context Britain's Great War on the Ottoman Empire** by Pat Walsh

Available as paperback or ebook-Athol Books 2013

The events that occurred in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 should be located in a broader context than simply that of Turk against Armenian. Both Turks and Armenians were, after all, actors in a much wider drama that was unfolding in the world and any judgement about their actions can only be made with the knowledge that they were caught up in circumstances that were not of their choosing and were largely beyond their control.



## The Morgenthau Plan



The map above shows the proposal made by Henry Morgenthau jr. for the partitioning of Germany and annexation of territories to foreign countries after its defeat by the Allies of WW II.

It was introduced to the other Allies at the Quebec Conference in September of 1944.

In 1944, during the height of the Second World War, Roosevelt was given a memorandum by Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of State, stating Morgenthau's proposal on how to treat the inevitably defeated Germany. The first half of the plan, regarding territorial divisions, appeared rather less harsh than what ended up happening: Germany was to lose East Prussia, the Saar region, half of Silesia and was to be divided into three parts.

But this was the mild part of it.

Morgenthau, in order to remove what he saw as the 'problem of Europe', demanded the complete destruction of Germany as a state. The entire nation was to be completely stripped of all industrial output: any industrial plant or facility, no matter how small, was to be dismantled or scrapped, mines were to be dismantled and wrecked. People with technical knowledge were to be 'encouraged' to migrate as far as possible.

Morgenthau had proposed that the entire country be reduced to a Medieval condition. Roosevelt enthusiastically backed the idea, something he'd explain in August 1944 in a letter to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands:

There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again — and those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude. Most decidedly I belong to the latter school, for though I am not bloodthirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war.

This is indication that either Roosevelt was an utter imbecile, or that he was lying through his teeth: the population of Germany, well over sixty million, could not be supplied with domestic food production, and with no industry at all permitted, there was no possibility of securing food imports from anywhere. The result was to be, as projections went, the deaths of up to thirty million people from starvation within the span of a decade.

That was nearly three times the number of Holocaust victims. It would have been the single largest genocide in the history of man.

Morgenthau was the only Cabinet member invited to the Second Quebec Conference, where Roosevelt attempted to force the proposal on a reluctant Churchill unwilling to see Britain shackled to the corpse of Germany. Here, the zeal with which Roosevelt pursued German dismemberment was again made evident: he would go on to ask Churchill:

Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned in the manufacture of armament.

If Germany was not to produce even furniture, what was it going to produce?

It took the basest form of blackmail to make Churchill relent. It was made clear to him that economic aid to Britain would come if, only and only if, Britain supported Morgenthau's proposal.

In Quebec two leaders came together, and agreed upon the deaths of thirty million people.

Luckily for the whole world, there were still people in both nations who held on to a modicum of good. As soon as he learned of what Churchill agreed on in Quebec, Anthony Eden gathered every supporter he could and practically waged war on Churchill to force him to set the plan aside. In the United States, opposition came from Secretaries of State and War, Cordell Hull and Henry Stimson. Hull, whose revulsion of the plan was so strong it sent him to the hospital, told Roosevelt in no uncertain terms that the inevitable conclusion of the Morgenthau Plan would be the death of half of Germany from starvation. Stimson's opposition was far more vigorous: Roosevelt denied to his face that he intended to fully deindustrialise Germany, to which Stimson replied by reading aloud the text of Morgenthau's memorandum, with Roosevelt's signature underneath, word by word, to Roosevelt's face in front of dozens of people.

The opposition from the military came with considerable vigor, but for different purposes. The plan had given Goebbels an unimaginable proof of just what fate awaited a defeated Germany. He'd go on to state that 'The Jew Morgenthau' was seeking to turn Germany into a potato patch. The *Völkischer* (Continued p. 24)

## Letters published in the Irish Times - the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill

[Lawmakers in the Republic of Ireland on Thursday voted in favour of a bill that would implement a draconian ban on goods produced by Israeli communities in the West Bank.

Despite the opposition of the Irish government, which insists that the legislation would violate the European Union's single market regulations, the bill passed by 75 votes to 45 votes, with three abstentions, in the Dáil, Ireland's parliament.

The Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill would impose jail for up to five years and heavy fines on Irish citizens who import or sell products from the West Bank. Crucially, it would require foreign companies with divisions or subsidiaries in Ireland to adhere to the boycott as well. The bill passed through Ireland's Senate in July 2018, and now has to win approval in committee before it becomes law.

