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The Northern Election

Who called the Northern Ireland election that nobody wanted?

In the Radio Ulster commentary during the voting it was repeatedly said that it was Sinn Fein. But Sinn Fein only pulled out of government after the SDLP defected from the 1998 Agreement and formed an Opposition alliance with the Unionist Party, hoping to profit by directing pseudo-democratic criticism at it over its unprincipled alliance with the DUP.

The indications were that Sinn Fein would have fudged through the difficulty of Arlene Foster's bungling of the Renewable Heating Initiative matter if the SDLP had not pulled out of Government in order to snap at its heels and had not committed itself to a post-Agreement majority-rule system in alliance with the Ulster Unionist Party.

The SDLP forced the election with its democratic posturing, which made it impossible for Martin McGuinness to manage the crisis. The outcome was that it suffered erosion in its Derry stronghold while Sinn Fein reinforced its dominance in the Nationalist community.

The SDLP vote held up rather well only because SDLP voters for the most part took no heed of the new, democratic, anti-Agreement policy of its leader.

Northern Ireland is not a democracy, never has been, and never will be.

It is a fragment of a state, excluded from the democracy of the state. The Unionist community, which constitutes the majority of the population by a small margin, and says it is British, does not want to be included in the democracy of the British state. It does not want the Tory and Labour Parties contesting Six County elections. It wants to be something itself, without having any purpose for it.

The large Nationalist minority, which considers itself Irish, has been shielded from the seductions of British democratic politics during the four generations since Partition, and it has grown in quantity and self-confidence with its identity intact.

Ian Paisley, who was more authentically British than the Unionist Party, thought to

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Lost In The Wilderness!

On 25th January, *'History Ireland'* held one of its 'Hedge Schools' at the London Irish Centre on *"Ireland & the UK from 1916 to Brexit"* with Tommy Graham, Dan Mulhall (Irish Ambassador to UK), Mary Kenny (writer & journalist), Michael Kennedy (Royal Irish Academy's *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*), and Martin Mansergh (vice-chair of the Advisory Group on Centenary Commemorations).

Despite the title, all participants felt obliged to give a potted history of Ireland since the Union and all agreed the Union failed because of British mistakes—failure to grant Catholic Emancipation with the Union of 1801, failing the 'Famine' dead, failing the tenant farmers, failing the Home Rulers etc. Irish history was a series of mistakes/failings by Britain.

What they failed to say was that the same time the people who made all these mistakes created the greatest Empire the world had ever known. How odd? They were geniuses in dealing with the rest of the world but complete fools when it came to Ireland? Could it possibly be that

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Brexit: Irish fudge undermines EU solidarity

There are commendable elements in the Government's Brexit strategy—some Government Ministers are actively pursuing initiatives in response to the risks, and official agencies like the IDA (Industrial Development Authority) and Enterprise Ireland are moving well to take advantage of the opportunities. But the positive work is being undermined by a diplomatic fudge emanating most probably from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The fudge is being expressed in the formula that

Ireland should occupy a neutral space between the UK and the EU in the Brexit negotiations. It seems to be beyond the grasp of the Irish diplomatic mind that, because of Brexit, close alignment with Britain and membership of the EU are now mutually exclusive.

POST-BREXIT STRATEGIC VISION?

Ireland, as a member of the EU, faces a unique problem: the substantial link between Europe and Ireland for passenger

and freight traffic crosses what will before long be a country outside the Union, Britain. This presents substantial difficulties for both Imports and Exports, as goods will be passing through an area with a different tariff regime.

The answer must surely be that Ireland and Europe have to develop new direct links and expand existing transport routes.

At present the only daily sea link between Ireland and the EU is through the port of Rosslare, which runs freight and passenger services to the ports of Roscoff and Cherbourg in France. There is no

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complicate life for the Nationalist community by making a deal with Sinn Fein to make the Good Friday Agreement functional. He brought the party into devolved government under the Crown.

The routine Unionists saw this as *selling the pass*. They turned on Paisley, hounded him out of politics, and even caused his Church to disown him.

The post-Paisleyite DUP, along with the post-Faulkner Unionist Party, have brought Sinn Fein within one seat of being the biggest party and have put the Nationalist combination ahead of the Unionist combination in the Assembly.

Mainstream BBC gave scant coverage to the Election. BBC2's *Newsnight* (1.3.17) gave it a contemptuous eve-of-election slot of five minutes. It noted that the UUP/SDLP Opposition was bidding to establish a normal democratic politics dealing with bread-and-butter issues. It interviewed Bertie Ahern:

"Bertie Ahern says people waiting for normal bread-and-butter politics should be patient: 'I remember when I was a

young politician in Leinster House, maybe in the late seventies, an old politician from one of the Southern Counties said to me that he detected in the 1977 Election that Civil War politics was coming to an end. You know—so that was the South—I don't expect the North to move—maybe not as slow, but not as quick either."

The "*Civil War*" political division in the Free State bore no resemblance to the communal national division in the Six Counties. Treatyites and Anti-Treatyites always knew that they belonged to the same nation. They only fought each other because Whitehall manipulated them into it with the threat that, if the dictated Treaty was not implemented, there would be an Imperial reconquest. And from the very start Dublin Governments had to deal with the bread-and-butter issues.

In the North the Unionists were claimed as Irish and they denied it forcibly. Collins made war on them to prove to them that they were Irish and they resisted him by force. And the bread-and-butter issue in

the North had always been dealt with by Whitehall. That was the condition on which Craigavon agreed to operate a Six County devolved Government outside the democracy of the state.

Newsnight also broadcast a comment by Margaret O'Callaghan—one of those academics from the revisionist South that Whitehall trusts with academics jobs in Queen's University:

"I think the developments of the SDLP and the UUP are quite interesting really—the idea that they would have—not a formal vote-sharing agreement across the sectarian divide—is a progressive development. Now there are some people have described Northern Ireland as almost like two separate electorates—you have almost like a Nationalist electorate and a Unionist electorate—well, if they cooperate in this way, that changes that to some degree."

The empirical fact of two distinct electorates, each with its own party system, is one of the two most obvious things about electoral affairs in the North. The University occasionally flirts with recognition of it. But it is not allowed to mention the other thing at all—exclusion from the democratic politics of the state.

There was a second factor (along with the post-Paisleyism of the DUP) that stimulated the resurgence of Sinn Fein: Brexit.

There is a strain of timid Nationalism—it calls itself *Constitutional*—that has desperately wished to believe that Britain, as a world force, had reached the end of its tether and had joined Ireland in Europeanism. It was disillusioned and shocked by Brexit. And Sinn Fein knew how to handle the matter.

Brexit precipitated the sea-change between the 2016 and 2017 election results. Despite the emotionalism of the centenary of 1916, nationalism did not have a good result in the centenary year. The gradual decline in nationalist turn-out was not reversed. It was only when there was an imminent prospect of separation from the European Union, and the prospect of a hard Border within Ireland—along with a reassertion of crass majoritarianism from the DUP—that there was the energising of the non-British elements of the Northern Ireland electorate, including EU nationals, which left Sinn Fein 1,168 votes behind the DUP: thus just on the verge of being the largest party.

While the DUP remains the largest party in the Assembly by a whisker, and will therefore hold the position of First Minister this time around, the prospects of a Border Poll cannot be too far away. ■

Northern Ireland Election 2 March 2017: Highlights

DUP - 28 seats, 225,413 votes, 28.1% of the vote: down 1.1% on May 2016.
 SF - 27 seats, 224,245 votes, 27.9% of the vote: up 3.9%.
 UUP - 10 seats, 103,314 votes, 12.9% of the vote: up 0.3%.
 SDLP - 12 seats, 95,958 votes, 11.9% of the vote: down 0.1%
 Alliance - 8 seats, 72,717 votes, 9.1% of the vote: up 2.1%.

In addition Jim Allister for the Traditional Unionist Voice got 6,214 votes and Independent Unionist Claire Sugden got 4,918. Thus the total Unionist vote was 339,859.

The Nationalist vote was 320,203: thus the difference between those designated as 'Unionist' and those designated as 'Nationalist' was 9,656.

Just 11 have been elected to the 'Other' designation in the Assembly. In addition to the 8 won by Alliance, 2 seats were won by the Green Party and 1 seat by People before Profit.

In the 2016 Assembly the DUP had the 30 votes needed to block votes, under the cross-community 'Petitions of Concern' feature of the GFA. No party can now block such Petitions on its own.

The turn-out in the election was 812,783, which was 64.78% of the electorate, compared to 54.9% in 2016.

Unionists in Stormont

Year	Body	Total Members	Unionist Members	Percentage Unionist
1921	Parliament	52	40	77%
1925	Parliament	52	36	69%
1929	Parliament	52	40	77%
1933	Parliament	52	39	75%
1938	Parliament	52	42	81%
1945	Parliament	52	35	67%
1949	Parliament	52	39	75%
1953	Parliament	52	39	75%
1958	Parliament	52	37	71%
1962	Parliament	52	34	65%
1965	Parliament	52	36	69%
1969	Parliament	52	39	75%
1973	Assembly	78	50	64%
1975	Convention	78	48	62%
1982	Assembly	78	51	65%
1996	Forum	110	61	55%
1998	Assembly	108	58	54%
2003	Assembly	108	59	55%
2007	Assembly	108	55	51%
2011	Assembly	108	56	52%
2016	Assembly	108	56	52%
2017	Assembly	90	40	44%

Divide And Rule?

A statement recently made on German radio (13 Feb) by Jean-Claude Juncker regarding British tactics over Brexit puts the Irish debate in perspective, especially the much hyped line that "Ireland needs to be Britain's best friend in Europe". Juncker is reported as saying:

"The other 27 [EU member states] don't know it yet, but the Brits know very well how they can tackle this [Brexit negotiation]. They could promise country A this, country B that and country C something else and the end game is that there is not a united European front. Now everyone is saying in relation to Trump and Brexit, 'Now is Europe's big chance. Now is the time to close ranks and march together.' I wish it will be like this, but will it happen? I have some doubt. Because the Brits will manage without big effort to divide the remaining 27 member states."

The notion that Ireland needs to align with Britain because UK trade is important to the Irish economy seems plausible on first glance. In practice it is a product of the debilitating Anglophile syndrome that has gripped the Irish elite in recent years.

As an EU member Ireland is within its rights to impress on Michel Barnier that Irish national interests threatened by Brexit require as much protection as can be allowed in the Brexit talks. It is completely unnecessary to cooperate with the British on the matter. Such cooperation will only be used by the British to undermine EU solidarity.

Juncker has the measure of one of the tactics that the UK will employ. Unfortunately, at this point in time, he is also correct in believing that the tactic is likely to be successful: the British will divide the EU 27 against themselves. So what can be done about this in Ireland? One simple line of action needs to be taken: the Redmondite caste of mind that has so many followers in the upper echelons of the Irish civil service and among the leaders of Fine Gael and Fianna Fail needs to be exposed, discredited and disabled, permanently.

Dave Alvey

Thoughts On The Garda Sergeant McCabe Saga

Recently I've been reading *Dona Teresa Confronts The Spanish Inquisition*, the true tale of the wife of the 17th-century New Mexico Governor as she tried to defend herself and her husband against changes of secretly practising Jewish rituals—a charge that could carry a death penalty. But were they really 'conversos' or were they victims of a campaign by their political enemies, anxious and willing to use any means to destroy them?

The Inquisition had been set up under the Dominicans in the 12th century to deal with the Cathar heresy, but gained a new lease of life under Spain's *Reconquista* when it effectively became a political tool in the hands of the Spanish monarchs to forcefully unify a country that had been a patchwork of Islamic, Christian and Jewish populations and kingdoms. That reach extended also to Spain's New World colonies.

For many today the Inquisition conjures up images of dungeons and torture to silence 'free thought', an anathema to the 21st century's obsession with total personal autonomy, freedom of speech and conscience. The reality, as always, was

more complex, and 'heretics' for much of the Middle Ages tended to be viewed by the wider population in the same manner many regard 'terrorists' today.

From about 1485 the Inquisition also began to concern itself with those accused of witchcraft, a crime which came to be regarded with even greater moral horror by ordinary people than heresy. Witches were assumed to be capable of causing harm to their immediate neighbours and inviting evil into society, and few people mourned their passing at the end of a noose or the flames of the fire.

It should be noted that the diverse Protestant Churches were even more zealous in this regard, executing supposed male and female witches at a rate nine times that of the Catholic Church. The activities of the 17th century English 'Witch-Finder General' Matthew Hopkins are well known to those interested in the subject. Hopkins had a commission to seek out witches and was paid a bonus for each one he 'discovered'. The system was obviously ripe for abuse, and it was later (belatedly for his many victims) discovered that he had secret tools made,

such as a retracting bodkin, in order to 'prove' his victims were witches. The bodkin retracted into the handle when pressed against the victim's skin so it caused no pain and left no mark. Both these were taken as signs the person being tested was indeed a witch.

The witch mania burned itself out by about 1750, by which time it had left over 90,000 people dead across Europe and the Americas, a rate of about 300 people a year over the 300 years it held sway. Whether one believes in the supernatural or not, there is no question some of the victims had in fact committed the-then crime of witchcraft—either trying to cast spells or make pacts with evil spirits and so on. When caught, they paid the penalty of the time. But it is equally certain now that many of its victims had done nothing wrong other than stand in the way of someone powerful's political ambition, greed or other desires—or had rejected their desires. In the case of Hopkins, money was the motivator and he lined his pockets (as no doubt did many others) by 'finding' witches everywhere he went.

As I followed the most recent revelations of the Maurice McCabe scandal I found myself thinking of these heretic and witch trials of the past, and how the moral horrors and bogeymen of the time were quickly exploited by the unscrupulous to deal with their enemies or opponents.

McCabe, a Garda Sergeant, was subjected to several years of what can only be termed 'pressure' for whistle-blowing on malpractice within the Gardai, it recently came to light that false allegations of child sexual abuse had somehow been copied and pasted into 'his file' by TUSLA (the Child And Family Agency: the name is based on *tus* the Irish for beginning, and *lá*, meaning day: *new beginning*).

If a clerical error, it seems one of such gargantuan proportions as to beggar belief. It also raises the obvious question—who else could this happen to? Are any of us safe in our beds, or could we expect to find some overworked pen-pusher had 'inadvertently' randomly copied and pasted sex-abuse allegations into our personal data? The first we would probably get to hear of it is when our doors were knocked on and our personal property seized for examination.

The allegation was circulated to opinion formers by the authorities, without Mc Cabe being informed of their existence.

It is difficult to escape the feeling that false allegations of child sexual abuse levelled at McCabe were in some way connected to his status as a whistleblower.

Had they not occurred against a background of well-publicised animosity to McCabe, they might have had devastating consequences for the man and his family. They could have quickly evaporated any sympathy or support the man might have from friends or the wider public. Few people will risk standing up for a person accused of either sex abuse or terrorism, for fear of being 'tainted by association'. That would be very convenient for his detractors and the implications would not have been lost on other potential whistleblowers.

Child sexual abuse represents probably the most morally repugnant crime possible to the modern mind, the one surest to leave the accused alone and friendless. It occupies a place in the popular mind that witchcraft once occupied in the late Middle Ages and beyond. Those seeking to understand the witch mania will find it useful to compare how child abuse is regarded in 21st century society. Both represent, for the times concerned, the most morally repugnant and socially isolating crimes one could be accused of. Both represent crimes for which it is, or was, very difficult for certain classes of people to defend themselves against—witchcraft for women, sex abuse in the case of men. Both represent crimes for which any protestation of innocence can be taken by many as further proof of guilt.

It is worth noting that in recent years there have been a number of high profile cases where sex abuse or misconduct allegations of one sort or another appear to be motivated by other, or additional, factors. Dominic Strauss Kahn was a possible contender for the French Presidency—until accused by his hotel chamber maid of sexual misconduct. Though prosecutors later dropped the case, his bid for the French presidency was scuppered and he paid almost \$1.5 million to the chamber maid in a separate civil suit. Julian Assange founds Wikileaks. Suddenly he is wanted for rape in Sweden, where he had gone, hoping to set up a base for Wikileaks. Just as Hilary Clinton appears to be losing the lead in the US presidential race, women suddenly start coming forward to accuse Donald Trump of being a sexist boor, though in that instance it was the timing of accusations that was of more significance, as Trump had himself admitted to 'inappropriate behaviour' with women in the past, in a leaked 2005 recording for example. That the recording itself was leaked in the middle of a Presidential race is of course also significant. How many celebrity divorce gossip headlines do we hear about these days where accusations of child abuse—usually against the husband —

quickly follow? While accusations in some cases may well be true, in other instances it's hard not to think the subtext is that these allegations could be made to go away if a divorce is granted on the terms sought by the bringer of the accusations; or perhaps simply a way to punish a philandering partner and gain sole custody of the children.

And now we have Maurice McCabe—and perhaps at least one other member of An Garda Síochána—faced with false allegations of child abuse, and again it is difficult not to think of it as part of a deliberate campaign to 'get whistleblowers' by hook or by crook. Dona Theresa had to take the stand and defend herself against allegations of being a '*conversos*' without even any idea the identities of those accusing her. The book suggests strongly that they were her—and her husband the Governor's—political enemies, who understood the *zeitgeist* of the times well enough to see that such charges were the ones most likely to be effective in achieving their ends. Is it the case that various accusations of sexual abuse have replaced witchcraft as 'the weapon of choice' for the unscrupulous in dealing with opponents?

Nick Folley

Lost In The Wilderness!

continued

their policies were all quite deliberate and sensible from their view but were in the end defeated by Irish resistance? Then the determinant becomes, not failings of British policy but the resistance to and defeats of British policy that explain the 19th and 20th century 'failures' of Britain in Ireland.

Which view makes more sense? One explains history and the other explains it away—history without cause and effect operating.

Professor Kennedy said that he had discovered his family history recently and his family had got on just fine during the 19th century in business between Ireland and England and this type of situation had to be recognised as well as all the convulsions of the 19th century. This is the 'balanced' academic view.

Martin Mansergh claimed that Home Rule was a '*mirage*'. This is a rather glib way to describe about half a century of British and Irish history. Here it seems the Irish were as foolish as the English in going in for failure through mutual illusion.

He then went on to talk about Irish

Independence and apparently this became inevitable because, by 1918 the world, now led by Woodrow Wilson was all for national independence. Which of course begs the question why were the British so foolish as not to recognise this in 1918 and accept the result of the 1918 Election? Another failing, I suppose—the poor misguided souls. And why did Wilson himself not recognise the 1918 Election result at Versailles? Another failing? Ironically Mr Mansergh's view is a perfect example of a mirage and with it he has a bigger mote in his eye about Irish Independence than the Home Rulers ever had about Home Rule.

There was much musing about the Dominion status obtained with the so-called 'Treaty' and how this led on the independence as if that was the intention. Dominions were where the English colonists ran their states but it was the natives who established a Republic in Ireland.

All the panel seemed oblivious to the fact that Dominion status was imposed in 1922 to reverse the existing independence and prevent it recurring by any and every means possible including the launching of a war.

To achieve independence the 'Treaty' and Dominion status had to be overcome and defeated and there was a military and political struggle for 15 years to achieve that—from 1922 to 1937. For the panel all that seemed not to have happened and political independence just appeared by some sort of unnoticed miracle.

There was minimum discussion on Brexit as all seemed a bit lost: they seemed to be waiting for Britain to sort out its latest 'mistake'. This reflects perfectly the current Government's position.

The concept of Ireland seeing Brexit as an opportunity to be taken full advantage of and an opportunity for it to extend its European dimension was not something that occurred to the panel.

Jack Lane

JUSTICE AS AN ASPIRIN

Under pressure they lift the lid a little, a bit of honesty delivered in a spittle.

Here a military abuse prosecution, there a child sexual arrest resolution. Don't ask for more, a token is the highest score.

Society isn't ready for an overhaul, so get ready to be again appalled.

Wilson John Haire
16 February 2017

Brexit

continued

service to Calais or other destinations. There are only weekly sailings between Cork and France, and Dublin Port and France; there are no links between Foynes (Limerick) and Europe. Direct Irish trade with the Continent and America was first curbed and then ended by Britain in the colonial era.

There has been little discussion of the problems posed by Ireland's isolation.

However, a number of recent Ministerial initiatives are worth highlighting. On January 31st the two Finance Ministers, Michael Noonan and Paschal Donohoe announced that an extra 2.6 billion was being made available for the capital investment programme that runs to 2021. Asked about specific projects, Noonan stated:

"If we live by trade, we need to increase the capacity of ports and if there are inhibitions on trading with the UK as a result of the Brexit negotiations, we'll need to expand the ports. Our tourist industry is going very well so airports will be important" (Irish Times, 31 Jan).

An indication of a proposal envisaged for one of the ports was given by Minister for Communications Denis Naughten in November. Naughten was quoted saying that Brexit will result in EU border checks which will drive up costs for freight companies transiting through Britain into Europe.

"Rotterdam is becoming hugely congested as the main port of Europe and there is potential to develop on the western seaboard a major port at Foynes that would act as a transit point for freight to and from North America. My suggestion is to do what we have done for passengers and have pre-clearance for large freight out of Foynes into the United States" (Sunday Independent, 6 Nov 2016).

No doubt such a proposal will meet the same response that met the original proposals for an airport at Knock, a TV channel in the Irish language (TnaG) and a financial service centre in Dublin. All three projects have been highly successful. The point is that, faced with a game changing development like the UK's exit from the EU, political leaders need to project a new strategic vision. Noonan and Naughten are striking the right notes.

Another Minister who is taking appropriate action rather than whinging about Brexit woes is the Minister for Agriculture, Michael Creed. Creed is continuing on

from where his predecessor left off in heading up trade missions to Morocco and Algeria, and defending the export of live cattle to Turkey. But he is using the issue of Brexit to add renewed vigour to those campaigns. Irish exports to Africa composed mostly of agri-food products are currently worth over 1 billion and some estimates project a potential expansion to 24 billion in the 2020s. Creed is showing that the diversification of foreign markets is a realistic answer to potential reductions in demand for Irish produce in the UK.

