

Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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Editorial: This World and the Next: Britain and the Jewish Question (Continued)

My mother-in-law was a Viennese Jew who escaped to Palestine as a refugee and married an Arab there, and who then escaped with her family from the Jewish conquest of 1948, losing all her material possessions. Because Jews trace descent through the mother and Arabs trace it through the father, I am related by marriage to both Jews and Arabs. My wife is a Jew to the Jews and an Arab to the Arabs.

What I witnessed at close quarters in Jerusalem in the 1970s was the utter racial contempt of Arabs expressed without embarrassment by Jews, and the total failure of this contempt to demoralise the Arabs.

The principle of Jewish conduct seemed to be: *Do unto others as others have done unto you*—all ‘others’ belonging to a common body of others for this purpose. And the European principle appears to be: *Do unto others as we did unto you*. Each engages in decent dissimulation with a flimsy drapery of humbug.

Vaclav Havel stood away from the humbug for a moment when he criticised the Jews for not having done to the Palestinian Arabs what the Czechs did to the Germans in 1945 when they got the opportunity.

Isaac Deutscher’s parable missed the point entirely with regard to Zionism in Palestine, but he is worth quoting about the position of Jews in Europe in 1945.

The following report appeared in *The Times* of 3rd January 1946:

“‘Well Fed’ Jews From Poland

“Lt.-Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, chief of UNRRA operations in Germany and former deputy chief of staff to General Eisenhower, stated today that he believed European Jews had a ‘positive plan for a second exodus’—this time from Europe.

“General Morgan said he had seen an exodus of Jews from Poland in Russian trains on a regular route from Lodz to Berlin. All of them were well dressed, well fed, healthy, and had ‘pockets bulging with money’. All of them, he said, told the same monotonous story of threats, pogroms, and atrocities in Poland as a reason for leaving. A new factor in the United States zone—the arrival of a whole carload of Jewish children from Rumania and Hungary—added to his belief that a world organization of Jews was being formed.

“He did not know who was financing the movement or stuffing Jewish pockets with Russian-printed occupation marks. He cited the example of ‘a committee of liberated Jews in Bavaria’ who formerly wrote to him on scraps of paper and were now writing on the finest engraved stationery. The formation of the ‘federation of former inmates of concentration camps’ in Germany, he believed, would bring German Jews into the movement. As these Jews were not displaced persons, he added, they did not come under the jurisdiction of Unrra.

“General Morgan made a plea for a successor to take over Unrra’s job when its funds and mission expired towards the end of the present year. There would be, he said, a hard core of 200,000 homeless displaced persons left in Germany to be provided for. In the problem of displaced persons lay ‘the seeds of some very promising minorities and also the seeds of a third world war...’”

A comment on this report, ‘By a Correspondent’, appeared in *The Economist* on 12th January 1948. It was included in Deutscher’s collection, *The Non-Jewish Jew* in 1968, under the title, *Remnants Of A Race*:

“...General Morgan must certainly have had some reason for speaking of an organised plan for a Jewish exodus—the evidence for its existence can be seen in Berlin in the form of thousands of Jews arriving from eastern Europe. Had he confined himself to stating this fact and to an emphatic and urgent warning against the trouble which the ‘exodus’ was creating for the Allied Military Governments in Germany and for the Jews themselves, nobody could have taken exception to his statement. It may well be that his words were in fact intended to carry some such warning... But... the form of the warning was most unfortunate. It conveyed the suggestion that the Jews, their pockets stuffed with notes, were repeating the tricks they once played on the Egyptians in their first great Exodus, when, it is related, they borrowed every man of his neighbour, and every woman of her neighbour, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold.

“It suggested, too, that they had once again evaded the normal barriers and frontier divisions—once with the connivance of the Almighty crossing the Red Sea, now with the connivance of the Russians entering the British zone. In a word, it attributed to the Jews the worst motives in a flight for which many normal reasons can be given.

“European Jewry’s desire for a new exodus is undeniable. Zionist organizations, especially of the extremer kind, are stimulating it; and they are trying to force its pace before the survivors of European Jewry again strike root in their old countries. They act in this way from a conviction that the Jews will in any case be prevented from re-establishing themselves permanently in their old communities. They act, in short, on the basis of a deep disbelief in the prospect of a tolerant and civilized Europe, a disbelief unhappily confirmed by continuing manifestations of violent anti-semitism on the continent. These cannot be denied, though they are magnified by Jewish fear and panic. Travellers returning from Poland and the Danubian area, reports in the press of those countries, and statements by officials leave no doubt at all that the atmosphere of eastern Europe is still infested with virulent anti-semitism...

“Anti-semitism invariably reflects or foreshadows a diseased condition in European civilisation. Its rise and fall is perhaps the most sensitive index of Europe’s moral and political sanity. The Jew was the first victim of the orgy of Nazi madness and destruction that was to engulf the whole continent. It might have been thought that after the holocaust of the last few years the Jews would now have the right to expect sympathy and human understanding from their countrymen and the world at large. The fact that anti-semitism is nevertheless rampant in eastern Europe, and certainly on the increase, though still only latent, in western Europe, is therefore all the more an alarming symptom of social and political disintegration.

“The emancipation of the Jews in the 19th century followed middle-class liberalism in its spread across Europe. The first declaration of equal rights for Jews, the first one in the whole of Christian civilization, was made by Jacobin France in 1791. ‘Let the Jews look for their Jerusalem in France’, was Napoleon’s enlightened maxim. He was hardly a sentimentalist about the Jews; and there was a tyrant’s touch in his policy towards them; for instance, he seriously proposed that every third Jew or Jewess should be compelled to marry a Christian. But his purpose of disaccustoming the Jews from usury and illicit trade, of breaking down their separatism and making them submerge themselves in the gentile population was certainly sound; and—who knows?—if it had been consistently carried

into effect all over Europe, the Jewish problem might have been forgotten long ago...

“The emancipation of the Jews in the greater part of Germany was also a by-product of the Napoleonic conquest. The triumph of the reactions on the continent under the Holy Alliance deprived the Jews of most of their newly won rights. For individual Jews baptism became once again the passport to European civilization, until the ‘Spring of the Peoples’ of 1848... The power of the middle classes and their liberal ideas weakened steadily from western to eastern Europe... What bourgeois liberalism achieved for Jews in western Europe, only Bolshevism was able to achieve for them in eastern Europe. The Communists, admittedly, would not permit Jews to continue as capitalists or ‘unproductive elements’, but otherwise gave them equal rights”...

Jews almost everywhere tended to be disproportionately active in politics relative to the Gentile population, which translates as the native population, when the opportunity is open to them. Nation states were stabilised by a large ballast of political indifference on the part of the Gentile populations on which they are based, but Jewish hyperactivity blended with Gentile middle class activism in Western Europe.

In Tsarist Russia, however, middle class development was weak, Jewish political rights were non-existent, and society was almost overwhelmingly peasant and was settled in its ways. The Bolshevik Revolution undertook the construction of a state on first principles. Equal rights were suddenly conferred on the Jews and were realised in stronger form than was the case in Western bourgeois states where they were part of an evolutionary development. It could be said that, in the first instance, they were more than equal within the revolutionary elite. For the first time they appeared as authority figures, beginning at the highest level. It was as political agents of the state that they first made political contact with the peasantry. This seems to have been a major reason for the anti-Semitism that characterises the Western interventions that attempted to overthrow the Communist regime, and for the widespread popularity of the idea of a world conspiracy of Jews of the kind set out in *The Protocols Of the Elders Of Zion*.

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The *Protocols* may have been a forgery, but the general idea that they expressed was made credible by the Russian Revolution combined with the Balfour Declaration. And it was indeed one of the factors that played into the production of the Balfour Declaration with its purpose of herding the Jews into Palestine and thereby diminishing the influence they exerted in the various states amongst which they were dispersed. Balfour was an anti-Semite in that sense, and so was Churchill. A purpose of the Gentile Zionism was to break up the Jews as a hyperactive international body.

Churchill, as far as I know, did not trace international Jewish activity to an organised political conspiracy. He saw it more as the natural outcome of the positions which the Jews occupied in the various states in which they were dispersed.

The Balfour Declaration had the immediate purpose of turning the Jews against Germany at a critical moment in the World War, and bringing the world influence of the Jews to the side of the Anglo-French. It presumed that the Jews actually were trans-national and were influential out of all proportion to their numbers. If that had not been presumed to be the case, the British statesmen who were running the war would not have bothered their heads with them at a critical point in the war. But that presumption is now taken to be a position of extremist anti-Semitism.

The Balfour Declaration validated the view that had until then been held to be anti-Semitic: i.e., that the Jews were not Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans etc., whose religion happened to be Judaism as the religion of others happened to be Catholicism or Protestantism, but were themselves a distinct national body, and that they were therefore not simply part of the nationalism of the states in which they lived.

Under the Balfour Declaration it became anti-Semitic to deny that the Jews were a separate nation, whereas before the Declaration it had been anti-Semitic to assert that they were a separate nation.

Ernest Bevin, the Trade Union boss who became British Foreign Secretary in 1945, had always stamped on anti-Semitism of the first kind when it reared its head in Trade Union business, but then as Foreign Secretary he was caught out by the fundamental change in what was officially *anti-Semitism*, and he was branded an anti-Semite by his assistant, Crossman.

The Labour Party adopted Zionism as an ideal around the time of its formation and at Annual Conferences between the Wars it routinely adopted Zionist resolutions without thinking about them. *A land without people for a people without a land!* It was not only a beautiful, trouble-free ideal, but was eminent commonsense!

It does not seem that Bevin ever gave the matter much thought before the War or during the War. Before the War he was preoccupied with building up the general Union, working out a *modus operandi* for it in capitalist society, and keeping the Labour Party functional under the National Government. And, during the war, he governed Britain domestically as Churchill’s Minister for Labour, while Churchill ran the War. He prepared the ground for the Welfare State in conjunction with the Tories and under fierce criticism from the Labour Left. Then in 1945 he was sidelined into the Foreign Secretaryship by Attlee, on the insistence of the King it is said. And he found that Palestine was far from being a land without people—and that he was expected to establish what he understood to be a religious movement as the State Power in that territory which, despite a quarter of a century of British-authorized Jewish colonisation, was still occupied by a majority of people of other religions.

He couldn't bring himself to do it with a will. He was therefore branded an anti-Semite

The Jewish colony had prepared itself for war. It had made good use of its status of a colony of the Empire while preparing for war. It was trained in irregular warfare in the late 1930s by a buccaneering British officer who went on to become the hero of the Burma Campaign. (In the late 1950s in London I worked with former NCOs who had served under General Wingate in Burma, who, greatly admiring his style, cheerfully admitted that, if the category of War Crimes had been applicable to the victors as well as the vanquished, he would have been a War Criminal.)

And then, in 1945, there was the influx of Russians and of arms that made possible the successful Jewish War of National Liberation against Britain, which was a prelude to the terrorist ethnic cleansing of Palestinians that was necessary to the formation of a Jewish State that was properly Jewish, rather than a multi-cultural hodge-podge in which Jews would be a bare majority, if a majority at all, even in the Partition area allocated by the United Nations—and the Zionist movement had no intention of remaining within that area.

This was all too much for Bevin to cope with. The Imperial Power necessary to bringing the Imperial project of the Balfour Declaration to an orderly conclusion had all seeped away. All that any Foreign Secretary could have done with the situation that British policy had brought about in Palestine was cut and run away from it.

About forty years ago, when I thought I had figured out the major consequences of the Great War, I described the British Empire as a drifting hulk. Post-1918 it was still the biggest thing in the world, but it had suddenly become purposeless. It could set up projects but could carry nothing through. All it was capable of doing was damage.

I recently noticed a book about that period, called *The Troubled Giant*. Giant it was, but troubled it was not. It was full up of itself, having won the greatest war ever fought in the world. And it had become a democracy. And democracies are kind to themselves—the Irish democracy of the past generation being the exception.

Its final purposeful act was the declaration of war on Germany in 1939—Germany which it had disarmed in 1919, and which was still unarmed in 1933—losing all control of the war within a year but insisting that it should continue until others brought it to an outcome which bore little resemblance to the purpose for which it was declared.

It still saw itself as the arbiter of world affairs when declaring war in 1939. It was the protector of European civilisation.

It declared war in 1939 because Germany broke international law by allowing the German city of Danzig to join the German state. Under the Versailles Treaty, Danzig was a kind of city-state. It was a kind of enclave within the territory of Poland but it was not under Polish government or even under theoretical Polish sovereignty. It lay on the border of East Prussia and its attachment to East Prussia would be a very slight variation in the actual order of things. But the transfer would be a breach in principle of international law and therefore Britain declared war in support of the principle of international law.

'International Law' was the system of the League of Nations under the Treaty of Versailles. The Versailles Treaty made it illegal for Germany to have a Navy or a regular Army. But Germany after 1933 had acquired a Navy and a regular Army without being authorised to do so by the League of Nations.

It had merged with Austria in defiance of prohibition by the League. And it had seized the Czech Sudetenland without consulting the League. If it had not done these things in contravention of international law between 1933 and 1938, it would have been in no position to secure the transfer of Danzig against the opposition of Poland in 1939.

It had built itself into a major European military power between 1934 and 1938, in breach of the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, with British collaboration. Britain had never subordinated its Empire to the League. The Empire remained the major World Power in practice, thereby disabling the League. And the consequent weakness of the League was the practical justification of the Empire acting in disregard of it.

Having collaborated with Germany in breaching the Versailles conditions for four years, Britain suddenly decided to force a war with Germany on the trivial issue of Danzig on the ground of International Law, but without referring the matter to the League.

The Munich Re-Settlement of the Fall of 1938 was the decisive event. By means of it, Britain changed the balance-of-power in Europe against itself and established Nazi Germany as the *de facto* hegemonic Power in Eastern Europe. It undermined the Czechoslovak state, which lost not only the Sudetenland but also the regions where there were Hungarian and Polish minorities, which were reclaimed by their nation-state. The Slovaks then declared independence and the Czech remnant was made a German Protectorate without resistance.

The German State was not only enlarged territorially but was strengthened militarily by possession of the advanced Czech arms industry. And a high-level German military conspiracy, which had made overtures to Britain about a *coup d'état* in the event of Czech resistance, was rebuffed and became demoralised.

Britain collaborated with Hitler in making Germany the major Power in Central Europe: the Naval Agreement, the militarisation of the Rhineland, the introduction of conscription, the *Anschluss*, the Munich Agreement—and then decided to launch another world war against it on the issue of Danzig, a German city, not under Polish sovereignty, which the Polish Government had never governed!

If it had either authorised the transfer of Danzig to east Prussia, removing the last German grievance over Versailles without doing any actual damage to Poland, or had engaged in battle along with the Poles when the Military Guarantee it gave to Poland provoked the war, the course of world affairs would undoubtedly have been very different. But it did what it did. It encouraged the Poles to refuse to negotiate over Danzig, but left them in the lurch.

The German/Polish War was an isolated event. Britain used it as the occasion to declare world war on Germany, but for nine months it made no effort to prosecute that war. But it tried to get into a relationship of war with the Soviet Union in alliance with Finland when the Soviets claimed part of Finland for the purpose of strengthening the defences of Leningrad. But, before Britain could mobilise, the Finns made a settlement with Russia.

Britain then attempted to stop Swedish trade with Germany. It made moves against Norwegian neutrality, slowly and laboriously, but was prevented by a quicker extemporised German intervention in Norway. And it was only then, as Britain was withdrawing from its bungled Norwegian adventure, that Germany responded directly to the declaration of war made on it by Britain and France.

In British psychology the German military response to the British declaration of war on it was a surprise offensive!

