

IRISH POLITICAL REVIEW

September 2018

Vol.33, No.9 ISSN 0790-7672

and Northern Star incorporating Workers' Weekly Vol.32 No.9 ISSN 954-5891

Nation States And Ideologies *Ireland; Syria; Palestine*

It is possible that Sinn Fein will be in the next Government. It has been widely characterised over the past few decades by people in authority as a Fascist party.

In England Dame Margaret Hodge, an upper-class ultra-Leftist for forty years, has discovered that she is a Jew. And she has come to realise that her close political colleague over most of that period, Jeremy Corbyn, is a racist anti-Semite. And, as it is quite possible that the Labour Party will win the next British General Election, she says that she now knows how Jews felt in Germany in 1933 as Hitler was taking over.

Northern Ireland is now a quiet backwater amidst all these excitements. It has no Government to bother its head—only the Government of the state, in whose electoral affairs it is not allowed to play any part.

A year from now the United Kingdom will either be out of the European Union or it won't. And there will either be an economic border between the Six County region of the United Kingdom and the 26 County region of the EU, or there won't. And the Dublin Government will have to relate to Britain as a foreign state, for the first time since its moral collapse of 1970, or it won't

All of these things will be decided within a minority party in the Westminster Parliament, and by the relations of that party with the European Commission.

Sinn Fein is where it is because it is the political party of the War that was fought between the Nationalist community in the North and the Whitehall Government. That War ended twenty years ago. Since the terms of settlement did not include the ending of Partition, we can assume that the purpose of the War was not the ending of Partition.

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Post-Brexit Hard Border

Vlad the impaled?

The UK Parliament website, has an item called a "*Summary of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2017-19. To make provision in relation to terrorism; to make provision enabling persons at ports and borders to be questioned for national security and other related purposes; and for connected purposes.*"

This is a catch-all Bill—somewhat literally—and the bland phraseology of the last few words speak volumes. It clearly seeks to extend and add to straight security issues, to include not just '*related purposes*' but '*connected purposes*'. This makes it a very inclusive Bill. It is easy to see how smuggling goods, for example, across a border can be classified as a security issue in the context of the NI Border. Is it not just another criminal activity like that of the many proscribed organisations? '*Connections*' can easily be alleged. '*Where are the proceeds going to end up*' is the catch-all phrase that can no doubt be used

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Ireland, Brexit and the Future of the EU Part 7

Implications Of The Greek Crisis For The Future Of The EU

The Greek crisis that began in 2010, summarised in last month's article in this series—a crisis that has subsided yet continues to take its toll on the citizens of that country—has much to tell us about the nature of the European Union.

The present article is an attempt to address five questions. Was saving French and German banks the overriding objective in the early phase of the crisis? How necessary was that to the survival of the Union? To what extent did the initial

response set the mould for dealing with the problem? How much is irrational North European prejudice a factor in the EU response? What lessons have been learned by the Brussels elite from the crisis, and what has not been learned?

Questions relating to Syriza and the implications of the defeat of the *Greek Spring* for the European Left, and to internal problems confronting Greece itself, will be covered in next month's article.

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Seán Ó Riain

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What fuelled Nationalist energy in the War was the humiliating position in which the Nationalist community was placed in the completely spurious democracy devised by Whitehall in 1920 for the Six County region of its state. The 1998 Agreement swept away that bogus democracy and established in its place an authentic apartheid system with two electorates and two separate groups of devolved Ministers. That arrangement has not led to 'reconciliation' between the two communities because that was not its purpose. Its purpose, as carefully arranged in its structures, was to equalise the terms of the conflict between the two communities. That conflict is taken to be a constant of the Six County situation in its exclusion from the political life of the state that holds them.

The 'Peace Process' achieved peace by giving structured expression to the conflict, thus consolidating it as permanent. All the other peace processes—and there were many—were a waste of breath because they did not face the basic fact of the conflict of nationalities.

Sinn Fein, having made its settlement in the North, set about establishing itself also in the South. Its main point of attraction in the South was that it was the party

of the War in the North. This was a piece of reality that stood out amidst the waffle that is always a great part of the discourse of Constitutional democracy. The waffle of the Southern democracy was especially empty because of its refusal to acknowledge Northern realities while maintaining the sovereignty claim.

Sinn Fein was successful in the first instance by almost not having policies. It then put itself at the head of the movement that was breaking up traditional culture—culminating in the abolition of marriage as a social institution designed for reproduction.

It did well with this approach. It was put to it, by rivals, that it would do even better if it disconnected itself from its Northern source and appointed a leadership that had played no part in the North. It has done this. and it now seems to be adrift without a compass or a destination.

It offers to throw the Republic into the melting pot and to rejoin the British Commonwealth because, after all, what did independence lead to but homophobia, paedophilia, misogyny, priestcraft, poverty, etc.

It was necessary for the Northern element, which was fighting the War, to assert itself against Rory O'Brady in order to make a Northern settlement. But South-

ern Sinn Fein, minus the Northern War and minus the O'Brady Republican spirit, now appears to be threadbare.

The original Sinn Fein movement was founded on a denial of the possibility of cosmopolitan human existence. Arthur Griffith's founding principle was—*"Between the Individual and Humanity stands, and must continue to stand, a great fact—the Nation"*.

The history of the world since 1905 has not proved Griffith wrong. And statements condemning nationalism usually turn out to be condemnations of one nationalism in the interest of another. In Ireland anti-nationalism has the practical meaning of Anglophilia.

*

Where effective national existence is denied to a populace, the probability is that a sub-national element will take its place—a kind of spontaneous racism. and we are warned that racism is on the increase in Europe.

In the Middle East what has taken the place of nationalism since Europe and the USA began destroying the national states there about thirty years ago is religious fundamentalism.

An effective national state was constructed by the Baath regime from the miscellaneous elements of population in the region of the British Empire called Iraq. Effective Iraqi nationalism held the Iranian revolution in check during the 1980s. In 1990 the US gave Iraq permission to intervene in the glorified British fiefdom of Kuwait, which had been stealing its oil while it was engaged in the war with Iran. Margaret Thatcher insisted that this was a breach of sovereignty that must be punished. The US fell into line. The Iraqi Army was easily driven out of Kuwait and was slaughtered by the unchallenged US/UK air power *chicken shoot* during its retreat.

The US/UK then called on the Iraqi populace to rise up and overthrow the *"regime"*, which is another name for the State. The populace did not respond. US/UK, with UN approval, then subjected Iraq to a dozen years of severe sanctions, and regular bombing designed to destroy the infrastructure of urban life. When the regime still held secure, the US/UK decided to overthrow the regime itself. It invaded and called on the elements oppressed by the regime to assert themselves and take over. The oppressed elements were elements of religious fundamentalism, which had been in decline until then.

The US/UK intervention, legitimised after the event by the UN, brought about a chaos of religious conflict in the space called Iraq: a kind of civil war which could have led to political stability out of its own conflict only by the triumph of 'Islamic State'. But the Powers that had destroyed the secular, liberal national state would not have that, and they set about concocting makeshifts that gave a better appearance but had no substance. The quantity of political killing has declined greatly since 2006, but remains far greater than it was before the invasion.

When Iraq settled down to a level of violence that was acceptable to the sensitivity of the Powers that had destroyed the national state, these Powers decided to do a job on Syria—which was a separate state from Iraq because, when Britain conquered Mesopotamia in its Great War, France, its necessary Ally, insisted on having a piece of it.

Syria was a liberal, secular national state, as Iraq had been, but, like Iraq, it was not a formal democracy, with the kind of consensual system of party conflict, less than half in earnest, that makes democracy possible. An agitation was launched against "*the Assad regime*". It was made up of weak liberal, secular elements demanding formal democracy, and substantial and purposeful Islamist forces spreading over from Iraq.

US/UK pretended that what was at issue was the formal democratisation of the liberal secular national regime and, on that basis, they withdrew recognition from "*the Assad regime*", recognised one of the flimsy democratic groups as the legitimate authority, and fuelled the actual Islamist assault on 'the regime' with great quantities of 'non-humanitarian aid'.

US/UK would probably have made Syria a replica of Iraq but for the fact that a new Power had arisen in the world, and did not see it as being in its interest that the Syrian nation-state should be destroyed. Communist Russia ceased to be in the early 1990s when the decision was taken to destroy Iraq. For more than a decade, Russia was no more than a geographical expression. But, when the moment came for US/UK to do a job on Syria, Russia had become a competent capitalist state, able to calculate its interests. It entered an alliance with "*the Assad regime*", and countered the wrecking influence of "*the Free World*"—a term which came back into use when Russia made the transition from Communism to Capitalism.

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British Guardsmen!

"If any question why we died,
Tell them, because our fathers lied"

These lines were written by Rudyard Kipling. He had pulled strings to have his only son, John, commissioned in the British Army. He was killed at the Battle of Loos in 1915 at the age of eighteen. I understand the boy had poor eyesight and might, if his father was honest, been deemed unfit to serve as a Private, much less as a commander of a platoon of thirty men.

Though Rudyard Kipling had no connection with Ireland—except as a vociferous opponent of Home Rule, he wangled a commission for John in the Irish Guards Regiment in the British Army. He wrote poetry seeking to identify the Regiment with "*The Wild Geese*"—those Irishmen of the Irish Brigade who joined the French Forces after the broken Treaty of Limerick in the hope of returning to Ireland and routing those who had broken that Treaty.

Kipling was not alone in that dishonesty. Joe Devlin, T.P. O'Connor, John Redmond of the Irish Parliamentary (despised by Kipling) were equally guilty.

The Irish Guards Regiment was established by Queen Victoria to show her appreciation for those Irishmen who served her in the second South African (Boer) War. John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party, as well as many British Liberals, opposed that squalid episode of British Imperialism, which, among other atrocities, established Concentration Camps, where tens of thousands of civilians, mainly women and children, died.

So highly regarded were the Boer fighters in Ireland, that many GAA Clubs were named after their leaders, such as De Wett.

I understand that the Irish Guards now have their own GAA team and it wouldn't surprise me if it were named after Rudyard Kipling. The Regiment parades every St. Patrick's Day to the air of Thomas Moore's "*Let Erin Remember The Days of Old*", oblivious of its irony—for the next line goes—"*Ere Her Faithless Sons Betrayed Her*"!

Rudyard Kipling's contribution to the war propaganda included a much-praised short story in which an Englishwoman refused a drink of water to a dying German airman. He had a poor regard for English women, who are rarely so vindictive.

He also, with Harry Lauder, was prominent in his support of a resolution passed at a massed meeting in London's Trafalgar Square in 1918 which anticipated Hitler's Nuremberg rallies from 1928 into the 1930s. No dissent was reported when the London rally demanded that naturalised British citizens of German, Austrian or Turkish origin be stripped of their British citizenship and immediately interned without trial. In 1935 the Nuremberg Laws stripped German citizens of Jewish ancestry of their German citizenship.

Kipling's contribution to European civilisation cannot be separated from that of his imitators.

Donal Kennedy

More Guardsmen!

In the 1950s, when every borough in London had an Irish dance-hall, including Tottenham Court Road in Central London, a group of young men in Irish Guards' uniform came into the Tottenham Court Road one. They had English accents and sat around talking about being Irish. (They could have had Irish parents.) Nobody bothered them. I have never seen such a naïve bunch in all my life as they sat around humming to the Irish music being played and reading the *Irish Democrat*.

The doorman was Paddy Blaney, from Tipperary. He was near 7 feet tall and wore this long green greatcoat down to his ankles like a Russian might in Siberia. On top of that was a green peaked hat. From the street there was long flight of stairs down into the dancehall. If you caused trouble you were thrown up the stairs into the street by Paddy.

He supported the Connolly Association and always had a few *Irish Democrats* beside him to try and sell. It turned out he let the young Irish Guardsmen in only on condition they bought the *Irish Democrat*.

Next time, I thought, as well as the *Irish Democrat*, I'll bring him some *Daily Workers*. But the two papers side by side wouldn't have pleased Desmond so I didn't.

Wilson John Haire

Nation States

continued

The "Assad regime" never ceased to be the legitimate Government of the Syrian nation-state according to the United Nations. It has now restored its effective authority over the territory of the state, except for a small corner into which both the good terrorists and the bad terrorists have now retreated. US/UK etc. are now faced with the prospect of betraying the seditious groups that they recognised as the legitimate authority in Syria seven years ago, and restoring civilised relations with the Assad regime which they have been demonising.

And the British Government has the problem of what to do with British Muslims who went to Syria under its encouragement to fight the good fight against the Assad regime as part of the only force that could possibly have overthrown the regime: Islamic State, under one name or another.

*

Anti-Semitism is in the news because the Jews, insofar as they constitute nation, are engaged in the conquest of another people and, in the colonial settlement of the territory of the conquered people, and because the people they are conquering do not like them, and will not submit quietly to them.

To engage in action against Jews is anti-Semitic, regardless of the circumstances in which that action is being undertaken. Palestinians offer as much resistance as they are able to Jewish conquest and colonisation, and that is anti-Semitic. And Jeremy Corbyn—who may be the next Prime Minister of the state which started it all by awarding Palestine to the Jews as a territory for conquest and colonisation—expresses sympathy with the Palestinians as victims of Jewish conquest, and that is anti-Semitic. And it is even anti-Semitic to describe the foundation of the Jewish State, in realistic historical terms, as an act of conquest and colonisation.

The Jewish state had its practical origin in an act of British Imperial policy in 1917, whose purpose was to detach Jewry from Germany and attach them to the British Empire. Britain was destroying the Ottoman Empire (within which the Middle East was a region of profound peace and tolerance) and it decided to make Palestine the site of Jewish political colonisation. Palestinian resistance was put down by British policing in the first

instance and, when it outgrew the resources of policing in the late 1930s, by the British Army.

In 1945 a Labour Government was elected in Britain, and a grass-roots Labour man—not a Fabian—became Foreign Secretary: Ernest Bevin. Bevin was a pioneer of the anti-Fascist movement in Britain. He did not see the establishment of a colonialist Jewish State on a non-Jewish population as being in accordance with the principles of the Anti-Fascist War in which he had played a prominent part. He put the project on 'hold' while searching for an alternative. He was denounced as an Anti-Semite.

An all-out terrorist war on the British administration in Palestine was launched, waged largely by an influx of Jews from Russia, supplied with arms from Russia by way of Czechoslovakia. Britain submitted to this terrorism, using the United Nations General Assembly as a face-saver. It would not act on its own authority, or even let the matter be decided by the Security Council. Its concern was to be able to plead innocence to all the Middle Eastern countries with which it needed to maintain good relations. If the matter had gone to the Security Council, Britain, with its Veto, would still have been responsible for a decision to establish a Jewish State. So the issue was referred to the General Assembly—the only major decision it was ever allowed to take—and the Soviet Union and the United States, on the eve of their Cold War, whipped their client states into line and got a majority for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

But the Jewish colonisation, thirty years after the Balfour Declaration, was still inadequate for the maintenance of a Jewish State. The problem was solved by a campaign of ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian population, and by increased immigration.

