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Centenaries And Current Politics

This month marks the centenary of the moment when the Irish failed to become British. They did their best, but they just weren't up to it. They were shepherded into the British wars on Germany and Turkey and 50,000 of them died loyally for the cause, asking no impertinent questions about what it was. And they were cheered on by the population at home. And then, a month after the victory celebrations, they voted for Sinn Fein.

They forgot for a moment in the polling booth what they were destined to become. They acted as if they were something already, and they voted to give effect to what they were. This led within the year to a war with the State for which they had been making war for four years. The British just could not understand such fickleness.

Major Street, in his authoritative *Administration of Ireland In 1920*, was of the opinion that they just did not know what they were doing, and that they would soon return to their senses if they were treated with a firm hand. And it appears that he was right, even though the return to sanity took a little bit longer than he anticipated.

What is being celebrated in this centenary year is not the anomaly of the December 1918 Election, but the Irish contribution to the great British victory of November 1918, which destroyed the German and Turkish States—a victory which was exploited by Britain in ways that produced Fascism and Nazism in the 1920s and 1930s, and “*Islamic terrorism*” today.

No history of the 1918 Election has ever been published, and we know of no plans to commemorate it—even with an obscure ceremony in some out-of-the-way place—in 2018. One of the main developments during the past generation in the state to which that Election gave rise is that it has abolished its history. Its historians have abolished its history.

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Pandering To Democracy!

Franz Timmermans is First Vice-President of the Commission, a leading Commissioner, a leading representative of the European Centre Left and a very likely candidate to replace Juncker. He personifies the EU in most political areas. But he is a worried man.

Speaking of the coming European Election he says:

"There is a lot at stake. This is the first European election that's not about a bit more to the left or a bit more to the right, but about, 'Are we going to have a European Union in the future?'..." (FT, 10 October 2018).

He later added: "*Europe is going through an existential crisis...*" "*What was unimaginable before now becomes imaginable: the disintegration of the European project*" (22 October, speaking at the traditional annual State of Europe event of *Friends of Europe*, a Brussels-based think tank).

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Part 9

Ireland, Brexit and the future of the EU: *Summary and Conclusions*

This series of articles was undertaken as a contribution to the Irish debate on Brexit. As a result of the UK referendum vote in June 2016, Ireland needed to choose between alignment with the EU or the UK; after a period of months it chose the former but the matter has not been definitively resolved, pending the outcome of the Brexit negotiations.

In the debate it behoves those on the pro-EU side, as I am, to assess the EU's role in the 2008-2015 Irish economic crisis and, working from the experience of those years, to suggest objectives/problems that need to be addressed in the future of the EU debate. Covering that ground was one purpose of the series.

A secondary purpose was to contribute to a debate initiated by Sinn Fein MEP Matt Carthy. Carthy commissioned Emma Clancy, a Sinn Fein official who does work for the GUE/NGL grouping of hard Left representatives in the European Parliament, to produce a document stating the European Left position on the Euro. To answer Clancy's case—which is set out in "*The Future of the Eurozone*"—it was necessary to answer the arguments of a source she cites repeatedly, US economist Joseph Stiglitz.

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It must be presumed that these historians, in doing what they have done, have given effect to the wishes of established authorities in the state. It is not conceivable that a resentful Anglo-Irishman like Roy Foster, or an Australian ignoramus like David Fitzpatrick, or a chancer like Peter Hart, could have become such influential propagators of anti-national history if there was not a consensus amongst those directing the state that it was an accidental concoction without the substance that would enable it to bear its history and develop through it, and that its history should therefore be shredded.

Mary Kenny (who, like Ruth Dudley Edwards, deplores political violence and bloodshed) celebrated the militaristic Redmondite victory of November 1918 by praising a Wicklow village that had sent almost all of its militarily eligible males, including a father and son, into the British Army to kill Germans and Turks—and of course to be killed by them, but since they were not blood-sacrificers, a thing which Kenny detests, their purpose was to go killing. (See Mary Kenny, *More Men From Rathnew Volunteered For WWI Than*

From Anywhere Else, Irish Indep., 4.11.18.)

And with what object? To save the world from something dreadful? Or just to ensure that Ireland would become a Home Rule component of the Empire?

Philip Off, the Ulster Unionist historian, astonished an RTE interviewer by explaining that Ulster Unionists saw the World War as an incident in the Home Rule conflict. 'Ulster' would not be subordinated to the Irish, even if the Irish were playacting at Empire Loyalty in order to get them. And 'Ulster', though greatly diminished in quantity, remains in spirit what it was back in those times, while nationalist Ireland has flip-flopped this way and that.

But it is only in the intellectual sphere as shaped by British academic patronage, that the Irish have flip-flopped. Its constancy lies in its music. And music, as Schopenhauer said, is a direct expression of the will, of "identity", which is not dependent on "ideas", which made up the other part of Schopenhauer's scheme. But in the long run the will rejects ideas which are inimical to it, and generates ideas that serve it.

"We are the music-makers,
We are the music makers,
We are the dreamers of dreams.
We are the movers and shakers
Of the world it seems."

England lost the art of music many centuries ago, when it sacrificed everything else in itself for Power. A vestige of it survives in the making of ceremonial hymns. In the early 20th century it survived most in Edward Elgar, who had some connection with Merrie England through Roman Catholicism. But when Elgar tried to set O'Shaughnessy's *Music Makers* to music he could not catch the spirit of it and only produced an uninspiring hymn.

There is one frank English poem about the War:

"This is no case of petty right or wrong
That politicians or philosophers
Can judge. I hate not Germans, nor
grow hot
With love of Englishmen, to please the
newspapers.
Beside my hate for one fat patriot
My hatred for the Kaiser is love true...
I am one crying, God save England...
...
The ages made her that made us from
dust:
She is all we know and live by, and we
trust
She is good and must endure, loving
her so:
And as we love ourselves we hate her
foe."

The matter was strictly nationalist. And Edward Thomas, author of a biography of Marlborough, knew that English national well-being depended on Empire, which depended on keeping Europe disabled by war. He did not have to bother his head in puzzling "*between justice and injustice*", or being concerned about "*something that historians/can rake out of the ashes*". All that counted was that he was English.

And that was why the Irish, fed by Redmond with transcendental abstractions about war for a higher cause, failed in the moment of victory, after they had made the supreme sacrifice, and fell back on themselves a month later.

The colonial ignoramus, who has moved from Trinity College to Belfast, wrote a book about *The Two Islands* for the Oxford University Press, in which he explained that—"*The partition of Ireland created two states embodying rival ideologies and representing two hostile peoples*". Each of these states had a civil war. And—

"the political alignments cemented in the two civil wars continued to dominate

political debate, restricting the opportunity for social and economic reform.”

He does not specify what social and economic reform he had in mind (so to speak). If he meant anything definite, it can only have been the British reform during the years covered by the book: 1919-39. Europe was in flux, largely as a result of British action on it, during those years. It is true that the Free State, though remaining in the Empire, did not follow the British path of reform. The Irish reformers were the Treaty breakers. But which British reform did the Northern "state" resist? Wasn't it the case that the Unionist Party, after agreeing to operate a devolved system in the Six Counties, outside the political life of the British state, as a "supreme sacrifice" to help Britain with the handling of the rebellious Irish, insisted that it would be included within the social and economic reform of the British state?

The critique of the Northern Ireland system made by this magazine over a long period appears to be known to Fitzpatrick and he attempts a refutation of it for Oxford University:

"The 'Partition act' broke with precedent by applying Home Rule to Northern Ireland, instead of simply excluding six counties from Dublin jurisdiction, or creating a Belfast assembly subordinate to Dublin and thence to Westminster. Those options no longer seemed viable, having formed the basis of repeated and fruitless negotiations in 1914, 1916, not to mention the Irish Convention of 1917-18" (p185).

A Six County assembly subordinate to Dublin was certainly not viable. But when had a simple exclusion of the Six Counties, from whatever arrangement was made for the 26 Counties, ever become a subject of dispute? When did the Ulster Unionists ever object to being governed by British politics after they were excluded from a *Government of Ireland Act*? The Ulster Protestants had participated in British party-politics until the Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1886. In 1886 the Ulster Liberals and Tories merged their forces as *Unionists* in order to oppose Home Rule. They did so in alliance with the Tory Party. If it was the Tory Party that had made the Home Rule alliance with Parnell, as seemed likely for a while, they would have done so in alliance with the Liberals. The natural thing, when the issue was resolved for them by Partition, would have been a reversion to the pre-1886 position of being Tories and Liberals within British politics—but with the Labour Party having displaced the Liberals.

Redmondism!

Those reviews in *Irish Political Review* concerning John Redmond's career are excellent. I have some account, in my 'CRY OF THE CURLEW', of the violence at the 1918 elections in Waterford city. My father, then a tough teenager from an Old Parish cliff-top farm, was one of several West Waterford Brigade men brought down to the city to help protect the Republican voters from the Ballybricken mob. They were armed with hurleys and "ash plants" and, according to the Witness Statements that mention the episode, only Mick Mansfield (my Dad's first cousin) and George Lennon were armed; they both were reported as carrying revolvers.

By the way, a very long memory of mine is to have seen Mrs. Bridget Redmond campaigning for Fine Gael here in Ardmore, on the back of a local merchant's lorry, parked outside the church, after Mass one Sunday. It was a very windy day and I recall the local Hotelier kneeling behind her to hold down her long dress in order not to expose her legs (knees even ???) She was being treated like royalty by the farmers, I remember.

Tommy Mooney
Ardmore

Messing With History!

I am not surprised that the Junior Cert History book 'Making History' has omitted any mention of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in which 33 civilians were killed. After all the Government tried to airbrush the 1916 Rising from history when on the 100th anniversary of the Rising they planned a kind of a dolly mixture of a homage cum apologia involving Bono and Bob Geldof and at one stage they were hoping to have the Queen of England present. The plan was also to omit the names of the executed leaders. They only abandoned this exercise in shoneenism when they learned of the thousands that marched through Dublin, from City Hall to Glasnevin (censored by the Irish TV and media) in the Sinn Fein commemoration in 2015 of the panegyric by Pádraig Pearse at the graveside of O'Donovan Rossa.

Simon O'Donnell
(13.11.18)

When the Government in 1920 proposed to set up a subordinate Six County Government, the Ulster Unionist Leader spoke against it. Did the Nationalist Party demand it? Did the Six County Catholics demand that, if they were to be excluded from the Irish Government, they should be placed under the local Protestant/Unionist community, instead of having the opportunities of Whitehall Government and British Party politics open to them?

We have never come across the slightest hint that the Six County Catholics demanded an enclave governed by Six County Protestants—by what they called "*the Orange state*" once it was established—rather than by Whitehall. So what grounds has Professor Fitzpatrick for saying that a simple Six County exclusion from the Government of Ireland Bill "*was no longer viable*" in 1920? None at all.

The establishment of Northern Ireland was an Imperial ploy for the handling of the nationalist Irish which the Ulster Unionists were persuaded to swallow in the interest of the Empire. By swallowing

it they detached themselves from British political life, and therefore, when British attention focussed on them in recent years, it could only regard them as a bizarre nuisance.

We attempted, thirty years ago, to persuade them to force their way into British mainstream politics, so that the Six Counties might be governed within the democracy of the state. But they had become addicted to the system that had been imposed on them against their will in 1921 and would hear of nothing else, even though their position within that system of devolved communal antagonism was being eroded steadily by the purposeful activity of the other community.

With regard to whatever happens now we can only say, with Moliere: "*Vous l'avez voulu, George Dandin*". They asked for it, not knowing what they were asking for.

The force that is cornering them just now is not the force of Irish nationalism. Official Ireland is preoccupied with celebrating "*the crime against Europe*" (Casement's phrase) in which, as

Redmondism, it took part a century ago—or, as Connolly put it, “the war upon the German nation”. The hostile force is behind Dublin. It is Europe.

The founders of what became the EU were acutely aware of the damage Britain did to Europe with its “balance-of-power” wars and they wanted to stop it. Europe pulled itself together in the 1950s, very much against British expectations. Britain tried to join the Common Market in the 1960s in order to retard its development, but the founders, who were still in command, kept it out. It gained entry in the 1970s and did some damage, but European development continued despite it.

It decided to leave in order to avoid being degraded into a mere European state, and hoped that, in the course of leaving, it could set off a process of disintegration within the EU.

But the EU has held together against it so far, and it is hard to resist the impression that the spirit of its founders are motivating it in its insistence that Britain, in leaving, must leave Northern Ireland behind it as part of Ireland.

Major C.J.C. Street: The Administration Of Ireland, 1920; with a substantial extract from his Ireland In 1921 and a review of his other writings on Britain's world role, and inter-war Europe. Introduction by Dr. Pat Walsh. Intelligence Officer Street produced this exceptionally informative justification of the Black and Tan War in Ireland, using the secret archives of Dublin Castle (with many captured IRA documents and officials statistics of incidents.) €18, £15 postfree

Pandering To Democracy!

continued

The great threat is seen as the rise of populism and the extraordinary thing is that this populism is counterposed to democracy—as if democracy is not populist by its very nature. Populism is regarded as demagoguery, but democracy and demagoguery are as related as much in practice as they are etymologically. Is it not the rule of the people, by the people for the people? And populism is simply an extension of this ideology—it is just more democracy.

How can it have gone so wrong as to threaten the EU which prides itself on consisting of democratic states and that is lauded as its great, unique strength in today's world? Its very *raison d'être*!

The fact is that the European project was never based on democracy. It could not have been. It was not anti-democratic—

rather *ademocratic*. A project such as European integration, the creation of a new polity, could not be voted into existence. Something that does not yet exist cannot be voted for or against. It has first to be created. The cart cannot be put before the horse.

Democracy is simply a mechanism for running a polity when such is established. Hence any polity, such as represented by the major states of the world, were first established by wars and/or revolutions and only then was the routine of running them left safely to democracy (in most instances), whether of the liberal or totalitarian kind.

The European project was unusual in that it was attempted by non-violent, ademocratic means, but that necessitated a very self-conscious guiding elite to carry it through—an elite not obliged to depend on the whims of democracy. Such a group, based on Christian Democracy, initiated the project and it created a unique institution to carry it through—the Commission. The Commissioners were nominated by the Member Governments, as they nominate ambassadors, judges etc., and so it was not anti-democratic. But the scheme created the basis of something new and separate from the Member States; and the Commissioners swore allegiance to the new Europe.

This was a delicate business to work out, as nation states were not likely to give up their sovereignty—eventually necessary if the European project was to succeed. The Commission had to establish its credentials and justify its existence at the expense of some of the prerogatives of the Nation states and and it had to do it in very concrete ways that established the inadequacies of the states. This was done in several areas for many years.

As it became more established, the EU project became more and more democratic, with the setting up of the Council in 1974, the European Parliament directly elected in 1979, and a constitution—that became a Treaty to be accepted by all Member States in 2009. All these developments were justified in the name of democracy. But the irony is that the project did not solidify accordingly. The more democracy was introduced, the more problematic became the project.

By contrast there has been one development that was carried out and implemented that has been so successful that, if it did not exist, it is hard to imagine any meaningful European entity at all existing without it today. According to polls, it is more

popular than EU itself and it impacts on every aspect of people's lives. It was done without democratic consultation or prior agreement of the peoples of Europe but it exists and thrives. It is the Euro.

If the peoples of Europe had been asked to vote away their functioning currencies and replace them with a new untried currency, it is most unlikely to have happened. It would have looked like a mad idea. The Euro was a *fait accompli* by an inner circle—Delors, Mitterrand and Kohl—which defied all democratic concerns and acted in the spirit of the founding fathers. Hence its success despite all its problems.

Critics of the EU have carried on non-stop about the EU's *democratic deficit*, a complaint which was perfectly true but the EU leaders have never explained its genesis, nor defended that deficit as a necessity for the project in hand.

Democracy has become an ideology that simply prevents realistic thinking. It has become a fetish. Until those who are serious about the European project get realistic and stop pandering to this ideology they are on a hiding to nothing.

Jack Lane

Ireland, Brexit and the future of the EU

continued

The first section of this article contains a detailed summary of the previous eight articles. Other sections draw some overall conclusions and make statements about the future of the EU.

A SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS

The opening article in the series, noting the architectural flaws in the Eurozone, concluded that these were peripheral to the causes of the Irish Crash. The main causes were home-grown expressions of neo-liberalism: banking practices, light touch regulation and political interventions from former Fianna Fail Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy and his allies in the Cabinet, the Progressive Democrats party. The populist trope that the Eurozone was to blame for the Irish financial crisis does not stand up.

The second instalment attempted to show that the case argued by Joseph Stiglitz, a major influence on Irish critics of the Euro, is essentially apolitical. Stiglitz provides useful polemical points exposing the technocratic rationale underpinning the European Central Bank (ECB)—but he fails to see that, as a factor, the single

currency is independent of the market fundamentalism that prevailed at the time of its conception. He has no answer to the argument of European defenders of the Euro, like Guillaume Duval, that the Eurozone could never have met the requirements of an optical currency area until it had existed in actual social life for decades.

Part 3 took up a central question of the series: the EU response to the Irish Crash. The article highlighted the verdicts of three economists: **Alan Ahearne**, a one time advisor to Minister Brian Lenihan, **Barry Eichengreen** from the International Monetary Fund, and **Jean Pisani-Ferry** from the EU elite. Trenchant criticism of the EU by Ahearne and Eichengreen provided a partial view which was balanced out by Pisani-Ferry's European perspective.

The disarray that characterised the deliberations of the EU leadership from the beginning of the crisis in 2008 until 2012 undoubtedly aggravated Ireland's economic woes, putting it mildly. However, it should not be forgotten that, even in the worst days of the crisis, membership of the Eurozone remained advantageous to Ireland. The traded sector of the economy, much of which is contingent on Ireland being a member of the Eurozone and EU, was a mainstay of the export performance that led the Irish recovery. Mario Draghi's *'whatever it takes'* speech in July 2012 also assisted the country's successful exit from the Troika programme the following year.

The fourth part of the series, which was a reflection on the EU response to the Irish crisis, had two conclusions. The first was that the ordoliberal/neo-liberal orientation of the EU, which contributed hugely to causing the crisis, is not so deeply embedded as to be definitive of the Union. Economic liberalism can be challenged and defeated in the EU in the same way that it was defeated in West Germany in the 1950s.

The second conclusion was that the Eurozone is a work in progress, an incomplete process. The failure of European leaders to properly consolidate their new currency constitutes a second EU-grown cause of the crisis. As a currency without a state apparatus behind it, the Euro is vulnerable to shocks as occurred after 2008. Institutional arrangements at European level that mimic the functions of a state—like Banking Union, the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact—need to be fully delivered, and need to be buttressed by other integrationist reforms.

Part 5 moved away from the main theme of the series to address the anti-austerity

arguments of the Left, specifically of Sinn Fein's Emma Clancy. A case was made in the article that, as a small open economy, Ireland is unsuited to the application of Keynesian policies, all the more so when the public finances are in massive deficit.

Main points of the article were that the Lenihan plan, which formed the basis of the Troika programme, was basically sound, and that knowledge of economic history in its political context provides a stronger basis for assessing economic policy requirements than the theoretical approach of thinkers like Stiglitz and Krugman on whom Emma Clancy relies.

It is right that the Greek crisis should receive special attention in any account of the Euro-debt saga and the next three instalments addressed it. The greatest problems in the crisis related to Greece and it was in their dealings with that country that the Brussels institutions could be seen at their worst. Part 6 provided a straight narrative of the story. In Part 7 five questions that cut to the heart of the EU's culpability were answered. In a summarised form the answers are as follows.

When the extent of the economic disaster facing Greece became known in early 2010, defence of the French and German banking systems became the priority of the Brussels institutions. Realistically, given that these are the two largest economies of the Eurozone, and given that their banks had been massively exposed to the US financial crisis, it was probably necessary to EU survival that such a priority should have been followed.

This initial response to Greece set the template for the EU in dealing with the crisis, an unfortunate development in that a more constructive approach became possible after the 2012 restructuring of Greek debt. A puritanical, northern European bias against the profligate economies of the southern periphery then caught hold of EU policy.

Under extreme pressure from international markets and global leaders, EU leaders eventually initiated reforms, the most important of which is Banking Union, as a way of addressing the crisis. In that way it is possible to say that some lessons have been learned, but the overriding lesson—that the imposition of doctrinaire liberalism on the people of Europe through the agency of EU institutions, especially evident in the financial sector, was a primary cause of the crisis—has yet to be acknowledged.

The main point in Part 8 was that, where the EU had been at fault in its treatment

of Greece, part of the responsibility for what happened lay on the Greek side. Fault lines running through the populism of the Syriza coalition prevented it from reaching a workable accommodation with Brussels. Ultimately Greece was handicapped in its EU membership by the traumas of its own history. That national consciousness never fully took root in Greece, largely as a result of foreign interventions, explains the corruption and clientelism that still characterises the State machine.

A further lesson of the crisis is that, contrary to the usual narrative of the EU elite, that which is national and that which is European are not opposites. Greece would function better in the EU if its national consciousness was stronger.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

In Part 2 of the series an incoherence at the centre of Sinn Fein's view of the Eurozone was identified. This incoherence, far from being a problem confined to the nationalist Left, is symptomatic of a short-termism and agnosticism that has marked the attitude to the EU of much of the Irish political class in recent decades. One clear benefit of the Brexit debate will be if it forces a critical review of that short-termism. First however, it will be instructive to examine where a well-constructed, well-researched analysis of the Eurozone by a Sinn Fein official falls apart.

At a key moment in her document Emma Clancy says:

"Rather than focus on the question of whether the Eurozone is a viable arrangement in the long term, this paper aims to discuss solutions to pressing problems in the short and medium term during a period of political crisis in Europe" (p. 63).