The British Army raced into Belgium, and then raced back again when the Germans split the French line by an attack through the 'impassable' Ardennes.

The fighting was over in six weeks. The British Army was brought home, apparently with Hitler's permission. The French Army was in disarray. The democratically-elected French Government made a settlement—which is what one does when one makes war and loses. The French settlement was provisional, waiting to be finalised when Britain settled. But Britain refused to settle, even though it was incapable of continuing the battle. It did not need to settle because the Royal Navy was still dominant at sea, and Hitler seemed to have no will for a conquest and humiliation of Britain.

It kept Europe on a war footing by a little bombing and adventurist interventions here and there, with the object of spreading the war.

The decision to refuse to settle, though unable to fight with any prospect of winning, is given very little thought in Britain. The only reflection on it that I noticed was by the journalist philosopher John Grey in a think-piece on BBC radio. He reflected on the consequences of Churchill succeeding Chamberlain in May 1940, instead of Halifax. He assumed that Halifax would have ended the war, which would have been 'dreadful'. But then the thought seemed to strike that, if Britain had not continued the war though unable to fight it (leading Germany to expand it in response to the British policy of spreading, though I don't think he put it quite like that), there may have been no Holocaust. But he hurriedly banished that thought with the reflection that Hitler was always intent on doing what he did, and he would somehow have got it done regardless of circumstances. It was predestined.

A few months later, in another think piece, Gray ridiculed the idea of history being determined in advance, apparently forgetting about Hitler.

In the British war propaganda after June 1941, when the policy of spreading the war achieved its greatest success, Nazi Germany was depicted as an enemy of all humanity, that had arisen through the force of some power lying outside human history. How else could it be that the British Empire, Stalinist Russia, and the United States which was founded on multiple genocide, were all against it on humanitarian grounds?

After 1945 that propaganda was scaled down but not fundamentally altered. If the Second World War was to be a sacred event, which destroyed a unique form of Evil which threatened to destroy all civilisation, the fact that the main work of destroying it was borne by Stalinist Russia could not be conjured away. Stalinist Russia and Ameranglia were the post-1945 Good and Evil, therefore some dimension beyond Good and Evil must have been the basis of their close war-time alliance!

The alternative is to set aside the mystical, assume that all concerned had intelligible human reasons—reasons with human precedents—for what they did. And in fact those reasons are not hard to find if one does not live in a culture that is saturated with the war-propaganda. But that destroys the myth of the post-War world and is unacceptable.

Hitler was very much a creature of circumstance—the circumstance of the "*Carthage must be destroyed*" ideology

applied to Germany by Britain and France in 1918 and 1919, but then aborted by Britain as a balance-of-power measure against France, bringing about the worst of all possible worlds. Hitler as a politician was the product of those circumstances—a Germany destroyed politically, historically and morally—and his will operated sensitively and astutely on those circumstances.

Britain raised the World War of 1914, declaring that it was not pursuing any material interest and was acting only as the guardian of civilisation. It is in that sense accountable for the war and worse, the disastrous peace, and must be held accountable for its outcome.

As the Gentile Super-power, which put the establishment of a Jewish colonial state in Arab Palestine on the world agenda, it must be held particularly accountable for what happened in Jewish affairs.

The European War in which Britain intervened, and which it enhanced into a World War, arose out of conflicts of interest. On France's part, it was an honestly irredentist war. The French Empire launched a war of aggression on Prussia in 1870 for the purpose of stopping the political unification of Germany. It lost the war, accelerated German unification, and lost the mixed region of Alsace-Lorraine to the new German state and wanted to get it back. Russia had long wanted to capture Constantinople (Istanbul) in order to have a warm-water port but had been prevented by Britain. Britain now said it could have it for the taking, and therefore it made the Austrian/Serbian conflict over the Serbian assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne the occasion of war with Austria and consequently with its ally, Germany.

These material ambitions, both of which were covertly encouraged by Britain, would have brought about some alteration in the balance of forces in Europe, but it seems highly unlikely that they would have destroyed the basic political structure of Europe. It was the intervention of Britain, the World Superpower, that did that. And one of the reasons it did it was that Britain was at least half in earnest when it said that it had no material ambitions and had entered the war for a purely moral purpose. And a Great War launched altruistically for a purely moral purpose is, in this material world, the pursuit of something that is in the nature of things unachievable: it is a will o' the wisp.

The European civilisation, which Britain said it was its only purpose to defend, was wrecked, and the political will that had built up the British Empire, by material ambition and acute political acumen, lost the run of itself in the course of its wrecking activity.

The Ottoman Empire was destroyed by Britain. The Tsarist Empire, whose ambition for Constantinople was encouraged by Britain, collapsed under the stress of the War, and the Hapsburg Empire was destroyed by Britain at the end of the War. The wrecking of these Empires deprived the main body of Jews in the world of the Gentile political structures in which they had a place, under a degree of harassment but without a threat to their existence, and put them at the mercy of the new nationalisms being conjured up by Britain and France at Versailles.

Isaac Deutscher:

"It was in Poland and Rumania with their four million Jews that the Jewish issue was most acute before the war. Much more than in other countries, and even in Germany, anti-semitism was a popular movement. It embodied all sorts of moods and motives: the jealousy felt by the under-developed Polish middle classes for their Jewish rivals and competitors; the socialism of the ignorant and especially of the *déclassé*, in which the Jews were blamed as a sinister and mysterious

capitalist power; the deeply rooted clerical hatred of the Jew as 'Christ's enemy'; and, finally, the fear of all Governments of Communism spreading among the vast mass of utterly impoverished Jewish artisans and outright paupers. The gentile working classes and peasantry... remained unaffected... But they also remained aloof from the Jews and more or less indifferent to their fate...

"Nor is this the whole picture. The grave of the Jewish middle class became the cradle of a new gentile middle class in eastern Europe. At the height of the slaughter a Polish paper wrote: "The Nazis are solving the Jewish problem in our favour in a way in which we could never have solved it". Jewish shops, houses, flats and personal belongings were seized by Poles, Rumanians and Hungarians. These profiteers were... a *lumpenproletariat* which turned overnight into a *lumpenbourgeoisie*... these new "middle classes" are undoubtedly suffering from a guilt complex which makes their temper extremely nervous and brutal. They look tensely and anxiously into the faces of the few Jews who now seek to return home... The greater the destitution in eastern Europe, the wilder the scramble for material goods, the more desperate and unscrupulous the determination of this horrible "middle class" to remain in possession. Possession is in any event nine-tenths of the law—zoological anti-Semitism provides the last tenth. The only way in which the new "middle class" can save not so much its newly acquired wealth but its nerves and a pretence of respectability is by smoking out the surviving Jews.

"This is surely the most morbid feature in the life of eastern Europe today. Woe to eastern Europe if this social hyena class were ever to become its ruling class!"

This is from *Remnants Of A Race* written early in 1946.

Of course that "*social hyena class*" never did become the ruling class. All of those societies were subjected to the refining process of "*Stalinist totalitarianism*" for two generations before becoming civilised bourgeois components of the European Union. And now they will not allow their antecedents to be raked over in the Zionist interest. And rightly so.

Let the master-minds that altruistically set up the catastrophic situations in which others had to live confront the truth about what they did before scrutinising others. They are, after all, the Moralists of the world.

Deutscher remarks:

"The blacker aspects of the present Russian-controlled regimes would pale in comparison with the horrors which this class could hold in store..."

I don't know if, in any later publication, he said more directly that it was fortunate that those east European regions had been taken in hand by the Soviet system.

Was eastern Europe liberated from the National Socialist system by Soviet Russia, or was it conquered by Soviet Russia? The official Western view must be that it was liberated, because it would spoil the picture to say otherwise. The doctrine must be that Fascism arose without sufficient reason and oppressed the Communist system and the Capitalist system, causing them to unite against it.

But, before this doctrine became expedient, Fascism was widely seen in the capitalist world as the force that saved Western civilisation from Communism. This was said most clearly by Churchill. He had to forget that he said it when he came to write his War memoirs. But he did not forget that it was the case. He knew that Europe could live with the Fascist system and therefore one of the first things he did on becoming Prime Minister was to arrange for anti-Fascist resistance

movements in London to be parachuted back into Europe. The concocted Czech resistance is a horror story.

And it seems that, while delivering his speeches about fighting them on the hills and in the ditches if they came to Britain, he set up a secret underground whose task would be, in the event of Occupation, to assassinate figures of local authority all around the country—Chief Constables, Mayors etc., nipping a vast Fifth Column in the bud.

Deutscher has some sense of this:

"The responsibility for the tragedy of European Jews... rests entirely on our western bourgeois "civilization", of which Nazism was the legitimate, even though degenerate, offspring" (*The Non-Jewish Jew*, p137).

Churchill too saw it as an offspring of western civilisation, but as a vigorous and protective offspring, rather than a degenerate one. When he was an anti-appeaser, it was not the appeasement of Fascism that he opposed, but the appeasement of forces hostile to the British Empire, and Fascism in the first instance was not a force hostile to the British Empire. He was an Imperialist not a social ideologist. He opposed the restoration of German power under Fascist leadership because it was German power and would restore something like the 1914 situation. The policy he suggested in 1919 was not the Carthaginian policy of destruction, but the formation of an alliance with defeated Germany against Communist Russia—a policy which would certainly not have brought about the situation to which Nazism developed as a remedy.

But, when Fascism did arise, he saw it as a functional remedy. He was of course required to denounce it as a kind of Satanism when he became Prime Minister, insisted on continuing the war, and became dependent on Communist Russia to defeat the enemy he was presented with by his predecessor. But in his History/Memoir he said he always considered Communist Russia to be the real enemy.

Churchill cared little about the Jews. He supported Zionism for the purpose of removing them from Europe, in which he saw them as an unstable and disturbing element. Their predicament figures very low in his war propaganda. It was only a generation after the War that the idea gained currency that the Nazi treatment of the Jews was the great issue in the War. I remember the publication of Lord Liverpool's book about the extermination camps and how it was frowned upon as an unhealthy probing of the seamy side of life.

Churchill was in his way an honest Imperialist and he saw things in their realistic Imperial perspective. He knew that the "*Indian Mutiny*" was an event that should not be probed closely. An Indian barrister in London in the early 20th century wrote an account of it as an Indian war of liberation and a British Court sentenced him to deportation to a Camp in the Andaman Islands for 20 years as punishment. It is only recently that Indian historians have been trying to count how many were slaughtered in what they recognise as a war of liberation, and the figure runs into millions. And Churchill himself caused a famine in India in which a couple of million died, when he requisitioned food and raw materials for his war, in disregard of the fact that the Congress Party, to which political power had to be relinquished a few years later, declared itself neutral in the War. But there are no pictures of the slaughter by which the 'Mutiny' was scotched, nor of the starving millions in 1943.

The mass extermination of Jews was carried on outside Germany, in the hinterland of the German advance into Russia, in regions where spontaneous anti-Semitism was

strong. A Polish resistance group, imagining that the British and American Governments did not know what was happening, collected evidence of it and sent an emissary, Jan Karski, with it to London and Washington, which took no notice of it.

A substantial body of Jews was saved by Stalinist Russia and it seems that after the war these Jews were crucial to the establishment of the Jewish State for which formal preparation had been made under the British mandate.

Britain had moral responsibility for it and Stalinist Russia had a degree of material responsibility. Within a few years Zionist influence caused Stalinist Russia to be branded as Anti-Semitic because it curbed further Zionist activities in Russia.

In 1945 the Occupation authorities in the European shambles puzzled over what the Jews were. The British Government had declared in 1917 that Jews everywhere constituted a Jewish nation, with national rights in Palestine, and had caused that view to be accepted by the League of Nations. And it had given the Jewish Agency an official position in Palestine. But in 1945 this seems to have been forgotten.

Ernest Bevin, a secularist of Baptist origin, was accustomed to treat Judaism as a religion and to stamp on suggestions that it was something else as anti-Semitism. And, if it was held to be a nation, what was to be done about it at the end of a War which was widely held to be caused by nationalism. To establish religion in state power was out of the question—it was mediaevalist. And to establish a displaced national group in a state in a territory which it had not inhabited for a couple of thousand years, and which was inhabited by others, would have been an act of very extreme nationalism indeed—a continuation of the Fascism which had just been suppressed with so much trouble.

(It is now said that to suggest that there is any resemblance between Zionism and Fascism is anti-Semitic, and therefore false. But unfortunately for me it was through a Zionist action that I witnessed that I got a sense of the Brownshirt mode of action. After the 1967 War a Palestinian protest meeting was held in the big hall at the Conway Hall, London. The meeting was packed. The spirit was one of ineffectual protest. Then a group of half a dozen Zionist militants came in and broke it up, clearing the room in a few minutes.

If Zionism had not been capable of doing such things on a large scale there would have been no Jewish State.)

Alan Bullock, in the third volume of his biography of Bevin, quotes him as follows in 1945:

“I am anxious that Jews shall not in Europe over-emphasise their racial position. The keynote of the statement I made in the House is that I want the suppression of racial warfare, and therefore if the Jews, with all their sufferings, want to get too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all” (*Bevin*, Vol. 3, p181).

Bullock comments:

“A new generation of Zionists for whom the Holocaust was the decisive experience discounted the goodwill of the British on which Weizmann had fixed his hopes and cast them in the role of the hated occupying power and themselves in the role of the Jewish Resistance Movement. [A Zionist relative said to me, with the air of stating an indisputable historical fact, that Britain had taken Palestine from them in 1919: BC.] When Bevin and the British criticized the Zionists for making political capital out of the sufferings of the Jews, they missed the point.

This was the strength, not the weakness, of the post war Zionist movement which was no longer pleading for compassion on humanitarian grounds—an appeal which had opened no door in the U.S., Britain or anywhere else—but asserting the political will of a nation in the making. Brought up in his Baptist days to regard Jews as members of another religious group with whose special customs—the keeping of the Sabbath and kosher food—he became familiar as a trade union organizer, Bevin could not see them as a separate nationality. When a delegate from the American League for a Free Palestine came to see him in November 1945, he told them that the fundamental decision Jews had to make was whether Judaism was a matter of race or religion, adding that if they were prepared to regard Judaism as a religion, there would be no trouble about their place in Europe. It is easy to put this down to Bevin’s ignorance of the question: but the Refugee Department of the Foreign Office took the same view:

‘We insistently deny’, runs a minute of 2 October 1945, ‘that it is right to segregate persons of the Jewish race as such... It has been a cardinal policy hitherto that we regard the nationality factor as the determining one as regards people of Jewish race just as in the case of other racial or religious groups. Once abandon that and the door is open for the discrimination in favour of Jews as such, which will ultimately become discrimination against Jews as such.’

“This was the argument repeated by both Attlee and Bevin, as if the Nazi persecution of the Jews “as such”, ignoring their claim to be German nationals, had never taken place, or could be erased from men’s minds. It wholly failed to meet the force of the Zionist argument. For it was not only that the European Jews—reduced by Hitler’s Final Solution... — ‘do not wish’, as the British Embassy in Warsaw reported, ‘to continue residence in what is for them one huge cemetery’; it was precisely the risk Bevin pointed to of being discriminated against which supported the Zionist thesis that only when there was a Jewish state to act as a refuge and protecting power would the Jews ever be released from this threat.

“A year later, Churchill was still prepared to argue that it was ridiculous to suppose that the Jewish problem would be solved or even helped by ‘a vast dumping of the Jews into Palestine’...” (p167-8).