Objective description of that piece of history is what the "self-definition" of anti-Semitism by a Zionist group now brands as anti-Semitic.

It is remarkable that the name of Ernest Bevin has not been mentioned in the current British Labour furor. Was he not the founder in the Labour Party of what is now called anti-Semitism? Was he not denounced at the time as an anti-Semite? Was there not an attempt to murder him as an anti-Semite? And he was not even a Corbynite, but a rock-solid Labourite anti-Communist.

His problem was that he was of pre-1917 vintage, when it was anti-Semitic to say that Judaism was not a nation but was merely a religion. Bevin, as a Trade Union boss, stamped on anti-Semitism whenever he saw it. Judaism was a religion for him, just like any other. Jews in Britain were British, just as Catholics were, and Baptists, and Presbyterians, and he would stand for no nonsense about them being something else. In 1945, therefore, he saw it as absurd that a Jewish State, a theocracy, should be launched in the modern, liberal, secular world by British power.

But now he was an anti-Semite for the very reason that made him an opponent of anti-Semitism in the past. He denied the separate nationality of Judaism. He fell foul of the reversal of the meaning of anti-Semitism, which had become a very tricky thing.

VLAD

continued

to make the connections between trade and security.

"The Irish News revealed yesterday how the planned legislation will result in the establishment of a mile-wide 'stop and search border zone'..." (11.8.18).

In effect it smells very much like the Hard Border that nobody wanted as a result of Brexit—and all to be done under the guise of security. It is a Hard Border with knobs on. But there is no reaction so far from Dublin on these plans. Where is the 'shock horror' response from Vlad, who has the support of the whole world, at least, in his campaign against a Hard Border? He has sought to indicate that, despite new customs arrangements being established on either side of the existing Border post Brexit, it would remain as soft as, and maybe softer, than it is now. These British plans show the shallowness of that view.

Vlad is a master of the glib phrase—he is against a Hard Border and he is also against all kinds of terrorism and tough on 'security'. He took a leading role in bringing about EU actions against Russia over the Salisbury security 'threat' concocted by the British Government. He showed all the characteristics of a power groupie among the big boys of the EU. And, if Britain declares that a Hard Border is shown to be necessary for security reasons in NI, then he has a problem: as there is

undoubtedly less of a security threat in Salisbury than there is in NI. There are as yet no proscribed terrorist organisations operating around Salisbury that we know of and not a single person has yet been charged with this alleged terrorist attack on the UK.

Will Taoiseach Varadkar believe Britain in one case and not the other? The necessary sound bites and PR to square the circle would not be easy to make credible. He could find himself impaled on his own sound bites across the Irish Border.

Leo Varadkar seems oblivious to the reality that, whatever is proposed and done about the Border around NI is actually not about that Border at all—it is always about the border *within* Northern Ireland: the border between nationalists and unionists. That is the context for everything to do with NI—and that latter border is as firmly a closed book to him, as it is to the Dublin political class for decades. That is why meddling comes naturally to them and always ends in tears—but not for them.

Jack Lane

Greek Crisis

continued

ROLE OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN BANKS

A key issue in the early stage of the crisis was the insolvency of the Greek State. According to the separate accounts of Yannis Varoufakis and James K Galbraith, the State's bankruptcy was covered up to sustain confidence in the Eurozone. Had an early Greek default been allowed, international financiers would simply have ceased lending to Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain—the peripheral Eurozone economies. As these economies followed Greece into bankruptcy or even partial debt restructuring, the massive loans owing to the large banks of France and Germany would have become impaired with dire consequences for the two leading EU economies.

Jean Pisani Ferry, a generally objective author who is close to but certainly not uncritical of the EU Establishment, describes the insolvency debate in a manner that is revealing. In the first chapter of *The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath* he says:

"This marked the start of an even thornier debate, on whether Greece's inability to repay its debt—insolvency, in one word—had to be recognized and whether the corresponding losses had to be borne by its private creditors, mainly banks. Germany was keen on this course of action—at least in principle—because it reckoned that insolvency was inescapable and that a managed default procedure (what the jargon calls a debt restructuring) would teach a lesson to future creditors. But it was in no hurry, because of what the losses of a debt write-down would imply for its banks. For France and the ECB, however, this was out of the question, because a Greek restructuring would send the signal that European government debt securities were not safe. Better pay for Greece, they maintained, than pay higher rates on most debt outstanding. The solution was to continue lending cheaply to Greece, at least until the storm had passed" (p. 10).

Noticeable here is the muted reference to the level of exposure of the French and German banking systems to Euro-periphery debt. Less diplomatic sources are needed to get a proper handle on this crucial part of the story. The following paragraph from Galbraith's *Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice* has a ring of truth to it.

"At the time, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a French Socialist, was managing director of the IMF and widely regarded as a progressive force as well as the future leader of a more progressive France. That soon-to-be-shattered illusion was only a small part of an entire pyramid of hopes and delusion—for a 'New Deal', a 'Green New Deal', a 'Marshall Plan'—that progressives briefly entertained in the slipstream of the financial crisis. In reality, IMF staff and board members from Australia, China, Switzerland, and elsewhere already knew that the Greek debt was unsustainable and that Strauss-Kahn had ignored their reservations in order to push through, in 2010, what was at thirty-two times Greece's quota (or ownership share in the IMF) the largest IMF loan in relation to quota in history. The political reason was straightforward, though unspoken: the rescue was for the banks, not for Greece, and Strauss-Kahn wanted the French bankers' gratitude as he geared up his presidential bid" (p. 5).

The breach of protocol at the IMF was a minor matter compared to decisions taken following what must have been frantic discussions and negotiations at the highest level of both the EU and the French and German Governments. The calculations informing those discussions are estimated by Varoufakis in a chapter of his book entitled, *Bailoutistan*. He points out that the \$30 trillion exposure of the banks of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to toxic US financial products in 2008

was far greater than that of the US banks. As we know many of these European banks had also loaned to the peripheral economies of the Eurozone. So, when the US financial crisis happened, many European banks found that they were doubly exposed: initially to US-based toxic derivatives and, as the full scale of the disaster unfolded, to a mountain of peripheral debt that seemed unlikely to be repaid. The eventual solution of course entailed a combination of taxpayer bailouts of banks and taxpayer-funded Troika loans to indebted countries like Greece. Greece was given those loans under a pretence that it was solvent so that it could be enabled to repay its debts to the top French and German banks.

Using figures from the Bank of International Settlements, Varoufakis shows that the three largest French banks had loaned ≈ 627 billion to the Governments of Italy, Spain and Portugal, and a further ≈ 102 billion to the Hellenic Republic prior to the crisis. He calculates that a collapse of confidence in the Eurozone periphery, triggered by a Greek default, would have required a public bailout of French banks to the tune of ≈ 562 billion, a horrific prospect.

In Germany Chancellor Merkel made a famous speech in Stuttgart in 2008 advising US bankers that, in the matter of financial management, they could learn much from the average Swabian housewife. Shortly afterwards she learned that her own banks were badly exposed to trades in US derivatives and that a public bailout of ≈ 409 billion was urgently needed. She procured Bundestag approval for the bailout in 2008 but a 2010 Greek default would have necessitated a repeat performance. Varoufakis argues that, being a consummate politician, Merkel understood that requesting a second massive bailout of between ≈ 340 and ≈ 406 billion would have amounted to political suicide (p. 26).

That the priority for European leaders in responding to Greek requests for assistance in 2010 was the surreptitious preservation of the French and German banking systems is a safe conclusion.

NECESSARY TO EU SURVIVAL?

The refusal to recognise the reality of Greek bankruptcy was damaging to Greece. Without a writing-down of debt, it was impossible to achieve a return to growth that would have placed the Greek economy and the repayment of the remaining debt on a sustainable basis. This

treatment of a small Eurozone economy showed that, when the chips were down, the national interests of the larger Member States came before those of the European Union and the smaller States . . . or did it?

The financial crisis caught the EU unawares and discredited the market fundamentalism that had achieved dominance within its own counsels and throughout the West since the early 90s. The scale of dislocation, ideological and practical, was unprecedented. In the circumstances, was it surprising that France and Germany acted to defend their national interests? And, if those economies had been disrupted in that time of crisis, how long would the Eurozone have survived?

While describing the implications for France of a Greek default, Varoufakis states that the country's top officials were aware that Greece's bankruptcy would force the French State to borrow six times its total annual tax revenues "*just to hand it over to three idiotic banks*" (p. 24). Expanding the point he states:

"In a country which had given up its capacity to print banknotes—the only remaining means of generating money from nothing—that [a massive bailout of French banks] would mean destitution, which in turn would bring down the whole of the European Union, its common currency, everything" (p. 25).

Precisely! The survival of the EU was at stake and, while we may dislike the underhand and self-interested way that European leaders conducted their affairs, their frequently incoherent strategising ultimately had enough practical realism to avert a Union-wide collapse.

That early moves to write off Greek debt would have had a contagion effect on the other peripheral economies is shown by the response to the Deauville deliberations in October 2010. When Merkel and Sarkozy announced that some Eurozone countries might be unable to pay their debts, that spooked the markets—and borrowing costs increased for all of the peripheral economies. Arguably, Deauville made an EU bailout of Ireland inevitable. During the first year and a half of the Euro debt crisis (until the middle of 2011), keeping debt relief off the Eurozone's agenda was a prudential imperative.

During the intense period of the crisis, timing was a vital consideration. The shock of a sudden default in one of the Euro-periphery economies is a different matter to a debt restructuring that has been

analysed and debated over eighteen months. Market operators, presumably, need time to adjust to the idea that an investment has gone bad and to make alternative arrangements. Wolfgang Schauble's letter to the ECB and IMF in June 2011, proposing a swap of Greek Bonds that would prolong their maturity dates, was an indication that reality was beginning to be openly acknowledged.

Varoufakis provides a further insight into the role of time in the following paragraph:

"As soon as the bailout loans gushed into the Greek finance ministry, 'Operation Offload' began: the process of immediately siphoning the money back to the French and German banks. By October 2011, the German banks' exposure to Greek public debt had been reduced by a whopping €27.8 billion to €91.4 billion. Five months later, by March 2012, it was down to €795 million. Meanwhile the French banks were off-loading even faster: by September 2011 they had unburdened themselves of €63.6 billion of Greek government bonds, before totally eliminating them from their books in December 2012. The operation was thus completed within less than two years. *This* was what the Greek bailout had been all about" (p. 27).

A date to bear in mind in relation to these transactions is February 2012, when the restructuring of Greek debt occurred. The French and German banks had offloaded the bulk of their Greek Bonds by then. But what happened to these Bonds? Galbraith explains that they were assumed by the IMF, the ECB and the precursor institutions of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (p. 6). In other words, they were paid for by public institutions funded ultimately by tax payers. They remain as a constituent element of Greek public debt which, because of the parlous state of the economy, is being paid back at a snail's pace.

On matters like the role of the European banks, Varoufakis and Galbraith have valuable insights, but on larger questions like the survival of the EU they can't see the forest for the trees. Having recognised that a Greek default would have triggered events that would have threatened the existence of the EU, Varoufakis is unable to see this as a compelling reason for avoiding a Greek default. For the most part he avoids the question but, when he comes near to broaching it, he argues from a purely Greek perspective. Replying to the point that demanding debt restructuring would cause the EU to eject Greece from

the Eurozone, he states:

"My rejoinder was also simple and to the point: doing so would destroy France and Germany's banking systems and with them the eurozone itself. They would never do it. But even if they did, what was the point in being in a monetary union that crushes its constituent economies?" (p. 33).

On a critical point he is engaging in debating points. Likewise, Galbraith argues that the solution to the problem of Greek insolvency was "*a commercial write-down, requiring recapitalisation of the French, German and Greek banks*" (p. 6). He is content to restate this article of economic orthodoxy without even discussing the possibility that such a write-down would most likely have had catastrophic economic and political consequences in Europe and globally.

A MOULD IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK?

While in Brussels in February 2015, after he had become the Finance Minister of Greece, Varoufakis met with Christine Lagarde, Director of the IMF. As the meeting was ending she said:

"You are of course right, Yannis. These targets that they insist on *can't* work. But, you must understand that we have put too much into this programme. We cannot go back on it. Your credibility depends on accepting and working within the programme" (p. 21).

There is no reason to doubt that these words were uttered by Madame Lagarde: the EU part of the Troika continued to insist on the implementation of austerity all through the crisis, while, as is well known, the IMF had serious misgivings about it. The Lagarde statement shows how the 2010 bailout had set the mould for the EU response to the crisis. A strategy had been embarked on and the consensus among European leaders was that there should be no going back on it.

No doubt a case can be made that at a difficult time the credibility of the European Council and the other EU institutions relied on the maintenance of a consistent line. But a case can also be made that the existing policy had failed and that a new policy was needed. It may have been necessary to the EU that the French and German banks should be saved but, once their position had been secured from 2012 onwards, there were solid grounds for initiating a comprehensive review of the austerity being forced on Greece. That no such review took place reflects badly on the political leadership of the EU.

It is instructive at this point to briefly focus on the effects of persistent austerity. In this regard the circumstances of the Irish and Greek economies could not be more different. A major fiscal adjustment carried on over seven Budgets in Ireland was mitigated by timely growth in two of its key export markets: the US and the UK. By comparison Greece is a relatively closed economy: export growth could not be used to counteract the relentless fiscal retrenchment. The effect of austerity on Greece is well summed in the following paragraph by Varoufakis.

"Forcing new loans upon the bankrupt on condition that they shrink their income is nothing short of cruel and unusual punishment. Greece was never bailed out. With their 'rescue' loan and troika of bailiffs enthusiastically slashing incomes, the EU and IMF effectively condemned Greece to a modern version of the Dickensian debtors' prison and then threw away the key" (p. 19).

IRRATIONAL RESPONSES FROM NORTHERN EUROPE

It is difficult to gauge the extent that an 'anti-Mediterranean country' prejudice emanating from Northern Europe is involved in the EU response to Greece, but it is present. The complicating factor is the profligacy, irresponsibility and prejudices of Greece itself which will be examined in next month's article.

The irrational nature of Germany's aversion to inflation arising from historical experience is well known. German support for the Single Currency, when the concept was being conceived in the early 90s, was reluctant at best, and, when the implications of Greece's insolvency seeped into public consciousness in 2010, the initial German reaction was a push to abandon the Euro altogether. This manifested in Angela Merkel's argument that the Greek crisis should be administered exclusively by the IMF, a policy that would have cut off the Eurozone from its own crisis.

An element of irrationality was also evident in German opposition to the Bond purchase programmes of the ECB, the policy that eventually enabled the EU to contain the sovereign debt crisis. So, the leadership role played by Berlin in the EU response to Greece should not be viewed uncritically.