Later when she gets down to specifying reform proposals she further elaborates that:

"In the current context, the deepening and expansion of the Eurozone should be resisted by the Left. If this sounds like a defensive position, that's because, unfortunately, it is" (p. 66).

So the European Left should focus on solutions to pressing problems, reforms that shore up the Eurozone like Banking Union and a deposit insurance scheme at EU level, even though in the long term the Euro is a *"straightjacket"*. The use of the word *"defensive"* in the second sentence can only mean that, because supporting the Euro is incompatible with Leftist ideology, priority must be given to defending that ideology regardless of other considerations.

In opposition to this incoherence, I would argue that the Euro is here to stay.

Once that fact is recognised, it follows that the policy focus should be on delivering reforms that consolidate the currency and the apparatus behind it. As was argued throughout the series, that means decontaminating the ECB from the influence of neo-liberal ideology and subjecting it to political control.

It means developing controls over the financial sector at EU level, moving to a point where a safe European asset whether in the form Eurobonds or something similar, can provide cheaper finance to the Governments of the Euro area, and transforming the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund—exercising a policy-forming role on top of its financial role.

The specifics of these reforms will always be open to debate and my proposals here are not intended to be set in stone. The critical point is that the EU needs to follow through on the expectation that accompanied the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that Economic and Monetary Union would be a stepping stone to a form of political unification along federal lines which would continue to accommodate the contributions of strong national Governments.

At a *Citizens' Dialogue* consultation meeting on the EU in Navan (April 19 2018), I argued during a roving mike discussion that Ireland had suffered major losses as a result of the incomplete state of the Eurozone, that it was in the national interest to ensure that the lessons of the crisis were learned, and that the Eurozone needed to be stabilised through various reforms. The unhesitating reply from Minister Helen McEntee was that *yes we need to learn the lessons but we also need to resist the drive for greater integration*. That view is rarely stated but has been Government policy since the 2000s. The incoherent argument at the centre of Sinn Fein's document is echoed in Government policy.

The attitude to the EU that Minister McEntee expressed is undoubtedly shared by a sizeable portion of Irish political opinion and indeed of the electorate. Acknowledging the validity and value of such thinking, I would characterise her viewpoint as the product of an instinctual rather than a thoughtful conservatism. A national community that allows itself to be led in this way agrees to cede an element of control over its destiny. Words appropriate to the process might be: passivity, anonymity, smallness, mindlessness, atomisation. The act of thinking is confronting us with an unwelcome reality so let's solve the problem by not thinking.

*

In Part 3 of the series, which examined the EU response to Ireland's crisis, extracts from accounts by Alan Ahearne and Barry Eichengreen showed that the EU aggravated the Irish recovery more than it assisted it. This is evident in numerous developments described in the extracts. Mishandling of the Greek crisis in early 2010 undermined international confidence in the other troubled economies of the Euro area, especially that of Ireland. As Irish banks became increasingly dependent on borrowings from the ECB system later that year, senior officials in Frankfurt briefed market investors about weaknesses in the Irish financial system, in that way pushing up the cost of Irish Bonds. Around about the same time hopes that the ECB would purchase Irish Bonds were dashed. Then Merkel and Sarkozy spooked the markets even more by announcing at Deauville that bailout countries might need to default on their sovereign debt. And so on.

The European perspective provided in the same article in extracts from Jean Pisani Ferry's book on the Euro crisis balance out the picture by showing the enormous difficulty that the ECB faced during the years of crisis. As I tried to show in Part 7, again quoting from Pisani Ferry, the difficult lesson that needed to be learned was that too much power in the Eurozone operated at the national level. It was not until the Spring of 2012 that the measure of further Eurozone integration that later became known as Banking Union was agreed to. As Pisani Ferry describes it: "*Responsibility for supervising and, if needed rescuing or closing down banks, had to be moved to the European level*" (p. 16). The clear lesson of the years from 2008 to 2012 was that the creation of the Euro currency was incomplete and that completing it entails a significant measure of further integration at the European level.

A first conclusion from the series, therefore, is that Ireland, arising from its experience of the crisis in which the half-formed status of the Eurozone was a major aggravating factor, should support the further integration that is needed in both the Euro area and the EU. A second conclusion, again arising from the experience of the crisis, is that the twin evils of neo-liberalism and excessive inter-Governmentalism need to be confronted and displaced from their current dominance in the councils of the EU.

THE FUTURE OF THE EU DEBATE

In concluding the series I will make a proposal which did not arise directly in the series and for which I am indebted to

a recent discussion in the *Irish Political Review Group*. It pertains to the debate about the future of the EU and explains why that debate, being dependent on the vicissitudes of national politics, especially in the recent past on German politics, is going nowhere. The proposal is this: for the EU to function effectively, authority and status need to be restored to its central institution, the European Commission.

The power of the Commission was first weakened in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Treaty that introduced the term, *European Union* and laid the ground for the Single Currency. Under Maastricht a new *pillar* system came into being in which the first pillar covered only those areas that until then had been overseen by the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (the supranational institutions). Two other pillars were created—Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs—which were to remain under the control of the national Governments working in cooperation (the inter-Governmental institutions).

The *pillar* system was devised as a compromise to meet the demands of the UK which had campaigned vigorously against the power of the Commission. Following Maastricht, the Commission was further undermined by the appointment of Commission Presidents who lacked the prestige and ability of former Commission President Jacques Delors.

Another change championed by the UK, the enlargement process that brought in ten new members in 2004, was a further blow to the federal agenda in that it dissipated the cohesion of the Union and rendered cumbersome its decision-making machinery.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 tilted the balance of power away from the supranational institutions by creating the position of European Council President to strengthen the role of the Heads of State and Government.

Institutionally the development of the EU since Maastricht has been marked by the emergence of the inter-Governmental European Council at the expense of the Commission as the Union's main policy-making body.

If the EEC could be compared to an organism, then its brain was the Commission. One virtue of the Commission was that its viewpoint was European rather than national, yet it was answerable to the Governments through the Council of Ministers and later through the European Council. The Commission functioned well

as a supranational institution because a productive tension existed between it and the Governments. The balance between the supranational and inter-Governmental levels was got right.

Another strength of the Commission pre-Maastricht was that, in line with the needs of Europeans, it dealt in large ideas and large ambitions. The major challenge of post-War Europe was combating malnutrition caused by unstable food supplies. The problem was successfully addressed through a policy devised, negotiated and administered by the Commission: the much maligned Common Agriculture Policy.

The Commission was also the body that supervised the removal of tariffs on trade between the Member States and the application of a protectionist external tariff on goods coming from outside its Customs Union, a process that took approximately ten years. The Customs Union boosted economic growth in Europe.

Following on from Articles in the Rome Treaty the Commission supervised the creation of Trans-European Networks in transport, telecommunications and energy. Some of these, such as the single electricity grid, are still a work in progress but they have transformed life in Europe. A lot more could be said regarding the achievements of the Commission, especially in the social and environmental areas.

As an institution it acted as the embryo of a federal state. What is difficult to understand is why it was sidelined at exactly the time when its most ambitious project, the Euro, was being introduced. Clearly the UK identified the Commission as a body inimical to its objective of disrupting European integration but why did the large EU States facilitate that agenda? One must assume that various European Governments had come to view it as a supranational institution that was becoming too successful.

During the years when the Maastricht Treaty was under debate, *Irish Political Review* was critical of the campaigns being waged in the British press against the Commission. The *Irish Political Review* position was that the significance of a very minor corruption scandal in the Brussels bureaucracy was being deliberately exaggerated and that the Thatcherite agenda on Europe needed to be opposed.

As it happened, we were not the only Irish voice being raised in defence of the Commission. An individual whose views were the diametric opposite of the general line of *Irish Political Review*, Peter Sutherland, was scathingly critical of the reduced role assigned to the Commission in the

Maastricht Treaty, considering it incomprehensible. Sutherland had been a well-regarded member of the first Delors Commission (1985-1988), and was the proposer of the popular *Erasmus* programme that facilitated students wishing to spend parts of their university courses studying abroad in European universities.

PISANI FERRY'S VIEW

Many of the issues needing to be considered in the future of Europe debate are addressed in the penultimate chapter of Pisani Ferry's *The Euro and Its Aftermath*. Having the title, *Governance Reform*, the chapter deals with the executive deficit that is "*the true core of the European crisis*" and treats it as an institutional problem of the Eurozone. Weaknesses in the construction of the Euro are listed as—

"a monetary union without a significant federal budget, limited coordination of budgetary and structural policies, no integrated financial supervision and no strong political counterpart to the central bank" (p. 166).

Pisani Ferry describes the task of building a political union as "*sought and defeated*" in the referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005. He then recounts how the Euro's rules-based governance regime, having limited capacity for the exercise of discretionary power, was shown to be grossly inadequate when the crisis hit. As he presents it, the EU coped with the crisis by adopting a model that was the opposite of federalism, "*mutual insurance*".

Thus he portrays the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as an inter-Governmental institution which was designed, against the advice of the Commission, as a credit cooperative. The disbursement of funds to financially distressed Euro countries through the ESM was and is accountable to national Governments, not the supranational institutions. As we know, a national Government (i.e. Germany) was the key institution defending the EU through the crisis.

The Euro and Its Aftermath was published in 2014, two years before the Brexit vote. In retrospect, its author comes across as surprisingly tolerant of the UK's insistence that the problems of the Euro needed to be handled outside of an EU framework. For example, he notes that the Fiscal Compact of 2012 could not be entered into EU law without mentioning that this was mainly due to the UK's stance.

However, he does come around to admitting that a governance model based on inter-Governmentalism has shortcomings. The two shortcomings that he identifies

—that it aggravates the executive deficit by limiting the role of the European Commission, and that it makes no allowance for a common European interest—seem to me to be the same thing. By the end of the chapter he is forced to conclude that only the federal model is flexible enough to provide a fitting solution to the problem of European governance—even though its adoption would require a "*politically controversial redefinition of the role of the Commission*" (p. 171).

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Pisani Ferry would have been better off opening his discussion of the governance issue by admitting that the sidelining of the Commission in the Maastricht Treaty was a major mistake. But where does he stand *vis a vis* the supranational/inter-governmental divide? By acting as an advisor to President Macron, he is endorsing the view that the problems of Europe can be solved by Government leaders whose main loyalty necessarily lies with their own countries.

To develop a coherent position on the future of the EU it is first necessary to find a solid vantage point or orientation. This series of articles has been written from the vantage point of the Irish political tradition prior to the Anglophile deviation of recent decades. By that I mean the national tradition associated with the names of Eamon de Valera, James Connolly, Constance Markievicz and Roger Casement. A legacy of ideas may evolve into being part of national tradition when the ideas in question have won sufficient public approval and become sufficiently embedded in the political life of the nation that they become the common inheritance of all.

From the viewpoint of the Irish national tradition, the EU policy of recent Irish Governments has lacked a sense of purpose. It has reflected opposition to further integration, narrow short-termism in relation to economic interests, and at times close alignment with the UK. A more appropriate policy would certainly include the defence of Irish economic interests but it would also encompass a wider European dimension.

The most obvious way of giving expression to the Europeanism of the Irish State is, in cooperation with other like-minded Member States, by supporting the restoration of authority to those EU institutions that act in the common European interest, chief among which is the European Commission.

Dave Alvey

Is Sinn Féin Disintegrating?

This writer was well disposed towards Mary Lou McDonald during her rise to the leadership of SF. Why should not a woman from Dublin, a St. Louis convent girl, from a republican family, whose first youthful political activism had been with Fianna Fáil, become SF president? She had been a solid supporter of the northern leadership during the difficult years following the GFA. But her election as party president was met either by grumbling or positive comments—depending on from which corner they came—that she was being pushed as a leadership candidate 'untainted' by the northern war and its complexities and hence free of its "baggage". She would represent a new, modern party, concerned more with bread-and-butter issues and progressive reform, north and south. This writer for one ignored these commentaries, as he ignores most commentaries on SF and its business, especially those coming from the south, and especially as McDonald herself had never come to notice in SF as any kind of Young Turk on a mission to radically liberalise the party. She had, by all accounts, been a loyal and effective Dublin and national party activist.

Sinn Féin identified itself prominently with the marriage equality campaign and subsequently with the repeal-the-eighth movement. Aligning with such causes is in the nature of the party, and would normally not be worthy of comment. SF is an all-Ireland party, the party created by the people who fought the northern war that secured equality, and had a project to make Irish unity a realisable aim. On this basis it extended the foothold it had achieved in the south, mainly in working class areas, during the years of the economic crisis. Adopting to progressive issues has always been a necessary tactic of the republican movement. As SF was socialist in the 1970s-80s, so is it now aligned with the progressive issues of today.

But there is a problem: the alignment this time is no mere adopting to popular strands of 'progressive' opinion for it appears rather that these are now being

framed as core party values. The rush to embrace such causes as core values is such that dissent is not tolerated on them. There were many members of SF in the 1980s who took the party's 'socialism' with a grain of salt, and it never occurred to the leadership to put them on the spot over this. But then Peadar Tóibín TD, a long time activist who had risen through hard constituency work and a high political profile, announced his resignation from the party, saying that restrictions imposed on him by the party over his views on abortion had "prevented me from fully representing my constituents" (*Irish Examiner*, 15 November 2018). This followed the earlier resignation for the same reason of Offaly SF TD and former primary school principal, Carol Nolan. Both had been suspended because of their refusal to support the party's position on abortion. This position, adopted by SF at its last Árd Fheis, ruled out allowing members a conscience vote on the issue. Sinn Féin had decided that representing views incompatible with rainbow liberalism was a disciplining offence.

This writer was amazed that a formula was not found to make it possible for such excellent local representatives as Tóibín and Nolan to continue their active roles in the party. As polls have consistently shown, a large minority of consistent SF voters are more in tune with these two representatives on abortion than with the new party line. Other parties, notably FF and FG, longer in the tooth in such matters, had more sense than to force a division within their parties and voter bases along such an amorphous line.

The problem with the SF position on these issues is not that it is not expedient, but that it is ideological. It derives from a strategy which sees Sinn Féin becoming a dominant all-Ireland party with an agenda for achieving Irish unification through a broad alliance of "progressive" forces. This strategy was set out over a decade ago by prominent party member and now Dublin South West TD, Eoin O Broin, in his book, *Sinn Féin and the Politics of Left Republicanism* (Pluto Press, 2009). While proposing a progressivist 'left' politics, the book took as its starting point that old Republican chestnut that declares the actual republic of

the south a "failed Republic", and sees the State only in negative terms. This ideological position was endorsed enthusiastically by party leader Gerry Adams.

On social media and elsewhere, leading SF politicians have been strongly defending the party's progressivist agenda and its parting of the ways with many former members over it. A problem for it of course is not only that in seeking to be seen as a leading force on the progressive agenda it makes itself indistinguishable from the other main parties, all of whom to a greater or lesser extent support the same agenda. There are many issues around progressive social policies and representing conservative viewpoints on them which up to now have had an outlet through the main parties, including Sinn Féin. But no more, and the progressive united front of all parties in the recent Presidential election led to the astonishing 23% vote achieved by Peter Casey, in many cases precisely among the voter base that had loyally backed Sinn Féin over the last decade. Fintan O'Toole in the *Irish Times* (27/10) denigrated Casey as a fool who stumbled into the contest without thought but became a magnet for widespread prejudicial opinions of Travellers, welfare recipients and others. But achieving 23% of the vote signified that he had tapped into a substantial voter base indeed, and one increasingly excluded from representation. Sinn Féin representatives have been quick to echo O'Toole's deploring of the deplorables, and in the process are certainly exposing what will become a very vulnerable electoral flank for them indeed.

In tandem with embracing progressive causes as core values, SF strategy also seems to be to pursue an elusive constituency for republicanism among Northern unionists by conceding to imperialist aspects of unionist political culture. Hence Mary Lou's recent statement that she would be open to discussing Ireland re-joining the Commonwealth, and the statement by SF presidential candidate Liadh Ní Riada that as President—i.e. commander-in-chief of the Irish Army!—she would have no difficulty wearing a poppy during "Remembrance" week. Both of these

statements proved disastrous for the party. Northern unionists, whose allegiance is not some passing fad amenable to being massaged into something else, remain indifferent to extravagant gestures like this from nationalists, while nationalist voters are left cold by such concessions. Meanwhile in the Republic, promoting the Commonwealth and poppies represents a regressive tendency towards a Free Statist rather than Republican identity for the state. The floating of these ideas by leading SF representatives indicated a lack of connection with the actual politics of the south, and were rewarded accordingly.

Critics of Sinn Féin's embracing of the so-called 'liberal agenda' and of issues such as the Commonwealth and the poppy have been quick to blame this as a tactical gamble of the new leadership of Mary Lou. But this is not correct. As already stated, the adoption of a 'progressive' stance on social issues has been a long time strategy of the party. On the Commonwealth/popy front, the party managed a workably balanced position for many years. The first SF Lord mayor of Belfast, Alex Maskey, deftly combined SF distance from the poppy symbol with a respectful cross-community gesture of mayoral remembrance by staying away from the British Legion poppy event at the City Hall Cenotaph but laying a laurel wreath at it instead in a muted but dignified ceremony ahead of the main event. The same approach was repeated by later SF mayors Tom Hartley in 2008 and Niall O Donnghaile in 2011. But Máirtín Ó Muilleoir broke with this pattern in 2013, going all the way in patronising the British Legion jamboree. Even Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin's finest general throughout both the war and the negotiation and implementation of the GFA, encouraged such tendencies as smoothing the way to new politics in the north. But he also stretched this point in intervening in the south in promoting Anglicising tendencies and undermining the defenders of Irish sovereignty, as when he threw SF's weight behind the Fine Gael Government's outrageous pardon-and-apology a few years ago for those who had deserted the Irish Army to join the British Army in World War Two.

McGuinness to an extent pursued a strategy post-peace process of promoting the type of United-Irelandism that has always been on offer—an Ireland united on a basis "acceptable" to both nationalists and unionists. This of course can only be one firmly within the British sphere, of a type with what the *Irish Times* editorialised

about in January 1922 as achievable from a unionist point of view under the Treaty. It is this type of thinking which led Mc Guinness to play along with the British propagandist narrative on the world wars, poppy patriotism and so forth. He even went to Baghdad in 2008—in those halcyon days before the rise of ISIS—to assist British "peace-making efforts" allegedly based on the formulae of the GFA. But west Britonism—or what Pat Walsh has called "*Hibernianism*"—is incompatible with the politics of a sovereign Republican state and can only be pursued at the expense of the latter. This is precisely what de Valera realised, and in the two decades from 1932 he constructed and maintained Irish sovereignty not least through abandoning the North. Concessions in building a sovereign state to ease conditions in the North could only have been concessions that kept Ireland within or returned it to the British sphere. This has remained a central dilemma for Irish politics. ***The progressing of Northern politics can simply not be at the cost of the sovereignty of the Republic.***

The Anglicising effect of poppyism was reflected in the comments of Belfast Deputy Lord Mayor, Emmet McDonough-Brown of the Alliance Party, who, in deputising for the absent SF Mayor at this year's "Remembrance Sunday" pageant, said: "*This Sunday, I will be remembering those in my family who fought the evils of their generation and all of those who have suffered in war*" (*Belfast Telegraph*, 07.11.18). So British involvement in fomenting and seeing through the Great War—the greatest military carnage in history until then—had involved Irish people who went forth and "*fought the evils of their generation*"!

This core idea of the whole poppy business is precisely what is the problem with it, and what SF has been gingerly embracing while knowing full well the absurdity of it. The British media attempt to present remembrance events across the channel in "Europe" as substantially the same thing as what they themselves engage in. But they are not. There former enemies jointly remember the war as a catastrophe, without any side being apportioned the blame for it, let alone being ascribed the saintly role of having being the side that "fought evil" in it.

During the presidential election and in the aftermath of the abortion referendum, Sinn Féin's dogmatic progressivism on what are called "social issues" came to cost it dearly. Not unrelated, and also exposed in the presidential campaign, was

Sinn Féin's confusion over its precise position on the international standing of the actual Republic when, in seeking to "attract" unionism, it again floated the hoary chestnut of Irish Commonwealth membership and seemed to embrace the "fighting evil" narrative of British poppy mythology. These interventions revealed the extent to which Sinn Féin is still not connected with southern politics, a disconnect which no amount of verbal nationalist positions—such as accusing the Varadkar Government of selling out the North in the Brexit 'Withdrawal Agreement'—can compensate for. Mary Lou McDonald accused the Taoiseach of having "*lost his nerve*" on the backstop after he signalled that he was prepared to agree to a "*review clause*" to be included in the Withdrawal Agreement. McDonald said that "*by even entertaining any notion of a review*" the Taoiseach would be "*signing up to an arrangement that is less than enduring, in other words that is temporary*" (*Irish Examiner*, 07.11.18). The southern middle class knows its economic interests. However adrift it has been on its identity in recent years, the Brexit issue, after initial wavering, has united it in a determination to protect its economic standing by cleaving close to Brussels. Coming on top of the comments by Ní Riada on the poppy, Mary Lou's statement only reinforced a general view of SF as profoundly at sea as regards the southern state and its politics.