I am not familiar with this statement of Churchill’s. I assume his reasoning was that the Jewish State would not solve Europe’s Jewish problem because the bulk of the Jews would not go there. He was a strong Zionist on the ground that the Jewish problem was real, in the sense of not simply being a product of irrational anti-Semitism, but had its source in the nature of the Jewish presence in the various states. The removal of the Jews to a state of their own was not the way to solve the problem. He had no qualms about riding rough shod over the Arabs who occupied Palestine in order to make a Jewish State. He held them in contempt, and described them as “*the dog in the manger*”. So he must have come to the conclusion that the Jews would not remove themselves to the Jewish state.

A bit of Palestine was allocated by the United Nations General Assembly to be a Jewish State. It was impossible for a properly Jewish State to be established in that territory because of the number of Arabs in it—either a bare minority, or probably a majority if properly counted. That territory was immediately subjected to extensive ethnic cleansing. This was followed by territorial expansion and colonisation, which still continues.

Description of the process of construction and expansion of the Jewish state is now self-defined by the Jewish body as anti-Semitism.

Israel is the national state of all the Jews, wherever they live. They have rights there which are superior to the rights of Arabs who live there. But, if they are held accountable for the conduct of their nation-state, that is anti-Semitism.

James Parkes in his 1939 Oxford War Pamphlet on the Jewish Problem said that, after the War, care should be taken

to keep the Jewish presence within other national populations below the percentage which triggers anti-Semitism. That was of course an anti-Semitic remedy. But doesn't it follow from the Weizmann/Crossman Zionist contention, which has never been repudiated as far as I know, that all Gentiles are by nature anti-Semitic?

Brendan Clifford

Britain versus Russia: Battle for the Caucasus 1918-20 (Part Three)

By Pat Walsh

In January 1919 General George Milne, who commanded British military forces in the Caucasus, wrote the following letter to his superior, Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, telling him just what he thought of the various peoples of the Caucasus:

"I am fully aware that the withdrawal of the British troops would probably lead to anarchy but I cannot see that the world would lose much if the whole of the inhabitants of the country cut each other's throats. They are certainly not worth the life of one British soldier. The Georgians are merely disguised Bolsheviks led by men who overthrew Kerensky and were friends of Lenin. The Armenians are what the Armenians have always been, a despicable race. The best are the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, though they are in reality uncivilised." (Papers of Sir Henry Wilson, IWM DS/Misc/80, 37/5, 22.1.1919)

There was a distinct contrast between the British occupations in the various parts of Transcaucasia. Of the three Caucasian states Georgia received the most favourable treatment by Britain, despite the suspicions of Bolshevism. The Georgians received a letter from the British Foreign Office pledging support for their independence from Russia. Outside of Batum the British military occupation was very light.

Martial Law was declared in Azerbaijan, General Thomson was appointed Military Governor and British military police were drafted in to "impose order" on the populace. The Azerbaijani Banks were taken over by the Imperialists, food rationing was introduced, and labour was strictly controlled. In the words of a Foreign Office Report "it was necessary to re-establish an administration in almost every department of the country's life" (A 34 page summary of the British Imperial administrations in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia is respectively given in FO 371/6280, 31.5.1922).

Armenia got no military occupation at all and was largely left to its own devices aside from aid and sometimes British military intervention, when it exercised its impulses toward irredentist nationalism against its neighbours.

The British objective in relation to Armenia seems to have been to establish a buffer state in the Caucasus between the Turks and Azerbaijanis to prevent a linking up of these two Turkic peoples, that would create a more powerful bloc against British interests. Lord Curzon referred to the Erivan Republic as a "tampon state." (Cited in Emin Shikhaliyev, *Britain's Armenian Policy in the South Caucasus*, IRS, Spring 2017, p.61)

At this point in time Britain did not know what size an Armenian state would emerge. However, it seems to have been

intent to incorporate the Azerbaijani region of Nakhchivan in it to increase its area. Major Gibbon was sent there to settle Armenians, under the guise of humanitarian effort, and when he failed, due to local hostility, General Thomson dispatched military forces and General Devy to support the population relocations aimed at Armenianising Nakhchivan (ibid, pp. 51-2 and IRS, Autumn 2017, pp. 36-40).

It was probable that the British, although encouraging the Armenians into demands for a Great Armenian state in Ottoman eastern Anatolia, were knowledgeable enough to realise that this was wholly unrealistic, given the demographics. So a concentration of Armenians around Erivan province was viewed as a more practical alternative.

However, this British attitude – the non-supervision of Armenia – enabled the Erivan Republic to ethnically cleanse from its territory large amounts of Moslems to create the most ethnically homogeneous state in the Caucasus (see Ilgar Niftaliyev, *Genocide and Deportation of the Azerbaijanis of Erivan, 1918-1920*, IRS NO. 15, 2013, pp.40-44)

When General Thomson, the British Military Governor of Azerbaijan, entered Baku he declared that "there is no question of the Allies retaining possession of one foot of RUSSIA." (FO 371/3667/11067, 9.5.1918). He insisted that the National Council of Azerbaijan, which was acting as a government in Baku, and whose members had been elected to the Russian Constituent Assembly in late 1917, act as a part of Russia, governed temporarily by the British military until the Whites could take over power.

General Thomson, whilst clearing all Azerbaijani forces out of Baku invited the forces of General Bicherakhov, the White Russian, back into the city. He gave his support to the armies of Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich and demanded that the Azerbaijan National Council establish relations with the Russian National Council, which was demanding the full recognition of Russia's territorial integrity, the overall authority of the Russian Constituent Assembly. He also demanded that it give allegiance to Kolchak's government in Ufa.

When the Chairman/Prime Minister of the Azerbaijani government, Fatali Khan Khoyski, met the British occupiers General Thomson told him he had come to Allied Russia and not Azerbaijan. The British Imperialists refused to recognise the Azerbaijani Republic in existence. Thomson made it clear that if the Azerbaijanis disputed the British authority they would have to do it through military force – rather than the democratic process, knowing that this was impossible (Anar Isgenderli, *Realities of Azerbaijan: 1917-1920*, pp.175-82).

However, General Thomson seems to have had a change of mind during his administration of Azerbaijan. He soon became repelled by the attitude of the Russian National Council, who wanted immediate and complete control of the Caucasus. General Thomson informed them that they were acting as if Russia actually existed – when it really didn't. At the same time Thomson, became impressed with the governing qualities of Khoyski and the Azerbaijani National Council, and decided to work through Azerbaijan's existing structures and depend on native military formations, who were scattered throughout the national territory and who were allowed to re-enter Baku a few months later (WO 106/1562).

It was decided in Whitehall that the status of Azerbaijan, along with the other Caucasian peoples, would be decided by the Paris Peace Conference to be held in the following year. This was communicated by Thomson to the Azerbaijanis.

The Bolsheviks and self-determination

Prior to the Great War nationalism was largely undeveloped in the Caucasus. It was not in the Tsarist interest to encourage it and Britain saw little to gain in promoting it there. There was, of course, a section in Liberal England who promoted ideas of nationality in the widely dispersed Armenians, but that was primarily a nonconformist Christian, anti-Turkish impulse. The British State itself did not see any tangible advantage in supporting the idea of an Armenian state.

In August 1914 a lot of propaganda regarding "small nations" was unleashed from Britain to justify the War on Germany. But this was certainly not meant to apply to the peoples of the Russian Empire, which was the military ally of Britain against Germany. Disrupting the Empire of an ally in a war situation was not a favourable outcome.

It was the emergence of the Bolsheviks that prompted impulses in the peripheral nationalities of the Russian Empire for self-government. One of the first acts of the Bolsheviks was to issue the Rights of Peoples, published in November 1917, which declared support for "*The right of all peoples to free self-determination up to and including separation from Russia and the formation of independent states.*" (Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921*, p.56)

This Bolshevik declaration went further than the dreams of the most advanced nationalists in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and it was practically an invitation to separate from the Russian state.

The Brest-Litovsk negotiations with Germany – which were very much conducted in the public gaze – consisted of the Bolsheviks issuing large amounts of propaganda around the "*rights of nations to self-determination*". This cannot have gone unnoticed in the borderlands, where nationalism hardly existed. Rosa Luxemburg, a doctrinaire Marxist in Germany, criticised Lenin for this on the basis that the Bolsheviks were only stirring up trouble for the Socialist state in the future.

The new proto-national political expressions in the Caucasus were still acting as part of Transcaucasia and Russia, assuming that their destiny lay with Russia, even if it was to be in some form of federation, at this juncture. The first congress of the Musavat in November 1917 demanded national territorial autonomy within the Federative Russian state and an all-Russian Congress to settle territorial disputes (see Rahman Mustafayev, *From Imperial Province to Parliamentary Republic*, IRS, No. 1 2010, p.5)

The Musavats initially supported the Bolsheviks both because of the Bolshevik declarations for self-determination of the peoples and a common desire for the ending of the War. This contrasted with the Menshevik programme of a "*one and indivisible Russia*" and continuation of the War on behalf of the

Entente (see Huseyn Tosun, *Developments in Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Revolution*, IRS, Spring 2018, pp.98-9).

However, Lenin's dispersal of the Russian Constituent Assembly in Petrograd in January 1918, after it had rejected Bolshevik dominance, led the Musavat and the Caucasus Commissariat to break off relations with the Bolsheviks and establish the Seim. The Musavat were forced into an untenable temporary alliance with Georgian Mensheviks and Armenian Dashnaks to preserve the basics of existence – order and stability.

The Bolshevik acquiescence to Brest-Litovsk had a number of implications for Russia that are not generally understood, due to the mystifications of anti-Stalinism. It, for one thing, represented the isolation of revolutionary Russia, with a virtue having to be made of "*socialism in one country*" by Lenin. Of course, the Bolsheviks hoped for the spread of the proletarian revolution to the West but they were disappointed.

If the Bolsheviks had held out for a non-annexationist treaty that allowed for a belt of states to be formed as a buffer between the Soviet state and the West, and the Germans had agreed, it would have been the case that self-determination was a possibility. But the Bolsheviks ensured the isolation of the Russian proletarian state whilst hoping for its expansion, uncurbed by buffer states to the west and south.

Most of the Bolsheviks, including Bukharin ("revolutionary war") and Trotsky ("neither war nor peace"), opposed the signing of Brest-Litovsk and wanted war, in some form or other to continue. Lenin, from the start, maintained that military resistance was hopeless and argued for submission to the German demands to maintain a Soviet state on such territory as remained to them. He calculated that submitting to Brest-Litovsk was a retreat in good order that would have the effect of steeling the people and create conditions for the building of an effective army and regeneration of the state. Lenin, calculating that he was indispensable, got his way when he threatened to resign.

Lenin's gamble of signing Brest-Litovsk also had internal consequences for Russia as it isolated the Bolsheviks from their allies, like the left SRs, who wished to continue it. So the decision not to wage war in defence of the state, against the Germans, led to a different form of war – Civil War. In the Civil War social life had to coalesce around the Bolshevik nucleus, which demanded all power to the Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik Revolution was isolated in Russia, under a single-party dictatorship. If the Soviet system could have developed into a multi-party democracy it could only have done so in early 1918. But the Bolsheviks closed off that possibility themselves because they had no faith in such a thing – not because of a civil war or as an emergency war measure. When the war on the Bolshevik state ended in 1920 Lenin did not discard the arrangements made in 1918 against multi-party democracy – he built upon them, extending and strengthening the one-party totalitarian state.

The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly narrowed the broadly-based political support in defence of the February Revolution, which contained the Bolsheviks as one element, and Brest-Litovsk obliterated it entirely. This made a one-party state and the reduction of the Soviets to mere appendages of the Bolsheviks inevitable. Henceforth, the Bolsheviks determined on the annihilation of all other political tendencies in the society as a prerequisite to their own survival. This would inevitably bring them into conflict with parties like the Musavat and the March 1918 events in Baku were one of the consequences.

When the Bolsheviks subverted the promise of the February Revolution and Russian democracy this gave the Caucasian elites little choice but to separate themselves from Russia.

The Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives of Transcaucasia were therefore brought together not only in order to prevent the chaos and conflict in Russia spreading to their area but through Bolshevik action. This prompted the Transcaucasian Commissariat to establish autonomous government as a kind of shield against the Bolsheviks in November 1918. The main intention of this federation was to protect the region against what was going on in Russia proper, until the situation improved and then some new relationship would be established with the rest of the state, with the Bolsheviks gone. The Transcaucasian Commissariat professed loyalty to the Russian Democracy of the February Revolution. It was not nationalist.

However, Lenin's gamble paid off – almost accidentally – because the Allied lines in the West held against the million extra Germans transferred to the front. Germany lost the War and the Bolsheviks as a consequence survived to face a Britain that, although triumphant, was substantially weakened, both physically and in terms of will, by 4 years of German resistance.

Lenin was either a genius or he was very lucky, saved by circumstances that were largely beyond his control. But from then on, the totalitarian state he established, constructed in the circumstances of early 1918, made, in the years to come, a fundamental social revolution possible.

The Transcaucasian Commissariat momentarily inclined toward acting as an entity independent of Russia when it had to deal with the Ottoman advance in the Caucasus in early 1918. If it had followed through on this, it could have secured peace and protection from the Ottomans. But it was disinclined to do so until the end.

The Commissariat, and from February 1918, the Seim – particularly its Menshevik part in Georgia – could not bring itself to become something apart from the Russian State, despite its collapse, and the general antagonism to the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus. The Commissariat, acting as part of a Russia that was in collapse, decided to go to war with the Ottomans and then lost very quickly (the Azerbaijani element was not in favour of this course).

It was the Bolshevik propaganda at Brest-Litovsk which provoked the separate organising and arming of Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani military units in response to events that pushed the parts of the region toward separatisms. And in May 1918 the Seim, which had only been established 5 weeks previously, dissolved and individual declarations of Georgian, Azerbaijani and Armenian independence were made. The declarations of independence of the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis were almost apologetic, rather than being upsurges of nationalism.

The four Caucasian Republics of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Dagestan came into existence in the vacuum between the advancing Ottomans and the dissolving Russian state. Georgia decided to accept German protection and declare independence before Azerbaijan put its trust in the Ottomans and declared its own independence on 28 May. Armenia followed suit on the same day. An agreement was reached between the Azerbaijani National Council and the Armenians consenting to the creation of an Armenian state within the limits of the Alexandropol Province. The city of Erivan was ceded to the Armenians on condition that Armenians would give up their claims to the mountainous part of Karabakh in the Elizavetpol Province (see Ismayil Hajiyev, *Lost Historical Lands of Azerbaijan*, IRS, No.24, 2016, pp.50-1)

The Ottomans stepped into the breach that had opened up in Transcaucasia, driving all the way to the Caspian and capturing Baku with the Azerbaijani national forces. The Ottomans, themselves had no problem with the Caucasian states and even placed the new Armenian state under their protection in a

treaty signed with the Erivan Republic (a treaty the Armenians immediately repudiated on the Ottoman Great War defeat).

Britain Encourages the Caucasus Nations

In a Memorandum to the War Cabinet on 1 November 1918, Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary stated:

“Recent events have created obligations which last beyond the occasions which gave them birth... In the South-east corner of Russia... in Transcaucasia and Transcaspiia... new anti-Bolshevik administrations have grown up under the shelter of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and we must endeavour to support them.” (CAB 23/8, WC 511, 1.11.1918)

It was presumed in Britain that some Russia would emerge from the Civil War and Britain would have to deal with it, no matter what management it was under. This had an implication with regard to whether Britain should promote the development of independent states in the region, which a future Russia, of whatever complexion, would surely not appreciate.

Britain's interest in the Caucasus had nothing to do with self-determination and any desire to establish democratic nation states. It was primarily geopolitical. The general British view was that the people of the Caucasus were unfit to govern themselves, being at a lower level of civilisation. When the states that eventually emerged from the situation of necessity finally succumbed to the Bolsheviks that was taken as proof by Britain that their view of the Caucasian people had been correct.

