

# Irish Foreign Affairs

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“Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy”  
—C.J. O’Donnell, *The Lordship of the World*, 1924, p.145

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# The Treaty that Never Was

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## Jack Lane

There is an easy way to establish whether or not there was a Treaty agreed in London on 6th Dec 1921 – is there an agreement in existence headed “A treaty between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom” signed by the respective heads of State, President Eamon de Valera and HM King George V? It’s a rather simple and straightforward description of such an agreement, but it does not exist and could not exist. Why? That’s what I will try to explore.

Any Treaty worthy of the name must have some basic preconditions, first and foremost that it was freely entered into by mutually recognised independent states. What was signed at 2am on 6th December 1921 did not meet a single one of these preconditions.

It was signed under a threat of immediate war.

The Irish Republic was not recognised.

The British Government demanded and got an oath of allegiance from the Irish negotiators.

The Irish Government was specifically prevented from seeing or agreeing to its final terms before the document was signed.

It is oxymoronic to call such a thing a Treaty.

We know what treaties look like. We live under one – the Treaty of Rome. It met all the preconditions whether you agree with it or not. Look it up.

Yet we are told by some that the document signed was not only a Treaty but the founding document of the Irish State. How could that be when the Irish state sent delegates to negotiate the agreement?

I will try to explore how this débâcle came about. To do so I will briefly look at the main events and personalities that brought it about.

The first event was on 15 July 1921 when de Valera met Lloyd George to follow up the Truce. Lloyd George offered Dominion Status. De Valera refused to consider it as he was Head of an existing Republic voted for on a number of occasions and defended in war. He did not even take the document. Lloyd George said this refusal meant war and that he could send a soldier for every man woman and child in Ireland. De Valera said he would have to be able to keep them there. Lloyd George backed down and his bluff was called. 1-0 to De Valera.

The next development came on the 27 July with the breaking of the negotiating deadlock by de Valera with his concept of External Association. It was an ambiguous concept to reflect an ambiguous situation that allowed for development by political skill in a positive or negative direction.

It became the basis of all the future negotiations on the Irish Government’s side. The idea was that Ireland would be

associated with the Commonwealth (Empire) but not a member of the Commonwealth.

The next event was on the 8 July with the appointment of delegates for a full conference. De Valera classified them as plenipotentiaries indicating they had full powers as they would not be accepted as delegates of the Republic. It was a concept from earlier times when states needed to give full powers to delegates dealing with faraway states when direct communications did not exist. But he ensured that the Cabinet also gave them the following instructions:

(1) The Plenipotentiaries have full powers as defined in their credentials.

(2) It is understood however that before decisions are finally reached on the main questions that a dispatch notifying the intention of making these decisions will be sent to the Members of the Cabinet in Dublin and that a reply will be awaited by the Plenipotentiaries before the final decision is made.

(3) It is also understood that the complete text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.

(4) In case of break, the text of final proposals from our side will be similarly submitted.

(5) It is understood that the Cabinet in Dublin will be kept regularly informed of the progress of the negotiations (Cabinet mins. 7/10/1921)

De Valera insisted that Collins be included against his wishes because of the reputation he had acquired in the British mind and to show that the Cabinet was united.

De Valera did not go at this stage for tactical reasons. He was conscious that any agreement reached had to be acceptable to the Cabinet and avoided the fate of President Woodrow Wilson, who had signed the Versailles Treaty only for Congress to reject it. Such an outcome would be a disaster in the Irish context and to be avoided at all costs.

John Regan has summarised his strategy well: “Against his maximum offer of external association de Valera had for tactical reasons to test to the point of destruction the British resolve not to go back to war. That in effect meant bringing the British to the point of fixing bayonets rather than merely rattling their sabres. To achieve the absolute extension of the British will to compromise de Valera constructed the Irish position in such a way as to enable him to conclude the talks personally at the eleventh hour. In these circumstances this was not only logical: it was good politics too.” (The Irish Counter-Revolution 1921-36.)

After the initial weeks of negotiations another view began to take shape in Collins’ mind who was head of the IRB. His sympathetic biographer Tim Pat Coogan explains that by mid-October “some time between 11 and 24 October .....Dominion status was as far as he was prepared to go.” (p.242.). IRB

records might throw light on this development if available but being a conspiratorial body these are not available as they were destroyed by the Secretary.

Coogan quotes his correspondence of 4 November: "Not much achieved, principally because P.M. (Lloyd George) recognises our over-riding difficulty – Dublin. Plays on that." And on 15 November: "I prefer Birkenhead to anyone else. He understands and has real insight into our problems – the Dublin one as much as anyone else. Dublin is the real problem." (p.242).

So Collins had come to see the British Government as his ally against his own Government!

And Coogan goes on to draw the conclusion that : "From what has passed before I believe it is not unreasonable to speculate that the 'ultimatum' could well have suited them (Collins and Griffith – J.L.) because it gave them the opportunity of producing a fait accompli as opposed to further hair-splitting and politicking in Dublin which they feared would only result in losing Ireland a historic opportunity." (p. 264.)

Another sympathetic biographer explains that at this point

"The Volunteers had expanded out of all recognition, from about 3,000 before the Truce to over 73,000. Michael himself viewed this expansion with some alarm, fearing this army might fall under the control of 'certain elements' who might then use it for their own ends. It takes no flight of the imagination to guess who he had in mind. Added to this was the worry that there was growing interference from Dublin which, he felt, might jeopardise the peace negotiations in London." ("Michael Collins – a life" by Peter Mackay.)

These were legitimate opinions to have but they should have been made clear to the Government he was a member of, and they were not.

The moment of truth for this occurred at what turned out to be the last Cabinet meeting on 3 December which

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discussed Lloyd George's 'final offer' that again insisted on Dominion Status with some additional powers and an Oath of Allegiance.

The meeting lasted for 7 hours with Griffith fully supporting acceptance. But the important view was that of Collins and he did not come clean. All commentators noted his strange behaviour.

Coogan says:

"The most eloquent statement of the day was embodied in Collins' silence. As Childers notes in his diary 'M.C. difficult to understand. Repeatedly pressed by Dev but I really don't know what his answer amounted to.'" And in his biography of de Valera Coogan says that "Collins had somewhat masked his hand" (p. 207).

Griffith agreed eventually not to accept the draft as it stood as Cabinet opinion was divided and he agreed it would split the country if put to the Dáil. He said he would go back and get it changed and let the Government know of the final position, and that the Dáil should then have the final word. De Valera then said there was no need for him to go "at this stage of the Negotiations."

If Collins had not "masked his hand" and clearly supported Griffith, De Valera would then have had to go to London and play his hand.

David McCullagh of RTÉ in his recent biography of de Valera gives the real reason for Collin's behaviour:

"Unknown to de Valera, the Cabinet was not the only body considering the draft Treaty. Collins had given a copy of the British draft to Seán Ó Muirthuile, secretary of the IRB, to put before 'the lads' – the Supreme Council. According to Ó Muirthuile, the oath proposed by the British was unacceptable, but a new version was drafted that expressed allegiance to the 'Irish Free State', with fidelity to the British Monarch in a subsequent clause. At best this was an appalling breach of confidentiality by Collins; at worst, it suggests he regarded the views of the Supreme Council as being of greater value than those of the Cabinet; the oath contained in the final treaty was in the IRB's form rather than de Valera's." (p.239)

McCullagh's 'worst' assumption was correct. Collins' first loyalty was to the IRB, not to the Cabinet or to his Government, and his subsequent behaviour followed from that. He did not attend the next meeting with the British. Lloyd George saw his opportunity in this division, met Collins on his own, made all sort of promises and established a rapport with him at these meetings and got him onside.

After Lloyd George issued his ultimatum and the Irish delegates were returning in a taxi to think about the terms, Collins shocked the others by saying, out of the blue, that he would sign the agreement. He then worked to persuade the reluctant others to do so as well, ignoring the Government in Dublin as Lloyd George had insisted.

So the scene was set for the débâcle that followed.

What is worth considering is the possible outcome of the De Valera strategy as John Regan notes. Was it realistic to reject the agreement and risk a resumption of war?

We saw that De Valera had called Lloyd George's bluff back in July. Would he risk it again? Let's put some flesh on John Regan's assessment of de Valera's strategy.

What was the situation in December 1921 compared to July 1921?

War in Ireland was certainly not popular anywhere in December 1921. Most were glad it was over and that it had appeared to have ended in Ireland's favour.

What was the issue – the difference between the rôle of the King as King of the Commonwealth but not King of Ireland? This seemed a quibble to most people. Would Lloyd George declare war over it?

And he would have had to declare war now for the first time, as heretofore it had formally been only a policing and law-and-order matter. Would public opinion wear it, especially in America which now obsessed British government policy, as there was a serious conflict where the US were determined to cut the British Navy - which was the backbone of the Empire - down to size. Trotsky predicted a war over this.

So, what was the military situation? The Empire was facing problems across the globe and it was stretched to the limit militarily. More so than before, when they had to recruit Tans and Auxiliaries for the war in Ireland. That situation had further worsened for Britain.

The Irish Volunteers had increased to something like 70,000 and there was a big increase with ordnance, as described by Emmet O'Connor:

"More munitions were imported in the five months of the truce than in the previous eleven months ... There is no doubt that from early 1921 the IRA was developing an effective supply network, in Germany and the US at least; foreign supplies were becoming more important in the eyes of local brigades and GHQ; and there was an increasing demand for heavier weapons. Had the war continued, it is probable that more attention would have been given to the importation of big shipments of the latest weaponry, and we can only speculate on the military and political consequences ... It was of course ironic that the most elaborate and successful importations occurred after the truce."

Was Lloyd George bluffing again? We have evidence almost from the horse's mouth: his Private Secretary, Geoffrey Shakespeare. He was to bring the infamous letter to Craig and described it as one big bluff. He found it incredible that the Irish were taken in. The idea of him needing to take a letter to Craig via a steam train from Euston to Liverpool, and then by steamer to Belfast, was pure theatrics (See his book "Bring in more candles").

It is also worth looking at what happened to Lloyd George to understand his weakness. He would be thrown out of power by the Tories a few months later because he wanted to renew war with Turkey, which was refusing to accept another Treaty, that of Sèvres, but found no support for this at home or abroad. All had had enough of war for now. The rejection of the Irish 'Treaty', instead of Sèvres, could have been the catalyst that led to his downfall.

In the 1930s de Valera went to Downing Street and had total success again calling their bluff. 2-0 to de Valera.

What the episode highlights is the role of the individual in history, an issue that's not a fashionable consideration with historians nowadays. It is not taken as a serious factor. Abstractions are much more comfortable and fashionable to deal with.

In Collins and de Valera there were two very different personalities. De Valera spooked the British at every turn throughout his life. They could never fit him into their mental framework. He was another demon in their large repertoire of same.

They could get the measure of Collins. They made him into a celebrity and a 'gunman' and these concepts they could easily cope with. By comparison de Valera was just alien to them.

And when they turned on Collins in the early months of 1922 when he tried to ameliorate the so-called Treaty they showed their true colours of contempt for him. Lloyd George described him now as like a "wild animal," "shallow," "all over the place," "jumping and hopping about", and even Eamon Duggan, a supporter, described him as "very highly strung and overwrought and sometimes left their own meetings in a rage with his colleagues."

There is no evidence of anything like this about de Valera.

So the essential difference was how an agreement was reached as much as what was achieved, with the issue being whether an agreement would 'stick' or not.

The one agreed did not, and I have tried to show why and how it did not.

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# Armenians on the New Reality in the Southern Caucasus

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## Pat Walsh

I have sometimes been asked in interviews whether Armenia has accepted the new reality in the Southern Caucasus, brought about by its defeat in the Second Karabakh War, which now has its first anniversary. That is a difficult question, but I believe I can finally answer it: The balance between Armenian delusions and an acceptance of the reality of the situation has been significantly altered by the War. The wishful thinking, and delusions are still there but the scales have shifted to a degree toward the cold, hard facts of the situation. There is denial in abundance and criticism of everyone and anyone that blame can be laid upon: the Pashinyan government and the previous regime, Turkey (of course), Russia, the United States, Israel, Iran etc. But there is also soul searching within Armenian nationalism for the answer about where it all went wrong and how to fix it.

The Armenian journalist and historian, Tatul Hakobyan, has just published a new book entitled, 'The Valley of Death: A 44-Day Catastrophe'. In it he has "memorialized his observation and analysis in a 360-page war diary." He previously authored 'Karabakh Diary, Green and Black: Neither War nor Peace' (2008, with a number of further editions), and 'Looking from Ararat: Armenians and Turks' (2012). Hakobyan revealed that he is ready to publish a book on Armenia from 1988 to 2020 and another on Armenian/Turkish relations which have very interesting information, largely unknown by today's Armenian communities. Hakobyan is also the co-ordinator of the ANI Armenian Research Center, which focuses on contemporary Armenian issues. Between 2009 and 2021, he was an analyst at the Civilitas Foundation and a correspondent for its online CivilNet broadcasts. In February 2021 he quit CivilNet, unhappy at state censorship practices within the organisation. On November 2, while in Davit Bek village in Armenia's southeast, Hakobyan had reported that the Azerbaijanis were approaching the borders of Armenia, while Yerevan was presenting a narrative of victory after victory.

Hakobyan has been touring the US Armenian diaspora and there has been great interest about what he has to say about what went wrong in the 44-Day war and what is to be done? In the space of just over a week Hakobyan spoke to gatherings of Armenians in Richmond Heights (Ohio), Las Vegas, Pasadena and Fresno. His talks on "the new reality in the South Caucasus," as Hakobyan

has described it himself, have been interesting. There is obvious unease in the diaspora about some of the things Hakobyan is saying but when challenged as to alternatives his critics have been found wanting. There are no replies. They are unhappy in their shattered dreams, but they have no course out of "the new reality" and back to Armenian dreamland.

The discussions are available in YouTube videos recorded during March and April in Chicago this year. I have taken notes from these discussions conducted in English and transcribed them. Some of the comments have been included in reports by the Armenian media, but others have been omitted, perhaps purposely. I am unable to say whether the discussions in Armenian were any different in content. As far as possible I have used direct quotes, with no misrepresentation being intended.

The English is occasionally tidied up for the sake of precision, but that is all. I have grouped the arguments under themes for the reader, rather than just transcribing chronologically. This enables points made in the two video discussions to be collected together for clarity of focus.

Tatul Hakobyan began his talks by saying that Armenians and Azerbaijanis had been enemies for a long time and had gone to war five times in just over a century (1905/06, 1918/20, 1991/94, 2016 and 2020).

He put forward a range of reasons why the last war was lost by Armenia. Those he mentioned included: the economic and military strength of Azerbaijan; Armenia's losing of the technological contest; Yerevan's diplomatic failure and loss of friends and allies due to its intransigence in the face of international law; the election of the catastrophic Nikol Pashinyan as leader; the failure to anticipate and make contingencies for the effective Azerbaijani preparations for war; the significant Turkish support given to Baku; and on the battlefield the mistaken belief that Armenians were always going to be superior.

He notes the excellent timing of Baku in launching the war. In late 2020 the world was pre-occupied with Covid; the US was in Presidential election mode and domestically focused; an inexperienced and incompetent Armenian leader, Pashinyan, had come to power; Russia was the only factor Azerbaijan had to overcome and Moscow was, by this time, willing to see Baku alter the situation in the South Caucasus. The war was also perfectly timed, just before the Winter set in, freezing the situation in Azerbaijan's strategic interest.

As a result of the last war Armenia had "lost 50 per cent of Artsakh" with the result that the 120 km buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been reduced to 0 km and the Goris-Kapan road was now adjacent to Azerbaijan. Speaking about "Syunik province" (Western Zangezur), Hakobyan related that the road built during the 2000s from Goris to Kapan and on to Meghri, "about 70 km now passes through Azerbaijan. In order to drive south, one is forced to see Azerbaijani flags, road signs and soldiers. This indicates that the Armenian-Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republican borders were restored." Hakobyan mournfully commented that this was "the sad reality of war".

## Before the War

Hakobyan told his audience that Armenia had often put misplaced faith in foreign allies in order to accomplish its territorial ambitions, rather than finding "common ground with our neighbours" to settle differences. But despite the wars and the latest defeat, diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan/Turkey were both desirable and possible, as was the case even during the worst periods of the past:

"We were determined that the future of Armenia will be decided in Sèvres or other places, and not in Armenia with its neighbours. We went to war and were terribly defeated, losing 30 square kilometers — the city of Ani, the entire Kars province and the biggest city of Armenia at that time, Alexandropol... Between 1918-1920 Armenia and Turkey had

diplomatic relations. The first country that recognised Armenia was Ottoman Turkey. We had two ministers in the Azerbaijan government in 1919 and an Embassy and Ambassador in Baku, while we were at war with Azerbaijan! The first state which opened an Embassy in the centre of Yerevan was the Ottoman Empire. The first state who sent a diplomatic envoy, Ali Mehmet Pasha, was Turkey. Diplomatic relations with Turkey were therefore organised by the founding fathers of Armenia with those, like Talaat Pasha, who had organised the Genocide. So why not now?"

Hakobyan was asked by the diaspora audience whether the Azerbaijanis were open to negotiations before the Second Karabakh War. He answered in the affirmative. He interestingly makes the point that Armenia's resources were, in 2021, as in the past, just not sufficient to satisfy the territorial ambitions of its nationalism. And objectives must align with means:

"Since 1991 Azerbaijan has been part of the negotiating process. We have had more than 300 meetings with the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijanis wanted peace but we were not prepared to pay for the peace... We believed we could preserve the status quo. Our calculation was wrong. It was disastrous. Our calculations were wrong and disastrous even back in 1920 when we could have talked with the Kemalists but we preferred to have 150,000 sq. kms of Armenia. But we lost all this territory and became part of the Soviet Union. Personally I would like to have Greater Armenia – the Greatest Armenia. An Armenia that stretches from Baku to Istanbul, from the Black Sea to the Arabian Desert, but for 3 million Armenians that is not possible."