Sinn Féin, however, and despite its faults and current difficulties, is still exercising a leadership role in Irish politics, and not just in the North. Fianna Fáil's Éamon Ó Cuív and Mark Daly sought to pre-empt FF inactivity in the north under Micheál Martin—or worse, a threatened alignment with the moribund SDLP remnant—by supporting a run by Independent (but formerly SF) Omagh councillor Sorcha McAnespy as a Fianna Fáil candidate in next year's northern local elections. While Martin moved to close down the Ó Cuív/Daly initiative as fast as he could—to the applause of Newton Emerson in the *Irish Times*—he also, according to a tweet by Declan Kearney of SF, answered a prickly question on the media show, Sunday Politics, by stating that yes, Fianna Fáil MPs, were they to be elected in the North to Westminster, would take their seats and would take the oath of allegiance! This demonstrated graphically that where Sinn Féin go, all others still always follow. After SF revealed its confused British tendencies in the presidential election, Fianna Fáil felt free to rush in to ape it! ■

Neo-Redmondite Ignorance Of Redmondism And The Traitors' Gate

This November 11th, the centenary of Armistice Day was marked by the unveiling, for temporary exhibition, of the *"Haunting Soldier"*, a gigantic piece of metallic sculpture which had a British soldier towering over the Traitors' Gate at St Stephen's Green. Perhaps he might be taken as representative of one who killed the *"Huns"* with gusto throughout what James Connolly categorised as Britain's War upon the German nation, or one of those British soldiers who rioted in Dublin on that date exactly one hundred years previously, and who celebrated the Armistice by assaulting and fatally injuring the writer Seumas O'Kelly, correctly described by Frank McNally as *"one of the last casualties of the Great War"* and *"victim of the 1918 Armistice"* (Irish Times', October 16).

Or perhaps a more sympathetic response would be to view him as a victim of that War, and representative of the cannon fodder sent to their slaughter by our British Imperialist masters, among whom was numbered John Sheehy, killed in action on an unchanging Somme Front on 15th February 1918, and who was a first cousin of my maternal grandfather. His death was, of course, mourned by my mother's family, but who also grieved all the more that he had perished in the uniform of the wrong Army.

Carol Hunt is a *'Sunday Independent'* columnist, currently taking some time out, who stood unsuccessfully as a Rossite candidate in the 2016 General Election, but who later that year was to be taken on as his media advisor by the man himself, Shane Ross, the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport. But taking time out has not meant her withdrawal from spoof. On November 10th, Carol Hunt tweeted:

"When I was a kid the Grafton St entrance to Stephen's Green was known as 'Traitors Gate'... 'coz of names of WW1 Irish dead inscribed on the arch. This was Dev's Ireland. This week at the entrance is the 'Haunting Soldier'. We've finally grown up."

And this tweet was, in turn, retweeted, with approval, by Jim Glennon, a onetime Senator (2000-2002) and TD (2002-2005) for Fianna Fáil, the Soldiers of Destiny.

Oh, dear God! The invincible ignorance of neo-Redmondism!

Now, much as I deplore the fact that my kinsman fought and died in Britain's War on Germany, I for one do not regard him or his compatriots as traitors, for they were following the exhortation of every single Irish Nationalist MP to join up and fight. Moreover, the Islandbridge Memorial to the Irish dead of that War was actually funded by the de Valera Government of the 1930s. But, for the benefit for neo-Redmondite Twitter twits like Hunt and Glennon, the Fusiliers' Arch has nothing at all to do with that 1914-1918 War on Germany. It honours those who fought for Britain in its previous 1899-1902 South African War.

And nothing else than such a tweet could illustrate more clearly the abysmal ignorance on the part of neo-Redmondism, not only of Irish Republican history, but of Redmondite history itself. For that particular British War had been vigorously opposed by Redmond and his *"constitutional Nationalist"* colleagues, and it was not Republicans, but the Redmondites, who rechristened that Arch with the far more appropriate and popular name of *Traitors' Gate*.

In the *'Journal of Liberal History'*, Summer 2013, James Fargher related:

"As for the Irish, in February 1900 John Redmond put a bill before the House demanding an end to the war in South Africa; he freely admitted that 'when the Empire is involved in complications a feeling of hope and satisfaction stir[s] the majority of Irish home and abroad'. When icily asked whether he feared losing all prospects for home rule from the Liberal Party, Redmond retorted that 'Ireland has nothing to lose and everything to gain by raising her voice on the side of justice and liberty.'"

And there was also the stand on that War taken by William Redmond, who would later be killed in action while fighting for Britain at Messines in 1917. *"In fact, William Redmond, brother of John Redmond, was so spirited in his defence of the Boers that he had to be escorted from the House by the Serjeant at Arms."*

"JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN BLAMED FOR BOER WAR. John Redmond Said He Should Be Hanged to Nearest Lamp Post."

The above was the heading of a *'New York Times'* report on 4th November 1901, of a speech delivered by Redmond in New York:

"More than three thousand persons in Carnegie Hall shouted themselves hoarse last night over the principles of the Irish Nationalist cause as presented by John E Redmond MP... Every one who was there paid for his own admission, and several hundreds unable to obtain tickets were turned away. There was no more available room in Carnegie Hall. The principal speech of the evening was made by Mr Redmond, who kept the crowd cheering, from the time he began until, with a finished peroration, he worked up the enthusiastic audience to a frenzy of delight. He spoke with the utmost bitterness of Joseph Chamberlain. The first mention of the name of Chamberlain during the meeting was greeted with groans and hisses that lasted a full minute... When Mr Redmond was introduced the audience again got to its feet and shouted. Finally Mr Redmond was able to make himself heard. He spoke with deliberation and with a distinctness that made him heard in all parts of the house..."

Redmond stated:

"I claim that the record of the Irish party in Parliament last session was one well to be proud of. Were it not for Ireland no voice would have been raised to protest against the brutal attempt to suppress two free republics in South Africa. Who was it that exposed to the gaze of the world the infamies of the concentration camps where Boer women and children were subjected to cruelties before which the atrocities of Weyler fade into insignificance? (Spain's General Weyler had established concentration camps in Cuba—MOR)... If Chamberlain met his deserts he would end his career by hanging upon the nearest lamppost... No murderer ever went to the scaffold with hands more deeply imbued with human blood than are Chamberlain's today..."

Heady stuff indeed, compared with which the Redmondite designation of the Traitors' Gate, for what it was, comes across as very mild stuff indeed!

Manus O'Riordan

See http://cf.broadsheet.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/THE-HAUNTINGS-SOLDIER-758A5068_905581491.jpg for photo of the "Haunting Soldier" towering over the Traitors' Gate.

"To violate Irish neutrality should it be declared at the moment of a great war may put you out of court in the opinion of the world, and may vitiate the cause by which you may be involved in war. If ever we have to fight again, we shall be fighting in the name of law, of respect for the rights of small countries...."

Winston Churchill, 5th May, 1938.

"We can only be a friendly neutral... Our circumstances, our history, the incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our country, made any other policy impracticable. Any other policy would have divided our people, and for a divided nation to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide...."

Eamon de Valera, 14th December, 1941.

Clair Wills And The Story She Tells (Part 6)

To backtrack for a moment—I was somewhat alarmed to receive communication from an academic friend after my previous article in the *Irish Political Review*, November 2018, where I mentioned Walter Starkie, Professor of Romance Languages at Trinity College, Dublin. He told me that what I had written was quite wrong and that Starkie was most certainly "*not a fascist*". Furthermore he pointed out that I seemed to have no knowledge that in 2013 there had been a very well received biography of Starkie and to be quite frank—I had to admit I didn't know anything of this. So I researched the matter and, having looked at all the new evidence, came to the same conclusion that Starkie was most certainly a fascist but that fact was now being airbrushed out of his history. It is certainly an inconvenient fact to say the least and so I had to be taken to task lest I infect Trinity academia with this taint.

I had to laugh because in fairness to Clair Wills, though she gave all the details of Starkie's fascistic involvements she too sought to diminish Starkie's politics by saying of him:

"He was a complex character."

This was her get-out-of-gaol-free card, lest anyone be minded to come after her but in the end nobody did as this book was published in 2007, and we'll see later on why that is important. The biography in question is '*Walter Starkie: An Odyssey*' by Jacqueline Hurlley (Four Courts Press, Dublin 2013). It was launched in the most salubrious surroundings of the Saloon, Provost's House, Trinity College, Dublin by Provost himself Dr. Philip Coleman

It Is Time

who in his speech acknowledged the presence of the Ambassador of Spain, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, and continued:

"...As Provost, I've a natural interest in past Trinity students and Fellows. The lives and ideas of great thinkers always remain relevant. When confronting contemporary issues, I like to bring to bear, for instance, the political insight of Edmund Burke, the wit of Oscar Wilde, and the deadly seriousness of Samuel Beckett... In Walter Starkie we have a most unusual and a most gifted individual ... Easter Monday 1916 he recalls as 'a lovely day for an outing'. Over the next few weeks he found his bicycle 'a godsend' enabling him 'to follow the progress of the fighting in the various zones of the city'. He exercised ingenuity to 'bypass the cordons, barricades, and sentry spots'.

"The account of this third-year in Trinity will be invaluable when we collate the Trinity experience of the Rising for the centenary in two years time."

While the Provost insisted on calling Starkie an Anglo-Irish man, one of the reviewers of the book was more on point stating that "*his family were scarcely Anglo-Irish, working in banks, the police and as magistrates. His father lived beyond his means in grand houses... leaving his widow in straitened circumstances*" (*Books Ireland*). But the Provost went on to boast that Starkie's father was also a Trinity Fellow who—

"died in 1920 and the family fortunes declined drastically. For a period Walter had to support his mother and two sisters, as well as his own wife and children, on his wages as a lecturer in Trinity's Spanish department. He was however helped in these familial obligations by his sister, Enid Starkie, who lectured at Somerville College, Oxford, and was herself a notable figure. It's regrettable that Trinity did not

manage to recruit both Starkies, although we did give Enid an honorary doctorate in 1960."

Enid Starkie was known to Iris Murdoch and ends up in her biography (by Peter J. Conradi, 2001, pg. 295, HB) as "*the trousered Enid Starkie, whose biography of Rimbaud Iris read in 1947*".

Going back to the speech of the Provost:

"In McDowell's and Webb's history of Trinity, Walter Starkie is recalled as (I quote) 'a stimulating lecturer—when he lectured, for his absences were frequent and sometimes prolonged'."

That little sting in the tail is, I should say, entirely characteristic of McDowell and Webb. Starkie did not confine his study of Spanish or modern languages to the library—rather he did a great deal of what we might call 'field-work' and which he cheerfully called '*tramping*', '*vagabonding*' and '*minstrel-ing*'.

The Provost continued in this laudatory vein for quite some time, extolling Starkie's book, '*Raggle-taggle: adventures with a fiddle in Hungary and Roumania*', which he stated that one reviewer in '*Time and Tide*' described as "*the perfect travel book*". But even the Provost had to acknowledge somewhere that all might not seem what it was:

"Starkie's accounts may sometimes seem naïve, and unable to grasp the complexities of 1930s Spain and Hungary. I don't have the expertise to judge his narratives in their historical context."

Aha, not half, Provost. Where is Starkie's '*The Waveless Plain*', published in 1938 and paid for by a grant from Mussolini's regime?

And, according to Clair Wills,

"Starkie was sent on a two-month trip to Abyssinia as a guest of Mussolini's forces, and he wrote up six articles for the 'Irish Independent' the following year, arguing against de Valera's position on sanctions".

Furthermore, though Wills foregoes to mention it, this was when Taoiseach Eamon de Valera was President of the League of Nations and he sought the help of the World Powers to stop Mussolini's march and was coldly rebuffed. De Valera soon learned, as-if-he-didn't-know already, how geo-political strategising was always factored into how the World Powers reacted to any and every situation. So, when 1939 saw another World War started, he was solid in his position of Ireland being neutral come what may.

Another fact that the Provost left out was something that Wills also brought up and that was that Samuel Beckett, being a student of Starkie, found him to be quite distasteful in his politics in every way—unlike of course Yeats who was quite fascinated by them as they so closely tied in with his own!

The *Books Ireland* review was done by Rory Brennan, poet, broadcaster and writer and it appeared under the banner, *Trickier than Violins: Rory Brennan reviews the new study of William Starkie* where he comes straight out and asks:

"So who, you may ask, was Walter Starkie? Don't be dismayed if you do not know. Many informed and well-read people I came across in the course of Christmas chit-chat had never heard of him either. Starkie was from an Irish Protestant professional family who had become Catholic in the mid-nineteenth century but retained a tradition of service to the British State and Unionist allegiance."

Brennan quickly gives a pen-portrait of Starkie's background, e.g. that *"his father was the last resident Commissioner of national education in Ireland until 1922"*. though we know that is wrong as he had died in 1920. Anyway Starkie, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2011), was—

"schooled like his father in Shrewsbury School and then Trinity College where he excelled in his studies, gaining a first-class moderatorship and gold medal in classics in 1917, was appointed to a lectureship in Romance languages in 1920 and to a college fellowship four years later, and was made a LittD in 1926. In that same year he was appointed Professor of Spanish, as well as retaining a lectureship in Italian."

The *Books Ireland* review headline about *violins* refers to the fact that Starkie was a consummate violin player, and won a gold medal in the Dublin music festival of 1913 which made his father nervous that he would neglect his studies over his musicianship, but of course this didn't happen.

Again using the Oxford DNB, we are informed that Starkie became a member of the Royal Irish Academy in 1930. Brennan, while acknowledging Starkie's books of travel amongst nomadic people like the Gypsies in the Balkans, felt that they glorified a hard life and therefore *"these works passed me by"*. And he immediately asks:

"So does Hurtley set about making a case for Starkie in this extensive volume?"

(It took her two decades to write as she extensively researched her subject we learn.)

Well Brennan finds her initial *"burden-some preaching"* about how to read her biography akin to *"the Victorian notion that the study of literature was morally uplifting"*. And he finds her scholarship, though extensive as stated on notes on the flap by the Synge scholar Ann Saddlemeyer, to be in the end intrusive in the—

"plethora of footnotes, some taking up a third of a page. John Fowles neatly described the footnote as an aesthetic blemish but this is an epidemic. Flicking through the book I couldn't find a page without one... Another difficulty is Hurtley's habit of littering her text with 'sics' brackets and corrections."

Brennan finds this *"compulsive display"* was almost reducing Starkie—

"to a footnote engine, a machine for the issuing of corrections, a reference showcase and only incidentally the subject of a biography. The Starkie that emerges from these methodological thickets is *not so easy to discern*" (Italics—JH).

Brennan does accept what he discerns *"right-wing politics"* and drifts on to suggest *"that it is perhaps too kind to classify him as a fellow-traveller, but then neither was he a rabid fascist"*. He married an Italian woman, Italia—though when in Spain she preferred to be known as Augusta and who, according to Brennan—

"denounced the anti-Semitism the dictator *subsequently espoused...*" (Italics—JH).

Brennan also thought his fiddle-playing with gypsies revealed his personality as—

"showy and opportunistic, a parvenu as the French put it... Starkie fruitlessly pursued the chair of Spanish at Oxford before accepting the Directorship of the British Institute in Madrid in 1940".

Wills rightly called it the British Council.

When Yeats, Lady Gregory and Lennox Robinson put Starkie on the Abbey Theatre Board in 1927—the better to access grants from the Irish State, they thought him to be *"pliable"* but definitely with the right sort of politics. Also he was, as Wills stated, though Brennan's book review didn't seem to know, *"a key advisor to the Cumann na nGaedheal government on educational policy"*. Almost as good a joke as the one about the M16 officer Michael Oakeshott who became the External Examiner for the National University of Ireland (NUI)—more of which at a later date.

Wills also went into detail about Starkie's *"close friendship"* with Louis MacNeice which didn't net the latter the lectureship in Trinity the former had promised him, but we have to be careful here as that is MacNeice's account and, when I finally am able to access the biography by Hurtley, I'll be hopefully in a better position to know what really happened.

Brennan bizarrely ends his review with this following observation:

Starkie "has a place in the tradition of plausible Irishmen, from Sheridan and Tom Moore to Terry Wogan, who in one way or another sang—or fiddled—for their supper."

And he asked *"is Starkie worth reviving? It has to be a qualified yes..."*

There is another review of Hurtley's biography wittily called *'Bohemian Rhapsodist'* by Micheál O hAodha in the *Dublin Review of Books*. The author, who is also a poet, writer and visiting lecturer to the University of Limerick, begins by asking this question:

"How does one recreate or resituate a 'character' and a Renaissance man-type personality as complex and as multifaceted as Walter Starkie?"

He does have one interesting fact and that is that Starkie's godfather was none other than J.P. Mahaffy of Trinity College, Dublin, and one time tutor to Oscar Wilde. But O hAodha comes a little unglued when, later on, he states that Starkie was appointed to TCD in 1926 at a time when—

"Ireland was in the early 1920s teetering on the edge of extreme violence and chaos, the timing of Starkie's appointment could not have been more appropriate given the state apparatus the then Cumann na nGaedheal administration under W.T. Cosgrave was developing, one which Gearóid O Tuathaigh has described as 'under very effective, if often very discreet or hidden, British control'."

"While bohemian in outlook, Starkie was a smooth operator and the archetypal 'Irishman living on his wits' on the political front... He lost no time making links with the most powerful political and cultural players in Dublin, describing Cosgrave and his ministers in particularly laudatory terms: '(pursuing) relentlessly the path of duty' with 'strong, fearless government', 'strong policy', 'productive of a movement of progress which will restore a country shattered by revolution'."

O hAodha is much taken with the *"poisonous politics"* of the Abbey Theatre and goes into detail about them but does not take much heed of the politics of Starkie. The latter was in Spain as the

British Council's first representative and where he sought through *"lectures and exhibitions to influence Spanish opinion during World War II whilst helping maintain Spanish neutrality"*.

Starkie had renounced his place on the Abbey Board in 1942 and then renounced his Fellowship at TCD in 1947, which would have had grave repercussions for his pension only that TCD helped him out at the end.

"Between 1947 and 1956 he was professor of comparative literature at the Complutense University of Madrid and after he retired from the British Council he lectured in America between 1961-1977. He and his wife retired to Madrid where they both died, Starkie in 1976 and his wife six months later and they are buried there in the British cemetery."

The Oxford DNB is very keen to get across that—

"Starkie was Churchill's man, not Franco's, sharing cigars when in London with the Prime Minister during the war. In 1986 *El País* referred to Starkie as 'a member of the espionage service of his country' much to the indignation of his daughter Alma, who wrote a letter of complaint to the newspaper. His CBE and CMG came in 1948 and 1954 respectively."

But there can be no doubt that, under the auspices of the British Council, Starkie facilitated a lot of contacts with the various writers and artists in Spain as he opened centres in Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville and Valencia. Indeed the future Nobel laureate, Camilo José Cela, was said to have loved *"the easy-going, party (in the festive sense) style of the place and its reminder of less grim and gloomy cultural climes in post-war Western Europe"*.

Julianne Herlihy ©

academic Jennifer Wellington talked about the Australia-New Zealand involvement.

Conor Mulvagh struck me as standard issue UCD history revisionist. Somehow he managed to spin his Great War Memorial/Reconciliation talk round to the Irish Revolution—which, he said, unreconstructed nationalists described as a *"War of Independence"*. He argued that the British State in Ireland was undermined, not by the IRA Volunteers, but by Local Authorities who transferred their allegiance to Dáil Éireann. A point worth arguing, as Dorothy Macardle's history (*"The Irish Republic"*) did way back in 1937. Just as it is useful, for instance, to re-tell the contribution that women made to Independence/Revolution.

But it strikes me that there has been an Armistice of sorts in the Great Footnote War with the tiny group of anti-revisionist academic guerrillas who have helped in a small way to disrupt the Great Revisionist Offensive. So nowadays instead of continuing to push their compromised and discredited arguments the academic revisionists tend to say, *"Oh, but look over here"*. I think that is what Mulvagh's talk was about.

The person sitting next to me in the audience said he regularly attends the annual German commemoration at Glencree and that, in comparison with partisan militaristic British-Irish Remembrance, it was like chalk and cheese.

These days Germany seems to have embraced Christopher Clark's *"Sleepwalkers"* theory of the origins of the Great War. If nobody really understood what they were getting into in 1914, that gets Germany off the hook of WW1 war guilt, doesn't it? But when you get down to it, sleepwalking is just as implausible as A.J.P. Taylor's railway timetable theory of the source of the Great War. The Great History Book Encirclement of Germany is just as strong as ever.

If the German Embassy wants to open up a discussion of the Great War, at the very least it would need to extend its range beyond the UCD history department.

And don't hold your breath waiting for the Britain-fixated Irish media to acknowledge any alternative to our annual one-sided Poppy Day Militarism.

Pat Muldowney

The Forgotten Remembrance

Remembrance weekend was held this year on Saturday and Sunday November 17th and 18th. But you'd never know it from media reports, because there weren't any.

After all Remembrance was November 10th and 11th, right? Actually that was Poppy Love, or British Remembrance.

Traditionally a German ceremonial, which anybody can attend, is held the following Sunday in the German Cemetery beside the Peace and Reconciliation Centre in Glencree, Co. Wicklow. And this year, for the first time, the Glencree memorial ceremony was augmented by a preliminary seminar on the implications of the Great War. It was organised by the German Embassy for Saturday November 17th in University College Dublin.

British Remembrance showcases gallantry, grit and heroism as the enduring and historic essence of the British character. That might be harmless enough if all this Braveheart stuff was merely romanticisation of the dim and distant past without implications for the present. But even though there was an Armistice on 11th November 1918, in some sense the Great War is still being fought a hundred years later. In the Middle East for instance, with no end in sight. So we ignore the real meaning of WW1 at our peril.

Even if the Great War is still rumbling on, a Remembrance event which also acknowledged and admitted misdeeds and criminality (as German Remembrance does) could be useful and praiseworthy. And if British-Irish Remembrance was less chauvinist, less partisan and less militaristic, there would be no need for a separate German ceremony in Ireland.

I attended an hour or so of the German Embassy event in UCD on Saturday November 17th. A violinist (from Serbia) and cellist (from France, I think) played uplifting music. Refreshments were provided to an attendance of about 100. A representative from the Irish army was present, and one from the British Legion, both of them sitting as equal members of a civilian audience. The meeting was low-key and inclusive, without a trace of military display. The theme was peace and reconciliation, and sadness for the catastrophic loss and suffering to each and all of the peoples involved, without preference or discrimination.