I must emphasise: If the idea around “self-determination” helped the British geopolitical interest the principle was supported, but it was never a principle in Britain's policy to establish democratic nation states in the region.

In late 1917 Britain had begun, for the first time, to encourage notions of nationality and self-determination among the peoples of the Caucasus in order to produce a new battle-line against the Germans and Ottomans. Whilst some success was achieved in this in relation to the Armenians and Georgians the British were not successful with the Azerbaijanis.

One British observer, Morgan Philips Price, a correspondent with *The Manchester Guardian*, who spent a number of years in the region, noted that the “national revival”/movement in Azerbaijan (and Daghestan) or “*Tartar nationalism*” was different in kind from the more narrow nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the Caucasus:

“The Tartars feel that their religion gives them a particular connection with all other Moslem neighbours. They feel a certain community of interest and fellow-sympathy with their co-religionists in Turkey and Persia. This form of freemasonry is characteristic of Moslem movements, which are not nationalist in the narrow political sense, as among Christian races, but cultural, like the earlier movements in the middle of last century among the Armenians and Georgians. They aim at developing the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish literature and language, at spreading knowledge of the great Moslem writers and thinkers of the past in Islam, and, generally, at promoting intercourse between Moslems in different parts of the world. Nationalism, in the sense of separating out one group of Moslems from another on the basis of language or origin or past history, of dividing Turk from Caucasian Tartar, or from Persian, has not yet been developed; and on the whole it does not seem likely that it will be.” (*War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, pp.262-3)

Philips Price, writing in early 1918, had the sense to dismiss the nightmares of British statesmen about “*Pan-Turanianism*” and “*Pan-Islamism*” that were gripping the makers of policy in Whitehall. He understood that the Azerbaijanis were a people

with a wider, more complex, culture than the Armenians (and Georgians) whose nationalism would be primarily territorial. As evidence of this we should remember how the Azerbaijani leadership decided not to contest the Armenians' claim to the Yerevan district, despite the fact that it had been a mainly Moslem area of settlement and still had a large Azerbaijani populace in 1918, in the hope that this gesture of goodwill to the Armenians would be reciprocated. It wasn't.

Most of the world lived in a pre-capitalist state until the Great War and it was felt – in Imperial Britain anyway – that the future was going to be Imperial rather than national. British Imperial writers predicted before the Great War that nations were dying, and Empires were spreading across the earth. That was “progress” and it was very much part of a Social Darwinist imperative that saturated Imperial thinking at the time.

Nations which sprang up out of the Great War are disinclined to write histories of themselves in pre-national form. The Great War catastrophe resulted in “progress” being national rather than Imperial. Not to have been a fully-fledged nation in 1914 was later seen to have been backward.

After the Great War the world was organised by the victors under a League of Nations, including newly constructed nation states with only a rudimentary national character, where no nations were before. These new nations bore no responsibility for the catastrophe that had taken place and which the League of Nations was established to prevent again. However, they were now required to be nations, by the states that had organised the catastrophe and under their authority. The future was the nation – although not all nations were equal!

A handful of states, who had brought about the catastrophe, presided over these new nations, deciding who was and who wasn't deserving of the prized national status. The world was now required to “progress” in this form within a system presided over mainly by Britain and France. Unfortunately, the tendency is to now write history within this scheme of things, which invariably results in deference to the definers of progress and gratitude for their recognition.

Britain had bombarded the world with propaganda about the Great War being about “*democracy*” and “*small nations*” for 4 years. When President Wilson took the U.S. into Britain's Great War he reinforced this particular moral aspect of the War and put behind it the new American power. A combination of British moral humbug and US moral earnestness therefore caused the Versailles Congress and its League of Nations to present itself to the World as the beginning of a new international order of things which would operate on the basis of democratic rights, self-determination, law and justice.

Is it any surprise that the Caucasian Republics believed they could become independent nation states in this general atmosphere and in a world being re-ordered by righteous champions of democracy?

The Azerbaijanis, who, among the Caucasian peoples, were the most serious about establishing national democratic structures, took the British at face-value and accepted the occupation as a kind of transition to the new world. The Musavat set out to prove their competence in government to the British and, it should be said, succeeded in leaving a good impression on them.

Of course, the reality was different. Britain advocated and applied its “self-determination” principle inconsistently – as it saw fit. As a general rule it advanced the principle in areas where problems could be caused for potential rivals to British power. This enabled it to destroy functional states and put together weird conglomerations and bloated states that spelt trouble for the future. In its own backyard – which was a sizeable part of the world in 1919 – on the other hand, Britain repressed such notions with its military forces (e.g. Ireland, Iraq, India etc.)

The new national governments were formed on a predominantly anti-Bolshevik basis and their interests conflicted with the Bolsheviks, despite the Bolshevik declaration on the Rights of Peoples. The peripheral areas, in consequence, provided potential bases for the formation of anti-Bolshevik movements whom Britain could support.

However the bigger question of Great Power politics confronted the British occupation in the Caucasus was: should Britain attempt to establish and support a series of buffer states that could be employed as a barrier against a future Russian return to the area or should it obstruct the development of such entities in the interest of future relations with a traditional Power that was not going to go away?

That was a question which it never fully resolved. The answer to it had to be supplied by the Bolsheviks themselves.

Denikin and the Nations Problem

In the Summer of 1918 Generals Denikin and Alexeiev had organised a volunteer army in Southern Russia to overthrow the Bolsheviks. It managed to dislodge the Bolsheviks from the area around the Black Sea and went on to occupy all of the Russian territory to the North of Georgia and Dagestan.

Initially, Britain pinned its hopes on Admiral Kolchak at Omsk in the East. During April 1920 Kolchak's armies went on the offensive and the Red Army in retreat. He had been supplied with 97,000 tons of British supplies including over 600,000 rifles and machine guns and was offered a set of Peace/Victory conditions to sign in the event of imminent victory in May 1920. Unfortunately, however, Kolchak's forces were stopped the next month and they never recovered from the reversal.

So, from the Summer of 1920 General Denikin was the main British Imperial instrument against the Bolsheviks in the absence of forces of their own, which had been hurriedly demobilised by Lloyd George at the end of 1918.

There was always a contradiction between Britain's support for Denikin and building any independent Caucasian Republics. Denikin, who Britain was lavishing with armaments and supplies against the Bolsheviks, made it clear that he intended to re-incorporate the Caucasus into a new Russian state, when he had seen off the Bolsheviks.

In December 1918 Armenian forces attacked Georgia, attempting to take a strip of territory and add it to the Erivan Republic, which was being governed by a Dashnak dictatorship. Firuz Kazemzadeh summed up the Armenian attitude:

“Had it not been for their faith in the Allies, they would never have attacked Georgia. They had been sure that Britain and France would not object to the punishment of a people who had collaborated with the Germans during the war. The West they felt owed them a debt. Had not Gladstone once said that to serve Armenia was to serve civilization? And ever since British, French, and American statesmen, writers, clergymen and diplomats had been repeating this phrase. Yet now that the Allies were in Transcaucasia, they failed to champion the Armenian cause.” (The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921, p.181)

Around the same time the Dashnaks began attacking Azerbaijan. General Andranik took his Special Striking Division into Karabakh, only to be stopped by General Thomson in Baku, who informed him that a dim view would be taken of any further aggressions. Andranik was encouraged to go on a tour of Europe, to get him out of the way.

The British had suspected an Armenian plot with General Denikin against the Georgians. Denikin's volunteer force had occupied Georgian Sochi in January 1919 claiming to act on behalf of the Abkhazians, presenting a difficult problem for the British.

In early 1919, after his victories against the Bolsheviks, Denikin invaded Dagestan, crushing the young Mountaineer Republic with great brutality. He then massed forces on the borders of Georgia and Azerbaijan and threatened Baku. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan attempted to help the Republic of Mountaineers against Denikin but without Allied support they could not save Dagestan. The British were at the same time aiding Denikin with war materiel that he was using against the Dagestan people.

Denikin also ran an underground organisation in Baku armed with explosives, rifles and communication material which was preparing for a rising – before being discovered. The White General Bicherakhov, who had been brought back to the city by the British, was found to be plotting a coup and had to be removed to England. When he was there his forces were expelled from Baku by General Thomson.

The threat from Denikin and his attempts to take the Caucasus back into Russian control prompted the Georgians and Azerbaijanis to draw up a mutual defence agreement in June 1919. Finally, the British acted. Major-General Cory defined a demarcation line to the North of the Caucasus mountains that Denikin had to withdraw behind. Denikin instituted a food blockade of Georgia and Azerbaijan and delivered a large quantity of ammunition to the Armenians in response. (*The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921*, pp.246-7).

The Bolsheviks used Denikin's aggression to court the Caucasus peoples. Commissar Chicherin published an appeal which declared that the British intended to give them up to Denikin:

“Comrades, workers and Peasants of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Georgia! Soviet Russia has no intention of marching against your republics... She stands firmly on the principle of self-determination... And if you, the Muslims and the Georgians of the Caucasus, are satisfied with the form of government of your republics, live in tranquillity, exercise your right of self-determination, and restore good neighbourly relations with us... Soviet Russia expresses the firm hope that the workers and peasants of Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia will not allow their freedom to be trampled under the feet of the Tsarist General, the English executioner, Denikin.” (ibid, p.248)

The Caucasus Republics could not, of course, respond to the Bolshevik appeal because of the British occupation. The British realised the potential danger, however. Denikin was brought to heel with the knowledge that without British support he could not maintain his forces in the field.

Britain's immediate policy in early 1919 aimed at keeping General Denikin, out of the Caucasus, and directed against the Bolsheviks.

The British military mission that arrived in Southern Russia during late 1918, provided General Denikin's White army with war material. The White armies had no local production facilities for making war, so British assistance was vital. It is almost certain that Denikin would have not been able to build or maintain his army of 225,000 men, or advance toward Moscow, without the British assistance. Without such help the Russian Civil War would have been confined to small scale engagements by Diehard anti-Bolsheviks. The British Mission organised, armed, trained and equipped the White Russian armies. Many of the British instructors also took part in fighting the Bolsheviks alongside Denikin's forces.

Britain was also supporting Admiral Kolchak's army in Siberia. But during the spring and summer of 1919, the White armies in the North suffered several defeats and began retreating. Denikin's army was more successful in Southern Russia, taking great amounts of territory from the Bolsheviks and advancing towards Moscow during the Summer. It was realised that Denikin was the White commander with the best chance to defeat the Bolsheviks. Most British military aid was directed toward his army and Southern Russia.

There were various views in Britain about what should be done with regard to Russia. But if there was one constant in British policy it was the desire to keep Russia fighting itself for as long as possible so that the disablement of the Russian State was continued. It was much better for Britain if a weak Russia emerged from its Civil War than a strong one, whether it be White or Red. The basic aim of the British policy was, therefore, to weaken Russia and to prevent its re-emergence as a strong state for as long as possible.

Documents

Macron and Kramp-Karrenbauer: Vive la Différence? by Andrew Watt

The proxy media exchange between the French president and the leader of the German Christian democrats is a sign of an emergent European public sphere.

On March 4th something unusual—as far as I can recall, unprecedented—happened in European politics. The head of state of a member state of the European Union, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, directly addressed the citizens of all EU countries, simultaneously, in no less than 22 European languages. He bypassed the usual intergovernmental channels completely and the filtering systems of 28 nationally organised media at least partially.

While the unusual form of the address undoubtedly ruffled some feathers, it drew a high-level response. The general secretary of the Christian Democratic Union and likely Germany's next chancellor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (widely known in Germany as 'AKK'), issued a reply, made available in five languages. Beyond the fact that this did not come from the current head of government, the exchange points, against the background of the incipient campaign for the European elections at the end of May, to emergent signs of a phenomenon whose absence has long been considered a critical weakness of the EU—a European public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*).

But what of the content? Here the differences are marked but in the context of the upcoming European elections that may not be a bad thing.

Macron: chastened but persistent

Macron's starting point is 'Brexit', which he sees as both an expression of Europe's weakness—specifically that it 'has failed to respond to its peoples' needs for protection from the major shocks of the modern world'—and an illustration that nationalist populism is a dangerous trap, peddled by the ignorant and untrustworthy. The EU needs to meet people's needs for 'protection' if citizens are not to abandon Europe and fall under the spell of nationalist pied-pipers.

The right response, he argues, is to emphasise where Europe already does effectively enhance individual member states' policy space and to reform Europe's capacity to act. He proposes that reform should occur in three broad areas, under the nebulous titles of freedom, protection and progress, giving in each case illustrative examples:—

Freedom: a European agency to protect democracy from foreign intervention, bans on foreign funding of political parties and European rules against hate speech and other internet-based abuse.

Protection: strengthening border protection and the common asylum system, a defence treaty with a mutual-defence clause and higher spending and an emphasis on fair (rather than ‘free’) trade and competition, with tighter controls over foreign enterprises and a more strategic industrial policy.

Progress: a continent-wide ‘social shield’ (presumably minimum standards), a minimum-wage norm, and a greater push on climate change, for example with a European climate bank.

As a mechanism to push for change he urges a Conference for Europe, which appears to follow the same philosophy as his *grand débat* in France. He ends with a nod to a multi-speed Europe as an alternative to stasis and, closing his rhetorical circle, a belief that such a Europe will be one which the Brits will wish to remain members of or to rejoin.

Macron has toned down the lyrical volume compared with his 2017 [Sorbonne speech](#) on Europe. The emphasis is on identifying areas where an institutionalised European approach offers advantages to *member states* in delivering solutions which meet citizens’ demands, thus making them less discontented with their national governments and with the EU. The form that this institutionalisation might take is often left open and is likely to vary from policy field to policy field.

What is not mentioned is also important: economic-policy co-ordination and eurozone reform—a major preoccupation of the past few years—has been dropped. Clearly Macron has concluded he is on a hiding to nothing here. Equally ‘scary’ subjects, such as the size of the EU budget and reform of the EU institutions, are also left out.

This lends Macron’s proposals a certain superficiality, even if the desired direction of travel is clearly stated. It is hard to imagine how, in unblocking progress, discursive exercises involving citizens can substitute for reducing the veto points in EU decision-making. This, in turn, means some combination of reducing the size of majorities needed to agree on EU-wide legislation and enabling greater resort to multi-speed initiatives.

AKK: icebergs ahead

AKK’s response, entitled ‘Getting Europe right’, came swiftly and is moderately detailed. There is an initial overlap of language and purpose with the declaration by the French president: Europe’s successes need to be recognised but it needs to enhance its capacity for collective action.

There is also—on the surface—a degree of thematic overlap. Some of the priorities mentioned by AKK echo those of Macron: fighting tax evasion, strengthening border control and defence capabilities (peppered with the off-the-wall example of building a European aircraft carrier) and support for technology and innovation, notably in the area of climate change. She also avoids eurozone economic governance.

Beneath the superficial harmony, however, lie four icebergs. The first is AKK’s repeated emphasis on subsidiarity and intergovernmentalism and the classic ordoliberal theme of equating political responsibility and liability. This approach is fundamentally at odds with Macron’s vision, which is incrementally federalist.

Related to this, secondly, AKK emphasises the need to respect countries’ idiosyncrasies, explicitly mentioning central and eastern Europe. In the short term, this implies tacit support for countries which Macron has portrayed as having a fundamentally different and regressive vision of Europe and, in the longer run, a view that integration should proceed at the speed of the most reluctant—thus a rejection of Macron’s idea of coalitions of the willing forging ahead.

Thirdly, she not only accepts, as Macron does, that populists air economic grievances which need to be taken seriously but plays to Islamophobic fears, blaming immigration primarily for increasing social heterogeneity, while pushing populist talking points such as the tax treatment of EU officials.