Prejudice against the Southern members of the Eurozone, especially Greece, has also been in evidence among the other States of Northern Europe. Loosely grouped in the modern Hanseatic League,

these comprise the three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Denmark and Finland—especially Finland because it is a Eurozone Member—the three small Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and two outliers, the Netherlands and Ireland. Of these the most important is the Netherlands which has stepped up as the leading supporter of liberal economic policies following the UK's exit. I would suggest in passing that Ireland would be better advised to strengthen its links with Germany—on the grounds that Germany remains committed to creating a more coherent EU—than to align with the ultra conservative (in terms of EU integration) Hanseatic League.

That the people of Greece deserve the punishment that is being visited upon them, an idea that harks back to a long dead Puritanism that, unfortunately, still resonates in some regions of the democracies of Northern Europe.

SOME LESSONS LEARNED, SOME NOT

Banking Union was first proposed as a strategic initiative for coming to grips permanently with many problems that had arisen during the crisis, in the Spring of 2012. Its emergence onto the EU agenda is described as follows by Pisani Ferry:

"Responsibility for supervising and, if needed rescuing or closing down banks, had to be moved to the European level, and a European deposit guarantee scheme had to be created. Only such a move would break the doom loop connecting banks and sovereigns, thereby restoring confidence in the future of the euro" (p. 16).

Banking Union represents a major Eurozone reform that will take many years to complete, and could yet be stymied. It needs to be defended, explained, written about, championed, adjusted in line with unforeseen developments and sold to the electorates of the Eurozone States. The core point is that *in principle* it holds immense potential for exerting a necessary level of control over the European financial industry. Implementing it will mean breaking a centuries old links between European Governments and various powerful banks. Mario Centeno, the socialist Finance Minister of Portugal, who with German support was elected as President of the Eurogroup in December 2017, recently stated:

"We were successful in launching a Banking Union. But we should recognise that the process is not complete. Our claim to protect taxpayers' money from reckless market behaviours needs to be

fully credible" (Speech to the Brussels Economic Forum, 5 June, 2018).

If Banking Union emerges as the only evidence of a lesson learned from the Greek crisis, the crisis will have produced at least one long-term benefit.

The obvious area where lessons have not been learned, mentioned above, is the futility of imposing austerity on Greece in the belief that its economy will somehow recover. The reduction of Greece to the level of a Vassal State is as unsustainable an end-result for the EU as it is for Greece. One possible starting point for ending the nightmare is the proposal for a thirty year holiday from debt repayment leaked by IMF staff members during the referendum called by Syriza in July 2015.

Another area where lessons may not have been learned as assiduously as they need to be is the application of neo-liberal regulations in the Member States. Taking just one example, the German *landesbanken*, it can be seen how disastrous the adoption of the Anglo Saxon economic model has been for Europe. The *landesbanken* are a group of State-owned regional banks unique to Germany. Together with the *Sparkassen* savings banks, they comprise the third pillar of the German banking system. In the early 2000s they were destabilised by an EU-led removal of their privileged status and—in the words of Pisani Ferry "*as financial institutions that have lost their business model often do*" (p. 88)—they invested recklessly. US subprime derivatives became their investment of choice. When the crisis struck, in a desperate attempt to shore up their losses, a number of the *landesbanken* purchased large amounts of high-yielding sovereign Bonds issued by peripheral Eurozone countries. This investment naturally included billions of Euro worth of Greek Government Bonds.

In this sequence of unfortunate events, a crisis that became centred in Greece was triggered, not by Greece or Germany or even the banks of those countries, but by EU institutions imposing liberal freedom on a group of State-owned banks that until then performed a useful social function. All things considered, arising from the Greek crisis, the future of the EU should include a rethinking of ideological matters by the community of public representatives, permanent civil servants and professional experts that make up what is called the Brussels elite. Many lessons still need to be learned.

Dave Alvey

es ahora *

'Requiem for the Croppies'

"The pockets of our greatcoats full of barley –

No kitchens on the run, no striking camp—
We moved quick and sudden in our own country.

The priest lay behind ditches with the tramp.

A people, hardly marching—on the hike—
We found new tactics happening each day;

We'd cut through reins and rider with the pike

And stampede cattle into infantry,
Then retreat through hedges where cavalry must be thrown,

Until, on Vinegar Hill, the fatal conclave.
Terraced thousands died, shaking scythes at cannon.

The hillside blushed, soaked in our broken wave.

They buried us without shroud or coffin
And in August the barley grew up out of the grave."

'Door into the Dark'. Seamus Heaney. Faber & Faber. London. 1969.

CLAIR WILLS AND THE STORY SHE TELLS (PART 3)

In her book *'Dublin in 1916: The Siege of the GPO'* (Profile Books. London. 2009), Wills stated that Seamus Heaney had to give up reading the above poem when the Northern Ireland "Troubles" erupted because otherwise it could be seen as giving somehow a tacit benediction to the Provisional IRA and their campaign. Heaney, who came from Derry, had already published his first book of poetry *'Death of a Naturalist'* to great acclaim in 1966, and the above poem appeared in his next book *'Door into the Dark'* in 1969. Surprisingly the latter went on to be reprinted in 1972, 1991 and 2002—which for a book of poetry showed what a stunning success it was.

Heaney dedicated it simply to "my father and mother". I was taken aback at Wills's assertion that Heaney abandoned reciting this very fine poem but then Ireland was under the heavy cosh of censorship. And Heaney had to walk a very fine line because, as a Northerner in Southern society, he was very much a marked man with the ever beady eyes of *'The Irish Times'*, *'The Irish Independent'* et al on him at all times lest he accidentally or otherwise trip up.

It Is Time

When today's commentariat go on about censorship, it is always the dark day of Archbishop John Charles McQuaid and Eamon de Valera but they never allude to the most brutal censorship that Conor Cruise O'Brien and the then Government of (that most 'liberal' ha, ha) Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald brought in to keep our republican instincts in check—I remember it was almost as bad to be called a fellow traveller—someone who sympathised with some or all of the aims of the Northern Republicans.

In the last few days it was a lovely surprise to be given a book by a friend of *'100 Poems'* by Seamus Heaney (Faber & Faber. London. 2018), compiled by his family with a Foreword written by his daughter Catherine Heaney. She wrote that, along with her mother Marie, and brothers Michael and Christopher, they were carrying out something their father had been contemplating before his sudden death. She writes this of the hundred:

"It includes many of his best-loved and celebrated poems, as well as others that were among his favourites to read and which conjure up that much-missed voice."

At number 17 is *'Requiem for the Croppies'*.

Clair Wills's book on 1916 is, according to a great scholar of that era, a very weak work. But then she is not a historian. On the inside jacket back-page, under her lovely photo, there is this information:

"Clair Wills is a Professor of Irish Literature at Queen Mary University of London. She has published widely on Irish Literature and culture, and is the author of *'Reading Paul Muldoon'*, (1998) and *'That Neutral Island'* which won the PEN Hessell-Tillman Prize for History 2007."

In the February issue of the *Irish Political Review*, there is an acutely attuned review of *'The Atlas of the Irish Revolution'* (Part 1) by Dr. Brian Murphy osb. In it, he very briefly refers to an article in the *Atlas* by Clair Wills called *'Staging the Easter Rising'*, in which she concludes that it was "a symbolic sacrificial gesture". Dr. Murphy demolishes this view and I would advise anyone interested to read his full article which can be accessed through www.atholbooks.uk.

In 2005, Cork University Press published a PhD thesis called *'Staging the Easter Rising: 1916 as Theatre'*, by a post-graduate student James Moran. In the original cover notes what is made explicit

is this very important, mostly overlooked, fact:

"Moran shows how different versions of 1916 have been retold by an assortment of Irish dramatists, especially O'Casey, Yeats and Shaw, but also examines a range of lesser-known plays, films and commemorations."

What is quite clear is that 1916 is being viewed through the lens of drama and those who write it, *not* by historians as a political/historical event.

The *Irish Times* did a review of this book on Saturday, 12th May 2006 by Ferdia Mac Anna under the heading *'A passionate pageant'*. I do not know who this person is, but the blurb at the end states that Mac Anna "is a writer, lecturer and musician. His memoir *'The Rocky Years'* has just been published by Hodder Headline".

The review is flawed by wisecracks and an arrogance that is off-putting. His attitude to the 50th anniversary in 1966 is full of mocking asides, even though he claims his father Tomás, a producer of plays at the Abbey Theatre, directed the commemorative "pageant" entitled *Aiséirí* which was staged in Croke Park. He then moves onto Hugh Leonard's RTE *'Insurrection'* and avers that the—

"combination of stage and TV screen suddenly made our outlaw history extremely exciting. Pearse, Connolly, Plunkett et al seemed like the Magnificent Seven..."

"Later, when the hardcore reality of the Troubles erupted and men of 1916 became patriotic icons mainly to diehard nationalists or Provos, it became less of a head-wreck to seek role models in the modern safety zones of rock music and movie icons. James Moran's book is an attempt to re-examine and re-evaluate the 1916 Rising as a theatrical and cultural event. Most academic books are dry affairs... Moran though, is an engaging writer and his original, opinionated and compelling study makes a terrific read, despite occasional lapses that betray the book's origins as a PhD thesis."

Mac Anna goes on to say that Moran—

"offers new interpretations of plays by Pearse, MacDonagh and Connolly (Under Which Flag) while re-assessing plays about the Rising by Yeats and O'Casey along with several other less familiar playwrights whose long-forgotten early works are given a new context. He probes the origins of Aiséirí-type commemorations (Dev started it) and explores the reason why 1916's protagonists became irredeemably mythologized. De Valera's role comes under severe scrutiny along

with those played by the Fianna Fáil party and the Church."

In other words, the usual suspects—as those in *The Irish Times* see them and keep reminding us—because Mac Anna goes on to write:

"For several decades, the legacy of the Rising became a manifestation of the more conservative aspects of a repressive and unimaginative new state, an Ireland from which we may only now be awakening. MORAN ALSO ARGUES that the Rising had a sexual agenda." [The caps are from *The Irish Times*—lest we have nodded off at this codology!] "Its mission to proclaim sexual equality has been brushed aside by history (alongside with the Rising's heroines), an aim that perished with the leaders in Kilmainham."

And that is followed by the sly aside about two great patriots, which Mac Anna wants to put out there: "*particularly the sexual orientation of Pearse and Casement*".

There was also another review of Moran's book which appeared in the *Irish Democrat*. It is by a Sally Richardson for the Connolly Association in London. Amongst other things, she reads Moran's book as an attempt to reclaim the "*way women and feminism*" were "*effectively written out of the Rising, although they had been essential to it*". She asserts that—

"O'Casey's play 'The Plough and the Stars' undermined heroic myth and portrayed women who did not conform to the ideal of the passive and sexless mother-figure, whose main duty was to rear sons to sacrifice for Ireland... An examination of Shaw's 'Saint Joan' demonstrates that the play is as much about Irish politics in the early 20th century as it is about French politics of the 15th century. The play's gender-bending heroine is closely connected to Shaw's involvement in the defence of another sexual transgressor, Casement."

One has to ask where they come up with this sort of stuff. I have never liked that awful play of O'Casey, and the more I read about those who are now mythologising him and it—the gladder I am that Orwell well and truly stitched up O'Casey in his now infamous List.

But here is a strange thing: in Ireland in the last few months, especially with the announcement of Pope Francis's visit to Ireland, a Northerner has unleashed a wave of invective against the Catholic Church—and that personage is no less a person than Mary McAleese. I remember Rev. Ian Paisley's foam-flecked ranting against Pope John Paul II when he visited the

European Parliament. He saw the latter as the very definition of the anti-Christ. And now we have McAleese, former Irish President of "*bridge-building*" fame and honestly it looks for the entire world that she too is infected with Paisleyism. She snarled that the Catholic Church is "*an empire of hate, of misogyny*", and whatever you are having yourself.

But I think that Mary Kenny, writing in *The Irish Catholic* (16th August 2018), got Mary McAleese exactly right—she is the raging Irish mother "*outraged on behalf of her gay son... We admire the tiger mother defending her young*". But what, I ask, is she defending her son against? He has a great job, is thinking of entering national politics on behalf of Fianna Fail, and is married to his husband—who, by all accounts, is a very decent young man. He has—it all—as the saying goes, so what drives his mother to distraction? Could it be her own personal *feelings*? Does she not protest too much?

And there we are—back to that trope that the media seemed to think it had got rid of—only for the *mother* to stamp back to the foreground and *demand her rightful place in the scheme of things*. Going back to Clair Wills, and her 1916 book, I found myself wondering how history itself has been hollowed out, emptied of its ballast of fact-finding archival research of documents. It is one thing to look at a play or a fictional novel and find within something that equates with the former. Our history is too important to fall into the hands of Professors of Literature—no matter how brilliant they are in *their field*. The *Irish Political Review* has a sister publication (actually one of many) called *Irish Foreign Affairs*. Every issue carries on its masthead the following words:

"Every nation, if it is to survive as a nation, must study its own history and have a foreign policy."

C.J. O'Donnell, 'The Lordship of the World.' 1924. p.145.

Julianne Herlihy ©

To be continued

A Reply To Senator Martin Mansergh On The Case Of (President) Mary McAleese vs B. Clifford by *Brendan Clifford*. 84pp.
€12, £8 (postfree)

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KILLER GRAVES, TWO OF MANY

Menachem Begin,
raw bloody meat he ate
on the altar of the pagan
at Deir Yassin,
the colour red and the smell of blood
on the assassins.
The road out of Palestine forlorn
with the foetus
of the Palestinian still-born.
Irgun Zvai Leumi the slasher,
ethnic cleansing
screaming through his
rotten knashers.
Then before he died
some remembered those terrible deeds
and cried.
Fury drove him beneath the earth
where he lies thinking
of his personal history's dearth.

Ariel Sharon, with Sabra and Shatila,
he acted strong.
Defence minister for the IDF
he sure had
a killer-fest.
16-18, September, '82
3,000 Palestinians died
in these West Beirut human zoos.
The Christian Phalange
did his dirty deeds.
Their garden of remembrance
now grows weeds.
Then an involuntary rest
for eight long years,
unconscious, bedridden
but never near that sea of salty tears.
Afterwards, the depths of holy ground
while other gods look on
and frown.

14 August, 2018

GAZA ON MY MIND

You thought you were free to think,
to distinguish, to judge,
when on to your mind they erected
a fence
of barbed chain-link,
you thought from the truth
you couldn't be budged
but with this cacophony of tin pots
you lost the knack.
One, or was it two, brave souls launched
their fire-kite, the slingshot, the catapult
at that border
then, from the watchtowers there winged
origami planes to order
as media pulp.
Up to your waist now in it,
apologising, suspending, expelling
those who go near the edge,
when it should be up with your mitts.
While brave Gazans
expire in their prison land-wedge.

1st August, 2018

W.J. Haire

The Second West Cork History Festival: A Report

The second West Cork History Festival took place on the weekend of the 17-19th August. The Aubane Historical Society (AHS) participated as part of the audience last year and subsequently suggested topics and speakers for this year's event to the

organiser, Simon Kingston. It also enquired how members could participate in the organising Committee. But all attempts to assist were ignored.