During the brief period for which I stayed short talks were given by academic historians from UCD. Robert Gerwarth, the German Head of History in UCD, talked about the continuation of the Great War after the Armistice, such as the Greco/Turk, Russian, Polish and Finnish conflicts which consumed lives at a rate equal to the Great War at its height. Australian

Who Votes For Fine Gael?

I know that it's an impertinent question, considering that the secrecy of the Parliamentary Ballot has been enshrined in law since 1872.

The idea would never have occurred to me had I not recently come across an old Cumann na nGaedhael poster claiming that only gunmen and Communists voted for Fianna Fail. I never realised how many of my fellow citizens were gunmen or Communists. Fianna Fail ruled from 1932 to 1948, from 1951 to 1954 and from 1957 to 1973 sometimes with its own majority in Leinster House, sometimes with the support of Labour or Independents, *but never in coalition*. Never once did Fine Gael rule except in Coalition, and Cumann na nGaedhael never, ever, won a majority of Parliamentary seats for the 26 Counties.

The Gunmen and Communists were oblivious to the attractions of Cumann na nGaedhael which promised them "*Peace,*

Prosperity and Piety".

We were not wild partisans in our house. My father always gave his first preferences to Fianna Fail, whom he described as "*the Best of a Bad Lot*". The Civil War was long over, and I think, like most citizens, we respected anyone who had ever thrown a stone for Ireland during The Four Glorious Years, before, and indeed since.

Even John Redmond was regarded as an honourable man, fooled by the British. I reckon Redmond's greatest hope for Irish men was the role of *White Gurkhas* expanding the Empire, whilst Irish women should stay at home sewing socks for Soldiers.

I only once voted in Ireland when I gave my vote in a by-Election to Labour's Denis Larkin, leader of my Trade Union and son of the immortal Big Jim Larkin.

I see that those telling lies about

Michael Foot are telling them about "Jack" Jones, who was christened in 1913 James Larkin Jones.

Lenin knew more about Irish history than do many professional historians. But he was wrong in thinking, during the Dublin Lockout of 1913 that Big Jim was related to Larkin (of Allen, Larkin and O'Brien) the trio of martyrs Hanged in Manchester in 1867.

Anyhow, so great was Big Jim's fame in world labour circles, that he was Elected (whilst in jail in the USA) a member of the Moscow Soviet. Later, whilst there, Comrade Zinoviev tried to convince him of the virtues of Atheism. But Big Jim, from Liverpool's Toxteth District, remained a faithful Catholic and died with his Piety intact in 1947. He left an estate of £14 Sterling.

The late Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave remained Pious to the last. He died in peace, leaving 33 Million Euros.

I'll get back to Fine Gael when I have the stomach for it.

Donal Kennedy

When Did The Irish War Of Independence Begin?

There is a notion being promoted to downplay the significance of the 1918 General Election. It does this by promoting the idea that the War of Independence really began on 21st January 1919, with the ambush of an RIC patrol by Dan Breen and others at Soloheadbeg. And that this action was more significant than the Election result.

Dan, being not only a great fighter, was also a good writer and did not suffer from false modesty by claiming that this ambush began the War of Independence. It is ironic that our revisionist historians are very keen to agree with Dan and use his claim to undermine the historic significance of the 1918 Election.

Of course Dan was gilding the lily. The country had been effectively under military rule since the appointment of Field Marshal Lord French as Viceroy in May 1918 and, with full use being made of DORA, it meant that the country was in a state of war well before January 1919. French made that very clear. What else are Field Marshals for if not to fight wars?

There were several military confrontations with the police and British Army after 1916. In April 1918 Tom McEllistrum led a raid on Gortalea RIC barracks in Kerry and the shooting of a policeman and the burning of the barrack. In early July 1918, Volunteers ambushed two RIC men,

who had been stationed to stop *a feis* being held, on the road between *Ballingeary* and *Ballyvourney* in the first armed attack on the RIC since the Easter Rising—one was shot in the neck, the other beaten, and police carbines and ammunition were seized. Patrols in *Bantry* and *Ballyvourney* were badly beaten in September and October. On Armistice Day 1918 there was a daring action by the Cork No. 1 Brigade when Donnacha McNeilus was rescued from the *Cork County Jail* where he was held for shooting a policeman.

To give an idea of the actions by the Crown Forces from May 1916 up to January 1919, the following list was published by the *Irish Bulletin* on 30th December 1919:

51 murders,
2064 deportations,
99 assaults on civilians,
713 raids on houses,
4785 arrests,
1460 sentences,
51 proclamations and suppressions,
28 newspapers suppressed and
322 court-martials.

A total of 9,553 actions—and these only give a flavour of what was happening: the list was not comprehensive. And the Crown forces were only getting into their stride, as this was long before the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries were set up.

It is not surprising therefore that the Dail in its Declaration to the Nations of the World on 21st January 1919 referred quite clearly to the—

"...*the existing state of war, between Ireland and England, (which) can never be ended until Ireland is definitely evacuated by the armed forces of England.*" Emphasis added.

So, with all due respect to Dan Breen and his comrades, they were continuing an already existing War.

The Election result should have been the Government's opportunity to stop the war developing further. But, because of its contempt for the principles for which it had allegedly launched a World War for '*the freedom of small nations*' etc. etc. (and cost the lives of about 40,000 Irishmen), it ensured that the War was escalated over the following four years.

Jack Lane

Irish Bulletin, full reprint of newspaper of Dáil Éireann giving war reports

Published so far:

Volume 1, 12th July 1919 to 1st May 1920. 514pp.

Volume 2, 3rd May 1920 to 31st August 1920. 540pp.

Volume 3, 1st September 1920 to 1st January 1921. 695pp

**£36, £30 paperback, per volume
(£55, £45 hardback)**

POSTFREE in Ireland and Britain

Insight Into Wartime Ardoyne

The author comes from the Catholic *Ardoyne*, Belfast. She doesn't give the location of her novel. It is the 1970s during the war situation. She describes the situation as war, saying that WW2 was a world war and this is a local war.

She doesn't mention that this is taking place in Northern Ireland. She doesn't mention PIRA but calls those in charge of the area as *Renouncers*: renouncers of the State. The State is described as '*they across-the-water*'. She doesn't mention Catholic or Protestant. The Protestant is '*they across-the-road*'.

'*They across-the-border*' is merely where renouncers go when on the run. 'They across-the-border' have no influence in renouncer territory.

The literature mentioned is mostly by English authors like Thomas Hardy and Charles Dickens. Then there is Kafka. This is read by the 18 year old unnamed narrator as she walks to work or walks around her home area. She reads it to her younger sisters, who are under ten years old, at bedtime. She doesn't read 20th Century literature but reluctantly continues to read Thomas Hardy when his work enters that century.

Television watched is British television, though programmes are carefully selected.

James Bond films are frowned upon by the renouncers. They are seen as PR for the repressive forces of that state across-the-water. Anyone in the community watching a Bond film will keep the sound down and the curtains drawn in case of being reported or being caught by renouncer patrols. Music is British pop. The food they eat is British produce. But the British Army is still loathed and hated and named as foreign security forces from across-the-water. Much like some PIRA volunteers in the past supporting Manchester United and preferring rock music to traditional Irish music.

They across-the-road are named as '*defenders-of-the-state*'. Some of them are thought to be part of the state-run death squads. Northern Ireland as an area isn't mentioned but when it is, it is described as *the statelet*.

Both renouncers and the population depend on one another. They are your neighbour. The population provides the

safe houses, a lot of Intelligence, and medical services with kitchen surgeries to extract bullets, apothecaries in backyard sheds, and hiding arms for the renouncers. Any serious disputes and the community threatens to withdraw these services. They can't, of course, but it reminds their own renouncer volunteers they are all in this together.

Then there are the *beyond-the-pale* people who feel they are living under totalitarian conditions. The author agrees with them on occasions. But there is nowhere for them to go, except across-the-water. No one mentions about going across-the-border.

Someone called the *real milkman* (no one has a name here) decides to dig up the arms buried in his garden, without his permission, and throws them into the street in broad daylight where a Brit helicopter hovering above might see them. He is arrested by the renouncers, though arrest isn't mentioned, rather it is a balaclava-clad gang with guns appearing at his door and a *kangaroo court*.

The author tries to disassociate herself from the renouncers on occasions but her anger at State forces in her area brings her back to the *status quo*. It is a relief when she drops the idea of tribalism from the narrative.

Her slight irreverence towards the situation in her no-go area does save us from the so-called Puritanism of the freedom fighter. Nothing is covered up. There is thuggery after the intake of alcohol, the posing of the 'hard man', a whiff of cordite to attract the girls. In her small area there are eleven drinking clubs. The person called the *real milkman*—he who dug the arms out of his back garden—described as not loving anybody, is saved from a bullet in the back of the head by the community. Instead he is given a light beating followed by being tarred and feathered.

In the community is someone known as *tablet-girl*. The narrator soon finds out why she is called that when her glass in a drinking club has some substance put in it while she is in the toilet. She suffers unbearable stomach pains. It is not advisable to go to hospital. Suspicious illnesses like that and the police are called. Then she might be pressured into becoming an

informer by the threat of the police conveying to the community that she is already an informer.

The solution is for the local women to purge her with medicines from their backyard apothecaries. She suffers continual vomiting and is put to bed and fed baby foods.

The renouncers don't know what to do with *tablet-girl* as a *sick-in-the-head*. She has poisoned a number of other people. Nor does the community know what to do with her except to cover their glasses when talking to her or never leaving them unguarded when they go to the toilet. She has a normal sister close to the renouncers.

There can be no calling in the police nor can a psychiatric hospital be contacted, nor staff from there. It could bring in the enemy in the shape of those from across-the-road or those from-across-the-water in as under-cover-agents. Spies.

Paranoia is good for you on these occasions.

Then one morning *tablet-girl* is found dead in an entry with her throat cut. Now the renouncers don't know what to do with an ordinary murder when all the deaths in the community have been political deaths. They question a few people but no one knows anything.

Eventually her death is reported covertly to the police. They arrive with State forces and question a number of people, knocking on doors, but no one speaks to them. So they leave with the corpse and their anti-sniper squad in case the renouncers have set them up and put them in their cross-hairs.

The pattern of State forces (they from across-across-the-water) is to photograph everyone and let them know they have been photographed by the deliberate click of their cameras from bushes, and tree clumps in the park or from derelict buildings.

They record the colour of wallpaper or paint work in the houses they raid, or might even look through windows. Every phone is tapped, everyone has a file on them.

Not to have a file on you or not to be photographed is to be put under suspicion.

The renouncers raid the drinking clubs looking for underage drinkers and those on the wanted list. They come wearing balaclavas, carrying guns. They ignore the underage drinkers and find no wanted people. They leave. Seconds later State forces enter the same clubs and leave without incident. The author's comment

on this missing each other by a hair's breadth is that not to signal intentions from both sides could result in a blood bath in a crowded drinking club. Not good PR for the State.

In the area there is what is known as the *red light street*. It doesn't have the original connotations. It's a street where unmarried people live together. One woman is said to have two male partners, another house has two men suspiciously living together.

The pious women of the area call it *dot...dot...dot street*.

One atrocious occurrence is when the community dogs are found in a heap with their throats cut one morning. State forces are suspected. Dogs are very useful for a community under siege. They are trained, as the author says, in partisanship, knowing the enemy. The community gather to take away the bodies of their dogs in pushchairs and wheel barrows. Some carry them in their arms to cuddle them.

Now they will have to train new dogs in *partisanship*.

These are dogs kept semi-feral. They roam the streets night and day and are not to be petted and fussed over. Children are much in the same category. They roam the streets until late at night and, in coming across State forces quietly creeping in, pelt them with imitation miniature explosive devices.

Many in this community have lost family members. The narrator has lost a brother who was with the renouncers. Another brother is on the run across-the-border. A sister, married to a renouncer, has lost him to a State death squad. One family is down to one member, a friend from the schooldays of the narrator has lost both parents and a brother. She too also dies accidentally in a bomb blast.

The pious mothers of the community try to influence their daughters not to marry a renouncer or they could end up Tombstone Visiting.

The former statelet and its former repressive laws isn't forgotten and the author ticks each one off in a book she is reading to *wee sisters* as a bedtime story:

"Search without a warrant, Arrest without a warrant, Imprisonment without charge,

Arrest without charge, Imprisonment without trial, Punishment by flogging,

Denying all prison visits by relatives, Prohibition of inquests into death of someone while held in prison after arrest without a warrant."

Then there is *Milkman*, the title of the

book, a leading renouncer, Intelligence officer, aged around forty whom she accuses of stalking her. No one knows if he has been a milkman in the past. They know he has been a motor mechanic. He has a number of cars he can use but usually he uses an old white van with surveillance equipment in it. Everywhere she is he appears, outside her workplace and near her home. It goes on so much it begins to affect her health.

Meanwhile in the community there are rumours that she is his lover, so much is he seen talking to her. There is a good scene where a group of girls surround her in the toilet of a drinking club to offer her various things like the use of their perfume and various other things like pep-pills. They are congratulating her on hooking Milkman.

Maybe this is where she enters fiction-land properly. Certainly her description of life under siege by State security (they across-the-water) rings true. Statelet personnel hardly get a look in. It is the renouncers versus the British State. Statelet personnel are a mere appendage.

It's not to say Intelligence officers in rebel movements couldn't act like this in modern times. The book's sometimes irreverence, makes the situation normal, that resistance is normal, that it makes for the *status quo*. Guerrilla leaders, in writing their memoirs, are liable to gloss over human weaknesses. Tom Barry, in his *Guerrilla Days in Ireland*, writes of volunteers dying while cleaning their guns, when it was suicide. The community, in this book, suffers suicides, most likely through stress—or maybe that's what they would have done without the War. In fact, there were a lot more suicides in these besieged communities when the shooting war was over. War can help one to focus on survival.

You begin to wonder if the book was published by those who thought the extreme conditions the community lived under was caused by the renouncers and not the British State. You do have to burrow hard to get the real story here. It is hidden under layer after layer of reflection on the part of the author that is much like waking up at three in the morning and having your past life to resolve. At times I found this heavy going.

If I hadn't intended to review this book of 348 pages I would probably have given up. But in carrying-on I got a picture of a determination to survive under very trying conditions by a community under siege by State and statelet forces.

Whether the person known as Milkman is fiction or not reality kicks in as State forces go on an assassination bender and kill up to six people, thinking it is Milkman. The real milkman is one of those shot but he survives.

As a single middle-aged man he is visited in hospital by fifteen middle aged widows and married ones who want to change their husbands. The police take an interest and question each one at the hospital or at the police barracks, for the real milkman has to be a terrorist if someone shot him despite him being labelled a beyond-the-pale by his community. The renouncers advised the women not to go to the hospital but were ignored.

The State, through the media, responded to the six *mistaken* deaths by saying:

"The state had responded by admitting that, yes, it had precision-targeted a few accidental people in pursuance of intended people, that mistakes had been made that had been regrettable but that the past had to be put behind, that there was no point in dwelling, that people could rest assured."

During the time Milkman, the Intelligence officer, was stalking the 18 year old narrator, and with the community thinking they were lovers, shops, including the local chip shop, felt they had to give her free gifts of food and chips. as a way of saluting Milkman. Now that he is dead they revenge themselves on her, in mostly petty ways by being rude, because they had humiliated themselves by 'kowtowing'.

Forecasting that there would be negative reactions to her now she had stopped going to the chip shop in particular where once people in the queue would let her go first and where the chip shop staff wouldn't take her money. She had been annoyed by this, first she wasn't Milkman's lover and, even if he had of been, she didn't want free chips. On one occasion she throws them on the floor in anger before deciding her behaviour wasn't right, and in deciding to pick up the unburst package as if she had dropped them by mistake, but the semi-feral dogs enter and gobble them up, paper and all.

The mystery of Milkman is no longer a mystery when his name is revealed as being Milkman after his death. Suspiciously people look up telephone directories to see how many Milkmans there are. That seems to be a weakness in the book. If he comes from that community and they trust him as a senior renouncer then they would know his name. But the atmosphere of the book still stands. Young boys in the street take on his persona and compete to be

Milkman. Hardly worth mentioning the incongruity then.

The author is correct when she describes how you can tell a Catholic from a Protestant by looks, the way people walk and how they use speech. Certainly it shows the national difference.

I don't know how the English public, who are mainly illiterate on Northern Ireland, will take this book. Will it serve a propaganda purpose for the British State?

But despite this the truth has leaked through.

There are so many more excellent scenes out of this book I could write about but I better stop now.

Papers like the *Irish Independent* and the *Belfast Telegraph* don't describe the novel fully, though they must know what it's about. The *Belfast Telegraph* did say she comes from Ardoyne, which pinpoints her background. Papers and magazines in England tend to lump the author with the #Me Too brigade. This has angered her, as evident in a statement she made on television recently, though it might help to sell the novel.

Wilson John Haire
9.11.18

Blasphemy Referendum

Voters were asked: *"Do you approve of the proposal to amend the Constitution contained in the undermentioned Bill?"*.

The Bill in question was the: *"Thirty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution (Repeal of offence of publication or utterance of blasphemous matter) Bill 2018"*. 64.85 per cent of voters agreed to remove the offence of Blasphemy from the Constitution.

Presidential Election

In the election held on 26th October six candidates were listed in alphabetical order according to their surname. These were: Peter Casey, Gavin Duffy, Joan Freeman, Seán Gallagher, Michael D. Higgins, and Liadh Ní Riada. All except Ms Ní Riada were running as Independents. The single transferable vote system was used, with the voter marking the candidates in order of preference, placing a number 1 in the box beside the candidate they wish to vote for, and then a number 2 beside their second preference, and so on. However, voters could vote for just one candidate if they wished.

President Michael D. Higgins was re-elected for a second seven-year term, winning the largest personal mandate of

any President in the history of the Office. He was supported by Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and Labour. The results were:

Michael D. Higgins	822,566	55.8%
Peter Casey	342,727	23.3%
Seán Gallagher	94,514	6.4%
Liadh Ní Riada	93,987	6.4%
Joan Freeman	87,908	6.0%
Gavin Duffy	32,198	2.2%

The election was notable for the late 'surge' of independent candidate Peter Casey, who was widely criticised for his controversial comments about Irish Travellers during the election campaign. Casey's vote was sufficient to qualify him

for a refund of his deposit and help with electoral expenses—but the other candidates lost their deposits and failed to qualify for aid.

Turnout for the Presidential election was 43.87 per cent, the lowest in any presidential election.

Turnout in Presidential Elections:

1945	63%	1990	64.4%
1959	58.3%	1997	47.6%
1966	65.3%	2011	56.1%
1973	62.2%	2018	43.9%

In that 2011 election, the late Martin McGuinness attracted 13.72% of the vote, which was sufficient to save his deposit.

What Is Money?

It's interesting that in most economic textbooks there is rarely a definition of money. Instead they describe the functions of money:

- a) medium of exchange
- b) store of value
- c) unit of account

a) Medium of Exchange

In barter the seller and the buyer must want what each other possesses for an exchange to take place. This is sometimes called the *"double coincidence of wants"*. A person with a cow who wants to buy, say, wheat must find someone who not only has wheat but also wants a cow. But with money all that is required for the person selling the cow is for someone with enough money to buy it. He can then buy the wheat with that money.

b) Store of Value

Most money commodities such as gold and silver have the quality of not losing their value. They are durable. The instinct to accumulate wealth manifests itself in the drive to accumulate gold or silver or whatever is the money commodity.

c) Unit of account

Money, or what Marx sometimes called *"the universal equivalent"*, values all commodities in terms of itself. So, if gold is the money commodity, a pint of beer, a kilogram of potatoes, a loaf of bread etc can be valued in terms of a specific quantity of gold.

There is no doubt that an understanding

of money—or indeed any entity in society—can be gained by examining the role it performs. But how can it perform this role?

The communist intellectual Palme Dutt described each unit of money as a title deed to a proportion of the income and wealth of a State. So it's in effect a legal document which gives the bearer property rights. The State underwrites these rights.

That, of course, is a definition of modern money. But what we call *modern money* is the product of a long period of historical development. And it is probably true to say that money preceded the existence of the State, even though at a certain level of development the State became essential for money's existence.

Centuries ago gold merchants offered to mind other people's gold as well as looking after their own gold. When the person from the public deposited a pound of gold he received an IOU from the gold merchant saying that the holder of the IOU was entitled to one pound of gold from that merchant.

At the beginning the transaction reflected a personal relationship between the gold merchant and the depositor. But gradually the human bond was severed. And the transaction became de-personalised. As Marx observed in relation to commodity production: the social relations between men began to assume the fantastic form of a relation between things. The IOU that the depositor held began to be used as a medium of exchange.

It, rather than gold itself, could be used to purchase commodities. And the gold merchant, once he had authenticated the IOU, was quite prepared to release gold to the bearer of the IOU even though this person was not the same person that the gold merchant had issued the IOU to.

At a certain stage of development the IOUs issued by one gold merchant or bank were accepted by a bank in a different part of the country or even outside the country. This facilitated trade. A merchant no longer had to lug his gold around with him on his business trips, but could carry around pieces of paper. When he purchased goods, the vendor could lodge the IOU in his own bank. And this bank would now have a claim over the bank that issued the original IOU. At the end of the month the thousands of transactions were accounted for and the net liabilities or assets of one bank in relation to another would be met by just one transfer of gold.

Meanwhile back at the bank, the banker began to wonder about all this gold that was accumulating in his vaults. Did he have to keep it in its pristine state? Did the original owner expect the same gold that he deposited to be returned to him? Clearly this was not the case. The depositor had no sentimental attachment to the specific piece of gold he deposited. As far as he was concerned gold is gold. To quote Marx again it is merely the physical form of "*unvariegated social capital*".