Finally, she waves—seemingly gratuitously—three red rags at the French bull, calling into question the French permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the status of Strasbourg as a seat of the European Parliament and the scale of agricultural subsidies. It is not that these proposals have no merit, but the casual way they are introduced, without any indication that this could involve a German *quid pro quo*, must reinforce concerns in France, and elsewhere, about the overweening power—not to say arrogance—of the EU’s largest member.

Very different visions

It seems that, beyond some hazy common ground, the French president and Germany’s likely next leader hold very different visions of the right direction of travel for Europe. On the one hand, building common institutions, strengthening the capacity for common decisions and permitting enhanced co-operation by integration-friendly coalitions, all with the aim of taking the wind out of the populists’ sails; on the other, a doubling down on the virtues of intergovernmental co-operation, subsidiarity, respect for national differences and at least partial acceptance of the cultural and identity-related arguments of nationalist populists.

It is election time and AKK is speaking as leader of the CDU. She is concerned to staunch losses to the EU-critical and anti-immigrant *Alternative für Deutschland*. If the next German ruling coalition is with the social democrats or the greens, then the government line will certainly be different—not, though, in the not-improbable eventuality of coalition with the market-liberal Free Democratic Party. Still, the huge gap between the two discourses does not bode well for the prospects of reforming Europe in the near term.

Macron had waited for a long-time for a positive response to his earlier initiatives. The 2018 Franco-German [Meseberg agreement](#) and subsequent policy steps have been very limited, even if the recent [Aachen treaty](#) contained some aspirational language and initiatives. Now, economy-policy issues having been largely dropped, a response from Germany has been forthcoming but, underneath a thin veneer, the language is at best unwelcoming and in places seems gratuitously provocative.

Yet establishing a European public sphere and getting key leaders to agree within it are two different things. The articulation of different visions puts the spotlight back on the [European elections](#) and has the advantage of bringing into focus a clear choice for European citizens at the end of May.

In the next European Parliament and Commission, voters can strengthen those forces seeking to strengthen common institutions (maybe accepting a multi-speed approach) and collective problem-solving. Or they can favour those which prioritise intergovernmental mechanisms in which the Council of the EU plays the key rule, defining minimalist solutions for the whole block, while maintaining and even increasing national veto powers.

A European public sphere is a venue for robust debate about the future course of the EU. It will not be created overnight but the exchange between Macron and Kramp-Karrenberger is a step forward.

Andrew Watt (21st March 2019 [@andrewwattu](#))

How did it all Go Wrong for Russia? The Durnovo Memorandum to the Tsar, February 1914.

Introduction by Pat Walsh

The short answer is when Tsar Nicholas II offered his country and its population up to Britain in its Great War of 1914 to destroy Germany and break up the Ottoman Empire. In waging that War, in which Russia was bled to collapse in return for substantial British finance to continue fighting to the bitter end, the Tsar sealed the fate of himself, his dynasty and his State. And it has taken Russia, and the World, a century to recover from that momentous decision.

The Tsar had been warned for a long time before about the dangerous road he was taking by his most able and impressive minister, Count Witte, who Nicholas had unfortunately dismissed in 1903. But he received one final warning before he finally took Russia to the abyss.

It came from Pyotr Durnovo, Count Witte's old Interior Minister, who had effectively suppressed the 1905 Revolution for the Tsar. Durnovo was a conservative monarchist who believed that it was not in Russia's interest to fight a costly war with an uncertain outcome against Germany, another state of traditional character. He thought the outcome of such a destructive war would only help further the interests of Russia's geopolitical enemy, Britain, and that rapprochement with Germany should be taken as a more prudent course by the Tsar.

In a long memorandum to the Tsar, written in February 1914, Durnovo set out his case to his leader. He warned about the drift of Russian Foreign Policy toward war, since 1907, in alliance with England and France, over the Pan-Slavic cause in the Balkans. It is one of the most magnificently prophetic pieces of writing in World history and is, therefore, worthy of re-publication. It can be found in full below this commentary.

A copy of the Durnovo Memorandum was found among the Tsar's most valued personal papers when he was arrested in 1917. It might have been that Nicholas had come to realise the wisdom of Durnovo's warning and saw the document as a kind of guide to what future travails would befall his country as a result of the decision to go to war. Or it might be that the Tsar kept it to remind the doubters how wrong they had been when the Russian Steamroller rolled into Berlin and Istanbul had become Tsargrad! We will never know.

It shows an unusually perceptive understanding of the nature of the Great War that was about to be fought and why it was the wrong course for Russia to take. And history verifies its almost faultless predictive accuracy.

Durnovo made no bones about describing the war he saw coming as being about the rivalry that had developed between Germany and England over recent decades. It was, really, none of Russia's business. Durnovo told the Tsar that the British would, through necessity, expand this war into a world war, and wage it with such a formidable group of allies that success was highly probable. It would seize the small number of German colonies, stop Germany's trade and destroy her navy. Durnovo also accurately predicted the main line ups as France, Russia, Britain, Italy, Serbia and Romania against Germany, Austro-Hungary, Ottoman Turkey and Bulgaria with the U.S. coming in later on the British side.

Durnovo saw no good in the Tsar's 1907 agreement with England and plenty of danger for Russia in what it was now entailing. It was the pivotal event on the Russian road to destruction. After a discussion about the supposed benefits to Russia in the Far East and Persia of the Anglo-Russian Convention, Durnovo stated: *"To sum up, the Anglo-Russian*

accord has brought us nothing of practical value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens us with an inevitable armed clash with Germany."

Durnovo correctly foresaw that the main burden of the war would fall on Russia and her population, as the Allies' *"battering ram"*. The French, with their declining population, could only possibly provide a holding operation in the West, whilst the British would use the sea to their own selfish advantage, as per usual. That was, after all, the British way in warfare and Empire building.

In conclusion, Durnovo advised the Tsar:

"A summary of all that has been stated above must lead to the conclusion that a rapprochement with England does not promise us any benefits, and that the English orientation of our diplomacy is essentially wrong. We do not travel the same road as England; she should be left to go her own way, and we must not quarrel on her account with Germany.

The Triple Entente is an artificial combination, without a basis of real interest. It has nothing to look forward to. The future belongs to a close and incomparably more vital rapprochement of Russia, Germany, France (reconciled with Germany), and Japan (allied to Russia by a strictly defensive union). A political combination like this, lacking all aggressiveness toward other States, would safeguard for many years the peace of the civilized nations, threatened, not by the militant intentions of Germany, as English diplomacy is trying to show, but solely by the perfectly natural striving of England to retain at all costs her vanishing domination of the seas. In this direction, and not in the fruitless search of a basis for an accord with England, which is in its very nature contrary to our national plans and aims, should all the efforts of our diplomacy be concentrated.

It goes without saying that Germany, on her part, must meet our desire to restore our well-tested relations and friendly alliance with her, and to elaborate, in closest agreement with us, such terms of our neighbourly existence as to afford no basis for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutional-liberal parties, which, by their very nature, are forced to adhere, not to a Conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation."

The Tsar could have not been presented with better analysis of the dangerous situation Russia was propelling itself toward and more astute advice about what to do instead. But evidently Durnovo's advice was ignored by the Tsar and his war mongering ministers and they proceeded to lead their country to destruction.

Count Witte and the Russia Threat

By the last decade of the 19th Century the Russian Empire had grown into the largest state in the world, in terms of continuous territory. It was not as large as the British Empire, but Greater Britain was an empire on many continents, held together by a navy. The Russian Empire had a population of 150 million and it had expanded at a rate of over 50 miles a day over the previous centuries.

After the Russian Revolution fatal weaknesses were found to exist within the Tsarist system, but that is not how things were seen from Britain at the turn of the century. Russia was a *"Going Concern"* of enormous size and considerable power. As a sure sign of its health, both capital and people migrated

there in considerable amounts. And it was the state that Britain undoubtedly feared most in the World.

Tsarist Russia was not the declining decrepit state that it is often portrayed as, in histories written after 1917. But the astonishing resurrection of Russia under the Bolsheviks, from where the Tsar and the Russian Liberals had left it in 1917, also tends to disguise how low it had fallen.

Russia was seen in England as the advance guard of Western Civilisation in Asia and its “civilising mission” was admired as much as the consequences of it were feared. In the decades prior to the events that led Tsar Nicholas to War, the Russian economy was in very good shape and was the fastest growing in the World. New railways were being laid at a tremendous rate. Between 1900 and 1914, iron and coal production more than doubled and Russian grain fed much of the European continent. Russia had a vigorous intellectual life which produced Tolstoy and Dostoevsky and there was a great flowering of cultural life in the last decades of the Romanovs.

In 1902 Valentine Chirol, Director of the Foreign Department of *The Times* and friend of Lord Curzon, visited the Southern Caucasus and Persia to see what the Russians had achieved. After disembarking from a Caspian ferry from Baku at Enzeli he observed the new 220-mile road from Resht to Teheran, funded by Russian capital and built through Russian enterprise. For Chirol it was symbolic of the ascendancy of Russia in the region and he marvelled at the enormous outlay and the difficulties that had been overcome. Chirol believed that the road would enable Russia to pour its troops quickly into Northern Persia where expansion was inevitable.

Russia’s great industrial development in the 1890s took place largely under the guidance of Count Sergei Witte. Witte was the director of Railway Affairs from 1889 to 1891 and after his success in this important role was appointed the Tsar’s Minister for Finance, a position he held until 1903. Under his direction Russia embarked upon a hugely ambitious programme of economic modernisation. Importantly, it was performed within the context of good diplomatic relations with both France and Germany. Witte was for internal development and against problems with other Powers.

Count Witte had to overcome a substantial conservative opposition which feared the growth of industrial capitalism and a proletariat in agrarian Russia. What distinguished Witte from his predecessors was his ability to produce a climate conducive to development and his ability to direct government policy, planning and resources to that end. He practised state capitalism, which directed the flow of capital into heavy industry and infrastructure and encouraged foreign inward investment and technological development to improve efficiency in all areas of the Russian economy.

Count Witte introduced monetary reform and placed the Russian currency on the Gold Standard. His measures created the climate for foreign capital investment of a progressive type. Between 1894 and 1902 the highest proportion of government funds were assigned to industrial growth and the development of the railways and the Russian State became the prime mover in this, by supplying capital itself or making it available from other sources. The chemical, mining and steel industries were built up and a programme of training was instituted to create an industrial proletariat out of the peasants. By 1900 there were around 2.5 million factory workers in Russia.

Railroads were most important to Witte as a force capable of drawing together the Empire’s vast spaces, its people, agriculture and industry. He saw them as agents of civilisation and progress, linking Russia with Europe and, particularly Asia, where markets could be developed that would reduce the country’s dependence on Europe. Under Witte’s administration there was a doubling of the amount of railroad track and it

was he who was responsible for the great Trans-Siberian line of 4,000 miles, which unified the Empire. The spread of the railways was accompanied by the expansion of heavy industry and increased outputs of iron, steel, coal, oil and machinery production to serve the expansion of trackbed. Ports like Riga and Odessa were expanded and quadrupled in size and Baku was transformed into one of the richest cities in the world during the period of Witte’s administration.

Russian growth rates, at around 8 per cent per annum, were phenomenal under Witte’s influence, with the country exceeding those of America, Germany and Britain and surpassing those of Britain’s industrial revolution at its height of progress - with far less of the brutal exploitation that had characterised Victorian England.

In 1904, the illustrious Director of the London School of Economics, Professor Halford Mackinder, eyeing the overall development of Russia with great concern, noted in a famous paper given to the Royal Geographical Society, ‘*The Geographical Pivot of History*’, that:

“The Russian railways have a clear run of 6000 miles... The Russian army in Manchuria is as significant evidence of mobile land-power as the British army in South Africa was of sea-power... the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with railways. The spaces within the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel and metals so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world... will there develop inaccessible to oceanic enterprise... Is not the pivot region of the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a network of railways. There have been and are here the conditions of a mobility of military and economic power of a far-reaching and yet limited character. Russia replaces the Mongol empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, on China replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppe-men. In the world at large she occupies the central strategic position held by Germany in Europe.” (Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, pp.260-1)

This is Mackinder’s influential idea of the world as an island, with Russia as its “pivot state”. Whoever controlled this “heartland” would control the world, according to Mackinder. This Russian “heartland” was unfortunately beyond the control of the great Sea Power of Britain.

One can see from this analysis, by the father of geopolitics, the issue that confronted Imperial Britain at the turn of the Century. Both Germany, with its Berlin-Baghdad Railway, and Russia, with its Trans-Siberian Railway, were developing rapidly and establishing extensive inter-continental markets that were largely immune from the influence of British Sea Power. These were dangerous developments for Britain’s global dominance and threatened the development of something that was seen as intolerable – a multi-polar world.

Britain, of course, could not confront the threat of Germany and Russia together. The two had to be detached and dealt with differently. One had to be curtailed and accommodated to a degree, to facilitate a situation by which the other could be destroyed as a rival.

The Liberal Fear of Russia

After Britain had secured the Russian Steamroller in its Great War on Germany, H.G. Wells addressed “The Liberal Fear of Russia” in a famous piece for *The Nation* on 22nd August 1914. He aimed to dispel the fears of English Liberals, which might get in the way of the waging of a successful war against the new enemy, with the former enemy as ally. It is interesting

in understanding how the unlikely alliance between Liberal England and Tsarist Russia was justified in Britain.

H.G. Wells described Russia as an “*obscurantist*”, “*barbaric*” and “*aggressive*” state. He declared himself prepared to let it expand, taking Constantinople if it must, along with the creation of Greater Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, which he hoped it would check. Such ideals were hardly the traditional causes of English Liberalism or even the Jingoism in the Tory Party.

There was little doubt that England would not have procured Russia as a force against Germany if it was not worth procuring. Wells’ basic message to English Liberals was that a triumphant Russia was not to be feared. It did not possess the internal character to be a future force in the World, that its size might have determined it should be, and if it liberalised itself in its development it would deprive itself of the very character that made it a threat in the first place, in the minds of English Liberals.

Russia was a very useful instrument to create the second front that was necessary for Britain to win such a War against that country which had been identified as the primary threat to British World dominance at that moment in time. Wells seems to have presumed that Russia would probably do enough for Britain’s needs, but damage itself badly in the process. That would be all well and good for the future. Russia would be no future threat to the British Empire in the aftermath of the War.

That seems to have been the calculation that British Liberals made when they cast aside their doubts about being an ally of autocratic Russia and abandoned their opposition to War in the days following Edward Grey’s famous speech.

It was as much a fatal calculation for English Liberalism as it proved to be for Tsarist Russia (Rather fittingly H.G. Wells’ article is included in the appropriately named collection, *The War to End War*. Perhaps the greatest illusion/miscalculation of all made in 1914.)

It was in the course of attempting to destroy the successful German State that Britain led Tsarist Russia to its destruction. Tsarist Russia was ready for war in 1914. It was a powerful and long-standing expansionary state with further ambitions of expansion – particularly down to the Dardanelles. It immediately went on the offensive on all fronts – European and Caucasian.

After Britain had made the European war of July 1914 into a World War by joining it and expanded its conflict zone to global proportions it supported the Tsarist War effort with nearly 600 million pounds in loans over the following few years. As in previous wars fought on the European continent, in pursuit of the Balance of Power, British finance was an important element in sustaining conflict to the required level of attrition so that the enemy could be ground down.

All that was required from Russia was blood in the short-term, until the War was won and then the loans could be repaid when things returned to normality, minus Germany and the Ottomans.