In a sign of the widespread political support enjoyed by the bill, the three abstaining votes on Thursday came from government ministers. One of them, Junior Minister John Halligan, who is a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause, suggested in a media interview on Thursday that he would have voted in favor of the legislation had he not been convinced that it would pass. <https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/01/24/israel-expresses-disgust-after-occupied-territories-boycott-bill-wins-crucial-vote-in-irish-parliament/>

Letters, Irish Times, January 23, 2019

Sir, – Last week we visited the West Bank and saw for ourselves the tragic impact of illegal Israeli settlements, built on Palestinian land. These settlements, condemned as illegal by the United Nations, European Union and the Government of Ireland, stand in the way of a permanent peace between Israelis and Palestinians. As a country, we cannot continue to condemn these settlements as illegal under international law and then trade with them, making them economically viable. Let us be under no illusions – the products we buy from these settlements deprive Palestinians of their homes, their farms and their livelihoods. Trade with settlements in the Occupied Territories legitimises their existence and ignores international law. Therefore it is necessary to be consistent in ensuring that products produced or manufactured in these settlements do not end up for sale in shops and supermarkets in Ireland. Today, Dáil Éireann has a historic opportunity to end trade with these settlements through passing the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill 2018. If the Bill is passed, Ireland will be the first country in the world to legislate in this way and will become a world leader in taking decisive action to bring this conflict to a just and peaceful end. We encourage our citizens to recognise the significance of this Bill and urge our TDs to be courageous in supporting it. – Yours, etc,

Bishop NOEL TREANOR,  
Bishop of Down and Connor, Member of the Episcopal Commission for Social Issues & International Affairs;  
Bishop ALAN MCGUCKIAN SJ, Bishop of Raphoe, Chair of the Episcopal Council for Justice & Peace.

Sir, – We, concerned citizens of Israel, are writing to you regarding the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill, which is due to be debated today in Dáil Éireann. The Israeli occupation of the territories beyond the 1967 borders, now in its 51st year, is not only unjust but also stands in violation of numerous UN resolutions. UN Security

Council Resolution 2334 of December 23rd, 2016, adopted 14:1 by the Security Council (the US abstained), calls for the international community to differentiate between its relations with Israel within the 1967 borders and its dealings with the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The passage of the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill has become all the more urgent following the Israeli government's recent announcement of plans to build thousands of new homes in illegal settlements, further undermining the possibility of achieving a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on two states. As this Bill does not call for a boycott of the State of Israel but rather differentiates it from the occupied territories, it is a modest step that can help ensure that obligations under international law are respected. Its passage through Seanad Éireann shows that there is widespread political and public support for this legislation in Ireland. We are convinced that Israel's ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories is morally and strategically unsustainable, is detrimental to peace, and poses a threat to the security of Israel itself. It has been enabled by the leniency of the international community, whose rhetoric regarding the dire situation in Palestine has not been matched by appropriate diplomatic action. The occupation and the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements have been correctly identified by successive Irish governments as major obstacles to peace, yet Ireland, along with the rest of the EU, continues to sustain the occupation by trading with illegal Israeli settlements established in clear and direct violation of international law. As people who care deeply about Israel's future and long for our country to live in peace with its neighbours, we urge you to support the aforementioned Bill. – Yours, etc,

Prof ELIE BARNAVI, Former ambassador of Israel to France;  
ILAN BARUCH, Former ambassador of Israel to South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe;  
MICHAEL BEN-YAIR, Former attorney-general of Israel, former acting supreme court justice;  
AVRAHAM AVRUM BURG, Former speaker of the Knesset, Labor Party;  
Prof NAOMI CHAZAN, Former member of Knesset, Meretz Party, former president, New Israel Fund;  
Prof ITZHAK GALNOOR, Former Head of the Israeli Civil Service Commission, professor emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem;  
ERELA HADAR, Former ambassador of Israel to the Czech Republic;  
Prof DAVID HAREL, Vice-president, Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, computer scientist, Israel Prize recipient (2004) and EMET Prize Laureate (2010);  
DANI KARAVAN, Sculptor, Israel Prize recipient (1977);  
MIKI KRATSMAN, artist, EMET Prize Laureate (2011);  
ALEX LEVAC, Photojournalist, Israel Prize recipient (2005);  
Dr ALON LIEL, Former director-general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador to South Africa and Turkey;  
Prof YEHUDA JUDD NE'EMAN, Filmmaker, Israel Prize recipient (2009);  
Prof David Shulman, EMET Prize recipient (2010) and Israel Prize recipient (2016);  
Prof ZEEV STERNHELL, Political scientist, Israel Prize recipient (2008).