Bankers decided that they could make a profit by lending gold at an interest rate. For example, a client arrives at the bank and requests some gold. It is possible that this client has never deposited any gold in that bank before. Nevertheless, the bank agrees to lend him the gold. The bank obliges the borrower to sign a bond, which obliges him to repay the gold at some future date along with the interest. The client then leaves the bank with his gold. But after carrying around the gold for a few minutes he decides to go back to the bank and deposit the gold in exchange for an IOU from the bank.

Of course in the real world the business would never be carried out in such a pedestrian fashion. It is unlikely that any gold would have changed hands. Instead the transaction would be abridged to an exchange whereby the banker would hold a bond and the borrower would hold the bank's IOU or paper money. In real terms the client is buying present consumption from the bank at the expense of future consumption when the bond matures. The bank is making a profit from this transaction.

Also, it should be noted that, while there is a lot of money and goods being exchanged as well as borrowing and lending, there is very little movement of gold. In time it would become completely unnecessary for gold to be held in local banks. Instead it will be held in Central Banks.

Another observation that can be made is that the bank is making a profit from lending—for the most part—other people's money. The more money it can borrow from the public, the more money it can recycle and lend to the public. And the more it lends to the public, the more interest income it can generate for its owners.

Is there any limit to what a bank can lend? Contrary to popular belief a commercial bank cannot create money out of thin air. So, in order to lend it either must borrow or use money from its own resources (which is, in effect, borrowing from the owners or shareholders).

Commercial banks ignore the advice of Polonius to his son Laertes:

"Neither a borrower nor lender be. For loan oft loses both itself and friend. And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry".

They must borrow in order to lend. In order to attract funds they raise the interest rate. When they lend they do so at a higher interest rate. Other things being equal, the interest rate is determined by the laws of supply and demand. The greater the supply of funds, the less is their price or the interest rate since, in a situation of abundant surplus funds, it is easy for the banks to attract depositors. On the other hand, in a situation where the demand for funds is great, the interest rate goes up.

While banks need to borrow in order to lend, this does not mean that they can lend 100% of what they borrow.

There are two risks, which prevent banks from lending 100% of what they borrow. These risks are:

- a) Liquidity
- b) Insolvency

a) Liquidity

Commercial banks borrow short-term funds at zero or low interest from the public (e.g. customer current accounts and savings accounts). These are savings in the hands of the public, but borrowings or liabilities for the bank. The banks make profits using these short term funds to earn interest on term loans, which by their nature are illiquid (can't be cashed immediately).

At any time the bank's depositors can

withdraw their money. So, the bank must have a reserve of funds in order to meet its obligations to its savers. In normal circumstances the pattern of savers withdrawing funds is predictable. So the bank can safely lend long-term funds while at the same time meeting its short-term obligations.

b) Insolvency

When banks lend they expect to be repaid. Credit control is an important function of most businesses but is essential for banks. If the bank's debtors are unable to repay their debts, the bank suffers a loss. Its assets are thereby reduced. As a consequence its reserves are reduced below a safe level. A situation might develop where the reserves are reduced to zero, or worse still, a negative value. In other words, the bank's liabilities exceed its assets. In this case the bank is insolvent.

At the onset of the Irish banking crisis a decade ago, the key question was: *are Irish banks in the midst of a liquidity crisis or are they insolvent?*

A liquidity crisis is caused by a sudden withdrawal of funds from a bank, which puts pressure on its ability to meet its funding obligations. The crisis is caused by the *perception* that the bank is insolvent. If the bank is in fact solvent, the crisis can be averted by loans from other banks or the Central Bank, which is the lender of last resort.

The banks and the Financial Regulator in Ireland were anxious to convince the public that it was a liquidity crisis. But, after the European Central Bank had pumped 140 billion euro into the Irish banking system, it became obvious that was an insolvency crisis.

The crisis in Ireland, which was part of a global crisis, raised the question of the importance of the banking system. A case can be made that a modern economy cannot function without a banking system and therefore it had to be saved. Banks are essential to the circulation of commodities. They are also essential for the conversion of savings into investment.

Given the importance of the banking system it is not surprising that the State found it necessary to regulate it, albeit not always effectively. The role of the State in underwriting the system made it possible for it to replace gold as the basis for the value of money.

Interestingly, Karl Marx believed that money could not be detached from a commodity such as gold, which has real value. In volume one of *Capital* he denounced a long forgotten economist

called John Fullarton for suggesting that money could exist independently of a commodity with value. And yet Fullarton was right and Marx was wrong. However, in fairness to Marx, it must be admitted that Governments have been reluctant to break the link with a real commodity. For most of the twentieth century the US dollar was linked to the price of gold. One dollar equalled 1/35th of an ounce of gold. It was only in 1971, largely as a result of the financial burden of the Vietnam War, that the link was finally sundered. There are still many people who believe that this was a mistake.

MONEY SUPPLY

The State, through the institution of the Central Bank, controls the money supply. It can do this by controlling bank reserves and by 'printing money'. During the financial crisis the European Central Bank was pursuing two apparently contradictory policies. On the one hand, it required commercial banks to raise their reserves, thereby *reducing* the amount of money in circulation. On the other hand, it was 'printing money' which *increased* the amount of money. It wanted to give stability to the banking system while at the same time preventing deflation. Some would say the overriding objective was to save the banking system since very little of the new money found its way into the real economy.

The reason why 'printing money' is in inverted commas is that the literal printing of money has a minimal effect on the money supply. Only about 3% of the value of transactions are denominated in notes and coins. Most of the 'printing' is done to replace old notes and coins. The extra 'printing' required is only a fraction of the 3% of the overall value of the money.

The business of increasing the money supply is a long-winded process involving the transmission of money to the banking system. Only a tiny proportion of this money involves notes and coins.

The process is long-winded because the Central Bank in most economies is independent of the Government. Partly, this is for historical reasons, and partly for practical reasons. When money was linked to the price of gold or some other metal, the Government could have no influence over its value. But, now that this is no longer the case, it is considered even more important that the Central Bank be independent of the Government. The temptation for governments to be profligate would be too much. They could, in

effect, buy elections at the price of the long-term stability of the currency.

The United States is an example of a state, which separates the functions of Government and money supply. When the Government wishes to borrow money, it issues bonds to what are called "*primary dealers*". These are elite commercial banks, which have the exclusive right to deal with the Government. These commercial banks lend on the government bonds to other banks and institutions in what is known as the "*secondary capital market*". They also have the option of holding on to their Government Bonds.

Let's now examine the economic effect of these transactions. Let's say the Government has issued 100 million dollars in bonds. The Government has borrowed 100 million from the private sector. The private sector has reduced its supply of money by that amount in exchange for the Government Bonds. The Government on the other hand has increased its supply of money, but has also increased its liabilities. It must pay back its loan from the private sector at some future date. In real terms purchasing power of 100 million has been transferred from the private sector to the Government. Overall there has been no increase in the money supply.

There is one other effect of these transactions. The Government, by borrowing, is affecting the interest rate. By flooding the market with bonds, it is reducing their price. A reduction in the price of bonds causes an increase in the interest rate.

Meanwhile, the Central Bank or the Federal Reserve (in the case of the United States) is observing this. It might be happy, in which case it will do nothing. On the other hand, it might for various reasons want to increase the money supply. If it decides to make an intervention, it cannot deal directly with the Government. It can only operate in the secondary capital market. Those are the rules of the game. The purchase of Government Bonds by the Central Bank in the secondary market is called an *open market operation*. The Central Bank finances this transaction by creating money out of thin air.

Say, for example, it decides to purchase all of the recently-issued 100 million bonds in the secondary market. It will do so at market prices. The effect of this intervention might be to increase the price of the bonds. But the good news from the Government point of view will be that it reduces interest rates on borrowing. But

let us assume for the sake of simplicity that the bonds have been bought at the 100 million original price. What is the combined effect of both transactions?

As we saw in the first transaction, borrowing by the Government has transferred purchasing power from the private sector to the public sector, but the effect of the Central Bank intervention has been to restore the money supply to the private sector. From the private sector's point of view it has the same amount of money as before.

On the public sector side of the equation, the Government remains with the extra 100 million in cash which it originally received but, instead of owing the private sector the money, it owes the Central Bank the 100 million. In economic terms this is meaningless. A 100 million asset held by one State institution (the Central Bank) is cancelled out by a 100 million liability of the other institution (the Government). Nevertheless the fiction that the Central Bank is independent of the State is preserved by including the debt owed to the Central Bank in the national debt statistics!

There are some commentators who actually deny that this is tantamount to printing money. They say that the debt is not forgotten about. The Central Bank can sell these Government Bonds back again in the secondary market. This has the opposite effect as buying the bonds. In this case the money supply is reduced. At present the Federal Reserve and the ECB are doing precisely this. The consequence will be to contract the money supply and increase interest rates.

In conclusion, while the financial system is unwieldy, this may be necessary to hide its fragility. Policy makers tamper with it at their peril. Preserving the system does not prevent worthwhile social objectives from being achieved.

John Martin

Next month

There will be a response to John Martin's suggestion that "*a commercial bank cannot create money out of thin air*".

Das Kapital Reviewed,
A Modern Business
Approach To Marxism
by
John Martin

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A Light Brexit Could Prove Palatable

It is no easy task to prepare a Brexit for a crew that is unappreciative, confused and bitterly divided. Shrieks of complaint stir from among the frantic murmurs and muffled obscenities. Mrs. May will be condemned, from some quarters, no matter what she cooks up.

A full Brexit is the worst option; crashing out of the EU without formal agreement would prove a nightmare. Modern trading best practice requires goods being moved across borders speedily, without friction, free of bureaucratic complication. Goods are expected to be transported to where they are required as soon as they are needed. The necessity to hold large stocks of components or finished goods is avoided. It is known, among business managers as *just in time* practice. A full Brexit would sabotage this smooth and unimpeded carriage of materials across borders. Instead, there would be scenes of long tailbacks of container trucks, their cabs, vacated by their frustrated and disgruntled drivers.

The Confederation of British Industry would choke on a full Brexit. Even the Brexit enthusiasts, who themselves protest they would relish a full Brexit, in practice, would learn it brought on the most severe and unpleasant indigestion.

A light Brexit, however, is a different matter. The one now on offer, despite the unwelcoming and difficult reception it has received, has a chance of eventual acceptance. The ingredients, while not irresistible, are simple and appealing. Further, they are appealing to a wide swathe of the British electorate, to ordinary folk, to people who before voted to remain in the EU as well as to those who voted to leave. The average voter entertains no desire to gorge themselves on a full Brexit. The typical man or woman in the street is no Brexit fetishist.

What has emerged from the Brexit negotiations is an outline of how the UK can formally withdraw from the European Union via an international treaty maintaining close ties. The end result would constitute, in practice, Britain retaining a form of associate membership of the club of nations it had belonged to. Trade in goods and services across European borders would continue almost exactly as before, since the UK is to remain part of the EU Customs Union. There would be

few if any new customs formalities. The great banking and financial behemoth of the City of London will maintain its presence across Europe and the world at large.

Regulatory alignment is the new term which would define a close administrative association between the market economies of the separated entities of the UK and EU. There is some wiggle room for divergence here but not a lot.

Withdrawal from the European institutions implies a loss of influence for Britain. However, this was influence defined by a minority voting share; a voting share roughly in accordance with Britain's share of the overall EU population. As such it was a limited influence. While this influence goes, other types of influence remain.

There is still the network of British embassies and consulates on the continent. There is the considerable lobbying power of British industrial firms and financial institutions with subsidiaries in EU nations. There is the world wide influence of the English language press and the associated Anglo-American news agencies. There is the implicit and very real influence derived from the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. There is also NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, membership of which enjoys continued British commitment.

Withdrawal from the EU institutions will constitute a loss of influence and power especially in the world external to the UK. However, in exchange, the UK will take back more control over its own internal affairs. This will appeal to the general public especially in relation to control of national borders. Apparent uncontrolled inward migration has provoked disquiet all across the European Union. This disquiet is part of the reason the British electorate voted to leave the EU in June 2016. The voters felt threatened by a sense of being under the heel of a soulless and unresponsive supra-national bureaucracy.

There is an extensive popular constituency in Britain which still believes in the EU. Moreover, much of the British elite are comfortable with the onward march of globalising forces; international institutions are favoured over national ones; here, no Brexit is the preferred choice.

Everything points to a sullen House of Commons, for diverse reasons, refusing to touch the Brexit Mrs May has served up when, soon, the matter comes to a vote. The question is likely to resolve itself into a repeat referendum where voters are asked to choose between Mrs May's light Brexit or no Brexit at all, possibly after an intervening general election.

Given the elite driven political dynamic which will be brought to bear in any new referendum we must expect that it is likely that the *status quo ante* will triumph and the EU withdrawal process will be aborted. However, we can not be sure.

The light Brexit option presents something for everybody to be contented with. For some it will be the UK having jurisdiction over the operation of its borders. For others it will be the uninterrupted flow of trade between Britain and EU member states. There is also the emotive pull of the perceived taking back of control to the national level; nationalism still animates electorates.

Eventually, despite the objections and the tantrums, despite expectations, the British may settle down willingly to a light Brexit.

Tim O'Sullivan
19.11.2018

Egg On High Court Faces

"The High Court has ordered the surrender of a Polish man to face trial in his native country despite finding "generalised and systemic" violations to the independence of Poland's judiciary.

Polish authorities had sought the surrender of Artur Celmer (31), who is wanted to face trial in his native Poland on drugs trafficking charges. He was arrested in Ireland on foot of a European Arrest Warrant last year. His lawyers had opposed their client's surrender over "radical changes" to the Polish justice system, which has put the country at odds with the European Union in recent years.

Ms Justice Aileen Donnelly, the judge in charge of High Court extradition, postponed the surrender of dozens of suspected criminals to Poland earlier this year over concerns for their fair trial rights" (Irish Times, 19.11.2018)

This is an embarrassing U-turn for the High Court. The situation in Poland has not changed but the High Court had to reverse its judgment because it could not find the evidence to back up its original decision. The judges made a judgement without acquiring the facts of the case! It is worthy of Lord Denning's famous description of another case as an "*appalling*

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November Brexit Summary

November has seen a number of major developments in the Brexit negotiations. A draft *Withdrawal Agreement* between the UK and the EU was published on November 14th. The draft text of the *Declaration on the Future Relationship* was also agreed by the negotiating teams on November 22nd. Both documents were formally agreed at a European Council Summit on 25th November, following which they will be referred back to the UK and European Parliaments for debate and possible ratification.

On November 15th, the day after the British Cabinet passed the draft Withdrawal Agreement, resignations in protest against it by Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab, Work and Pensions Minister Esther McVey and a few Junior Ministers, created something of a sensation. At the same time the DUP, on whom the May Government relies for its Parliamentary majority, indicated that all ten of its MPs will vote against the deal, and in the full glare of publicity Jacob Rees Mogg sent a letter of No Confidence in Theresa May's leadership to the Tories' 1922 Committee.

As reaction to May's deal continued, a demand from Brexiteers that it needed to

be renegotiated gathered momentum. Speaking in the House of Commons, May replied that such a course of action risked "*no Brexit at all*". Statements from the EU side made plain that talks on the deal were concluded and Angela Merkel announced that she would refuse to attend the Summit if the negotiations were re-opened.

48 letters need to be sent to the 1922 Committee before a leadership contest within the Tory Party can be triggered. The expectation was that, following Rees Mogg's lead, that figure would be reached. When it was not, the speculation was that some pro-Brexit Tories had concluded that the present juncture was the wrong time for a leadership campaign. There has also been speculation that the public mood is swinging behind May and, if true, this could influence the voting behaviour of Conservative MPs when the issue finally comes before the Westminster Parliament.

THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT

The case against the Withdrawal deal from a Brexiteer perspective was well summed up by Rees Mogg when he stated that what his party needed was a Leader who will say to the EU:

"it is impossible to divide up the UK, it is impossible to agree a situation where we have a perpetual customs union, it's impossible to pay £39 billion of taxpayers' money for a few promises which was meant to be £39 billion for an implementation of a deal, and it is impossible for us to allow the continuing jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice" (IT 20 November).

May has opted for a soft Brexit that will fall short of the promises given by the Leave campaign. Her political survival has become tied to the avoidance of a *No deal* outcome.

A pro-Brexit alternative to the Rees Mogg position is being offered by Michael Gove although, apart from refusing to take up the vacant Brexit Secretary post, he is keeping a relatively low profile. His reason for remaining in the Cabinet is that "*it's absolutely vital that we focus on getting the right deal in the future*". His approach is: get Brexit over the line at the end of March and then chip away at the Withdrawal Agreement during the negotiations over a trade deal. Some observers might see this as a time-

honoured British political tradition and it is close enough to Theresa May's position when she told Sophy Ridge of *Sky News* that the Withdrawal Agreement has been "*agreed... in principle*". She said:

"We won't agree the leaving part, the withdrawal agreement, until we've got what we want in the future because these two go together" (Daily Telegraph, 19 November)

TORY UNIONISM

"I believe that the regulatory regime proposed for Northern Ireland presents a real threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom" (from Dominic Raab's letter of resignation)

"It also threatens the integrity of the United Kingdom, which as a Unionist is a risk I cannot be party to" (from Esther McVey's letter of resignation).

The above excerpts testify to the existence of a strand of Unionism in contemporary Toryism that has not been conspicuous in recent decades. What may be behind it is the danger that Brexit may spur a revival of Scottish nationalism leading to a break-up of the UK. A recent article in the *Spectator* magazine, while discussing the deepening divide in Conservatism that the Withdrawal Agreement is causing, states the following:

"There's also now a group of Tories who are Unionists first and Conservatives second: the party's Scottish contingent. This used to be a one-man band, but not anymore. There are now 13 Scottish Tory MPs, and the Scottish party makes up 15 per cent of the overall party membership: nowadays, Scots are almost twice as likely as the English to be Tory members. This powerful bloc would resist anything they thought would bolster the case for either a second Scottish independence referendum or the eventual breakup of the United Kingdom" (*Spectator*, James Forsyth, 24 November).

Forsyth acknowledges that there are influential Tories who would happily accept a special status for Northern Ireland half way between the UK and the EU if it meant Britain having the economic benefits of Brexit, but his central point is that, having initially been sold as a way of overcoming Tory divisions over Europe, Brexit under May's leadership is now exacerbating that division. He sees the current deal as keeping in constant friction two of the most cherished principles of Toryism—sovereignty and the Union.

THE DUP'S PREDICAMENT

At one level Sammy Wilson of the DUP is providing a valuable service in the current debate by calling a spade a spade,

Egg On High Court Faces

continued

vista". That appalling vista was the reality in that case as it is in this case particularly as there are dozens of suspected criminals involved.

The report goes on to say that Mr. Celmer will appeal his case—but the substance of his case can only be the earlier statements and decisions of Ms Donnelly and the High Court. Effectively the judges in the case will have to '*appear*' for the defendant and will have to pass judgement on their own actions which they had to reverse. *Appalling vista* is too inadequate a description for this scenario.

It is often said that the law is an ass but in these gender-correct days, but in deference to Ms Donnelly who initiated the whole case, perhaps that should be clarified to '*the law is a jennet*'—and words fail me to be more gender specific than that.

Jack Lane

but ultimately the party's preference for plain and simple politics is causing huge friction in the 'Confidence and Supply' deal with the British Government that may rebound on it in years to come. Its trenchant approach is also creating an unprecedented rift between the party and its own business and farming communities.

Sammy Wilson is saying that the Political Declaration is a "*non-binding aspirational agreement of convenience*", whereas the Withdrawal Agreement is a "*legally binding text that will tie the UK for years to come*". He describes the Declaration as having been drafted "*to help Mrs May rather than mitigate the very damaging and dangerous withdrawal deal*". Many observers would say: spot on, on all counts. But, in place of this plain speaking, might not the DUP's long-term interests be better served by a tincture of diplomacy? If, as now seems moderately probable, May succeeds in winning Parliamentary approval for both draft documents and then implements the strategy mapped out by Michael Gove, a more supportive relationship with the Prime Minister that honours the terms of *Confidence and Supply* might turn out to have been the more politic option.

It would be easy to exaggerate the difficulties facing the DUP. As Newton Emerson argues in the *Irish Times* (22 November), the unionist community will continue to support the party at the polls given the nature of Northern Ireland politics, and the weak state of the Official Unionist Party since the last Elections means that party-political competition within Unionism is currently non-existent. However, the convulsions and twists of the Brexit negotiations are showing up an ideological cast in the DUP's make-up which is making enemies for itself at Westminster and antagonising elements of its electoral base. By comparison, Lady Sylvia Hermon, an Independent Unionist MP, is demonstrating what a more tactically savvy unionism might look like. She is requesting a meeting with Theresa May to seek assurances on certain points before deciding how she will vote, but her general inclination is supportive of the Conservative Government.

The vote in the Commons is the next milestone on the road to Brexit. As things stand, Michael Gove seems to be the player who has most adroitly read the game.

Dave Alvey

The Russian Revolution

The Russian economy when Lenin died consisted of about 25 million privately owned farms, a growing number of privately owned manufacturing enterprises, and a small number of State farms and State industries. That was the New Economic Policy, the NEP.

The NEP was introduced at the end of the Civil War in order that there should be an economy. The Revolution had abolished the weakly developed capitalist market. It had also abolished the big landed estates, which had been the main suppliers of food to the cities. And it had abolished the substantial capitalist enterprises, which were the source of the proletariat.

The industrial working class of 1917 had used itself up in making the Revolution, in fighting the Civil War and in staffing the State apparatus of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. So there was a Dictatorship of the Proletariat, without a proletariat.