The Road to Destruction

A series of three events enabled Britain to ultimately master the perceived Russian threat to its preponderance in the World: Firstly, there was the unfortunate dismissal of Count Witte as Finance Minister by the Tsar in 1903. This was closely followed by the disastrous Russian war on Japan in the following year, facilitated by the British alliance with the Japanese of 1902. And then the 1905 Revolution.

The disastrous war that the Tsar fought with Japan over Manchuria, after the dismissal of Count Witte, was a pivotal event in the downward spiral of events that took the Romanovs and Russia to destruction in 1917. It is a war that is very much

neglected in British history books despite, or maybe because of, England’s role in it.

After Japan had seized the Liaoting Peninsula, as a result of its 1894-5 war on China over the possession of Korea, Count Witte became determined to maintain the integrity of the Chinese Empire and prevent it becoming carved up by the Western Imperialists. Witte pressed the European Powers to present an ultimatum to the Japanese to evacuate Liaoting for a war indemnity. The tripartite alliance that Witte summoned up, through his good relations with France and Germany, forced the Japanese out. However, ominously, Britain, which had its eyes on an alliance with Japan, refused Witte’s invitation to join the pressure on Tokyo.

To protect the future integrity of China, Witte established a Russian/Chinese Bank and secured loans for the Chinese Government. He also signed a secret treaty promising military assistance to China if it were attacked again.

However, Count Witte then found all his good work undone by his enemies at the court, who persuaded the Tsar to occupy Port Arthur on the Liaoting Peninsula and undermined good Russian/Chinese relations. This act, and other European encroachments, led to the Boxer Rebellion. Russian forces were then sent into Manchuria to secure interests and the Chinese Eastern Railway. Witte urged the Tsar to withdraw these troops as soon as possible to avoid Russia falling into a quagmire.

England concluded an alliance with Japan in February 1902, ostensibly to block Russian movement toward the Pacific coast and the attainment of a warm-water port. From the 1890s British shipyards had built a modern battle fleet for the Japanese navy, which Tokyo would require to safeguard its own designs on China and Korea. The agreement had a clause which promised British assistance if Japan got into a war with more than one Power.

This was clever because it meant that if Japan felt like taking on Russia there would be a strong deterrent effect on France, Germany, or anyone else, minded to help Russia. Secret clauses authorised the Japanese to avail of British coaling stations and docks in the region, in return for looking after British interests in the Far East. The British thus contracted out a policing role to Tokyo on behalf of the British Empire to release the Royal Navy for other pressing engagements elsewhere in the world. Large British loans were facilitated by Lord Esher, through the City of London, to build up Tokyo’s war chest.

The Anglo-Japanese treaty was something that astonished the World. It was unprecedented as a formal alliance, granted by Britain to a foreign Power, and an Asiatic one at that. It was concluded in secret by Lord Lansdowne and presented as a *fait accompli* to a surprised British Parliament.

The Tsar, who had initially taken Witte’s good advice and agreed to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and promised a phased withdrawal of Russian troops, inadvisably went back on his word. This prompted Count Witte, who had warned him of the danger, to resign from the Council of Ministers. The Japanese presented Russia with an ultimatum to recognise Tokyo’s claims on Korea or face war. The Tsar refused to accept the indignity of an ultimatum from an inferior race and in February 1904 Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, without issuing a declaration of war. The Russian garrison at Port Arthur was then put under siege by a force of up to 80,000 Japanese, blocking off all chance of relieving them by land.

This is where the Straits Convention came into play for Britain. The Russian Black Sea fleet was the closest naval force with the potential to relieve Port Arthur but the Tsar was reminded by London, citing the Treaty of Berlin, that any

attempt to sail it through the Dardanelles would mean war, severely handicapping the Russian war effort.

Because of this the Russian Baltic fleet had to be sent on an eight month voyage to relieve the Russian force at Port Arthur. Before it could reach the Cape of Good Hope the Russians were forced to surrender at Port Arthur and their army in Manchuria was destroyed by Japanese forces. Having sent his fleet out, half way across the world, the Tsar then decided, unwisely, to let it fight a face-saving battle. At Tsushima the Russian fleet was annihilated by the Imperial Japanese Navy, which lay in restful wait for the exhausted Russians. The Baltic fleet lost 24 ships in the battle, before surrendering the rest. This meant that the Tsar lost two of his three fleets – the Pacific and Baltic- whilst the British bottled up his remaining forces in the Black Sea.

Count Witte was summoned out of retirement by the Tsar to salvage a deal with the Japanese victors, which he did in limiting the Japanese to the southern half of the Liaoting Peninsula and avoiding a crushing war indemnity.

The Russian defeat resulted in the loss of 100,000 soldiers and sailors and the obliteration of the Tsar's navy. The 1902 treaty with Japan had been a wonderful success for Britain. Russian prestige had been badly damaged by the Japanese because the Orientals were not seen as a first-class race by White Europeans. The limitations of Russian land power had been demonstrated by the appliance of a sea power from the East. The importance of the Straits had been demonstrated to the Tsar and his only warm-water port was gone. And worse was to come when the disastrous and humiliating war sparked off revolution in Russia in 1905.

1905 and After

During 1905 terrorism grew to gigantic proportions in Russia with 3,600 officials killed or wounded by assorted assassins. The remains of the Tsar's fleet mutinied in the Black Sea. Bloody Sunday occurred outside the Winter Palace and the Tsar's uncle was assassinated. Serious inter-communal violence exploded in the Southern Caucasus destroying the Baku oil wells and paralysing production.

Count Witte advised the hesitating Tsar that he should either appoint a military dictator to crush the revolution or buy it off by embracing constitutionalism, through the convoking of a representative Duma. This would split the liberals from the revolutionaries, who could then be dealt with in an appropriate way. Witte told the Tsar that it was one course or another and half-measures would be fatal. The Tsar authorised Witte to draw up a reform plan that became the October Manifesto.

The Revolution was defeated through Witte's programme and the main soviets in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Tiflis were crushed in the military clampdown organised by the Minister of the Interior, Durnovo. The Revolution, following the disastrous war, had shaken the Romanov regime to its foundations, but Witte, before he resigned in April 1906, had bought the Tsar time to stabilise things.

Count Witte had enabled the Tsar to stabilise his State and preserve the Romanov dynasty. Luckily for the Tsar, after Witte's retirement, another effective statesman emerged. Peter Stolypin, who became Minister for the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, employed a combination of ruthless suppression of the revolutionaries and terrorists with popular social and land reforms, which he pushed through the Duma, to restore order. He revived Witte's state capitalism with good effect and resumed railway building to finish the Trans-Siberian line. Following Witte, Stolypin operated a paternalistic system through the Tsar and Church, counterposed to the excesses of the profiteering liberal capitalists.

But the success of the Stolypin programme, like that of Count Witte, depended on the maintenance of external peace

and the avoidance of war. Stolypin, most of all, endeavoured to avoid foreign entanglements to avoid a repeat of 1905.

In that respect the 1907 convention with Britain was a dangerous initiative. It was opposed by Count Witte, in retirement, who called it "*a triumph of British diplomacy*" viewing it as a fatal accommodation by Russia to the British interest in the World. Witte knew it would poison relations with Germany through the suspicions it would raise and he saw it as an unnecessary concession over Persia, whose Northern provinces Russia was destined to absorb in any case.

Sir Edward Grey's Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, settled a number of territorial issues between the two Powers, including Persia. In the Agreement Persia was partitioned into three zones of influence, with the Tsar taking the Northern part, the British absorbing the South East and an intermediate "*neutral*" zone in between.

This Agreement suspended "*The Great Game*" of Imperial rivalry between England and Russia in the interests of the British Balance of Power Policy in Europe and a future war on Germany.

The ground for the 1907 Agreement with Russia was prepared by Sir Edward Grey and the City of London through a 90 million pound loan made to Russia in 1906. The disastrous war with Japan had caused a financial crisis in Russia with the Tsarist State buckling under the strain of maintaining the Gold Standard as its Bonds rapidly depreciated in value. Russia had a long-standing financial relationship with French banks, but after the 1904 *Entente* France and Britain began to work more closely together and the British Foreign Secretary insisted on British participation in the 1906 Bond issue. It may have seemed strange that Britain was ready and willing to bail out its chief enemy in the world at a time of its great financial crisis, but Grey obviously saw a great opportunity to tie Russia into a relationship, when it was most vulnerable.

The British Agreement with the Tsar in 1907 had immediate effects within Russia, with Britain's signal that they probably would no longer defend the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Russia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Izvolski, began to press the Tsar for a "*short, victorious war*" against the Ottomans, to restore Russia's prestige after the defeat by Japan. Izvolski argued for a war to bring about "*Russia's historical goals in the Turkish East*", and he made plans for seizing the Straits and the partition of the Ottoman territories. Stolypin opposed such schemes, telling the Tsar that Russian mobilisation would be madness and would kill the financial stability he had recently put in place, endangering the recovery after 1905. He demanded "*twenty years of peace*" to ensure the stability and transformation of Russia.

Izvolski was undermined by a foolish deal he cut with the Austro-Hungarians in October 1908, designed to take advantage of the instability in the Ottoman State, as a result of the Young Turk revolution of July 1908, which nearly toppled Sultan Abdul Hamid. In exchange for Russian acquiescence in Vienna's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Austrians offered to revise the Treaty of Berlin to allow Russian warships through the Istanbul Straits. This was not in the gift of Vienna, coming up against not only the opposition of the Sultan but Britain too. It would have ran a coach and horses through the Public Law of Europe/International Law. Russian opinion was outraged when Vienna announced its annexation of the Ottoman territory in Bosnia and Izvolski revealed his part in the deal. Sergei Sazonov, Stolypin's brother-in-law, replaced Izvolski as Foreign Minister in 1910.

Stolypin continued to oppose the Liberal Pan-Slavism which threatened to entangle Russia in the Balkans against the Ottomans. However, court politics resulted in his sudden disfavouring by the Tsar, and soon after he was shot dead by a

terrorist in September 1910. With both Witte and Stolypin gone the brakes were off.

From this time on pressure began to be mounted on the Tsar to take advantage of the situation in the Ottoman Empire and to seize the Straits. The Tsar knew, however, that Russia could only act in conjunction with England, when Britain was prepared to move against Germany, vetoed plans for war. Instead, Russia adopted a policy of fake *rapprochement* with the Ottomans, under the new Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov, in a holding operation to maintain the Ottoman territories until the moment for a large war was right.

The Straits agreement in the Treaty of Paris, therefore, continued to provide Britain with great leverage over Russia. The blocking of the Straits, and its unblocking, which seemed to be the Sultan's prerogative, was actually strongly determined by British attitude and action. Russia's ability to trade could, therefore, be contingent upon services rendered by the Tsar in relation to England's Germany problem. And Russian internal stability was very much dependent on the value of trade.

Things came to a head at a meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers in January 1914. Sazonov had, a week earlier, proposed to the Tsar that the time was now right to provoke a European war, in alliance with England and France, so that Constantinople could be stormed and made into Tsargrad. The idea was to use the appointment of Liman von Sanders, a German, as a cause for war. Only a reality check by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kokovtsov, who asked: "*Is the war desirable and can Russia wage it?*" seems to have stayed the Russian rush to war.

There was almost unanimous enthusiasm among the Tsar's ministers for provoking a European war over the von Sanders affair. However, whilst there was near certainty amongst the ministers that Russia would be joined by England and France in such a war there were lingering doubts about whether London would stay out of the conflict if it was provoked at that point on such an issue. Britain was a democracy of sorts and had to take care of public opinion and the Liberal Government had not been straight with its own backbenchers on what it had been doing in the background so it was vital that the war be launched on the right issue.

The Russian naval command warned that a unilateral amphibious assault would also be beyond them at that moment. It was determined, therefore, to resort to war only if "*the active participation of both France and England in joint measures were assured.*" Kokovtsov then convinced everyone to back down from war.

Durnovo was of the opinion that the Ottomans would be drawn into any war between the two great combinations who were shaping up for confrontation in Europe. After all, how would the Tsar get the Straits without the war being taken to Istanbul? It was self-evident.

It was at that moment, in February 1914, that the Tsar got his final warning:

The Durnovo Memorandum of February 1914

A Future Anglo-German War Will Become an Armed Conflict between Two Groups of Powers

The central factor of the period of world history through which we are now passing is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the issue of which will, in all probability, prove fatal to the vanquished side. The interests of these two powers are far too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as world powers will sooner or later prove impossible. On the

one hand, there is an insular State, whose world importance rests upon its domination of the sea, its world trade, and its innumerable colonies. On the other, there is a powerful continental empire, whose limited territory is insufficient for an increased population. It has therefore openly and candidly declared that its future is on the seas. It has, with fabulous speed, developed enormous world commerce, built for its protection a formidable navy, and, with its famous trademark, "Made in Germany," created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic prosperity of its rival. Naturally, England cannot yield without a fight, and between her and Germany a struggle for life or death is inevitable.

The armed conflict impending as a result of this rivalry cannot be confined to a duel between England and Germany alone. Their resources are far too unequal, and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany could provoke rebellion in India, in South Africa, and, especially, a dangerous rebellion in Ireland, and paralyze English sea trade by means of privateering and, perhaps, submarine warfare, thereby creating for Great Britain difficulties in her food supply; but, in spite of all the daring of the German military leaders, they would scarcely risk landing in England, unless a fortunate accident helped them to destroy or appreciably to weaken the English navy. As for England, she will find Germany absolutely invulnerable. All that she may achieve is to seize the German colonies, stop German sea trade, and, in the most favourable event, annihilate the German navy, but nothing more. This, however, would not force the enemy to sue for peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will attempt the means she has more than once used with success, and will risk armed action only after securing participation in the war, on her own side, of powers stronger in a strategical sense. But since Germany, for her own part, will not be found isolated, the future Anglo-German war will undoubtedly be transformed into an armed conflict between two groups of powers, one with a German, the other with an English orientation.

It Is Hard to Discover Any Real Advantages to Russia in Rapprochement with England

Until the Russo-Japanese War, Russian policy has neither orientation. From the time of the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia had a defensive alliance with France, so firm as to assure common action by both powers in the event of attack upon either, but, at the same time, not so close as to obligate either to support unflinchingly, with armed force, all political actions and claims of the ally. At the same time, the Russian Court maintained the traditional friendly relations, based upon ties of blood, with the Court of Berlin. Owing precisely to this conjuncture, peace among the great powers was not disturbed in the course of a great many years, in spite of the presence of abundant combustible material in Europe. France, by her alliance with Russia, was guaranteed against attack by Germany; the latter was safe, thanks to the tried pacifism and friendship of Russia, from revanche ambitions on the part of France; and Russia was secured, thanks to Germany's need of maintaining amicable relations with her, against excessive intrigues by Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Lastly, England, isolated and held in check by her rivalry with Russia in Persia, by her diplomats' traditional fear of our advance on India, and by strained relations with France, especially notable at the time of the well-known Fashoda incident, viewed with alarm the increase of Germany's naval power, without, however, risking an active step.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relations among the great powers and brought England out of her isolation. As we know, all through the Russo-Japanese War, England and America observed benevolent neutrality toward Japan, while we enjoyed a similar benevolent neutrality from France and

Germany. Here, it would seem, should have been the inception of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy faced abruptly about and definitely entered upon the road toward rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British policy; there was formed a group of powers of the Triple Entente, with England playing the dominant part; and a clash, sooner or later, with the powers grouping themselves around Germany became inevitable.

Now, what advantages did the renunciation of our traditional policy of distrust of England and the rupture of neighbourly, if not friendly, relations with Germany promise us then and at present?