NEUTRAL REGARDING BREXIT

In early December Minister for Housing, Planning & Local Government Simon Coveney provided an honest summary of the Government's overall approach to Brexit in response to a Dail Question from Niall Collins of Fianna Fail. He said that Ireland will be neutral as between the UK and the EU in the negotiations following the sign-off of Article 50 (8 Dec, Irish Times). By any standards that statement on behalf of the Government of an EU member state was extraordinary.

While this is an advance on an earlier position that Ireland would be Britain's advocate in Europe, Coveney's statement betrays the central weakness in the Government's strategy. The unusually close relationship of recent years between Dublin and London has been rendered problematic and unsustainable by Brexit, but Dublin can't accept that it must end. The relationship has been nurtured meticulously by many officials and political leaders from both sides since at least the time of the Good Friday Agreement (1998); it has become so embedded in the mindset of Dublin officialdom, that, apparently, its loss cannot now be borne. So, official business is being conducted under the illusion that the relationship with London can go on much as before. At the same time reality is starting to impinge. We can only imagine what divisions are simmering beneath the surface in two key Ministries of the Irish State: the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

If Ireland persists in trying to retain its close relationship with Britain, it will make itself an instrument of British machinations and be treated accordingly by both the EU elite and the other member states. Such a stance will put Irish interests at severe risk. Ireland is remaining in the EU and it must therefore defend its interests by building support from inside the EU. In the circumstances the idea of staying neutral between Britain and Europe belongs in a compendium of great tactical blunders of our times.

CONTINUING LINKS WITH WHITEHALL

A recent article in the *Irish Times* provided an interesting spin on the current state of Anglo Irish relations. The article by Pat Leahy is headed, "*Ireland ramps up campaign to secure a special Brexit deal*". The following paragraph shows that Irish diplomats are being less than honest about their support for the UK's position:

"A lot of countries don't have big trading interests with the UK. Some are still using the word 'punishment,'" says one senior official. "This is a problem for Ireland because it is clear that Ireland's interests coincide with British objectives to a large degree—not something that Ireland will stress but something which the others can probably work out for themselves"..." (30 Jan, Irish Times).

Under the sub-heading, '*Constant contact*', the article reads:

"There is constant contact with the British government.

Despite the clear position—they sound at times like instructions—emerging from Brussels (repeated again last week by visiting economic affairs commissioner Pierre Moscovici) that there should be no negotiations with the British until article 50 is triggered, Irish Government officials are involved in pretty much a rolling conversation with their British counterparts."

Senior official contact was formalised in 2012 when an annual meeting between top mandarins in both governments was instituted (it was in London last October), but, more important, people have the email addresses and mobile numbers of each other. So far did this process go, that it was agreed to exchange civil servants for temporary placements. These links are now coming into play:

"

We're not negotiating. But we are in constant touch with them, yes". says a high-ranking source involved in the contacts with the British. He continued:

"We accept the rule on no negotiations. But you have to explore the issues. We don't regard it as a breach of the rule" (30 Jan, Irish Times).

This excerpt bears the unmistakable stamp of a Government press briefing, and its timing—it was published on the same day that Theresa May met Enda Kenny in Government Buildings in Dublin—indicates that it was for British as much as Irish consumption. The excerpt is nonetheless telling. That senior official contact between representatives from both jurisdictions was only formalised in 2012 shows how recent is the cementing of the over-hyped 'unique' relationship.

There are grounds for believing that the DFA is playing a rearguard action in defence of close alignment with Britain. Ray Bassett, the recently retired Irish Ambassador to Canada and a senior official in the DFA for 30 years, has mounted a spirited defence of the alliance with Britain in articles published in the *Sunday Business Post* (see '*A round of the Irish Brexit debate*' in this issue of *Irish Political Review*). Bassett may be dismissed in some quarters as a loose canon but he is confident that his views are shared by his former colleagues at the DFA. He states:

"Ireland should not shrink from claiming the mantle of Britain's strongest ally within the EU. Instead of bleating about a common EU position, we should be convening meetings in Dublin at heads of government level with like-minded countries such as the Nordics, Netherlands etc, that have a powerful self-interest in Britain getting as good a deal as possible. While I have no doubt our officials are working on this behind the scenes in Brussels, it is time to do so in a much more open and public manner" (1 Jan, *Sunday Business Post*).

Britain was instrumental in altering the original social principles on which the EU was based. It obstructed the objective of European integration over many years. Now, its decision to leave is regarded by many commentators as posing an 'existential threat' to the Union. Others would see it as an opportunity to embrace the original vision of a social union, with a degree of protection to safeguard employment. Either way, solidarity is now needed among EU member states against the formidable challenge mounted by the UK.

If elements in the Department of Foreign Affairs are working to undermine EU solidarity in the British interest, they are working against Irish interests which are closely bound up with the interests of the EU, and especially the Euro.

In general it appears that the Government is responding appropriately to the challenge of Brexit by taking realistic steps to re-orientate Irish trade away from the British market. That realism needs to be matched in the diplomatic arena through a clear acceptance that close alignment with the UK is no longer politic. The fudge of being neutral between the EU and the UK is damaging to Ireland's standing in the EU and an obstacle to EU solidarity. It needs to end.

The near-universal use of the British land/sea route to the Continent for freight and passengers is symbolic of Ireland's over-reliance on the British connection. It

is so much taken for granted that it is taken to be axiomatic. But, if Ireland is to develop an integrated relationship with Europe, this assumption will have to change.

However, Ireland cannot develop and expand direct Continental sea and air links for freight and passengers, relying entirely on its own resources. Europe must establish direct links with Ireland too. Active assistance must come from the European Commission, in terms of substantial subsidy and regulatory change. All around Europe all the main infrastructure developments have been developed over the decades by direct State intervention before the EU came into being. If Ireland is to develop a whole new sea and air freight industry, EU regulations on State aid and budgetary prudence will have to be eased.

Counteracting the bad effects of Brexit cannot simply be left to haphazard response. A joint effort by all the European partners to link up directly with Ireland, circumventing Britain, will be needed.

GOVERNMENT BREXIT MEETING

I attended a public meeting on Brexit on 24th February. The chair was Fine Gael TD Noel Rock and the main speaker was Eoghan Murphy, Minister of State at the Department of Finance. A representative of North Dublin Chamber of Commerce also spoke.

Murphy said Ireland was in a very good position to take financial services business from London as it had a similar legal system and was English speaking. The uncertainty around France's future in the EU worked against Paris.

The Government had a commitment from the UK and the EU that there should not be a 'hard border'. However, if there was a disorderly Brexit, then IMF trade rules would apply and that would mean a 'hard border'. (In practice, then, the border commitment is a statement of intent which might not in the end be realised.)

The fact of the political problems in the North at present had the positive side in that it let politicians on the Continent realise that the peace was not fully bedded down, that there was still a problem, and that this justified special treatment for Northern Ireland. The North would be recognised during the negotiations as a special economic/political zone. (Again, we have to ask as to what will be the result of this, practically speaking.)

Murphy considered Brexit as a historically very significant event (more so even

than the financial crisis of the last decade) and did not think Ireland could be sure where it would lead.

Would Ireland benefit in the long run? He was not sure. It could pan out in many ways.

No matter what, the situation was very challenging for Irish Governments now and in the future.

The Government had been contacting Governments across the globe to exchange information. Brexit could have implications regarding Asian investment in Ireland. Murphy had travelled to many countries to inform Governments of the Irish position and to assure there was no stomach for following UK's example by leaving the EU.

A lot of office space was being made ready in Dublin and Cork to facilitate businesses relocating from the UK. Transport connections were being upgraded.

New second-level schools, providing the *International Baccalaureate* qualification which would suit the offspring of international executives were to be built.

An audience member criticised Murphy for failing to make the steps the Government was taking a matter of public knowledge. Murphy admitted there had been a public relations failure but in mitigation said the press were more intent on publishing negative stories.

Murphy came across as very much in command of his brief, committed and highly articulate.

He denied he was "*a nationalist*" but said he was in favour of delegation of powers from the EU to regional bodies. He showed no great enthusiasm for more EU integration.

Tim O'Sullivan

A Round Of The Irish Brexit debate

OVERVIEW

The Irish Brexit debate received a notable fillip on the first day of 2017 when the *Sunday Business Post* published a provocatively anti-EU article by a former diplomat, Ray Bassett. The article proposed that Ireland should threaten to exit the EU, and it drew support from predictable sources like the columnist, David Mc Williams, and the RTE broadcaster, Marion Finucane, who invited Bassett on her radio show (8 Jan). It also received support from surprising sources like the pro-Fianna Fail *Irish Times* columnist, Noel Whelan, and the sometime critic of Irish historical revisionism in the *Sunday Business Post*, Tom McGurk.

Bassett's case also provoked opposition, notably from Paul Gillespie in his *Irish Times* column. It may have spurred a vigorous pro-EU intervention from Ireland's EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Phil Hogan. Hogan's statements in turn gave rise to contrary views in the forms of a letter in the *Irish Times* from John O' Brennan, Professor of European Studies at Maynooth, and a dismissive reference in a column from Brendan Keenan of the *Irish Independent*.

Three contributions from individuals with varying degrees of professional standing published in the *Irish Times* in mid January tilted the balance of the debate towards the EU side. The first, from a former Secretary General of the European Commission who happens to be Irish,

Catherine Day, called for the debate to be given a focus wider than Brexit. The next from the Director of the MacGill Summer School, Joe Mulholland, invoked the memory of Garret Fitzgerald who had claimed in 2002 that "*in relation to our size, no country had benefited more from the European Union than Ireland*". The third came in the form of a letter responding to Theresa May's Lancaster House speech in which she strongly hinted that hard Brexit with privileged access to the single market was what she favoured. The former Trade Union leader, Blair Horan, argued that the UK Prime Minister's strategy would come undone at first contact with the EU 27. He concluded that Ireland's future lay with the EU as, "The alternative would be a return to the UK's orbit and sterling; a cheap food policy that would destroy our farming and agri-food sectors; and replacing a market of 445 million people for one of 65 million" (See *Biteback* page of this magazine, p29).

Ray Bassett, who received considerable media coverage, especially on RTE radio, on the strength of his *Sunday Tribune* article, had a second article published in the same paper on January 22nd. Here he repeated some of his previous arguments and made fresh claims against the EU: other member states like Austria and the Netherlands, he believed, were coming round to a Eurosceptic position; and efforts to deepen EU integration after Brexit, he considered, would only damage the EU.

A final contribution to this phase of the debate came in a statement from a Government source; Dara Murphy, the Minister for European Affairs, who was quoted as being concerned about arguments that "*we should threaten to leave the EU if we don't get what we want*". He said: "*We are all aware of the very significant potential negative impact of a hard Brexit on our economy, but that would be in the halfpennyplace compared to the economic devastation that a withdrawal from the EU would cause.*" Memorably, he described the tactic of threatening to exit the EU as, "*taking yourself hostage*".

At the time of writing it seems that this phase of the debate has played itself out, but, doubtless, the contributors will return to their positions as Brexit unfolds.

Cork Business 'Forgets' EU

The Cork Chamber of Commerce held their annual dinner on 3rd February. The highest and the mightiest attended: commerce, civil servants, Church dignitaries, media people—all were there. Here is a list of the big hitters at the top table:

Robin Barnett, British Ambassador to Ireland.

Agnieszka Kepka, British Embassy
John McGrane, CEO British-Irish Chamber of Commerce

Mark Redmond, CEO American Chamber of Commerce of Ireland

Reece Smith, Charge d'Affaires, US

Embassy

Kevin Vickers, Canadian Ambassador to Ireland.

Opposition leader Micheál Martin as did Minister Simon Coveney. All the local TDs, Senators and MEPs; The two Bishops, most of the multi-national Executives: all, except **Apple!**

There was not even a minor Executive from the European Union or any of the other 26 member countries.

Surely even the silliest dunderhead in the Chamber could fail to have notice these absences?

And Cork could have the next Taoiseach in either Martin or Coveney!

Pat Maloney

Clearly, the pundits who lean towards Britain are on the back foot. In the cold light of economic reality it makes sense for Ireland to remain in the EU; the logic of Brexit is that, in forging new relationships in the EU, Ireland must disentangle itself from its recent alliance with Britain. Yet that alliance was deeply embedded among sections of the Irish elite and there is always a case to be made that the achievement of Irish objectives is dependent on British good will.

Commentators will continue to grind their axes; influential officials won over to the British worldview will continue to hold the line wherever they can. In at least two scenarios the pro-British case, potentially, has traction: if the UK is seen to prosper under Brexit Irish attitudes may change, as Nigel Farage has argued; and the EU itself may founder as individual member states move towards adopting Eurosceptic positions, as Ray Bassett is arguing. There are indeed times when the latter scenario seems distinctly possible, but even then the immense advantages of the EU's various cooperative structures and synergies are such that new arrangements of similar effect would immediately have to be recreated. In line with its history and economic interests, regardless of current developments internationally, Ireland's destiny lies with Europe, not Britain.

This article will examine Bassett's case and set it in the context of recent EU history, specifically the row over the 2011 Fiscal Treaty and David Cameron's pre-referendum deal with the European Council. Mairead McGuinness's failed bid for the Presidency of the European Parliament is presented as evidence that Ireland is perceived as being *'too close to Britain'*. This round of the Irish Brexit debate sheds light on Ireland's self image at a rare moment of flux. Key extracts from that debate, all expressed at different dates in January 2017, are reproduced fully referenced, and with comments where they seemed appropriate, at the end of the article.

RAY BASSETT'S CASE

In his *Sunday Business Post* article Dr. Bassett, who held senior positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs over thirty years, basically argued that the Irish negotiating strategy regarding Brexit should be to row in behind Britain. His key points were:

"Ireland's indigenous SMEs and its labour market remain inextricably linked to Britain. The relationship in these areas is still more important to us than our

relationship with the rest of the EU...

We certainly hope we can continue as an active and supportive member of the EU, but we should rule nothing out. If we are determined to stay in at whatever the cost, then our bluff may indeed be called. In Brussels, as we saw in the infamous bailout and other matters, Ireland's national interest does not carry much weight nowadays."

One weakness in this expression of the anti-EU position is that it is couched in diplomat-speak: being an active and supportive member of the EU and threatening to leave it are contradictory positions. By using as a ploy the possibility that it may follow the UK out of the Union, Ireland would be adopting a stance of UK-like hostility to the EU at a time when the Union has moved into defensive mode. In a discussion on the *'Drivetime'* programme on RTE radio (23 Jan) former Minister for European Affairs, Lucinda Creighton, dismissed this point in Ray Bassett's argument by stating that threats made by smaller member states carry little weight in the EU.

That a former Irish diplomat should exhibit a predisposition towards support for Britain as opposed to the EU is not surprising in the light of the stance adopted by the Irish Government during David Cameron's campaign to 'reform' the EU along Eurosceptic lines. The Irish stance in that campaign was epitomised in Minister for Foreign Affairs Charlie Flanagan's statement, made at a meeting of the British-Irish Council in Oxford after the referendum (10 Sept. 2016): *"We passionately believed that a strong UK in a strong EU was the best possible outcome for Ireland, the UK and the EU"*. The first part of the sentence is contradicted by the second part: a strong UK in the EU could only mean a weak EU. By supporting David Cameron in whatever demands he chose to make, Enda Kenny and Charlie Flanagan showed scant regard for the cause of the EU and averted their eyes from the disruptive role Britain has been playing over many decades.

2011 FISCAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

British hostility to the EU has manifested on many issues but the danger it posed for the European project was seen most clearly in the Fiscal Treaty negotiations that occurred in late 2011. At that time the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis threatened the global economy. Part of the solution was deemed to be adding a fiscal union to the existing monetary union. In layman's terms this meant that the members of the Eurozone needed to exert strict control over their public finances, the balance

between tax revenue and the amount spent on public services. In that way the monetary union underpinning the Euro would be bolstered by a measure of fiscal uniformity across the seventeen Euro member states.

Due to the gravity of the crisis there was a willingness to support the Fiscal Treaty among the non-Euro members of the EU. Having an EU Treaty, rather than an Agreement among Euro members, was important at that time because it would have allowed the full force of EU law to be mobilised behind efforts to enforce the new Treaty. In the final negotiations ten of the eleven non-Euro states in the EU backed the Treaty, but David Cameron on behalf of the UK applied a veto against it. The Fiscal Treaty became an Agreement among Eurozone members without EU support.

At one stage in the negotiations Cameron offered to support the Treaty if the EU could provide *"a written promise that Britain would be free from potentially cumbersome European rules and regulations that could hamper London's vast financial district"* (*Washington Post*, 9 Dec. 2011). Angela Merkel's response was clear: *"if you want to be part of Europe, you must submit to its rules"* (*ibid*). Merkel was satisfied that enough had been agreed in the negotiations to provide a way out of the crisis and, with the passage of time, she has been proven right, yet the Fiscal Treaty summit revealed the toxic nature of the UK's relationship with the EU. Enda Kenny and his officials would have been well aware of the damaging effect on the EU of the veto applied by the UK against the *Fiscal Treaty* in 2011.

CAMERON'S DEAL

Interviewed on *'Drivetime'* (RTE radio, 23 Jan), Ray Bassett opined that Irish support for the UK in the run up to the Brexit referendum had not been loud enough; it had not been picked up by the media on the Continent; if greater effort had been expended by the Irish Government at that time, more would have been conceded by the EU; and the Brexit mess might have been averted.

This line of argument betrays an exaggerated notion of Irish influence in the EU and a skewed understanding of the politics of the pre-Brexit negotiations. Actually, David Cameron gained most of what he was looking for in the deal announced on 19th February 2016 (*'Brexit: UK-EU deal agreed as Cameron wins most demands'*, *Irish Times*, 19 Feb 2016). On the contrary, from an EU perspective, a strong case can

be made that Donald Tusk and the EU negotiating team conceded too much on key principles underlying the Union in trying to provide cover to Cameron in advance of the referendum.

The British case for a reform of the EU was set out in a letter from David Cameron to Donald Tusk as President of the European Council (10 November 2015) under four headings: economic governance; competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. The EU team held firm to a principle, listed under economic governance, that financial stability and supervision should be retained as an area of competence belonging to the EU: the French had argued that, if Britain could avoid elements of EU banking regulation, UK-based banks would acquire a competitive advantage. In everything else Cameron got what he wanted. In three areas the concessions came perilously close to compromising the viability of the European Project: the acknowledgement that *the EU was a multi-currency area* and that currencies other than the Euro could not be discriminated against, a principle that had the potential to inhibit the progress of the Euro; the right of the UK to opt out of *'ever closer union'* and this to be recognised in a legally irreversible document; and the proposal that *in-work benefits should be withheld from EU immigrants* until they had worked in the UK for four years.

Dr. Bassett's case that more could have been wrought from the EU does not stand up; Donald Tusk and his team could not have been more flexible or placatory. If fault is to be found with the parties to the EU summit of February 2016, it should be sought in David Cameron's strategy. The following extract from an article in *The Economist* provides an accurate assessment of the deal agreed at the summit. Referring to the confidence of EU officials that the provisions of the deal reducing welfare entitlements would withstand a legal challenge, the article states:

"What seems less certain still is that fiddling with benefit rules will make much difference to the numbers of EU migrants coming to Britain, because almost all of them come to work, not to claim benefits.

This leads to a broader question, which is whether Mr Cameron's reform package will make much difference to British voters. Bits of it, notably the reassurances for non-euro countries, are worthwhile. But nobody can pretend that it adds up to the fundamental change in Britain's relationship to the EU that Mr Cameron had promised. He can expect much bashing from the Eurosceptic press and from backbench Tories for watering down what they already saw as pretty thin gruel.

They will highlight his failure to secure limits on EU migration or give Britain's parliament a veto over EU legislation" (20 Feb 2016).

In retrospect it can be seen that the differences between the UK and the EU were irreconcilable; the aim of achieving *ever closer union*, the *raison d'être* of the EU, was always anathema for a majority of the UK electorate; and once the issue was brought centre stage by being presented in a referendum, a parting of the ways was likely. Before the referendum it made sense for Irish political leaders to highlight the disadvantages for Ireland that Brexit would bring, but such a stance needed to be communicated cautiously, given the amount of anti-EU feeling in Britain and Ireland's relationship with Brussels. The Irish Government headed by Enda Kenny threw caution to the winds by the wholesale manner in which it backed the Cameron *Remain* campaign; it erred in putting narrow short-term interests before Ireland's long-term interest as a member of the EU.

MAIREAD MCGUINNESS & PRESIDENCY OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The effect in Europe of Kenny's pro-Cameron stance can be seen in the story of a recent electoral contest in the European Parliament (EP). In the Autumn of 2016 the position of President of the European Parliament became vacant and lobbying to elect a new President commenced. One of the contenders for the position was an Irish MEP, Mairead McGuinness, a member of the same party as Enda Kenny. Writing about the contest, *Irish Times* journalist Suzanne Lynch, stated:

"Some EU sources suggest McGuinness's nationality could go against her, given the perception in some member states that Ireland is too close to Britain at a time when Britain's exit negotiations top the EU agenda.

McGuinness has dismissed this. She told *The Irish Times* she was committed to an 'EU27 approach' to the forthcoming negotiations, and said there would be no special deals for member states—a message she conveyed to Britain's Brexit secretary David Davis earlier this week in Strasbourg.

It seems wishful thinking, then, that having an Irish president at the head of the European Parliament during the Brexit negotiations could be an advantage for Ireland as it seeks to have its unique relationship with Britain recognised by member states.

If anything, McGuinness is likely to stress her neutrality and commitment to the EU first as she seeks the presidential nomination in the coming weeks.

Proving that the interests of all 27 EU

member states trump national concerns will be imperative for whoever succeeds Schulz at the helm of the parliament in January" (24 Nov 2016).

The perception that Ireland was *'too close to Britain'* is very likely to have stemmed from the forthright support rendered by Enda Kenny for the British campaign to 'reform' the EU. That policy fixation is even evidenced in Suzanne Lynch's article through her reference to *"Ireland's unique relationship with Britain"*. In the circumstances, it was politically astute on Mairead McGuinness's part to distance herself from the Government's alignment with Britain by emphasising her commitment to an *"EU 27 approach"*. But her efforts were in vain. The result of the election for the European Peoples' Party (EPP) nomination were: 94 votes for Antonio Tajani (Italy), 57 for McGuinness, 38 for Alain Lamassoure (France) and 18 for Alojz Peterle (Slovenia). Tajani was duly elected President in January 2017.