The proletariat that the scattering of large-scale capitalist industries had produced before 1917 was absorbed into the running of the proletarian State, and therefore it was no longer a proletariat in the literal meaning of the term. It was no longer a working class exploited by capitalism. It was the ruling class of the new state, both in name and in substance. But it was a minuscule part of the whole population. And fresh proletarian reserves were no longer being produced. The proletarian revolution had abolished the source of supply of proletarians—industrial capitalism. The proletarian State was therefore in the position of having to restore capitalism in order to generate a proletariat.

A German socialist writer, Paul Lensch, published a pamphlet in 1917, *Three Years Of The World Revolution*, arguing that the socialist movement had misconceived the nature of socialist revolution, envisaging it in terms of the bourgeois revolution, as an affair of barricades etc. He held that it was a much more intricate affair. And it is evident that he had a strong case with regard to Germany.

The purpose of bourgeois revolutions was to destroy obstacles to the spontaneous development of capitalism posed by the framework of the pre-capitalist State. *Laissez faire*—let us get on with it—was

the slogan under which the capitalist breakthrough to social dominance was made. Though the slogan was French, and the principle of unrestricted individual liberty was French, it was in England that individual capitalist enterprise was freed from all social restraint, and the rule was "*every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost*".

It was in England that, through a mixture of Puritan theology and Political Economy, the principle of capitalist freedom was made the principle of general freedom, and a mass proletariat was created, to be used up in short generations by what used to be called "*Manchester capitalism*".

The great agitation that followed the 1832 electoral reform was the Anti-Corn Law League, which was crowned with success in 1848, on the pretext of relieving the Irish Famine. That was when the Whig Party began to call itself the Liberal Party, and liberalism signified free capitalism in the framework of British Imperial dominance of the world.

The English proletariat, saturated with the conformist spirit of Nonconformist liberalism, endured its subjection patiently and deferentially, engaging in occasional demonstrative outburst (e.g. Chartism).

Employed labour quickly became the major class in English society as England reconstructed itself under Capitalism, but, in good times and bad, it remained under Liberal tutelage until the Liberal Party overreached itself by launching the first World War and broke up in the course of it.

It was only in 1918, when the Liberal Party was engaged in self-destruction, that Arthur Henderson, hitherto a Liberal in substance, launched the nationally organised Labour Party.

Labour became His Majesty's Loyal Opposition as a result of the 1918 Elections. A couple of years later the Trade Union movement, attempting to cope with the aftermath of the Great War, into which the working class had poured itself, put to the Government a set of demands to relieve the situation. The leaders of the Triple Alliance of Trade Unions went to Downing Street and confronted Prime Minister Lloyd George. He said he was sorry but he did not have the power to do anything for them. They represented the irresistible

power of the country. If they decided to take over the running of the country, he did not have the power to prevent them. But, if they were not going to do that, then they should go home and let themselves be governed by him—which they did.

Considered in terms of abstract economic data, the working class was the preponderant class in England. But it was a mere numerical preponderance. It had no effective political existence. Its number did not constitute political power. Henderson's Labour Party did little more than let the space vacated by the suicide of the Liberal Party be thrust upon them.

In Russia the working class was in political power, and it had abolished Capitalism, but it was so small numerically that it had to restore Capitalism in order to increase its number.

It was in Germany that the working class was organised politically as a class, was the major social class, and had honeycombed capitalist society to the extent that it might conceivably have shrugged off the capitalist skin and carried on. But England had made war on Germany, and thanks to the United States had defeated Germany, and it was intent on plundering and humiliating Germany, so it had intensified the war-time Starvation Blockade of Germany into 1919, in order to compel the new German Social Democratic Government to make a false confession of War Guilt on behalf of the German people, and to submit to being plundered by Britain and France.

Some German Marxist tendencies, who insisted on being revolutionary, in what Lensch had described as the bourgeois mode, contributed to the capitalist disorder that proved to be chronic until it was overcome by Fascism fourteen years later.

The overthrow of Capitalism by the working class in Russia did not bring a new social order with it, because Russian society was not a society that had been organised by Capitalism, and that might therefore have been superseded by organised Socialism.

Russia was over 90% peasant. Peasant farms had been increased by about 50% by the division of the great landed estates—from about 16 million to about 25 million. The landed estates had fed the cities. During the Civil War the State had directly requisitioned food from the peasantry. The peasantry had agreed to this—or tolerated it—because the enemy of the Bolshevik state in the Civil War had the purpose of restoring the Tsarist system, including landlordism.

The direct requisitioning of food by the State was what was called War Communism.

When the Civil War ended with the comprehensive defeat of the Western invasion forces attempting to restore landlordism, the peasant farmers would no longer offer up food to the State. Lenin therefore set up an arrangement under which the State would buy food from the peasants. It was therefore necessary to restore market relations between the country and the town.

But what would the peasants do with the money they got for their produce? Buy manufactured goods. But socialist manufacture fell far short of being able to supply manufactured goods to the vast market of peasant farmers. It was therefore necessary to bring about a restoration of capitalist manufacture.

Of the 25 million peasant farmers, only a minority of the bigger and more enterprising ones produced a significant surplus for sale. It was to be expected that, in the normal course of events, this energetic minority would develop capitalist ambitions. They were still only owners of small property, petty bourgeois, but they were budding capitalists. As Lenin put it, the petty-bourgeoisie must tend to generate capitalism "*daily and hourly*".

In the first instance restrictions were placed on what farmers might do with their farms. They might not be bought and sold, but in the mid-1920s they were allowed to be leased.

Bukharin—who had been the pet theorist of the Bolshevik Party under Lenin, and its major theorist after Lenin died—issued the slogan to the peasants: *Enrich yourselves!* It was only through peasant enterprise that the increasing demands of the cities for food and raw materials could be met.

How long would it be until the socialist cities found themselves surrounded by, and dependent on, capitalist agriculture?

Bukharin, in 1920, published *The Economics Of The Transition Period*. It had little relevance to the Russian situation because it was about the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, and the thing about the Russian Revolution was, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out, that it was not a socialist revolution enacted within a capitalist society, but a revolution whose main economic policy for the achievement of political power was bourgeois—the establishment of private property in land.

The Socialist State was overseeing the development of a mass-based market economy for the purpose of generating production, but with the purpose of enacting a socialist economic revolution

in the future. It was relying on private production to supply the means of establishing a socialist sector of the economy which would be the means of enacting a general socialist revolution in the future.

I have seen that situation described by latter-day Bukharinites as "*a mixed economy*". The mixed economies I know about are developed capitalist economies, in which it has been found necessary for social purposes to establish a sector, under State supervision, which is not driven by the individual search for private profit. In those circumstances there is a relatively stable combination of private and public. But that was not the case in Russia, which was a pre-capitalist society in which a Socialist Party had established itself in political power and had constructed a strong State in which there was mass involvement.

The purpose of this State was the establishment of a general socialist economy. It allowed private enterprise for the purpose of getting an economy going, with the purpose of suppressing private enterprise when the socialist sector became strong enough to take over. The relationship between the two sectors of that 'mixed economy' was one of antagonism.

One or other would prevail. For the private sector to prevail, it would have to overcome the political power under which it acted. For the socialist sector to prevail, the State would have to act against the private sector before it developed an effective political will. And this would have to be done in an international environment in which Capitalism had become universal.

"*Capitalism is world capitalism*", Bukharin wrote.

When Lenin died he became, along with Stalin, the effective centre of government, while a group around Trotsky constituted itself an Opposition, though there was no role for an Opposition in the system established by Lenin.

It was not that Trotsky was driven into opposition by the Stalin group. It was that Trotsky did not attempt to undertake the business of leading the state, even though it appears that Lenin had asked him to, because what that would have required was distasteful to him.

Revolutionary agitation was no longer the order of the day. All of that had been done and an effective structure of State—a system of committees—had been established. Trotsky called this structure of state "*a bureaucracy*", and he did not want to become the master bureaucrat. But the bureaucracy was the means by which the State could act in the very complicated

business of fostering private enterprise in an overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois national environment in order to be able to build up state productive forces with which to abolish the private sector at an opportune moment.

This would inevitably be a zig-zag procedure, to be carried out by a bureaucracy which was the only available instrument of the revolution that was being undertaken, in an isolated Russia, in a world environment dominated by the international division of labour of capitalism—whose pressure on Russia would be unrelenting, and would be irresistible in the long run. And Trotsky did not fancy that.

In addition to which, he had laid down long before the Revolution that the socialist revolution that would happen when the Tsarist State fell would be the first act of a European socialist revolution, and would fail if the European revolution failed. And, by 1924, the European revolution had failed, but Trotsky, while re-asserting that Socialism could not be built in an isolated Russia, did not propose that the attempt to do so should be aborted. He adopted the role of critic, while the role of running the state fell to Stalin as Party Secretary.

Stalin's colleague was Bukharin, who was the theorist of the Party. He was approved of by Lenin in a condescending sort of way. He was a systematic theorist whose theorising usually took off at a tangent from the reality which he was theorising.

As a politician he had opposed the signing of a Treaty with Germany in early 1918 and proposed instead a declaration of revolutionary war against Germany. He gained a majority against Lenin on the

issue in the Central Committee, but did not dare to act on it. Somebody later remarked that he liked to run ahead of Lenin, always looking back over his shoulder to see that Lenin was following. But Lenin was insistent on making a Treaty with Germany and he threatened to break Party discipline if he did not have his way. As far as I recall, Trotsky saved Bukharin's face by withdrawing his support for revolutionary war and letting Lenin get his majority.

Bukharin remained a 'Leftist' for a couple of years but, when the New Economic Policy was established, he adapted to it and became a 'Rightist' and was Stalin's colleague from 1924 until 1928.

Left and *Right* were terms used by the opposition group around Trotsky to describe differences of opinion on something which was entirely a matter of practical judgment: how long should the NEP be allowed to continue providing the state sector with the food and raw materials that were needed for the construction of a socialist industrial economy before it became a system of private economy whose strength would take the construction of a general socialist economy off the agenda of practical politics. The richer and more enterprising peasants were getting richer and more ambitious all the time. By making themselves richer, they were also supplying the socialist State with the food and raw materials that it needed for socialist industrial development. A point would be reached on this line of development where the State could no longer hope to bring about a socialisation of agriculture. The art of politics lay in knowing when it was time for the State

to act against the incipient capitalism that was inherent in NEP.

The 'Left', which constituted itself an opposition of critics within the dictatorship, was urging the 'Right', or the governing section of the dictatorship, to begin eroding the NEP from 1923-4 onwards, when the 'Right' judged that it was still impossible for the State to do without the supplies put on the market by the richer peasants, and actually increased private property rights in order to increase those supplies. And the Left critics in the dictatorship increasingly began to depict the Right governing section as being in the grip of the capitalist potential that was inherent in the NEP. The Right—Bukharin and Stalin—was represented as having become an instrument of "*the bureaucracy*", meaning the apparatus of State, which had adapted itself in practice, and increasingly in principle, to the NEP as a self-sufficient system.

But then in 1928, when there was a shortfall in peasant supplies to the cities, "*the bureaucracy*" set about abolishing the NEP—the compromise with Capitalism—and the general socialist revolution began: the revolution against the bourgeois revolution in landownership with which Lenin had gained political power.

The Left Opposition was disorientated, and most of it was drawn into the service of "*the bureaucracy*" to take part in doing what it had been demanding for five years should be done. And that was the beginning of the socialist revolution in 90 per cent of Russia. And it was the beginning of "*Stalinism*" because Bukharin balked at it.

Brendan Clifford

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Pat Maloney

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Winnie Barrington

"The life and tragic death of Winnie Barrington. The story of the Barrington family at Glenstal Castle, County Limerick c. 1800-1925 by Brian P. Murphy OSB. (Papaver Editions, Limerick, 2018) ISBN 978 0 9928220 2 6

This is Brian Murphy's latest book and tells a tragic story of the accidental killing of a young woman in an IRA ambush at Newport, Co. Tipperary on 14th May 1921. Winnie Barrington was the daughter of the owner of Glenstal Castle, Sir Charles Barrington. She was a popular woman in the area and, because of her background, knew some personnel in the Crown forces though there is no evidence she assisted them in their operations. One of these was Captain Henry Biggs, DI of the RIC at Newport who gained a notorious reputation and thereby became a target for the local IRA.

Winnie happened to be travelling with him when he was attacked and killed and she was accidentally killed in the same action.

Brian Murphy, as usual, provides a meticulous, thoroughly researched account of the tragedy but the major part of the book is a history of the Barrington family and their long relationship with Limerick. It shows how they, as a leading Unionist family, dealt with the events of the War of Independence. It therefore also becomes a history of the war in the locality.

In the course of this Brian, *inter alia*, deals with allegations of republican sectarianism against Protestants in the Limerick area. He provides yet another example of the way the late Professor Hart distorted facts by reporting part of a story about alleged sectarianism but omitting all reference to what actually happened in the end, when contemporary Protestants refuted the allegation.

Jack Lane

The Life And Tragic Death Of Winnie Barrington

is available from:

Dr Angus Mitchell,
Papaver Editions, Mount Carmel, 4
Ballinacurra Terrace,
Limerick, Ireland.

angus.mitchell16@gmail.com

Price: Euro 20 or £20



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Did the Dashnaks make a terrible mistake?

Did the Armenian Dashnaks make a terrible mistake in 1914? Was there an alternative course open to the Armenians in which they would have gained far more than they ended up with, between 1918 and 1924? Would they have secured the safety and continued existence of the Armenian people in their traditional homelands by acting differently than they did? Was there no other way possible but collaborating in the destruction of the Ottoman state and organising an insurrection to facilitate it? Might the Armenian future have been far better if they had not done what they did after August 1914?

These are questions which the Armenian lobby does not want to face up to. They seem to be just too much to contemplate, given what happened to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the road the *Dashnagtzoutium* chose to take. It would be just terrible to think that perhaps the wrong turn was taken at the crossroads and another road may have led to a less glorious/disastrous outcome.

PASDERMADJIAN'S CANDID ADMISSION

I first came across this issue when I read two small books written under the revolutionary pen-name of "Armen Garo" (Armenian Hero). The Armenian insurrectionary, Dr. Garegin Pasdermadjian, published these as he waited in Washington for his nation to be granted a territory for its Great War service, by the victorious Allies in Paris. The books were called *Why Armenia Should Be Free* (1918) and *Armenia and her Claims to Freedom* (1919).

Why Armenia Should Be Free describes an Armenian Insurrection, beginning in late 1914, that, it is argued, contributed substantially to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and which was viewed by Pasdermadjian as being well worth the lives of the hundreds of thousands, or more, it consumed, because it had—presumably—achieved its objective. As Armen Garo wrote:

"...the Armenians from the beginning of the war... have stood by and been loyal to the allied cause in the Near East, and they rendered not only appreciable military service but also jeopardised their very existence in Turkey, where more than a million of Armenians, men, women and children, were ruthlessly massacred and exterminated by reason of their pro-ally attitude."

Pasdermadjian was a committed

Dashnak and it is clear that he believed the risking of the "very existence" of his people was considered worthwhile to achieve Magna Armenia. And in 1918, at the conclusion of the Great War, he felt the risk, despite the losses, to have been completely justified and the Dashnaks vindicated.

At this moment of seeming triumph Pasdermadjian was candid enough to reveal that there had been another choice open to the *Dashnagtzoutium* that had certainly been a possible alternative to what they decided to do and this alternative was rejected, fully in the knowledge of what would happen instead:

"Had the Armenians assumed an entirely opposite attitude from what they actually did; in other words, had they bound their fate in 1914 to the Turco-German cause, just as the Bulgarians did in 1915, what would have been the trend of events in the Near East? Here is a question to which, it is quite possible, our great Allies have had no time to give any consideration. But that very question was put before the Armenians in 1914, and with no light heart did they answer it by their decision to join the Allies. Each and every one of them had a clear presentiment of the terrible responsibility they assumed. Those millions of corpses of Armenian women and children which spotted the plains in the summer of 1915, rose like phantoms before our very eyes in the August of 1914 when we decided to resist the wild Turkish revengefulness and its frightful outcome.

Now, in October, 1918, when we are so close to the hour of the final victory, and feel quite safe and certain that the heavy and gloomy days of the summer of 1914 will never return, I shall permit myself to picture in a few words, before I finish, that which would have taken place if the Armenians had sided with the Germano-Turks in the Near East from the beginning of the war.

First of all, those frightful Armenian massacres would not have taken place. On the contrary, the Turks and the Germans would have tried to win the sympathy of the Armenians in every possible way until the end of the war" (p.44).

That is quite clear in suggesting that what happened to the Armenian populace from 1915 was very much the result of the Armenian Insurrection and if there had been no Insurrection there would have been a large number of Armenians (and Turks and Kurds) still alive and all the better for it in 1918.

Just after the Great War began in Europe a delegation of Young Turks attended the 8th Dashnak Congress held at Erzurum, in Ottoman eastern Anatolia. There they made an offer to the Armenians to secure their loyalty in the event of the War coming to the Ottoman territories so as to preserve stability in the territories in which the Armenians lived.

That the Ottomans should have hosted the Dashnak Congress as the Great War was beginning reveals something about the good intentions of the *Committee of Union and Progress* (Young Turkey). For most of the previous decade the Dashnaks, including Pasdermadjian himself, had sat in the Ottoman parliament, Armenians had been Ottoman ministers and there had been genuine attempts at reform, which were to be supervised by International inspectors, in the vilayets where the Armenians mostly lived.

At this Congress the Ottomans offered the Dashnaks the thing they had been struggling for over the previous 30 years – autonomy.

The Ottoman Government sent a delegation of 28 CUP members, representing all the ethnic groups of the Empire, including important individuals like Beheddin Shakir and Naji Bey, to make an offer to the Armenians—who were observed to be moving toward supporting a Russian assault on the Empire.

I recently came across the following account of the offer made to the Dashnaks at their Congress in Erzurum. It is from a book written by Morgan Philips Price, a pro-Armenian British Liberal, who became a Labour M.P. He acted for C.P. Scott as *The Manchester Guardian's* Caucasus correspondent during the Great War, joining up with the Tsarist army and the Dashnaks:

"At the outbreak of the European war the Committee of Union and Progress became all-powerful, and all reform schemes and reconciliation plans fell to the ground. The Armenian party, "Dashnaksution", happened to be holding a conference at Erzerum when the war began. Turkey had not yet entered; but at the beginning of August Hilmi Bey, Behadin Shekir Bey, and Nedji Bey were delegated by the Committee to make certain proposals to the Armenians in the event of war with Russia. These delegates arrived at Erzerum at the end of the month, and their first proposal was that the Armenians should observe complete neutrality, the population of Armenia and the Trans-Caucasus doing its military duty, to whatever Empire it owed allegiance.

This the Armenians accepted, and all seemed to point to an agreement. But a few days later the Turks suddenly made another proposal. Turkey, they said, could never be secure until there was a chain of buffer States between her and her arch-enemy, Russia, and they claimed that, if war broke out, the Armenians should assist them in carrying out their plan. They then produced a map of the Middle East in which the following political divisions were made. Russia was to be pushed back to the Cossack steppes beyond the main range of the Caucasus. Tiflis and the Black Sea coast, with Batum and Kutais, were marked as belonging to an autonomous province of Georgia. The central part of the Trans-Caucasus, with Kars, Alexandropol and Erivan, were to be joined to the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and East Erzerum, as an autonomous Armenia. Eastern Trans-Caucasia, including Baku, Elizabetopol and Dagestan were to become an autonomous province of Shiite Tartars. The Armenians, feeling the impossibility of the Ottoman Empire ever being able to realize such a grandiose scheme... refused to have anything to do with the proposal. So the Young Turk delegates, unable to make any impression in Erzerum, proceeded to Van, where they met with no greater success.

According to statements made to me during 1915 by prominent Van Armenians, it is clear that the action of the Tiflis Dashnakists, about which the Committee of Union and Progress had doubtless been informed by the end of August, was the principal cause of these Turkish demands. Early in August 1914 the Tiflis Armenians seem to have decided that a Russo-Turkish war was inevitable, and thereupon the Dashnakist leaders there at once offered 25,000 volunteers to assist the Russians in conquering the Armenian vilayets.

This offer was made before the outbreak of the war with Turkey, and in the interval the volunteers were busy training and forming at the various centres in the Caucasus. At the end of October, when Turkey came into the war, preparations had been so far advanced that Andranik, the famous revolutionary leader from Turkey, at the head of the first volunteer battalion, took part with the Russians in the advance through North-west Persia, capturing Serai early in November. Meanwhile five more battalions had been formed and were ready to leave for the front, as soon as they could get rifles and equipment. Fifty per cent, of these volunteers were Armenians who had left Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania since the outbreak of the European war, and had come to the Caucasus to offer their services.

There can be little doubt that this volunteer movement, started under the auspices of the Caucasus Armenians, was the cause of the Young Turk demands on the Armenians of Erzerum, Van and Bitlis for a similar volunteer movement against

Russia, and of the subsequent persecution when this demand was refused. Prominent Armenians, whom I met in Van, told me how the attitude of Djavid Pasha towards them and their people became much more unfriendly as soon as the news arrived that Armenian volunteers were on the front fighting against the Turks. He at once demanded the return of a number of Armenian deserters, whose absence had hitherto been winked at. He accused them of going over to the volunteers with the Russians, and commenced the policy of forcing the Armenians into special labour battalions, where they had very hard work and bad food. Thus the Van Armenians were at the mercy of the Turks, who avenged on them all the rash acts of their kinsmen in the Caucasus.