**‘In Year Zero, a contribution to the history of the German Press’ (VII) Hans Habe (1966)**  
**(Translated by Angela Stone)**

Final Instalment.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE END OF AN ERA

The subtle conflict with the military government intensified. Not least because of the war crimes trial in Nuremberg.

Whenever time allowed me to do so, I drove from Munich to Nuremberg. At the time this had an uncomfortable start. Although the required *Horch* was at my disposal, previously used by the former president of the Reich media chamber, Max Amann, the motorways were in a desolate condition and every journey on the icy roads took up many hours of my time.

There I saw them all on the dock - Herman Göring, the gory clown, Joachim von Ribbentrop, promoted from a champagne salesman to foreign minister and now was a champagne salesman at best, Julius Streicher, who would have filled even Marquis De Sade with disgust, healing him of sadism, Hjalmar Schacht, the devil mint master, Rudolf Hess, the only obvious lunatic in the madhouse.

I certainly did not feel any sympathy for these men, and if I am honest, nor did I feel any for the ‘upright ones’, including Schacht and Neurath and Papen - I still remember how Schacht disdainfully dissociated himself from his neighbour Streicher again and again - even less sympathy than I had for the convicted mass murderers. As the people who were interviewed by our opinion researchers said: “I am just a small man...” Never have I seen smaller men incite greater damnation. There was not one of them who even proved the lowest behaviour - not even Göring, whose glorification would later be driven with such sinister fortune. A sorry bunch of small men...

It did not change anything that I could not wrest any sympathy out of the trial that took place here. I could not ‘sell’ the war crimes trial, the validity of which I doubted, to the German public. *Die Neue Zeitung* dedicated less and less room to the trial, dedicating only glosses instead of feature articles, and in the end, reflected on the juristic disputability of the whole spectacle. I moved my American correspondent, Kurt Wittler (now a factory owner in Los Angeles) back out of Nuremberg. The reporters changed constantly: at one time, I wrote myself, then Arthur Steiner, then Kästner. The reportages moved backwards. The headquarters in Bad Homburg threw a fit. They counted up the pages together that the licensed press dedicated to the Nuremberg trials, and compared them with the little place it took up in *Die Neue Zeitung*. I addressed a memorandum of over twenty pages to the headquarters - I allowed the five points of my reasoning to be published in the New York *Aufbau* shortly afterwards on 31 May 1946. The essay ended with these words:

“German prisoners of war worked down in the yard. It seemed to be a pointless work that they were carrying out: they collected water that streamed from a burst pipe in small containers. Opposite, the contours of the destroyed town became apparent: the papered walls, the suspended radiators, the dirty piles of stones, the steps that lead nowhere. In the courtroom, people spoke of concentration camps in which people were manufactured into soap. I thought of how easy it would have been to convict the twenty four of not only guilt, but also to show every German, the crimes that each of them had committed. The prisoners collected rain water and the steps led to nowhere. I ask myself why the Nuremberg trials lasted five months.”

Still not satisfied with this, I committed the error of making policies instead of just newspapers. I bombarded my superiors with memoranda, in which I harshly attacked occupation policy, even America’s entire policy towards Germany. One memorandum, *The Five Mistakes of the US-Policy*, was later published, with newer information conclusions, in *Aufbau* in March 1947. It included the following sentences:

“According to the evaluation of the controlling officers of the intelligence service, in our zone on the day of capitulation there were around 15% ‘convinced Nazis’, 10% so called Anti-Nazis, 40% ‘followers’ (Nazi-sympathisers) and 35% of people who could not be politically classified. The same numbers concluded that until today the number of ‘convinced’ Nazis has admittedly not risen, but that the number of Anti-Nazis has sunk by 3%... It has taken a year for us to decide to support the only politically clean party, the SDP. The Russians first had to call the communist unity party into being, and first it had to be proven that the CSU was established by nationalists and militarists, before we would move to reluctantly help the SPD...”

“While the machine gun factories explode, in which any secret production would be impossible, German atom bomb experts and rocket aircraft constructors are transported to America in luxury cabins; up until now 621 ‘academics’ have been brought to the United States. A former colonel of the Luftwaffe, Dr Klaus Aschenbrenner, works hard at Boston University; an eager party member, Dr Heinz Fischer, runs free at Syracuse University; the upper Nazi who led the production of V-weapons in Peendemünde now sits in the laboratories of Fort Bliss; others ‘busy’ themselves in Fort White Sands and Dayton.”

“From false teeth, to brassiere, to penicillin, American products of all kinds were sent from the United States to soldiers, who traded them for pictures, diamonds and mink coats.”