Hakobyan also points out that after the defeats of a century ago there was a lot of soul searching among Armenians about the future, in which the desire for territorial expansion was questioned. However, the revanchist instinct had re-emerged over time:

"After the Treaty of Kars defeat all the Armenian books (e.g. Katchaznouni, Karinian, Lalaian etc.) written subsequently said we did not do our best to have good relations with our neighbours. From 1920 to 1925 we saw this discussion among Armenians, but the discourse was then changed and we wanted a Greater and Greater Armenia again. I think there is no Armenian in the world who does not want a Greater Armenia but this is a dream, not a reality."

Hakobyan suggests that Yerevan should have learnt lessons from the brief war in 2016. The Russians had attempted to persuade Yerevan that it was time to make concessions to Baku. However, the Armenians prevaricated and then events took another course with the Velvet Revolution and the rise of Nikol Pashinyan.

In answer to a question about whether Russia could have stopped the 2020 war, or prevented it from even occurring, Hakobyan answered:

"In 2016, after the 3 day war (which was really a 12 hour war), the Russians told Sargsyan that the status quo was no longer acceptable. That is how the Lavrov Plan appeared. We said several times that we were prepared to withdraw from 7 adjacent territories but we did not. If we had accepted the Lavrov Plan we would now have a different picture. At least the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, 4,4,000 sq. kms, I'm sure would be under the control of Armenia. The problem of Shushi was the key issue. We said "No" to Russian plans every time and Pashinyan and the Velvet Revolution muddied the situation. Armenia had gone back on its commitments... We lost the war because we did not try our best to establish normal

relations with Azerbaijan. Now many believe that Levon Ter Petrosyan was right when he said we should have tried to solve the problem back in 1997... We left the Azerbaijanis with three options: 1. Accept the status quo; 2. Continue negotiations; 3. Start a war... Armenia provoked Azerbaijan into this war... This disastrous Pashinyan government did everything to force Azerbaijan into starting a war... We left no choice for Azerbaijan. They started a war and won the war."

### **Why Armenia Lost the 2020 War**

Hakobyan makes clear his understanding that Armenia had prepared to fight another war on the same lines as in the 1990s, believing that the result would be the same as it was then, against the Azerbaijanis. The delusion of actually expanding the occupied territories took hold, and the Pashinyan government threatened Baku with "new war for new territories" without realising it was a different Azerbaijan they would be fighting:

"This war was not like the war of the 1990s. We were not ready for a new technological war. This was clear after the 2016 war when they used Turkish and Israeli drones... We believed we could defeat them. If Azerbaijan started a new war we would conquer new territories... But it was soon obvious that we were not ready for this type of war."

According to Hakobyan, as the war got underway it became clear, in only a few days, when the Azerbaijanis penetrated the Armenian lines and began destroying a large part of its military equipment, that Armenia should have cut its losses and accepted a deal. There was a question from a viewer about "whether Armenia used its entire military capacity to defend Artsakh?" It was a popular belief among diaspora Armenians during the war that Pashinyan was holding back much of the Armenian army for unexplained reasons. This belief emerged when news filtered through of the Azerbaijani advance causing disbelief that Armenia was fully fighting. Hakobyan made it clear that Armenia had fought as much as it could and it was its own fault the loss was so severe:

"We had a chance to stop the war on 4/5 October if we had accepted the Lavrov plan. Also, in mid-October we had another opportunity, as well as on 19 October. We waited for the breakthrough but Pashinyan and his government continued to lose territory with 5,000 dead. That was a disastrous decision. Armenia used its entire military capacity to defend Nagorno Karabakh, yes! We made disastrous mistakes. Why did we allow women and children to leave Karabakh?... We believed that Russia or Iran would support Armenia, but nobody supported us... No Armenian journalist told the truth during the war. The Armenian government did not allow us to tell the truth. From the fourth day of the war we were losing the war and should have stopped it. When I said that we were losing the war I received more than 3,000 threats saying: 'You are a Turk, a defeatist, who does not love your country'. We were under the influence of the lies of state propaganda and I could not persuade our journalistic team to tell the truth."

### **Future Relations in the Aftermath of the War**

The Armenian diaspora was most interested in what Hakobyan had to say about what could be done after the defeat. When it comes to the future, Hakobyan revealed that Armenian revanchist desires had not died within him. They have just become more limited by the shock of the defeat:

"We now have 50 per cent of Artsakh and we have enough power to keep this territory. It is under the control of Russia. Our security is guaranteed by Russia. At least Hadrut and Shushi should be re-occupied by Armenia... This would be a balanced solution. 4,4,000 sq. kms is acceptable... The Pashinyan government is a symbol of our defeat. We must

return to the Armenian colony and rebuild our army to do this... The status of Nagorno Karabakh is not important for me. Much more important is to have more and more Armenians living in Nagorno Karabakh and not to leave it. We should keep Nagorno Karabakh as a continuation of Armenia.”

Hakobyan warned the diaspora about the situation that he expects will develop in 4 or 5 years time when the Russian Peacekeeping Mission comes up for renewal under the Trilateral Agreement. He suggested that while some Armenians presumed the Russians would remain permanently in Karabakh he believed that if Azerbaijan insisted on their withdrawal Moscow will oblige and go in 2025:

“The war is not over... After 5 years the Russians will leave the territory as they left Eastern Anatolia in 1915 and Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991... The Russians and Turks are on good terms. That is always bad for Armenia. I talked to Adam Schiff (prominent Californian pro-Armenian member of the US House of Representatives) about this. He is worried about US influence in the region, with the Turks and Russians being on such good terms... The real war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis started the day after the Soviets left on 26 December 1991.... Armenia should be ready for the new war. Always the defeated party needs to start a war. We have changed places with the Azerbaijanis. We need a new government, to recover the economy and to rebuild the army... We Armenians never give up, we will prevail in the end. We must win, we have no other option!”

Hakobyan, however, insisted that he is still a believer in enhancing relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. He argued that this is the only alternative for Armenia if it wishes to be a truly independent state. Currently, the Pashinyan government is going in the opposite direction, according to Hakobyan:

“For the first time since 1991 we delegated the security of Artsakh to Russia. Will the Russian peacekeepers leave in five years, in ten years or will they stay? Or can our ally Russia one day make an agreement with Turkey and again sacrifice that Armenian territory? These are questions that we need to think about incessantly.”

If Armenia does not establish normal relations it will become more and more dependent on Moscow and gradually will be absorbed into Russia:

“Armenia will be much more secure if it has relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey... Georgia tried to ally with the US. What happened? Disaster! We need balanced relations and good relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. I understand what I am saying is very unpopular in the diaspora. But my understanding

comes from history... But the Armenian government is doing nothing. We have an opportunity now for open roads and open borders... 80 per cent of our borders are with Turkey and Azerbaijan. It is not normal to have poor relations with neighbours. There is no other option but to have diplomatic relations. The only other option is to become part of Russia. It is not too late to accept reality. We do not want to be Armenograd.”

### Commentary

The views of Tatul Hakobyan and the reactions to them reveal that the War of 2020 has had a significant impact on Armenians. They are having to adjust to the new reality in the South Caucasus brought about by the liberation war. Hakobyan has many interesting things to say about the war, including the admission that Armenia was responsible for it and Yerevan had multiple opportunities to prevent it and to end it, prior to its defeat.

Hakobyan mentions how Armenians re-appraised their position a century ago, after their disastrous defeat. But this re-appraisal came about under the influence of Sovietisation and the iron fist of Joseph Stalin. Armenia was put on a new Bolshevik path in 1921 from which a re- assessment of its nationalism was a requirement of survival. And when Stalin gave way to those who treated Armenian nationalism more lightly, it revived, flourishing when the last General Secretary gave the kiss of death to the Soviet Union.

Armenia has suffered defeat in 2020, as it did a century earlier, but its defeat is not so thorough. It feels that if it could survive the catastrophe of 1915 and the power of Stalin it will survive this latest reverse and make a comeback again.

In Hakobyan’s view of what happens next it is clear that the irredentist spirit of Armenian nationalism lives on. While territorial ambitions have been curbed by the shock of defeat there is no recognition that Karabakh is Azerbaijan. In fact, there is an unrepentant revanchist desire to re-occupy Shusha and other areas of Azerbaijan. There is the realistic recognition that the Armenian state can never shake off its dependency on Moscow as long as it refuses to make peace and settle accounts with Azerbaijan and Turkey. But while Hakobyan’s desire that Yerevan establishes good relations with its neighbours is to be welcomed, his message that Armenia should rebuild and rearm for war is unhelpful for peace and stability in the region. It does not encourage generosity in Baku in relation to any future settlement.

On the anniversary of the war, it appears that the road to enduring peace will be a long and difficult one.

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## ECONOMICS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Part Five)

Peter Brooke

### US ATTEMPTS AT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE REVIVAL OF GERMANY, 1945-50

In an article published in 1932, Michal Kalecki outlined two components in the capitalist economy: 'a cartelised sector displaying constant profit margins and a competitive one where profit margins fluctuate with prices, thereby rising in a boom and falling in a recession.'<sup>1</sup> The cartel is able to escape these price fluctuations because its area of production requires a very high initial capital outlay and a high level of specialist expertise. It therefore faces very few competitors and can determine its own prices - cost of production and a self determined profit margin. In the case of an increased demand for its product it increases its workforce; in the case of a decrease in demand it lays its workforce off and reduces the quantity of goods it produces, but its productive capacity in terms of the material means it has at its disposal, is unaffected, so it represents idle capacity. The theory of the cartel and its effect on the national economy had been developed by the Marxist economist Rudolf Hilferding in his book *Das Finanzkapital* (1910).

Hilferding had seen the cartels as a stabilising influence, with the destabilising pattern of boom and bust being determined by the competitive sector of the economy, but Kalecki saw them as exacerbating the boom and bust pattern, pushing into overproduction during the boom which then contributes to the bust which it deepens radically by reducing its production and laying off workers, thus reducing demand in the competitive goods sector.

The broad argument of Josef Halevi's essay *The Political economy of Europe since 1945 - a Kaleckian perspective* is that the process of European integration, promoted by the US in the privileged position it occupied after the war, was the transformation of cartels, still operating within the framework of the nation state, into 'oligopolies' which straddle national boundaries. The argument gets its full expression in the period from 1945 to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This present article - which is based on my own reflections though in broad agreement with Halevi - is confined to the period from 1945 to 1950, before the process really gets going.

The two most heavily cartelised economies in the Western World - indeed in the world prior to the late twentieth century unless we could add Japan - were the United States and Germany. The United States presented the bizarre spectacle in the 1930s of a country fully self sufficient in all the necessities of life, from raw materials and food to the most technically advanced manufactures, nonetheless undergoing a crippling depression with the solution appearing to be a revitalisation of industry through exports but the opportunities for export blocked by protectionist British and (to a lesser extent) French empires, a German (National Socialist) system of bilateral trading arrangements spreading through Europe, a Communist

1 Michal Kalecki: 'The influence of cartelisation on the business cycle' in *Collected Works of Michal Kalecki, Vol 1* (part 2), Oxford, Clarendon, 1990-97. The original article was published in 1932 in the *Polish Socialist Review*. Summarised in Joseph Halevi: *The Political economy of Europe since 1945 - a Kaleckian perspective*, INET (Institute for New economic Thinking) Working Paper No 100, June 2019. The pages are unnumbered.

Soviet Union (whose need for imports had however promising possibilities in the 1920s and possibly, at least in the short term furthered rather than cut off by Stalin's drive towards industrialisation) and a Japan which had been the US's best market but was developing through territorial expansion the means of becoming much more self sufficient.

The situation in Germany was very different because, unlike the US, Germany was heavily dependent on imports both of raw materials and agricultural produce - imports paid for largely by exports of the produce of the cartels. In the financial crises of the interwar period these had come under quite heavy US domination, a factor to which Halevi attaches particular importance with regard to its consequences for the post-war period:

'American corporations stood to benefit from a German dominated recovery chiefly for two reasons. Firstly because they had already been heavily involved in the industrial sectors of the Third Reich, with their own branches in the automotive and electronic industries. Secondly, at the European level, US multinationals were especially well placed to profit since they could link up their plants in Germany with their affiliates in the UK and Belgium. In this way US corporations in Europe would become a major factor both in terms of structural integration because US firms looked right from the beginning at the overall level of European demand. The practical problem was that no spontaneous "market" mechanism could bring about the desired expected level of profitable demand.'

Halevi gives as a source for 'the integration of US automotive companies into Nazi Germany and how such an integration worked after 1945,' Simon Reich's book *The Fruits of Fascism*.<sup>2</sup> Reich certainly shows that there was substantial US involvement in the beginnings of the large scale automobile industry in Germany but the main point he is making is that the Nazis made life difficult for foreign-owned firms to function in Germany and that this policy was continued after the war. He wants to 'assert that Fascism revolutionised the attitudes of the German state about economic policy and how it conceived of the scope and domination of its power. Those changes were sustained in the Bonn Republic and reflected in Bonn's behaviour in the automobile sector' (p.5). 'If I can present evidence to sustain the claim that Nazi state policies are critical to the auto industry's degree and distribution of power in the post war period, I will have done much to explain the basis of German post-war prosperity, without making a claim about other sectors.'

In the 1920s and early 1930s, according to Reich, there were some 150 small producers in the German car industry. The Ford Motor Company was incorporated as a car manufacturer in Germany in 1925, the first car was assembled in 1926, and the first wholly German produced car appeared in 1932. The only German car manufacturer that had successfully copied Ford's method of mass production was Opel, but it was bought by General Motors in 1929. According to Reich the Nazis pursued a policy that discriminated against Ford as a 'foreign' firm, initially favouring Opel, despite its ownership by GM, but obliging both firms to adopt a fully German management and eventually giving full backing to the wholly German Daimler

2 Simon Reich: *The Fruits of Fascism - Postwar prosperity in historical perspective*, Cornell University Press, 1990.

Benz and the new, largely government created Volkswagen. There were ups and downs in the story (Hitler in 1938 awarded Henry Ford the 'Grand Cross of the German Iron Eagle' in honour of his 75th birthday) but in general it is a tale of steadily increasing state domination and 'Germanisation' of the sector and Reich sees it as contributing to the success of the post war German automobile industry in contrast to Britain which pursued a policy of equal treatment for foreign investors, offering foreign firms 'national treatment.' He tells us (p.2) 'Governments in Japan, Italy, France and West Germany never talk about the advantages of attracting foreign investment or the application of anything resembling "national treatment."' In 1989 Europeans reacted angrily to Margaret Thatcher cultivating Japanese investment. 'They want to subvert Japanese competition' (Reich's book was published in 1990). If one wished to argue that the UK joined the Common Market in order to subvert it that might make a good starting point.

Reich maintains (p.28) that the automobile industry in the 1920s was 'the only major German economic sector where foreign firms were the dominant producers.' This was because, contrary to the chemical, electronics, optical and coal cartels, well established since the nineteenth century, automobiles were a new sector with the US already installed in the leading role. Nonetheless, given the dependence of the German economy in the 1920s on American financial manipulation through the Dawes and Young plans, US capital must have become important in German industry and would hardly have been withdrawn once the Nazis came to power.<sup>3</sup>

## THE ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Be that as it may, it was quite plainly the desire of the US - continuous from Morgenthau and White in the Treasury to Marshall in the State Department - to open Europe up as a free trade area accessible to US exports. The assumption had initially been that, given the perceived need to suppress Germany, the motor force for the process would be the UK and France, principally the UK which, it must have seemed, had been beaten into shape by White's victories over Keynes both with regard to the Bretton Woods arrangements and the subsequent conditions for the post war reconstruction loan. This was discussed in the last two articles in this series. The jewel in the crown of White's achievements was obliging the British to agree to the convertibility of sterling which would have opened up the whole sterling area to penetration by the dollar. Convertibility was implemented in July 1947 but, as we saw in the last episode, sterling almost immediately came close to collapse as holders of sterling made a rush for the much more reliable dollar. This was not at all the intention and the reform had to be quickly reversed.

It was obvious that Britain - still reliant on a protected sterling area, and on the principle of 'imperial preference' - could not fulfil the desired role of motor for a free trade Europe. Nor was France to American eyes a likely alternative despite the ambitions of Jean Monnet. The Monnet Plan aimed to use German coking coal to enable France to replace Germany as the major European producer of steel and other high value capital goods. But France had a long way to go before it could fill that role and, like Italy, it had the disadvantage of a powerful Communist Party. In American eyes it was obvious that the leading role would have to be played by Germany but that happy outcome, and indeed the whole project of an integrated Europe, had many obstacles in its path.

For the US, the creation of an integrated Europe was the principle aim of Marshall Aid, and the first vehicle

for achieving it was the Council for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), meeting in Paris in July 1947. The principle was that the Europeans themselves would come together to hammer out a plan for the distribution of Marshall Aid. But instead of an integrated plan covering the whole area of Western Europe what the Americans received amounted to fifteen separate plans for the differing ambitions of the fifteen countries represented. Nor was the situation much improved in the case of its successor, the hopefully permanent Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The main obstacles to the US project were Britain and France often working in tandem on this, despite their disagreements on other matters.

The closest the US got to support - given that Germany was still excluded - were Belgium and the Netherlands ('Benelux'), especially Belgium which at the end of the war had an exceptionally well placed industrial capacity and had become the most successful European exporter, a privilege obstructed by continued European reliance on bilateral trade agreements and in any case threatened as other countries caught up. Belgium was keenly supportive of both the main planks of the US policy - regeneration of Germany and an integrated Europe - and with US support the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was elected as chairman of the OEEC with 'no enthusiasm on the part of the others present' according to a British Foreign Office memorandum quoted in Alan Milward's book *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (p.179).<sup>4</sup>

Milward goes on to describe the impossible task the OEEC had. It was the European liaison with the American ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration), charged with organising Marshall Aid for the whole of Europe, that is, in principle, developing a consensus as to what each country should receive, a problem made the more difficult in that all the European countries were hoping for their own export led recovery, meaning they needed other countries to take their imports. But Marshall Aid money was to be spent on imports from the US. At the same time Marshall Aid was subject to annual renewal by the US Congress which was feeling progressively less generous as, by 1949, the US itself went into recession and it became clear that the Europeans were not advancing towards the 'United States of Europe' which Congress was persuaded was the whole point of the exercise. To quote Milward (p.191):

'The period from July to October 1949 was the grand climacteric of the first American attempt to bring European economic integration into being. The political struggle coincided with a sharp recession in the US whose international repercussions on the European economies exacerbated their differences with each other and made the allocation of aid within the OEEC an even more divisive function. Thenceforth the OEEC faded rapidly from the forefront of European politics and began its transition to honest statistical toil.'