That their conduct was keenly resented by the Turkish Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, was made clear by some articles in the Van Tosp, the organ of the Van Armenians in Tin as early in 1916. In its issue for January 9th, 1916, Professor Minassian took the Dashnakist party to task for having entered into negotiations with the Russian authorities without consulting its kindred societies in Turkish Armenia. It had spread, he said, baseless rumours of a Russian promise of autonomy for Armenia, and then had proceeded to organize volunteer battalions, regardless of the effect that this would have on their kinsmen in Turkey, whose position under the nose of the Turks was very precarious and required tactful handling. He denied that there was any serious negotiation with the Russian Government about Armenian autonomy, and said that the Dashnakist leaders of the Caucasus were pretending to represent responsible opinion, whereas they really only represented a group. The Orizon, the organ of the Dashnakist party in Tiflis, defended itself by saying that the massacre would have happened in any case, and that Prince Vorontsoff Dashkoff had not only verbally promised Armenian autonomy in return for the service of the volunteers, but had actually signed a document to this effect. Whether this document ever existed is however exceedingly doubtful" (War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia, pp.243-6).

The Armenians turned the Ottoman offer down and instead joined the Tsarist invasion and mounted an Insurrection against the Ottoman state.

The CUP mission offered the Armenians autonomy in two and a half vilayets of East Erzurum, Van and Bitlis plus "*Russian Armenia*" in return for service in the Ottoman army in the event of War and support from their brethren in Russian territory, who would then, in the event of victory, be part of the larger autonomous region. The offer would be guaranteed by the German Government. The *Ittihad* (CUP) delegation

proposed that the Dashnaks aid the Ottoman State by mounting attacks on any Russian invasion behind the lines in Transcaucasia, where an autonomous Armenian state could be founded.

In the two and a half vilayets of Turkish Armenia this would have placed around 1 million Moslems under the authority of an autonomous Armenia containing only around 400,000 Armenians. So it was undoubtedly a generous concession on the Ottoman side (see Justin McCarthy, *Turks and Armenians: Nationalism and Conflict in the Ottoman Empire*, p.10). The Armenian population of the autonomous area would have been increased by another 1 million from the Kars, Erivan and Alexandropol Russian *guberniyas* (although this area would have also contained a sizeable amount of Moslems).

So, an Armenian autonomous region, with "*Russian Armenia*" included, under Ottoman sovereignty would have perhaps been made viable by a small majority of Armenians—something that all the Armenian territorial claims were incapable of delivering without the extensive ethnic cleansing of Moslems.

This was the concrete realisation, to all intents and purposes, of the deal the Dashnaks had concluded with the Young Turks in 1907. It was more realistic and realisable than the choice the Dashnaks subsequently took in throwing in their lot with Russian expansionism and British Imperialism.

It could be said that the Dashnaks backed the wrong horse, believing it to be the more powerful one, more likely to win.

A TURKISH WARNING

Halil Bey, whilst Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1916, gave a very frank interview to an Associated Press reporter in Vienna about the discussions the Ottoman leadership had with the Dashnaks in the autumn of 1914 and the attitude the Young Turks had to the Armenians. Halil Bey recalled that he had offered the Dashnaks some very sound advice:

"When the war broke out we knew exactly what the Armenians were doing. More bombs, rifles, ammunition, and money had been brought into the country and their organization was made even more perfect. I was then President of the Chamber of Deputies and was very fond of the Armenian members, as I had always been a friend of that race. So I called the Armenian representatives together and asked what they intended doing. At the end of the conversation I told them I could sympathize with their ideals and had always done so as long as they were

not entirely separatistic.

'Gentleman', I said, 'I fully understand your position and hope that you understand ours. We have engaged in a war in which we may go down. That will be your opportunity to make arrangements with the Entente, but bear in mind that the Ottoman Government will apply the most severe measures if you act against the Turks before you know we are conquered. Make your plans so that you can meet the Entente Powers with clean hands, which you can do by supporting us so far and no further than the law demands. I think the Entente statesmen will see the correctness of such conduct and will recognize your claim to autonomy. You can then take up the work where we left off and in which I wish you every success, but bear in mind that we are not gone yet, and that the slightest false move on your part will bring trouble to all Armenians. Sit quiet and let us try this issue. When you are sure we have lost, go over to the Entente and get from them all you can'."

Halil Bey continued:

"I wish to say the Young Turks have always looked upon the Armenians as a valuable asset to the Turkish Empire. The fact is, we needed them. The country's commerce was largely in their hands; and as farmers the Armenians have a great value. We did not look upon them as valuable chattels, however. We were willing to give them an equal share in the Government, which we did, as is shown by the fact that before the outbreak of the war we had a large number of Armenians in the Chamber of Deputies and also several Senators and a Minister. Nearly all the Vice Ministers were Armenians, because we recognized the ability of the Armenians and were ready to give them their political rights in the tenancy of a proportionate number of public offices.

After the revolution all went well for a time, and the Young Turks hoped they had finally found a solution to the problem which had vexed the old regime in Turkey for many years and had retarded the progress of the country. The Balkan war, however, caused the Armenians to again take up their separatistic ideals. Committees formed an organisation with the intention of securing for the Armenians an autonomous government.

I think I would be the last man to deny a people self-government, but the case of the Armenians is one where this must be done. The Armenians, spread throughout Asia Minor and Southern Russia, are merely a majority in the districts usually designated as Armenian. Armenian autonomy, therefore, would lead to the loss of the independence of the other Ottoman races. Under these conditions even the Young Turks were opposed to the Armenian plan, but in justice they wanted to give the Armenians a fuller share in the Government, which was done, and even our worst traducers cannot deny that" (*The New York Times*, 28.10.16).

DASHNAK ACCOUNTS

There are different versions of what the Dashnak response was to the offers made by the Young Turks. One Armenian source, Papazian's 1932 book, suggests that the Dashnaks promised to do their duty as loyal Ottoman subjects:

"In August 1914 the young Turks asked the Dashnag Convention, then in session in Erzerum, to carry out their old agreement of 1907, and start an uprising among the Armenians of the Caucasus against the Russian government. The Dashnagtzoutune refused to do this, and gave assurances that in the event of war between Russia and Turkey, they would support Turkey as loyal citizens.

"On the other hand, they could not be held responsible for the Russian-Armenians.

"The Turks were not satisfied. They suspected them of duplicity. This perhaps was not true, because the answer given the Turks was based on a resolution adopted by the convention. The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. The Dashnagtzoutune in the Caucasus had the upper hand. They were swayed in their actions by the interests of the Russian government and disregarded, entirely, the political dangers that the war had created for the Armenians in Turkey. Prudence was thrown to the winds; even the decision of their own convention of Erzurum was forgotten and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasus front.

"Thousands of Armenians from all over the world, flocked to the standards of such famous fighters as Andranik, Kery, Dro, etc. The Armenian volunteer regiments rendered valuable services to the Russian Army in the years of 1914-15-16. However, their deeds of heroism and the blood they shed in the conquest of Turkish Armenia by Russia, did not help the Armenian cause. The Dashag leaders declared, that the Russian government had promised freedom for Armenia. There was no foundation to this: and the deception was exposed finally. But thousands of Armenians had already answered the false call, and incidentally, millions were poured into the coffers of the Dashnag 'National Bureau'.

"On the other hand, the methods used by the Dashnagtzoutune in recruiting these regiments were so open and flagrant, that it could not escape the attention of the Turkish authorities, who were looking for an excuse to carry out their program of exterminating the Christian population which they had adopted as early as 1911" (Patriotism Perverted, pp. 38-9).

The account of future Armenian Prime Minister Katchaznouni supports this view.

'The Case for Armenia', published by the London Armenian Bureau in 1921, suggests that the Armenian leaders turned down the offer, making it clear they would not fight for the Ottoman State. Pasdermadjian agrees with this, adding that the Armenians advised the Ottomans against taking part in the war.

Whatever the truth of the matter the behaviour of the Dashnaks was very slippery and represented a betrayal of the pact they had made with the CUP in 1907. The Ottoman offer was communicated by the Dashnak Congress to Russia, France and Britain—who advised the Armenians to reject it.

Enver sent a personal note to the Armenian Patriarch requesting that he restrain those who were expressing support for the Allies. However, on August 5th, the day following Britain's entry into the European war, the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin wrote to Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Tsar's Viceroy of the Caucasus, asking him to take this most favourable moment "*to solve the Armenian Question*". He suggested an autonomous Armenian state be established under a Christian governor. If the Russians agreed to this they would have Armenian support in the War. The Count advised the Catholicos that the conflict with the Ottomans needed to be carefully choreographed to ensure that the Turks were seen as the aggressive party and the Armenians should be careful in their actions—only obeying orders from Russia.

On receiving this reply the Catholicos wrote to Tsar Nicholas asking for a Russian Protectorate for the Armenians. The Tsar replied: "*Tell your flock, Holy Father, that a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians.*"

This, of course, was not an agreement for an Armenian state but just "*a most brilliant future*" under a new shepherd.

Dr. Zavriyev, who handled foreign relations for the Dashnaks, went to the Count and promised him Armenian assistance in the Russian war on the Ottomans. The British Foreign Office later noted that it was through this contact between Zavriyev and Count Vorontsov-Dashkov that the Russians organised disturbances in the Russian/Ottoman borderlands. (see Salahi Sonyel, *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia*, p.82)

Pasdermadjian reveals that Count Vorontsov-Dashkov informed the Armenian National Council, meeting in Tiflis,

that "if the Armenians would unreservedly give their support to the Russian armies during the course of the war, Russia would grant autonomy to the six Armenian vilayets"(p.16). The Armenians were cautious about the Russian offer, however, since they had been let down by the Czar on a number of occasions before, during the last century. However, the crucial thing this time was the British/French Entente that backed Russia:

"...this time the Armenians thought that Russia was not alone; the two great liberal nations of the West, France and England, were her Allies. After long and weighty consultation, with their hopes pinned on France and England, the Armenians resolved to aid the Russian armies in every possible way" (p.16).

The impending destruction of the Ottoman State caused by invading Allied armies was the major factor in turning the position of Armenians from one of mainstays of the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire and "the loyal community" into a problematic element within it. And since the objective of the Allies was the destruction of the life of the Ottoman State through invasion and blockade that future, indeed, had the Armenians?

Once the Imperialist Powers had made their choice and the Armenian Dashnak Insurrectionists had made their choice what choice had the ordinary people in the events that everyone knew were about to unfold around them?

A GRANDIOSE SCHEME?

The Dashnaks described the Ottoman offer made at Erzurum in 1914 as a "grandiose scheme" to Price Philips. The meaning seems to be that whilst it was a big and generous offer it would never be realised, except through War and Insurrection against the Ottoman Empire. Either the Ottomans were incapable of realising it with the forces ranged against them or they would chose not to follow through with it upon victory.

What subsequent events indicate, however, is that the Ottomans could certainly have realised it, if the Armenians had not gone over to the Russian side and become a fifth column on the Tsar's behalf.

In 1917 the Tsarist War effort began to collapse under the strain of the sacrifice the Russian masses were making in blood for the Tsar's expansionary objectives. That was mainly due to the losses suffered against the Germans rather than the Ottomans. The Russian Front in Eastern Anatolia remained solid and had advanced in 1916, taking in large parts of what the Armenians saw as their territory.

However, how successful would the Tsar's armies have been without Armenian assistance? Certainly the Russian armies would have been numerically reduced, there would have been no insurrectionary activity distracting Ottoman forces from the front and the War might even have been lost in 1915 through Enver's bold move at Sarikamish.

It is, therefore, probable that the Ottoman army would have been able to take the territory abandoned by the disintegration of the Russian army in 1917 even earlier than they did, in the summer of 1918.

This "grandiose scheme" which the Dashnaks rejected was more or less what actually pertained in the Caucasus from 1918 onwards, not only under Ottoman but British hegemony.

It might be argued that the Dashnaks believed the Ottomans to have been insincere and untrustworthy. The Ottomans had promised reform before and had only began to consider delivering under duress. They were only conceding the offer because of the threatened War and an Armenian Insurrection that would ensue on behalf of the Russians. And so the Dashnaks decided instead to put their destiny, and that of their people, in other hands.

The Dashnaks decided to rely on the Russians and British Imperialists. Under the Ottoman offer the Armenians would have got a much larger territory than they subsequently ended up with from their allies. And they would not have had the hundreds of thousands of losses in population they suffered from their decision to go for broke, relying on Russian and British Imperialism to deliver.

WHAT DASHNAKS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED

On this point we need to assess the likelihood of the Armenians achieving a separate state rather than autonomy, offered by the Ottomans to the Dashnaks in 1914.

Firstly, it should be noted that the maximum offer made by Tsarist Russia to the Armenians—and this is even shrouded in doubt—was one of autonomy. Tsarist Russia was a centralised state that did not do nation-building. It had no intention of establishing an independent Armenia on its route to Constantinople. In other words, Tsarist Russia made an offer no better than the Ottoman offer to the Dashnaks. And we know from a reading of Padermadjian and others that the Russians were trusted as little as the Ottomans by the Dashnaks. In fact, Padermadjian notes

an ominous occurrence of when the possessions of the relocated Armenians, carefully stored by the Ottomans, presumably to await their return, was taken away by the occupying Russian army. Armenians who had fled the Ottoman territory for the Caucasus in the early stages of the War were refused return by the "liberating" Tsarist armies in 1916.

So, if Tsarist Russia had been among the victors it would have been up to the Armenians themselves to improve their own position beyond what the Tsar could do for them. The Dashnak calculation, presumably, would have been that the Armenians under Tsarist rule could reduce the Moslem populace and increase their own power as a Christian outpost of the Russian Empire.

This left the Armenians dependent on British and French Imperialism—or the British Empire under influence of the United States—for gaining more than the Ottoman offer. And, of course, US influence would have been an unanticipated event in 1914, when the Ottoman offer was declined.

During the Great War the British stated on occasion that the Armenians would no longer have to tolerate Ottoman rule. However, these statements were vague and had more the appearance of moral exhortations than formal declarations. The British were careful in their words. Whilst making numerous offers and promises to various states and peoples there were no promises of a separate, independent Armenian state.

The Mudros Armistice, concluding the British War on the Ottoman Empire, had nothing to say on 'Armenia'. The Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet suggested "a national home for the scattered people of the Armenian race" akin to the promise made to the Zionists. But there was no equivalent of the Balfour Declaration and Balfour himself was more in favour of the people of the Caucasus "cutting each other's throats" than establishing states with help from the British Empire.

The Armenians were not mentioned in the official announcement of the countries participating in the Peace Conference. President Wilson explained to Boghos Nubar, the head of one of the two rival delegations the Armenians sent to Paris in any case, that Armenia had not been "welcomed into the family of nations" as yet and not to take offence (The newly

constructed Czechoslovakia was invited).

In February 1919 the British Delegation at Paris informed the Peace Conference that it was in favour of a great Armenian state comprising six Ottoman vilayets plus Cilicia and "Russian Armenia". However, it had already been decided at that point that not only was Britain not prepared to use its power to establish this state it favoured but it was intending to evacuate its military forces from the area and attempt to pass on responsibility for Armenia to the US. Since by then the Armenians had made enemies of all their neighbours—Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Persia and Bolshevik Russia—with territorial demands against them, this was like a mother abandoning her child.

Firuz Kamemzadeh, the Iranian/Russian historian, says the following about the Armenian demands at Paris:

"The Armenian leaders were drunk with victory and power. Their demands for an Armenia on three seas and for exorbitant indemnities were bound to antagonise those whom it was their purpose to win over. Among the Armenians only a few voices were heard protesting against the dangerous course adopted by the Dashnaks... (The two Armenian delegations...) held conferences and meetings at which hundreds of journalists, writers, singers, and ex-ministers, made long speeches in support of the Armenian cause. The Armenian delegates followed Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, reminding them every minute of the 'debt they owed Armenia'. Their importunity annoyed everyone, and they began to lose friends... The excessive demands and the tone in which they were made finally drove most people to dislike them" (*The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, p.257).

The *Treaty of Sevres* of 1920, which Britain was attempting to impose on the Turks, using Greek and Armenian proxies, incorporated "Wilsonian Armenia" in its terms. The idealistic President Wilson was in favour of taking a Mandate for Armenia, getting his map makers to draw up a great Armenia on a map. And then the Senate, who well understood Britain's game, on 24th May 1920 passed a resolution declining Wilson's acceptance of a US Mandate over Armenia.

So America was out of the game.

Britain was not willing to use its power and predominant position in the world to enforce the Treaty it wished to impose on the Turks. And the lack of British will paid to Armenian hopes as the small Erivan Republic, which was only recognised as

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Marking Centenary of Northern Ireland

Martin Mansergh (November 6th) laments that some "reject out of hand the core of it [the unionist tradition], which is Northern Ireland itself, part of the UK and now nearly 100 years old, [and that there are] many still refusing 20 years on from the Belfast Agreement even to refer to it by name".

Nationalists and republicans do not "reject out of hand" Northern Ireland, except Mr Mansergh interprets opposition to partition and aspiration towards a re-united Ireland as "rejection".

As to the refusal of "many" to use the name Northern Ireland, perhaps they're attempting to provide a counter-balance to frequent unionist references to NI as "the Province" (geographically inaccurate) and "the country" (surely impossible, given that, as Mr Mansergh acknowledges, Northern Ireland isn't a state).

Many of us in the north are placing our faith in An Taoiseach's promise that the north will not be left behind again. It looks as though Mr Mansergh and Fianna Fáil are exerting themselves mightily in the opposite direction.

Jude Collins

(Irish Times, 8.11.18)

the Red Army was waiting to pounce on it after seeing off General Denikin, was squeezed between a resurgent Turkey and the revived Bolshevik Russia.

While Armenia went down under the blows of Mustafa Kemal's forces, in an ill-judged war provoked by the Erivan Republic, the First General Assembly of the League of Nations discussed her demise. A few days later Armenia was Sovietised by the Red Army.

In late 1920 the results of the Dashnak decision of 1914 were plain to see. The Ottoman Armenian population had been devastated by the Dashnak gamble of collaborating in the destruction of the Ottoman state. Two-thirds of a million of them had perished and most of the remainder were scattered to various parts of the world (The Armenian lobby claims the catastrophe as being even worse). Magna Armenia, the objective the Dashnaks pursued until destruction, was shown to have been a delusion of insane proportions.

The Dashnaks had calculated that the Ottomans would let them down. But those on whom they pinned their hopes, and the future of their community, let them down in a far greater way—encouraging them to fight on to destruction.

Can it really be argued that an acceptance of the Ottoman offer made at Erzurum in the Summer of 1914 would have been worse for the Armenian population than what subsequently occurred?

Pat Walsh

The Nationalist Party And WW1

On 4th August 1914 Britain declared war on Germany. Her Royal Navy swept German merchant shipping from the oceans, obliterating the overseas trade of her greatest rival. Simultaneously, Britain cut the transatlantic cable linking Germany with the still neutral United States so that 'news' and comment sympathetic to Britain's war would enjoy a monopoly.

Britain's Official Secrets Act had been in force for some years, MI5, MI6 or their equivalents had already been established, British Naval Intelligence, like her Royal Navy itself, was the most developed in the world. It took one day only, the 8th August 1914, for Parliament to enact the *Defence of the Realm Act* (DORA).

Disagreement with Government's Declaration of War was followed by internment of Dissidents: for instance, Bertrand Russell. Newspapers, including Britain's influential *Manchester Guardian* and *Daily News*, Liberal critics of Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey's nearly decade-long war planning were bullied into repudiation of long-held principles.

The Irish Nationalist Party at the time was led by a triumvirate: John Dillon, John Redmond and Joe Devlin. It had traditionally opposed Britain's Imperial Wars. John Dillon had consistently attacked Sir Edward Grey's policies, which he recognised were aimed at making war on Germany. But the President/Chairman of the Party, John Redmond, had become a convinced Imperialist, deluded into

believing he had won Home Rule for Ireland. Without consulting his Party colleagues, or the Irish Electorate, he presumed to commit Ireland to war against Germany and Austria, on 4th August 1914, and later, on the Ottoman Empire. Not waiting even four days for the passing of the *Defence of the Realm Act*, his Party colleagues fell into step with the warmongers.

This was more than a disaster for Ireland. Many Liberal MPs who were unhappy with Sir Edward Grey's policy would have opposed it had the Irish Party stood by its previous principles, and led an anti-war campaign. This was a disaster for all mankind, with its reverberations in Turkey—and Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, countries making headlines to this day. These hotspots could, within years if not months, be the spark that would yet set off the destruction of life on this planet. Alas for History, there will be no historians to record with approval the current Irish Government's standing shoulder to shoulder with Britain and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's planning!

I believe Daniel O'Connell was a great man but that the title *"The Liberator"* is pure Hyperbole. Parnell has been described as *"The Uncrowned King of Ireland"*, but his arrogance destroyed both himself and the prospect of Home Rule.

Perhaps Redmond could be best described as *"The Unmandated Dictator"*.

He was a mere Backbencher in a party which never participated in government, even in a coalition. He was not a Privy Councillor: the Speaker of the Commons could ignore him when Privy Councillors wanted the attention of the Commons.

At the time, any Backbencher nominated for a Cabinet post had to resign his seat and get re-elected before taking that post. For example, Winston Churchill was elected for Manchester North in 1906. When Asquith nominated him for the Cabinet in 1908 as Minister for the Board of Trade, he had to resign his seat and fight a bye-election, which he lost.

Redmond who was posing as something above Minister for the Board of Trade, never contemplated resigning and fighting a bye-election as a warmonger. The Irish electorate buried his party forever at the first opportunity.

Donal Kennedy

'Great' War Without End

The Great War did not end on November 11, 1918. The fighting stopped but a one-sided killing by other means continued into 1919, and was actually intensified.

The starvation blockade of Germany by the Royal Navy was extended by now having access to the Baltic: German trade with Scandinavia was blocked, and death by starvation under the supervision of the British occupation continued until June 28, 1919, when a weak, conciliatory German government signed a false confession of war guilt in the name of the German people, absolving Britain of responsibility for the war it declared on August 4, 1914, and laying the ground on which Nazism developed.