However, we wanted to contribute to

this year's discussion and distributed some four items of material to people attending the event. This included the following leaflet. None of our efforts to contribute were welcome to Mr. Kingston who vociferously objected to our efforts.

1918: "The Eventful Year and its Consequences"

This is a theme that runs through this year's West Cork History Festival but some major aspects of the events of that year are not included.

1918! The year when the Great War did not end.

1918! The year when Ireland voted by democratic election for the establishment of an independent Irish Government but did not get it.

1918! The year when the Ulster Unionist Party voted for Six County exclusion from the Irish Home Rule Act, without the obligation to conduct a subordinate Six County Government in which it would have to govern Catholics, outside the medium of British democratic politics, and did not get it.

1918! The year when John Redmond died, leaving a trail of death behind him, and bequeathing a political shambles to his heirs.

*

The Great War did not end on November Eleventh 1918. The fighting stopped but a one-sided killing by other means continued into 1919, and was actually intensified. The starvation blockade of Germany by the Royal Navy was extended by now having access to the Baltic: German trade with Scandinavia was blocked, and death by starvation under the supervision of the British Occupation continued until 28th June 1919, when a weak, conciliatory German Government signed a false confession of War Guilt in the name of the German people, absolving Britain of responsibility for the War it declared on August 4th 1914, and laying the ground on which Nazism developed. The German Government made this false confession in order to get food for its people, but they got a deep fund of resentment along with it.

What did the *Irish Times* have to say about this souped-up exercise in Souperism? What did John Redmond's colleagues, with time on their hands after the Election, have to say about those final fruits of their warmongering?

Germany was taught a lesson about the vindictive use of absolute power during those final months of the Great War, from November 1918 to June. It was Hitler who learned it.

*

1918!: the year when the British State adopted a democratic Parliamentary franchise, four years into the Great War for democracy and the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination. Ireland voted democratically, by a 75% majority, to determine itself as an independent state.

The new, democratic British Parliament took no heed of this Irish act of self-determination. It authorised its Government to continue governing Ireland against the clearly expressed will of the Irish populace. The Irish democracy was governed Imperially by the democratic British Government in punishment for voting wrong in the Election. The British Prime Minister then explained that the national self-determination for which Britain had fought the Great War had applied only to peoples in the enemy states, and that if the Irish had been paying attention they would have understood this, and would not have behaved foolishly in the Election.

*

1918: The Ulster Unionist Party contested the Election on a programme of Six County exclusion from the Home Rule Act, with the Six Counties being governed as an integral part of the British state. It explained that separation from the 26 Counties would remove the need for separate Irish legislation and separate Irish institutions. These had been adopted in the governing of Ireland after the Act of Union because the greater part of Ireland was substantially different in its economic life and its social character from the rest of Britain.

But the Six Counties were of a kind economically and with the rest of Britain. They would not need separate economic legislation, and did not want it. They wanted to be treated simply as part of the British state and society.

The Westminster Parliament took no heed. When it introduced legislation for Partition, it did so establishing subordinate regional government for the Six Counties and calling it Northern *Ireland*. The Ulster Unionist Party protested that it did not want a separate Government in which it would have to govern a Catholic minority. It wanted British government to which both Protestants and Catholics would be subject. Westminster said it could only have Partition if it agreed to operate a devolved Northern Ireland Government. The Ulster Unionists therefore agreed to operate the Northern Ireland system which they did not want.

The British political parties then decided that they would boycott Northern Ireland—would not organise there or contest elections there. The place was made a little hot-house, excluded from essential institutions of the British state but not itself a state, and therefore without the potential to generate a democratic politics of its own. All the major British social reforms came into

Northern Ireland from the outside, through the British apparatus of state which always existed behind the Northern Ireland hot-house and enabled it to exist.

Excluded from British politics, but provided for by British politics, there was no constructive work for the Ulster Unionist majority to do, except win every Election in order to remain "*connected*" with Britain, and keep the Nationalist minority in order by intimate policing.

It took almost half a century for this aggravating system divided by Whitehall to produce a War.

*

1918. John Redmond died. He was pre-deceased by about 50,000 Irishmen whom he had urged to their death. He left behind him a Party in tatters. He had destroyed it by committing it, without an electoral mandate, and even without consultation, to Britain's war on Germany.

If he had not done this, there would have been no 1916 Rising. The Rising was provoked, and made possible, by Redmond's demagogic war-recruiting.

If he had sought an electoral mandate for Nationalist participation in the war on Germany, the course of Irish history would have been very different. It was within his power to do this. He was the Home Rule Prime Minister-in-waiting. He might have stood down his 80 MPs and had them re-fight their seats on a war policy in a Home Rule Election. If he had won, the electorate could not later have reneged on what they had voted for. And it there had, nevertheless, been an attempt at Republican Insurrection, it would have been clearly undemocratic, and would have been a treasonable act against Home Rule Ireland rather than against the Imperial Power.

It was all very well for the British Parties to go to war without a specific electoral mandate. In British politics—long-established Imperial politics—there is always an assumed mandate for war. But in Nationalist Ireland there was no semblance of such a mandate.

If, in August 1914, there was any assumed mandate, it was for Neutrality. And Neutrality would have maintained peace in Ireland.

Redmond had responsibility for the scale of Irish casualties in Britain's war on Germany, and later on Turkey. He also had responsibility for the 1916 Insurrection, which would not have happened but for his War policy. He brought about death and destruction and left the party he inherited from Parnell in ruins. But he is honoured by many today for the reason (as far as we can discover a reason for it) that he was not a member of the Provisional IRA.

But that won't pass muster. He had the opportunity in 1916 to implement Home Rule with Six County Partition, but without the ruling of the Ulster Catholic community by the Ulster Protestant community in a subordinate system of government that could do nothing but aggravate their antagonistic relationship.

The British Government responded to the 1916 Insurrection by trying to arrange for the implementation of the Home Rule Act. It held meetings with the leaders of the Ulster Unionist movement and also with the leaders of the Home Rule Party. The Ulster Unionists withdrew their objection to Home Rule in principle on the condition that they were excluded from it and remained an integral part of the British political system. And they reduced their exclusion demand from the Province of Ulster to the Six Counties—consigning the other three Counties to the Home Rule system.

The Agreement was proclaimed by the Home Rule Party to be a Treaty which settled the question, with the exclusion of the Six Counties for a limited period, after which the Six Counties would come under the Home Rule Government. The Ulster Unionists then denied that they had agreed that exclusion should be for a limited period. Their understanding was that exclusion had no term of years put on it.

The Agreement had not been made by direct negotiations between the Ulster Unionists and the Home Rule Party. Each had negotiated separately with the Government, and it seems that the Government achieved an agreement for immediate Home Rule with Partition without dwelling on the remote future.

When, under Home Rule provocation, the Ulster Unionists, encouraged by some Southern Unionists, clarified that they had to come under Home Rule government after a few years, the Home Rule Party claimed that the Agreement had been broken.

It is not credible that Redmond should have believed, in the light of all that had been going on since 1912, that the Ulster Unionists had agreed to what in 1914 they had described as "*a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years*". And he must have known, if he had any practical political sense at all, that, if a 26 County Partition Government was put into effect in 1916, and became an accomplished fact, the Ulster Unionists—having been relieved of the pressure of the Irish Question for a number of years, and having experienced political life without it, would not have withdrawn themselves from the British system and placed themselves under the Redmondism which they had raised a Volunteer Army to resist.

But Redmond did not act to seize the Agreement that was on offer. He let the course of events be decided by the leader of nationalism in Ulster, Joseph Devlin, and others who would not agree to Partition without a time limit. And 'the Party' became open to the criticism of both having agreed to Partition and of having reneged on its agreement.

It is pleaded in support of Redmond's conduct that he was not really the Leader of the Party at all: that he was only a Chairman who held the various factions together by conciliating them by blurring contentious issues. If that is true, then the praise that is now being lavished on him is undeserved.

And it is true—with one exception: the 1914 War. On his seat in the Commons, in response to the War speech by the Foreign Secretary, and without consulting his colleagues, he acted as Leader—committing the Party to the War, and acting decisively to infect the country with war fever.

He was not there when the country swept away his Party in December 1918. His colleagues who were there rejected the verdict of the Irish electorate no less than the British Government did.

They refused to participate in the Irish Parliament. The handful of MPs that survived the Election, saturated with Imperial fervour by then, preferred to traipse back to Westminster and play their part in the mess it was making of the world at large.

There is no reason to suppose that Redmond would have done otherwise.

*

1918. The Election. A watershed in the actual history of Ireland. A blank space in the academic history of Ireland and at this Festival.

Aubane Historical Society
August 2018

The papers presented last year, and this year, do not appear to be available. The only one that has been made public is that from Micheál Martin, which appeared as a press release from the Fianna Fáil leader, headed '*Lessons of 1918 are Unfortunately Still Very Relevant*'. It deals with the theme of the Festival, the legacy of 1918, and it probably reflects the views of many speakers as it refers favourably to a number of them. He says:

"Eunan O'Halpin, already firmly established as one of our most challenging thinkers about the Irish Revolution, will examine events of 1918 through the perspective of the behaviour of the British government—and in particular the catalogue of errors which defined its behaviour in that year."

What errors exactly? Britain had succeeded in its main objective, the destruction of Germany through enticing America to get involved and win the war for it. It dominated the Versailles Conference and got America out of Europe. It prevented France from becoming the dominant power in Europe, thereby maintaining the good old Balance of Power to activate again when necessary. It had seen off the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire. It dominated the world as never before. Some error! If this was achieved with errors what would have been achieved with no errors?

In the face of this it must have seemed easy peasy to put down the cheeky Irish who wanted independence in the face of all this power. It was not an error on the part of the British to try to put them down. But they failed. Failure is failure and not an error. If one can foretell the future, there would be no errors or failures—but then there would be no history. We might all as well not get out of bed.

The British had the problems of over-success in 1918 and it is hard to avoid an

error that achieves more success than you can cope with—which is what happened to Britain in Ireland and elsewhere.

The Fianna Fail leader goes on:

"The case of seeing our revolution as part of a much wider stream of events in Europe is simply unanswerable. We miss a lot when we look at Irish history through an exceptionalist approach—and we cannot appreciate what is truly unique without a wider European perspective."

But Ireland *was* exceptional in Europe. Europe consisted of Imperial and colonial powers that were wrecked by WWI. There was no other national uprising against these Powers within Europe. The '*stream of events*' was the breakdown of European states and the resulting social chaos caused by the war. Ireland was exceptional as it only wanted what it had wanted for generations —national independence—not finding new-fangled ways to organise society. It was, and is, the only non-colonial state in Western Europe. Hence, for example, the natural empathy

with the Palestinians who are facing the only colonial attempt at conquest today.

But Martin went on to propose a truly exceptional role for Ireland in the world today:

"I think we should be proud that we honour those who founded this state as well as those who fell in the service of a monarch who we rejected."

The Auxies, Tans and the RIC also "*fell in the service of a monarch we rejected*", so they should all be equally honoured from the perspective of the Irish state—those that fought for its establishment and those who fought to prevent it?

What other potential leader of a state would suggest such a thing?

Irish jokes are not dead while Micheál is around.

But it is a notion that fits in perfectly with the theme of the West Cork History Festival, past, present and possibly future.

Jack Lane

Aubane Historical Society

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Lemass, 'The Devil's Era', And The Economic War

"*Citizens of the Republic, Jewish History in Ireland*" was the title of an essay-in-review carried online in *Dublin Review of Books*, Summer 2007. Among the books I reviewed were *German-speaking Exiles in Ireland 1933-1945*, edited by Gisela Holfter (2006), with particular reference to the essay "Policy and Public Opinion Towards Refugees 1933-1945", by Siobhán O'Connor; *Jewish Ireland in the Age of Joyce: A Socio-economic History*, by Cormac Ó Gráda (2006); and *Dublin's Little Jerusalem*, by Nick Harris (2002). As I put it at the time:

Siobhán O'Connor's essay proceeds to set Irish refugee policy of the 1930s in a wider European framework:

"It is in this context that the 1935 Aliens Act was created... As de Valera pointed out to the Seanad, 'most modern states... reserve rights for the control of citizens'. This was very true. As the period 1933-1940 progressed most European States were implementing ever stricter criteria before allowing aliens across their borders. In Denmark those who looked like or confessed to being Jewish were denied entry. In the Netherlands those with no passport and no means were denied entry. In Czechoslovakia and Luxembourg Jewish refugees were not permitted to cross the borders: they had to return to Germany. No country dared be seen as an easy target for fear of the always anticipated 'influx' of refugees assumed to be waiting to descend on and take advantage of a liberal approach to them".

And what of the circumstances of the Irish Jewish community itself? It is indeed a pity that a very informative essay like O'Connor's had to open with the following gratuitous piece of 'scene-setting':

"1933 was the year when both Adolf Hitler in Germany and Éamon de Valera in Ireland asserted their personal authority. At the beginning of this period Joyce in jest referred to the coming times as being the Devil's Era—a play on the letters and sound of de Valera... In his attempts to dismantle the Treaty he brought Ireland into a period of economic stagnation."

While the term "economic stagnation" is an appropriate description of the Ireland of the 1950s, the very opposite is the case in respect of the de Valera/Lemass record during the 1930s. In his 1994 comprehen-

sive work, *Ireland: A New Economic History 1780-1939*, it is Ó Gráda who has in fact shown how, at 199,000 in 1936, total industrial employment had reached a level that was as much as 26 percent above its 1926 level of 157,000, notwithstanding the Great Depression afflicting capitalist economies world wide. Total employment in those industries enjoying tariff protection expanded from 45,000 in 1932 to 80,000 in 1939 and to 89,000 in 1947. Employment in the clothing industry alone expanded from 9,000 in 1932 to 21,000 in 1939 and to 24,000 in 1947.

In his latest work Ó Gráda demonstrates how the Jewish community particularly thrived during that same period of de Valera's economic nationalism:

"The Jewish community maintained its numbers in the interwar period, when the population of the country as a whole continued to decline... The attractions of setting up a business in an ever more protectionist Irish Free State were increasing. The post-1932 tariff regime even prompted the immigration from across the Irish Sea of some 'tariff Jews', as they were known in the Jewish community."

With regard to the clothing sector in particular, Ó Gráda further writes:

"The protectionist tariff regime introduced by the Fianna Fáil party, which ruled uninterruptedly between 1932 and 1948, was a boon to clothing manufacturers, and Jewish immigrants with tailoring skills capitalised."

As Little Jerusalem's own Nick Harris recalls:

"When I was setting up in the early 1940s it was a boom time in the clothing business. The clothing trade was protected from imports, and Jewish firms dominated it by as much as 75 percent".

At the end of the day, for the Jewish generation that actually lived through it, it is not so much Ó Gráda's "*Age of Joyce*", but what Joyce himself mockingly designated as "*the Devil's Era*", that is in fact remembered with such affection. See <http://www.drb.ie/essays/citizens-of-the-republic-jewish-history-in-ireland> for the full essay.