He continues (pp.206-7):

'The purpose of making them divide that aid had been to build in the process an integrative European organisation which would survive the end of the ERP [European Recovery Plan, 'Marshall Aid' - PB] and go from strength to strength. Nothing held it together in July and August 1949 but the scramble for dollars and even that worked no further than to produce an unsatisfactory report in an unsatisfactory way leaving no hope that the exercise could be done again next year and not the slightest hope that, if it were, it would advance the cause of integration. No sooner had the exercise been completed than there was a sweeping readjustment of European exchange rates, done with no co-operation and no reference to the OEEC, making nonsense of the forecast deficits and the programmes

3 There must be a literature on this but I haven't yet encountered it.

4 Alan S. Milward: *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, Methuen & Co, 1987 (first published 1984).

of aid to finance them which had taken the OEEC nine months to hammer out ...

'In future the ECA itself would decide on the allocation of Marshall Aid ...'

## TOWARDS THE ESCS

Milward is insistent that the OEEC had nothing to do with the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS), which is usually seen as the beginnings of European integration but which he describes (p.217) as 'an assertion of European economic and political will as a reaction against American policy.' It was in fact the continuation of the Monnet Plan with its need for access to coking coal (the only coal suitable for steel production) from the Ruhr. In the integrated United States of Europe envisaged by the Americans, each country would concentrate on its own specialisation in relation to a single coherent entity. The European nations, however, particularly, in their different ways, Britain and France, wanted so far as possible to have their own complete economies and their own distinct mode of political organisation - the British Welfare State being a conspicuous example. Marshall Aid in the end helped this project, not the US project: 'Ironically the success of Marshall Aid was itself a major obstacle to the implementation of American policy' (Milward, p.210).

The Americans had been critical of the Monnet Plan, wanting France to concentrate much more on the immediate satisfaction of consumer demand, food and housing, with a view to forestalling the discontent that was fuelling support for the Communist Party.<sup>5</sup> From the American point of view in an integrated Europe if Germany could produce a surplus of steel there was no need for other countries to do likewise.

France had pressed hard for the establishment of an international authority for the Ruhr. The future of the Ruhr was discussed at length in a conference held in London in 1948 and something like the desired authority was agreed but, says Milward (pp.153-4) 'few bodies can have argued about for so long which in the end did so little. Its historical importance lay precisely in that, because its powers were so inadequate as to be capable only of producing ill-will, it paved the way for the European Coal and Steel Community.'

The principle was that 'access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr, which was previously subject to the exclusive control of Germany, be in future guaranteed without discrimination to the countries of Europe co-operating in the common good' (p.154). But this flew in the face of the determination of the US military in charge in the US/UK bizon to restore full German sovereignty as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and as a motor power for the European economy as a whole. No sooner was the 'international authority' gained than the substance of it was whipped away:

'By the end of May 1948, it had become certain that the second stage of the London conference would recommend a West Germany with a more unitary constitution than France considered acceptable and an International Authority for the Ruhr with neither the powers nor the duration which France considered indispensable. The inevitable moment of choice had arrived. The choice had not been imposed on France by acceptance of the Marshall Plan. Within the CEEC France had been able to rely on British support against all American attempts to force political integration on to Western Europe and even on a certain measure of British support for the idea that German economic recovery should be slower than that of the rest of Western Europe. But in the London conference there was no British support for French views on the German constitution.'

Indeed, it was made clear to the French that if the National Assembly rejected the proposals for the German constitution and the Ruhr Authority as they had emerged from this stage of the London conference the United States and Britain would still go ahead by themselves with their own version of a future Germany.' (pp.157-8)

The French had to accept this conclusion because 'Not to accept would have been to end almost all French influence over the future Germany save that exercised in the French zone of occupation' which, especially since the coal-rich Saarland had already been incorporated into France would be nothing but a burden.

'The conclusion from such an unavoidable analysis was only a short step logically; in terms of Europe's future organisation it was a giant's pace. If, faced with this defeat, what France sought in Germany was influence over the future society there and access to the Ruhr resources, these could only be achieved by a closer Franco-West German political association and economic co-operation. From the time the decisions of the second stage of the London conference had to be accepted or refused there began a determined search in Paris for an entirely different solution, and now the only logical one, to the problem of Franco-German relations.' (p.158)

## LUDWIG ERHARD AND THE GERMAN CURRENCY REFORM

The beginnings of this radical reorientation of French policy with regard to Germany, which Milward dates to the London conference and the middle of 1948, coincides more or less with the currency reform - Reichsmark replaced by the Deutschmark - which occurred on 20th June 1948 and is generally seen as the beginning of the German 'economic miracle' - the end of the post-war period of deprivation and beginning of the restoration of West Germany as a major economic power (it could be called the third German 'economic miracle after the miracles that occurred in 1924 - end of inflation - and 1933 - beginnings of a solution to the problem of unemployment).

It was universally agreed that the Reichsmark was no longer serviceable as currency. No-one wanted to hold Reichsmark for any length of time which inhibited any long term investment. Where production occurred, the lack of trust in the Reichsmark encouraged hoarding in the expectation that things would improve. For many people the sole access to necessary goods was through the black market where small scale transactions were conducted on a basis of barter, with cigarettes often used as a form of currency. The reform was delayed through disagreements with the Soviet zone as to how the new currency could be supplied. The decision to go ahead with introducing the Deutschmark into the Western zones (the US/UK bizon and the French zone) marked the definitive end of the possibility of a united Germany. It was immediately followed by the introduction of a new currency in the Soviet zone and the blockade of Berlin, the point at issue being the Soviet desire to introduce their currency through the whole city and the Western desire - supported by the elected German administration - to introduce their currency into the areas under their control. Bullock's biography of Ernest Bevin has much to say about the Berlin blockade but little on the effects of the currency reform in West Germany. The name 'Ludwig Erhard' does not appear in the index. I shall pursue the opposite approach.

The currency reform and attendant 'economic miracle' have an importance that goes beyond the actual historical event. To quote the German-American historian Diethelm Prowe: 'For many years, the immediate post-war phase of German history was wholly overshadowed by the so-called economic miracle, which, as the allegedly purest model of American-style free

5 See e.g. Irwin M.Wall, Philippe-Etienne Raviart: 'Jean Monnet, les États Unis et le plan français', Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire, No 30, Aoril-June 1991, pp.9-10.

enterprise in all of Europe, raised Germany from the depths of economic destruction and despair within a few years and initiated an extraordinarily long period of sustained economic growth.’<sup>6</sup> When in the 1970s Keith Joseph established what was to become the Centre for Policy Studies, one of the motors dismantling Conservative Party acceptance of the post-war British Keynesian consensus, he initially called it the ‘Ludwig Erhard Foundation’ and ‘Institute for a social market economy’ - ‘social market’ being the term used to describe Erhard’s economic philosophy. Reading about how the reform was implemented suggests that it might have been the inspiration behind the disastrous ‘shock therapy’ imposed on the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.

Although the actual currency change was an American project the implementation was planned and executed by a German administration. When the bizonex - officially coming into existence on 1st January 1947 - was formed five central offices were established staffed by German civil servants covering economy, transport, finances, postal services and food supply. Subject to approval of the occupying powers they had the right to issue law in their own areas of competence. It was as Director of the Economics Administration that Erhard became responsible for managing the currency reform.<sup>7</sup>

Between 1928 and 1942 Erhard had worked in market research in the Nuremberg Commercial College under Wilhelm Vershofen who, in 1935, founded the powerful Berlin-based Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (Society for Consumer Research). He left Vershofen in 1942. According to Mark Spicka (pp.33-4): ‘Erhard, an ardent supporters of the free market, disagreed sharply with Vershofen’s support of cartels to order the economy. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Erhard had become familiar with the leading economists of the neoliberal school, including [Walter] Eucken, [Alexander] Rüstow and [Wilhelm] Röpke. Having parted with Vershofen, Erhard had founded his own Institut für Industrieforschung (Institute for Industrial Research) with funding from several major industrial firms. During 1942/43 Erhard concentrated upon studying Germany’s transition to a peacetime economy after the war.’

Spicka suggests that ‘the circulation of his 268 page memorandum *Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung* (War finance and debt consolidation) was a potentially dangerous move on Erhard’s part for [after?] Josef Goebbels’ declaration of “total war” in January 1942, talk of the peace after the war’s conclusion was unacceptable to the Nazi regime.’ However, his own footnote goes on to quote a biography of Erhard by Volker Hentschel saying that ‘the economics ministry, in conjunction with heavy industry, was already interested in generating plans for the conversion of the wartime economy to a peacetime economy.’ It would surely be surprising if it were otherwise. The German historian Werner Abelshäuser, who has done much to overturn conventional notions of German economic history, says that ‘the principles of the market economy were entirely

6 Diethelm Prowe: ‘Economic Democracy in Post-World War II Germany: Corporatist Crisis Response, 1945-1948’, *The Journal of Modern History*, Sept 1985, Vol 57, No.3, pp.151-182 (this extract pp.151-2). Born in Bonn in 1941, Prowe’s academic career was pursued as a Professor in Carleton College, Minnesota, from 1966 until his retirement in 2008. He was editor of the *German Studies Review*.

7 This account is based on the first chapter of Mark E.Spicka: *Selling the Economic Miracle - Economic reconstruction and politics in West Germany, 1949-1957*, New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2007 (the full text is available free of charge at <https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SpickaSelling>). Spicka is a historian based at Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania.

perceptible in the plans for the post-war order envisaged by the National Socialist economic associations and authorities in the final phase of the total war and ... they offered an astonishingly large field of action to convinced supporters of the market economy, such as Ludwig Erhard.’<sup>8</sup>

## ‘ORDO-LIBERALISM’

Erhard’s close collaborator in the ‘social market’ project, Walter Eucken, was head of the ‘Freiburg School’ of economists based in the University of Freiburg where, after the National Socialist assumption of power, Martin Heidegger was elected as rector. Spicka (p.30) says that Eucken ‘was relatively successful in creating some distance between his “Freiburg School” and the Nazi regime, despite the efforts of the University rector, Martin Heidegger, to “Nazify” the Institution. Eucken sought to rehabilitate classical economics in the face of the autarchic economy Hitler was building in the Third Reich.’ It would be interesting to know more about this in detail. Eucken’s father, Rudolf, was a philosopher, well-known in his day (he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1908) and after Rudolf’s death in 1926, Walter and his mother became close friends with Edmund Husserl, Heidegger’s predecessor in the Philosophy Chair at Freiburg. Both Walter Eucken and Husserl (despite his Jewishness) were members of the Confessing Church, the Protestant church that refused incorporation into the state supported German Evangelical Church. According to one account: ‘Eucken belonged to the core group of the Freiburg Circles [a group of theologians and economic theorists formed in 1943. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was involved with it - PB], a resistance movement opposing National Socialism. He was one of the university-intern opponents to Heidegger’s attempt to establish the Führerprinzip and the Gleichschaltung at the university, and he risked his life in fighting Nazi ideology, propagating ordoliberal ideals for a new socio-political and economic ordering for the post-war-period, and of course due to his remaining contact with persons who fell in disgrace under the Third Reich dictatorship [presumably a reference to Husserl - PB]. Walter Eucken received death threats after his lectures *Kampf der Wissenschaft*, the second edition of his book *Nationalökonomie wozu?* was prohibited, and he was arrested and interrogated after the failed July 20 plot. This is all the more astonishing reminding [sic - PB] the fact that Eucken’s mother in law was, due to the NS-racial laws a Jew, his wife Edith was a half-Jew, and Walter Eucken himself was classified as non-Arian (interrelated).’<sup>9</sup>

We may however note that whereas after a couple of years Heidegger withdrew from engaging in anything other than his own very isolated philosophical research, Eucken continued in public life throughout the whole Nazi period. Abelshäuser again says (p.186) that ‘the Party leadership

8 Werner Abelshäuser: ‘Aux origines de l’économie sociale de marché - État, économie et conjoncture dans l’Allemagne du 20e siècle,’ *Vingtième Siècle, revue d’histoire*, April-June, 1992, No 34, pp.173-191. This extract p.187. My translation of what I assume is a French translation of a German original.

9 Rainer Klump and Manuel Wörsdörfer: ‘On the Affiliation of Phenomenology and Ordoliberalism: Links between Edmund Husserl, Rudolf and Walter Eucken’, *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, Vol. 18(4) (2011); pp. 551-578. This extract from footnote 72, p.27. The context of the article is commentary on an argument by Michel Foucault given in lectures in 1978-9 and published posthumously as *Naissance de la politique* (2004). Foucault presented the Husserl/Eucken relationship as a sign of an intrinsic connection between phenomenology and Neoliberal economic theory.

maintained close contact with the reformers. It put the Party's publication resources at their disposal and very quickly took up their demands into its own economic programme', abandoning the doctrines of its own founder-economist Gottfried Feder, who wanted to put an end to the 'bondage of interest.' Alfred Müller-Armack, a very close collaborator with Eucken who is credited with having coined the term 'social market', was a member of the Nazi Party. The point here is not to tarnish the 'ordo-liberals' with an association with the Nazis (or pace Foucault, to tarnish phenomenology with an association with the ordo-liberals!). Two other leading ordo-liberal theorists, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow, left when the Nazis took power - both spending some time in the University of Istanbul. The point is rather that German National Socialism, like Italian Fascism, allowed of a wide range of debate on economic matters and that the 'ordo-liberalism' that emerged with Erhard was not necessarily a radical break in the continuity of German economic thinking, however congenial it might have been to the Anglo-American - especially American - occupation.

Eucken died in 1950 but the thinking associated with him continued with the publication of the journal *Ordo*. As the name, evocative of 'order', suggests, the 'ordo-liberals' were not advocates of *laissez-faire*, of an absence of government interference in economic life. They regarded Ludwig von Mises as something of a father-figure and Friedrich von Hayek was a frequent contributor to *Ordo* but they nonetheless believed in regulation of the economy, primarily to prevent the emergence of cartels, of those sections of the economy that were above the rules and disciplines of competition. As such their position was opposite to that of the SPD which, following the lead of Rudolf Hilferding, saw the emergence of the cartels and of 'organised capitalism' as an advance towards socialism. As 'socialism' in an imagined pure state might be thought to be the end of history, the achievement of a state of affairs in which the economy ceased to be problematical, so the ordo-liberals regarded a pure state of competition as the ideal to be aimed for that would solve social problems while ensuring the highest degree of individual liberty. Although Erhard continued to be associated with them it hardly seems that they could have been happy with him, or with the American influence on the German economy, if Halevi is right in arguing that the principle tendency was a development towards 'oligopoly.' According to an account by Henry Oliver, Professor of Economics in Indiana University: 'Erhard's professional colleagues favour more stringent measures than those which Erhard's party has sponsored. Among the restrictions most frequently recommended are the outlawing of all agreements restricting competition, the prohibition of mergers and other combinations that result in monopoly or oligopoly, the splitting of monopolistic and oligopolistic firms except where this is not technically feasible, and the prohibition of competitive practices intended to cripple one's rivals: e.g., price wars, price discrimination, and pre-emptive purchases. In general, the fight on cartels receives the greatest attention. Among the administrative devices widely proposed is a monopoly bureau to keep potential recalcitrants constantly in fear of the law.'<sup>10</sup>

As the 'Golden Hunger' in Germany after the war was a period of intense cultural activity so it was also a period of intense political and intellectual activity. The occupying powers in all the zones had allowed the creation of political parties, under license, from December 1945 and in the Western zones the domination of the Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), together with the smaller Free Democrats (FDP), that was to last well into the twenty first

10 Henry M. Oliver Jr: 'German Neoliberalism', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 74, No. 1, Feb 1960, pp. 117-149. This extract, p.142.

century was quickly established. The contrast with the constant rearranging of party labels in France is striking.

As the Socialist SPD was a continuation of the pre-war SPD, so the Christian Democratic Union and its sister party the Bavarian Christian Social Union, were a continuation of the pre-war Centre Party which had been formed primarily to represent the interests of German Catholicism, threatened by the domination of Prussia and its Protestant monarchy. But although overwhelmingly Catholic, with its leadership very largely drawn from the old Centre Party, the CDU/CSU adopted from the start a principle of interdenominational 'Christianity', hoping to attract a Protestant membership. This, however, was problematical since the Catholic leadership tended to blame the rise of Nazism on aspects of German culture - secularisation and Prussianism - they associated with Protestantism.<sup>11</sup>

Christian Democracy has this much in common with Fascism that, unlike the Socialist SPD or the Free Market FDP it wasn't defined by attachment to a particular economic doctrine. It therefore straddled a wide range of economic views from those close to the SPD to those close to the FDP. With the ascendancy of Konrad Adenauer and the adhesion of Ludwig Erhard, the free market view associated with Erhard and Eucken prevailed, but in the immediate aftermath of the war it was, or at least appeared to be, the left wing view that was dominant, right across the spectrum. Even the free market oriented Free Democratic Party was making proposals for an 'economic Parliament' on which both 'business' and 'labour' would have equal representation.<sup>12</sup> This was especially the case in the British zone where the British, engaged in nationalisation of the coal industry in Britain, were pressing for similar measures in the Ruhr, to the annoyance both of the Americans and the French. In North-Rhine Westphalia, the land (administrative division or 'state') which included the Ruhr, the CDU in February 1947, produced the 'Ahlen Programme' which called for an 'economy of a collective kind.' Abelshauser comments: 'It is on this point, on the transformation of mines and heavy metal industry into a collective property, as well as on that of the public controls of banks and credit, that the beginnings of the collaboration between the CDU and SPD - mainly in the framework of the central economic administration of the British zone - could take place.' He says that all the first constitutional texts of the *länder* contained clauses enabling certain major branches of industry to become collective property. 'This collective property would not necessarily replace private property, but there was a strong inclination towards a solution of a collective order for mines, energy, metalworks and steelworks.'<sup>13</sup> In other words, the 'cartels'.