*“We have brought democracy to the Germans like a suit from a clothing store that you choose from a catalogue, regardless of the size and build of the wearer... no less infantile is the agitated campaign against Dr Schumacher, who expressed critical views of the occupation methods in London, and later in Hamburg... Exactly as in the aftermath of the First World War, the Stresemanns are too ‘German’ for us - we keep a sharp eye on the purity of Dr Schumacher but we turn a blind eye to the major general Ellerich’s filthy rummaging... The solution lies in the education of an intellectual aristocracy, and in the full support of these chosen ones. In the selection of half a million people there is no ‘Führer’ danger. Instead Germany lets itself be led by them.”*

What folly to believe that such pieces of writing would be graciously received by the military officers and their advisors in Bad Homburg, Paris and Washington. There it meant that Major Habe still only represented his own thoughts in *Die Neue Zeitung*, and tried to change the press of the military government into his own voice. The fact that I was not placed before a military court, as my immediate superior Colonel Powell friendly warned me again and again, or simply sent home, as it could have easily happened, had many reasons. On the one hand, my military past argued against such plans, on the other hand, the American democracy can bear a fair amount of criticism. More crucial I believe, however, was the *esprit de corps* that dominated in *Die Neue Zeitung* which had not forgotten any member of this corps.

Without sentimentality: sixteen German chief editors and over thirty editors in leading positions have emerged from this

editorial team, and if the former colleagues of *Die Neue Zeitung* speak today of 'their' newspaper as being of the 'Reinhardt School of Journalism' then this tribute does not apply to the director alone. The visitors of *Die Neue Zeitung* from abroad, whose number grew constantly - I remember a full-page rave review that Robert Jungk published in the Zürich *Weltwoche* - marvelled at the 'happy microcosm in the German macrocosm.' Germans and Americans worked together here, as if there had never been a war; civilians did not consider the uniforms, and the Germans in their miserable plain clothes were nothing other than colleagues to the Americans; American officers and German print workers drank watery beer together, produced by the Munich breweries - and everyone was possessed by the idea of the newspaper - whether it was a young doctor like Dr Ernest Wynder or a novelist like Stefan Herym, whether it was a cabaret artist like Werner Finck or a full-blood journalist like Hans Wallenberg. It is understandable that through this possession I sometimes went too far. So it was advised to me that I should send Lieutenant Stefan Heym home, who wrote the first feature article of *Die Neue Zeitung* because he was 'strongly suspected of communist sympathies'. I did not consider Stefan Heym to be a communist, but instead as an ingenious queer fellow, who I contrived to control very well. I refused to dispense with his employment. This was one of my many high-handed acts which were disregarded. Stefan Heym went of his own accord: apparently he had already planned to desert to the East. Whoever dared to loosen a single stone from the building of the state within a state, should have reckoned with the collapse of the whole building.

### BLACKMAIL IN STARNBERG

It is important to realise that at this time there were already a large number of newspapers that were published by the German 'licensees'. In Munich itself the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* had emerged, whose masthead featured three - later, four - 'licensees'. Although there were no bad feelings on either side, there was no connection between the journalists of these newspapers and the editorial of *Die Neue Zeitung*. And so it was able to come to pass that Werner Friedmann (now publisher of the Munich *Abendzeitung* and co-publisher of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*) and I never met each other, although we both started our journalistic career at the Munich *Süddeutsche Sonntagspost* - him as the chief reporter and I as Viennese correspondent. The so-called licensing teams stood between us. These were - in our zone - Americans, who chose, examined and finally commended the new German newspaper publishers and chief editors with the unprecedented gift of a newspaper organisation, often a printers as well. The members of the licensing teams fully identified with the interests of the new publisher; the existence of the nationwide *Neue Zeitung* with its two and a half million subscribers was a thorn in their side. As the licensing was now completed, they now had little to do and populated *Ritters Park Hotel* in Bad Homburg, mainly occupied with convincing the American generals and the representatives of the State Department of the 'superfluosity' of *Die Neue Zeitung*.

This should not mean that I condemned the tasks of the licensing teams - in Bavaria one of my oldest war comrades, Ernest Langendorf (now chief press of *Radio Free Europe*) played an influential role in the issuance of the licences. The then licensed newspapers proved themselves, at least in the American zone, to be immense in every respect. Only one of the 'licensees' failed commercially, only two or three withdrew due to political reasons. Without the newspapers of the original licensing press - *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Augsburger Allgemeine*, *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, *Tagesspiegel*, *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* and many others - without these newspapers people would have

spent many more sleepless nights thinking of Germany in any case; not to mention the Springer mammoth group with its arch-nationalistic mass media which originated in the post-licensing period; from diverse magazines like the Burda Group *Bunte Illustrierte* and its intellectual behaving big brother, the *Spiegel*. It is also the credit of the licensing teams and not their lowest credit, that a provincial press emerged in Germany, whose importance eclipses all other European provincial press examples: as I cannot list all of the excellent sheets of the 'province', I will mention just the *Nürnberger Nachrichten*, the Mainz *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Rhein-Zeitung* in Koblenz, the *Saarbrücker Allgemeine*, the *Schwarzwälder Boten* in Oberndorf, the *Mannheimer Morgen* and the *Freie Presse* in Bielefeld.