On June 2nd last, the *Irish Times* published transcripts of a selection of taped interviews given by Seán Lemass in 1969,

edited by that paper's own Ronan Mc Greevy. The latter proceeded to conclude from his own reading of the tapes:

"The stereotype of de Valera as the romantic dreamer and Lemass as the bustling pragmatist are not that far removed from Lemass's own observations as to how their relationship worked."

In my own article on Lemass in the June issue of *Irish Political Review*, I pointed out:

"But the tapes, in fact, undermine McGreevy's stereotype. I have long been inclined to view the Dev/Lemass working relationship and leadership as having been not that dissimilar to that of the Mao/Chou partnership in China."

I quoted from the transcripts themselves, and concluded: "*I have been content to let Lemass speak for himself in this article. But beyond highlighting some of the contradictions present in his own self-assessment, there are other caveats that need to be explored in a further article.*"

This present article is indebted to the 2011 biography by Bryce Evans, '*Seán Lemass, Democratic Dictator*'. This British historian took on the "*conventional wisdom*" of Irish academic historians and journalists alike. He pugnaciously argued:

"Lemass is acknowledged as an extraordinary historical figure. He held key ministerial appointments in every one of de Valera's administrations from 1932 onwards, went on to become Tanaiste and, between 1959 and 1966, Taoiseach. He orchestrated two critical economic transitions in twentieth-century Irish history: the construction, and dismantling, of protectionism... 'Lemassigraphy' is at times cloying, but his qualities shine through in any work dedicated to him, and this book is no exception. It would be trite, however, to ignore a major factor in Lemass's enduring popularity: his place in the politics of memory or, to put it plainly, the use and abuse of Lemass's name by Ireland's elite... During the Belle Époque of the Celtic Tiger boom, a period overseen by Ahern and Cowen, Fianna Fáil projected itself as the spearhead of national progress. This 'modern Ireland', much like a newly emergent state, needed a creation myth. De Valera, the post-independence colossus of party and nation, was increasingly seen as peculiar and twee, 'de Valera's Ireland' grim and anti-materialistic... Lemass, however, fitted the bill. In the popular imagination he came to be contrasted with his close political ally, de Valera, and his son-in-law, Haughey. Lemass was invoked as the embodiment of the march of progress, a visionary free trader who kick-started progressive, cosmopolitan, secular, neoliberal Ireland..."

"To the historian, the darker arts deployed in the game should naturally demand attention. But when it comes to Lemass an entire generation of Ireland's historians have neglected them for a tasty dichotomy. De Valera, we are told, stood for an Ireland 'pious, disciplined and folksy', 'a real-life version of 'The Quiet Man''. (Tom Garvin, 'Preventing the Future', 2004). Dev's Ireland was 'a few comely maidens and the occasional athletic youth', full of asexual mothers of ten nodding approvingly, 'not an impure thought or an orgasm in sight'. (Tim Pat Coogan, 'De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow', 1993). Lemass's Ireland was, by contrast, radical and modernising and 'promised at long last to banish to the rubbish dump of history the wailing of Kathleen Ni Houlihan, the champion whiner of the western world, the princess of the begging bowl'. (JJ Lee, 'Ireland 1945-70', 1979). The construction of this gulf between two men who had worked alongside each other for the best part of forty years involved a considerable amount of airbrushing, particularly of Lemass's career before he became Taoiseach in 1959. Most historians now recognise that the 'Age of de Valera' interpretation inhibited a fuller understanding of Ireland in the last century. The same cannot be said for its corollary, the 'Age of Lemass', which is loosely applied to pre-Troubles, Swinging-Sixties Ireland and remains popular with Irish historians."

"Recent works celebrating Lemass, most prominently Tom Garvin's 2009 biography ('Judging Lemass'), have clung dear to a 'Whig history' of the man, in which a narrative of progress and development obscures other considerations... The thrust of these books resembles all too closely and uncritically the upbeat tone of 'Lifting the Green Curtains', the famous 1963 'Time' magazine (USA) piece on Ireland: 'The nation is at last facing up to its future... The nation's new mood is that of Seán Lemass who four years ago succeeded Eamon as Taoiseach (Prime Minister)... The two men could not be more dissimilar. 'Dev', the aloof, magnetic revolutionary with a martyr's face and a mystic's mind, was the sort of leader whom the Irish have adored in every age. Lemass, a reticent, pragmatic planner ... is by temperament and ancestry more Gallic than Gaelic, and represents a wholly new species of leadership for Ireland. In de Valera's shadow, the new Taoiseach (pronounced tea-shook) has labored single-mindedly for decades to break the vicious circle of declining living standards and dwindling population that threatened Ireland's very survival as a nation'. The celebration of Lemass as the father of boom Ireland started around this time and is epitomised by Garvin's much later book which, fittingly, was composed as the Celtic Tiger was starting to limp. To a number of influential commentators in between, the influx of foreign capital into Ireland was a sort of deus ex machina which resolved all the country's problems. Lemass's role in the process led to a tendency among historians

to resort to ahistorical post hoc, ergo hoc reasoning when looking at Lemass's life prior to his reforms as Taoiseach. And this, in turn, begat the intellectual laziness of hero worship... This book ... seeks to balance the scales... and, most importantly, to explode Tom Garvin's contention that Lemass was a 'cultural revolutionary'. It highlights the condescension inherent in the tendency to look nostalgically to the Fianna Fáil 'golden age'...(pp 1-5).

"Shortly after assuming office (as Minister for Industry and Commerce) in March 1932 Lemass... (had as) his new departmental secretary John Leydon... a quiet man who has consistently been overlooked by the Lemass-iography, which instead concentrates on the later influence upon Lemass of another top civil servant, T K Whitaker. Leydon ... was a pious man who had considered entering the priesthood... But he was also the dedicated civil servant... Tellingly reverting to military terminology, Lemass said of Leydon (in 1969): 'no minister could ever have a better chief of staff'... Lemass was Taoiseach for just seven of his forty-six years as a politician. And yet the vast majority of literature on Lemass concerns his performance in this figurehead role... which has much to do with his ownership by T K Whitaker, to whom everyone goes to talk about Lemass. This has obscured the influence of John Leydon, Lemass's lieutenant for the best part of three decades before Whitaker. Leydon was described by Todd Andrews as 'the greatest public servant of our time' and 'the crutch on which Lemass leaned'. And Leydon's scrupulous professionalism as a civil servant ensured he attributed all his achievements to Lemass exclusively. Similarly, the Lemass-de Valera relationship was much closer than conveyed in the Lemass-iography. 'The whole of our political and social activity is based on the knowledge that mankind has a spiritual destiny... more important than factories, power stations and material wealth.' These were the words of Lemass, not of de Valera, speaking in in 1952... Lemass followed his chief's lead, and occasionally his turn of phrase, for most of his political life. Theirs was a relationship based not only on loyalty but also shared aspiration... Garvin has little time for either the idealism of the old Ireland or the commerce-driven authoritarian bureaucracies of the new Ireland. But in reality, Lemass's footprints are perceptible in both of these camps" (pp 74 and 261-2).

From the outset of the party's formation in 1926, and particularly after entering Dáil Éireann in 1927, de Valera left it to Lemass to formulate and articulate Fianna Fáil's economic policy. Evans related:

"He became a trenchant advocate of the protection of Irish business from foreign competition. Tariff protection was a well-established nationalist policy ... and it was also the policy of Arthur Griffith, the original founder of Sinn Féin. Griffith had signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty, but died shortly thereafter. In power the pro-Treaty party, Cumann na nGaedheal, was less influenced by Griffith

than by large Irish-based businesses which favoured free trade and easy access to the British market. By contrast Lemass and Fianna Fáil stuck more faithfully to the original Sinn Féin economic formula. In line with this policy Lemass proposed replacing the Tariff Commission. This body investigated applications for the protection of industries referred to by the (Cumann na nGaedheal) Minister for Finance (Ernest Blythe). Lemass wanted a more interventionist alternative. He envisaged a body which would be able to impose wholesale protection on sectors of economy that required it. If businesses objected they could be overruled. This radical idea dismissed the selfish vested interests of large so-called manufacturers who were in fact importers who stood to gain from the absence of tariffs. It also went against the strong anti-tariff lobbying of companies like Guinness and Jacob's. Instead, the national interest would come first" (p 55).

"In March 1932, Fianna Fáil entered power... Lemass [was] in the all-important post post of Minister for Industry and Commerce... His party's appeal was based around the assertion of greater sovereignty; radical agrarianism and self-sufficiency; industrial development and employment; and the revival of Irish culture... Fianna Fáil rejected the old economic order of the liberal market economy... When he took over at Industry and Commerce the department was not 'all important'... De Valera had given the critical Finance portfolio to Lemass's rival, Seán MacEntee... (there being) one persistent difference: Lemass wanted to stimulate growth by spending money whereas, frequently, MacEntee wanted to save it... Lemass's rapidly emerging MacEntee nausea was assuaged... when he saw his staunchly protectionist 1929 document realised... The Control of Manufactures Act passed on 8 June 1932... The following month... Lemass successfully subverted the Tariff Commission. On 15 July 1932 the Emergency Imposition of Duties Bill was passed, asserting *his* power to impose tariffs by order over the commission's... Lemass was absent from the Dáil on the day the Bill was passed. On the same day Britain imposed tariffs on Irish produce in retaliation for the Irish refusal to pay the land annuities. At the time Lemass was en route to an imperial trade conference in Ottawa, Canada... Agonisingly for Lemass, the Economic War had begun without him... Several issues became crystallised in his head. Retaliatory duties on British imports would only hurt Irish consumers. Instead the Irish state should exercise 'wide powers' on a larger scale... He hurriedly composed a letter (15 July 1932) to de Valera: 'We received by wireless the news of the 20% ad valorem duties to be imposed on Free State produce exported to Britain... I think that the present situation, if rightly handled, can prove of *permanent* benefit to the Free State if our people are prepared to stick out the transition stage... The situation calls for wide powers of action and movement in the hands of Government and... you should consider whether any

special action is necessary to secure that decisions will not be delayed by keeping to the usual formal procedure in the Department of Finance...' Lemass could content himself that with the change of government had come an unprecedented diminution in the influence of the Department of Finance. Amazingly, de Valera omitted MacEntee, his Minister for Finance, from the government's Economic Committee, formed in May 1932. Lemass was a member of this body... MacEntee may have sunk many of Lemass's progressive proposals, but he was less successful than his Cumann na nGaedheal predecessor Ernest Blythe in vetoing spending. This was in large part due to Lemass and Leydon's energy and ruthlessness. This ambitious duo and their officials were more active than their predecessors in meeting with capitalists keen to start up factories and frequently outmanoeuvred Finance. Industry and Commerce used the Emergency Imposition of Duties Act to its own interest. To Finance's chagrin, the department often commissioned the parliamentary draftsman to draft a new order before referring the proposal to Finance, which could be left with only one day to respond. In this rapidly escalating great game, Leydon's influence on blunting Finance was decisive" (pp 71-76 and 85).

It was at the July 1932 Imperial Conference that Lemass would encounter Jimmy Thomas, recently expelled from Britain's National Union of Railwaymen, of which he had been General Secretary (1916-31), for splitting from the Labour Party to form "National Labour" with Ramsay MacDonald and joining his "National" Coalition Government with the Tories. Evans related an account given by Lemass during the 1933 election campaign:

"Lemass claimed that when in Canada the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, James H Thomas, had sidled up to him and told him that he expected civil war to break out afresh in Ireland. Lemass inferred that the British were engineering a coup and accused Thomas of 'economic Black-and-Tannery'. Cumann na nGaedheal, he claimed, were doing the work of the British for them and were ultimately responsible for the Economic War. ('The Irish Press', January 9 and 12, 1933)... Lemass may have been bluffing, but there is evidence elsewhere that the British were attempting agent provocateur tactics in Ireland. Thomas had anticipated (in February 1932) Fianna Fáil's 1932 election victory and viewed their election promises with alarm. He was determined to let de Valera make the first move in souring relations and precipitating economic warfare. When it came, with the default on the land annuities, Thomas had recommended to the British cabinet (23 March 1932) that their response be 'no less emphatic'. He

encouraged the imposition of duties (21 June 1932) because he expected them to improve WT Cosgrave's electoral chances over de Valera's... Throughout the Economic War, Thomas's communications with the British cabinet left them in no doubt that the Dominions Office regarded Cumann na nGaedheal as 'loyalists' and Fianna Fáil as dangerous radicals. Running a hostile eye over the Irish cabinet, Thomas discerned a united front under de Valera..." (p 79).

In November 1934, he drew up another memo, claiming that Fianna Fáil's "*ideal of a self-sufficing community*" had become complicated by the Economic War:

"Thomas correctly identified the hostility of sections of the nascent Irish bourgeoisie to outside competition, but overstated Lemass's Anglophobic prejudice. In the climate of Irish-Irelandism and insular economics, it is refreshing to note that Lemass did not adhere wholesale to the almost hysterical antipathy towards 'aliens' in 1930s' Ireland. In 1933, for example, Lemass granted a licence to manufacture clothes to Hyman Jacobovitch... a British Jew..." (p 89).

Evans, however, failed to record that it was no "*insular*" Irish-Irelander who was leading the pack in the "*almost hysterical antipathy towards 'aliens' in 1930s Ireland*", but the pro-British and anti-Semitic Fine Gael Blueshirt, James Dillon. In vain did Lemass respond with the question "*if you have no clothing industry here, to whom are the woollen mills going to sell their cloth?*" when James Dillon ranted and railed in the Dáil on 27th October 1937:

"Any fly-by-night from Czechoslovakia, Great Britain or Yugoslavia can come here, provided he has got a name you cannot get your mouth around, and he will be nurtured and cherished by this Government, to the detriment and the ultimate destruction of people who were engaged in industry in this country before de Valera was heard of... (and) worth more than all the new industries, established by gentlemen with unpronounceable names, put together... I should like to have a list of the manufacturers of ladies' clothes in this country. I should like to get their names and I should like the Minister to try to pronounce them. He would choke before he would get through the list."