In the US zone, Abelshauser tells us, the constitutional assembly for Hesse, elected in June 1946, produced a constitution which called, with the support of the Social Democrats, Communists and 'most of the CDU' for the immediate collectivisation of 169 enterprises in mining, metalwork and transport sectors. The American administration tried to persuade them to withdraw the article and when they refused insisted that when the constitution was put to a referendum this clause should be put separately. 71.9% of

11 This is discussed in e.g. Maria Mitchell: 'Materialism and Secularism: CDU politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol.67, No.2, June 1995.

12 Prowe: *Economic Democracy*, pp.466-7.

13 Werner Abelshauser: 'Les nationalisations n'auront pas lieu. La controverse sur l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique et social dans les zones occidentales de l'Allemagne de 1945 à 1949'. *Le Mouvement social*, No.134, Jan-March, 1986, pp.81-96. This extract, pp.91-2. My translation of what I assume is a French translation of a German original.

Hesse electors voted in favour of collectivisation and 76.8% in favour of the constitution as a whole.

Both the British and American administrations decided, partly to avoid disputes among themselves, to delay implementation of such measures until the decisions could be made by a German administration, hoping, in the event correctly, that the mood in favour of collectivisation would have dissipated. Diethelm Prowe (*Economic Democracy*, pp.455-7) argues that this mood was not at all a mood of revolutionary enthusiasm. It was on the contrary a feeling that in the circumstances of the *Mangelwirtschaft* - scarcity economy - determined action was necessary. And that the catastrophe which had hit Germany was to be blamed on the great industrialists who had supported Hitler. At the same time there was a reluctance to see any concentration of power, especially in reaction to the experience of the Nazi wartime economy, in the hands of the state. This reluctance was felt right across the political spectrum, including in the SPD. As a result the proposed reorganisations of industry tended to be complex, attempting to bring together all the different possible interests - entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, local and national administrations. They were 'corporatist' rather than 'socialist', though the term 'corporatist', associated with Fascism, wasn't used. 'Economic democracy' was the preferred phrase.

That Erhard was Director of the Economics Administration of the Bizone has something accidental about it. When it was established, the first Director was Victor Agartz, previously head of the economic office of the British zone and one of the most committed SPD advocates of Socialist planning. But he resigned owing to ill health and was replaced by Johannes Semler of the Bavarian (formerly in the US zone) CSU. Although he was a committed free trader, under the circumstances - the shortage of raw materials, food and consumer goods - he continued the policy of price controls and rationing, together with Agartz's emphasis on the revival of heavy industry and a generally planned reorganisation of transport facilities. However, after he complained vigorously about the quality of food being supplied by the US under Marshall Aid, he was dismissed by the allied military governors in January 1948 and replaced by Erhard who, since Autumn 1947, had been a member of the *Sonderstelle für Geld und Kredit* (Special Bureau for Monetary and Currency Matters) of the Economics Council where, in close consultation with Eucken, he had developed 'a policy of sound money and price deregulation.'

According to Spicka, whose account I am following, the Economics Council was divided, with 44 CDU/CSU representatives against 46 Social Democrats and Communists, 'but the CDU/CSU under Konrad Adenauer wanted at all costs to avoid forming a coalition with the SPD ...

'The CDU/CSU could not agree on whom to name to the position of economics director, especially with the strong trade unionist wing of the CDU/CSU supporting more economic controls and emphasis upon heavy industry. The FDP, on the other hand, was promoting Erhard as director of the Economics Administration and its support was crucial in creating an anti-socialist bloc. As a result, in heated discussions in early March 1948, the CDU/CSU and FDP compromised by nominating the Christian Socialist Herman Pünder from Cologne to head the whole Bizone, while Erhard was nominated as the director of the Economics Administration—a position to which he was elected on 2 March 1948. As some historians have suggested, Erhard's quick rise from obscure industrial researcher to head of the economy in the Bizone was due more to political wheeling and dealing than the CDU/CSU's commitment to his economic ideas.' (p.38)

The result was that the currency reform was accompanied by a radical liberalisation of the economy - 90% of price controls,

mainly on consumer goods, were eliminated and the remaining controls only very loosely applied - and because the reform was generally seen as a success it created a very strong bias in German politics towards the free market ideal. In particular, under Adenauer's guidance, this became the overwhelming theme of the CDU/CSU in the following 1949 election, at the expense of the party's Christian Socialist wing. The Ahlen Programme was replaced by the 'Düsseldorf Principles' (Sicka, p.61), developed in close consultation with Erhard and made public in July 1949 at the start of the CDU/CSU election campaign.

Adenauer had insisted that the theme of the campaign would be 'planned or market' - 'The system of the planned economy robs the productive man of his economic self-determination.' In Spicka's account (p.62) the Düsseldorf Principles 'did not stress the currency reform, which was an American initiative, instead arguing that the CDU/CSU economic policy led to a political-economic turning point when the efficiency of workers at all levels rose and production climbed. It was the rejection of the "ration card economy (*Bezugscheinwirtschaft*) that gave freedom back to the consumer.'" After 20 June, "The stores became full, courage, strength, and energy were roused, and the whole nation was ripped out of its state of lethargy."

## THE REAL SOURCES OF THE MIRACLE

Although Erhard was not actually a member of the party he took the lead in the campaign. He was Adenauer's Minister for Economic Affairs from 1949 to 1963, and Vice Chancellor from 1957 to 1963, when he succeeded Adenauer as Chancellor. He thereby became the very personification of Germany's economic recovery. Not everyone, however, agreed with this rosy view. Spicka (pp.41-2) gives a summary of Werner Abelshäuser's argument, published in 1982, that 'West Germany's economic growth from the late 1940s through the 1950s represented a period of catching up after the destructive impact of the war, and that eventually West Germany fell into longer-term trends of twentieth-century economic growth. Abelshäuser challenged the often accepted roots of the economic miracle by attacking the following postulates: that the West German recovery began with the currency reform of 20 June 1948; that this recovery was based upon foreign aid, especially the Marshall Plan; and that the changes in the political economy associated with the social market economy triggered the eventual West German economic recovery.'

A very similar critique was published as early as 1950 by the Hungarian-British economist Thomas Balogh.<sup>14</sup> He begins by summarising the arguments of the reform's supporters:

'It is said that the currency-reform, which put an end to the state of "suppressed Inflation" by annihilating excess purchasing power, together with the abolition of controls decreed simultaneously, has achieved a new "economic miracle". The abolition of food subsidies combined with a reduction of direct taxation is said to have restored incentive and increased initiative lacking in controlled economies. The play of the price-mechanism, it is argued, has provided for an "economic" use of resources which planned systems are unable to achieve and thus sped recovery. The Government is precluded from unbalancing the budget by law and has no say in credit policy. Thus it cannot indulge in inflationism. The rate

14 Thomas Balogh: 'Germany: an experiment in planning by the "free" price mechanism', *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, Vol III, No 13, April-June, 1950, pp.70-101.

of interest is once more restored to its rightful place as the main director of investment. Western Germany, it is said, shows the resilience and effectiveness of the “free market mechanism.” (p.71)

Balogh argues however that the increase in production that followed the reform was already occurring in 1946/7 (making allowance for the hard winter of 1947) and was much less marked than it should have been once a money economy had been restored. The way in which the restoration had taken place had resulted in a huge increase in inequality and poverty. According to Spicka’s account (p.41), unemployment more than doubled, from 442,000 in June 1948 to 937,000 in January 1949, owing to the inability of firms to pay using the new Deutschmark. In order to combat the possibility of inflation following the currency reform the supply of money had been cut drastically. Up to 60 (initially 40) Reichsmark were exchanged against Deutschmark on a 1:1 basis but thereafter, and in the case of moneys lodged in institutions (bank holdings, pension funds etc) the exchange was 10:1. According to Spicka some 93.5% of currency was thereby taken out of circulation. As a result (p.40) ‘workers, pensioners and small savers lost practically all their liquid assets’ - for the second time in just over twenty years. Meanwhile ‘the owners of physical assets or means of industrial or agricultural production had 90% of their debt wiped out.’

Nonetheless now that a trustworthy money was in circulation a flood of previously unavailable goods suddenly appeared on the market. Quoting Spicka again, ‘Instead of a scarcity of goods being chased by abundant but worthless money, there were available goods but money was scarce.’ In the absence of any government direction of the economy Balogh says (p.72)

‘such productive effort and especially investment as exist are to a considerable extent misdirected towards luxury consumption, the creation of palatial hotels, restaurants, shops, movies and shops and industries catering for them ...

‘There is no doubt of course that German recovery was maintained and important advances were achieved. The miracle so often talked about, however, is due to the fact that, while the progress since June 1948 was suddenly made manifest to tourists, progress before the currency reform was carefully and malevolently concealed with the intent of making illegal pecuniary gains [hoarding - PB]. To the superficial observer riding down the streets in a car the change must indeed have been miraculous.’ (p.75)

Balogh explains that despite the destruction caused by allied bombing and the post-war dismantling of industrial assets for transfer either to the Soviet Union or to France, Germany’s productive capacity remained surprisingly intact:

‘The first and basic fact to remember is the failure of the Allied air attack on Germany to destroy or even seriously impair her industrial productive potential ... The frightful devastation of the centres of the cities and the loss of a priceless architectural heritage and the undermining - as far as a large part of the population was concerned - of the basis of civilised life should not lead to an overestimate of the effects on machines, which are less destructible.’ (p.73)

Germany’s productive capacity had been increased enormously by the Nazis. The point is confirmed by Spicka, paraphrasing Abelshauser (p.42): ‘the total amount of fixed

industrial assets was actually about 20% higher in 1945 than in 1936 because of the heavy wartime investment in German industry.’ Simon Reich’s *Fruits of Fascism* gives details of how Volkswagen expanded production during the war, largely (but not exclusively) through the use of slave labour in appalling conditions, but he also indicates how they managed to escape the consequences of the bombing (though he does say that some of the Daimler-Benz plants were badly affected):

‘The first serious attack took place in April 1944, when 500 high explosives and 450 incendiary bombs were dropped on the plant with limited effect. By this time a dispersal plan had been activated by Speer’s Ministry of Munitions, decentralising production in well-hidden, well-protected, and often underground locations. In Volkswagen’s case the dispersal plants were located within 100 kilometres of the main factory ... Dispersal plants totalled 104,000 square feet, only about 2 per cent of the main plant, but this small area accounted for 827 machine tools - 32 per cent of what was located in the main works. Subsequent bombing occurred on 20 June, 29 June and 5 August 1944, and 1,383 high explosives and 58 incendiary bombs actually fell on plant buildings ... However, the controlling officer of the Volkswagenwerk under British trusteeship suggested that Allied attacks were not as effective as these figures indicate. Ivan Hirst claims that the Germans deliberately collapsed the roof on parts of the plant after major raids hoping to convince the Allies that the attack had been successful, thereby sparing it from serious damage. The plan was successful, and all raids ceased after August 1944 ... There was no roof on the press shop, but the plan successfully protected essential machinery and the plant suffered very little structural damage.’ (pp.167-8)

The main problem according to both Balogh and Abelshauser lay in the ‘bottlenecks’ created by disruption in the means of transport which had been successfully targeted by the bombing - roads, bridges, railway track, rolling stock, canals, as well as much of the administrative structure which, Balogh says, had ‘left the country cut unto a large number of almost autarchic districts.’ But this had created problems for the occupying forces and the needs of the military administration: ‘Given this unparalleled situation, the first phase of reconstruction [removal of bottlenecks caused by the disruption in communications - PB], carried out mainly under direct military control and primarily from the viewpoint of military needs, was remarkably successful.’ It was a triumph of planning! Similarly, the introduction of Erhard’s measures coincided with ‘the increase in coal production as a result of the deliberately planned and selective scheme which should have been introduced much earlier.’

In short Balogh, and after him Abelshauser, argue that Erhard’s reforms acted as a hindrance to German recovery rather than an aid, largely because they provided incentives to conspicuous consumption, therefore to imports, therefore to the flight of money out of the national economy, rather than to the development of the nation’s own productive capacity, in particular the large scale industry (the cartels) which were favoured in the thinking of the SPD, less so in the thinking of the *ordo-liberals*. ‘Nonetheless’, as Galileo might have muttered underneath his breath, ‘it moves.’ There was an apparently miraculous German recovery. Something has been said of the reasons for this, mainly to do with the continuation of the productive capacity left by the Nazis. But more will be said in the next article when we will look at the impact of the Korean War and the radical restructuring of the US aid programme which it inspired.

## A Narrative of the Anglo –Irish negotiations in 1921 (Part Four)

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 2. IRISH BULLETIN.  
FRIDAY, 21ST OCTOBER, 1921.

### THE SOURCE AND CAUSE OF THE “TROUBLES IN IRELAND”.

#### PRESIDENT DE VALERA’S MESSAGE TO HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XV.

Late last evening the IRISH BULLETIN published a special edition containing the following:-

“President de Valera has dispatched the following telegraphic message to His Holiness, Benedict XV:-

‘His Holiness, Benedict XV., Rome.

‘The people of Ireland have read the message sent by Your Holiness to the King of Great Britain, and appreciate the kindly interest in their welfare and the paternal regard which suggested it. I tender to Your Holiness their gratitude. They are confident that the ambiguities in the reply sent in the name of King George will not mislead you, as they may the uninformed, into believing that the troubles are ‘in’ Ireland, or that the people of Ireland own allegiance to the British King.

‘The independence of Ireland has been formally proclaimed by the regularly elected representatives of the people of Ireland, and ratified by subsequent plebiscites.

‘The trouble is between Ireland and Britain, and its source that the rulers of Britain have sought to impose their will upon Ireland, and by brutal force have endeavoured to rob her people of the liberty which is their natural right and their ancient heritage.

‘We long to be at peace and in friendship with the people of Britain as with other peoples, but the same constancy through persecution and martyrdom that has proved the reality of our people’s attachment to the faith of their fathers proves the reality of their attachment to their national freedom, and no consideration will ever induce them to abandon it.

#### Sinister Misrepresentations.

Since the beginning of the present negotiations members of the British Government, in speeches, letters and indirect statements to the Press, have continued their sinister misrepresentations of Ireland’s case. Those who drafted King George’s reply to His Holiness knew well that the phrase “the troubles in Ireland” was a dishonest description of the British war upon Irish liberties. The phrase suggested that the “troubles in Ireland” are troubles among the Irish people themselves and of their own seeking. The suggestion is false. The source of the Anglo-Irish war is a foreign source, its existence is due solely to the fact “that the rulers of Britain have sought to impose their will upon Ireland and by brutal force have endeavoured to rob her people of the liberty which is their natural right and their ancient heritage.” The Irish majority and the Irish minority both regard Ireland as their “beloved land” and both desire for her peace and contentment. The minority are, it is true, opposed to the national demand of the majority, but this opposition springs from the same cause as the Irish war of independence, namely, alien interference.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER 5. IRISH BULLETIN.  
WEDNESDAY, 26th OCTOBER, 1921.

### THE “CRISIS”.

If the Conference in London results in peace between the British and Irish peoples the British Press will be able to claim little credit for that event. During the period of the Terror they concealed or mitigated the outrages of the British armed forces or joined with Sir Hamar Greenwood in attributing them where possible to Sinn Fein. Since the Truce the same journals – whether deliberately or through defective information does not arise – have consistently misrepresented the position of the Irish people and the acts of their leaders. The newspaper “crisis” of the last few days is exceptional only in being a more general example of an habitual policy of distorting the facts.

#### “Insulting the King.”

President de Valera is accused of “unmannerliness”, “churlishness”, “impertinence”, “truculence.” His telegram to His Holiness is described as the outcome of “wounded vanity”, “childishness”, “clumsiness”, “a desire to wreck the peace.” He is charged with “insulting the King.” The Press which makes this baseless accusation must be aware that it can have but one result – the revival in England of the hatred which so recently expressed itself in the Black and Tan Terror. The question of “insulting the King” did not arise from the President’s telegram. That telegram was an answer, not to a personal statement by the English monarch, but to a statement drafted by the British Cabinet. This fact is carefully concealed by the British Press. We can see no other reason for this concealment than that the phrase “insulting the King” would make a useful electioneering slogan in England.

#### “Inconceivable in an Englishman.”

The President is further charged with an attempt to wreck the Conference by sending an “uninvited” message. Even the “Manchester Guardian”, usually fairer to Ireland than most other English journals, takes the view that the message to His Holiness was uncalled-for. In its issue of Monday, October 24th, 1921, it said:-

“It is said by some apologists for Mr. de Valera that his telegram to the Pope said nothing which had not been said before in his speeches and letters. That is true. But no diplomatic negotiations are possible if statesmen act on Mr. de Valera’s principle. If a negotiation were proceeding between the British Government and the French – to put this negotiation on the basis on which Mr. de Valera would put it – it is inconceivable that a Frenchman or an Englishman in Mr. de Valera’s position would interrupt those negotiations by a public declaration of this kind.”

The fact is that President de Valera’s telegram was made necessary by the very action of which British statesmen are in this paragraph declared to be incapable. While “negotiation” was proceeding between the British Government and the Irish Delegation of plenipotentiaries the British Government “interrupted those negotiations by a public declaration” that the Irish people were a subject people and implied that they

had accepted the status of a subject people. The question of Ireland's relationship with "the community of nations known as the British Empire" – the principal subject for discussion at the Conference – was dismissed as irrevocably settled even before, as it appears from the Press, it had come up for debate at the Conference. Having taken this "inconceivable" step, the British Government made a reply from President de Valera essential if world opinion were not to be misled as to the fundamental issues between the two peoples.