Meanwhile, the history of the German press in Year Zero would have been even more fragmentary than it already is if I had overlooked two facts.

The American licensing groups had a difficult footing because not only was there no connection between them and the other licensing teams, mainly the English, there was an open rivalry. It was a downright childish soapbox derby in which they competed in who could bring the most newspapers into being. The English teams, who let themselves be mesmerised by every young German journalist who had not been a member of the NSDAP did it better. This is the only way that Hamburg and Hannover became press centres of a new, if also then well-disguised, nationalism.

The second disruptive element was the ever intensifying rivalry between the 'American' newspapers - *Die Neue Zeitung* and *Heute* joined the magazines *Amerikanische Rundschau* and *Auslese* - between the licensing organisations.

This rivalry had three reasons. The first was of a technically material nature: the paper fabrication could not keep up with the demands of the newspapers; the more the circulation of *Die Neue Zeitung* grew, the less paper was available for the licensed press. The second reason correlated with the 'American-English' licensing war: the more *Die Neue Zeitung* dominated the market, the bigger the danger that the British licensed newspapers would outstrip the American licensed papers. But there was also a political reason, and this had a paradoxical nature: the German newspapers were published in the criticism of the understandable resistance of the occupation policy, while it was becoming more and more difficult to finish up with the 'Habe-boys-band' as my editorial was called in Bad Homburg.

The former licensing teams, which now looked after the new German press like their 'baby', also had, physically speaking, their own stronghold. Under the leadership of Colonel MacMahon (later the US-military attaché in Helsinki, now in retirement) they had obtained the old fortress-like Schloss Seeburg at Lake Starnberg and shot their arrows to Munich from there. It is typical of how hard this internal battle was that Colonel MacMahon - incidentally an extremely endearing old warhorse with a face of stone and a heart of gold - appointed me from the castle where he sat enthroned like a Bavarian territorial prince.

"Habe", the colonel said, "I have an offer to make you. Of course you want to preserve the life of *Die Neue Zeitung*, correct?"

"If I can..." I responded carefully.

"Voluntarily reduce the circulation by a million and you can be sure of the paper's allocation for a year."

I refused.

I do not boast about this adolescent passion today in any way, but rather think of the episode with a certain admiration for my adopted country, America. Colonel MacMahon and

his superiors did not have to make the major and newspaper publisher an 'offer': nothing stopped them from simply cutting off the water supply - that is the paper tap. The fact that they accepted my argument that in a young democracy you could neither force the readers to certain reading material nor could you detain them from such - speaks in favour of the United States of America, and not for the first or the last time.

On the other hand, it is understandable that - I anticipate - some months later Colonel MacMahon gave me a farewell party that was attended by the whole general staff of the Bavarian military government, which was more like a victory party for the triumph over a tough opponent. The fact that the pretty menu cards included the inscription *Bon Voyage* next to some excessive praise for the guest of honour with these witty sentences did not change this:

"Our sorrow for your departure will be soothed by the thought that you will return home from Bavaria to a much happier country where only dogs, cars and occasionally marriage ceremonies require a licence..."

But we are not that far yet. The more I realised mistakes in the occupation policy, the more I made my own policy. The following example shows this:

On 1 March 1946, *Die Neue Zeitung* announced a 'conference' in Munich. It read: "*On 3 March 1946 the round table conference of Die Neue Zeitung in the small town hall room in Munich will be started. Taking part at this meeting will be nine prisoners of war who had been released just a few months ago, three each from Großhessen, Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria. The participants were selected by the editorial committee of Die Neue Zeitung out of 4,532 applicants.*" On the agenda was: immediate problems after the return home, problems with jobs, welfare for invalids, political problems like the role of party members and activists, belligerents as active opponents of war, combatting the apathy of the prisoners of war who have returned home. In my welcome speech - the conference attendees were welcomed by Colonel MacMahon, Minister President Dr Wilhelm Hoegner and Lord Mayor Dr Scharnagl - I said the following:

"A Germany condemned to miserable, continuous, steady misfortune and to eternal ruins would mean that one replaces the scraped out lesion of germs for a new one. It is self-evident that the reconstruction of the states oppressed by Germany, those who fought by our side, must and does come first. But although Germany is further removed from the heart in our body as France or Holland, it is still part of this body."