But to return to the Evans biography: one can infer from the book's pejorative subtitle itself, "*Democratic Dictator*", that it is far from being a hagiography. Evans continued with the following "*on the one hand, on the other hand*" critical assessment of Lemass:

"He let big British companies set up operations with a few Irish directors on them, aware that the real decisions were

made at the company's headquarters in Britain. These included the confectionary firms Cadbury and Fry, the flour-milling business Rank, and the rubber manufacturers Dunlop. Lemass addressed native manufacturers' concerns by his subjection of foreign firms to his instruction in key areas such as size, location and labour force. In this regard, and in line with party policy, Lemass was committed to the geographical dispersal of factories. Contrary to popular opinion, de Valera was 'all for industrialisation'... His Anglocentrism aside, Thomas had come close to hitting on the raw nerve of protectionism: the lack of Irish capital, economies of scale, and know-how. As Lemass later conceded. ('The Irish Press', 24 January 1969), the biggest obstacle to national industrial development was a lack of technical expertise in the country... In 1937 Lemass defended his policies: 'Industrial progress has been so rapid in the last few years that mistakes were nearly inevitable, but I do not admit they were either numerous or serious. During that time, I acted on the principle that the only way to avert mistakes was to do nothing. As I did not intend to do nothing, I discounted the mistakes in advance.' ('The Irish Times', 11 May 1937). The 'Hobson's Choice' that Lemass conveyed displayed the zero-sum mentality of a gambler. Yes, Ireland needed to industrialise. But... what was noticeably missing from Lemass's efforts was any clear economic strategy beyond industrialisation and employment under native ownership... The lack of a national shipping line, leaving Irish exports at the mercy of the British when the Second World War came, would prove a major oversight... The hardest truth of the Economic War was that a cessation in trade between Ireland and her largest market was causing living standards to decline and aggravating emigration... Something had to give. Quietly, the government sought out negotiations with the British. In 1935 the two countries agreed a series of Coal-Cattle pacts. The tariff war began to ease thereafter... With European war looming, the imperative to normalise trade relations with Britain became even more pressing. On 15 January 1938 Lemass and Leydon left for talks with their British opposite numbers in London... accompanied by de Valera, Ryan, MacEntee, and their departmental secretaries... On 23 April 1938 the trade delegation left for the fourth and final time. Two days later the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. Lemass had missed the start of the Economic War, but he was ever-present for its lengthy denouement" (pp 89-93).

But whose living standards had declined due to the Economic War? In his 1994 book, *Ireland: A New Economic History 1780-1939*, Cormac Ó Gráda had been quite specific: "*Though those worst affected were a minority of strong farmers (never*

noted for their support of Fianna Fáil), all ('all' in italics) farmers were affected" (p 416). Switching to an 'on the other hand' mode, Evans himself proceeded to show who did benefit:

"In the 1930s Lemass played a leading role in meeting what he called the 'dual purpose' of providing housing and employment during the economic slump. The Economic War actually brought prosperity to Ireland's urban centres, where cheaper food and better job prospects won Fianna Fáil much working-class supports. The meanness of social spending under W T Cosgrave's governments meant Fianna Fáil was almost obliged to expand welfare legislation when in power. During the 1930s Lemass championed old age pensions, unemployment assistance, widows' and orphans' pensions, and a mass house-building programme. (How we so urgently need one now!—MOR). In Lemass's own words, 'no housing had been built at all by the Cumann na nGaedheal government and the slum situation in Dublin and all over the country was appalling'. The house-building programme of Fianna Fáil in the 1930s was closely linked with the establishment of what would become a

long-standing patronage network between the party and building merchants. Nevertheless it represented a marked change from conservative inaction to social provision" (pp 93-94).

But as the "*Devil's Era*" of the 1930s drew to a close, Ireland faced into still greater threats and dangers. In his second book, *Ireland during the Second World War: Farewell to Plato's Cave* (2014), Bryce Evans further wrote:

"Unfortunately, it seems that neither Lemass nor Leydon foresaw the extent of the British trade squeeze of early 1941. Britain's pursuit of *economic warfare* was clearly signalled: between 1939 and 1945, there was an entire Whitehall Ministry devoted to just that... In June 1940, France fell to Nazi Germany. This pivotal geopolitical event prompted Britain to resume Economic War with renewed vigour through the trade squeeze of 1941. This move spelt economic disaster for an island nation heavily dependent on its bigger neighbour for trade" (pp 38 and 179).

Manus O'Riordan

To Be Continued

disposed to suspect the worst.

But Browder over-played his hand. To boost his campaign, he recruited to his cause the dissident Russian film-maker Andrei Nekrasov who has a track record of opposition to Putin. Nekrasov took on the job in good faith. But, as the filming progressed, he noticed troubling discrepancies and sleight of hand in Browder's story.

When he sought explanation from Browder, he got the brush-off. And, when he dug deeper, Browder's story completely unravelled. The truth was the opposite of what Browder alleged.

Browder denounced Nekrasov's film ("*The Magnitsy Act: Behind the Scenes*") and condemned Nekrasov as a Putin stooge. He accomplished the considerable feat of preventing public access to Nekrasov's film.

From time to time the film surfaces in different locations of the internet, only to be quickly removed on legal grounds.

But, if Browder's story is true, Nekrasov's version could be easily discredited and Browder would emerge all the stronger.

For instance, Nekrasov's film places original Russian documents side-by-side with Browder's English translations and claims that Browder reversed the original meaning of the documents.

So, if Nekrasov is the one who is lying, it would be simple to debunk this part of his film by means of a meticulous and rigorous examination of these documents. Instead Browder and his agents and teams of lawyers and spooks have striven to erase Nekrasov's film from public view.

Which of these two sides is using heavy-handed KGB/Orwellian methods of censorship and suppression? Who is running for cover?

Pavel Karpov is the Russian policeman who is the main target of Browder's accusations of corruption, organised crime, fraud, embezzlement, torture, and murder. (For Karpov, read Putin.) In 2013 Karpov brought a case for libel in the English High Court against Browder.

The court did not award damages to Karpov, and subsequent Browder propaganda makes this the ultimate vindication of his case against Russia/Putin.

Yet again this is Browder-style fraudulent reversal of the truth.

In fact the judge accepted Karpov's case, but stated that the English High Court was not the appropriate legal body for Karpov to go to for damages.

The High Court judgement states:

William Browder, Andrei Nekrasov, and the New Cold War

Earl Browder was leader of the American Communist Party in the 1930s and '40s, and ran for President twice. His grandson William Browder played a leading role, firstly in the looting of Russian resources in the 1990s, and subsequently in the demonisation of President Putin who pulled Russia back from the brink of total collapse and dismemberment.

The Browder affair was one of the few matters of fact (other than intention) mentioned in the Trump-Putin press conference after their confidential Helsinki talks. Putin offered to allow American investigators into Russia, to interview suspected cyber spooks for interference in the Trump-Clinton contest, as *quid-pro-quo* for Russian investigators being allowed to interview the American spooks who masterminded William Browder's activities in Russia.

As to influencing the Presidential election, Putin asserted that Browder donated 400 million dollars of his Russian loot to the Clinton side. At least, that is the version given in translation [<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/16/full-text-trump-putin-meeting-transcript-724369>]

Like Al Capone, Browder was caught for massive tax fraud in Russia. (Try to

imagine the scale of looting against which a tax of 230 million dollars was chargeable!)

Browder's Russian accountant, Sergei Magnitsky, was jailed and died in questionable circumstances. Browder claimed that the Russian police had stolen his business and then perpetrated the tax fraud themselves in alliance with Russian mafia. He claimed that the police tortured and murdered Magnitsky who had sought honestly to use the law to expose them.

Browder successfully lobbied the American Government to enact a law---the 2012 Magnitsky Act---by which Russians involved in human rights abuses could be sanctioned. Russia retaliated and the new Cold War ratcheted up a further notch.

Browder's propaganda was pushing at an open door. His story about Russian corruption and brutality was told in the media, conferences, parliaments, laws, and in his 2015 book ("*Red Notice: How I Became Putin's No. 1 Enemy, A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice*"). It was accepted at face value around the world.

Even in Russia---for a while---liberals or pro-western people, who feared renewal of a strong Russian Government with "enemy-of-the-state" mentality, were

"... *The Defendants [Browder & Co.] are not in a position to justify the allegations that [Karpov] caused, or was party to, the torture and death of Sergei Magnitsky [Browder's Russian accountant]... [T]he record, at least in so far as it is presently set out in the pleadings, has been 'set straight'. I recognise that this will not prevent a repetition of the [Browder] libel ..."*

The full judgement is at <https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Karpov.pdf>

As the Trump/Putin Helsinki Summit demonstrates, the Browder affair is at the core of the new Cold War. But Browder's propaganda is so weak that it failed to

convince, not only an English High Court judge, but also a dedicated anti-Putin Russian dissident film-maker.

Though it may pop up on the internet in whack-a-mole fashion, access to Nekrasov's film about Browder will probably continue to be patchy. But, with a bit of diligence, information about the key issues can be located.

"*The Killing of William Browder*" by Alex Krainer (2017) is a good starting point. It is available as a free download from the internet:

<https://archive.org/details/TheKillingOfWilliamBrowderPrintLayout6x91>

Pat Muldowney

secret is, from this platform, we declare here to-night that we go back to the old policy of our Chairman's father: '*Out with them, Bag and Baggage!*' (Applause) I agree with all that Lord Bryce... as to what the future Armenia should be. It ought to be a big Armenia, not a small one."

Immediately after O'Connor's speech, a resolution was read out pledging those present to supporting "*The Future Government of Armenia and the Boundaries of the New State*" as claimed by the Armenian delegations at Paris. The claim for the 7 Ottoman vilayets plus Cilicia and Russian Armenia was then read out. A map appears in the pamphlet showing what *Magna Armenia* represented. It took in about half of Turkey, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, most of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and parts of Iran as well as Erivan.

When T.P. O'Connor Met General Andranik

On 19th June 1919 T.P. O'Connor, MP, spoke at a meeting held in Central Hall, Westminster, in support of the Armenian cause. O'Connor appeared on the platform with Lord James Bryce, Lord Gladstone (son of William), G.P. Gooch (famous historian), and the Armenian General Andranik. A record of the proceedings was published in a pamphlet, *Armenia and the Settlement*, by the Armenian Bureau in London.

O'Connor was one of the last remaining Redmondite MPs left in the British House of Commons, after Sinn Fein had destroyed the Irish Parliamentary Party in the 1918 Election. The Irish had rejected O'Connor's party after it had gone over to Imperialism and recruited Irishmen in their hundreds of thousands to die and kill in Britain's Great War on Germany and Ottoman Turkey. O'Connor had supported the War because England had promised Irish Home Rule in return for war-recruiting by his party. But, five years later, there was no sign of Home Rule: Britain had rejected the vote by the Irish democracy for an independent Republic and was governing Ireland through military repression.

T.P. O'Connor had been a long-standing supporter of the Armenians, and an anti-Turk in the Gladstonian "*bag and baggage*" tradition. He supported Russian 'liberation' of the Armenians in the 1877-8 war. He was not only an MP for Liverpool in England but had a successful journalistic career in English Liberal circles.

O'Connor is also noteworthy as the inspirer of Wellington House, the secret British Department of State, set up under Charles Masterman to conduct a massive

propaganda campaign against the Germans and Turks through distinguished historians and literary figures. (This information about O'Connor's role in the foundation of Wellington House is contained in Lucy Masterman's biography of her husband, p.272). It was Wellington House that published Arnold Toynbee's '*Armenian Atrocities, The Murder of a Nation*', which formed the basis of Lord Bryce's Blue Book, the British Government record of the massacres, produced in 1916.

At the meeting Lord Bryce said that "*we should have in Armenia a homogeneous Armenian population including all these territories*". But he didn't say how that was to be achieved. Given that the Armenians constituted a minority in "*all these territories*" claimed—illustrated in a map of *Magna Armenia* contained in the pamphlet—one presumes the author of the *Blue Book* was in favour of extensive ethnic cleansing or worse, to create this "*homogeneous Armenia*".

T.P. O'Connor revealed in his speech that he had been fighting for the Armenians for 45 years, starting with Gladstone, the Chairman's father, and he was angered by newspaper reports of the terms to be given to the Turks (in what became the *Treaty of Sèvres*):

"Why is it that the terms of the Armistice in the demands on the Turks contrast so favourably with the terms we imposed on the Austrians and Germans?... when I... read in an English paper of the 'gentlemanly Turk,' well Ladies and Gentlemen, I see red. What is the meaning of it all? Is it money? Is it international finance? Whatever the

When I originally wrote about this meeting in the book *The Armenian Insurrection and the Great War*, a thought occurred to me: What was the most effective Armenian General, Andranik, doing away from the battlefield at this time?

The War, of course, was far from over. A few months earlier Andranik had himself been waging it in a very thorough manner, carving out Greater Armenia through massacre and ethnic cleansing of Moslems in the Caucasus, after he had been driven out of eastern Anatolia by the Turks.

Andranik had a fearsome reputation as an irregular fighter (*fedayi*). The Armenian publication *Andranik—Armenian Hero* (Patriot Publishing) details his exploits. He became active against the Ottoman Government and the Kurdish population in the late 1880s in the *Hunchak* party. He then joined the *Dashnaktustyun*, participating in the assassination of Constantinople's chief of police, in 1892. He took part in the Sasun Rising in 1894, which was portrayed as an Ottoman massacre of Armenians but which was actually an inter-ethnic battle between Armenians and Kurds which the Ottoman Army put an end to. It was an event manufactured by the Armenian insurrectionists to provoke foreign intervention on the model of the '*Bulgarian Horrors*' that had enthralled the Gladstonian Liberals a couple of decades before.

In 1901 Andranik took part in the Battle of Holy Apostles monastery, another attempt to encourage Great Power intervention in the Ottoman state on the Armenian side. This exploit greatly impressed Trotsky at the time. He then took command of another attempted insurrection in Sasun in 1904, which led

to the deaths of thousands of Armenians and Kurds before Andranik was forced to flee into Persia by Ottoman forces.

After these failures the ARF/Dashnaks changed tack and went into politics. When the Dashnaks decided to go into the Ottoman Parliament and work with the Young Turks, Andranik dissented and went to fight in Bulgaria against the Ottomans, pursuing the 'bag and baggage' policy of driving the Moslem population out of the Balkans.

When the Great War began Andranik commanded the first Armenian Volunteer Battalion, attached to the Tsarist invasion force. He took part in the capture of Van and the massacre of the Moslem population there, as well as the taking of Mush in February 1916.

Annoyed by the Russian decision to demobilise the Armenian battalions after their freelance ethnic cleansing operations and the successful capture of most of eastern Anatolia, Andranik resigned and left the Front in July 1916.

Things changed, however, in late 1917 because of events in Russia. Andranik returned and participated in the Armenian administration of occupied eastern Anatolia, authorised by the Provisional Government in Russia. Much killing and ethnic cleansing took place with Russian authority weakened and the Dashnaks in key positions.

Andranik was appointed Major General within the new Armenian Army Corp and he led the unsuccessful defence of Erzurum in early 1918 after the Russian lines dissolved with the Bolshevik takeover. When the Armenian National Council signed the Peace Treaty of Batum with the Ottomans, giving up their demand for Western Armenia and settling for the Erivan Republic in the Caucasus, Andranik took a die-hard position, refused to recognise the Armenian State and set out with his forces to realise the original demand for Magna Armenia.