McGuinness's high standing in the EP was shown on 18 January 2017 when she was elected first Vice-President, topping the poll with 466 votes, 88 votes ahead of her nearest rival. When this performance is added to the fact that she is popular among Green MEPs, whose votes were needed by the EPP candidate to win the Presidency, and that she had the tacit backing of the leader of the EPP, Manfred Weber, as being the only woman candidate for the position, it can be seen that her defeat by Tajani was a rupture from the expected course of events.

The manner in which Mairead McGuinness was deprived of the top job in the European Parliament is only the conspicuous evidence of the damage done to Ireland's standing in the EU in consequence of Irish support for British Euroscepticism. That less conspicuous reputational damage has been inflicted in the other EU institutions is a safe bet.

Dave Alvey

To Be Continued

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Anatomy of a Lie

ABSTRACT:

This essay analyses the origins of the homosexual allegation in the Casement controversy. This aspect appeared suddenly when Casement arrived in Christiania on 29th October 1914 and it appeared in a document prepared in the British Legation and sent to the Foreign Office that same evening. In the last 102 years no Casement author has analysed this document.

The document, a purported memorandum, is demonstrated as the invention of two Legation officials, Lindley and Findlay; its factual content amounts to a mere 7%. To support the allegation in the 'memo' Findlay later invented the Olsen story which came in two contradictory versions.

Both the 'memo' and the Olsen story alleged that Casement was homosexual. A year later, when Casement was in prison, the British authorities circulated typescript pages which they said were copies of diaries written by Casement; the content recorded homosexual activity over several years.

The 'memo' and the Olsen story are phase 1 and the typescripts are phase 2; they are related by a common allegation which was intended to destroy Casement's reputation. The relationship is demonstrated to be one of sufficient causation; the allegation in phase 1 is the same allegation in phase 2 and this is not a coincidence but is the result of a shared strategy. The document in phase 1 is demonstrably false and cannot produce truth in the phase 2 document. The harmful outcome derived directly from the phase 2 typescripts and indirectly from the phase 1 'memo' and that outcome was both intended and reasonably foreseeable from the start. The phase 2 typescripts are as false as the phase 1 'memo'.

"Sir Roger Casement

There is a curious though ... persistent feeling among quite important persons in Germany, that the above is in the pay of the British Government. ... arguments for this are the following:

(a) ... it is noticed that he is received into the best circles both officially and personally ...

(b) ... it is noticed that he appears to devote his chief attention to persons who influence ... either the public opinion or relations with Foreign Powers. That he is kept informed to an extraordinary degree, as to movements, both prospective and in execution, of the troops on all fronts.

(c) It is generally considered ... that the whole story of his attempted assassination is an extremely well-laid scheme, as is proved by the fact that the individual responsible still remains at his post.

(d) As a reward ... he will be given a high position in the English Government ... and ... be allowed to carry out with success a law sanctioning Home Rule.

... would you sanction a scheme... whereby the matter could be so arranged that *evidence could be manufactured by which the position of the man would be rendered untenable*. If you wish for the names of the persons in Germany who are interested, I can furnish them at short notice." [italics added]

(Report to British Intelligence by unnamed agent in Germany dated 8.8.15. The National Archives KV-2/6.)

THE 'MEMO'

On the night of 29th October 1914, Mansfeldt de Cardonnel Findlay,¹ Minister to the British Legation in Christiania, placed a four-page handwritten document into the diplomatic bag along with a short covering letter addressed to Foreign Minister Edward Grey. The sealed diplomatic bag was collected by that night by Hugh Gurney from the Copenhagen Legation.

Findlay's document and covering letter reached Grey the following day and were passed to British Intelligence. The letter described the four-page document as a memorandum written on 29th October by Francis Lindley² who had interviewed Adler Christensen, Casement's servant, that afternoon. The text stated that Christensen showed copied documents and that his un-named master was travelling to Germany "*about trouble in Ireland*" and that he was an English nobleman who had been decorated by the King. The 'memo' also included the following; "*I understood that his relations with the Englishman were of an improper character.*"

The 'memo' sent to the Foreign Office by Findlay, on 29th October contains handwriting which is often illegible with letter and word formation compromised; the document looks untidy and improvised with many cancellations, interpolations, corrections. It is not addressed to anyone and the term 'memorandum' does not appear. Overall it is very unprofessional and does not look like the work of an Oxford-educated diplomat. In the bottom right corner of the last page, squeezed into the margin, there appear to be Lindley's initials—F.O.L.—with the date, but written in a different ink or perhaps in pencil.³

Despite its improvised appearance, the

so-called 'memo' was written by the Winchester and Oxford educated diplomat and future ambassador, Francis Lindley. Within days the 'memo' was in the hands of Major Frank Hall, former Secretary of the Ulster Volunteer Force, who prepared a typed version for circulation.⁴ Hall was born in Warrenpoint, County Down and had been one of the masterminds behind the illegal 1914 Ulster gunrunning from Germany which aimed to militarily defy the UK Parliament over Home Rule. He had become a high-ranking British Intelligence Officer with special responsibility for Ireland. With reference to the 'memo', Hall wrote: "I am awaiting further information on this point, and also as to his habits (natural & unnatural!)". The 'memo' had arrived precisely where Findlay had intended—in the hands of Casement's sworn enemies.

Neither Hall nor Lindley nor Findlay had ever met or even seen Casement. But with these thirteen fateful words the conspiracy began: "I understood that his relations with the Englishman were of an improper character".

Scrutiny of the 'memo' reveals 17 cancellations, and 21 interpolations, some in a lighter ink or in pencil. Several parts have been squeezed in after composition was completed. The document is not addressed to anyone and bears no heading as Memorandum. Many words are scribbled and almost illegible due to poor or non-existent letter formation. Overall the visual impression is of hastily improvised and untidy work. It would be reasonable to think it improbable that any diplomat would produce such a document for presentation to his superior. It is inexplicable that any crown official would send such a shoddy, partly illegible document to a famous Cabinet Minister. Improbable and inexplicable—but that is what happened. An analysis of the circumstances of the creation of the document will illuminate why and how it happened.

Firstly the document, which is mentioned by one Casement author only—Inglis,⁵ is extremely difficult to find in The National Archives (TNA) because it does not resemble what is usually called a memorandum with the conventional identifiers *From X* and *To Y*. Indeed it was located only after the personal intervention of a specialist at TNA. It cannot be confirmed that Casement's biographers have not seen this document but if they have seen it, they chose with one exception not to mention it. Given that this document contains the first ever reference to the homosexual dimension, it is significant that it has not received the attention it deserves. When

Footnotes at end of article.

given attention, anomalies, incongruities and a major contradiction emerge.

Lindley met Christensen at around 2 pm on 29th October in the British Legation. Christensen returned after the meeting to the Grand Hotel and informed Casement. Accounts suggest that the meeting was relatively short—perhaps 30 minutes.

In the 'memo' the crucial words are "I understood that his relations with the Englishman were of an improper character; it is just possible I may have been wrong in this, but I don't think so." The second sentence has been cancelled with single strokes on each line. Casement's biographers have interpreted the first sentence as the result of an implication made by Christensen to Lindley but none have offered any explanation of why he might have made a self-incriminating implication to a complete stranger. The construal by the biographers is also based upon later remarks made by Findlay who on 30th October wrote "with whom he evidently has unnatural relations"⁶ and on 31st October wrote "He implied that their relations were of an unnatural nature ..."⁷ and later on 24th February converted this *alleged implication into statements* made by Christensen when he wrote "... informer stated the unnatural character of their relations to myself and Lindley."⁸ Findlay conjured the initial innuendo in the 'memo' into an implication the following day and then into a statement without any evidence of such implication or statement.

But the first sentence makes no reference to any speech act or gesture by Christensen which might constitute an implication. Lindley does not say Christensen made any implication; he says "*I understood...*" which refers to his own mental process during or after the encounter. He attributes nothing to Christensen. The sentence merely reports a subjective mental impression without explanatory evidence to give it context. The second qualifying sentence indicates that no clear signals were perceived by Lindley. Both sentences require analysis.

The concept of implicature developed by H.P. Grice allows a deeper understanding of how these sentences function logically and semantically.⁹ Implicature is a technical term in linguistics which refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though neither expressed nor strictly implied. Example: 'John is meeting a woman this evening.' This suggests that the unidentified woman is not his mother, sister or wife. By not identifying the woman, the speaker tacitly invites the hearer to *assume* that John is involved with the woman.

By contrast, the statement 'John is meet-

ing his wife this evening' *entails* that John is married. If John is not married the statement is false. The truth of the statement is predicated upon John's being married.

Entailment statements cannot be qualified or cancelled without compromising their truth value. Implicature statements can be cancelled and can be qualified. The two sentences in the 'memo' constitute an implicature in which the second sentence qualifies the first sentence and then is cancelled in order to disguise that together they function as an implicature—a suggestion, an innuendo unsupported by facts or evidence. The truth value of implicature statements cannot be determined from the statements themselves. Entailment statements convey bare information whereas implicature statements convey *unstated meanings* which require external verification. Therefore the 'memo' sentences have no intrinsic truth value until verified by external evidence. They have the same status as gossip.

Lindley's "*I understood...*" is a self-referential report which precludes external verification of that which is reported. Nothing can verify Lindley's report of a mental impression because his words refer to an exclusively subjective invisible state rather than a fact in the tangible world. The written words do not *entail* the experience reported. Therefore nothing can establish the truth or falsity of those words. Statements which cannot be verified or falsified cannot contribute to the determination of facts. Lindley's sentence does not refer to facts or even to alleged facts; it is innuendo. But on the basis of this innuendo a defamatory conspiracy was founded.

Further scrutiny of the 'memo' reveals incongruities which indicate that the plot began in Oslo on the evening of 29th October 1914. By definition, conspiracy requires at least two persons and scrutiny indicates that Findlay was co-author of the 'memo'.

A highly significant anomaly is the verb tense used in the qualifying sentence—"I may *have been* wrong..."—which indicates that the words were written in a later time frame distinct from the time of the meeting. If these words were written in the same time frame as the event, it would be more natural to write 'I may be wrong...'. For precision, the two time frames are a) the meeting at around 2 pm and the minutes after, and b) later that evening of 29th several hours after the meeting. The tense used strongly indicates the evening time frame as the time of the hasty composition of the document. Since the document, despite its improvised look, was placed in the diplomatic bag that evening by Findlay along with *his* brief

covering letter, the presence of Findlay *during composition* that evening is a near certainty. The many interpolations and corrections strongly indicate the intervention of a second person assisting composition before final approval. It is reasonable to deduce that the document is the joint work of Lindley and Findlay improvised in haste for immediate dispatch. This deduction explains why the so-called memorandum lacks the normal identifiers 'From' and 'To'. It never was a memorandum in any normal sense of the term. This deduction is further supported by Findlay writing in his letter of 31st October to Grey "He [*Christensen*] went over much the same ground as he had covered with Mr. Lindley on Thursday *evening*."¹⁰ (Italics added.) It is undisputed that Christensen met Lindley in the early afternoon. The "ground" referred to in Findlay's letter is that covered by himself and Lindley *that evening* when they composed the four-page document.

The grounds for holding that the 'memo' was composed in the evening as a joint effort outweigh the grounds for believing it was written by Lindley alone earlier that day. Evening composition means that it is not a memorandum at all, since both supposed sender and recipient were involved in its composition. The fact that such an *unkempt bout de papier* was sent that evening to the Foreign Office indicates that it was composed for that specific purpose and in a hurry. This is supported by the fact that no fair copy was written out or typed up as would be professional and correct when sending Legation documents for the attention of Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. To this must be added the observation that Lindley did not need to write any 'memo' to a colleague in the same office whom he would in any case see in person later that same day. (See Appendix II.)

On 30th and 31st October Findlay wrote two drafts and two letters to Grey at the Foreign Office, three of which refer to the 'memo'. It is clear from Findlay's unfinished short draft of 30th October that this was written after the 11 am meeting with Christensen and before the 3 pm meeting but the draft does not refer to any implication by Christensen to him at that 11 am meeting. In that draft, Findlay wrote "with whom he *evidently* has unnatural relations" which refers only to the 'memo' of 29th since *this allegation would not be 'evident' to Grey except* from the 'memo' already sent to him. Therefore this idea of a confirming implication made at the 11 am meeting on 30th came to Findlay *after* he had written the incomplete draft letter following that 11 am meeting. The implication allegedly

made by Christensen on 30th appears only on 31st when Findlay wrote the longer draft letter to Grey. Neither the draft of 30th nor the first short letter of 31st mentions any implication made by Christensen at either meeting on 30th. For greater precision: Findlay's *first two written records* after his meetings with Christensen do not record any implication about unnatural relations *made to him*. Since the *short letter* of 31st was written after both meetings on 30th and omits any implication, a rational person would deduce that no implication was made at either meeting.

However, in his second much longer letter to Grey on 31st, Findlay wrote "He implied that their relations were of an *unnatural nature* and that consequently he had great power over this man who trusted him absolutely." (Italics added) It is not clear which meeting is referred to. On page 4 of the eight-page draft of that letter Findlay's first version of the above sentence reveals three corrections including "their relations were improper" with the word 'improper' inexplicably cancelled and replaced by the incongruous "of an unnatural nature". By this 'correction' Findlay avoided repetition of the word 'improper' previously used in the 'memo'.

The 'memo' contains detail on page four attributed to Christensen as the source but which it is extremely improbable he could possibly have known; that there were eight German officers travelling on the Oskar II with false passports. It is not credible that these officers would have revealed such compromising information to anyone on board, far less to an unknown Norwegian travelling second class. Moreover, the information cannot be verified. If true, it is much more probable that such information would have come to Findlay that day from his informers and agents or indeed from British Intelligence. (See Appendix III.)

Most important, there is a contradiction in the 'memo' itself which can only be explained as an oversight due to the haste of its composition. This concerns two pencil copy letters allegedly shown to Lindley, one addressed to the German Chancellor "outside" and one to Harden,¹¹ both in Berlin. Another two letters allegedly mentioned by Christensen *had not been copied* and therefore were not shown to Lindley. But on page 4, the 'memo' mentions the two copy letters (to the Chancellor and to Harden) allegedly shown and then refers to a third letter "addressed to the G. Minister *here*, which I *also* saw in copy ..."; this refers to the Minister at the German Legation in Oslo and not to the Chancellor in Berlin (italics added). Yet

the memo states clearly on page 2 that only two letters were allegedly copied and shown. "There were four letters and my informant steamed them open (before returning them) and had made pencil copies (of two) which he showed me." (Parentheses added to indicate interpolations.) The page 4 affirmation contradicts the alleged fact on page 2. This means that Lindley claims he saw a third copy letter which he also states did not exist. Page 2 and page 4 cannot both be true but both can be false. Page 2 was written *before* page 4 and whether page 2 is false or true it *follows that page 4 is false*. The affirmations on page 4 refer to three copy letters allegedly shown. The demonstrated falsity of page 4 entails the falsity of page 2. Therefore no copy letters were shown.

This contradiction has implications which reach beyond the veridical status of the 'memo' itself and those implications compromise the drafts and letters subsequently written by Findlay in support of the 'memo'. The detail about copy letters in the 'memo' amounts to 56% of the overall length of 463 words and that detail has been demonstrated as false. (Word count of the 'memo' includes all cancelled and interpolated words.)

However, that 56% of the document is false does not entail that the remaining 44% is also false; 7.56% of the document is certainly true and is undisputed. These are the 35 words on page 1 which refer to Christensen's afternoon presence in the Legation, his being Norwegian and that he arrived from the US on the Oskar II. The remaining 36.29% is, however, compromised if only because it cannot be verified and therefore no facts can be derived. This includes the innuendo on pages 1 and 2. Therefore 92.44% of the document contains text which is either false or compromised. Only a lawyer who wished to commit professional suicide would present the 'memo' as evidence in a court of law. Only those in a severe state of cognitive dissonance would insist that the 'memo' is authentic.

The scrutiny above is the first and only analysis of this *faux* memorandum in 102 years. The fact that the principal Casement authors have avoided it cannot be due to negligence since it is a fundamental document in the Casement story. It constitutes the birth of the conspiracy which will pass through further phases of development in the hands of Findlay and of British Intelligence.

The extensive unverifiable references to copy letters and to German officers with false passports are intended to furnish illusory authentic detail as a supportive

framework for the innuendo.

The probability of Findlay's claims that Christensen made a self-incriminating implication (later a statement) of homosexual conduct can be safely left to the impartial reader's judgment based on his/her knowledge of human nature and on common sense. Equally, the probability judgment can be based on the record of Findlay's overall integrity *vis-à-vis* the false 'memo' and his later attempts to corroborate this.

OLSEN

In March 1915, Findlay sent a letter to Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office which contained his account of events on the night of Casement's arrival in The Grand Hotel on 29th October 1915.¹² Findlay was not present in the hotel but he reported his source as an un-named informant, a person with "private interests" who would identify himself only "if absolutely necessary". According to Findlay, the informant was witness to compromising behaviour in Casement's room at around 2 am on 29th October, 1914. Christensen was present.

On 21st July 1916, Findlay's informant identified himself before Inspector Sandercock at New Scotland Yard as Gustav Olsen, former Chief Reception Clerk at the hotel and he signed a typescript account of events that night twenty-one months earlier.¹³ In general terms the accounts coincide but in detail they differ significantly. B.L. Reid in his 1976 book reports the earlier version but is not wholly convinced of its truth.¹⁴ The second version is one of the so-called affidavits solicited in 1916 by Thomson as corroboration. However, the statement signed by Olsen contains no oath and is therefore not an affidavit.

Findlay's 1915 account tells of a "German Secretary" repeatedly asking for James Landy (Casement) in the hotel for 2 days before his arrival. At 2 am on 28/29th October, the German again asked and Findlay's anonymous informant went to the room and entered *without knocking* to find Casement and Christensen sitting on the bed, embracing but fully dressed. The German was shown up and remained in the room until 6.30 am.

The account which Olsen signed in 1916 tells of a German "Naval Attaché" Hans Hilmers seeking James Landy (Casement) urgently at 2 am on 28/29th whereupon Olsen went to the room, knocked and "without waiting for an answer" entered to find Casement and Christensen "half-naked" and in a sexually compromising position over the bed. Casement asked Olsen to show the Ger-

man up who remained in the room until early morning.

Casement's account states that Hilmers "from the German Legation" arrived to see him at midnight but on the 29th/30th October to advise him to remain in the hotel during the following day.¹⁵ Hilmers returned at 6.30-7 am on the morning of 30th October to inform Casement that travel arrangements were under way and that Count v. Oberndorff would visit at midday.

The significant variation in detail between the 1915 and 1916 versions might be explained as follows: the first version was prepared by Findlay in person in a handwritten letter marked 'Private and Secret' and therefore without the informant having seen it; the second version was revised and typed by Scotland Yard and then signed by Olsen in person in London some twenty-one months after the alleged events. The second version was created by the Metropolitan Police as corroboration for the ongoing campaign against Casement. Therefore this police version was 'inspired' by the first which Olsen *had never seen*.

Despite allegedly witnessing this criminal behaviour in the hotel, Olsen did not report to his superiors or to the police; instead he allowed both men to stay a further night and had no qualms about welcoming Christensen back to the hotel on November 26th for 2 nights and again on 5th December for 2 nights according to his 1916 statement, and on 12th December and yet again on 2nd January and as late as 20th October, 1915.¹⁶

That B.L. Reid, who *always* favours the official version, had doubts about the Olsen story is not surprising. The weakest link in both versions of the story is the German Secretary or Naval Attaché without whom Olsen had no reason to disturb Casement at 2 am. The alleged *insistence* of the German is the tell-tale mechanism. The 'urgency' indicates something important but there is no record of such an urgent meeting on the night of 28th/29th in Casement's writings. That the urgent information could not wait a few hours until morning indicates the inherent implausibility of the Olsen story since *urgent information implies immediate action*. But there was no action which Casement could possibly have taken at 2 am and indeed, by Olsen's account, he took no action but remained in his room until morning.

That Hilmers allegedly remained in the room for *four hours* delivering his urgent information is not credible; he was supposedly resident in the same hotel and might have returned to sleep. That the chief reception clerk was on night duty rather

than a night porter is also strange. That Olsen knew when Hilmers left Casement's room is also strange.

The police version of 1916 is above all founded on an uncanny sense of timing—Olsen entered the *unlocked* room just when the unambiguous act was about to occur. Olsen records neither protest by Casement nor any shock at what he allegedly witnessed. This is not credible.

MacColl's 1956 book does not mention the Olsen story at all and he gives a different time for Casement's arrival at the hotel. MacColl quotes directly from Casement's own account: he left the ship at 1.30 am and arrived at the hotel at nearly 2 am.¹⁷ By the 1916 police account, Casement arrived at the hotel "just after midnight". However, the vessel SS. Oskar docked at midnight. 2 am is after midnight but not *just after* midnight. By this account Olsen's 'uncanny sense of timing' failed him.

The Inglis book of 1973 does not mention the Olsen story nor is it mentioned by Sawyer. Ó Síochain briefly refers to Reid's account of the Findlay version of 1915 without mentioning Reid's scepticism.

Discrepancies between Findlay's 1915 version and the police version signed by Olsen in 1916:

- 1—Findlay version—un-named German Secretary / police version—named Naval Attaché,
- 2—Findlay version—Olsen entered without knocking / police version—Olsen knocked and entered without waiting for reply,
- 3—Findlay version—"not undressed" / police version—"half naked",
- 4—Findlay version—sitting on bed / police version—compromising position over bed.