Considering with any degree of care the events which have taken place since the Treaty of Portsmouth, we find it difficult to perceive any practical advantages gained by us in rapprochement with England. The only benefit-improved relations with Japan - is scarcely a result of the Russo-English rapprochement. There is no reason why Russia and Japan should not live in peace; there seems to be nothing over which they need quarrel. All Russia's objectives in the Far East, if correctly understood, are entirely compatible with Japan's interests. These objectives, in their essentials, are very modest. The too broad sweep of the imagination of overzealous executive officials, without basis in genuine national interests, on the one hand, and the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, on the other, which erroneously regarded these dreams as a consistently executed policy - these were the things that provoked a clash which a more capable diplomacy would have managed to avoid.

Russia needs neither Korea nor even Port Arthur. An outlet to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea in itself is, after all, not a market, but merely a road to a more advantageous delivery of goods at the consuming markets. As a matter of fact, we do not possess, and shall not for a long time possess any goods in the Far East that promise any considerable profits in exportation abroad. Nor are there any markets for the export of our products. We cannot expect a great supply of our export commodities to go to industrially and agriculturally developed America, to poor, but likewise industrial, Japan, or even to the maritime sections of China and remoter markets, where our exports would inevitably meet the competition of goods from the industrially stronger rival powers. There remains the interior of China, with which our trade is carried on, chiefly overland. Consequently, an open port would aid the import of foreign merchandise more than the export of our own products.

Japan, on her part, no matter what is said, has no desire for our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese are by nature a southern people, and the harsh environment of our Far Eastern borderland cannot attract them. We know that even within Japan itself northern Yezo is sparsely populated, while apparently Japanese colonization is making little headway even in the southern part of Sakhalin Island, ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth. After taking possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go farther north, and her ambitions, it may be assumed, will turn rather in the direction of the Philippine Islands, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, and Borneo. The most she might desire would be the acquisition, for purely commercial reasons, of a few more sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceable coexistence, nay, more, a close rapprochement, between Russia and Japan in the Far East is perfectly natural, regardless of any mediation by England. The grounds for agreement are self-evident. Japan is not a rich country, and the simultaneous upkeep of a strong army and a powerful navy is hard for her. Her insular situation drives her to strengthen her naval power, and alliance with Russia would allow her to devote all her attention to her navy, especially vital in view of her imminent rivalry with America, leaving the

protection of her interests on the continent to Russia. On our part, we, having the Japanese navy to protect our Pacific coast, could give up once and for all the dream, impossible to us, of creating a navy in the Far East.

Thus, so far as our relations with Japan are concerned, the rapprochement with England has yielded us no real advantage. And it has gained us nothing in the sense of strengthening our position in Manchuria, Mongolia, or even the Ulianghai territory, where the uncertainty of our position bears witness that the agreement with England has certainly not freed the hands of our diplomats. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with sharp opposition from England.

In Persia, also, our position has been no better since the conclusion of this agreement. Every one recalls our predominant influence in that country under the Shah Nasr-Eddin, that is, exactly at a time when our relations with England were most strained. From the moment of our accord with the latter, we have found ourselves drawn into a number of strange attempts to impose upon the Persian people an entirely needless constitution, with the result that we ourselves contributed to the overthrow, for the benefit of our inveterate enemies, of a monarch who was devoted to Russia. That is, not only have we gained nothing, but we have suffered a loss all along the line, ruining our prestige and wasting many millions of roubles, even the precious blood of Russian soldiers, who were treacherously slain and, to please England, not even avenged.

The worst results, however, of the accord with England - and of the consequent discord with Germany - have been felt in the Near East. As we know, it was Bismarck who coined that winged phrase about the Balkan problem not being worth to Germany the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. Later the Balkan complications began to attract much more attention from German diplomacy, which had taken the "Sick Man" under its protection, but even then Germany, for a long time, failed to show any inclination to endanger relations with Russia in the interests of Balkan affairs. The proofs are patent. During the period of the Russo-Japanese War and the ensuing turmoil in our country, it would have been very easy for Austria to realize her cherished ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. But at that time Russia had not yet linked her destinies with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to lose an opportunity most auspicious for her purposes.

No sooner had we taken the road to closer accord with England, however, than there immediately followed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a step which might have been taken so easily and painlessly in 1905 or 1906. Next came the Albanian question and the combination with the Prince of Wied. Russian diplomacy attempted to answer Austrian intrigue by forming a Balkan league, but this combination, as might have been expected, proved to be quite unworkable. Intended to be directed against Austria, it immediately turned on Turkey and fell apart in the process of dividing the spoils taken from the latter. The final result was merely the definite attachment of Turkey to Germany, in whom, not without good reason, she sees her sole protector. In short, the Russo-British rapprochement evidently seems to Turkey as tantamount to England's renouncing her traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles to us, while the creation of the Balkan league, under the auspices of Russia, appeared as a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European power.

To sum up, the Anglo-Russian accord has brought us nothing of practical value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens us with an inevitable armed clash with Germany.

Fundamental Alignments in the Coming War

Under what conditions will this clash occur and what will be its probable consequences? The fundamental groupings in

a future war are self-evident: Russia, France, and England, on the one side, with Germany, Austria, and Turkey, on the other. It is more than likely that other powers, too, will participate in that war, depending upon circumstances as they may exist at the war's outbreak. But, whether the immediate cause for the war is furnished by another clash of conflicting interests in the Balkans, or by a colonial incident, such as that of Algeciras, the fundamental alignment will remain unchanged.

Italy, if she has any conception of her real interests, will not join the German side. For political as well as economic reasons, she undoubtedly hopes to expand her present territory. Such an expansion may be achieved only at the expense of Austria, on one hand, and Turkey, on the other. It is, therefore, natural for Italy not to join that party which would safeguard the territorial integrity of the countries at whose expense she hopes to realize her aspirations. Furthermore, it is not out of the question that Italy would join the anti-German coalition, if the scales of war should incline in its favour, in order to secure for herself the most favourable conditions in sharing the subsequent division of spoils.

In this respect, the position of Italy is similar to the probable position of Rumania, which, it may be assumed, will remain neutral until the scales of fortune favour one or another side. Then, animated by normal political self-interest, she will attach herself to the victors, to be rewarded at the expense of either Russia or Austria. Of the other Balkan States, Serbia and Montenegro will unquestionably join the side opposing Austria, while Bulgaria and Albania (if by that time they have not yet formed at least the embryo of a State) will take their stand against the Serbian side. Greece will in all probability remain neutral or make common cause with the side opposing Turkey, but that only after the issue has been more or less determined. The participation of other powers will be incidental, and Sweden ought to be feared, of course, in the ranks of our foes.

Under such circumstances, a struggle with Germany presents to us enormous difficulties, and will require countless sacrifices. War will not find the enemy unprepared, and the degree of his preparedness will probably exceed our most exaggerated calculations. It should not be thought that this readiness is due to Germany's own desire for war. She needs no war, so long as she can attain her object - the end of exclusive domination of the seas. But, once this vital object is opposed by the coalition, Germany will not shrink from war, and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most auspicious moment.

The Main Burden of the War Will Fall on Russia

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on us, since England is hardly capable of taking a considerable part in a continental war, while France, poor in manpower, will probably adhere to strictly defensive tactics, in view of the enormous losses by which war will be attended under present conditions of military technique. The part of a battering-ram, making a breach in the very thick of the German defence, will be ours, with many factors against us to which we shall have to devote great effort and attention.

From the sum of these unfavourable factors we should deduct the Far East. Both America and Japan - the former fundamentally, and the latter by virtue of her present political orientation - are hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on the German side. Furthermore, the war, regardless of its issue, will weaken Russia and divert her attention to the West, a fact which, of course, serves both Japanese and American interests. Thus, our rear will be sufficiently secure in the Far East, and the most that can happen there will be the extortion from us of some concessions of an economic nature in return for benevolent neutrality. Indeed, it is possible that America or

Japan may join the anti-German side, but, of course, merely as usurpers of one or the other of the unprotected German colonies.

There can be no doubt, however, as to an outburst of hatred for us in Persia, and a probable unrest among the Moslems of the Caucasus and Turkestan; it is possible that Afghanistan, as a result of that unrest, may act against us; and, finally, we must foresee very unpleasant complications in Poland and Finland. In the latter, a rebellion will undoubtedly break out if Sweden is found in the ranks of our enemies. As for Poland, it is not to be expected that we can hold her against our enemy during the war. And after she is in his power, he will undoubtedly endeavour to provoke an insurrection which, while not in reality very dangerous, must be considered, nevertheless, as one of the factors unfavourable to us, especially since the influence of our allies may induce us to take such measures in our relations with Poland as will prove more dangerous to us than any open revolt.

Are we prepared for so stubborn a war as the future war of the European nations will undoubtedly become? This question we must answer, without evasion, in the negative. That much has been done for our defence since the Japanese war, I am the last person to deny, but even so, it is quite inadequate considering the unprecedented scale on which a future war will inevitably be fought. The fault lies, in a considerable measure, in our young legislative institutions, which have taken a dilettante interest in our defences, but are far from grasping the seriousness of the political situation arising from the new orientation which, with the sympathy of the public, has been followed in recent years by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The enormous number of still unconsidered legislative bills of the war and navy departments may serve as proof of this: for example, the plan of the organization of our national defence proposed to the Duma as early as the days of Secretary of State Stolypin. It cannot be denied that, in the matter of military instruction, according to the reports of specialists, we have achieved substantial improvements, as compared with the time before the Japanese War. According to the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired; the gun is entirely satisfactory, and the equipment convenient and practical. Yet, it must be admitted that there are substantial shortcomings in the organization of our defences.

In this regard we must note, first of all, the insufficiency of our war supplies, which, certainly, cannot be blamed upon the war department, since the supply schedules are still far from being executed, owing to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of munitions is the more significant since, in the embryonic condition of our industries, we shall, during the war, have no opportunity to make up the revealed shortage by our own efforts, and the closing of the Baltic as well as the Black Sea will prevent the importation from abroad of the defence materials which we lack.

Another circumstance unfavourable to our defence is its far too great dependence, generally speaking, upon foreign industry, a fact which, in connection with the above noted interruption of more or less convenient communications with abroad, will create a series of obstacles difficult to overcome. The quantity of our heavy artillery, the importance of which was demonstrated in the Japanese War, is far too inadequate, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defences has scarcely been started, and even the fortress of Reval, which is to defend the road to the capital, is not yet finished.

The network of strategic railways is inadequate. The railways possess a rolling stock sufficient, perhaps, for normal traffic, but not commensurate with the colossal demands which will be made upon them in the event of a European war. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that the impending war will be fought among the most civilized and technically most advanced nations. Every previous war has invariably been

followed by something new in the realm of military technique, but the technical backwardness of our industries does not create favourable conditions for our adoption of the new inventions.

The Vital Interests of Germany and Russia Do Not Conflict

All these factors are hardly given proper thought by our diplomats, whose behaviour toward Germany is, in some respects, even aggressive, and may unduly hasten the moment of armed conflict, a moment which, of course, is really inevitable in view of our British orientation.

The question is whether this orientation is correct, and whether even a favourable issue of the war promises us such advantages as would compensate us for all the hardships and sacrifices which must attend a war unparalleled in its probable strain.

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict. There are fundamental grounds for a peaceable existence of these two States. Germany's future lies on the sea, that is, in a realm where Russia, essentially the most continental of the great powers, has no interests whatever. We have no overseas colonies, and shall probably never have them, and communication between the various parts of our empire is easier overland than by water. No surplus population demanding territorial expansion is visible, but, even from the viewpoint of new conquests, what can we gain from a victory over Germany? Posen, or East Prussia? But why do we need these regions, densely populated as they are by Poles, when we find it difficult enough to manage our own Russian Poles? Why encourage centripetal tendencies, that have not ceased even to this day in the Vistula territory, by incorporating in the Russian State the restless Posnanian and East Prussian Poles, whose national demands even the German Government, which is more firm than the Russian, cannot stifle?

Exactly the same thing applies to Galicia. It is obviously disadvantageous to us to annex, in the interests of national sentimentalism, a territory that has lost every vital connection with our fatherland. For, together with a negligible handful of Galicians, Russian in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainian Uniates we would receive! The so-called Ukrainian, or Mazeppist, movement is not a menace to us at present, but we should not enable it to expand by increasing the number of turbulent Ukrainian elements, for in this movement there undoubtedly lies the seed of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism which, under favourable conditions, may assume quite unexpected proportions.

The obvious aim of our diplomacy in the rapprochement with England has been to open the Straits. But a war with Germany seems hardly necessary for the attainment of this object, for it was England, and not Germany at all, that closed our outlet from the Black Sea. Was it not because we made sure of the cooperation of the later power, that we freed ourselves in 1871 from the humiliating restrictions imposed upon us by England under the Treaty of Paris?

Also, there is reason to believe that the Germans would agree sooner than the English to let us have the Straits, in which they have only a slight interest, and at the price of which they would gladly purchase our alliance.

Moreover, we should not cherish any exaggerated hopes from our occupation of the Straits. Their acquisition would be advantageous to us only as they served to close the Black Sea to others, making it an inland sea for us, safe from enemy attack.

The Straits would not give us an outlet to the open sea, however, since on the other side of them there lies a sea consisting almost wholly of territorial waters, a sea dotted

with numerous islands where the British navy, for instance, would have no trouble whatever in closing to us every inlet and outlet, irrespective of the Straits. Therefore, Russia might safely welcome an arrangement which, while not turning the Straits over to our direct control, would safeguard us against a penetration of the Black Sea by an enemy fleet. Such an arrangement, attainable under favourable circumstances without any war, has the additional advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan States, which would not regard our seizure of the Straits without alarm and quite natural jealousy.

In Trans-Caucasia we could, as a result of war, expand territorially only at the expense of regions inhabited by Armenians, a move which is hardly desirable in view of the revolutionary character of present Armenian sentiment, and of its dream of a greater Armenia; and in this region, Germany, were we allied to her, would certainly place even fewer obstacles in our way than England. Those territorial and economic acquisitions which might really prove useful to us are available only in places where our ambitions may meet opposition from England, but by no means from Germany. Persia, the Pamir, Kuldja, Kashgar, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Ulianghai territory - all these are regions where the interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict, whereas the interests of Russia and England have clashed there repeatedly.

And Germany is in exactly the same situation with respect to Russia. She could seize from us, in case of a successful war, only such territories as would be of slight value to her, and because of their population, would prove of little use for colonization; the Vistula territory, with a Polish-Lithuanian population, and the Baltic provinces, with a Lettish-Estonian population, are all equally turbulent and anti-German.

Russia's Economic Advantages and Needs Do Not Conflict with Germany's

It may be argued, however, that, under modern conditions in the various nations, territorial acquisitions are of secondary importance, while economic interests take first rank. But in this field, again, Russia's advantages and needs do not conflict with Germany's as much as is believed. It is, of course, undeniable that the existing Russo-German trade agreements are disadvantageous to our agriculture and advantageous to Germany's, but it would be hardly fair to ascribe this circumstance to the treachery and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be forgotten that these agreements are in many of their sections advantageous to us. The Russian delegates who concluded these agreements were confirmed protagonists of a development of Russian industry at any cost, and they undoubtedly made a deliberate sacrifice, at least to some extent, of the interests of Russian agriculture to the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we ought not to forget that Germany is far from being the direct consumer of the greater share of our agricultural exports abroad. For the greater share of our agricultural produce, Germany acts merely as middleman, and so it is for us and the consuming markets to establish direct relations and thus avoid the expensive German mediation. Lastly, we should keep in mind that the commercial relations of States depend on their political understandings, for no country finds advantage in the economic weakening of an ally but, conversely, profits by the ruin of a political foe. In short, even though it be obvious that the existing Russo-German commercial treaties are not to our advantage, and that Germany, in concluding them, availed herself of a situation that happened to be in her favour - in other words, forced us to the wall - this action should have been expected from Germany and thought of. It should not, however, be looked upon as a mark of hostility

toward us, but rather as an expression of healthy national self-interest, worthy of our emulation. Aside from that, we observe, in the case of Austria-Hungary, an agricultural country that is in a far greater economic dependence upon Germany than ours, but nevertheless, is not prevented from attaining an agricultural development such as we may only dream of.