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 8. IRISH BULLETIN.  
MONDAY, 31ST OCTOBER, 1921.**

**PEACE OR – "WAR ON A GREAT  
SCALE."**

**BRITISH CONFERENCE DELEGATE  
THREATENS A RENEWAL OF THE TERROR.**

The British Press which was so disturbed by President de Valera's telegram to the Pope made no comment on the speech delivered by Sir L. Worthington Evans, British Secretary of State for War, at Reading on October 28th. President de Valera simply restated the Irish position and was considered by that act to have "endeavoured to wreck the peace." Sir L. Worthington Evans, himself a member of the Peace Conference – threatened the Irish people with extermination if they insisted on maintaining their independence, and his speech has been passed over in silence by the British Press.

"The country knows," he said, "what war on a great scale is and will not go in for such a war if it can avoid it; but the country will not shrink from its duty if it is necessary to carry on that war for the safety of the Empire. They will brace themselves for the effort and will carry on that war to a successful conclusion."

**The Bull-dog Spirit.**

Sir L. Worthington Evans speaks as if Ireland were a nation as well equipped for war as Germany in 1914. The British Empire "will not shrink," the British people "will brace themselves" to meet a nation of four million men, women and children, whom British Governments have been systematically disarming for the last half century. Britain refuses to flinch before a people whose main armament consists of rifles, revolvers and shot-guns. But, in fact, Britain would be well-advised to shrink from a renewal of the war. Ireland may not be capable of inflicting a permanent military defeat upon the British forces, but the British Government or its troops can do nothing to bring "that war to a successful conclusion." A war of conquest directed against a spirited people is never "concluded," much less can it ever be "successful." Great Britain has, no doubt, the power to flood Ireland with troops, to bombard its cities, even to starve her women and children by an economic blockade as the women and children of Austria have been starved. But neither the British Government nor any other power on earth has the strength to compel the Irish people to surrender their nationality. Such a surrender was never made in the past and will not be made now. A "successful conclusion" to a renewal of British aggression in Ireland is inconceivable unless the Irish people are in fact exterminated, which is not possible.

**"The Safety of the Empire."**

Sir L. Worthington Evans suggests that "the safety of the Empire" would be endangered were the Irish demand for

justice granted. Ireland, once free, could not, and, even if she could, would not, endanger the safety of the British Empire. Without a fleet, without an air force, with a limited army, with a small revenue, with a population a tenth of Britain's and with a geographical position which leaves her open at all times to a British attack from the sea and invasion under cover of the British fleet, Ireland will be compelled as much by the law of self-preservation as by the law of necessity to avoid any action that might earn her the enmity of the British Imperial Government.

**Ireland's Moral Strength.**

In fact, Ireland desires what her interests demand, namely a close friendship with Great Britain, but that friendship must be founded on justice. In any case, the "safety of the Empire" is not now, and will not be, threatened by any material resources Ireland possesses. The Empire has been endangered by Ireland's moral protest against injustice. Twelve months ago Alderman Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, died of hunger after seventy-four days' fast in Brixton prison. The British Government refused to release him. They dismissed as insignificant the moral effect of his death. They are wiser now. Yet the nation that produced Terence MacSwiney and the spirit which inspired him to the incomparable sacrifice he made can still produce and inspire others and, if the war is resumed, the British Government can not neutralise the influence of these men by hanging or shooting them. For such men are born to express the moral greatness of a nation's struggle against oppression and, as such, their deaths are understood by the peoples of other nations. Not all the resources at the disposal of the British Government can rob us of this power of suffering for an ideal. Materially we may be defeated, even destroyed. Morally every defeat inflicted upon us strengthens us.

**Terror – nor War.**

If then the British resume war because the Irish people refuse to surrender their independence, the nation that will suffer most by the resumption will be Great Britain herself. Her prestige will suffer not only because she endeavours to break by force a people who refuse her compulsory allegiance, but also because she will have to return to Black and Tan methods if her war in Ireland is to have even a momentary success. Ordinary war "on a great scale" is impossible in Ireland. In the first place, the Irish armies conduct their campaigns on guerilla lines and cannot be overcome by masses of troops. Secondly, the Irish people are as passionately devoted to the ideal of liberty as their armies, and, even if the armies were scattered and captured, the struggle would still go on. This means that the methods of the last year would have to be revived if the Irish people were to be crushed. General terrorism was the main feature of the British war for the last two years. It failed, but there remains no other method of warfare against a people situated as the Irish people are and possessed of their powers of resistance and suffering. If, then, war is to be renewed against them, it must again be a war of flogging, torture, assassination, the flame and the sword, for combatants and non-combatants alike. The British people would do well to keep that in mind. The creation of the Black and Tan Constabulary and the Auxiliary Cadets caused anger and indignation in many parts of the world. Yet the formation of these terrorist corps was the natural outcome of such British determination to compel Ireland to submit to alien authority. Such submission can be forced by one weapon only – general terrorism. Germany adopted this policy in Belgium. The British Government adopted it in Ireland and if that Government is still determined to force Ireland to surrender her national rights the policy of terror must again become British policy in Ireland. There is no such thing as a polite and gentlemanly war by a

strong nation against a weak. A war of that kind is savage and unjust in its conception and will be savage and unjust in its operation.

### **Incidents of the “War”.**

Sir L. Worthington Evans was “loudly cheered” when he declared that Britain would not shrink from renewing such a contest. In the British Courts in Ireland claims for compensation by victims of British war methods are now being heard. The evidence as sworn before and accepted by British Judges discloses the nature of the war from which Britain will not even now shrink. We quote four examples of this kind:-

## **VOLUME 6, NUMBER 9. IRISH BULLETIN. TUESDAY, 1ST NOVEMBER, 1921.**

### **SOME COMMENTS ON MR. LLOYD GEORGE’S SPEECH.**

The British Premier in his speech in the House of Commons last evening did the cause of peace one notable service. He based a considerable part of his statement on fact, and by discarding many of the old propagandist shibboleths, arrived at an almost accurate interpretation of certain phases of the Irish situation. He has cleared the air of many of his own illusions.

In the course of his address he made several admissions which we chronicle here not in any spirit of political self-satisfaction but simply because they will help foreign readers to know the truth about Ireland.

### **The Sympathies of Ireland behind the Dail.**

The British Premier admitted that the Republican representatives (Dail Eireann) were duly and fairly elected, and alone have power to speak in the name of the nation, whose confidence they hold. No other party had the confidence of the Irish people, could express their wishes or act on their behalf. “For the moment,” said the Premier referring to the Republican deputies, “the sympathies of Ireland are behind these people.”

This is a welcome change from the “small-band-of-terrorists” theory. The British Government’s attitude heretofore has been to represent Sinn Fein as a minority enforcing its authority by intimidation and outrage. It was this ridiculous misrepresentation that led the British public to support the Government in its policy of “restoring law and order” by unstinted force. Mr. Lloyd George now sweeps the misrepresentation aside as the invention of Ireland’s enemies.

“I have never seen a party obtain a majority in this House,” he said, “but that the other party said that they had been elected by methods which were a discredit to the very last degree. You always get that charge, whoever obtains the majority. Let us face the real facts.”

### **The National Declaration of Independence.**

The British Premier admitted that the Irish people, not terrorised but expressing itself freely, has through the Sinn Fein movement declared in favour of an independent Ireland with a republican form of government and has definitely repudiated the authority of the British Government.

We do not desire at the moment to build upon this statement anything that it was not designed to sustain but it is apparent that, if Ireland, through the great majority of her citizens

freely declares for independence and separation from England, she, by that act, exercises her right to self-determination and her decision should be accepted by all states who subscribe to the principle of self-determination as a principle essential to just government.

### **The Army and the People.**

The British Premier admitted that the sympathies of the mass of the Irish people were “entirely” with the Irish Republican Army and against the British Forces.

This again is a valuable contribution to the realities of the Irish situation, for, obvious as the truth of it is, many people believed the fiction that the I.R.A. were criminals, armed to the teeth, who murdered all who glanced inquisitively at them, while the rest of the Irish people were a cowering mass whose one desire was to hand over the I.R.A. to the British military. The simple fact which Mr. Lloyd George has now frankly stated is that the army and the people are one inseparably, with the same ideals and the same readiness to sacrifice themselves in defence of them. Referring to the difficulties in meeting the guerilla tactics of the Irish National Army, he said:-

“You have to surround them, hunt down small elusive bands over very considerable tracts of territory, a good deal of it over highly difficult mountainous country, where the population is entirely in sympathy with your guerillas.”

and compares their campaign to that of the Boers in South Africa. In his peroration he speaks of the Irish nation as a “gifted and gallant people.”

Belated Understanding.

We appreciate the desire the British Premier displays to see the facts as they are. We regret beyond measure that the same anxiety to get at the “real facts” did not animate the British Government eighteen months ago when the policy was first launched of breaking up “the small body of assassins” alleged to have the nation trembling at their feet. All the suffering inflicted both on the British and Irish peoples in those months might have been avoided if British statesmen had realised then, as they now seem to, that the revolt against British domination in Ireland is a national revolt.

### **A Tissue of Misrepresentations.**

Although the British Premier in the greater part of his speech showed a keen appreciation of the realities of the situation, his peroration was not free from the old-time misrepresentations. He doubted if peace could be made “without danger of dishonour.” He feared for the security of the British Empire. War will, he suggested, be renewed.

“If the security of the country (England) is menaced, if the Throne is repudiated, if the Empire is to be mutilated, and Ireland established as an alien country, so that she is free to make war on our commerce – and British commerce be liable to attack on the Irish coast ... if Ireland walks off with her freedom leaving Britain staggering along under her burden, which Ireland joined in incurring, ... if an arrangement is insisted upon which means that the fires of civil war are to rage at our doors between Catholics and Protestants, while we look on, then Great Britain, I feel confident, will take the necessary risks (of war).”

This is the Mr. Lloyd George of other days at his best. The sentence is a tissue of misrepresentations. By taking the points singly it will be easier to deal with them.

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 32. IRISH BULLETIN.  
FRIDAY, 2nd DECEMBER, 1921.**

**IS THE WAR UPON THE IRISH PEOPLE  
TO BE RESUMED ?**

There seems to be general agreement that the situation in regard to the Conference in London is particularly grave. The British Press has begun to discuss a renewal of the war upon the Irish people as an immediate possibility. At such a moment plain speaking is necessary.

The war which preceded the Truce was a savage war. It was directed against a people whom for five years previously the British Government had tried by every means at its disposal to disarm. It was directed against that people not because of any aggression upon their part but because they had demanded at the General Election of 1918 freedom to exercise their inherent national rights. Its very nature demanded that it should be a savage war. It was unjust; it was uneven; it was the conflict of national will with Imperial ambition. Every such conflict in the world's history presaged the methods the Empire would eventually be driven to adopt in order to crush the national spirit. Nevertheless, the war was undertaken. It began with the suppression of popular institutions. When the Truce was declared its weapons had become assassination, arson, flogging and the torture of prisoners. Its development was marked by an ever-increasing capacity for suffering, and, consequently, an ever-increasing capacity for resistance on the part of the nation and a corresponding intensity of aggression on the part of the Empire. There could only have been one of two endings to a war of this kind. Either the insurgent people would have to be exterminated or the Empire would be compelled for its own security to recognise the rights they possessed.

**Preparation for Resumption ?**

Is this futile struggle to be resumed ? Does Britain believe that it can ever exterminate the Irish people or crush out of them their love of liberty? We are reluctant to think that this is so. Yet the signs are ominous. A press campaign has been begun in England – begun by order, as the close similarity of the comments in six of the principal London newspapers of November 30th suggests – to turn public attention from the obduracy of the British supporters in North East Ulster and incite in its stead public anger against the Irish plenipotentiaries by imputing to them responsibility for the failure of the Conference. Simultaneously allegations are being made against the Irish people that they have not kept the Truce. The London "Times" of November 30th said:-

"The recent riots in Belfast and the obvious difficulty of the Sinn Fein leaders in securing rigid observance of the Truce throughout Southern Ireland – a difficulty which in the interest of peace they should henceforth strive with redoubled energy to surmount – show how easily a state of warfare might revive . . ."

The suggestions in this paragraph regarding the indiscipline of the Irish forces are false. The Truce has been broken in one part of Ireland and in one only – the "loyal" city of Belfast. It has been broken there not by Sinn Fein, not by the Nationalist minority mercilessly persecuted for the last sixteen months, but by the pro-British majority and their fellow Orangemen who have been created "constables" and armed by the British Government. The Secret Circular of November 9th did not come from Sinn Fein. The rabid incitements to the Orange

mob by members of the British Partition Parliament in Belfast, incitements invariably followed by the bombing of Catholic homes and the "shooting up" of crowded Catholic streets, were not made by Republicans. The Nationalists in the North East have been guilty of retaliation, occasionally of a vicious kind, but despite the efforts of the British Press to suppress the truth it is notorious that in no instance were the Nationalists the aggressors. As for Republicans in Belfast, they have as far as possible defended themselves when attacked, but as a whole they have seldom participated in the riots.

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 34. IRISH BULLETIN.  
TUESDAY, 6th DECEMBER, 1921.**

**THE CONFERENCE - STATEMENT THAT  
AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.**

At about 3 a.m. this morning the following statement was issued from London:-

"The Press Association is officially informed that the Conference reached an agreement, the terms of which will be recommended for acceptance to Parliament and to Dail Eireann. A copy of the agreement has been sent to Sir James Craig by special messenger."

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 35. IRISH BULLETIN.  
WEDNESDAY, 7th DECEMBER, 1921.**

**THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT -  
DECEMBER 6TH, 1921.**

The following are the Articles of Agreement arrived at between the Irish Delegation of Plenipotentiaries and the Representatives of the British Government on the morning of December 6th, 1921, at 2.15 a.m.:-

**SECRET.  
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT.**

Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.

Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.

The representatives of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments.

The oath to be taken by Members of Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:-

I . . . . . do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of

Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claim on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counter-claim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire.

Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Government whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty's Imperial Forces. But this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries.

The foregoing provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at a Conference of Representatives of the British and Irish Governments to be held at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence.

The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty's Imperial Forces:-

In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State; and

In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purpose of such defence as aforesaid.

With a view to securing the observance of the principal of international limitation of armaments, if the Government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.

The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on payment of the customary port and other dues.

The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of Police Forces and other Public Servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of Government effect in pursuance hereof.

Provided that this agreement shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary Police or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The British Government will assume responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted persons.

Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercised as respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for the return of members to serve

in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the holding of such elections before the end of the said month.

If before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, (including those relating to the Council of Ireland) shall so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications.

Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland and one who shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Governments shall determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.

For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to elect members of the Council of Ireland shall after the Parliament of the Irish Free State is constituted be exercised by that Parliament.

After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is mentioned in Article 12 hereof is presented, the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, but the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters in respect of which the Parliament of Northern Ireland has no power to make laws under that Act (including matters which under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the rest of Ireland, subject to such other provisions as may be agreed in manner hereinafter appearing.

At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland and the provisional Government of Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions subject to which the last foregoing article is to operate in the event of no such address as is therein mentioned being presented and those provisions may include:

Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland;

Safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern Ireland;

Safeguards with regard to import and export duties affecting the trade or industry of Northern Ireland;

Safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland;

The settlement of the financial relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.

The establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern Ireland and the relation of the Defence Forces of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland respectively:

and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have effect as if they were included amongst the provisions subject to which the Powers of the Parliament and Government

of the Irish Free State are to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.

Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school or make any discrimination as respects state aid between schools under the management of different religious denominations or divert from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for public utility purposes and on payment of compensation.

By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the date hereof and the constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such provisional Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the date hereof.

This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland, and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation.

On behalf of the Irish Delegation.  
On behalf of the British Delegation.

Signed

Art O Griobhtha (Arthur Griffith).  
D. Lloyd George.  
Michael O Coileain.  
Austen Chamberlain.  
Riobard Bartun.  
Eudhmonn S. O Dugain  
Birkenhead.  
Winston S. Churchill  
Seorsa Gabhain ui Dhubhthaigh.

December 6, 1921.

**ANNEX**

The following are the specific facilities required.

Dockyard port at Berehaven.  
Admiralty property and rights to be retained as at the date hereof. Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.  
Queenstown.

Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties. Certain mooring buoys to be retained for use of His Majesty's ships.

Belfast Lough.

Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.

Lough Swilly.

Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.

Aviation.

Facilities in the neighbourhood of the above Ports for coastal defence by air.

Oil Fuel Storage.

Haulbowline - to be offered for sale to commercial companies under guarantee that purchasers shall maintain stock

Rathmullen - for Admiralty purposes.

A Convention shall be made between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State to give effect to the following conditions:-

That submarine cables shall not be landed or wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland be established except by agreement with the British Government; that the existing cable landing rights and wireless concessions shall not be withdrawn except by agreement with the British Government; and that the British Government shall be entitled to land additional submarine cables or establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland.

That lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and any navigational marks or navigational aids shall be maintained by the Government of the Irish Free State as at the date hereof and shall not be removed or added to except by agreement with the British Government.

That war signal stations shall be closed down and left in charge of care and maintenance parties, the Government of the Irish Free State being offered the option of taking them over and working them for commercial purposes subject to Admiralty inspection, and guaranteeing the upkeep of existing telegraphic communication therewith.

A Convention shall be made between the same Governments for the regulation of Civil Communication by Air.

D. LG.	A.G.
B.	E.S.O'D
A.C.	MC
W.C.	S.G.
D.R.B.	
A.G.	

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 37. IRISH BULLETIN.  
FRIDAY, 9th DECEMBER, 1921.**

**PROCLAMATION BY PRESIDENT DE VALERA.**

President de Valera issued the following Proclamation last night:-

**“TO THE IRISH PEOPLE.  
“A Chairde Gaedheal,**

“You have seen in the public Press the text of the proposed Treaty with Great Britain.

“The terms of this Agreement are in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of this Nation as expressed freely in successive elections during the past three years.

“I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend the acceptance of this Treaty either to Dail Eireann or to the country. In this attitude I am supported by the Ministers for Home Affairs and Defence.

“A Public Session of Dail Eireann is being summoned for Wednesday next at 11 o’clock a.m. I ask the people to maintain during the interval the same discipline as heretofore. The members of the Cabinet though divided in opinions are prepared to carry on the public services as usual.

“The Army as such is of course not affected by the political situation – and continues under the same orders and control.