Another anomaly is Findlay's later description of Christensen as "fleshy and of dissipated appearance" while the police version describes him as "good looking". When these discrepancies are added to the other unexplained aspects such as the four-month delay before the story's appearance, the different timing of Casement's arrival at the hotel, the vital insistence of Hilmers a day early, both versions of the story are seen to require a generous credulity that most level-headed persons would be unable to find. Either one version is true or both are false. The second version is an 'upgraded' but contradictory version of the first. For both to be true they must agree in all details which they do not. *Whether the first is false or true, the second is false since the versions contain contradictory details.* Upgrading cannot

convert falsity into truth. Therefore the second version signed by Olsen is false and this falsity compromises the possible truth of the Findlay version which Olsen had not seen.

THE OLSEN STORY

It may seem paradoxical but the Olsen Story was probably not told by Olsen at all since the first version was written by Findlay and the second was typed by the Metropolitan Police for his signature.

Here is the relevant extract from page two of Findlay's March 13th handwritten letter, marked Private & Secret, to Nicolson at the Foreign Office:

"I have received the following information from an independent Norwegian source. My informant would be prepared to come forward if absolutely necessary, but as his private interests would suffer may not wish to do so.

For two days before Casement's arrival on Oct. 28, a German Secretary who had been living at the Grand Hotel enquired repeatedly for Mr. James Landy under which name Casement was passing.

Casement & Christensen arrived at Christiania at midnight & asked for rooms near each other. At 2. a.m. the German Secretary turned up & insisted on seeing 'James Landy' at once. My informant (who is a respectable man) was asked to go himself to Landy's room; he consented, & found Casement & Christensen sitting on Casement's bed with their arms round each other. They were not undressed but the nature of their relations was evident. The German Secretary remained with them from 2. a.m. till 6.30 a.m. and the waiter warned my informant that Casement and his friend or servant were evidently spies. This appears valuable corroboration of fact that German Legation had been warned to expect them and of the nature of their relations. It strengthens our case ..."

Findlay ends this letter by repeating an earlier request of 21st February for information. The information he was still seeking concerned the reason for Casement leaving the consular service—"Was it sodomy?" and if he was known "to be addicted to sodomy". Answers to those questions might have had relevance three weeks earlier *before the Olsen story* but at this point on 13th March having just revealed his *witnessed evidence* of 'unnatural relations', Findlay no longer needed those answers since they could add nothing to what he already allegedly had learned from his informant. But he automatically repeated the request as if he was unwittingly signalling the falsity of the account he had just set out.

It is clear from grammar of the opening sentence of the above extract from Findlay's letter that he did not possess the

informant's story much before March 13th, 1915, therefore some four and a half months after the alleged events. Again ineptly, he does not explain how he obtained the story although it is clear that the informant is a male hotel employee on night duty who knows where guests are located. It is not clear how the informant's "personal interests" might suffer but possibly he feared prosecution. If Findlay had possessed the Olsen story in October or early November, he inexplicably kept it quiet for an unaccountable length of time. Yet in late February he was still seeking confirmation about 'unnatural relations' whereas earlier knowledge of Olsen's story would have made confirmation unnecessary.

On 13th March 1915, Findlay sent this account of the Olsen story to London. That such a delay occurred between the alleged event of 29th October and Findlay's report of it to London indicates that he did not have the Olsen story before March 1915 despite claiming in writing that Christensen had made an implication of '*unnatural relations*' as early as 30th October. These facts support the argument that the Olsen story originated in new circumstances after the written promise of January 3rd and when Findlay was aware not only that he had been duped and humiliated but that he faced the threat of a criminal lawsuit in the Norwegian courts. That Findlay did not report the Olsen story in October indicates that either Olsen or Findlay kept the matter quiet until March or it was invented in March. That Findlay had nothing more substantial than an alleged implication in late February 1915 is clearly demonstrated in his communications with London. Therefore Findlay 'found' the Olsen story after 24th February 1915. It was Findlay rather than Olsen who had motive to invent the story—to defend himself from a prosecution by Casement over his written bribe.

The Findlay version of 1915 does not rest upon a single verifiable fact and when considered in the context of Findlay's distressed mental state, its inherent implausibility compels one to regard it as a poisonous fiction. The poison was concocted by Findlay in late February or early March and was transmitted to London. But an anonymous story from a reluctant 'witness' and without demonstrable proof could not be safely used against a free Casement in Germany without risk of a strong legal reaction which would publicly verify Findlay's bribe on behalf of the British Government—his prime motive for the poisonous fiction.

That the Foreign Office and the Intel-

ligence chiefs appeared to overlook Findlay's story in March and the following months suggests that either they perceived its inherent implausibility and shared Reid's later scepticism or they felt it was too weak legally (being anonymous and uncorroborated) to be used against Casement at that time without risk of a court action for slander. British Intelligence would prefer tangible, visible and incontrovertible evidence to stand as 'self-sufficient proof' of the behaviour Findlay had clumsily invented for them. Ideally, Casement should damn himself. Thomson's discussion (reported in his 1922 book *Queer People*) with his informer Maundy Gregory, a professional expert on sexual scandal in high places, introduced the idea of compromising diaries. In the absence of such diaries, the self-damning evidence would have to be manufactured when the time came.

On 24th February Findlay wrote to Nicolson: "Casement is evidently unaware that informer stated the unnatural character of their relations to myself and Lindley."¹⁸ Neither the false 'memo' nor Findlay's letters of 31st October mention any such statement made by Christensen. But by 24th February, the alleged implication had become for Findlay an unambiguous affirmation of a fact. From this self-deluding position Findlay moved towards the invention of his informant's story for March 13th.

In March Findlay converted these unverified insinuations into alleged facts as a self defence tactic by engaging an anonymous informant in the hotel. In light of his earlier generous offer to Christensen it is highly probable that Olsen, his anonymous informant, had also received a generous offer especially when, by his own admittance, Findlay was accustomed to paying informers for information. Therefore Findlay's curious locution "his private interests would suffer" was code for the price of Olsen's false testimony which he duly provided in July 1916 when it was safe to do so after Casement's conviction.

OSLO—TWO VERSIONS

In his 1956 book René MacColl wrote:

"... the British Minister in Norway, the late M. de C. Findlay, made a fairly spirited attempt to have Casement kidnapped. British agents got hold of Christensen and took him to see Findlay, who tried to bribe him to deliver Casement into British hands ... Christensen seems to have been loyal to Casement in everything having to do with this affair ... He promptly reported back to Casement..."¹⁹

Later authors gave a very different version of these events in which Christensen is the villain. The later version is that

Christensen went on his own initiative to the British Legation on 29th October with a proposal to betray Casement. This is now the standard version invented by Inglis, Reid etc. from 1973 onwards. However, the evidence in the Foreign Office documents for his alleged treachery comes from one man—Findlay. The few verifiable facts do not sustain the version based on Findlay's incomplete account which MacColl had not seen. Some might consider it ironic that MacColl's book, which is certainly hostile to Casement, might contain a more honest version. That MacColl found the Christensen version credible indicates that he believed Findlay capable of plotting to capture Casement by bribing Christensen and this seems confirmed in Nicolson's later letters warning Findlay that no physical harm must come to Casement.

Later authors describe the Christensen version as a preposterous pulp fiction emanating from a vulgar imagination but it was *believed and published* by MacColl, the distinguished journalist and jewel of the Beaverbrook empire. It was also believed by thousands of readers who, like MacColl, did not find it preposterous. But when an alternative, more comfortable Findlay version was released to the Public Records Office in late 1967, the version *believed* by MacColl necessarily became a pulp fiction.

A GREAT MISTAKE

Findlay's judgment had already caused grave concern in Britain for his involvement in the Dinshawai controversy in Egypt in 1906 and his authorisation of a summary court hearing which led to the hanging, flogging and incarceration of eighteen peasant villagers accused of the alleged murder of a British officer. Despite being reprimanded for his gross over-reaction and his justification of the retaliatory punishments, it was Pro-Consul Lord Cromer who paid the price with his resignation shortly afterwards. It is difficult to imagine that Findlay would hesitate to take whatever retaliatory measures he felt necessary against Casement, the renegade and traitor.

On January 3rd, 1915 Findlay issued Christensen an undated one-page note written on Legation notepaper promising him on behalf of the British Government a reward of £5,000 for information leading to the capture of Casement.²⁰ This note was to play a key role in determining subsequent events. The sum offered had been approved by the Foreign Office on 27th November but Findlay was at once rebuked by Nicolson for having personally

given a signed, written undertaking to Christensen. Findlay apologised. When Casement heard of the bribe he determined on a legal action against Findlay in the Norwegian courts which he believed would provoke a diplomatic scandal; so began what has been called *'The Findlay Affair'*.

Over the following weeks Findlay was to suffer for that written promise. After Nicolson's immediate rebuke, Findlay wrote on 6th January: "I regret you should disapprove of my action ... I would never have done so in time of peace."²¹ And as his mood darkened at the failure of his plan to trap Casement, he wrote again on 14 January to Nicolson: "I need hardly say that the failure of the coup ... has distressed me greatly and I could not forgive myself if it was due to mismanagement on my part ... I cannot see how I could have acted otherwise than I did ... I am sorry if I was wrong in doing so ..."²²

In seeking to defend himself to London, Findlay erred again by describing his written promise as simply an offer of reward for information such as might be posted in any police station. But such public reward offers do not name the recipient of the reward in advance, nor do they offer immunity and free passage to another jurisdiction. Findlay's promise was a bribe made to a specific person.

The full extent of Findlay's humiliation arrived in late February in a letter from Nicolson which made clear the degree to which a man of low intelligence, a "loathsome beast", had succeeded for months in duping His Majesty's Minister Findlay:

"I enclose a copy of a letter which has been received from Casement... You will see that Christensen was playing a double game ... merely a ruse to obtain something from you in writing. You made a great mistake in giving it ... I have no doubt that Casement and his German friends will make the most of it. If Casement carries out his threat of exposing the whole story in Norway you should immediately see the Minister for Foreign Affairs and put the best light on the case by telling him frankly the main outlines."²³

To this humiliation was added the threat of full exposure by Casement in the courts and therefore a diplomatic scandal and a consequent risk to Findlay's entire career. It was by then clear to Findlay and to his superiors that Casement had masterminded the deception and that Christensen had played his role loyally.

Findlay had been 'dirtied' and humiliated by his contacts with Christensen and his response was to intensify his plot against Casement. The chemistry of Findlay's anger fermented hurt pride into

personal vendetta. Insinuations, however insidious, are not facts but even insinuations can be made to *perform as facts* with the creative touch of lies. On March 13th, out of the blue, four and a half months after the 'memo', Findlay produced the story from his anonymous informant. The poisoned bait had been set in the October 'memo' by Findlay who, by then intoxicated and desperate, transformed it ineptly into the Olsen Lie which in turn fed the vengeful plans of Thomson and Hall.

VERIFIED FACTS

It is essential to indicate the few facts which are not in dispute. These are as follows:

- 1- Christensen was at the Legation once on 29th October and twice on 30th October.
- 2- Christensen told Casement of first visit at once.
- 3—After Christensen met Findlay in person at 11 am on 30th October, Casement instructed him to return that afternoon as invited by Findlay. Christensen returned & met Findlay again.
- 4—Christensen did not tell Findlay on either visit that Casement already knew of his earlier visits.
- 5—Christensen received the written bribe on January 3rd and gave the document to Meyer on the 5th.

The most improbable aspect of the 'official' version—that Christensen went uninvited on 29th October, intent on betrayal—is the fact that Christensen informed Casement of that first visit. The second most improbable aspect is Christensen allegedly making a self-incriminating implication to Findlay. The source of the first aspect is not Findlay but Brian Inglis *et al.* The source of the second aspect is Findlay. *A rational explanation for both of these improbable aspects must be predicated on the truth or falsity of the alleged betrayal plan.* That there was no betrayal plan is verified by Nicolson's letter which informed Findlay that Christensen had deceived him.²⁴ There never was a genuine betrayal plan instigated by Christensen. From this fact it is reasonable to conclude that Christensen did not go to the Legation uninvited on 29th October, as alleged not by Findlay but by Inglis *et al.* From this it is reasonable to conclude that Christensen was indeed contacted by Findlay's agents as per his account related to Casement upon return. From this conclusion it follows that Findlay authorised that first contact and therefore knew of the presence of 'Landy' and Christensen in the hotel on 29th October. This knowledge implies an informer in the hotel and that informer was later identified

in July 1916 as Olsen. It is also verified by Findlay himself that his Legation colleague Goff was resident in the hotel and had seen both Casement and Christensen there.

In Findlay's letter to Grey of 31st October he stated on page 3 that he had identified Landy as Casement and he attributed that identification to Christensen at the meeting on 30th. The attribution cannot be verified. The only aspects of Findlay's version which can be verified are that Christensen was in the Legation on 29th and 30th October where he met Lindley and Findlay separately and that Findlay had identified Casement by 30th October.

The verified facts above seriously undermine the biographers' version of the Christensen meetings on 29th and 30th October. When these facts are placed alongside the fact that Olsen was Findlay's hotel informer, the version believed and published by MacColl has greater credibility than the version invented for Findlay by the later biographers. To the proven falsity of the 'memo' must be added Findlay's dishonesty in the Olsen story of March 13th with the result that the balance sheet for his integrity displays a painful shortfall. He predicated his Casement strategy from the beginning upon *'unnatural relations'* for which he possessed no verifiable evidence but which he could not renounce. When Nicolson exposed his deception by Christensen his strategy was in crisis; soon after, Findlay *manufactured the evidence* of the Olsen story to save face and to protect himself.

THE FATAL NEXUS

When Christensen visited the British Legation on 29th and 30th October, a kind of chain reaction was started which eventually led to the diary conspiracy and to Casement's destruction. With the 'memo' in the hands of his enemies that lie quickly infiltrated the State security organs long before his arrest. The growing conspiracy created the degenerate traitor and the necessary evidence was manufactured in order to take revenge. Like all revenge, it was personal, very personal. Empire had honoured his name that the Empire's honour be seen in his person and he, the Empire's hero, had openly defied the honour of the largest Empire in history. The fatal nexus between treachery and *'unnatural relations'* forged by Findlay in the 'memo' was also a malediction which uncannily prophesied the shape of things to come; his lies bound others into an uncontrollable vortex of deceit which endures to the present day. Evil is prolific, by its nature fertile; otherwise it would not exist. The poisonous lie invented by *one man* in 1914 still has its toxic effect a century later.

BELIEVING IS SEEING

The falsity of the 'memo' and of the subsequent Olsen story has been demonstrated. The fact that Findlay never explained how first contact with Christensen was made compromises the versions published by post-1973 biographers. Two verified facts remain: a) Casement was informed of the visits; b) no betrayal took place.

It is undisputed that Christensen, following Casement's instructions, systematically duped Findlay to obtain the written bribe. The verified fact remains that Christensen did not sell Casement to Findlay *in spite of the bribe* and that on February 19th, 1915; he spoke to a German newspaper about the bribe and the Findlay plot.

The falsity of the Inglis version of first contact reinstates the MacColl version which is the Christensen version. The demonstration that Findlay made first contact also produces a second confirmation of the falsity of the Olsen story; possession of that story on 29th or 30th October would have induced Findlay to exploit it immediately and not *four months later*. Such an immediate exploitation would also have made the alleged implication totally unnecessary.

It remains to demonstrate the relationship of the 'memo' to the defamatory typescripts circulated in 1916. To establish a causal link in law an agency must be demonstrated to act as a substantial factor in the harmful outcome in order to be considered a cause of it. Agency and outcome must be intimately and obviously linked. The criterion for the existence of causal connection *in law* is that the cause must possess a specific feature in relation to the consequence in order to demonstrate causal connection. In the case of the Findlay 'memo' and the defamatory typescripts, this special feature is *identity of allegation* which acted as substantial and sufficient factor in the harmful outcome. Both 'memo' and typescripts were intended to destroy Casement's reputation with the same allegation and they achieved this shared objective.

That link is reinforced by the fact that the allegation in the typescripts *was not determined* by the 'memo' but was *freely chosen* as an extension of the same strategy and intent to defame. This free choice linked the 'memo' and the typescripts into a single continuous allegation bonded by a single intent. Within the parameters of *legal causation*, the 'memo' is the sufficient indirect cause and the typescripts are the direct cause of the harmful outcome.

With regard to the veridical status of the documents, it has been demonstrated that the 'memo' is untrue. From this there follow two considerations. A) Accepting

that the memo is demonstrably false makes it impossible for a rational person to believe that the typescripts are true copies of Casement writings. The impossibility arises from accepting that those who composed the 'memo' acted dishonestly while also believing that those who prepared and circulated the typescripts acted honestly. No rational person can believe this because the *reductio ad absurdum* is obvious—both parties made the same basic allegation which is therefore both true and false. B) The 'memo' as sufficient indirect cause of the harmful outcome cannot be the cause of the alleged authenticity of the typescripts. If the typescripts are genuine copies, their authenticity derives from other factors and not from the false 'memo'. Those other factors are the claims of Findlay's Government colleagues who circulated the false 'memo' and the defamatory typescripts without any evidence of their veracity. It is undisputed that, *whether genuine copies or not*, the typescripts were circulated in order to defame. Those colleagues are therefore accessories to the crime of defamation inspired by Findlay.²⁵ Their testimony can only be admitted if it serves to prove the allegations are true. The accessories did not seek or provide material or witness evidence as to the veracity of either 'memo' or typescripts *before* their circulation. There were no 'other factors' to verify the typescripts which fact signifies they were not demonstrated to contain true facts before circulation. Because they are an integral part of the defamation initiated by Findlay's 'memo', their claim to be factual is without foundation and it follows that the allegation in the typescripts must be deemed as false as the same allegation made in their originating source. To hold that the typescripts are genuine copies is to hold that truth can be brought into being by falsity. A simple analogy illustrates this; Findlay alleged that Casement was a Martian and, acting on this unsupported allegation, his colleagues produced diary typescripts to reveal his Martian origins. If truth can be derived from falsehood, then the categories are meaningless because they cannot be distinguished. If the typescripts are genuine copies it follows that Findlay's 'memo' is also factually true. Conversely, proof of 'memo' falsehood is also proof of the falsity of the typescripts.

It is undisputed that those who produced the memo and the typescripts *acted* with a common malicious purpose. If the two phases are unrelated despite sharing the same basic allegation, then this was a most remarkable coincidence. Both phases so closely resemble conspiracies that an

impartial observer might deploy Occam's razor and conclude that there was one conspiracy since there was one outcome which was reasonably foreseeable from the start. Coincidences do happen but, by definition, they cannot be made to happen.

Had it not been for Findlay's fear of a threatened lawsuit, he would not have felt it necessary to invent the Olsen story. By late February when Findlay realised he had been duped and made to look foolish, these toxic ingredients fermented in his mind to become the poison which resulted in the Olsen story which *only then* he transmitted to London. There the poison was incubated for future use. The destruction of the world famous renegade knight required much more than an anonymous and improbable yarn by an unknown hotel employee in a foreign city. But the poison lost none of its lethal potency over the following year and, even before Casement's arrest, British Intelligence had decided how it could best be used. From Findlay's lies and insinuations there grew the plan to destroy Casement as a moral degenerate with the 'self-damning' diary typescripts. The smear campaign was essential to ensure there would be no reprieve once condemned.

The initial success of the smear campaign with the typescripts bound the British authorities to maintain authenticity indefinitely. Governments do not admit they have lied to everyone for a century. Thus in 1916 the typescripts were sufficient and necessary for the immediate task; today the bound volume diaries in TNA are still essential because they act to protect the typescripts, the original lie repeated by successive governments; this was always a lie which would have to be maintained no matter the circumstances. Paradoxically, radically altered attitudes to sexuality have made the lie easier to maintain—there is no slur today despite the original intention.

Thus was born in the troubled and duplicitous mind of *one man* who had never met Casement, the lethal virus which was used by Thomson and British Intelligence to rapidly infect the British Establishment with a visceral hatred for a man all had honoured only a few years before. Findlay's 'memo' in the 'right hands' evolved directly into the diary plot which guaranteed Casement's destruction.

Upon this single document *without evidential value* an entire edifice of deception and innuendo was constructed with Findlay laying the first lie in the 'memo', then a second in the Olsen story, followed by another by British Intelligence which was taken up by Scotland Yard and the

press and the agents of state propaganda; within this Escher-like structure of illusions moved the main players in Casement's destruction leading the bewildered through new perspectives of belief which spins lies into truths, distorting and controlling perception so that common sense is lost as in a trance, cause and effect are compounded and *believing is seeing*.

A new generation of illusionists, posing as impartial scholars and biographers, shored up the edifice of lies for decades. In the art of deception they were as skilled and successful as their predecessors Findlay, Thomson, Hall, Blackwell etc. Of these scholars, one only risked a tentative reference to that single document of October, 1914. These word-juggling alchemists convinced tens of thousands that their research had produced truth—not a difficult task but one they felt was necessary because they knew the illusory structure might crumble at any time. The hypnotic power of mass media broadcasting completed the task of disinformation and extinguished the possibility of doubt and with it, the possibility of truth.

APPENDIX I

There has been much misinformation and confusion about Christensen's role in the events of 29th to 31st October and particularly about how he came to be in the Legation on 29th. His version is that he was contacted by an Englishman in the hotel, invited outside and taken there in a large car where he was asked about his master by Lindley. This version was undisputed until the Inglis biography of 1973 in which Inglis wrote "*the Foreign Office files told a different story*". The new story was that Christensen went entirely on his own initiative with intention to betray Casement. However, scrutiny of those Foreign Office files reveals that they do not tell "*a different story*" because they do not tell any story at all. Nowhere in those files is there any account of how Christensen came to be in the Legation on the 29th. At no later time did Findlay account for his presence on that day. Only on 17th February does Findlay state that Christensen arrived *on 30th October* "of his own accord". But this is true for all three visits since he was not compelled. Therefore Findlay's comment *does not contradict* the account of first contact given by Christensen on 29th to Casement; nor is there any documentary evidence to prove that Christensen's account is false.

The Inglis citation is simply an unsupported insinuation which was taken up by later authors. One of these is B.L. Reid who continues:

"In his first account of these events, sent to Sir Edward Grey on 31 October 1914, Findlay wrote that Christensen had simply presented himself at the door of the British Legation at 79 Drammensvein in the *late afternoon* of the twenty-ninth."