Andranik took his Special Striking Division of Dashnaks to Nakhchivan, Zangezur and then Karabakh in the Caucasus to extend the territories of the Armenian state he would not recognise. He cosied up to the Bolsheviks after accusing the Armenian Republic of betrayal and declared Nakhchivan part of Soviet Russia. With the arrival of Turkish forces, he moved his forces into Zangezur in order to put an Armenian territorial barrier between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Andranik—Armenian Hero is quite frank about the ethnic cleansing this involved:

"Andranik's irregulars remained in Zangezur surrounded by Muslim villages that controlled the key routes connecting the different parts of Zangezur. According to David Bloxham, Andranik initiated the change of Zangezur into a solidly Armenian land by destroying Muslim villages and trying to homogenize key areas of the Armenian state. In late 1918 Azerbaijan accused Andranik of killing innocent Azerbaijani peasants in Zangezur and demanded that he withdraw Armenian units from the area. Antranig Chalabian wrote that, "without the presence of General Andranik and his Special Striking Division, what is now the Zangezur district of Armenia would be part of Azerbaijan today..." Andranik's activities in Zangezur were protested by Ottoman General Halil Pasha, who threatened the Dashnak government with retaliation for Andranik's actions. Armenia's Prime Minister Hovhannes said he had no control over Andranik and his forces."

Despite the Mudros Armistice at the end of October 1918, ending Britain's war with the Ottomans, Andranik decided to fight on to extend Armenian territory into Azerbaijan. He took his Special Striking Division north-east toward Karabakh and its main town, Shusha. Local Armenians, fearing the worst, attempted to stop Andranik through negotiations with their Moslem neighbours. However, after overcoming Kurdish resistance on the road to Shusha, Andranik was only stopped by the British General, William Thomson, in Baku. The latter informed him that a dim view would be taken of any further activities at the Peace Conference in Paris.

The British warning forced Andranik back to Zangezur. After spending the Winter there with his force, to get him out of the way, he was persuaded by the British to surrender his weapons to the Armenian Catholicos in Etchmidzin and go to Europe.

We have an interesting reaction to all of this from Near East Relief, one of the main US Protestant missionary organisations which promoted Armenian/Christian interests in America against the Ottomans during the period. They were one of the suppliers of anti-Moslem propaganda to the West that fuelled atrocity stories and formed the basis of War Propaganda against the Ottomans in Britain and America.

E.A. Yarrow—Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Near East Relief, in Tiflis—wrote an article called *The British Withdrawal and Present Conditions* in early 1920. He was "bewildered" with the British evacuation from the Caucasus, which had been completed in September 1919. The

British had occupied the region for a mere 7 months. Yarrow contended that Britain overall "*did badly*" in their occupation in the Caucasus, although, at the same time, he gave British forces the credit for bringing peace, order and stability to the general area:

"They defined the territories of the different republics, put these territories under the control of constitutional authorities, and adopted the policy of maintaining the status quo."

What seems to have annoyed Yarrow was the surprisingly impartial attitude of the British military authorities in the Caucasus. They did not favour their former allies, the Armenians, as Yarrow thought they should have. Instead, the Georgians, who had been sympathetic to the German enemy, and the Azerbaijanis, who had sided with the Turks, were given every respect, even at expense of the "*Christian nation*".

Yarrow noted the complaints of his Armenian contacts about the British:

"In the Shusha and Karabagh districts, a detachment of the Armenian army under the leadership of General Andranig was making a successful advance on the Tartars, but were stopped by the British, and Andranig was 'persuaded' to take a journey to Paris to take part in the peace negotiations! Nothing has been heard of his actions there" (*The Journal of International Relations*, Vol.10, No.3, January 1920, pp.251-55).

Yarrow complained that Karabakh had been placed under British authority and was given an Azerbaijani Governor. The Armenians had been disarmed and ammunition taken away from them. Finally Nakhchivan, like Karabakh, was not given to the Armenians, but retained as part of Azerbaijan.

Yarrow believed that the British were intending to off-load the mandate for Armenia to the United States, whilst retaining influence over the Baku to Batum Railway through Azerbaijan and Georgia. He thought such an arrangement "*would be deadly*" for the mandated Power over Armenia.

Yarrow was correct in one thing, but not in the way he intended. He forecast that there would be trouble when the British left. The Armenians, supported by the Government in Erivan, began an offensive against the Azerbaijani populations of Zangezur, Nakhchivan and Karabakh. It was reported that the Azerbaijani police force in Karabakh had been slaughtered by their Armenian colleagues. This aggression, which necessitated the diversion of the Azerbaijani Army to these areas, left

the northern border open to the Red Army in April 1920. Not only Azerbaijan, but Armenia and Georgia as well, fell to the Bolsheviks as a result.

Lloyd George, stumbling from one crisis to another in the expanded British Empire that had been won through the Great War, did nothing to defend the Caucasian states he had helped create and guaranteed the existence of.

It must be said that in the year following the Mudros Armistice, during 1919, Britain did some good in the Caucasus, stabilising things and bringing about orderly state formation in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Democratic government, functioned particularly effectively in Azerbaijan. Of course, this was done largely with the intention of establishing buffer states against Bolshevik Russia.

But, nevertheless, it was a positive development that upset those who were mindlessly agitating in the West for a Greater Armenia and the establishment of a large Christian state among a predominantly Moslem population.

T.P. O'Connor was one of these. And he found himself on a platform in Westminster with a Die-hard terrorist and supporting great irredentist objectives involving substantial ethnic cleansing and massacre.

The last word about how T.P.O'Connor met with General Andranik in Westminster in June 1919 should go to British General Thomson:

"Pursuant to our requirement, the Azerbaijani Army was withdrawn from Baku and was deployed in Yelizavetpol to fight against Armenian aggressors, who committed massacres of Muslims under the command of Andranik and Avetisov" (CAB 45/107, General W.M. Thomson, *Narrative of first few days in Baku*, November 17th-24th 1918).

This is where the Redmondites ended up when they went down the Imperial road for Irish Home Rule.

Pat Walsh

The Armenian Insurrection And The Great War by Pat Walsh, Garegin Pasdermadjian ("Armen Garo"). 218 pp. ₤20, £18

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The Russian Revolution

The second revolution in Russia was a consequence of the first. The first revolution, usually called *bourgeois*, failed to establish a viable bourgeois State in place of the Tsarist State. This failure is connected with the fact that the Tsarist State was not overthrown by purposeful political action by those who took its place as a Provisional Government. Tsarism just stopped functioning, apparently because of a mood that came over those on whose activity it depended. And it seems that it was only after it had ceased to function for a few days that the idea got about that there had been a revolution.

England had declared war on "Autocracy" in 1914, but the only Autocracy in Europe was the Tsarist State with which it was in close alliance in the War. The quick victory, which England expected the vast Russian Army to bring about, would have extended Autocracy.

The Kaiser was not an Autocrat. The Tsar was.

An event that preceded the cessation of the Tsarist regime was the murder of Rasputin by a group of nobles. Rasputin, an uncouth, philandering monk, had for a number of years been a major influence within the regime. He had become the adviser of the Tsar's English wife, and the Tsar was hen-pecked.

Rasputin had a sense that war with Germany would be fatal to Russia, but his influence could not be brought to bear on decision-making in July-August 1914 as he was laid up with wounds inflicted by a woman he was seducing. The War was an accomplished fact when he returned.

A group of nobles close to the Tsar decided to remove him from the political scene and they murdered him in December 1916. The regime died quietly a couple of months later. Such things happen in authentic Autocracies.

The Duma, which bore no resemblance in effective Constitutional terms to either the Reichstag or the Westminster Parliament, found itself in possession of nominal state power which it had not attempted to seize.

Kerensky was a major figure in the Provisional Government from the start. He was its connection with the people. He had been active in the Populist movement,

and had been a member of a terrorist group. He did not in his *Memoirs* apologise for having been a terrorist. He was impatient with people who did not have an instinct about right and wrong in the matter. There were situations in which it was obviously the right thing to be a terrorist and there were situations in which it was equally obviously the wrong thing.

Tsarism ceased to be. The event that had been yearned for came about, God knows how. The Autocratic obstacle to the ideal took itself away, and that was sufficient for the ideal to be realised. The ideal and the real became the one thing and social harmony had come to be in the nature of things.

Either that was the mental world in which Kerensky acted in 1917, or he constructed in his retirement a very convincing pretence that it was.

Anyhow, no State was constructed by this excessively idealised bourgeois revolution, and it was brushed aside by a socialist party that was in earnest.

The socialist revolution developed quickly as a Russian State power in which a substantial stratum of the people was actively involved.

A Russian people, in the political sense, was left to the socialist revolution to bring about. The first democratic Russian State, in the sense of a State whose functioning depended on the political activity of the populace, was a socialist State. And, because of the failure of the bourgeois revolution, the socialist State was faced with the task of doing in the economy too what the bourgeoisie had failed to do—industrialisation.

Industrialisation was the work of *laissez-faire* Capitalism in England. It was done by the action of free individuals each seeking a profit and hiring the labour of loose proletarians (whose numbers had been multiplied by Enclosures of common land) to do it. Was it possible that it might be done by the action of a socialist State? And, if it was possible, was it proper that it should be done? Was it not the purpose of a socialist State to abolish the process of capitalist exploitation of proletarian labour-power by which industrialisation was achieved?

If Capitalism failed, could the proletariat as a mass organise itself as a State and,

directed by managers drawn from itself, undertake the basic task of establishing an industrial economy that rivalled the capitalist economies of Western Europe?

Lenin set the Bolshevik Party the task of industrialising the Russian economy, without capitalists, by methods which were compatible with the comprehensive development of Socialism in the longer term, and then he died.

The means which he left for doing this were a one-party system of state and a rural economy consisting of millions of recently-established, small-scale, owners of private property, to whom he had conceded the right to engage in market activity under the New Economic Policy. There was no urban economy worth speaking of. It had been broken up by the socialist revolution and used up in the Civil War. And the State form was a dictatorship of the proletariat, that was without a proletariat to run it.

The proletariat, as a functioning economic category had disappeared along with the urban capitalism that produced it: "*The proletariat has disappeared. It has sometimes figured in statistics, but it has not held together economically*" (Lenin, October 1921).

What Lenin meant by "*proletariat*" was the industrial working class, which was not quite what it meant in Roman times. The Roman proletariat, as far as I could gather, was the parasitic populace of the cities that was provided with bread and circuses from the proceeds of the Empire. The industrial working class of modern industrial capitalism was something very different. It was a necessary economic class of industrial capitalism, and therefore it had acknowledged social status in capitalist societies—minimally in Britain, more so in France, and extensively so in Germany. And, to the extent that it had acknowledged social status, and that some gestures were made towards meeting its concerns, its relationship with the capitalist regime that exploited it became conciliatory.

In England, under *laissez-faire* capitalism, there were great riots, and great demonstrations of protest that seemed to be on the brink of causing a revolutionary rupture in society. All of that ended in 1885-6 when Joseph Chamberlain, a Birmingham manufacturing capitalist, split the Liberal Party and went into alliance with the Tories on a social reform programme. He wondered that the working class put up with the way it was being treated under Liberal capitalism, was convinced that it would not put up with it

much longer, fought elections under his own "*Unauthorised Programme*" in which the development of the welfare state was projected, formed a joint party with the Tories (the Unionist Party) which dominated politics for ten years around 1900, obliging the Liberals to repudiate *laissez faire* and become social reformers under cover of a spurious class war against 'feudalism' waged by Lloyd George.

Chamberlain stood for social reform and Empire. It seems probable that *laissez faire* capitalism was one of the elements that made the establishment of the World Empire possible, but then at a later stage it was the Empire that made social reform in Britain possible. And then, in the 1890s, the sentiment of popular Imperialism sponsored by Chamberlain made democratisation seem feasible to ruling class circles.

Then Britain launched the World War, and the industrial working class played its part in it stoically, year after year, when the Germans did not prove to be a walkover.

Lenin formed the International of Communist Parties to overthrow European capitalism and protect the Russian Revolution. The construction of a British Communist Party proved difficult. The proletariat, in the sense of the industrial working class, kept its distance, despite the irritant of post-War depression instead of "*homes fit for heroes*". The proletariat had made its agreement with 'the system' and held to it.

Lenin then advised the British Communists to chase up the proletariat in the other sense—to go out into the highways and by-ways and enlist the drop-outs of various kinds: the lumpen proletariat. (I can't give a reference for this, it is so long since I read it, 50 years ago.)

The proletariat of British capitalism, in the sense of the organised working class, then became, in Leninist terms, the "*labour aristocracy*", which shared the proceeds of imperialist exploitation with the capitalists. Ivor Kenna, of the Finsbury Communist Group in North London, investigated this idea and demonstrated in detail that it was the case.

I was diverted into Northern Ireland politics at that point. I didn't have the British temperament required for British politics anyway. Ivor continued to describe the situation in these basic terms (see the *Finsbury Communist*). It is a good thing that somebody does it. And Brexit, if it happens, may require a return to that kind of understanding.

Kerensky described the Bolshevik Revolution as mob rule. He said that mob

rule is irresistible. There's no doubt about it. But it usually spends itself and dissipates. Except that, in Russia it didn't. Therefore . . .

Mobs have played very little part in Irish history. O'Connell arranged to carry Repeal of the Union by assembling a great mob in Clontarf in 1843. The Duke of Wellington let it be understood that massacre is the appropriate way for dealing with a seditious mob. O'Connell backed down and never recovered. (And Ireland lost more through the Famine/Holocaust in the next few years than it would ever have by administrative massacre.)

The only other mob I know of is the one that burned down the British Embassy in Dublin in 1972, in response to the British administrative massacre in Derry. And it is significant, not because the burning of the Embassy was an outrageously disproportionate response to the massacre, but because of the effect it had on the frightened mind of Dermot Keogh.

Keogh was on the editorial staff of the Fianna Fail paper, the *Irish Press*, at the time. Fianna Fail was the governing party of the day, and was the party that had given democratic stability after 1932 to the administration imposed by Britain on 26 Counties of the island in 1922 by means of a one-sided 'Treaty', to which a majority submitted under threat of an all-out Imperial reconquest by Boer War methods—Concentration Camps plus a dense network of barracks across the country. Fianna Fail was the party that had refused to submit to the Treaty and that ten years later had nursed the electorate back to a spirit of republican independence which supported a unilateral Irish breach of the Treaty.

The Party that had enforced the Treaty with British financial and military support in 1922 formed itself into a Fascist movement in 1933 against Fianna Fail's breach of the Treaty. But this Irish fascism—which declared itself to be fascist—was curbed electorally by Fianna Fail all through the 1930s, and its threats of direct action—a projected *March On Dublin*, for instance—came to nothing in the face of popular support for Fianna Fail's stance in favour of continuing Parliamentary Government. Fascism was then allowed to wither peacefully and reinvent itself within the Parliamentary system which it had failed to overthrow.

Complete formal independence of the 26 Counties as a state was achieved in 1938, when the British occupation of three Ports, which it held under the Treaty,

ended—enabling the Irish state to be free of Britain in Britain's next World War. The Irish State had by then adopted a new Constitution which made no mention of the Treaty.

That Constitution, however, asserted *de jure* sovereignty over the 6 Counties in the North which remained within the British state in the slightly detached form of Northern Ireland. It treated the Partition of the country as illegitimate, and the British Government of the North as illegitimate.