The records of the Munich conference, during which the representatives of the former prisoners of war did not mince their words, taken down in shorthand were published uncensored in *Die Neue Zeitung*.

## **BE THAT AS IT MAY**

Now the fat was in the fire. As my 'secret service' from Bad Homburg notified me, the Governor of the US-zone, General Joseph T. McNarney summoned the Chief of Information Control to Berlin where he confronted him with the question:

"Who is actually in charge of the occupation policy in Germany - is it me or Major Habe?"

I did not have any support from the American authorities, and the German press were not favourably disposed towards me. Today I often read with wonderment that I had created the 'licensed press' and assured its favour: in reality I did not know who would be issued a licence, and the licensees understandably considered *Die Neue Zeitung* as severe competition. I myself put up with the schemes without saying a word because I saw the most encouraging signs of democratization in the licenced press' revolt against *Die Neue Zeitung*. In this respect, at least, I experienced no disappointment: I do not know of any licensed

newspaper that did not develop into full, critical independence within a few months. All the same, it is true that I did not dare to expect any articulate support from the public opinion in Germany.

Nevertheless it was my decision to leave *Die Neue Zeitung*, quite of my own accord, and to give up the uniform that I had worn for over four years. It dated from a particular day, 5 March 1946.

On this night I stood in the layout hall of Schellingstraße, as always. The clock turned two; the layout designer Altmann had just brought the last 'galley' into the casting machine. I wanted to return to my editorial room where I was in the habit of holding a 'critical editorial conference' between two and four in the morning, waiting for the first copies of the fresh as dew-smelling newspaper. Then the telephone rang on the layout desk. It was the headquarters of General Eisenhower in Paris. An officer, whose name I had not heard before, explained: "I am to convey the instruction to you to bring Churchill's speech in Fulton to the front page of the newspaper in full-page."

"I am not aware of a speech in Fulton. In any case the machines are starting in one hour."

"You are to stop the machines." A small pause. "I will let the speech be transmitted to you. Connect me with an English stenographer."

While I connected the officer with an English stenographer, I tried to reach Bad Homburg on another extension. My superiors were in Bad Homburg, not in Paris: perhaps I could speak some sense with them.

Bad Homburg was asleep. It wasn't until half an hour later that I succeeded in reaching Lieutenant-colonel Dilliard (today leading editor of the Pulitzer paper *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*).

Dilliard had been briefed. "I'm sorry", he said, "you have to change the front page."

"The newspaper cannot be published in time. I'm not a magician."

"Magician or not - this speech changes our whole policy."

In the meantime, the manuscript pages of Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, were sent to me. It was the later famously worded speech in which the former English prime minister accused the Soviet Union of being the 'communist imperialism'. The cold war had begun.

I considered Churchill's argument neither inaccurate nor unjust, but I had to remind myself of the fact that Wallenberg and I had been threatened with military court because of our criticism of the Russians just weeks before. It was also clear to me that the United States would henceforth follow a new policy towards Germany; it was my job to convey it to the astounded German people.

I was at least partly mistaken. There was a new policy towards the Soviet Union, but there was no 'new' policy towards Germany: that would have required an old one. Whereas myself and my team had essentially been given free rein since the day that General Banfill surprised me with the news that my headquarters were situated in *Hotel Bristol* in Bad Nauheim, the military officers now did what they always do when they see no alternative: they gave orders. Now 'guidances' came in daily from Bad Homburg, principles and language conventions, conventions of speech, which very often contradicted the 'guidances' arriving from Washington. What is more, the incessant visits from senior officers, spouting off political wisdoms themselves, impeded my work. After one year and a half of speaking completely independently as the 'voice of America', I realised that I was not suited to the megaphone, not even there where I conformed with the opinions of my superiors, - 'opinion' in the doubtful majority.

When Colonel Powell - who had constantly 'shielded' me from the uniformed bureaucracy- shared with me that he would be taking his leave in the summer of 1946, I also offered my resignation. According to the point system that set aside five points for every half a year in Europe and for every medal - you were entitled to leave the army with eighty points - the US-Army had to release me from their unit. They attached an oak leaf cluster to the Bronze Star on my breast. However much this honoured me: it honoured me even more that the Informations Department of the Army accepted my recommendation without discussion to entrust Major Hans Wallenberg as my successor. I now knew that my child, *Die Neue Zeitung*, was in good hands. Year Zero was over but *Die Neue Zeitung* could continue for many years.