The German government made this false confession in order to get food for its people, but they got a deep fund of resentment along with it.

Germany was taught a lesson about the vindictive use of absolute power during those final months of the Great War, from November 1918 to June 1919. It was Hitler who learned it.

Furthermore, once the terms of the Armistice were made known to them, the Germans were given 72 hours to decide for or against an acceptance of the Armistice.

At the outset and under instructions from their government, the German delegation requested an immediate cessation of hostilities, in order to avoid the ongoing waste of life while the Armistice terms were being considered and, on being informed of the 72-hour deadline, the delegation pleaded: "For God's sake, Monsieur le Maréchal, [Foch] do not wait for those seventy-two hours. Stop the hostilities this very day" (11th Day, 11th Hour. Armistice Day 1918: World War I and its violent climax, by Joseph E Persico, published by Arrow, London, 2004, p308)

But the appeals fell on deaf ears. In denying this request which would have resulted in thousands of lives being "saved for their families" the Allies showed a level of callousness consistent with the manner in which the war had been fought by them since the start. The lives that would have been saved by an immediate cessation of hostilities were not only German lives but French, American and British and yes, Irish lives at a time when the war had intensified over a wide front.

We are told we must celebrate the "war to end all wars" but we must not discuss it.

The Irish dead were deceived and dishonoured both in their lives and in their deaths.

Let Ireland reverse this deception and dishonour and tell the real truth of what the war was about.

That is the greatest honour we can pay our dead on this centenary year.

Pat Maloney, Editor, *'Labour Comment'*
(*Irish Examiner* 10.11.18)

President's Move Pandered To Imperialism!

Bad enough to denigrate the people of Ireland with the proposal that the inauguration of our President, the highest office in the land be deferred to make way for the annual red letter day of British Imperialism—Remembrance Day.

But to have this view promulgated by the leader of the Labour Party defies every principle on which the party was founded.

The following was the view of James Connolly, a principal founder of the party:

"Should a German army land in Ireland tomorrow we should be perfectly justified in joining it, if by doing so we could rid this country once and for all from its connection with the Brigand Empire that drags us unwillingly into this War".—James Connolly, *Our Duty in the Crisis*, *Irish Worker*, August 8th, 1914.

Is it any wonder that 56% of the population refused to bother exercising their franchise in the Presidential election!

Pat Maloney, Editor, *Labour Comment'*
(*Cork Evening Echo* 13.11.18)

[Two respondents replied on the 17th November. **John Ahern Snr of Farranree** wrote: "Mr Higgins was correct in honouring those brave Irish nationalist volunteers who fought for the freedom of small nations, who were formed to combat loyalist opposition to home rule", while **Peter James of Mayfield** wrote "Maloney... is a disgrace in what he said about Remembrance Day, because many Irish people lost their lives in World War I, as did many English, fighting for what they believed in, so he should keep his biased comments to himself". **Pat Maloney's response to these letters appears on page 26.**]

Does It Stack Up

Stack ?

MOTORING NAIVETÉ

One of my friends has recently bought a new hybrid car. She is very enthusiastic about its benign effect on the environment. I did not like to pass any adverse comment to dampen her enthusiasm and I've been thinking about it since. The hybrid car has a petrol engine which drives the wheels and at the same time charges the batteries and the batteries can also be charged from public charging points or from a private charging point at home or at the place of employment of the driver. The public charging points are at present 'free', courtesy of the tax-payer: i.e. you and me via the State. The private charging points operated by an employer are free to the employee using a hybrid electric or pure electric car. And so, if the driver of the car works the system, there might be no fuel costs. Or very little if the petrol tank is filled only now and then because the batteries drive the car through an electric motor. Also, going downhill instead of using the brakes (supplied as the usual standard) the run downhill can also be used to recharge the batteries. That is the theory.

But it does not really stack up. In practice, in real life, the enthusiasts do not like to say how often they purchase petrol, nor how often or seldom they use the petrol engine, nor how far they travel on an electric charge of their batteries. The information that I have gathered from gentle and circuitous interrogation seems to indicate that no owner of a hybrid or a purely electric car has managed to travel from Cork to Dublin and back to Cork—about 550 kms minimum—without refuelling at some stage.

Cork to Dublin and back without refuelling is an appropriate measure because, if a Cork person goes to Dublin in the morning she/he will inevitably want to get back to Cork in the evening, and one does not want to knock up a filling station proprietor late at night for a fill of fuel. I know, it happened to me once. Not, I hasten to add, due to the ire of the filling station owner who could not have been more friendly and jovial when his initial

scowling demeanour was mollified by my father who emerged from his slumber in the back of the car and recognised him as a stalwart of the nearby Greyhound Owners' Association branch and they cemented what looked like a burgeoning life-long friendship by being admitted in the back-door of a nearby dead-looking pub where I soon found myself drinking lemonade for what seemed like hours.

We made our escape only when the filling station owner's wife slipped in and gently reminded him of the hour he had to get up in the morning. When we returned to the car, my father delivered a paternal sermon about watching the fuel gauge and the dangers of running out of fuel in the small hours of the night. That was in Urlingford, Co. Kilkenny. Later on the journey home it occurred to me that the cost of the fuel had not been mentioned, but the filling station owner had been liberally plied with liquor by my father. However, I digress.

Ever since then I would not have a car which did not travel to Dublin from Cork and back again on one tank of fuel. In France, I understand, the measure of a good car is one that can travel from Paris to Cannes on one tank of fuel when one gets the urge on emerging late at night from a café in Paris. As one does, it seems.

Another one of my friends bought a new all electric car about three years ago. He admitted to spending \approx 55,000 on it and he went to Dublin by train to collect it. The batteries needed to be charged three times on the journey from Dublin to Cork and charging took hours and innumerable cups of coffee (for the driver). I would not know this but for the fact that the driver took as his companion an engineer—who was amazed at the whole proceedings. The driver has not yet disposed of his petrol engine car and the electric car is rarely seen.

Electric cars are not a recent invention. At Blenheim Palace in the UK, an electric car can be seen which is a 1901 Waverly used by Consuelo Vanderbilt, wife of the 9th Duke of Marlborough. These cars were expensive and marketed to wealthy women as being a clean and independent way to travel. But the batteries were very weighty and slow to recharge. The sales of electric cars were eclipsed by Henry Ford's Model T which was relatively cheap to buy and cheap to run on petrol—which was available to purchase from most Chemists' Shops in non-sparking metal containers.

The car, known as the horseless carriage, was invented in 1808 by Francois Isaac de Rivaz who designed and built the first internal combustion engine fuelled by hydrogen. Hydrogen is dangerous stuff and the car did not succeed in the marketplace.

Then there were steam-driven traction engines and steam-driven cars. These were very powerful but very slow. The drivers were called *chauffeurs*—a *chauffeur* means a small portable furnace—and, even as recently as the 1950s and 1960s, car insurance policies referred to cover for losses from injuries received from steam, hot ashes and cinders.

As I write this, I contacted the driver of an electric car and asked him directly to say how far he could drive in it without a recharge and he said: "*from Cork to Cashel, they say it will go further but I wouldn't chance it*". The distance from Cork to Cashel is about 100 kms (about 60 miles). I would not venture as far as Henry Ford's financial advisor who said:

"Cars will never catch on, there will always be horses"

—but certainly the time of the electric car is not yet come. The internal combustion engine—either petrol, diesel or gas—will be with us for the foreseeable future.

IRISH INVENTOR: NICHOLAS CALLAN

Incidentally, when I was reading something else entirely, I came across a biography of Rev. Fr. Nicholas Callan, a priest and scientist who taught at Maynooth College from 1826 until 1864 when he died. In Maynooth College he taught Mechanics, Mathematics and Electricity and during his long career he made major discoveries and inventions. To start a petrol engine, you turn the key or press a "start" button which causes an electric motor to turn over the engine and at the same time causes the ignition of the fuel by means of a high-voltage spark.

The car battery is normally 12 volt but Nicholas Callan's invention of the induction coil enables a high voltage spark to be made. In his laboratory, he was able to generate up to 60,000 volts by means of his transducer. This invention is still used in modern cars. If you have cause to fiddle with the engine of a car when it is running it is well to wear rubber-soled shoes and keep one hand in your pocket! Seriously.

RAPE

A properly constituted Court of a Judge and Jury recently decided a man was

innocent of a charge of rape. A TD of the Dáil, Ruth Coppinger took issue with the verdict and in the House of the Oireachtas produced knickers for all the TDs to see. She stated a person (the complainant in the rape trial) should not be questioned about her undergarments in Court. What followed were numerous #mobs of protesters throughout Ireland walking the streets waving their knickers and some persons even wearing their knickers on their heads!

If Ruth Coppinger's logic is to prevail, then shoplifters should not have their underskirts examined for specially-made pockets to hold their thieved goods nor should burglars be subject to search for house-breaking tools suspended from braces inside their clothes.

Inspectors of Taxes and Customs and Excise officers have long had the powers, necessary for their work, to search every item of a person's clothing and even into a person's body. So why is Ruth Coppinger complaining? If knickers can openly be waved around in public—what is wrong with mentioning the garments in Court when a person's liberty is at stake? It does not stack up that the Rules of Court and the law itself should be changed to suit women's agendas.

It used to be the case that a crime or an offence could not be proved in Court unless there were a minimum of two witnesses. The motto was "*One witness, no conviction*" and this still holds good, except where the complainant is a woman and the subject involves the sexual behaviour of a man. How did this unequal situation come about? It does not stack up and does nothing for societal cohesion.

Michael Stack ©

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Letter sent to *Evening Echo* on 22nd November 2018

Betrayal Day!

In reply to Messrs. John Ahern, Snr. and Peter James (*Evening Echo*-17.11.2018) I did not object to the honouring of the Irishmen who died in World War 1, what I object to is the craven kow-towing and deference to our lining up with Imperial Britain in preference to the Inauguration of our President on November 11.

Our dead died in horrible circumstances and their ideals were trampled on by the state they fought for. They died for a propaganda lie: "the Freedom of Small Nations."

If Ireland desires to honour its dead of World War I, honour them in our own way and our own narrative of the Slaughterhouse they engaged in. Call August 4, the day Britain declared war on Germany: "Betrayal Day"—it was nothing else but that for Ireland.

John Ahern, Snr. writes that his father and his three brothers went to war. "They were not hungry, they had plenty."

Well, John this was the real world in 1914: The landscape was ideal in recruiting starving young men who had not worked in Dublin since the lock-out of 1913, and thousands of men across the country whose only possibility of work was seasonal.

The economics of joining the army was the payment of the 'Soldiers Separation' allowance, which was 31 shillings and six pence, as against a labourer's wage of 12 shillings per week at the time.

I won't even comment on the morality of going out to shoot Germans, Austrians and Turks on the basis of starvation wages.

Peter James is correct "...many Irish people lost their lives in World War 1, as did many English..." What was their reward? The people voted overwhelmingly in 1918 for an Independent and Sovereign nation and the advocates of the "Rights of Small Nations," sent in the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries—and gave us a land fit for heroes by burning down Cork city. And yes, they gave the English workers the General Strike of 1926, the Jarrow March and mass depression saved only by another World War in 1939.

So, it gets down to this: we must celebrate the "Great War" but we must not discuss what it was about! Is that it?

And don't forget the Court Martials inflicted on the Irish troops, which was completely disproportionate to their numbers. Twenty-nine were executed. Most of the executed Irish were teenagers, raw recruits who had never been away from home. They were tried, usually with no legal defence, and the trial usually lasted a few minutes.

The usual 'charge' was leaving their post, and 80% suffered from dysentery and going to the toilet was not regarded as a reasonable excuse. When not executed they were tied to wagon wheels for weeks in disgrace. Probably the most infamous execution was Private Downey, from Limerick, who was executed for not wearing his cap when ordered to do so.

It is right that we should remember this disgusting and atrocious war whose consequences still persist, having produced, not a mere four years of carnage, but a whole century of it. Look at Palestine! Is it really a "contribution to the world" which we can be proud of?

Honour, dishonour, honesty, dishonesty. These are strong words. Truth is also a strong word. We should remember the whole truth, not some selective, sanitised, partial version which promotes such "honourable contributions" in our own age.

In its leading article on 20.11.2018: the *Evening Echo* stated "Drop history at all of our peril," and concluded with these words: "History is not an easy subject. It requires a bit of work." It does indeed, but above all it requires honesty!

Pat Maloney

CONNOLLY continued

had nothing to do in the management. The children of all nationalities and all creeds and classes attended these schools and grew up together in them, and he believed that the result of this was a better understanding amongst them in after life."

Mr. Redmond exalts Canada as a model for Irish Government, but opposes in Ireland all these domestic institutions which make free government a success in Canada.

If it was right, as it undoubtedly was, to demand aid for Irish farmers, why is it not equally right to demand state aid or local aid for starving Irish school children?

If, as Mr. Redmond claims, Ireland is overtaxed to the extent of over two millions per year, how will payment of Irish members of Parliament be a gift from the 'British' Treasury? Does one feel like the recipient of a 'gift' when you get back some of your own?

How then does Mr. Redmond and his party maintain their hold despite their essentially reactionary position? Simply because the Irish Unionists are still more reactionary. It is almost a choice between the devil and the deep sea.

Observe: In the debate in the House of Commons on the McCann case, [1] Mr. Joseph Devlin, M.P., taunted the Orange bigots with the fact that none of their clergymen had been on the Anti-Sweating platform in the Ulster Hall, Belfast. As a matter of fact, the same was true of the Catholic clergymen. None of them were on that platform either, but the stupid Orange reactionaries could not think of a better answer to Joe than to deny the fact of the sweating. The obvious retort was apparently beyond their capacities.

Another illustration: In the debate upon the issue of the writ for North Louth, an Orange member, Mr. William Moore, moved to suspend the issue of the writ for four months on the ground that 'Protestants' had been assaulted. This motion was made despite the fact that the whole trend of the evidence had been to prove that every species of intimidation and bribery had been brought to bear upon Catholics who refused to bow to the dictates of the official Home Rule gang. That, in short, it was Catholics who needed to be protected and not Protestants.

A motion to suspend the issue of the writ pending a Parliamentary investigation into the workings of the organisations responsible for the wholesale terrorism exercised upon the electors of North Louth—irrespective of

religion—would have opened the way for a capable man to give such an exposure of the workings of the Ancient Order of Hibernians (Board of Erin) and its relation to the United Irish League, as might have led to the extirpation of that pest in Ireland, but no one could expect such *statesmanship* from the Orange quarter.

But just imagine what a real Irish democrat could have made of such a situation!

Then he could have dealt with the pilgrimage of the M.P.'s to America and Canada to beg from Irish exiles money towards the Irish cause, how our exiled brothers and sisters stinted themselves of, perhaps, even the necessaries of life in order to help to "free Ireland and uplift poor Mother Erin", and how the money thus procured was used to debauch Irish men and women, to destroy political purity, to purchase bludgeons to smash in the heads of Irish men, and to terrorise the peaceful countryside?

A real representative of the Irish democracy might go on to show how Mr. Joseph Devlin's organisation, the A.O.H., supposed to be the Ancient Order of Hibernians, but by some believed to be the Ancient Order of Hooligans, has spread like an ulcer throughout Ireland, carrying social and religious terrorism with it into quarters hitherto noted for their broad-mindedness and discernment.

How it has organised the ignorant, the drunken and the rowdy, and thrown the shield of religion around their excesses; how it has made it impossible to conduct a political contest in the South of Ireland except on the lines of civil war; and how, every man who dares to oppose the Redmondite party, or every man within that party who opposes the A.O.H., must be at all times prepared to take his life in his hands ...

Every shade of political feeling in Ireland, outside of the official gang at the head of the United Irish League, agree that this organisation of Mr. Devlin's creation, and of whose work Mr. Redmond accepts the fruits, is the greatest curse yet introduced into the political and social life of Ireland. It is the organised ignorance of the community placing itself unreservedly at the disposal of the most insidious and inveterate enemies of enlightenment. In West Belfast it calls upon the Labour vote, upon the Socialists, to vote for 'Wee Joe Devlin', and in Queenstown [2] it foments a riot in order to prevent a Socialist speaker delivering his message; it is a true reincarnation of mediaeval intolerance masquerading in the guise of Christian charity ...

Such is the problem, or rather some factors in the problem, in Ireland. Say, ye British Socialists, have your leaders any conception of this problem, or do they imagine that an Irish branch of a British Socialist organisation can grapple with this problem, or do anything with it save make a mess of it?

Or that it can be grappled with in any manner save from within the Irish nation by the workers of Ireland uniting in a party of their own to throw off the incubus of social slavery and religious intolerance?

Such is the work the Socialist Party of Ireland sets out to accomplish. In that work the Socialists of Ireland know well that they can expect no help or countenance from the bigots of either Green or Orange persuasion, and while ever insisting upon the right of Ireland to control its own destinies, it allows precedence in its thoughts and plans to no interest but one, that of the working class. To the Redmonds and the Devlins, the Carsons and the Moores—it leaves the apostleship of religious bigotry; in our ranks there is no room for that type of politician of whom the poet writes that:—

With all his conscience and with one
eye askew,
So false he partly took himself for true;
Whose pious talk, when most his heart
was dry.
Made wet the crafty crow's-foot round
his eye;
Who never naming God except for gain,
So never took that useful name in vain;
Made Him his cat's paw, and the Cross
his tool,
And Christ his bait to trap his dupe and
fool;
Nor deeds of gift, but gifts of grace, he
forged,
And, snakelike, slimed his victim ere
he gorged.

SEA DREAMS by Alfred Lord Tennyson

(From: *FORWARD*, March 18, 1911)

Footnotes:

1. McCann Case (1910) arising out of the recently promulgated Catholic Ne Temere decree
2. Since renamed Cobh. A reference to the organised attack on one of Connolly's Socialist meetings there.

The text here is not the full text of the article. The omitted portions consist of very long quotations from the Cork Free Press, organ of William O'Brien, MP, and Mr. Lindsay Crawford, leader of the Independent Orangemen, both exposing the sectarian activities of the AOH (Ancient Order of Hibernians). ■



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Connolly on Redmond His Strength and Weakness (1911)

In endeavouring to give readers in Great Britain some real conception of the realities of Irish political life, one finds the task of explanation made increasingly difficult by the spectacular nature of the campaign waged by the Redmondites on the one hand, and the reactionary, lying stupidities of the Irish Tories on the other. The fact that national political freedom is both desirable and necessary blinds many people to the truth that the advocates of such freedom on the political field may be most intensely conservative on the social or economic field and, indeed, may be purblind bigots in their opposition to all other movements making for human progress or enlightenment.

On the other hand there are not wanting, even among Socialists, many who seeing the socially reactionary character of much of the agitation for national freedom, became opposed to the principle because of the anti-Socialist character of some of its advocates.

The Socialist Party of Ireland avoids the dangers of either course. It recognises that national political freedom is an inevitable step towards the attainment of universal economic freedom, but it insists that the non-Socialist leaders of merely national movements should be regarded in their true light as champions of the old social order and not exalted into the position of popular heroes by any aid of Socialist praise or glorification. A fact many of our British comrades are apt to forget.

We need not beslaver the United Irish League because we detest the Tories. We can detest them both. In fact they represent the same principle in different stages of social development. The Tories are the conservatives of Irish feudalism, the United Irish Leaguers are the conservatives of a belated Irish capitalism. It is our business to help the latter against the former only when we can do so without prejudice to our own integrity as a movement.

How difficult this becomes, at times, is best illustrated by the position of Mr. John E. Redmond, M.P., "*Leader of the Irish race*", as his followers enthusiastically assure us. Mr. Redmond has a record as a reactionist difficult to excel. Long before the Parnell split, he denounced the Irish agricultural labourers in a speech at Rathfarnham, near Dublin, for forming a trade union to protect their own interests. On the granting of Local Government in 1898, a measure that first enfranchised the Irish working class on local bodies, Mr. Redmond made a speech counselling the labourers to elect landlords to represent them—a speech truly characterised by Mr. Michael Davitt in the House of Commons as the "*speech of a half-emancipated slave*".

The labourers in town and country treated Mr. Redmond's advice with contempt and elected men of their own class all over Ireland. Compelled by the imperative necessity of maintaining in power a Home Rule government, Mr. Redmond votes for every measure of social reform the defeat of which would lead to the resignation of said government, but

quietly acquiesces in every exemption of Ireland from progressive measures.

Mr. Redmond believes that the Irish people are capable of governing their country, but opposed the proposal of Mr. T.W. Russell to allow the Irish people to control their own schools under the Local Government Act of 1898. Mr. Redmond bewails the fact that lack of employment compels the Irish workers to emigrate at the rate of 30,000 per year, but opposed the attempt of the Labour party to compel the government to recognise its duty to provide work for them at home; Mr. Redmond believes that all public servants and representatives should be paid for their services to the State from the funds of the state, but is opposed to payment of members being extended to Ireland; Mr. Redmond's heart bleeds for the poor of Ireland, but he would not vote for the Feeding of School Children's Act to be applied to Ireland, and Mr. Redmond is a friend of the Labour party in England, but his party fights to the death against every independent candidature of Labour throughout the purely Nationalist districts of Ireland.

If we are, as we are, capable of running our own country, how comes it we are not fit to be trusted with our own schools? And if the public control of schools by the Catholic Irish people would lead to atheism and to the persecution of the clergy, how has it not produced the same effect in Canada which Mr. Redmond is continually praising as an example for Ireland? Here is what a clergyman, the Rev. J.E. Burke, in a recent speech in the Assembly Hall, Belfast, said of the educational system of Canada—that country so beloved of Mr. T.P. O'Connor and Mr. Redmond:

"They had no church schools—nothing but state schools. While the priest and the parson were at liberty to visit the schools and give advice and encouragement, they

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