“The great test of our people has come. Let us face it worthily, without bitterness and above all without recriminations. There is a definite constitutional way of resolving out political differences – let us not depart from it, and let the conduct of the Cabinet in this matter be an example to the whole nation.

“Mise,

Mansion House, Dublin.

8th December, 1921,

“(Signed) EAMON DE VALERA.”

**STATEMENT BY MR. ARTHUR GRIFFITH.**

Mr. Arthur Griffith, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Irish Delegation of Plenipotentiaries, issued the following statement this morning:-

“I have signed the treaty of peace between Ireland and Great Britain.

“I believe that this treaty will lay the foundation of peace and friendship between the two nations.

“What I have signed I shall stand by, in the belief that the end of the conflict of centuries is at hand.

“(Signed) ARTHUR GRIFFITH.”

Any agreement come to by the Irish Delegation of Plenipotentiaries is subject to ratification or rejection by Dail Eireann just as any agreement come to by the British Delegation is subject to ratification or rejection by the British Parliament.

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 38. IRISH BULLETIN.  
MONDAY, 12th DECEMBER, 1921.**

**THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION.**

**STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT DE VALERA.**

The following statement has been made by President de Valera:-

“I have been asked whether the honour of Ireland is not involved in the ratification of the agreement arrived at. The honour of Ireland is NOT involved.

“The plenipotentiaries were sent on the distinct understanding that any agreement they made was subject to ratification by Dail Eireann and by the country and could be rejected by Dail Eireann if it did not command itself to Dail Eireann, or by the country if it did not comment itself to the country.

“The Parliament of Britain and the people of Britain will on their side similarly consider the agreement solely on its merits. If the British Parliament desires it can reject it, so can the British people.

“Ratification is then no mere empty formality. The United States refused to ratify a Treaty signed even by its President.

“The honour of the nation is not involved unless and until the Treaty is ratified.

“(Signed)

“EAMON DE VALERA.

“Mansion House, Dublin.

“December 12th, 1921.”

**THE PROCEDURE AT WEDNESDAY’S MEETING OF DAIL EIREANN.**

On Friday, December 9th, the Publicity Department of Dail Eireann stated:-

President de Valera today made the following statement:-

“To prevent misunderstanding the public should realise:-

“(1) That the Treaty signed by the Plenipotentiaries must be ratified by Dail Eireann no less than by the British Parliament in order to take effect.

“(2) That the usual course would be for the Cabinet of the Dail to introduce the Treaty agreement as a Cabinet measure. In the present case, owing to the fact that in the later stages of the negotiations the views of the delegation of Plenipotentiaries differed from those of certain members of the Cabinet, this course cannot be taken. The motion for Ratification will not be introduced by Mr. Griffith, as Chairman of the Delegation.”

**VOLUME 6, NUMBER 39. IRISH BULLETIN.  
TUESDAY, 13th DECEMBER, 1921.**

The following is a copy of the agenda for tomorrow's session of Dail Eireann:-

**DAIL EIREANN.**

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Sioson, 14 adh. Mi na Nodlag, 1921  
(Session, 14th December, 1921)  
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CLAR  
(AGENDA)

An Rolla.  
(Roll-call).  
Abhar Ruin go dtionolfar an Sioson go priobhaideach. (An Dr. de Faoite.)  
(Motion that Session be held in private. (Dr. White).)  
Oraid an Uachtarain.  
(President's Statement.)  
Abhar Ruin go ndeimhneofar an Connradh.  
(Motion for the ratification of Treaty.)  
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E N D.

**Advertisement**

**Irish Bulletin, Volumes One, Two, Three  
and Four  
Dail Eireann**

**Edited by Jack Lane**

Published by Aubane Historical Society  
2012-2019

The Irish Bulletin was the official newspaper of the Irish Government during the War of Independence. Its aim was to provide those outside Ireland with the Government's case and the facts of the war that it had to wage. This information could not otherwise be obtained because of the suppression by the British of all other outlets that put the Irish Government's case. It was produced with minimal resources and under constant threat of suppression. It was therefore an underground publication despite being the paper of a legitimate Government.

It was unadorned with any other content except straightforward factual and irrefutable information. This is what made its reputation and because of that it became one of the most powerful weapons in the war that eventually proved successful.

It deserves an honoured place in Irish history, yet it has never been republished and it is hardly referred to by our contemporary historians, and when it is, it is almost inevitably in disparaging terms.

These are four volumes of the paper reproduced as faithfully as possible to the original.

Volumes 3 and 4 contain Annexes of items which belong in previous volumes, but which have since come to light. Other volumes will follow.

The books are available at: <https://www.atholbooks-sales.org> postage free in Europe and UK.

**Advertisement**

**The Armenian Insurrection And The Great War  
Including two pamphlets by "Armen Garo"  
By Pat Walsh**

Published by Belfast Historical & Educational Society 2015

The Great Calamity that engulfed the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 has been narrowed down to a single question: Was the Young Turk Government in Istanbul guilty of Genocide? But the tragedy of the deaths of great numbers of Armenians, Turks and Kurds is inexplicable if confined solely to this. And it obscures important historical questions around the issues of instigation and betrayal that should be raised around these events.

So a context is required to explain what really happened to produce such a disaster. That context is the Great War and the Armenian Insurrection. The Armenian Insurrection is described by a leading figure in it, the Dashnak revolutionary Dr. Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), in writings long since forgotten.

These put a very different complexion on the events of 1915. They describe a great moment of decision when the very existence of a people was gambled in the struggle for a Great Armenia, carved out of Ottoman territories in which the Armenians constituted a small minority. His two pamphlets reprinted here reveal that the 1914 Ottoman offer of an autonomous Armenian State was rejected by Armenians when what they thought was a better offer came from America, Britain and France. The price was that they fight the Ottomans.

They gambled and lost, bringing disaster on the Armenian people. Also included is a commentary by Pat Walsh on the origin and development of 'the Armenian Question' and its culmination and final resolution in the catastrophic events in Anatolia brought about by the Great War. This reveals the instrumental part played by the Liberal Anglosphere in foisting dangerous notions of historic destiny on the Armenians and then a fraudulent war that encouraged them to destruction.

When remembering the Armenian Great Calamity what should be sought is not only the truth, but the whole truth.

# Putin speaks at Plenary Session of Valdai Discussion Club meeting -Transcript

October 22, 2021

## President of Russia Vladimir Putin:

Ladies and gentlemen,

To begin with, I would like to thank you for coming to Russia and taking part in the Valdai Club events.

As always, during these meetings you raise pressing issues and hold comprehensive discussions of these issues that, without exaggeration, matter for people around the world. Once again, the key theme of the forum was put in a straightforward, I would even say, point-blank manner: Global Shake-up in the 21st Century: The Individual, Values and the State.

Indeed, we are living in an era of great change. If I may, by tradition, I will offer my views with regard to the agenda that you have come up with.

In general, this phrase, “to live in an era of great change,” may seem trite since we use it so often. Also, this era of change began quite a long time ago, and changes have become part of everyday life. Hence, the question: are they worth focusing on? I agree with those who made the agenda for these meetings; of course they are.

In recent decades, many people have cited a Chinese proverb. The Chinese people are wise, and they have many thinkers and valuable thoughts that we can still use today. One of them, as you may know, says, “God forbid living in a time of change.” But we are already living in it, whether we like it or not, and these changes are becoming deeper and more fundamental. But let us consider another Chinese wisdom: the word “crisis” consists of two hieroglyphs – there are probably representatives of the People’s Republic of China in the audience, and they will correct me if I have it wrong – but, two hieroglyphs, “danger” and “opportunity.” And as we say here in Russia, “fight difficulties with your mind, and fight dangers with your experience.”

Of course, we must be aware of the danger and be ready to counter it, and not just one threat but many diverse threats that can arise in this era of change. However, it is no less important to recall a second component of the crisis – opportunities that must not be missed, all the more so since the crisis we are facing is conceptual and even civilisation-related. This is basically a crisis of approaches and principles that determine the very existence of humans on Earth, but we will have to seriously revise them in any event. The question is where to move, what to give up, what to revise or adjust. In saying this, I am convinced that it is necessary to fight for real values, upholding them in every way.

Humanity entered into a new era about three decades ago when the main conditions were created for ending military-political and ideological confrontation. I am sure you have talked a lot about this in this discussion club. Our Foreign Minister also talked about it, but nevertheless I would like to repeat several things.

A search for a new balance, sustainable relations in the social, political, economic, cultural and military areas and support for the world system was launched at that time. We were looking for this support but must say that we did not find it, at least so far. Meanwhile, those who felt like the winners after the end of the Cold War (we have also spoken about this many times) and thought they climbed Mount Olympus soon discovered that the ground was falling away underneath even there, and this

time it was their turn, and nobody could “stop this fleeting moment” no matter how fair it seemed.

In general, it must have seemed that we adjusted to this continuous inconstancy, unpredictability and permanent state of transition, but this did not happen either.

I would like to add that the transformation that we are seeing and are part of is of a different calibre than the changes that repeatedly occurred in human history, at least those we know about. This is not simply a shift in the balance of forces or scientific and technological breakthroughs, though both are also taking place. Today, we are facing systemic changes in all directions – from the increasingly complicated geophysical condition of our planet to a more paradoxical interpretation of what a human is and what the reasons for his existence are.

Let us look around. And I will say this again: I will allow myself to express a few thoughts that I sign on to.

Firstly, climate change and environmental degradation are so obvious that even the most careless people can no longer dismiss them. One can continue to engage in scientific debates about the mechanisms behind the ongoing processes, but it is impossible to deny that these processes are getting worse, and something needs to be done. Natural disasters such as droughts, floods, hurricanes, and tsunamis have almost become the new normal, and we are getting used to them. Suffice it to recall the devastating, tragic floods in Europe last summer, the fires in Siberia – there are a lot of examples. Not only in Siberia – our neighbours in Turkey have also had wildfires, and the United States, and other places on the American continent. It sometimes seems that any geopolitical, scientific and technical, or ideological rivalry becomes pointless in this context, if the winners will have not enough air to breathe or nothing to drink.

The coronavirus pandemic has become another reminder of how fragile our community is, how vulnerable it is, and our most important task is to ensure humanity a safe existence and resilience. To increase our chance of survival in the face of cataclysms, we absolutely need to rethink how we go about our lives, how we run our households, how cities develop or how they should develop; we need to reconsider economic development priorities of entire states. I repeat, safety is one of our main imperatives, in any case it has become obvious now, and anyone who tries to deny this will have to later explain why they were wrong and why they were unprepared for the crises and shocks whole nations are facing.

Second. The socioeconomic problems facing humankind have worsened to the point where, in the past, they would trigger worldwide shocks, such as world wars or bloody social cataclysms. Everyone is saying that the current model of capitalism which underlies the social structure in the overwhelming majority of countries, has run its course and no longer offers a solution to a host of increasingly tangled differences.

Everywhere, even in the richest countries and regions, the uneven distribution of material wealth has exacerbated inequality, primarily, inequality of opportunities both within individual societies and at the international level. I mentioned this formidable challenge in my remarks at the Davos Forum

earlier this year. No doubt, these problems threaten us with major and deep social divisions.

Furthermore, a number of countries and even entire regions are regularly hit by food crises. We will probably discuss this later, but there is every reason to believe that this crisis will become worse in the near future and may reach extreme forms. There are also shortages of water and electricity (we will probably cover this today as well), not to mention poverty, high unemployment rates or lack of adequate healthcare.

Lagging countries are fully aware of that and are losing faith in the prospects of ever catching up with the leaders. Disappointment spurs aggression and pushes people to join the ranks of extremists. People in these countries have a growing sense of unfulfilled and failed expectations and the lack of any opportunities not only for themselves, but for their children, as well. This is what makes them look for better lives and results in uncontrolled migration, which, in turn, creates fertile ground for social discontent in more prosperous countries. I do not need to explain anything to you, since you can see everything with your own eyes and are, probably, versed on these matters even better than I.

As I noted earlier, prosperous leading powers have other pressing social problems, challenges and risks in ample supply, and many among them are no longer interested in fighting for influence since, as they say, they already have enough on their plates. The fact that society and young people in many countries have overreacted in a harsh and even aggressive manner to measures to combat the coronavirus showed – and I want to emphasise this, I hope someone has already mentioned this before me at other venues – so, I think that this reaction showed that the pandemic was just a pretext: the causes for social irritation and frustration run much deeper.

I have another important point to make. The pandemic, which, in theory, was supposed to rally the people in the fight against this massive common threat, has instead become a divisive rather than a unifying factor. There are many reasons for that, but one of the main ones is that they started looking for solutions to problems among the usual approaches – a variety of them, but still the old ones, but they just do not work. Or, to be more precise, they do work, but often and oddly enough, they worsen the existing state of affairs.

By the way, Russia has repeatedly called for, and I will repeat this, stopping these inappropriate ambitions and for working together. We will probably talk about this later but it is clear what I have in mind. We are talking about the need to counter the coronavirus infection together. But nothing changes; everything remains the same despite the humanitarian considerations. I am not referring to Russia now, let's leave the sanctions against Russia for now; I mean the sanctions that remain in place against those states that badly need international assistance. Where are the humanitarian fundamentals of Western political thought? It appears there is nothing there, just idle talk. Do you understand? This is what seems to be on the surface.

Furthermore, the technological revolution, impressive achievements in artificial intelligence, electronics, communications, genetics, bioengineering, and medicine open up enormous opportunities, but at the same time, in practical terms, they raise philosophical, moral and spiritual questions that were until recently the exclusive domain of science fiction writers. What will happen if machines surpass humans in the ability to think? Where is the limit of interference in the human body beyond which a person ceases being himself and turns into some other entity? What are the general ethical limits in the world where the potential of science and machines are becoming almost boundless? What will this mean for each of us, for our descendants, our nearest descendants – our children and grandchildren?

These changes are gaining momentum, and they certainly cannot be stopped because they are objective as a rule. All of us will have to deal with the consequences regardless of our political systems, economic condition or prevailing ideology.

Verbally, all states talk about their commitment to the ideals of cooperation and a willingness to work together for resolving common problems but, unfortunately, these are just words. In reality, the opposite is happening, and the pandemic has served to fuel the negative trends that emerged long ago and are now only getting worse. The approach based on the proverb, "your own shirt is closer to the body," has finally become common and is now no longer even concealed. Moreover, this is often even a matter of boasting and brandishing. Egotistic interests prevail over the notion of the common good.

Of course, the problem is not just the ill will of certain states and notorious elites. It is more complicated than that, in my opinion. In general, life is seldom divided into black and white. Every government, every leader is primarily responsible to his own compatriots, obviously. The main goal is to ensure their security, peace and prosperity. So, international, transnational issues will never be as important for a national leadership as domestic stability. In general, this is normal and correct.

We need to face the fact that global governance institutions are not always effective and their capabilities are not always up to the challenge posed by the dynamics of global processes. In this sense, the pandemic could help – it clearly showed which institutions have what it takes and which need fine-tuning.

The re-alignment of the balance of power presupposes a redistribution of shares in favour of rising and developing countries that until now felt left out. To put it bluntly, the Western domination of international affairs, which began several centuries ago and, for a short period, was almost absolute in the late 20th century, is giving way to a much more diverse system.

This transformation is not a mechanical process and, in its own way, one might even say, is unparalleled. Arguably, political history has no examples of a stable world order being established without a big war and its outcomes as the basis, as was the case after World War II. So, we have a chance to create an extremely favourable precedent. The attempt to create it after the end of the Cold War on the basis of Western domination failed, as we see. The current state of international affairs is a product of that very failure, and we must learn from this.

Some may wonder, what have we arrived at? We have arrived somewhere paradoxical. Just an example: for two decades, the most powerful nation in the world has been conducting military campaigns in two countries that it cannot be compared to by any standard. But in the end, it had to wind down operations without achieving a single goal that it had set for itself going in 20 years ago, and to withdraw from these countries causing considerable damage to others and itself. In fact, the situation has worsened dramatically.

But that is not the point. Previously, a war lost by one side meant victory for the other side, which took responsibility for what was happening. For example, the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, for example, did not make Vietnam a "black hole." On the contrary, a successfully developing state arose there, which, admittedly, relied on the support of a strong ally. Things are different now: no matter who takes the upper hand, the war does not stop, but just changes form. As a rule, the hypothetical winner is reluctant or unable to ensure peaceful post-war recovery, and only worsens the chaos and the vacuum posing a danger to the world.

Colleagues,

What do you think are the starting points of this complex realignment process? Let me try to summarise the talking points.

First, the coronavirus pandemic has clearly shown that the international order is structured around nation states. By the way, recent developments have shown that global digital platforms – with all their might, which we could see from the internal political processes in the United States – have failed to usurp political or state functions. These attempts proved ephemeral. The US authorities, as I said, have immediately put the owners of these platforms in their place, which is exactly what is being done in Europe, if you just look at the size of the fines imposed on them and the demonopolisation measures being taken. You are aware of that.

In recent decades, many have tossed around fancy concepts claiming that the role of the state was outdated and outgoing. Globalisation supposedly made national borders an anachronism, and sovereignty an obstacle to prosperity. You know, I said it before and I will say it again. This is also what was said by those who attempted to open up other countries' borders for the benefit of their own competitive advantages. This is what actually happened. And as soon as it transpired that someone somewhere is achieving great results, they immediately returned to closing borders in general and, first of all, their own customs borders and what have you, and started building walls. Well, were we supposed to not notice, or what? Everyone sees everything and everyone understands everything perfectly well. Of course, they do.

There is no point in disputing it anymore. It is obvious. But events, when we spoke about the need to open up borders, events, as I said, went in the opposite direction. Only sovereign states can effectively respond to the challenges of the times and the demands of the citizens. Accordingly, any effective international order should take into account the interests and capabilities of the state and proceed on that basis, and not try to prove that they should not exist. Furthermore, it is impossible to impose anything on anyone, be it the principles underlying the sociopolitical structure or values that someone, for their own reasons, has called universal. After all, it is clear that when a real crisis strikes, there is only one universal value left and that is human life, which each state decides for itself how best to protect based on its abilities, culture and traditions.