The farewell party took place in the Schwabing Villa where most of the American editors of *Die Neue Zeitung* lived. No one concerned themselves with the laws, that even despite the 'new' policy towards Germany, still forbade the Americans from socially associating with Germans. Everyone came - from Erich Kästner to Werner Finck, from the German layout designers to the American chauffeurs: deep into the morning hours, American officers, German actresses, American professors and German aristocrats, German print workers, and American women in uniform, drank together, partly bad German beer, partly Californian wine that was just as bad.

I thought back: to victories and defeats, to failures and low blows, of some prophetic moments, and some of bitter mistakes, to the frenzy of great journalistic moments and political disillusionment, to the injustice that I had done, and the injustice that was done to me, to the barracks of Camp Sharpe, to the snowy park of Luxemburg, to the *Hotel Bristol* in Bad Nauheim, to the empty flat in Braunschweig and the daybreak in Schellingstraße. I thought of the future, of which I did not guess a thing.

In my speech in which I thanked the address of my successor, I quoted the lines that Alfred Kerr wrote for his own sixtieth birthday:

What is our role  
in the depths and the heights  
of the earthly clod?  
to pass by vibrantly!  
In Faust it seems  
the full truth stands  
"Be that as it may,  
it was so wonderful!"

Today, twenty years later, I look back at this great adventure of the 'ship of fools' that steered through Year Zero. Nothing else occurs to me. *Be that as it may, it was so wonderful.*

### IN PLACE OF AN AFTERWORD

The small round table stopped chitchatting long ago about the significant and insignificant things that have proceeded lately. Hans Habe explained. The hours of the night melted away unnoticed. It was only astonishing that Hans Habe mentioned, as if in passing, that he had written a chapter of German newspaper history and contemporary history. The 'Zero Hour' of the German press, he said, did not interest anyone anymore. Everything was different now. Reality had not stuck with the plan. But could one understand the reality of today without knowledge of the purposes of yesterday? This is how I convinced him.

The first edition of Hans Habe's memoirs of the reconstruction of the German press was published under the title, 'The German Press in Year Zero' as an instalment piece in *Die Weltwoche*. The fact that a Swiss newspaper opened this chapter of German

newspaper history does not seem astonishing when one recalls the function the Swiss papers had in occupied Germany.

In those days, a good twenty years ago, *Die Weltwoche* and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* -alongside some other newspapers of the confederation - were the first to occupy the gaps in information. Although the Germans lacked the bare necessities - one of the most striking pieces was Erich Kästner managing to report on the happy neighbours in the oasis of peace - although they were lacking matches and shoelaces, they also hungered for information, for reports about the condition of their country and the world. In the course of months the Swiss newspapers belonged to the coveted treasures. However, in our country, in which the party papers ran wild, *Die Weltwoche* was one of the exceptions that proved the rule: an independent paper, independent from party rules and party compromises, certainly only dependent on an international community of readers. No coincidence then that Hans Habe's memoirs from 'Year Zero', appearing in this very newspaper, should find an enthusiastic echo here.

As a war volunteer Hans Habe witnessed the collapse of France, got into and escaped war captivity. A touch of borrowed safety in Switzerland. Fled to Portugal. There he procured the luck of a place on a ship to the United States. The United States sent him as an American soldier sometime later over the Atlantic to the North African battle zone. Invasion of Sicily, Italian mainland, the Battle of Salerno. Normandy.

Because he did not 'simply return from exile to Germany' in the wake of the victorious armies, because he sensed a new order behind the collapse of the glimmer of hope - because of this he was in a position to launch the plans of Washington without the servile submission of the recipient of orders.

In Bad Nauheim Captain Habe set himself up with his small team of pressmen. His task was clear: he should launch 'official journals' in the larger German cities of the American zone. These instruments would serve the military government in distributing orders and instructions. All in all it was a technical problem. Or so the American army saw it anyway. Hans Habe saw it differently. But not from the start. Ultimately, he was an American officer, used to obeying orders and, also in this case, minded to fulfill his duty unexceptionally. By Cologne, when he put the first German rotary press into motion, and held the first issue of 'his' first newspaper in his hands, the journalist in him was awakened. From this moment on, he did not obey the military command, but the pressing laws of the world of newspapers. At one point of the book he says himself: "We made newspapers, nothing else." Henceforth, Captain Habe combatted technical problems with mastery. He did not create the 'official journal of the American military government', but instead the 'Kölnischer Kurier', the 'Frankfurter Presse', the 'Weser-Boten' and the 'Ruhr-Zeitung', the 'Hessische Post' and the 'Stuttgarter Stimme'. All attractive newspaper names. Even the wealth of names should have aroused justified suspicion in the superiors of the diligent newspaper founder. Man first gives names to things he is fond of. The newspapers should carry out their duty as effectively as possible, Habe found. Furthermore, in his eyes it was necessary to open the careful conversation with the population. This second 'fall' automatically follows the first. No true journalist could have handled it otherwise.