In view of what has been said, it would seem that the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany, entirely acceptable to Russia, by no means requires that Germany first be crushed. It will be quite sufficient to maintain neighbourly relations with her, to make a careful estimate of our real interests in the various branches of national economy, and to engage in long, insistent bargaining with German delegates, who may be expected to protect the interests of their own fatherland and not ours.

But I would go still further and say that the ruin of Germany, from the viewpoint of our trade with her, would be disadvantageous to us. Her defeat would unquestionably end in a peace dictated from the viewpoint of England's economic interests. The latter will exploit to the farthest limit any success that falls to her lot, and we will only lose, in a ruined Germany without sea routes, a market which, after all, is valuable to us for our otherwise unmarketable products.

In respect to Germany's economic future, the interests of Russia and England are diametrically opposed. For England, it is profitable to kill Germany's maritime trade and industry, turning her into a poor and, if possible, agricultural country. For us, it is of advantage for Germany to develop her sea-going commerce and the industry which serves it, so as to supply the remotest world markets, and at the same time open her domestic market to our agricultural products, to supply her large working population.

But, aside from the commercial treaties, it has been customary to point out the oppressive character of German domination in Russian economic life, and the systematic penetration of German colonization into our country, as representing a manifest peril to the Russian State. We believe, however, that fears on these grounds are considerably exaggerated. The famous "*Drang nach Osten*" was in its own time natural and understandable, since Germany's land could not accommodate her increased population, and the surplus was driven in the direction of the least resistance, i.e., into a less densely populated neighbouring country. The German Government was compelled to recognize the inevitability of this movement, but could hardly look upon it as to its own interests. For, after all, it was Germans who were being lost to the influence of the German State, thus reducing the manpower of their own country. Indeed, the German Government made such strenuous efforts to preserve the connection between its emigrants and their old fatherland that it adopted even the unusual method of tolerating dual citizenship. It is certain, however, that a considerable proportion of German emigrants definitely and irrevocably settled in their new homes, and slowly broke their ties with the old country. This fact, obviously incompatible with Germany's State interests, seems to have been one of the incentives which started her upon a colonial policy and maritime commerce, previously so alien to her. And at present, as the German colonies increase and there is an attendant growth of German industry and naval commerce, the German colonization movement decreases, in a measure, and the day is not remote when the "*Drang nach Osten*" will become nothing more than a subject for history.

In any case, the German colonization, which undoubtedly conflicts with our State interests, must be stopped, and here, again, friendly relations with Germany cannot harm us. To express a preference for a German orientation does not imply the advocacy of Russian vassalage to Germany, and, while maintaining friendly and neighbourly intercourse with her, we

must not sacrifice our State interests to this object. But Germany herself will not object to measures against the continued flow of German colonists into Russia. To her, it is of greater benefit to turn the wave of emigration toward her own colonies. Moreover, even before Germany had colonies, when her industry was not yet sufficiently developed to employ the entire population, the German Government did not feel justified in protesting against the restrictive measures that were adopted against foreign colonization during the reign of Alexander III.

As regards the German domination in the field of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly justifies the complaints usually voiced against it. Russia is far too poor, both in capital and in industrial enterprise, to get along without a large import of foreign capital. A certain amount of dependence upon some kind of foreign capital is, therefore, unavoidable, until such time as the industrial enterprise and material resources of our population develop to a point where we may entirely forego the services of foreign investors and their money. But as long as we do require them, German capital is more advantageous to us than any other.

First and foremost, this capital is cheaper than any other, being satisfied with the lowest margin of profit. This, to a large extent, explains the relative cheapness of German products, and their gradual displacement of British products in the markets of the world. The lower demands of German capital, as regards returns, have for their consequence Germany's readiness to invest in enterprises which, because of their relatively small returns, are shunned by other foreign investor. Also, as a result of that relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia is attended by a smaller outflow of investors' profits from Russia, as compared with French and English investments, and so a larger amount of roubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the profits made on German investments in Russian industry do not leave our country at all, but are spent in Russia.

Unlike the English or French, the German capitalists, in most cases, come to stay in Russia, themselves, with their money. It is this very German characteristic which explains in a considerable degree the amazing number of German industrialists, manufacturers, and mill owners in our midst, as compared with the British and French.

The latter live in their own countries, removing from Russia the profits produced by their enterprises, down to the last kopek. The German investors, on the contrary, live in Russia for long periods, and not infrequently settle down permanently. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the fact is that the Germans, unlike other foreigners, soon feel at home in Russia and rapidly become Russianized. Who has not seen Frenchmen and Englishmen, for example, who have spent almost their whole lives in Russia and yet do not speak a word of Russian? On the other hand, are there many Germans here who cannot make themselves understood in Russian, even though it be with a strong accent and in broken speech? Nay, more - who has not seen genuine Russians, orthodox, loyal with all their hearts dedicated to the principles of the Russian State, and yet only one or two generations removed from their German emigrant ancestry? Lastly, we must not forget that Germany herself is, to a certain extent, interested in our economic well-being. In this regard, Germany differs, to our advantage, from other countries, which are interested exclusively in obtaining the largest possible returns from capital invested in Russia, even at the cost of the economic ruin of this country. Germany, however, in her capacity of permanent - although, of course, not unselfish - middleman for our foreign trade, has an interest in preserving the productive resources of our country, as a source of profitable intermediary operations for her.

Even a Victory over Germany Promises Russia an Exceedingly Unfavourable Prospect

In any case, even if we were to admit the necessity for eradicating German domination in the field of our economic life, even at the price of a total banishment of German capital from Russian industry, appropriate measures could be taken, it would seem, without war against Germany. Such a war will demand such enormous expenditures that they will many times exceed the more than doubtful advantages to us in the abolition of the German [economic] domination. More than that, the result of such a war will be an economic situation compared with which the yoke of German capital will seem easy.

For there can be no doubt that the war will necessitate expenditures which are beyond Russia's limited financial means. We shall have to obtain credit from allied and neutral countries, but this will not be granted gratuitously. As to what will happen if the war should end disastrously for us, I do not wish to discuss now. The financial and economic consequences of defeat can be neither calculated nor foreseen, and will undoubtedly spell the total ruin of our entire national economy.

But even victory promises us extremely unfavourable financial prospects; a totally ruined Germany will not be in a position to compensate us for the cost involved. Dictated in the interest of England, the peace treaty will not afford Germany opportunity for sufficient economic recuperation to cover our war expenditures, even at a distant time. The little which we may perhaps succeed in extorting from her will have to be shared with our allies, and to our share there will fall but negligible crumbs, compared with the war cost. Meantime, we shall have to pay our war loans, not without pressure by the allies. For, after the destruction of German power, we shall no longer be necessary to them. Nay, more, our political might, enhanced by our victory, will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And so it is inevitable that, even after a victorious conclusion of the war, we shall fall into the same sort of financial and economic dependence upon our creditors, compared with which our present dependence upon German capital will seem ideal.

However, no matter how sad may be the economic prospects which face us as a result of union with England, and, by that token, of war with Germany, they are still of secondary importance when we think of the political consequences of this fundamentally unnatural alliance.

A Struggle Between Russia and Germany Is Profoundly Undesirable to Both Sides, as It Amounts to a Weakening of the Monarchist Principle

It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are the representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, as opposed to the democratic principle, incarnated in England and, to an infinitely lesser degree, in France. Strange as it may seem, England, monarchist and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogical tendencies, invariably encouraging all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, a struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its issue, is profoundly undesirable to both sides, as undoubtedly involving the weakening of the conservative principle in the world of which the above-named two great powers are the only reliable bulwarks. More than that, one must realize that under the exceptional conditions which exist, a general European war is mortally dangerous both for Russia and Germany, no matter who wins. It is our

firm conviction, based upon a long and careful study of all contemporary subversive tendencies, that there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution which, by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor.

During the many years of peaceable neighbourly existence, the two countries have become united by many ties, and a social upheaval in one is bound to affect the other. That these troubles will be of a social, and not a political, nature cannot be doubted, and this will hold true, not only as regards Russia, but for Germany as well. An especially favourable soil for social upheavals is found in Russia, where the masses undoubtedly profess, unconsciously, the principles of Socialism. In spite of the spirit of antagonism to the Government in Russian society, as unconscious as the Socialism of the broad masses of the people, a political revolution is not possible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement inevitably must degenerate into a Socialist movement. The opponents of the government have no popular support. The people see no difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian masses, whether workmen or peasants, are not looking for political rights, which they neither want nor comprehend.

The peasant dreams of obtaining a gratuitous share of somebody else's land, the workman, of getting hold of the entire capital and profits of the manufacturer. Beyond this, they have no aspirations. If these slogans are scattered far and wide among the populace, and the Government permits agitation along these lines, Russia will be flung into anarchy, such as she suffered in the ever-memorable period of troubles in 1905-1906. War with Germany would create exceptionally favourable conditions for such agitation. As already stated, this war is pregnant with enormous difficulties for us, and cannot turn out to be a mere triumphal march to Berlin. Both military disaster, - partial ones, let us hope - and all kinds of shortcomings in our supply are inevitable. In the excessive nervousness and spirit of opposition of our society, these events will be given an exaggerated importance, and all the blame will be laid on the Government.

It will be well if the Government does not yield, but declares directly that in time of war no criticism of the governmental authority is to be tolerated, and resolutely suppresses all opposition. In the absence of any really strong hold on the people by the opposition, this would settle the affair. The people did not heed the writers of the Wiborg Manifesto, in its time, and they will not follow them now.

But a worse thing may happen: the government authority may make concessions, may try to come to an agreement with the opposition, and thereby weaken itself just when the Socialist elements are ready for action. Even though it may sound like a paradox, the fact is that agreement with the opposition in Russia positively weakens the Government. The trouble is that our opposition refuses to reckon with the fact that it represents no real force. The Russian opposition is intellectual throughout, and this is its weakness, because between the intelligentsia and the people there is a profound gulf of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. We need an artificial election law, indeed, we require the direct influence of the governmental authority, to assure the election to the State Duma of even the most zealous champions of popular rights. Let the Government refuse to support the elections, leaving them to their natural course, and the legislative institutions would not see within their walls a single intellectual, outside of a few demagogic agitators. However insistent the members of our legislative institutions may be that the people confide in them, the peasant would rather believe the landless government official than the Octoberist landlord in the Duma, while the workingman treats the wage-earning factory inspector with more confidence than the legislating manufacturer, even though the latter professes every principle of the Cadet party.

It is more than strange, under these circumstances, that the governmental authority should be asked to reckon seriously with the opposition, that it should for this purpose renounce the role of impartial regulator of social relationships, and come out before the broad masses of the people as the obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectual and propertied minority of the population. The opposition demands that the Government should be responsible to it, representative of a class, and should obey the parliament which it artificially created. (Let us recall that famous expression of V. Nabokov: "Let the executive power submit to the legislative power!") In other words, the opposition demands that the Government should adopt the psychology of a savage, and worship the idol which he himself made.

Russia Will be Flung into Hopeless Anarchy, the Issue of Which Will be Hard to Foresee

If the war ends in victory, the putting down of the Socialist movement will not offer any insurmountable obstacles. There will be agrarian troubles, as a result of agitation for compensating the soldiers with additional land allotments; there will be labour troubles during the transition from the probably increased wages of war time to normal schedules; and this, it is to be hoped, will be all, so long as the wave of the German social revolution has not reached us. But in the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable.

As has already been said, the trouble will start with the blaming of the Government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against the Government will begin, followed by revolutionary agitations throughout the country, with Socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the intellectual opposition parties, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless to stem the popular tide, aroused by themselves, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the issue of which cannot be foreseen.

Germany, in Case of Defeat, is Destined to Suffer Social Upheavals No Less than those of Russia

No matter how strange it may appear at first sight, considering the extraordinary poise of the German character, Germany, likewise, is destined to suffer, in case of defeat, no lesser social upheavals. The effect of a disastrous war upon the population will be too severe not to bring to the surface destructive tendencies, now deeply hidden. The peculiar social order of modern Germany rests upon the actually predominant influence of the agrarians, Prussian Junkerdom and propertied peasants.

These elements are the bulwark of the profoundly conservative German regime headed by Prussia. The vital interests of these classes demand a protective economic policy towards agriculture, import duties on grain, and consequently, high price for all farm products. But Germany, with her limited territory and increasing population, has long ago turned from an agricultural into an industrial State, so that protection of agriculture is, in effect, a matter of taxing the larger part of the population for the benefit of the smaller. To this majority, there

is a compensation in the extensive development of the export of German industrial products to the most distant markets, so that the advantages derived thereby enable the industrialists and working people to pay the higher prices for the farm products consumed at home.

Defeated, Germany will lose her world markets and maritime commerce, for the aim of the war - on the part of its real instigator, England - will be the destruction of German competition. After this has been achieved, the labouring masses, deprived not only of higher but of any and all wages, having suffered greatly during the war, and being, naturally, embittered, will offer fertile soil for anti-agrarian and later anti-social propaganda by the Socialist parties.

These parties, in turn, making use of the outraged patriotic sentiment among the people, owing to the loss of the war, their exasperation at the militarists and the feudal burgher regime that betrayed them, will abandon the road of peaceable evolution which they have thus far been following so steadily, and take a purely revolutionary path. Some part will also be played, especially in the event of agrarian troubles in neighbouring Russia, by the class of landless farmhands, which is quite numerous in Germany. Apart from this, there will be a revival of the hitherto concealed separatist tendencies in southern Germany, and the hidden antagonism of Bavaria to domination by Prussia will emerge in all its intensity. In short, a situation will be created which (in gravity) will be little better than that in Russia.

Peace Among the Civilized Nations is Imperilled Chiefly by the Desire of England to Retain Her Vanishing Domination of the Seas

A summary of all that has been stated above must lead to the conclusion that a rapprochement with England does not promise us any benefits, and that the English orientation of our diplomacy is essentially wrong. We do not travel the same road as England; she should be left to go her own way, and we must not quarrel on her account with Germany.

The Triple Entente is an artificial combination, without a basis of real interest. It has nothing to look forward to. The future belongs to a close and incomparably more vital rapprochement of Russia, Germany, France (reconciled with Germany), and Japan (allied to Russia by a strictly defensive union). A political combination like this, lacking all aggressiveness toward other States, would safeguard for many years the peace of the civilized nations, threatened, not by the militant intentions of Germany, as English diplomacy is trying to show, but solely by the perfectly natural striving of England to retain at all costs her vanishing domination of the seas. In this direction, and not in the fruitless search of a basis for an accord with England, which is in its very nature contrary to our national plans and aims, should all the efforts of our diplomacy be concentrated.

It goes without saying that Germany, on her part, must meet our desire to restore our well-tested relations and friendly alliance with her, and to elaborate, in closest agreement with us, such terms of our neighbourly existence as to afford no basis for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutional-liberal parties, which, by their very nature, are forced to adhere, not to a Conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation.

N. Durnovo,

February, 1914.

(Basil Dmytryshyn, Imperial Russia; A Source Book, 1700-1917 for full text, and Sean McMeekin, The Russian Revolution, p.55-6 and p.363 for summary.)