In this regard, I will again note how severe and dangerous the coronavirus pandemic has become. As we know, more than 4.9 million have died of it. These terrifying figures are comparable and even exceed the military losses of the main participants in World War I.

The second point I would like to draw your attention to is the scale of change that forces us to act extremely cautiously, if only for reasons of self-preservation. The state and society must not respond radically to qualitative shifts in technology, dramatic environmental changes or the destruction of traditional systems. It is easier to destroy than to create, as we all know. We in Russia know this very well, regrettably, from our own experience, which we have had several times.

Just over a century ago, Russia objectively faced serious problems, including because of the ongoing World War I, but its problems were not bigger and possibly even smaller or not as acute as the problems the other countries faced, and Russia could have dealt with its problems gradually and in a civilised manner. But revolutionary shocks led to the collapse and disintegration of a great power. The second time this happened 30 years ago, when a potentially very powerful nation failed to enter the path of urgently needed, flexible but thoroughly substantiated reforms at the right time, and as a result it fell victim to all kinds of dogmatists, both

reactionary ones and the so-called progressives – all of them did their bit, all sides did.

These examples from our history allow us to say that revolutions are not a way to settle a crisis but a way to aggravate it. No revolution was worth the damage it did to the human potential.

Third. The importance of a solid support in the sphere of morals, ethics and values is increasing dramatically in the modern fragile world. In point of fact, values are a product, a unique product of cultural and historical development of any nation. The mutual interlacing of nations definitely enriches them, openness expands their horizons and allows them to take a fresh look at their own traditions. But the process must be organic, and it can never be rapid. Any alien elements will be rejected anyway, possibly bluntly. Any attempts to force one's values on others with an uncertain and unpredictable outcome can only further complicate a dramatic situation and usually produce the opposite reaction and an opposite from the intended result.

We look in amazement at the processes underway in the countries which have been traditionally looked at as the standard-bearers of progress. Of course, the social and cultural shocks that are taking place in the United States and Western Europe are none of our business; we are keeping out of this. Some people in the West believe that an aggressive elimination of entire pages from their own history, "reverse discrimination" against the majority in the interests of a minority, and the demand to give up the traditional notions of mother, father, family and even gender, they believe that all of these are the mileposts on the path towards social renewal.

Listen, I would like to point out once again that they have a right to do this, we are keeping out of this. But we would like to ask them to keep out of our business as well. We have a different viewpoint, at least the overwhelming majority of Russian society – it would be more correct to put it this way – has a different opinion on this matter. We believe that we must rely on our own spiritual values, our historical tradition and the culture of our multiethnic nation.

The advocates of so-called 'social progress' believe they are introducing humanity to some kind of a new and better consciousness. Godspeed, hoist the flags as we say, go right ahead. The only thing that I want to say now is that their prescriptions are not new at all. It may come as a surprise to some people, but Russia has been there already. After the 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks, relying on the dogmas of Marx and Engels, also said that they would change existing ways and customs and not just political and economic ones, but the very notion of human morality and the foundations of a healthy society. The destruction of age-old values, religion and relations between people, up to and including the total rejection of family (we had that, too), encouragement to inform on loved ones – all this was proclaimed progress and, by the way, was widely supported around the world back then and was quite fashionable, same as today. By the way, the Bolsheviks were absolutely intolerant of opinions other than theirs.

This, I believe, should call to mind some of what we are witnessing now. Looking at what is happening in a number of Western countries, we are amazed to see the domestic practices, which we, fortunately, have left, I hope, in the distant past. The fight for equality and against discrimination has turned into aggressive dogmatism bordering on absurdity, when the works of the great authors of the past – such as Shakespeare – are no longer taught at schools or universities, because their ideas are believed to be backward. The classics are declared backward and ignorant of the importance of gender or race. In Hollywood memos are distributed about proper storytelling and how many characters of what colour or gender should be

in a movie. This is even worse than the agitprop department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Countering acts of racism is a necessary and noble cause, but the new ‘cancel culture’ has turned it into ‘reverse discrimination’ that is, reverse racism. The obsessive emphasis on race is further dividing people, when the real fighters for civil rights dreamed precisely about erasing differences and refusing to divide people by skin colour. I specifically asked my colleagues to find the following quote from Martin Luther King: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by their character.” This is the true value. However, things are turning out differently there. By the way, the absolute majority of Russian people do not think that the colour of a person’s skin or their gender is an important matter. Each of us is a human being. This is what matters.

In a number of Western countries, the debate over men’s and women’s rights has turned into a perfect phantasmagoria. Look, beware of going where the Bolsheviks once planned to go – not only communalising chickens, but also communalising women. One more step and you will be there.

Zealots of these new approaches even go so far as to want to abolish these concepts altogether. Anyone who dares mention that men and women actually exist, which is a biological fact, risk being ostracised. “Parent number one” and “parent number two,” “birthing parent” instead of “mother,” and “human milk” replacing “breastmilk” because it might upset the people who are unsure about their own gender. I repeat, this is nothing new; in the 1920s, the so-called Soviet Kulturtraegers also invented some newspeak believing they were creating a new consciousness and changing values that way. And, as I have already said, they made such a mess it still makes one shudder at times.

Not to mention some truly monstrous things when children are taught from an early age that a boy can easily become a girl and vice versa. That is, the teachers actually impose on them a choice we all supposedly have. They do so while shutting the parents out of the process and forcing the child to make decisions that can upend their entire life. They do not even bother to consult with child psychologists – is a child at this age even capable of making a decision of this kind? Calling a spade a spade, this verges on a crime against humanity, and it is being done in the name and under the banner of progress.

Well, if someone likes this, let them do it. I have already mentioned that, in shaping our approaches, we will be guided by a healthy conservatism. That was a few years ago, when passions on the international arena were not yet running as high as they are now, although, of course, we can say that clouds were gathering even then. Now, when the world is going through a structural disruption, the importance of reasonable conservatism as the foundation for a political course has skyrocketed – precisely because of the multiplying risks and dangers, and the fragility of the reality around us.

This conservative approach is not about an ignorant traditionalism, a fear of change or a restraining game, much less about withdrawing into our own shell. It is primarily about reliance on a time-tested tradition, the preservation and growth of the population, a realistic assessment of oneself and others, a precise alignment of priorities, a correlation of necessity and possibility, a prudent formulation of goals, and a fundamental rejection of extremism as a method. And frankly, in the impending period of global reconstruction, which may take quite long, with its final design being uncertain, moderate conservatism is the most reasonable line of conduct, as far as I see it. It will inevitably change at some point, but so

far, do no harm – the guiding principle in medicine – seems to be the most rational one. *Noli nocere*, as they say.

Again, for us in Russia, these are not some speculative postulates, but lessons from our difficult and sometimes tragic history. The cost of ill-conceived social experiments is sometimes beyond estimation. Such actions can destroy not only the material, but also the spiritual foundations of human existence, leaving behind moral wreckage where nothing can be built to replace it for a long time.

Finally, there is one more point I want to make. We understand all too well that resolving many urgent problems the world has been facing would be impossible without close international cooperation. However, we need to be realistic: most of the pretty slogans about coming up with global solutions to global problems that we have been hearing since the late 20th century will never become reality. In order to achieve a global solution, states and people have to transfer their sovereign rights to supranational structures to an extent that few, if any, would accept. This is primarily attributable to the fact that you have to answer for the outcomes of such policies not to some global public, but to your citizens and voters.

However, this does not mean that exercising some restraint for the sake of bringing about solutions to global challenges is impossible. After all, a global challenge is a challenge for all of us together, and to each of us in particular. If everyone saw a way to benefit from cooperation in overcoming these challenges, this would definitely leave us better equipped to work together.

One of the ways to promote these efforts could be, for example, to draw up, at the UN level, a list of challenges and threats that specific countries face, with details of how they could affect other countries. This effort could involve experts from various countries and academic fields, including you, my colleagues. We believe that developing a roadmap of this kind could inspire many countries to see global issues in a new light and understand how cooperation could be beneficial for them.

I have already mentioned the challenges international institutions are facing. Unfortunately, this is an obvious fact: it is now a question of reforming or closing some of them. However, the United Nations as the central international institution retains its enduring value, at least for now. I believe that in our turbulent world it is the UN that brings a touch of reasonable conservatism into international relations, something that is so important for normalising the situation.

Many criticise the UN for failing to adapt to a rapidly changing world. In part, this is true, but it is not the UN, but primarily its members who are to blame for this. In addition, this international body promotes not only international norms, but also the rule-making spirit, which is based on the principles of equality and maximum consideration for everyone’s opinions. Our mission is to preserve this heritage while reforming the organisation. However, in doing so we need to make sure that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater, as the saying goes.

This is not the first time I am using a high rostrum to make this call for collective action in order to face up to the problems that continue to pile up and become more acute. It is thanks to you, friends and colleagues, that the Valdai Club is emerging or has already established itself as a high-profile forum. It is for this reason that I am turning to this platform to reaffirm our readiness to work together on addressing the most urgent problems that the world is facing today.

Friends,

The changes mentioned here prior to me, as well as by yours truly, are relevant to all countries and peoples. Russia, of course,

is not an exception. Just like everyone else, we are searching for answers to the most urgent challenges of our time.

Of course, no one has any ready-made recipes. However, I would venture to say that our country has an advantage. Let me explain what this advantage is. It is to do with our historical experience. You may have noticed that I have referred to it several times in the course of my remarks. Unfortunately, we had to bring back many sad memories, but at least our society has developed what they now refer to as herd immunity to extremism that paves the way to upheavals and socioeconomic cataclysms. People really value stability and being able to live normal lives and to prosper while confident that the irresponsible aspirations of yet another group of revolutionaries will not upend their plans and aspirations. Many have vivid memories of what happened 30 years ago and all the pain it took to climb out of the ditch where our country and our society found themselves after the USSR fell apart.

The conservative views we hold are an optimistic conservatism, which is what matters the most. We believe stable, positive development to be possible. It all depends primarily on our own efforts. Of course, we are ready to work with our partners on common noble causes.

I would like to thank all participants once more, for your attention. As the tradition goes, I will gladly answer or at least try to answer your questions.

Thank you for your patience.

Moderator of the 18th annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club closing session  
**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Thank you very much, Mr President, for your detailed remarks covering not only and not so much the current political problems, but fundamental issues. Following up on what you said, I cannot fail to ask you about the historical experience, traditions, conservatism and healthy conservatism that you have mentioned on several occasions in your remarks.

Does unhealthy conservatism frighten you? Where does the boundary separating the healthy from the unhealthy lie? At what point does a tradition turn from something that binds society together into a burden?

**Vladimir Putin:** Anything can become a burden, if you are not careful. When I speak about healthy conservatism, Nikolai Berdyayev always springs to mind, and I have already mentioned him several times. He was a remarkable Russian philosopher, and as you all know he was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922. He was as forward-thinking as a man can be, but also sided with conservatism. He used to say, and you will excuse me if I do not quote his exact words: “Conservatism is not something preventing upward, forward movement, but something preventing you from sliding back into chaos.” If we treat conservatism this way, it provides an effective foundation for further progress.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Speaking of traditions, you also tend to mention traditional values quite frequently, and this is a hot topic in our society. In particular, you have proposed relying on traditional values as a foundation for bringing the world together. However, traditions are destined to be unique for every nation. How can everyone come together around the same traditional values, if they have their own traditions?

**Vladimir Putin:** Do you know what the trick is? The trick is that of course there is a lot of diversity and every nation around the world is different. Still, something unites all people. After all, we are all people, and we all want to live. Life is of absolute value.

In my opinion, the same applies to family as a value, because what can be more important than procreation? Do we want to be or not to be? If we do not want to be, fine. You see, adoption is

also a good and important thing, but to adopt a child someone has to give birth to that child. This is the second universal value that cannot be contested.

I do not think that I need to list them all. You are all smart people here, and everyone understands this, including you. Yes, we do need to work together based on these shared, universal values.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** You made a powerful statement when you said that the current model of capitalism has run its course and no longer offers a solution to international issues. One hears this a lot these days, but you are referring to our country’s unfortunate experience in the 20th century when we were actually rejecting capitalism, but this did not work out for us either. Does this mean that this is where we want to return? Where are we headed with this dysfunctional capitalist model?

**Vladimir Putin:** I also said that there were no ready-made recipes. It is true that what we are currently witnessing, for example on the energy markets, as we will probably discuss later, demonstrates that this kind of capitalism does not work. All they do is talk about the “invisible hand” of the market, only to get \$1,500 or \$2,000 per 1,000 cubic metres. Is this market-based approach to regulation any good?

When everything goes well and there is stability, economic actors around the world demand more freedom for themselves and a smaller role for the state in the economy. However, when challenges arise, especially at a global scale, they want the government to interfere.

I remember 2008 and 2009 and the global financial crisis very well. I was Prime Minister at the time, and spoke to many Russian business leaders, who were viewed as successful up to that point, and everything is fine with them now, by the way. They came to me and were ready to give up their companies that were worth tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, for a ruble. Why? They had to assume responsibility for their workforce and for the future of these companies. It was easier for them just to keep what they earned and shift their responsibility to others.

At the time, we agreed that the state would lend them its shoulder: they kept their businesses, while the state paid off their margin loans and assumed responsibility, to a certain extent. Together with the businesses, we found a solution. As a result, we saved Russia’s largest private companies, and enabled the state to make a profit afterwards. We actually made money because when the companies were back on their feet, they paid back what they owed the state. The state made quite a profit.

In this regard, we do need to work together and explore each other’s experience. Other countries also had positive experiences in making the state and the market work in tune with each other. The People’s Republic of China is a case in point. While the Communist Party retains its leading role there, the country has a viable market and its institutions are quite effective. This is an obvious fact.

For this reason, there are no ready-made recipes. Wild capitalism does not work either, as I have already said, and I am ready to repeat this, as I have just demonstrated using these examples.

In a way, this is like art. You need to understand when to place a bigger emphasis on something: when to add more salt, and when to use more sugar. You see? While being guided by the general principles as articulated by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the OECD, etc., we need to understand where we are. To act, we need to understand how our capabilities compare with the plans we have. By the way, here in Russia we have been quite effective over the past years, including in overcoming the consequences of the epidemic. Other countries also performed quite well, as we can see.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Do you mean that we are moving not only towards an optimistic conservatism but also towards an optimistic capitalism?

**Vladimir Putin:** You see, we need to build a social welfare state. Truth be said, Europe, especially the Nordic countries, have been advocating a social welfare state for a long time. This is essential for us, considering the income gap between various social groups, even if this problem exists in all the leading economies of the world. Just look at the United States and Europe, although the income gap is smaller in Europe compared to the United States.

As I have said on multiple occasions, only a small group of people who were already rich to begin with benefited from the preferences that became available over the past years. Their wealth increased exponentially compared to the middle class and the poor. This problem clearly exists there, even if it is not as pressing in Europe, but it still exists.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Thank you.

I will ask the last question so that we do not keep the audience waiting. You mentioned the UN's invaluable role. We can understand this, since the UN is a fundamental institution, and so on. However, many now criticise the UN, and you have mentioned this in your remarks.

Just a few days ago, President of Turkey Erdogan, whom you know well, said that the Security Council must be reformed because a group of WWII victor countries monopolised power, which is not the way it should be. Do you agree with this statement?

**Vladimir Putin:** I do not. He has recently visited Russia, as you know, and I had a meeting with him. I raised this question myself, saying that I saw his main points. I have to admit that I did not read the entire book, but I did look at some of the ideas. I agree with some of them. This is a good analysis. We can understand why a Turkish leader raises this issue. He probably believes that Turkey could become a permanent Security Council member. It is not up to Russia to decide, though. Matters of this kind must be decided by consensus. There are also India and South Africa. You see, this is a question of fairness, of striking a balance.

Different solutions are possible here. I would rather not talk about this now, getting ahead of things and preempting Russia's position on this discussion. But what is important (I just said so in my opening remarks, and I also said this to President Erdogan), if we dismantle the permanent members' veto, the United Nations will die on the same day, will degrade into the League of Nations, and that will be it. It will be just a platform for discussion, Valdai Club number two. But there is only one Valdai Club, and it is here. (Laughter.)

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** We are ready to step in.

**Vladimir Putin:** Valdai Club number two will be in New York.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** We will go and replace it with pleasure.

**Vladimir Putin:** But this is the point – we would rather not change anything. That is, some change might be necessary, but we would rather not destroy the basis – this is the whole point of the UN today, that there are five permanent members, and they have the power of veto. Other states are represented on the Security Council, but they are non-permanent members.

We need to think how we could make this organisation more balanced, because indeed – this is true, and in this sense, President Erdogan is right – it emerged after World War II, when there was a certain balance of power. Now it is changing; it has already changed.

We are well aware that China has overtaken the United States in purchasing power parity. What do you think that is? These are global changes.

And India? Another nation of almost 1.5 billion people, a rapidly developing economy, and so on. And why is Africa not represented? Where is Latin America? We definitely need to consider this – a growing giant there such as Brazil. These are all topics for discussion. Only, we must not rush. We must not make any mistakes on the path of reform.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** The leaders of the Valdai Club will consider holding a meeting in New York. Only, they might not issue visas to all of us, I am afraid, but no problem, we will work on that.

**Vladimir Putin:** By the way, why not? The Valdai Club might as well meet in New York.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** After you and Biden agree on the visas. (Laughter.)

**Vladimir Putin:** I do not think the heads of state will need to step in. Just ask Sergei Lavrov, he will speak with his colleagues there.

Why not? I am serious. Why not hold a Valdai Club session on a neutral site, outside the Russian Federation? Why not? I think it might be interesting.

We have important people here in this room, good analysts who are well known in their countries. More people can be invited in the host country to join these discussions. What is wrong with that? This is good.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Well, we have just set a goal.

**Vladimir Putin:** It is not a goal; it is a possibility.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** A possibility. Like a crisis. It is also a possibility.

**Vladimir Putin:** Yes.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Please, Piotr Dutkiewicz.

**Piotr Dutkiewicz:** Mr. President, I would like to return to the words you have just said, that Russia should rely on Russian values. By the way, we were talking about this at a Valdai Club meeting the day before yesterday.