So it happened that the American captain in Bad Homburg actually no longer thought in the interests of the military government, a government who in any case, only wanted to speak *to* the Germans and in no way *with* the Germans.

He undertook to teach his reader, swiftly and reliably, about all important events - through 'his' newspapers. Given the choice whether to be able to offer his readers nothing or to have to procure the subject matter from the 'black market

of information' he always made the right decision - for the information.

As one paper after another was turned into German hands by the licensing teams, Hans Habe retreated in America's journalistic bastion, which he also established himself: he led 'Die Neue Zeitung' in Munich. For the second time, he stretched in his sense of the assignment to the mission. For this reason, something came out of the newspaper of the American occupation power that today he hears being called the 'Reinhardt School of Journalism' - not without some pride. Many German journalists have walked through this school where Erich Kästner and Hans Wallenberg learnt. The fact that the newspaper of American occupation power did not simply remain with the privileges of the provided mouthpiece of a foreign government, that its staff did not have to wag the American policy, that the rotary presses, which formerly spat out the 'Völkischen Beobachter' in large batches, now printed a newspaper of the highest level - all of this is to Hans Habe's credit, above all.

In the course of the new policy towards Germany, when his superiors wanted to speak with the Germans themselves, he took his leave. He did not want to have to accept conventions of speech or guidelines.

With the wish to show the resurgent press a path into the future, Hans Habe established his key objective. This explains why his contribution to the history of the German press was written with grateful and firm words. Hans Habe's merits are so obvious, just like the recognition that he imparts to us, that a little more obedience would have perhaps accomplished a lot less.

Rolf R. Bigler

Chief editor of *Die Weltwoche*

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## A poem of 1880s Irish-Arab solidarity.

Manus O'Riordan

I was delighted to open, this January 18, the broadcast, on the Dublin Northside radio station Near FM, of the first episode of "The Indignant Muse" by Terry Moylan, with my recitation of this poem of 1880s Irish-Arab solidarity.

"SERVED HIM RIGHT"

- a poem by Arthur M Forrester, author of "The Felons Of Land". As Forrester explained:

An Irish girl, hearing that her brother Pat had been killed in the Royal Irish, fighting against the Mahdi Uprising in Sudan, said: "I HAVE no tears for brother Pat, served Pat right. He had no business going out there to fight those poor creatures (the Arabs). May God strengthen the Mahdi."

Though stark he lies, and stiff and gory,  
On the Egyptian desert, that  
He might assist in England's glory.  
The foes he fought were not his own,  
Nor his the tyrant's cause he aided;  
Then why should I his fate bemoan?  
O brother, faithless and degraded!  
He saw how Saxon laws at home  
Had crushed his sires and banned his brothers  
Why should he cross the ocean's foam  
To place that hated yoke on others?  
The Arabs slew him in a fight  
For all by brave and free men cherished -  
Ay, for the cause of truth and right,  
For which his kith and kin had perished.  
No Arab chief in Ninety-eight  
Placed foot on Erin's shore as foeman;  
They lent no spears to swell the hate  
Of Hessian hound and Orange yeoman.  
But those who wrapt our homes in flame  
And trod us down like dumb-brute cattle -  
It was for them - oh, burning shame!  
My brother gave his life in battle.  
Sure, every memory of late  
Must from his wretched heart have vanished;  
Our hills and valleys desolate,  
Our ruined homes, our people banished.  
And yet, God knows, he learned in youth  
The gloomy story of his sireland -  
Drank in at mother's knees the truth  
That England is the scourge of Ireland.  
I cannot weep for brother Pat -  
I hate the hellish cause he died for  
False traitor to the freedom that  
His brothers strove, his sisters sighed for,  
E'en when in tearfilled dreams I see  
The parching sands drift blood-stained o'er him,  
My grief is changed to anger. He  
Was treacherous to the land that bore him!

Click on <http://nearfm.ie/podcast/?p=29914> to download and play the January 18 broadcast.

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Eamon Dyas is a former head of The Times newspaper archive, was on the Executive Committee of the Business Archives Council in England for a number of years, and was Information Officer of the Newspaper.

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