This is wholly untrue. Findlay's letter of 31st does not contain this apparently paraphrased written statement attributed by Reid to Findlay. Here is the relevant extract of Findlay's letter:

"The man called at the Legation about 11 a.m. and asked to see me alone. He went over much the same ground as he had covered with Mr. Lindley on Thursday evening."

In this letter there is no reference anywhere to Christensen's arrival at the Legation on the afternoon of Thursday 29th. Therefore Reid has misinformed his readers by *falsely attributing* to Findlay his own false account of Christensen's arrival on 29th. (p. 213, *The Lives of Roger Casement*, 1976.)

Ó Siochain's version is even more duplicitous:

"... Two versions of what happened survive. According to the *British Legation account*, Christensen had presented himself at the door of the Legation, intimating that he had information on a well-known 'Englishman' involved in an 'Irish-American-German conspiracy'. Francis Lindley, the first Secretary, was the first official to interview Christensen. While cautious, he was willing to hear more, and *asked his visitor to return the following day*...

Casement's version painted a very different picture. According to it, *early in the afternoon of 29 October*, Christensen was approached by a stranger in the hall of the hotel and taken by car to a large house, which Casement later ascertained to be the British Legation; here he was questioned about his master... Over the course of three visits, *Christensen's hosts*, Findlay and Lindley, quizzed him about his master, whose *identity Legation officials were very interested in*... Christensen claimed to have driven a hard bargain and to have, ultimately, extracted a promise of £5,000 in gold for delivering Casement... Christensen, *it seems likely*, was playing a *double game*, seeing possible advantages for himself, especially financial gain, on both fronts.

During his *encounters* with Christensen, *Francis Lindley received from him information* on Casement's homosexuality: 'He implied that their relations were of an unnatural nature and that consequently he had great power over this man who trusted him absolutely' ... In addition to Christensen's *hints* to Lindley and Findlay, the latter subsequently acquired *corroborating information from a Norwegian ...*" (italics added) (Ó Siochain, *Roger Casement—Imperialist, Rebel, Revolutionary*. 2008. p. 393/4).

This is almost entirely invented. 1—there is no "British Legation account" and no evidence in the 'memo' or elsewhere that Lindley "asked his visitor to return the following day". 2—Christensen met both Lindley and Findlay alone, not together as suggested above. 3—Findlay himself claims that Casement was identified at the second meeting therefore Christensen was not "quizzed" about this "over the course of three visits". 4—Lindley had one encounter only with Christensen. 5—there is no "information on Casement's homosexuality" in the 'memo'. 6—the quotation in the last paragraph comes from Findlay's letter of 31st October and not from the 'memo' or from Lindley. 7—there is no proof of any "hints" made at any time. 8—the "corroborating information" refers to the Olsen story the falsity of which has been demonstrated.

Conspicuously missing from Ó Siochain's duplicitous version is any reference to the 'memo'. While he mentions Christensen's sworn deposition of April 1915, he does not quote from it, preferring to quote Findlay instead. The "*double game*" theory emerged only in 1973 with Inglis and in 1976 with Reid. The theory is very weak and easily disposed of by the following undisputed facts: 1—he did not betray when the Oskar II was boarded by the British Navy, 2—he did not blackmail Casement who was in possession of a considerable sum of money, 3—he informed Casement of all his Legation visits, 4—he gave Casement the 'earnest money' given him by Findlay at the third meeting, 5—he persisted with Findlay for two months to obtain the bribe in writing, 6—he did not betray Casement when he had the written bribe, 7—he *at once gave the written bribe to Meyer in Berlin*, 8—he later gave a newspaper interview about the Findlay Affair.

This voluntary surrender of the written bribe is of vital importance because it demonstrates that Christensen never had any intent to betray Casement. Casement's biographers are sensitive to these verified facts but they overlook that the handing over of the written bribe renders utterly untenable the theory of a double game. The undisputed facts show that there was but one game—the deception and entrapment of Findlay. Therefore since there was one game only, the biographers' claim that the first contact was on his own initiative is not credible. Christensen's account is very detailed and very plausible. He gave no information to Lindley and was not invited back by Lindley. He did not tell any 'story' as the 'memo' claims nor did he show any papers to Lindley. He also

guessed on the 29th that he was in the British Legation. Christensen gives the numbers of the taxi cabs used on his two visits on 30th. He records the 100 kroner 'earnest money' as a single bank note. He gives precise times. Christensen gives name and address of contact given by Findlay on 30th saying it was written in block capitals on Legation paper with top address torn off by Findlay. The contact name and address was later confirmed to Casement as being that of an employee of the Norwegian lawyer representing the British Legation. Findlay confirmed giving the contact address in his long draft of 31st. Christensen's sworn deposition was made before US Vice Consul in Berlin in April, 1915.

APPENDIX II

Lindley's private letters of 1914-15 reveal a rather mediocre personality but one who was fully complicit in Findlay's plotting against Casement. His private letters do not mention the events of 29th October; this silence can be explained by the fact that the 'memo' was secret and confidential. In a letter dated 21 February 1915, after Casement's open letter to Grey had been "spread all over the place", Lindley wrote briefly about 'The Findlay Affair' without revealing his meeting with Christensen or his role in the 'memo'. There is no mention of the written bribe issued on January 3rd which had provoked Casement's letter. Lindley writes:

"The truth is that Casement is a b- er His "friend" a blackguardly young Norwegian American came up to the Legation and supplied us with a lot of very valuable information about Casements [sic] plans and accomplices. Finally after a good many visits and after we had got a lot out of him he fell out about the money, wanted a big sum down before he had supplied the goods."

Since the "very valuable information" had proved false and worthless long before 21st February, Lindley seems to be out of date or misinformed or is simply covering up the mess created by Findlay.

APPENDIX III

There is considerable written and circumstantial evidence which indicates that Findlay was in contact with British Intelligence during this period. Given that it was wartime and that Norway was in a strategic position, it would be surprising if he was not in such contact. In his draft letter of 30th October Findlay writes: "I am arranging to obtain news of what this man does after arrival in Germany". The only way such news could be obtained was through agents and spies within

Germany. It is reasonable to deduce from this that he also had contact with agents elsewhere. Casement records that his hotel was being watched constantly from the time of his arrival and that his taxi was followed on the evening of 29th. From these circumstances it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Findlay had been pre-alerted to Landy/Casement's arrival in Oslo. He had been under surveillance while in the US until 14th October when, by subterfuge, he boarded the Oskar II in New York and his disappearance thereafter must have been noticed.

In his draft letter of 30th and short letter of 31st to Grey, Findlay wrote; "The alleged Casement is described as very tall ..." and "The man alleged to be Casement is described as very tall, dark, heavy jaw ... he is now clean shaved and is said to have formerly worn a beard." This information does not appear in the 'memo' and is not attributed to Christensen. The most probable source is British agents in the US who would have seen a bearded Casement before his departure. Use of the passive "is described" twice conceals the source of the information. These deductions strongly indicate that Findlay was in contact with Intelligence agents in relation to Casement. This helps to explain his actions and motivation; it also partly explains his failure to publicly rebut the accusations in Casement's published letter to Grey.

Paul Hyde

FOOTNOTES

¹ Francis Oswald Lindley, 1872-1950, succeeded Findlay in 1923; future Ambassador to Austria, Greece, Portugal, Japan. Knighted in 1926. His memoirs *A Diplomat Off Duty* were published in 1928, Findlay (1861-1932) Minister at Christiania from 1913 to 1923, knighted in 1916.

² Francis Oswald Lindley, 1872-1950, succeeded Findlay in 1923; future Ambassador to Austria, Greece, Portugal, Japan. Knighted in 1926. His memoirs *A Diplomat Off Duty* were published in 1928.

³ PRO FO 337/107. ⁴ TNA KV-2-6

⁵ *Roger Casement*, Brian Inglis. Coronet, 1974. Strangely, this study contains no source references whatever.

⁶ TNA FO 337/107. ⁷ TNA FO 337/107.

⁸ PRO FO 95,776.

⁹ In linguistic pragmatics H. P. Grice, the philosopher of language, (1913-1988) developed a theory of meaning which involved the concept of implicature. Among his principle works is *Studies in the Way of Words*, 1989, Harvard University Press.

¹⁰ TNA FO 337/107.

¹¹ Maximilian Harden (1861-1927), influential and controversial German editor & journalist. Born Felix Ernst Witowski, he damaged the reputation of the Hohenzollern caste by exposing the Eulenburg homosexual scandal in 1906.

¹² Letter from Findlay to Nicolson 13 March, 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

¹³ Typed statement signed by Olsen 21 July, 1916. PRO HO 144 1637 311643 140,

¹⁴ *The Lives of Roger Casement*, B.L. Reid, 1976. p. 212, footnote.

¹⁵ *Diaries of Sir Roger Casement*, Dr. Charles E. Curry (Ed.) Munich 1922. Memorandum, p. 48.

¹⁶ Christensen stayed in The Grand Hotel on 20 October, 1915 when he arrived from NY with Monteith as related in *Casement's Last Adventure*, Robert Monteith. Chicago 1932.

¹⁷ *Roger Casement; A New Judgment*, René MacColl, 1956. p. 140-141.

¹⁸ Letter from Findlay to Nicolson, 24 February, 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

¹⁹ *Roger Casement, A New Judgment*, René MacColl, 1956. p. 141.

²⁰ Findlay's handwritten bribe to Christensen, undated and issued on 3 January, 1915. UCD Archives. Boehm/Casement Papers P 127/1.

²¹ Findlay to Nicolson, 6 January, 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

²² Findlay to Nicolson, 14 January, 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

²³ Nicolson to Findlay, undated, late February 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

²⁴ Nicolson to Findlay, undated, late February 1915. PRO FO 95,776.

²⁵ At the time homosexual acts were criminal acts; therefore the defamation was criminal in nature.

McConville And Casement

*"In the olden days before colour television" * I watched a British TV programme on the trial of the Irish patriot Roger Casement in London, following his arrest in Kerry in 1916. Conor Cruise O' Brien was a contributor and he remarked on the fact that the Prosecution had been led by England's Attorney General, Frederick Edwin Smith, who, from 1912 to 1914 had helped organise and arm the Ulster Volunteers, pledged to fight the British Army if Parliament made good its promise of Home Rule in Ireland.*

Television technology has improved wonderfully since I saw that programme, but it was more informative than one on the same subject made recently in London's Irish Embassy, chaired by the Irish Ambassador, in which Professor Sean Mc Conville of Queen Mary's University (London) insisted that Casement was a traitor and that the trial was a model of propriety.

I had never heard of the Professor, but, like the statesman lampooned in the rhyme *"George Nathaniel Viscount Curzon, I'm a most superior person"*, he appears to expect the deference of us plebs. He has a brilliant CV but strikes me about as admirable as F.E. Smith. Smith hailed from Birkenhead and arrived in Oxford with an accent appropriate to that environment but changed it to blend with toffs. I don't know where McConville hails from but those of a servile disposition will kow-tow to him and self-respecting people would want him tied to a ducking stool. Ducking and diving may be his *forte* for he held in his hand Roger Casement's *"The Crime Against Europe"* with *"The*

Crime Against Ireland" and quoted a passage about Germany, comparing that country favourably with Britain, without putting it in its context as a reply to Arthur Conan Doyle's "*Great Britain And The Next War*" in February 1913. Conan Doyle, who defended Britain's conduct in the Second South African War, was part of the propaganda campaign for making the war on Germany which Britain's ruling clique had been preparing since 1904.

McConville appeared to be the only person at the gathering with a copy of Casement's authenticated writings. He quoted Casement's useless Defence Counsel, Serjeant Sullivan for a statement made many decades after his Trial, which has been disputed by some authorities. He is

adamant about the Black Diaries which he considered genuine.

I've read books and articles by superior persons defending the convictions of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four, and the findings of the Widgery Inquiry. I've read Seumus Murphy SJ's assertion that Daniel O'Connell never shot anyone. O'Connell was a fine advocate but never denied shooting John D'Esterre dead in a duel in 1815, nor travelling to Ostend to similarly face Robert Peel some decades later. I'd catalogue the Professor with such humbugs.

Donal Kennedy

* My son, now aged 44 spoke of the olden days before colour TV about 36 years ago.

org/ipr/2006/IPR_July_2006.pdf for my July 2006 article "*What If a Patriot Priest Has Been Traduced? In Defence Of Father O'Flanagan*", where I took issue with Ferriter's 2004 magnum opus of 900 pages, *The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000*. It was there that Ferriter first pronounced:

"The Rising presented the Catholic Church with its own problems, including a fear that it would undermine the bourgeois consensus between constitutional nationalism and the Church's representatives. Mrs. Tom Barry's statement to the BMH recorded that at the time of the Rising in 1916, Fr. Michael O'Flanagan, later vice-President of Sinn Fe_in, had remarked of the fighters in the General Post Office: '*let these people burn to death, they are murderers*'... But Church disapproval was by no means unanimous." (p 151).

Why has "the paper of record" failed to access its February 1917 records?

An *Irish Times* history professor columnist, and its book editor journalist, on the Roscommon By-Election centenary

In the February issue of *Irish Political Review*, I described how the Revolution Papers, "*produced in collaboration the Centre for Contemporary Irish History, Trinity College Dublin*", effectively treated the endorsement of the 1916 Rising by the February 1917 Roscommon By-Election as more or less amounting to having been a non-event. But what of Diarmaid Ferriter, listed on the website of University College Dublin as its Full Professor of Modern Irish History? He is described as follows on the *Irish Times* website:

"Diarmaid Ferriter is one of Ireland's best-known historians and is Professor of Modern Irish History at UCD. His books include *The Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000* (2004)... He is a regular broadcaster on television and radio and a weekly columnist with the *Irish Times*."

While, in its issue of 28th March 2010, Fintan O'Toole enthused about "Ferriter's groundbreaking book, *The Transformation of Ireland*", with O'Toole opening his profile by awarding the plaudit: "*Hard-nosed scholarship and moral passion underpin Diarmaid Ferriter's work*".

In the *Irish Times* of 11th March 2015, Patsy McGarry began his report on the launch of Ferriter's latest, 500 page, tome, *A Nation and Not a Rabble: The Irish Revolution 1913-1923*, with the proclamation: "*Historian and Irish Times columnist Diarmaid Ferriter has warned against 'shameless celebrations' of Ireland's past and the downgrading of history in schools.*"

McGarry ended:

"The book was launched by Caitriona Crowe, head of special projects at the National Archives. She described it as 'a clear-eyed, accurate, intensely human and endlessly interesting version of the events which have obsessed generations of Irish people'."

And yet, the sum total of what Ferriter had to say, in his latest 500 page work, concerning the first Election victory in February 1917 of the National Democratic Revolution, was this:

"Count Plunkett, the father of the executed Joseph Plunkett, won the North Roscommon by-election as an independent candidate supported by Sinn Féin; other by-election successes that year suggested the Irish Parliamentary Party was being beaten at its own game" (p 170).

True, when RTE Radio thought it worthwhile to mark the centenary of that By-Election victory, and he was invited to discuss it on the Sean O'Rourke Show this February 6th, Ferriter did provide a reasonable amount of biographical detail regarding Plunkett himself. Yet the key architect and strategist of that victory was treated as a non-person. Ferriter chose not to mention the name of Fr. Michael O'Flanagan at all, not even once. But, as we shall see, that might well have been a blessing in disguise, as listeners were spared that combination of academic incompetence and outrageous slander that has characterised Ferriter's 'assessment' of O'Flanagan.

See <http://free-magazines.atholbooks.org>

In 2004, sloppy, incompetent and un-professional research on Professor Ferriter's part had led him to confuse two very different priests, Fr. John Flanagan, of Dublin's Pro-Cathedral, and Fr. Michael O'Flanagan, the Roscommon Sinn Féin leader who had, of course, championed the Rising. The result was that Ferriter slandered the man hailed by Cathal Brugha as "*the staunchest priest who ever lived in Ireland*". In his 2015 book, Ferriter compounded the slander, by unapologetically regurgitating it, as he added another howler:

"Parts of the country that were not mobilised in 1916 were nonetheless to be important in the aftermath of the Rising; in Limerick, for example ... what was influential was the role of the local bishop, Thomas O'Doherty... O'Doherty praised the rebels for the 'purity and nobility of their motives' and their courage, and decried Maxwell as a wanton, military dictator. O'Doherty had regarded Redmond's backing of the war effort as a betrayal and was a public subscriber to a fund for the Volunteers' dependants; he was, it seemed, in the Rising's aftermath, assuming the role of 'moral leader' of the nationalist opposition. But O'Doherty's peers did not share his certainty at the time of the Rising... Leslie Price (who would later marry Tom Barry—MO'R) stated that at the time of the Rising in 1916 Fr Michael O'Flanagan, later vice president of Sinn Fein, had remarked to her of the fighters in the General Post Office: '*let these people burn to death, they are murderers*'..." (p 160).

Ferriter got his Bishops mixed up, as, of course, he had already done with his O'Flanagans. Edward O'Dwyer was the Bishop of Limerick in question. Thomas O'Doherty was the Bishop of Clonfert, and later of Galway. And a minimum of elementary research on Ferriter's part would have shown him that the Pro-

Cathedral curate Leslie Price had encountered was named Fr. John, inaccurately recalled by Price, decades later, as having been named "Michael". So much for Ferriter's supposedly "*clear-eyed, accurate*" account, or the acclaim from the *Spectator* magazine featured on the book's cover, which is actually a reference to another Ferriter book again: "*An outstandingly diligent researcher ... Ferriter is masterly at marshalling facts and the facts are often revealing.*"

In the eleven years since Ferriter first wrote up his slander in 2004, he made no effort to correct it, but spewed it out again in 2015. Which also makes his only other reference to O'Flanagan in his latest book beyond bewildering. Ferriter now wrote of O'Flanagan's role in the 1918 General Election which saw the triumph of Sinn Féin:

"Fr Michael O'Flanagan, a compassionate but arrogant republican activist and priest in Roscommon who had been active in the Gaelic League and was elected vice president of the newly consolidated party, was put in charge of SF publicity during the general election, and at its conclusion allegedly said, '*The people have voted Sinn Féin. What we have to do now is explain to people what Sinn Féin is'...*" (p 184).

But it is Ferriter himself who cannot explain how a man, whom he wrongly accused of denouncing the 1916 Rising rebels as "*murderers*", could be elected Sinn Féin Vice President a year later, and, a year later again, would be put in charge of publicity for its victorious General Election campaign. Perhaps there was method, then, when asked to speak on radio about the intervening February 1917 By-Election, that Ferriter made no mention whatsoever of O'Flanagan, and still less of his pivotal role in ensuring victory.

So much, then, for the academic professional historians of both TCD and UCD. And yet, in stark contrast, others have highlighted the pathbreaking character of that By-Election. This was the case with *An Phoblacht* on January 16th, which carried an excellent article by Sinn Féin Dublin City Councillor Mícheál Mac Donncha, entitled "*Fr Michael O'Flanagan and the Roscommon by-election*". I would also encourage readers to check out <https://erinascendant.wordpress.com/2017/02/01/an-idolatry-of-candidates-count-plunkett-and-the-north-roscommon-by-election-of-1917/> for a most impressive Irish History Blog by one Daniel Murray.

Diarmaid Ferriter, in his capacity as

resident weekly columnist with the *Irish Times*, did not have anything to say about the By-Election in that organ's columns, but the topic was covered by *Irish Times* journalist Ronan McGreevy on January 31st, under the heading of "*Out for the Count—An Irishman's Diary on George Plunkett's North Roscommon byelection victory in 1917*". Unlike the Trinity College History Department's *Revolution Papers*, McGreevy did treat that By-Election as one of consequence. He began:

"The people of Roscommon have often shown a contrarian streak in elections. Ministers have been deposed, mavericks elected and constitutional amendments rejected, but no election was more significant than the one held this week 100 years ago."

Midway, McGreevy further wrote:

"The Irish Party fully expected to win and was stunned when it did not. Plunkett won in a landslide... The Irish Party's mouthpiece, the *Freeman's Journal*, prophetically called the result 'ruinous' for the party. It brought an end to its hegemony in nationalist Ireland and presaged the wipeout of the party at the December 1918 election. The North Roscommon byelection has some claim to be the most important byelection in Irish history."

And he closed:

"The North Roscommon byelection was the first opportunity the Irish people had to pronounce directly on the Easter Rising. Plunkett put himself forward as the living embodiment of the spirit of the Rising and sought retrospective democratic validation for the actions of the rebels of the Easter Rising. In that he succeeded. Things would never be the same again."

McGreevy is, however, an *Irish Times* journalist with a particular set of agendas. As the *Irish Times* has described its own man on January 20th, under the heading of "*President Trump: Irish writers have their say*"—"Ronan McGreevy is the author of *Wherever the Firing Line Extends: Ireland and the Western Front*. He is also the editor of the *Irish Times* book *Was it for this? Reflections on the Easter Rising*." And so, in his article on the Roscommon by-election, McGreevy indulged himself in some political point scoring, when he further wrote:

"He (Plunkett) was not, as the present Sinn Féin erroneously claims, the first elected Sinn Féin MP. Plunkett stood as an Independent. His election agent was the Independent MP Laurence Ginnell. You will search in vain in his extensive election literature for any mention of Sinn Féin. As his daughter Geraldine, in her posthumously published memoir, remembered: 'He was not a member of

Sinn Féin, but a separatist supported by a combination of separatists and almost all advanced Nationalist opinion.' Indeed, one of Plunkett's first acts on being elected was to set up a rival organisation, the Liberty Clubs, based on the republican ideals in the Proclamation. He and Sinn Féin leader Arthur Griffiths (sic) detested each other and had a bitter falling out before Plunkett became a member of the party later in the year."