I would like to ask you which Russian thinkers, scholars, anthropologists and writers do you regard as your closest soul-mates, helping you to define for yourself the values that will later become those of all Russians?

**Vladimir Putin:** You know, I would prefer not to say that this is Ivan Ilyin alone. I read Ilyin, I read him to this day. I have his book lying on my shelf, and I pick it up and read it from time to time. I have mentioned Berdiayev, there are other Russian thinkers. All of them are people who were thinking about Russia and its future. I am fascinated by the train of their thought, but, of course, I make allowances for the time when they were working, writing and formulating their ideas. The well-known idea about the passionarity of nations is a very interesting idea. It could be challenged – arguments around it continue to this day. But if there are debates over the ideas they formulated, these are obviously not idle ideas to say the least.

Let me remind you about nations' passionarity. According to the author of this idea, peoples, nations, ethnic groups are like a living organism: they are born, reach the peak of their development, and then quietly grow old. Many countries, including those on the American continent, say today's Western Europe is ageing. This is the term they use. It is hard to say whether this is right or not. But, to my mind, the idea that a nation should have an inner driving mechanism for development, a will for development and self-assertion has a leg to stand on.

We are observing that certain countries are on the rise even though they have a lot of unsolved problems. They resemble erupting volcanoes, like the one on the Spanish island, which is disgorging its lava. But there are also extinguished volcanoes, where fires are long dead and one can only hear birds singing.

You, please.

**Piotr Dutkiewicz:** Mr. President, you have referred to Lev Gumilyov, who presented me with a samizdat edition of his first book in St Petersburg in 1979. I will pass this samizdat on to you.

**Vladimir Putin:** Thank you very much.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Samizdat, a tradition.

Dear friends, please introduce yourselves, when you take the floor.

**Alexei Miller:** Good afternoon, Mr President.

I am Alexei Miller, a historian from the European University at St Petersburg.

**Vladimir Putin:** There are two Alexei Millers. Russia is a rich country. (Laughter)

**Alexei Miller:** Two years ago, you were asked during a meeting at the Valdai Club about the European Parliament's resolution, which made the Soviet Union (and hence Russia) and Nazi Germany equally responsible for the outbreak of WWII. Since then, you have commented on this issue several times in your statements and in the article published in the summer of 2020.

In particular, during the ceremony to unveil a monument to the victims of the siege of Leningrad at the Yad Vashem memorial complex in January 2020, you said you would like to propose a meeting of the Big Five leaders to discuss this issue as well, so that we could overcome the current confrontation and end the war on memory. I believe the situation has not improved since then. Or maybe you know something the general public is not aware of, maybe there have been some improvements? It would be great if you could tell us about this.

My second question follows on from the first one. When there is such confrontation in the countries that are involved in the war on memory, some forces may be tempted to join ranks and to restrict, to a greater or lesser degree, the freedom of discussion, including among historians. Such discussions always involve a difference of opinions and some risqué or even wrong views. Do you envision the threat of such restrictions in our country?

**Vladimir Putin:** No, I do not believe there is such a threat in our country. We sometimes see the danger of not being responsible for what some people say, indeed, but then this is the reverse side of the freedom you have mentioned.

As for my initiative to hold a meeting of the heads of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, it has been supported by everyone, in principle, and such a meeting could have been organised. The problems that arose are not connected with Russia but with some disputes within this group of five countries. As I have said, they are not connected with Russia. This is the first point.

And the second is that the pandemic began soon after that, and the situation has become really complicated.

The idea of the meeting received a highly positive response, and I hope it will be held eventually. This definitely will be beneficial. We are discussing this with our American partners, with our Chinese friends, with France – incidentally, the French President supported it immediately, as well as with Britain. They have their own ideas and proposals on additional subjects that can be discussed at such a meeting. I hope the necessary conditions will develop and we will hold this meeting.

As for historical memory, the memory of WWII, you know, of course, that I am ready to talk about this with arguments in hand. We have many complaints about the country's leadership between 1917 and 1990, which is obvious. However, placing the Nazis and the Communists before WWII on the same level and dividing responsibility between them equally is absolutely unacceptable. It is a lie.

I am saying this not only because I am Russian and, currently, the head of the Russian state, which is the legal successor of the Soviet Union. I am saying this now, in part or at least in part, as a researcher. I have read the documents, which I retrieved from the archives. We are publishing them now in increasingly large amounts.

Trust me, when I read them, the picture in my mind started changing. You can think about Stalin differently, blaming him for the prison camps, persecution campaigns and the like. But I have seen his instructions on documents. The Soviet government was genuinely doing its best to prevent WWII, even if for different reasons. Some people would say that the country was not ready for the war, which is why they tried to prevent it. But they did try to prevent it. They fought for the preservation of Czechoslovakia, providing arguments to protect its sovereignty. I have read, I have really read – this is not a secret, and we are declassifying these archives now – about France's reaction to those events, including regarding the meeting of the leading politicians with Hitler in Munich in 1938.

When you read this, when you see it, you understand that attempts can indeed be made to distort these facts. But you can at least read these documents. I can understand the current Polish leadership's attitude to the 1939 events, but when you tell them: Just take a look at what happened slightly before that, when Poland joined Germany in the division of Czechoslovakia. You lit the fuse, you pulled the cork, the genie came out, and you cannot put it back into the bottle."

I also read the archival documents which we received after the Red Army entered Europe: we have German and also Polish and French documents, we have them. They directly discussed the division of Czechoslovakia and the time for the invasion. And then to blame it on the Soviet Union? This simply does not correspond to reality and facts.

Simply put, who attacked who? Did the Soviet Union attack Germany? No, it did not. Yes, there were secret agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union. Incidentally, I would like to note that the Soviet troops entered Brest when the German troops had been already deployed there; the Germans simply moved back a little and the Red Army moved in. Do you see?

There is no point adding a political dimension here. Let us act calmly at the expert level, read the documents and sort things out. Nobody is accusing the Polish leadership. But we will not allow anyone to accuse Russia or the Soviet Union of what they did not do.

And lastly, I would like to say that there are some perfectly obvious things. Firstly, it was Germany that attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and not vice versa, and secondly, let us not forget who stormed Berlin. Was it the Americans, the British or the French? No, it was the Red Army. Have you forgotten this? It is easy to recall, for it is an obvious fact.

As many as 1.1 million of our people died in the Battle of Stalingrad alone. How many casualties can Britain claim? 400,000. And the United States, less than 500,000. A total of 75 percent, and probably even 80 percent of the German military potential was destroyed by the Soviet army. Are you a little rusty on this?

No, you are not rusty at all. These events are being used to deal with the current internal political matters in an opportunistic manner. This is wrong, because nothing good will come of manipulating history. At the very least, this does not promote mutual understanding, which we need so badly now.

Fyodor Lukyanov: Orietta Moscatelli, go ahead please.

**Orietta Moscatelli:** Orietta Moscatelli, Italy. Thank you for the meeting.

As you mentioned, different things have been said about Homo sovieticus over the 30 years since the Soviet Union's disintegration. Was there really a person like that? Here is my question: Do you think it was true? Do you believe Russia has fully overcome Soviet experience as a society? What are the main features of the Soviet times that you have kept in your life?

**Vladimir Putin:** I, as well as many people of my generation certainly remember this idea and this formula – a new community, Soviet people, the Soviet person. Of course, all of us remember this. In reality, this definition is not at all bad. This is my first point.

The second point. Look, the whole world and the United States describe the US as a “melting pot,” in which people of different nations, ethnicities and religions are melting together. What is bad about this? They are all proud – the Irish, people of European and East European origin, you name it, as well as Latin Americans and Africans by their initial descent – many of them are proud to be US citizens and this is wonderful. This is what “the melting pot” is about.

Russia is also “a melting pot.” Since the formation of a united Russian state – the first steps were made, probably in the 8th-9th centuries, and also after Conversion of Rus', the Russian nation and a centralised Russian state began to take shape with a common market, common language, the power of a prince and common spiritual values. The Russian state began to be established and later expanded. This was also a “melting pot.”

Nothing particularly new was created in the Soviet Union except one very important circumstance: this new community, the Soviet person, the Soviet people acquired an ideological tinge. Of course, there was nothing good about this because this narrows the horizons of the possible. This is the first point.

The second point. Positive features of the Soviet times reflected on the Soviet people. What were they? Patriotism inherent in our peoples, supremacy of the spiritual dimension over material things, all these values I mentioned, including family ones. But negative things in the life and destiny of the Soviet Union also stuck to the Soviet people. Thus, they were deprived of property as such. Private property was embodied in a household plot, but this is quite a different category. Hence, their attitude to labour, the one-size-fits-all approach and so on.

The Soviet Union had many problems. They triggered the events that led to the collapse of the USSR. However, it is wrong, crude and inappropriate to paint everything black. Yes, I know we have people that paint everything black. Hence, they deserve to be put into something that smells bad.

There are both pluses and minuses, as for “the melting pot,” I think it was good to have it because it enriches the people, enriches the nation.

You know, what is typical of Russia, something you can find in all historical documents: when expanding its territory Russia never made life difficult for the people who became part of the united Russian state. This applied to religion, traditions and history. Look at the decrees of Catherine the Great who issued her instruction in clear terms: treat with respect. This was the attitude towards those who preached Islam, for instance. This has always been the case. This is a tradition. In terms of preserving these traditions, the new community of the Soviet people had nothing bad about it except the ideologisation of this melting pot and the results of its functioning.

I think I have described everything linked with the Soviet period of our history. Now I have mentioned this again and I do not think it is worth discussing this topic again.

As for me, like the overwhelming majority of people of my generation, I faced the problems of that period, but I also

remember its positive features that should not be forgotten. Being from a family of workers, yours truly graduated from Leningrad State University. This is something, right? At that time, education played the role of a real social lift. On the whole, the egalitarian approach was very widespread and we encountered its negative impact, such as income levelling and a related attitude to work, but a lot of people still used the preferences of social lifts I mentioned. Maybe, it was simply the legacy of past generations or even cultivated in the Soviet Union to some extent. This is also important.

I have now recalled my family. My mum and dad were simple people. They did not talk in slogans but I remember very well that discussing different problems at home, in the family, they always, I would like to emphasise this, treated their country with respect, speaking about it in their own manner, in simple terms, in the folk style. This was not demonstrative patriotism. It was inside our family.

I think I have the right to say that the overwhelming majority of the Russian people and the other peoples of the USSR cultivated these positive features. It is no accident that over 70 percent of the population voted for preserving the Soviet Union on the eve of its collapse. Many people in the union republics that gained independence regretted what had happened. But now life is different and we believe it is going its own way and generally recognise current realities.

As for the Soviet person, the new formation, as they said then, I believe I have already said enough on this subject.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** This year's Valdai Club meeting is special in part because we have a Nobel Peace Prize laureate here with us for the first time in our history.

I would like to give the floor to Dmitry Muratov.

**Dmitry Muratov:** Thank you. Good afternoon.

Mr President, Valdai Club guests, Fyodor, I want to let everyone know that the prize money has been distributed.

Thanks go to the Circle of Kindness Foundation. Furthermore, we hope that our modest contribution will help everyone realise that the Circle of Kindness Foundation helps young people under 18, but then after they are 18, they are left without guidance. It is like saying, “Thank you, we saved you, and now goodbye.” We look forward to the Circle of Kindness Foundation (they appear ready to do this) expanding its mandate. There is the children's hospice Lighthouse, the First Moscow Charity Hospice Foundation Vera, the Podari Zhizn Foundation, the Anna Politkovskaya Award, and the Foundation for Medical Aid for Media Members. That is all.

Of course, I also think that, to some extent, probably, this is a prize for our country as well, although I consider myself an impostor. I will do my best to make sure it benefits our people.

Now, if I may, a brief remark and a question.

Mr President, I have very carefully studied the answer you gave during Moscow Energy Week regarding foreign agents, where you said that we were not the first to adopt this law, that the United States did so back in the 1930s.

But, Mr President, since we do not adopt every law that is adopted in the United States, my question about foreign agents remains. After all, I believe this concerns not only dozens and dozens of journalists and human rights activists who are listed in the register, but also hundreds of thousands and even millions of readers. Therefore, I believe it is a serious matter.

Most importantly, you have just mentioned Leningrad University and I think your subject of study will help us understand each other well. This law does not provide for any court recourse. You are designated a foreign agent and there is no argument of the parties, no provision of evidence, no verdict. It is a stain. Let me remind you of our favourite

childhood book. This is the same kind of brand Milady in *The Three Musketeers* had. But before Milady was beheaded, the executioner of Lille read the verdict to her at dawn whereas in our case there is no verdict whatsoever.

Furthermore, it is impossible to get away from this law. There is not even a warning that you become a foreign agent starting, say, tomorrow. For many, this status undoubtedly means they are an enemy of the Motherland. I remember from my days of army service that under the guard service regulations, the sentry first fires a warning shot in the air. Excuse me, but only security guards at prison camps shoot to kill without a warning shot.

I believe we need to sort this out, since the criteria are woefully vague. Take, for example, receiving organisational and methodological assistance. What does this mean? If I am asking a member of the Valdai Club for a comment, and they come from another country, does that make me a foreign agent? They make their announcements on Fridays. I want to remind you that tomorrow is Friday.

I would like to ask you to respond to the way this issue is presented. Perhaps, you, Mr President and, for example, the State Duma Chairman, could hold an extraordinary meeting with the editors from various media in order discuss the issues at hand.

Thank you very much.

**Vladimir Putin:** First, I would like to congratulate you on the Nobel Prize. I would like to draw your attention to one fact: Nikolai Berdyayev, whom I have mentioned, was expelled by the Bolsheviks on the well-known Philosophy Steamer in 1922. Nominated for a Nobel Prize more than once, he never received this award.

Dmitry Muratov: That was about literature.

**Vladimir Putin:** No difference, but yes, I agree. The first Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Barrack Obama also received Nobel peace prizes. So, you are in good company. Congratulations! But we really know. You have just spoken about a hospice. I would give you a prize for that because you are doing this good work. It is truly noble work, the Circle of Kindness, and the like.

Your concern about foreign agents; I will not deviate to the right or left. Look, you said that here when these decisions are made... firstly, American laws. Do we have to copy everything from the Americans? No, we do not need to copy everything. Yet many liberals in Russia still think we should copy almost everything. But I agree with you: not everything.

You said this is not decided in court. This is not done in the United States either. They summon people to the Department of Justice. Ask Russia Today about what they are doing. Do you know how tough they are? Up to and including criminal liability. We do not have this. This is not about the position of some public figure, some public organisation, or a media outlet. Their position does not matter. This law does not ban anyone from having one's own opinion on an issue. It is about receiving financial aid from abroad during domestic political activities. That is the point. The law does not even keep them from continuing these political activities. The money that comes from abroad, from over there, should simply be identified as such. Russian society should know what position someone comes from or what they think about internal political processes or something else, but it should also realise that they receive money from abroad. This is the right of Russian society. In fact, this is the whole point of this law. There are no restrictions in it at all.

So, when you said there is no verdict, that is right. There is no verdict. There was a verdict for Milady – her head was cut off. Here nobody is cutting off anything. So, just continue working like you did before.

But you are right about one thing. I will not even argue with you, because this is true. Of course, we probably need to go over these vague criteria again and again. I can promise you that we will take another look at them. I know it happens occasionally. Even my personal acquaintances who engage in charitable activities were telling me that cases were being made against them portraying them as foreign agents. I am aware of the fact that our colleagues discuss this at the Human Rights Council. I keep issuing instructions on that score to the Presidential Administration and the State Duma deputies so that they go over it again and again, improve this tool, and in no way abuse it.

So, thank you for bringing this up. We will look into it.

Thank you very much.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Just a quick follow-up on that. Mr President, are you not afraid of excessive acts?

**Vladimir Putin:** I am not afraid of anything, why is everyone trying to scare me?

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Okay, then we are afraid, and you tell us about excessive acts, since you know your former security service colleagues well.

**Vladimir Putin:** Not everyone, this is a mass organisation, how can I know everyone?

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** Well, not everyone, but many.

**Vladimir Putin:** When I was [FSB]director, I sometimes even summoned operatives with specific cases and read them myself. And now I do not know everyone there. I left it a long time ago.

**Fyodor Lukyanov:** I am talking about specific cases. Their psychological makeup is that overdoing things is a safer approach than missing things. Will there be no blanket approach to identifying foreign agents?

Vladimir Putin: What?

Fyodor Lukyanov: Will they not use a blanket approach to identifying foreign agents?

**Vladimir Putin:** Is there anything there that looks like a blanket approach? How many do we have? Every second, or what? I believe there is no such thing as widespread branding of people as foreign agents.

I think the danger is vastly exaggerated. I believe I have formulated the underlying reasons for adopting this law quite clearly.

<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/66975>

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# ‘The Treaty that never was’

A talk by Jack Lane

There is a tsunami of commentary at the moment on the document that was signed in London on 6th December 1921 which is universally called a Treaty.

But the signed document was itself not called a Treaty or specified as such anywhere in the text – and for good reason. It was officially called “*Articles of Agreement between Great Britain and Ireland.*”

It had been discussed by two sets of negotiators and their top legal experts line by line before being signed. So it was hardly an oversight that it was not called or specified as a Treaty. As with all legal documents what is not said is just as important as what is said and it did not say that this agreement was a Treaty.

## So why did it not qualify as a Treaty?

- Treaties are designated and elaborated as such when agreed.
- They are established by mutually accepted independent states.
- They are freely entered into by the governments concerned.
- There is no allegiance required by one state to another.

## The *Articles of Agreement* met none of these requirements:

- It was signed under a threat of immediate war.
- The Irish Republic and Dáil were not recognised.
- The British Government demanded and got an oath of allegiance from the Irish negotiators.
- The Irish Government was specifically prevented from seeing or agreeing to its final terms before the document was signed.

Jack Lane will explore how this débâcle arose and the differences between de Valera and Collins’ roles in dealing with it.

**7pm, Monday 6<sup>th</sup> December 2021**

For the Zoom link to attend this talk, email Jack Lane at:

[jacklaneaubane@hotmail.com](mailto:jacklaneaubane@hotmail.com)