As for the historical Sinn Féin, McGreevy chose to ignore the evidence before his eyes. Plunkett was an advanced Republican; Griffith's original Sinn Féin was not. Plunkett joined Sinn Féin in October 1917, as soon as the Party itself became a Republican one. Griffith's Sinn Féin had started out with the objective of a dual monarchy, and not a Republic—which is how Griffith again ended up before his demise—which would explain Plunkett's antipathy towards him. And, as for present-day Sinn Féin, Councillor Mícheál Mac Donncha replied on February 10th:

"Ronan McGreevy could not resist a sideswipe when he wrote that Plunkett 'was not, as the present Sinn Féin erroneously claims, the first elected Sinn Féin MP'. Plunkett did indeed stand as an Independent but had the support of Sinn Féin, the Irish Volunteers and other nationalist and republican groups, most of which came together later that year to adopt a republican constitution for Sinn Féin. Naturally the North Roscommon election was seen then and since as the first of a series of byelection victories for resurgent 'Sinn Féinism'. As for 'the present Sinn Féin', I do not know what 'erroneous claim' Ronan McGreevy refers to, but in the January 2017 edition of *An Phoblacht*, I wrote: 'While often cited as the first Sinn Féin election victory after the Rising, Plunkett was not officially a Sinn Féin candidate.'"

While Ferriter treated Fr. O'Flanagan as a non-person in the Roscommon By-Election victory, McGreevy admitted that he was its champion strategist. But his narrative had a patronising, sneering tone:

"George Plunkett (was) a papal count, a leading expert on the Renaissance artist Sandro Botticelli and a patrician figure... At his first meeting in Carrick-on-Shannon, he was introduced by his great champion, the rebel priest Fr Michael O'Flanagan. Plunkett, O'Flanagan opined, was no less than 'the leader of the Irish race' and the 'royal face of Cathleen Ní Houlihan'. O'Flanagan saw divine intervention at work in Plunkett's candidature. It was thought impossible to move around the constituency, given the depth of snow, but O'Flanagan had galvanised an army of volunteers to clear the path for the old count. (At that juncture, Plunkett had lived just two thirds of his life. He was 65, and would live on for a further 31 years,

passing away in 1948—MOR). Children improvised their support, spelling out the words 'Up Plunkett' on the snow-covered fields of the constituency."

Non-believers might remain unimpressed by O'Flanagan's religious imagery, but McGreevy's sneering was in sharp contrast with the reverential tone adopted by him with respect to the divine intervention invoked by his British Army Great War hero Thomas Kettle, supposedly fighting on behalf of the Son of God, "*for a dream born in a herdsman's shed, and for the sacred Scripture of the poor*".

McGreevy's article of September 9th last was entitled "*Tom Kettle and the 'foolish dead' who perished in foreign wars: Kettle died to liberate France which has long been an inspiration for Irish republicans*". He advanced the incredible thesis that British Imperialism's First World War had been waged in order to prevent a proto-Nazi genocide of the French nation in 1914:

"Would Kettle have been better off fighting for Ireland at home instead of the ancient enemy on foreign soil? Was it better to die 'neath an Irish sky than at Suvla or Sud-El-Bar'?.. At the end of his famous poem, Kettle concluded that the war transcended petty nationalism and it was Christian values that were at stake... It is tempting to conclude that the First World War was all for nothing, tempting but wrong. How can it be universally acknowledged that the second World War, which liberated Europe from German aggression, was a just war, yet the liberation of Europe in the first World War was not?.. Many more Irish men like Kettle died in the defence of the French Republic than died in the creation of our own. They died that France might live."

And, sure, why wouldn't McGreevy make such outlandish claims? Hadn't he been given every encouragement by his bosses to go down that particular road three months previously when, on June 29th last, the paper headlined: "*Book by Irish Times journalist on first World War*". It continued:

"This week 100 years ago, Irish soldiers were among thousands preparing for the onset of the Battle of the Somme... Their story is among those explored in a new book by *Irish Times* journalist Ronan McGreevy—*Wherever the Firing Line Extends: Ireland and the Western Front*... The title is from a speech by John Redmond in 1914 urging Irish Volunteers to go 'wherever the firing line extends'. 'Many, many more Irishmen died in the preservation of the French Republic than died in the creation of our own', McGreevy said at the launch. 'There are more Irishmen on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing than were killed in the War of Independence'..."

The *Irish Times* had already entrusted McGreevy with editing its own 1916 centenary book, *Was it for this? Reflections on the 1916 Rising*. The book a compendium of a whole range of views, including those of Gerry Adams. Of particular note, however, is how, in its issue of May 20th last, the *Irish Times* indulged McGreevy in shamelessly plugging his/their own book himself, and the unique view held by him of that paper's role in 1916 itself that he sought to push to the fore. "Other Easter Rising books are about what happened. *Was it for This?* is about what it means", ran McGreevy's self-promoting headline, followed by the sub-heading "*Was it for this?—Reflections on the Easter Rising* begins and ends with *Irish Times* editorials but in between is a whole spectrum of opinion, from Seán O'Casey to Kevin Myers". And, several paragraphs down, came His Master's Voice apologia: "Contrary to what has often been suggested since, *The Irish Times* never explicitly called for the executions of the leaders of the Rising, but neither did it condemn them. In August 1916, the newspaper suggested the hanged Sir Roger Casement deserved his fate."

How on earth could McGreevy employ such mealy-mouthed terminology as "*never explicitly*" to what the *Irish Times* had actually and unequivocally called for? Let us recall that paper's exact words:

"The State has struck, but its work is not yet finished. The surgeon's knife has been put to the corruption in the body of Ireland, and its course must not be stayed until the whole malignant growth has been removed."

By McGreevy's 'logic', the *Irish Independent* should also be exonerated of the charge that it had called for Connolly and Mac Diarmada to be finished off, because it "*never explicitly*" named them!

McGreevy's "*contrary to*" was, in fact, directed against a former *Irish Times* journalist, John Horgan, who had addressed that issue head on in the *Irish Times* of 24th September 2005. In the concluding sentence of his review of Donal Nevin's biography of James Connolly, Horgan wrote:

"We probably need a book on Connolly in every generation to keep his memory green. Perhaps the next one will also remind us, not only of the *Irish Independent's* splenetic editorial on the eve of the execution of Connolly and MacDiarmada, but also of the *Irish Times's* cold-blooded and repeated exhortations to Asquith and Maxwell, as the protests against the executions gathered momentum, to wield 'the surgeon's knife... until the whole malignant growth has been removed'."

The reality actually been worse than that, for such a precise *Irish Times* call had been made from the very outset, in its issue of 28th April 1916, in advance of—and in order to advance—the wave of executions that would run from May 3 to May 12.

As it happened, it was John Horgan who would review the McGreevy/ *Irish Times* book for that paper in its issue of May 21st last. In the course of a predominantly favourable review, however, Horgan drew attention to yet another apologia in the extreme on McGreevy's part:

"Readers may not be convinced, given *The Irish Times's* then visceral dislike of the Irish Parliamentary Party, by the editor's suggested reason for the omission of the most poignant excerpts from the post-Rising House of Commons debate, at which John Redmond praised the 'bravery and skill' of the insurgents and described Gen Sir John Maxwell executions of the leaders of the rebellion as 'letting loose a river of blood'. Could 'deadlines pressures' alone have been responsible for such political omissions?"

In McGreevy's self-promoting article of May 20th last, he boasted of his *Irish Times* book:

"It would be difficult to assemble such an array of heavyweight commentary if one were to try and do it from various sources. Indeed, one could argue that such a book would not be possible except through the archives of *The Irish Times*, which has been a forum for all shades of Irish opinion over the last century."

Readers will be aware that I myself frequently delve into those archives—though hardly as much, admittedly, as McGreevy's own systematic excavation. But, then, that's what, as an *Irish Times* employee, McGreevy is paid to do. In a series of nineteen articles between January 14th and March 25th of last year, which he entitled "*1916/2016: A miscellany*", McGreevy's research made skilful use, on each day of publication, of what "*the paper of record*" had covered on that same day 100 years previously. I have not the slightest doubt that McGreevy is comprehensively conversant with his newspaper's archives for February 1917. That is why, when noting that in his centenary article he had quoted the *Freeman's Journal* on the Roscommon By-Election, I was at first completely bewildered as to why he had chosen not to quote a single word from the coverage of that election by his own *Irish Times*. He had, after all, conceded that Plunkett's victory saw a retrospective democratic mandate being provided for the 1916 Rising. And then the penny dropped as to why McGreevy

had decided to portray that election's issues as centring on Easter Week and "*divine intervention*", why he had set out to present a caricature of Fr. Michael O'Flanagan, and why—when it came to February 1917—the *Irish Times* archives became for him "*the love that dare not speak its name*". For the *Irish Times* of 8th February 1917 clearly showed that, while the North Roscommon electorate had indeed endorsed the Easter Rising, this was secondary to its decisive rejection of British Imperialism's Great War, so beloved by crusader McGreevy in his retrospective "*War Upon the German Nation*" (to borrow Connolly's classification). And it was O'Flanagan's astute and relentless anti-War campaigning that had decisively swung the election on this issue, as that *Irish Times* report, entitled "*How Count Plunkett Won North Roscommon—The Inner Story Of The Contest (By One Who Was Through It)*", made demonstrably clear:

"Count Plunkett won North Roscommon on the anti-conscription cry plus the appeal to the people's sentiments in connection with the Rebellion of Easter

Week. The Rev. Michael O'Flanagan ... was the main driving force behind the candidate... The burden of all Father O'Flanagan's election speeches was the same. He argued that conscription would have been applied to Ireland last year were it not for the Rebellion of Easter Week... By voting for Plunkett they were warding off conscription from Ireland. As Father O'Flanagan put it in all his speeches, it would be better and easier for the young men in Ireland to carry their fathers on their backs to the polls to vote for Plunkett rather than have to serve as conscripts in the trenches in Flanders. This appeal went straight home to the parental instincts of voters with sons of military age."

A hundred years ago, in a perceptive report where it did indeed function as a "*paper of record*", the *Irish Times* saw that it could no longer present as "*Our War*". And in a demonstration of *suppresio veri*, the world view of today's self-regarding 'paper of record' has chosen to suppress the historical truth of that particular *Irish Times* record.

Manus O'Riordan

Transcendental Politics? Part 2

How Redmond Won Irish Independence!

The article by Martin Mansergh referred to last month is in fact a letter, which is worth reprinting in full as it sums up the revisionist view of events in Ireland between 1914 and 1922 and dismisses all that was done on the Irish side as having been unnecessary to the achievement of what was eventually recognised by Britain as an Irish state.

The Irish state was established on the British initiative. It, or something like it, would, therefore, have been established anyway. The significant Irish contribution to it was mass enlistment in the British Army for war on Germany and Turkey, because the purpose of the war was to establish a new international order based on the principle of national self-determination. That new international order was established, and it brought a dozen new states into being, including the Irish Free State. Germany (with which the 1916 Insurrectionaries allied themselves) contributed nothing to the establishment of these new states.

The letter is rather incoherently written, and leaves room for equivocation, but that is the gist of what it says.

There is nothing new in it. It is the view of the past as "*seen historically*" through

a series of distorting mirrors put in place by Australian David Fitzpatrick's 'Trinity History Workshop', and by the new lightweight NGO Professorship of Roy Foster, whose vantage point on Ireland is strictly Anglo-Irish. What makes it different is that Mansergh is—or was until recently—an intellectual who is actively engaged within the Dublin political Establishment.

He was "adviser" to a series of Fianna Fail Taoiseachs.

When John Bruton unexpectedly became Taoiseach, he seemed to understand that his well-known nihilistic opinion of the Independence movement was inappropriate to the position of Prime Minister of the State which the Independence movement brought about. It just would not do in his handling of the North. He wanted Mansergh to stay on as his adviser. Mansergh refused.

It was very much to Bruton's credit that he wanted somebody who had been brought into high politics by that very bad man, Charles Haughey, to be his adviser on the North. It indicated an awareness that his simple-minded ideological position, that he could indulge in Opposition, did not express the reality of the things that a Taoiseach would have to deal with.

I was not much aware of Mansergh until then. Or, rather, I was aware of Mansergh senior. Away back in the 1960s, before I ever thought I would be writing about these things, Pat Murphy told me about him and about his ambivalent relationship with De Valera.

That Mansergh was a senior administrator in the British apparatus of State. During the World War he directed the Ministry of Information (the English name for Propaganda). And De V, having a difficult situation to cope with as leader of a neutral state during a British War, whose neutrality the British Prime minister did not recognise as legitimate, found it useful to strike up a relationship with Mansergh, knowing what he was and taking account of it.

(Jack Lane discovered some years ago from the British archives that Mansergh conducted subliminal propaganda against Irish neutrality. See *Propaganda With Your Laxatives*, Irish Political Review, June 3009.)

Nicholas Mansergh was Irish-born but all his work was done in the service of the British State—administrative and academic. He owned the substantial remnant of an Irish landed estate.

Martin Mansergh was born, reared and educated as part of the lower upper-class of England but he made a career in Irish politics—or in the politics of the Irish State, which is not the same thing. He gained status by being adopted as an assistant by Haughey, who knew how to use anything usable while keeping it in its place. He continued in the service of Fianna Fail leaders after Haughey, but his relationship with them cannot have been what it was with Haughey. He grew in status as his surroundings shrank.

Haughey was by far the most substantial thing in Irish politics since De Valera. That fact must have been apparent. even to the later Fianna Fail leaders who were obliged, by the influence they allowed the *Irish Times* to exert on disoriented public opinion, to denounce him. And Mansergh gained added value through having been used by him.

His status would have gained further increase if he had responded positively to Bruton's request that he should continue as Northern adviser when Fine Gael replaced Fianna Fail in the Taoiseach's Office—an Office greatly enlarged by Haughey for the purpose of reducing the influence of the External Affairs Department.

The Republic was a 26 County state with 32 County pretensions written into

its Constitution, but without a 32 County policy, even though a war was being fought by the large, undemocratically-governed, Nationalist minority of the Six County-part, which Dublin was obliged by the Constitution to regard as being governed illegitimately because it was not subject to government by the Irish State.

(The fact that it was governed undemocratically as part of the British state, even if British sovereignty was regarded as legitimate, was something that Leinster House politics of all brands preferred not to see.)

Furthermore, the 26 County party system, which had always been lop-sided because of the Treaty War, and which limped along only by means of occasional Coalitions of the two Opposition extremes which acted as interludes in the continuous government since 1932 of the substantial Fianna Fail Centre-left, was threatening to become seriously dysfunctional.

Haughey had been put on trial, effectively for the treasonable act of making arrangements for war on the North. The charge was laid by Jack Lynch who had himself, as Taoiseach, set in motion the arrangements for which Haughey was prosecuted, and had instructed the Irish Army to plan for possible incursions into the North to assist the Nationalist insurgency. Lynch did this to Haughey and others under pressure from the Fine Gael leader, Liam Cosgrave, who himself acted under prompting from the British Ambassador.

The Prosecution failed because authoritative evidence was given that the defendants acted under Government instruction. The charge against Haughey's associate, Neil Blaney, had already been dropped at the level of the Magistrate's Court without any reason being given. The reason can only have been that Blaney indicated that, if he was taken to the High Court, he would have conducted a full-blooded defence and shown that all that had been done had been done in accordance with the Taoiseach's policy. However, his promising prospects in governing politics was finished.

Haughey let himself be tried but conducted a minimal defence, knowing that Lynch was disabled in Court by the fact that it was his own Northern policy that he was prosecuting. The military man who was presented as a co-conspirator, Captain Kelly, conducted an active defence, showing that he had acted under Government authority. His military superior, who acted on the instruction of the relevant Government Minister, gave truthful evidence, showing the prosecution case to be without foundation. (He also suffered the consequences, in his retirement.)

The connection between Captain Kelly and the Taoiseach was sufficiently indirect to allow Lynch to survive the failed prosecutions, but if Haughey had conducted an all-out defence, the Government, and more than the Government, would have been blown away.

Lynch, supported by Fine Gael and Labour, treated the verdict as perverse, but there was no attempt to discipline Haughey within Fianna Fail for having committed treason and got away with it because of a jury that was got at (the line that was put out).

From that point onwards there was no Northern policy in Leinster House. There was convoluted chatter by the party leaders but there was no point to it in the war situation that had come about in the North.

The chatter, if taken in earnest, would have led to a political movement to amend the Constitution so as to legitimise British sovereignty in the North, so long as a majority desired it. That was not done. All that one heard were routine condemnations of the "*men of violence*" in the North who were acting against the illegitimate British sovereignty.

The condemnations of violence were for the record. There was extensive support in all parties for the "*final push*" that would cause the obsolete feudal-religious concoction of Ulster Unionism to crumble.

I proposed in 1969 that Dublin should come to terms with the fact that the Ulster Protestant community had the durable quality of a nationality, recognise it as such, and set about negotiating terms of co-operation with it. That was in September 1969. The proposal was categorically rejected by Lynch in October.

Partition—the conciliation of Protestant religious bigotry by Britain—was the cause of the trouble in the North and the trouble would only end when Protestant bigotry was faced up to and Partition was ended.

My "*two-nation*" proposal was rejected by all sides. Nevertheless, it was experienced as an irritant—a ridiculous notion that would not go away. Many eminent figures undertook to dispute it with me in public debate. I debated with Fine Gael Front-Bencher Richie Ryan in Coleraine, and with Labour Front-Bencher Frank Prendergast in Limerick. And I'm sure that Haughey's ideas on the character of Ulster Protestant society were nowhere near as crudely and unthinkingly nationalistic and denialist as theirs were: The IRA was engaged in the final push against the Ulster Unionist hulk dumped across the path of

the nation by Tories. It was a pity it had to be dealt with like this. But that was how things were.

The party leaders used complicated forms of words about the North. Some of them seemed to believe what they said—though I couldn't see what meaning there was in them to believe. But, on the whole, the official forms of words did not express the state of feeling in the parties—the state of feeling was directly contrary to the spirit of the form of words.

Haughey, after his Trial, set about building a base for himself in Lynch's Fianna Fail. He took over from Lynch, and had policies both for the Republic and the North. The propaganda against him as the rebel who tried to plunge the state into war prevented him from ever winning an outright election victory, but he still made his policies effective, both North and South. The South entered the world of Finance Capitalism and the "*failed constitutional entity*" in the North was taken in hand in cooperation with John Hume and Gerry Adams.

And John Bruton, a genuinely anti-Nationalist Fine Gael leader, became Taoiseach, and asked Martin Mansergh to come over to him from Fianna Fail. And Mansergh refused.

I was puzzled by his refusal. I had somehow got the notion of him as a public servant in the interface between the Government and the administrative machine, such as Maurice Hankey had been when the established British party-system of Liberals and Tories broke up due to the collapse of the Liberal Party under the strain of the Great War that it had launched, and a new party, effectively founded only in 1916, and entirely inexperienced in government, suddenly became His Majesty's Opposition in a world that was in flux. Hankey acted as a kind of general political administrator of the emergence of a new party system. And I don't think it was absurd to see Bruton's sudden arrival in power as being similar in some degree—and to see Mansergh as doing in some degree the kind of thing that Hankey did. The situation certainly called for it.

Raymond Crotty, who was to my mind the last Irish academic worthy to be called so, despaired of the Republic in the mid-1970s. In an article published in the (London) *Times* he called on the British ruling class to come and take nationalist Ireland in hand again. It was a pathetic expression of the intellectual bankruptcy of Professor Crotty himself and of the professional bourgeois class of which he was the best sample. For me, an outcast in

Belfast, it justified the contempt felt for the Dublin Establishment after its weak-minded refusal to face Northern facts in 1969-70—a weakness of mind that expressed weakness of character, and that soon became the frightened mind committed to the construction of sedative alternative realities in what little remained of Irish academia.

By the time of Professor Crotty's appeal, Britain had already committed resources to taking the Irish middle class in hand, relieving its despair by bringing it back into fold, And what Crotty himself did was establish the Irish Sovereignty Movement that was directed against the European Union and could therefore only be Anglophile in effect.

The only counter-development was Haughey's establishment of his own personal Government as an independent force within the Government of which he was Taoiseach, which made the EU believe that the Republic was actually an independent state after all, and which set in motion a realistic policy for the North, based on the maxim that Northern Ireland was not a viable Constitutional entity—and which indulged in none of the mindless mischief-making "*initiatives*" one had become accustomed to from Dublin.

So, why did the Englishman who had been useful by Haughey, and had apparently been in his confidence, refuses to put his Haugheyite understanding at the service of John Bruton? It puzzled me at the time. The reason soon became clear enough. Fianna Fail was the awkward party in the British view, and Mansergh has used the influence he gained through being used by Haughey to chip all the awkward edges of Fianna Fail, abolishing its distinctiveness, and re-making it into a Treatyite Party.

Here is his *Irish News* letter of 11th August 2016:

"Future progress may depend on ability to transcend conflicts of the past"
MARTIN MANSERGH

While we all take sides in historical conflicts, the consequences of which still affect our lives today, future progress may depend on our ability collectively to transcend the conflicts of the past, recognising that the black and white political polemics that surrounded them may not always correspond to a better understanding that there were much more complicated realities. Significant progress has been made with regard to commemoration of those who died in the First World War. Initial nationalist support for and involvement in the First World War and heavy sacrifices

throughout are now widely acknowledged and respected, where for a long time this was suppressed. Last week, I attended a ceremony at Richmond Barracks in Dublin—where the hall used to hold prisoners from the 1916 Rising has just been restored by the State – at which the Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness unveiled a bust of the soldier poet Francis Ledwidge. He wrote a famous poem that was a lament for Thomas McDonagh, the executed 1916 leader who was a fellow poet, a year before he himself was killed on the Western Front. Surely we can acknowledge that they were both patriots.

Of course, the First World War was caused by imperial rivalries, irresponsible brinkmanship, and intriguing warmongers to be found in every participating country, and the result was an horrendous war of attrition costing millions of lives. Let us also acknowledge that Irish separatists had been waiting 60 years or more for Britain to become embroiled in an international conflict. Most historians accept that the rising would not have occurred outside this context. Irish soldiers in British uniform were told by their political leaders that they were fighting for Irish freedom in the form of Home Rule (or freedom from it, if they were unionist). The volunteers in 1916 were fighting for complete freedom, but of course they did not get it. De Valera, who was the leader of the subsequent phase of the independence struggle, always acknowledged the debt to Wilsonian principles, after America entered the war on the allied side, and in particular the principle of national self-determination, even if Wilson was personally totally unsympathetic to Ireland and even if Lloyd George never recognised its application to Ireland. The period 1918 to 1923 saw the consequent emergence of about a dozen new states in Europe, including the Irish Free State. The gallant allies in Europe, who had been counted upon, were for nothing in all this. The point that is not yet widely grasped is that, seen historically, the statehood such as has been achieved was not only the work of the separatist volunteers, but was also the product of a new international order that resulted from the allied victory to which Irishmen also contributed. We also tend to forget that on the Western Front at least Irish soldiers were fighting to free homelands of France and Belgium from German occupation and possible annexation, and there was nothing particularly imperialist about that. People can serve their country with effect in different ways, and we should be slow to excoriate them for doing so.

Martin Mansergh
Tipperary, Co Tipperary

So, Irish statehood, "*such as has been achieved*", was not brought about by voting (which is not even mentioned), or by military action in defence of what had been voted for. It was established by the

"*new international order*" established by the defeat of Germany in the War to which Redmond had committed the Home Rule cause—which shows that "*People can serve their country in different ways*".

It was, he says, "*not only the work of the separatist volunteers*". But, if it was not only or chiefly their work, but was substantially the work of the enemy on which they had made war, then their work must have been counter-productive. The fact that they made war on Britain during its war on Germany, which was being fought for the principle of national statehood, would naturally have biased Britain against them when it was doling out statehoods in the moment of victory in 1919.

A "*dozen new states*" emerged in 1918 to 1923, "*including the Irish Free State*". But the others emerged in 1918-19, by grace of "*the new international order*" that was formalised by the Versailles Conference and its League of Nations adjunct.

By the time the Free State "*emerged*", the new international order was defunct. France was in serious conflict with Britain over the German border and was acting unilaterally. Italy, cheated of some of the territory 'awarded' to it by Britain by private arrangement in 1915 in order to lure it into war against Austria in defiance of a large body of public opinion (represented by the Socialist Party and the Vatican), was also acting unilaterally, led by Mussolini who in 1915 had acted with Britain to bring Italy into the War.

Japan—Britain's ally, which had protected Britain's Asian Empire during the War, found itself rejected by Britain under pressure from the United States; its motion for a statement on racial equality was rejected by the League of Nations—was acting unilaterally to secure its position as an Empire in the international order of things into which it had been forced by American warships in the 1850s.

Turkey had repudiated the Treaty dictated to it by the new international order and had waged a successful national war against it.

Greece—brought into the War against Turkey by a puppet Government set up by British invasion, and urged by Britain to invade and annex part of the Turkish mainland—found itself abandoned by Britain in the face of a strong Turkish resistance supported by France.

That was the "*new international order*" that conferred "*such statehood as has been achieved*" on the Free State in 1923.

That "*order*" had been a shambles long before 1923.

Nicholas Mansergh, while directing the British Ministry of Propaganda (which it preferred to call *Information*) in 1944, came to Dublin to deliver the *Lady Ardilaun Lectures* at the Princess Alexandra College for Protestant young ladies, and these Lectures were published in London as *The Coming Of The 1st World War* in 1947, which was used as a textbook in the Queen's University, Belfast, for a period. (Princess Alexandra College had become Alexandra College in common usage, and had broadened out in its intake, but Mansergh continued to call it by its given name.)

The master of the British war propaganda must have seen advantage in leaving the War for a while in order to lecture young ladies in Dublin. Jack Lane discovered that he tried to subvert the morale of neutral Ireland by various indirect means (see *Propaganda With Your Laxatives* y Jack Lane. *Irish Politicval Review*, June 2009/), and this presumably was also the purpose of his Lady Ardilaun Lectures.

Discussing the background to the War, he said that—

"the retreat of the Turkish Empire from Europe and the approaching disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy presented a series of political problems insoluble without war" (p9).

Well, Turkey had already withdrawn from Europe as much as it was going to do, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not disintegrate.

It is a technique of British propaganda history (the predominant kind) to speak of *disintegration* or *collapse* in place of *destruction*.

The Hapsburg Empire did not *disintegrate*, it was destroyed in a long war in which superior force was applied to it from the outside. There was no counterpart in Hapsburg territories of the 1916 Insurrection in the British Empire, and there had been no nationalist Home Rule movements in the Hapsburg territories such as had dominated politics in Ireland for generations. And there was no Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia waiting to be brought to birth by the British midwife.

The Empire that was in the grip of a disintegrative force which had a direct bearing on the War was the British Empire.

Mansergh does not mention this. He does not mention that the Irish Home Rule issue had brought British public life to a fever pitch verging on civil war, so that the sudden arrival of the opportunity to put into effect the preparations that had been made for war on Germany came as a relief.

"In South Eastern Europe it was the... impending destruction of the Dual Monarchy which made war inevitable under the old order... Fundamentally, it is not a question of disputes between states but of a transfer of sovereignty in order to reconcile institutional with political realities. In 1914 the peaceful abdication was not to be contemplated" (p245).

But what was the ideal of Arthur Griffith's Sinn Fein? A settlement between Ireland and Britain on the lines of the Dual Monarchy settlement between Austria and Hungary!

It was in the United Kingdom that peaceful accommodation between the Empire and national development—an accommodation not even involving sovereignty—could not be achieved, and that the attempt to achieve mere devolution brought the state to the verge of civil war.

The "*impending disintegration*" of the Hapsburg State had been averted by Dual Monarchy two generations past, and the Dual Monarchy was now feeling its way towards shaping itself into three dimensions, to include a Slav component. The incident in July 1914, that enabled Russia, France and Britain to put their "*understandings*" into effect was not the work of a Yugoslav movement that was striving to break free of the Dual Monarchy. It was just a terrorist act organised from outside by expansionist Serbia. It led, for reasons that had nothing to do with the alleged instability of the Dual Monarchy, to the European War which Britain boosted into a World War.

The "*surging, relentless tide of Balkan nationalism*", which "*must in the long run sweep away the bulwarks of the Austro-Hungarian Empire... from within*" (p245) gave rise to not a single insurrection against Vienna.

It was Britain that suffered the only nationalist Insurrection of the War.

But, after the United States had defeated Germany, Britain destroyed the Dual Monarchy and created independent "*nation states*" out of it.

Yugoslavia did not appear at Versailles clamouring for admission to the Conference: Ireland did, but was locked out.

Yugoslavia was not a nation state. It was created by Versailles from various discordant bits of the destroyed Dual Monarchy which were attached to Serbia. It had from the start internal forces of disintegration, which pulled themselves apart when Hitler provided the opportunity, reconnecting themselves with Austria—which, as a small fragment of the destroyed Hapsburg State of which it once

been the centre, had combined itself with Germany on nationalist grounds.

Czechoslovakia also did not knock at the door of the Versailles Conference Room. It was created within the Room. It did not suspect that it existed until the Rulers of the World (Britain and France) declared it to be a sovereign state. It was made up of five or six nationlities, and the ruling Czechs (a minority in the state) did not have the aptitude for making accommodations that the Dual Monarchy had.

Britain, which had destroyed the Dual Monarchy in 1918,, destroyed Czechoslovakia 20 years later by making a gift of the German region to Hitler—whereupon the large Hungarian minority seceded to Hungary and the Poles to Poland, and the Slovaks constructed their own state.

This was the substance of the national principle, as applied by the "*new order*" established by the War to which Redmond supplied scores of thousands of Volunteers.

Of the Versailles "*nation states*", the only one that had asserted its existence in arms during the War was the Polish one. But the Poles had not fought against Germany/Austria. They had, like James Connolly, fought against the *Entente* Allies, in alliance with Germany and the Dual Monarchy—so it was not the case that "*the gallant allies in Europe... were for nothing in all this*". (And presumably the reason the gallant allies did not commit themselves more heavily in Ireland was that they judged from the minimal response to Casement's recruiting that separatist Irish nationalism was a negligible fringe movement that would do nothing because the bulk of the national movement had been absorbed into the British Empire to the extent of *volunteering en masse* to fight for it when various means of compulsion were already having to be applied in England.

If the Dual Monarchy was broken up by strong national movements within—as the United Kingdom was—one would expect the result to be effective nation states. The two crucial Versailles states, thrown together for reasons of Anglo-French Imperial expediency, were dysfunctional from the start. And they gave rise to real instability in the European order of things, in place of the notional instability projected onto the Dual Monarchy by British propaganda.

The replacement of the Dual Monarchy by those Versailles concoctions gave rise to the widespread and deep anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe that gave vigorous popular life to the somewhat doctrinaire anti-Semitism of part of the Nazi elite. It was not in Germany that the killing of

Jews in public was a popular entertainment.

The Jews had a secure place as the commercial and professional class of the Dual Monarchy. They were entirely out of place in the little pieces of the Monarchy that were precipitated into extreme nationalism by Versailles, as nation-states that were not founded on comprehensive national development.

As for Woodrow Wilson: there was no Wilson era in European affairs. Wilson did not bring the national principle into the Allied war propaganda. It was put there at the start by Asquith and Lloyd George. It was the sentiment by which they gained Redmond as a war-recruiter and overwhelmed anti-War sentiment on the Liberal backbenches. The United States, after three years of profitable neutrality, had sound material reasons for entering the War—one reason being that Britain was in hock to it and the debt would have to be written off if Britain lost, as seemed likely.

It prevented Britain from losing, but Britain did not allow it to determine the peace arrangements, and the Versailles "Treaty" (dictated to Germany) was repudiated by Congress well before the Free State was established by war on the ruins of the Republic.

Lloyd George "*never recognised*" the application of the supposed Wilson principles to Ireland, and Wilson did not try to insist. Therefore, even supposing that the new order existed in some form, Ireland was not included under it.

The Oxford University Press—which has, I hear, become an Irish publishing house run by a Cork woman—published last year a book with the interesting title, *The Politics Of Self-Determination: Remaking Territories And National Identities In Europe, 1917=23*. It does not give an account of how Ireland was taken in hand by the new Wilsonian international order and set up as a state. Ireland is not mentioned in it. The name doesn't even appear in the Index. And it is admitted that there was no distinct Wilsonian element which superseded the British policy, or strategy, or rhetoric, of 1914. Wilson, at most, introduced a kind of wild idealism which Britain discounted, holding to its own original position as Wilson became increasingly confused by the complexity of the situation.

When Lloyd George was making war on the self-determined Irish Republic, he was questioned in Parliament by a remnant

of the Home Rule movement about how this was compatible with the war-time principle of national self-determination. He explained that national self-determination, as proclaimed by Britain, had been clearly intended to apply only to nationalities within the Hapsburg Empire.

Was that a piece of trickery by which Perfidious Albion slipped out of an engagement? Not in the least. As far as Ireland was concerned—and Ireland is the only case in point—there was never any suggestion that Westminster recognised a right of independence under its war policy. Irish independence continued to be ruled out of the question all through the war.

If the Home Rule leaders were deceived in this matter, they deceived themselves.

But I don't think they were deceived at all. They committed themselves to the Empire in August/September 1914, seeing a glorious future for themselves as partners in it. They no longer wished for national independence. But, after things went awry, with the Insurrection, and the Election, and the Versailles fiasco, some of them could not remember clearly what they had done in 1914. And it is possible that in 1914 the excitement of the war-drums had addled their brains. It's a thing that happens. But don't hold Lloyd George responsible for it. It's best to hold him to the catastrophic things for which he *was* responsible.

The Home Rule MP, T.P. O'Connor, became a through British Imperialist during the War and remained so afterwards, and was honoured by Churchill for it. The only real gripe he had was that Britain had not forced the Ulster Protestants under a Home Rule settlement. He would have relished that. But he found a substitute satisfaction in contemplating the subjection of a large body of Hungarians to the Czech State—which less than twenty years later was a factor in the undoing of the Versailles state of Czechoslovakia.

Mansergh asks us to "*acknowledge that Irish separatists had been waiting 60 years for Britain to become embroiled in an international conflict*". Very well. Let's acknowledge it. Everybody knows it.

"You that Mitchell's prayer have heard,
Send war in our time, O Lord!"
[Yeats]

So what? The British terms of the Union were that it could only be ended by force. Therefore those who wanted independence made preparations to fight for it at a favourable opportunity. The extent of the Fenian conspiracy, under close police supervision, indicates a

widespread desire for Independence.

It was a case of either/or. Either give up on Independence or be prepared to fight for it.

The Irish made preparations to get something they wanted in the only way that it could be got. Maybe they shouldn't have wanted it. But that is a different argument—an argument about something else. John Bruton's position seems to be that they would have been better off—or would have been better people?—if they had not wanted it. But to condemn them for trying to get it in the only way it could be got is irrational.

There is a third position, and I think it was held fairly widely though not articulated clearly: Irish independence was a worthy ideal but, since it could only be realised through war with Britain, it should not have been striven for.

What does that boil down to? Might is Right. Superior power must not be challenged on the only ground that it knows?

How should Home Rule militarism be commemorated in accordance with "*a better understanding*" of "*complicated realities*"? What exactly is there to "*respect*" in that militarism that got scores of thousands killed while failing to achieve its object—if its object was Home Rule?

The memory of it was not "*suppressed*" and survivors were, in my experience, not discriminated against. They were let be, and were sympathised with as have been militarised in support of a British cause by irresponsible leaders.

If we are to go beyond this, and have official commemorations (in the British style, which are tantamount to celebrations), what exactly is to be the focus of the commemoration?

Surely not the mere fact that they were recruited by war propaganda—one of the oldest and most common stories in the world.

If they are not to be treated simply as having been duped, and the fact that their response to the War drum was not rewarded by Home Rule is set aside, all that remains is the purpose for which Britain launched the World War. But that is not something that those with the "*better understanding*" have dwelt upon.

Some time ago, Vincent Browne was given a guided tour of a Great War exhibition at the Imperial War Museum by Keith Jeffrey, a British military historian who dabbles in Irish affairs. *But what was this War for?*, Browne asked at one point. Jeffrey was taken aback and groped for an

appropriate cliché.

It was an indecent question. Britain is a war-fighting state—as Tony Blair reminded it. What one discusses in connection with war is technique, heroism, duty. If one cannot take it that war is integral to the existence of Britain, and can only see each war as a particular event—a grotesque aberration requiring some extraordinary moral purpose to justify it—one simply cannot discuss warfare intelligibly on British terms.

Some years ago I heard the Ulster Unionist historian, Philip Orr, interviewed on Radio Eireann about the Somme etc. He explained that, from the 'Ulster' viewpoint, the World War was seen as an incident in the Home Rule conflict. He was not understood.

The Ulster Protestants were a people of the Empire. They were unquestioningly with the Empire in its wars. They did not require extraordinary reasons for being at war as an integral part of the Empire, but it so happened that in 1914 they had a particular local reason that gave additional edge to the cause. They vied with the Nationalists to show their worth in recruitment figures. The Home rule militarists, however, had no sound basic reason for making war in the ranks of the Empire. They had to be given extraordinary reasons. That was their weakness. They had too many reasons. They had a confusion of reasons.

It is difficult after the event, and in the light of what it led to in the world, to justify the War for "*Commemorative*" purposes without verging on the notion that war is a good thing in itself, whose 'sacrifices' should be celebrated without inquisitive probing of purposes.

Mansergh suggests that "*on the Western Front at least Irish soldiers were fighting to free homelands of France and Belgium from German occupation and possible annexation*". Desperate stuff!

In war between France and Germany the territory of one side is going to be occupied by the other. In 1870 France launched a war on Germany but ended up being occupied by Germany because it would not negotiate peace terms. In 1914 France had an annexationist claim on German territory, Germany had none on France. A degree of German occupation of French territory occurred entirely in the course of battle. And the European War (which Britain made a World War) happened because France and Russia made an alliance against Germany, each for an expansionist purpose, while Germany had

no annexationist claims on anybody. And the War was precipitated by Russian mobilisation to which Germany responded by declaring war on France.

For Ledwidge, a supporter of the anti-Redmond Irish Volunteers, aware of the duplicity of the British war-propaganda, enlistment was an act of personal eccentricity, or perverseness, or weakness. (He joined the regiment of his literary patron, Lord Dunsany.) He is reported as saying later that he considered Germany an enemy—on what grounds I do not know—and would not have it said that he would not let Ireland be defended against it by England. He professed Labour sympathies but before he enlisted James Connolly had gone strongly pro-Germany on Labour as well as anti-Imperialist ground. And the War he joined was not the War he was set to fight in the first instance. He was sent to Gallipoli to take part in the British war of conquest against the Muslim state, and later, as far as I recall, to Salonika and the invasion of Greece to compel it to declare war on the Turks. Of course he had no choice in the matter. Joining the British Army was one brief act of volunteering after which he had to go and try to kill whoever he was ordered to or be killed himself for being choosy.

After the Easter Rising he wrote his poem on MacDonagh and said other things indicating that he concluded that he was in the wrong army. But he just had to go on being wrong. In 1917:

"And now I'm drinking wine in France,
The helpless child of circumstance.
Tomorrow will be loud with war.
How will I be accounted for?"

He was killed at Ypres—but not until he had written a poem about *The Irish at Gallipoli*, who mingling their cross with England's—"Were they not one with Christ Who strove and died?"—so that by their joint efforts "*a land is sanctified/For Christ arisen*", and "*Liberty and Justice, Love and Peace*" were served.

That war of Christian re-sanctification of holy land that fell to the infidel has never ended.

The Turk was not only an infidel. He was also "*the sick man of Europe*". He "*collapsed*"—that is, the Ottoman State was defeated in four years of defensive war against the Russian, British and French Empires. In 1916 there was an 'Arab Revolt' in the form of a Muslim Jihad, proclaimed in Mecca at Britain's request and directed by Britain ('Lawrence of Arabia'). The terms of the Anglo-Mecca

agreement was that the Middle East should become an Arab Muslim state if the Turk was defeated, but what happened were that the Middle East was shared between Britain and France: and the Arabs who proclaimed an Arab State were made war upon, and crushed, in Damascus and Baghdad by France and Britain. Spurious nation-states were later set up in the region by the Great Powers of "*the new international order*" and have been manipulated against each other ever since.

Constantinople (Istanbul) was occupied by Britain and the Sultan was made to sign a humiliating 'Treaty'. During the War the Government of neutral Greece was toppled by British invasion and a puppet Government installed which declared war on Turkey. After the War that Government was urged by Britain to invade the Turkish mainland, annex Asia Minor, and restore the Greek Empire of ancient times. The invasion force enjoyed initial success, engaged in ethnic cleansing of the coastal towns, and plunged deep into Anatolia. It was met by a powerful Turkish resistance which drove it back to the sea—and Greece was abandoned to its fate by Britain.

That betrayal of Greece brought down the British War Coalition and led to the series of weak party Governments in the 1920s and National Coalitions in the 1930s that were unable to give purposeful government to the greatly expanded Empire of 1919, an Empire which the War Coalition had decided should have precedence over the League of Nations in world affairs. There was no new world order. There was only a mess.

Defeat by the Turks and the tearing up of the Turkish Treaty so soon after the masterful imposition of the Irish Treaty—that was a traumatic experience for the British State. But the Irish Treaty had been gained by a bluff, and the help of Michael Collins acting independently of his Government, and they knew it. The Irish Truce six months earlier had been shocking and the recuperative effect of the Treaty for the British body politic was quickly dispelled by the Turks.

The Irish War and the Turkish War debilitated the Imperial will and conditioned the working-out of things thereafter.

Imaginary history such as Mansergh gives us is a cheap propaganda device which presumes a great depth of public ignorance of circumstances. That ignorance has been industriously cultivated, under Oxbridge hegemony, by Irish Universities for the past forty years.

Brendan Clifford

Casement Diaries: An Untenable Thesis

Regarding Paul Hyde's letter (*Irish Political Review Feb 2017*) I wish to add a number of remarks to those contained in *An untenable Casement Diary Thesis* (*Irish Political Review, Jan 2017*).

Rev John Harris, secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society, Baptist clergyman and onetime close friend of Casement had been deeply distrustful of the rumours of 'degeneracy'. However, in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, of 19th July 1916, he wrote "*Sir Earnley Blackwell placed everything before me yesterday at the Home Office, and as a result, I must admit with the most painful reluctance that Sir Roger Casement revealed in this evidence is a very different man....*" (Kew—HO 144/1636/311643/3a) It is hard to conceive of Harris using the phrase "*placed everything before me*" if the very diaries themselves were absent.

The phrase "*placed everything before me*" suggests strongly Harris had an opportunity to match up the diaries with the typescripts and see if the contents complemented each other. However, the diaries are not described in his letter. Thus, a small possibility must be conceded that Harris could have viewed material other than the bound volumes we know today. But does this small possibility justify the conclusion: "*...the Intelligence chiefs did not show the bound volumes to any independent witness during the three-month period up to August 3rd*"? It does not.

Hyde stated "*However, there is no verifiable record that these volumes were shown to anyone in that period*" (25/04/1916 to date of execution). This statement is, very strictly speaking true (see above). However, with the interpretation of archival data by historians such strictness is not practical. Archives are not reference libraries containing complete and comprehensive narratives. Gaps need be filled by common sense and calculation informed by a sense of context.

A premise implicit in Hyde's article is that the showing of the volumes would have generated a well-defined archival impression. But this misses the secrecy and furtiveness in which the whole process was shrouded. A memorandum from Michael F Doyle, Casement's American attorney is in the National Library, Dublin describes his encounter with Casement in prison where he informed him about the rumours. "*Gavan Duffy and, myself then tried to locate this 'diary'... I never saw the alleged diary, or*

any part thereof, or even any statement thereof, in any photostatic or other form. Nor did I meet anyone who said he actually saw the diary, or even a photostatic copy of it..." (NLI—MS 17601 (4))

The effort to locate the diaries failed. The reason: secrecy was of the essence in how the state agencies handled the affair. They needed to prevent Casement's more vociferous supporters and legal team and Casement himself acquiring precise information on their contents and where they were kept. Had Duffy and Doyle succeeded (validity of the forgery case assumed) it would have had ramifications for what would happen next which are hard to estimate. It would have been possible for Duffy, defending solicitor, to publicly demand a viewing, thus placing the matter squarely in the public domain. Such a challenge could only provoke a curt "*no comment*". Yet, the situation would have been inflamed. There would have been a very disquieting effect on public opinion, particularly so in Ireland and America.

It is not farfetched, then, to imagine, viewers of the diaries had impressed on them the requirement not to communicate precise details. Reasons of state in time of war and reasons of propriety (a man's personal diary) could have been called upon. It is conceivable the Official Secrets Act came into play. Given the furtive way matters were conducted the lack of a substantial archival remnant is not all that surprising.

For the sake of argument let us ignore the Harris case above. The core thesis of Hyde's article is: "*That the Intelligence chiefs did not show the bound volumes to any independent witness during the three-month period up to August 3rd...*" The conclusion depends on a lack of archival evidence. Should a lack of archival evidence always and in every instance lead to a conclusion that certain events never happened? No, certainly not.

"*Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence*" is a well worn phrase. In a portrait gallery we might view a portrait of an elderly couple. No children surround them. Do we automatically conclude they had no children? We do not. The absence of children in the picture can have many explanations. To conclude they had none is to apply the logical fallacy, *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*, in English; argument from incomplete knowledge. Hyde's central argument is an application of this logical fallacy.

Hyde has applied the techniques of the criminal justice defence counsel outside their

proper context. The historian, ideally, interrogates events from the past realistically. The defence attorney, on the other hand, seeks to defend his client within rules laid down by the criminal justice system. He seeks to challenge the chain of prosecution evidence and seeks out weak links. One link deemed insufficient can lead to an acquittal. His first priority is to protect the assumed innocence of his client rather than to uncover a realistic interpretation of past events.

The arenas of the historian and the defence attorney are markedly different. Archives can not be treated as books of evidence. Within these two spheres of activity the grounds rules for how evidence is routinely treated must necessarily be different. Historical inquiry calls for a more subtle approach than the mechanical featuring down of a chain of evidence as features at a criminal trial.

Tim O'Sullivan

Review

Coogan's Bluff: Coolacree Re-visited

Philip Seán Coogan was a car mechanic and trader with a garage business in Donaghadee in Co. Down, which was burnt out in the Troubles in 1971. Over the past ten years or so he has written accounts of his family and personal history under a number of titles: *Famine and fortune: a remarkable true story spanning five generations of an Irish family*, also appearing as *Love and courage: a memoir* and *Collusion with Injustice*.

Extracts from the books can be read online in Google Books. One episode concerns his family's connection with the Pearsons of Coolacree in Co. Offaly, who were the subject of a controversial 2007 RTÉ documentary (*The Killings at Coolacree*) by Niamh Sammon, in which Eoghan Harris played a prominent part.

The Sammon/Harris thesis was that two of the Pearsons were murdered by the IRA for sectarian, landgrabbing reasons. The Aubane Historical Society's 2008 book *Coolacree: the True Story* established that the two Pearson brothers were justifiably executed for carrying out a successful armed attack on an IRA roadblock, and that there was no sectarian landgrab.

Various generations of Philip Coogan's family lived in Counties Monaghan, Tipperary, Offaly, Leitrim, Tyrone, and Dublin. He writes that his grandfather Owen Coogan, a Monaghan-born trader and weaver, joined the British Army, served in India, and retired

as Colonel in Crinkle Barracks in Birr, Co. Offaly. One would want to see some confirmation of such an elevation in rank, from squaddie to Colonel.

Coogan's account goes as follows. Owen married and bought an estate house and farm near Coolacree, becoming friendly with the Pearsons. His son Philip joined the new Air Corps of the British Army in the Great War, in which he may have jousting in the skies with the Red Barron (sic); and afterwards joined the Auxiliary force of the RIC in Ireland. Another son Owen served in the RIC in Tralee. Philip, a Catholic, courted Matilda Pearson, a Protestant, and visited there on his motorcycle. The loyalist Coogans were burned out by the IRA early in 1921. In June 1921, after an RIC patrol opened fire on the IRA at a roadblock, the two Pearson brothers were shot by the IRA and their house burned.

Afterwards, Matilda blamed Philip for drawing down the hostility of the IRA, and the romance ended. The Coogans and the Pearsons received compensation. The Pearsons moved to England and Australia, the Coogans set themselves up in business in an eating-house/home bakery near Omagh.

The author Philip Seán Coogan is the grandson of (Colonel) Owen Coogan, and son of a third brother Patrick Coogan. Much of the online bits of the memoirs is about harassment by the RUC, B-Specials and loyalists in Northern Ireland. The author, born 1937, has had a rather difficult life, and writes about it interestingly. He contracted tuberculosis as a child, and had a 'near death' experience, and also saw an apparition of the Virgin Mary. After the 1971 loyalist attack in Donaghadee he suffered from physical and mental ill-health, and was subsequently unable to work.

Coogan's account of Coolacree contradicts some known facts. The IRA roadblock was attacked by the Pearsons, not by an RIC police patrol. It is unlikely that grandfather Owen Coogan, Colonel or not, was comparable in financial means to William Pearson. The compensation received by the Pearsons enabled them to set up in some style, not only in England but also in Australia. The Coogans' Co. Tyrone café is not exactly the same. The author claims that his Auxie Uncle Philip, who he says joined the Free State Army and participated in an action which defeated the IRA in the Slieve Bloom area, was bosom buddies with Michael Collins. The Philip-Matilda story is implausible as doomed, romantic tragedy causing the Fall of the House of Pearson.

It is unlikely that Coogan's books will enable Eoghan Harris and Niamh Sammon to resurrect their failed atrocity propaganda.

Pat Muldowney

Irish Policy And Brexit

The following letter appeared in the *Irish Times* on 19th January

The strategy outlined by Theresa May for the UK's future trade relationship with the EU is to have membership of the single market in all but name, and to leave the customs union while retaining the main benefits. The two key objections to membership of the single market that she identified were free movement of people and supranational institutions, both of which were core principles of the Treaty of Rome, making a nonsense of the usual claim that the UK's real problem was the way the community developed after the 1975 referendum. The truth is that the UK is returning to its postwar preference for a global trade policy and a free-trade arrangement in Europe, neither of which it managed to achieve at that time. The development of bilateral free-trade agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Ceta) has encouraged the UK to believe that this strategy could work this time.

In their 1961 EEC application, the UK sought special terms on trade and agriculture, and the Six refused. This time a strategy of having most the benefits but few of the obligations of the single market is unlikely to survive first contact with the EU 27. As before, there are threats, then to withdraw troops from Europe and now to become a European "Singapore" with low tax and deregulation.

The EU will not be punishing the UK when it refuses to allow it to cherry-pick the trade aspects of the Treaty of Rome that it signed 45 years ago next Sunday. It will, in fact, be protecting the single market and ensuring that no European country can gain a competitive advantage by refusing to abide by its common rules.

The choice was made by the Six at a meeting in Messina in June 1955 to create a continental scale market with the four freedoms rather than a free-trade area. History and geography still matter in Europe, and that choice is unlikely to be overturned just because the English and Welsh have now changed their minds.

The UK's leverage in these negotiations will be weak compared to the EU. It sends 44 per cent of its exports to the EU, while the EU only sends 8 per cent to the UK.

The formal trade negotiations will not begin until the UK has left the EU in 2019, so if the UK leaves the single market at the same time, it will default to trade based on WTO tariffs. That would have very serious consequences here because 37 per cent of Irish agri-food exports goes to the UK. The farming and agri-food sectors would need significant financial assistance to protect jobs and secure new markets and support from the EU would be essential.

Over time, the UK would negotiate a free-trade agreement but it would not match existing arrangements, and most likely would still require concessions by the UK on free movement and EU regulations.

The best way to avoid a customs Border on this island is for Northern Ireland, exceptionally, to remain in the customs union but that would only be possible if the free-trade agreement includes the agri-food sector.

Whatever happens, Ireland's future will remain with the EU. The alternative would be a return to the UK's orbit and sterling; a cheap food policy that would destroy our farming and agri-food sectors; and replacing a market of 445 million people for one of 65 million.

Blair Horan

Some Comments

Blair Horan is a former Trade Union leader. Other recent pro-EU articles in the *Irish Times* from Catherine Day, a retired Secretary General of the EU Commission and Joe Mulholland, Director of the MacGill Summer School are indicative of a move inside the Irish Establishment that is pro-EU and anti-Britain. Brexit is a disaster for the pro-British element in Ireland and responses point up the shallowness and cravenness of Ireland's anglicisation project.

Dave Alvey

An English academic on Channel 4 in mid-January, speaking on Brexit, was quite bullish about the prospect of "no deal". He claimed that no deal will mean a reversion to WTO rules in which average tariffs are about 2%. However, the tariffs on Agricultural products are well into double digits. So it is likely that Irish agriculture will lose market share in the UK (to New Zealand/South America).

John Martin

Perhaps it's time Ireland stopped crying over spilled milk and instead got proactive developing new market relationships elsewhere before the inevitable happens. We've only been in the EU for the last 43 years! Britain has a population of some 60 million, the EU—even without Britain—has some 400 million. Even a small slice of that would compensate for the loss of easy access to the British market. It could only be a good thing—opening a wider window on the world to us than our traditional narrow Anglo-speaking one and providing some real competition for consumers. Incidentally, it is often cheaper to do shopping on the Internet in Europe than through English websites.

Nick Folley

Does
It
Up

Stack
?

ASIANS EXCEL IN TECHNOLOGY

It would appear from an examination of the technical and academic papers being produced now by mathematicians and scientists from Asian countries such as China that European and American countries are falling behind in the knowledge race. Take, for example, *The Journal of Navigation* which is produced in the UK by Cambridge University Press. In the November 2015 edition of this magazine, there is a list of fifty members of its Editorial Advisory Board, every one of whom is either a Professor or Doctor. Of the fifty-five, twenty-nine are UK, USA or Canada, five are from Australia/New Zealand, one Russian, three Croatians and two Polish and the other fifteen are Asian.

And yet, of the fifty authors of technical articles, only four had recognisably Anglo-American names, nine had Polish/Russian names, there were four Spanish/Portuguese names and the other thirty-three authors had Asian names—mostly Chinese. The articles ranged from "*Signal Biases Calibration for Precise Orbit Determination of the Chinese Area Positioning System using SLR and C-Band Transfer Ranging Observations*" and "*An Improved Geometry-free Three Carrier Ambiguity Resolution Method for the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System*" to "*Error Correction of Infrared Earth Radiance for Autonomous Navigation*".

The articles are largely in the area of physics and advanced mathematics. It is quite amazing to see how the Asian authors are beginning to predominate over authors from the rest of the world in recent years. Unfortunately, the graduates of Irish Universities do not seem to be in the same league, or is it that the Irish graduates are not publishing? It does not stack up!

What does seem obvious is that the editorial power resting in the present Editorial Board is bound to shift soon to the Asian authors of the technical articles and will shift as the members of the present Editorial Board pass their respective retirement dates if—as it seems quite possible—the Asians continue on their progressive path.

EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK?

The concept of "*equal pay for equal work*" is one which is often pursued by gender activists. But what is it? We know what equal pay means but what exactly does *equal work* mean? I was prompted to meditate on this recently when I was researching ancient building materials. In a very comprehensive book titled: '*Portland Cement*' by A.C. Davies, published by Concrete Publications Ltd., London, UK in 1934, the following paragraph is on page 258:

"Between 1914 and 1918 there arose an ever-increasing demand for cement for defence works and other military purposes. It became necessary to use not only prisoners of war, American negro troops and others in cement factories, but to call upon women to help..."

The book makes it abundantly clear that manufacturing and packing cement is a very dusty and dangerous business. The constituents of cement include typically lime, silica, alumina, ferric oxide, magnesia, sulphuric anhydride, potash, sodium etc. and the processes included grinding, burning and mixing thousands of tons of these dangerous ingredients. Power included electricity at 3,000 volts.

This was seriously dangerous work. Much worse than mining, it seems. No reference was made to equal pay. Maybe some, such as the prisoners of war got no pay at all? Very likely the "*American negro troops*" were paid more than the women and had less chance of being killed in the war than their non-negro American troops. But in the long term, they must all have suffered very much from respiratory problems due to the poisonous cement dust.

All of this led me on to think of the relative merits of passenger-bus drivers and surgeons. It is arguable that a bus driver in a big city will have to make more life and death decisions in an hour than a surgeon makes in a week. On the other hand, the bus driver would need to train for perhaps ten years to become a good surgeon, whereas a surgeon could become a good bus driver after a few weeks training. And then there is the argument that a bus driver can begin to be paid a good wage at eighteen years of age, whereas a surgeon is spending money on university fees and books/computer programmes, food, clothes and housing until qualifying after six or seven years and then working for small wages in a hospital for a few years. So the bus drivers lifetime earnings may be equal to or just short of the lifetime earnings of a surgeon.

Then again, there are the teachings of the Catholic Church and indeed also the communist doctrinal theories obviously taken from the former "*from each according to his/her ability and to each according to his/her needs*". This latter thinking has been long discarded by a greedy and impatient younger generation which has no respect for older, wiser and more experienced people. British Labour Party Leader Jeremy Corbyn raised another aspect when he recently said that, as well as a minimum wage, there should be a maximum wage so that so-called fat-cats would not be paid enormous remuneration. When asked what figure would he suggest as a cap on annual pay, he said £150,000 a year which happens to be just a little over his own annual pay, which was stated to be £138,000. So is it all subjective?

The word "*remuneration*" is for people at the top—captains of industry, Trade Union leaders, and politicians, and lower down the scale workers in offices get "*salaries*" and others are happy to get "*wages*". Just like the phrase: "*horses sweat, men perspire, and ladies glow*". Words and the abuse of words have been the cause of starting wars! And speaking of wars—it has been discovered by the US Army that women snipers are much more effective than men snipers, and so: should the women snipers be paid more than the men because the women shoot more of the enemy? Really, it all boils down to what exactly does "*equal work*" really mean?

SYRIAN WAR

The USA and UK (USUK) have been making a lot of noise and propaganda about the Russian bombing of Aleppo in the course of eliminating ISIS in the Syrian War. Russia is legally supporting the legitimate Government of Syria. USUK's interests have been in fomenting terrorism and civil war in Syria from Day One. It was their stated intention to get rid of President Assad and have another 'failed state' foisted on the world.

We remember the war crimes for which USUK were not prosecuted as war criminals, such as the Napalm bombing of civilian Tokyo on 9th March 1945 (which was described by military historian Victor Davis Hanson as "*the most lethal single day in the history of human conflict*"), the carpet bombing in two nuclear attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the napalm bombing of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and they are not finished napalm bombing yet, as witnessed by TLS photograph

(copyright US Marines) of a demonstration of napalm bombing at Miramar Air Show, Miramar, California on 1st October 2011.

And is not Nevada in USA?

"Drones manned from a Nevada Air Force base killed 200 people in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2013 of

whom only 35 were 'targets'..." according to a new book *'The Assassination Complex: Inside the US Government's Secret Drone Warfare Programme'* by Jeremy Scahill.

Aleppo was being terrorised by Western /Saudi-backed terrorists who were com-

mitting terrible war crimes on the Syrian population.

So do we take much notice of the feigned innocent outbursts of the US and the UK media about the legitimate bombing of Aleppo—Syrian—aided by Russia?

Michael Stack ©

BUS DISPUTE continued

an election which cannot be too far away.

There can be little doubt that defensive action by Unions has meant that the cost base of such publicly-provided services is higher than it might otherwise have been. But there is everything to be said for workers with a public service ethos to be valued by society—so long as they provide the good service that the travelling public needs and act for the good of all.

To achieve that kind of approach, transport workers should be given a strong voice on how their services are delivered. After all, they know the situation intimately.

That is certainly a better approach than splitting up routes and introducing spurious competition.

Kickback Against Globalism

David McWilliams has made an acute analysis of the reasons for the popular revolt against Globalism that has so far occurred in the two countries most responsible for its promotion, Britain and America—a revolt which is threatening to spread to France and other countries in the EU. Here is how he describes the kickback:

"...It was the great French romantic poet and novelist Victor Hugo who declared: *"You can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time has come"*

...The big idea whose time has come is nationalism and a desire to insulate a population that is threatened by globalisation. The big idea is not fixed or immutable, but rather is a scorecard of legitimate grievances that working people feel. This means immigration to some, job insecurity to others. It means cultural dilution to some and capacity pressure on the welfare state to others. It means a fall in living standards to some and a rise in inequality to others. Although it's unlikely to be a universal panacea, electorates are looking for the state to protect them from

these forces, which are generally being blamed on globalisation.

People want to be protected by a strong sovereign state from the threats that they feel are now ubiquitous, so protectionism replaces free trade, localism replaces globalism, borders replace openness, and nationalism and the heartland replace multinational and one-world solutions.

Ms Le Pen represents the alternative and she is a powerful political force, articulate, reasonable and highly electable. She wants France to leave the euro the day after she gets elected, she wants to tell the EU Commission to back off and she wants to kick-start French industry by allowing the French government to explicitly buy French manufacturing goods and to subsidise French industry. Both EU competition law and EU state-aid provisions prohibit such policies.

For Ms Le Pen, it is up to the EU to change, not France..." (*Irish Independent*, 11.2.17: *Ireland's financial destiny is in the hands of angry French voters...*)

While this analysis is spot-on, Mc Williams goes astray on further conclusions and remedies. He sees a vista of France exiting the Euro and the EU falling apart. Perhaps he is motivated by a desire to see Ireland back with in the British orbit: he would be of the view that Ireland is more *Boston than Berlin*. But the Irish affinity with America is more apparent than real. In many ways they are polar opposites. America is above all a society of Individualists, heavily marked by the Protestant dissidents who founded the first colony. Correspondingly social services are piecemeal and life expectancy well below what might be expected in the world capitalist leader. Ireland's big characteristic as a post-Catholic country, on the other hand, is its sense of community. That is why it was able to withstand the 2008 Financial Crisis (which is not over yet) and why it has some of the best social provision in Europe and the world.

The shock of Brexit to Europe has now given a chance to reverse the liberal/globalist direction which Britain superimposed on the original European social

model. This will not happen easily or overnight. The EU Commission is a huge ship and cannot turn around quickly. The Competition Secretariat alone, for example, has over 500 staff, recruited on the basis of the mantra that increased competition is good.

The answer to Le Pen and to other forces which want to resist Globalist trends within Europe is for Europe itself to return to its Protectionist roots. And the obsession with breaking up publicly-owned industry must give way to seeing the necessity for State involvement in, and direction of, the production process.

If the European Commission is unable to undertake a retrenchment and to return to its founding protectionist values, there could be a break-up. But it is far more likely that there are countries in Europe who are eager to throw off the liberalising economic mantras introduced by Britain and return to a more social market form of capitalism.

Angela Clifford

IF ONLY...

Can a nation be born through
virgin birth
without bullets and mines sown
in the earth
then Dev would have been
a carpenter
his son a whiteboard of all our sins
a harbinger
but his mother wept at the foot
of a cross
it seems there is no gain without
a loss

Wilson John Haire
20 February, 2017



Bus Dispute

When Britain exits the EU it will leave behind a legacy of destructive 'liberal' law, ostensibly to encourage the provision of low-cost services to the consumer, but in reality designed to destroy social rights established by hard-fought action by Trade Union members down the decades.

The current Bus Dispute illustrates the cause in point. Ireland established some reasonably good inter-city 'Expressway' bus systems to link various towns and cities. And the thing with a publicly-owned bus service is that the profitable routes subsidise the less-used routes—routes which are still needed, even if by 'uneconomic' numbers of people.

One may take the view that people should not live in small communities or out in the countryside. Or, if they do wish to live in this backward way, they have to run cars or be affluent enough to travel by taxi. Certainly that would be the approach of An Taisce, which advocates urbanised living in the countryside.

However that is not the Irish way. And it is certainly not 'green' to insist on a 'one person/one car' policy in the countryside.

Ireland established a reasonably good country bus and 'Expressway' bus system to provide rural transport. The service required some, but not a great deal, of subsidy from the Government. What helped was that surplus from profitable routes could subsidise loss-making areas.

That was a model which operated throughout Europe. Then the EU came under British influence and started setting regulations about how national Governments conduct such affairs. Margaret Thatcher started promoting her 'liberalising' agenda, and giving State tax money to the private sector. And where the Tories left off, Labour's Tony Blair enlarged that bridgehead. Over the years a raft of market 'liberalising' legislation has been introduced. And the worst of it is that the

whole thing operates on a ratchet basis. Once a service is put out to competition from the private sector, it cannot be taken back to be directly run for the public benefit any more. It is the end of direct social provision.

There was no necessity on Irish Governments to follow this route, but a succession of liberal-influenced Governments went that way.

In this instance, the Commission encourages spurious competition on inter-city bus services.

In Ireland some of the Expressway bus routes, on which there was money to be made, were put out to competitive tendering. This meant that the State operator had to compete against the private sector to run routes. But the State operator has a big structure behind it, enabling it to service all sorts of routes. It cannot be a slim operator with low office costs as a one-route operator can. And the more routes are taken from the national operator, the more top-heavy does the State operation become.

The private operator is under no obligation to service all the towns on a particular route. By missing out stops at lesser-used destinations, they can attract passengers looking for a faster journey. The result of this is that the State operator is left with fewer passengers to cover a larger cost-base.

And with fewer passengers, the running costs become disproportionate. What would make sense in this situation is to bring the privatised services back into the public domain—but EU regulations make that problematic.

Another thing that could be done is for the State to give an extra subsidy to the State company to pay for the social service performed by stopping at out-of-the-way towns and villages, but EU regulation does not allow that. The Government would have to put the schedule in question out to tender again after deciding to provide this subsidy, and there is nothing to prevent the private companies from tendering for it and under-cutting the public provider.

After all of this, what was a reasonably well-balanced public service before 'competition' was introduced has become unwieldy and inefficient. The loss of passengers has meant that the overhead per passenger carried by the publicly-owned buses is too heavy to sustain.

Under this present Government there is little hope of tackling the issue as it should be—with a direct demand to the EU that Competition rules should be relaxed to enable all bus routes to be taken back under a single public authority, which would run them as a service rather than on a profit basis.

Instead the move is to cut pay and conditions in the public service—and starting at the bottom, rather than at the top! The only constraint is the instability of the coalition and fear of public anger in

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