In 1972 the British Army, acting under command, fired randomly into a Civil Rights demonstration in Derry. In the parlance of more recent times, it killed its own people. But, from Fianna Fail's point of view, and from the Constitutional point of view of the Irish State, they were not its own people to kill as it chose. They were citizens of the *de jure* Irish sovereignty who were temporarily deprived of their citizenship by the usurping power of the foreign British state.

Dermot Keogh was in the News Room of the Fianna Fail paper as accounts of the massacre came in. He later went out on the streets to observe the popular response to the event. And then he gave this account of the affair in an interview for the RTE documentary, *The Seven Ages Of The State*:

"I was working in the Irish Press news-room on Bloody Sunday, and I remember vividly on the evening on the Subs desk waiting as the copy came in, and it was three, and then four, and then five, and six, all the way up to the Butcher's Dozen. It was a terrible night because I and others who had no sympathy for the I.R.A., or no sympathy for violence in Northern Ireland, was wondering what was going on in the minds of British administrators. It was like Amritsar all over again. It was like old-fashioned colonialism."

"As I was standing in the Park just opposite the Embassy, somebody said 'Take down the railings!' And I looked in stupefaction. But within minutes the railings were down and people had poured out. And then I saw people in green uniform, Oglai na hEirean, directing traffic. And that was the moment of realisation that there was a Fascist organisation likely to take over the state, unless there was radical action: that the IRA were intent, not just on destroying Northern Ireland, but also on bringing down the Government in Southern Ireland. And that was a moment of truth for me."

"Working as a journalist in that period I clearly had some indication that this was qualitatively different to anything the IRA had done before. This was an

entirely new set of revolutionaries, new technology, and a new ruthlessness."

This is the hysteria of a tender mind, unfit for contemplating the realities of things.

Keogh retreated from news reporting to academia, becoming influential in Cork University in the "*radical action*" of disembowelling Irish history, making it nice instead of nasty.

Others in the Dublin Establishment at the time looked on the burning of the Embassy as the easy way out of the problem with which the Derry massacre presented them. (Taoiseach Lynch phoned Prime Minister Heath and asked for a guarantee that nothing like it would ever be done again. He was given the brush-off.)

The idea took hold of organising a mass convergence of the nation at Newry the following weekend. Train time-tabling began to be organised. If that had actually happened, the fat would have been in the fire. By directly implicating the Southern populace in the undemocratic affairs of the North, it would possibly have warded off the further development of the War in the North.

But the burning of the Embassy took the heat out of the situation. All that happened in Newry was a token demonstration. The opinion began to be cultivated that the North was really a place apart, not the Fourth Green Field illegitimately held by a foreign state—though the Sovereignty claim to it in the Constitution was kept in place.

The Nationalist body in the North, effectively disowned by the state which still asserted *de jure* sovereignty over the North, fought its own war with the British State, which was never recognised to be a war by any Dublin Government, and it "*destroyed Northern Ireland*", in the sense of forcing a drastic alteration of its political structure. The disowning of the North in the early 1970s, by the state which continued to assert *de jure* sovereignty over it, clearly did not exert a pacifist influence on its affairs.

The distinct thing that gave Dermot Keogh a vision of Fascism at the burning of the Embassy was that the mob that assembled at it did not act with complete spontaneity. There was a thinking element in it which gave it direction.

Kerensky said that mob rule is irresistible. And there's no doubt about it. But the mob soon wears itself out for want of coherent purpose. His essential case against Bolshevism is that it conferred

lasting power on the mob by giving immediate practical purpose to its inchoate yearnings for the Millennium.

The only Continental intellectual of pre-1914 vintage that I have known is Manuel Sarkisyanz. He advertised in Irish magazines for a translator and publisher of a book he had written in German.

The only reply he got was from Athol Books. The book was translated by Angela Clifford as *Hitler's English Inspirers*. Sarkisyanz was surprised by this as he had illusions about Ireland being boldly revolutionary. But he made the best of his discovery that the Irish State was profoundly bourgeois and had no intelligentsia. I had a number of discussions with him in Heidelberg. He was living out of his time and place, and so I suppose was I. He was Armenian/Iranian by origin, and was saturated with Russian culture as well as German, and he lived in Mexico in Winter because it was governed, sort of, by the Party of Permanent Revolution. (At other times he lectured in Heidelberg University.)

He surveyed the post-1918 world with the mind of a coherent pre-1914 intellectual. And I somehow had acquired a similar mentality through growing up in the backwardness of Slieve Luacra, whose culture was still that of Young Ireland, and not having it eroded by contemporary education.

Sarkisyanz was of the opinion that, beyond the discipline of scientific socialism, Bolshevism was Christian in spirit. And that Fascism was a development of Humanism. And certainly the object of Fascism was very modest and particular compared with that of Bolshevism.

Bolshevism was engaged in the comprehensive remaking of humanity in such a way that, after the intervention of so many disturbing modes of production, it would be restored, on a higher technical level, to the contentment that characterised the primitive Commune.

The purpose of Fascism was merely to restore the viability of the capitalist state where it had been disrupted by the elemental Great War, by curbing the uncompromising class antagonism that fed into its party-politics under the influence of the Russian Revolution.

The War had brought the masses into political action suddenly. The 'masses' were a new phenomenon, a product of Capitalism, which capitalist liberalism had difficulty in coping with after the shock of the Great War. Fascism protected

Capitalism by suspending the Parliamentary conflict of parties and restoring national politics by means of a party which established within itself the compromise between socialism and capitalism where that had not come about through the conflict of parties.

Fascism met with general approval of West European civilisation. The historic voice of Western civilisation during the generation after 1917 was Winston Churchill. It was Churchill's fate to start what is called the Anti-Fascist War by refusing to make a settlement of the War that Chamberlain had declared on Germany in 1939, even though Britain had lost the battle and was incapable of sustaining the War with its own resources.

Churchill continued that War with a view to bringing about a war between Germany and Russia. He then saw it as a regrettable necessity to become an ally of Russia for the moment, though he always regarded it as the basic enemy.

The second British war on Germany was a historical absurdity. The British military strategist and historian puts it like this.

"The last thing Hitler wanted ... was another great war...

If he had really contemplated a general war, involving Britain, he would have put every possible effort into building a Navy... But, in fact, he did not build up his Navy to the limited scale visualised in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935...

How did it come about that he became involved in the major war that he had been so anxious to avoid? The answer is to be found... in the encouragement he had long received from the complaisant attitude of the Western Powers coupled with the about-turn of the spring of 1939. The reversal was so abrupt and unexpected as to make war inevitable" (Basel Liddel Hart, *The Second World War*, Chapter 1, *How The War Was Precipitated*).

In the Fall of 1938 Britain used its influence to enact a major breach of the Versailles Treaty in favour of Hitler by breaking the Czechoslovak state (formed under that Treaty) and awarding Sudetenland to Germany, while Poland and Hungary took other parts of it. Then, in March 1939, Britain and France made a military encirclement of Germany by means of a military alliance with Poland. Germany, having been raised to the status of a hegemonic Regional Power by the Munich Agreement, responded to this hostile military encirclement, erratically established by Britain after five years of close collaboration, by striking at its

weakest point. And Britain responded to Hitler's move against Poland, not by making war in alliance with Poles as the terms of the encirclement required, but by leaving the Poles to fight alone and be defeated, and then by making leisurely arrangements for war on Germany, in the mode of world war.

Germany responded in May 1940 to the British/French declaration of war made on it in September 1939, taking Britain by surprise and causing it to leave the Continent, to which it did not return for four years.

Britain then "*stood alone*" for a year, refusing a settlement but being unwilling or unable to fight—the two things being closely related. And Hitler, quixotically concerned to preserve British Imperial civilisation in the world, and wanting only a settlement of the War that Britain had declared on him, let it have its year of defiant posturing, while he made preparation for war on the Power which both sides agreed was the fundamental enemy of European civilisation: Communist Russia.

Martin Mansergh denies that the Polish Guarantee amounted to a military encirclement of Germany. The South African Government—the Dominion with military experience—advised Whitehall that that is what it would be. And No. 12 of the Oxford War Pamphlets (*Encirclement* by J.L. Brierly. 1939) said that was what it was. Military encirclements are not things to play about with, especially with relation to a state whose growth as a military power one has been encouraging up to that point.

The sense of the Polish Guarantee, of the failure to deliver on it, and of the British attempt to become engaged in war against Russia in Finland—after having declared war on Germany—is that of a grossly bungled attempt to engineer a European War on Russia which the British Labour movement could be wrong-footed into supporting.

As things worked out, German military power—which Britain had helped to build up—was stopped in Russia, and was driven back to Central Europe, and Britain got back on the Continent after four years of absence only because the United States had joined the War, and insisted on it.

The refusal of Britain in June 1940 to make a settlement of the war it had declared on Germany, but had not fought in earnest, led to the German war on Russia—which brought the power of Communist Russia into Central Europe. That was its most noticeable effect at the time. It also led to

the mass killing of Jews in the German-controlled hinterland of the invasion of Russia, with the popular approval, or acquiescence, of the local populations. This was scarcely noticed in the British war media at the time, but about a generation after the war it began to play a major part in the apologetics of the war.

I write this after hearing a Lord Hennessey say on BBC radio that in June 1940 to June 1941 Britain stood alone and thus saved the world.

Well, if the world was saved from what was dominant in Europe in 1940-1, it was not Britain that saved it, but Communist Russia. The USA and Britain, in June 1944, clambered back onto a Europe in which the greater part of German military power was engaged in the Russian Front and was relentlessly being driven back. And the purpose of D-Day was not the salvation of Europe from National Socialism, but the occupation of part of it before it was saved by Communism.

And, no sooner was the National Socialist regime cleared away, than the Power that broke it was treated as hostile in the Western Occupation Zones—and in Germany its adherents were punished.

Fascism was a force of evil that arose outside the bounds of civilisation and became dominant over civilisation and threatened to destroy it. What was the source of its power? Its Evilness of course. The notion of a Pact with the Devil as a source of power survives in the undergrowth of post-Protestant liberalism.

The need to destroy that Evil Power had priority over all differences of opinion within civilisation, and so it was that the Grand alliance of all humanity joined in a League against it.

But the way things were handled in 1945 suggests that the Evil of National Socialism was destroyed by the greater Evil of Communism!

English liberalism, after its treason to itself in August 1914 and again in 1919, has never been able to grasp the events of the world coherently. At critical points it makes do with makeshifts carried over from the Biblicalist theology from which it emerged.

The sources of power after the 19th century are the great masses of population, whose grooves of living were broken up by the totalitarian world war launched by Britain in 1914 and concluded with the draconian punishment of Germany in 1919, after it was compelled under starvation to make a false confession of having caused it.

When the Tsarist State collapsed under the stress of this war, into which Britain had lured it with the offer of Constantinople, the Bolshevik Party took in hand the disordered masses—the mob, as Kerensky saw it—and gave them structured existence as active participants in a viable State.

The terminology of class was used in the formation of the State but, by Lenin's own account, did not so much describe what existed as establish a purpose which would enable orderly social existence to be constructed out of anarchy. And then it was Stalin who guided the establishment of those structures which generated the power that resisted National Socialism in 1941 after Britain had given it two practice-wars to hone its expertise—Poland in 1939 and France in 1940.

So how was this done?

Brendan Clifford

To Be Continued

Manuel Sarkisyanz, PhD: *Hitler's English Inspirers*. 348pp. €27, £22.50
The British Legion And Hitler—"Lest we forget". How the British State shaped ex-servicemen's associations into its own instrument by Eamon Dyas. €6, £5
Lord Londonderry: On Britain And Hitler Germany. Introduction by Brendan Clifford. 28pp A4. €6, £5
Aspects Of WW2: *Neutrality, Second Front, Nuremberg Trials, Japan, Cold War* etc. 92pp. April 2008. €8, £6
Albrecht Haushofer: Moabite Sonnets (1944-45), with an English translation. Introduction by Angela Clifford: *The Haushofers, Geopolitics And The Second World War*. 94pp. Illustrations €12, £10
James Murphy's Berlin Magazine of 1931, International Forum—full reprint (pamphlet format). Contributors include Oliver St. John Gogarty, Thomas Mann, Erwin Schrödinger, Max Planck. 94pp (A4). €10, £8
Connolly And German Socialism by Brendan Clifford. 80pp. €6, £5
Luise Haushofer's Jail Notes (1944). With Letters Exchanged between Karl Haushofer and Paul Renner. Introduction: Angela Clifford. 68pp. €6, £5

in a General Election. Meanwhile Nigel Farage has joined the *Leave Means Leave* lobby group and has started travelling the country in a campaign bus.

'GET IT OVER THE LINE'

Writing in *Prospect* magazine (August 14) Aarti Shankar, a policy analyst for the Open Europe think tank, has argued that "just get it over the line" is becoming the new Brexiteer mantra. The strategy, which is associated with Government Minister Michael Gove, has been conceived as a means of avoiding a No Deal end result. It entails agreeing terms for the UK withdrawal and referring the future UK/EU relationship to later negotiations. Under this strategy, following the transition, the initial arrangement would approximate to a Norway-style Brexit which would then be open to an evolution towards a harder Brexit.

This 'blind Brexit', as it is being called, is being opposed by Dominic Raab, the new UK Brexit Minister, who espouses the established UK position that payment of the financial settlement of £39 billion should be conditional on finalising the Future Agreement. The problem of course is that an imminent No Deal collapse might render that strategy inoperable.

THE BACKSTOP AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL

The Irish 'Backstop' has become the key issue of contention in the internal UK debate, as well as the main obstruction to a Withdrawal Agreement. It is all very well for Varadkar to indicate a willingness to compromise on the issue, but the true position is that he has invested too much political capital in opposing a Hard Border to now make a meaningful compromise.

In truth all three parties, the Irish Government, the UK Government, and the Barnier Task Force, have each been using the issue as a political football. The Brussels team may have had genuine concerns about the danger of a re-ignition of the conflict but the Irish and British sides must be well aware that dissident republicans lack the community support necessary for a return to violence.

The immutable underlying reality is that the Border must necessarily become the EU's external frontier when the transition ends. It may be possible to minimise the disruption and in time a technological solution may ease the friction, but the starting point must be the establishment of a dividing line separating the EU from the non-EU. Undoubtedly this will discommode commuters, traders and transport agencies but the problem is

August Brexit Summary

The Brexit story has taken some interesting twists and turns in the last four weeks. In Britain a growing backlash against the Chequers White Paper has taken the form of a UKIP revival and has caused Nigel Farage to return to active campaigning. The crescendo of justified speculation on the increased possibility of a 'no deal' breakdown of the talks may also have spurred support for a 'blind Brexit', in which agreement is reached between both sides on an orderly exit in March of next year and the future relationship is left to be sorted out over the following years.

In Ireland Taoiseach Leo Varadkar was quoted in late July saying that the Government is prepared to be 'flexible' regarding the Border backstop—an unsurprising stance given that the backstop remains the issue at the epicentre of the current deadlock. In a related development, it was disclosed in August that the British have urged the Irish Government to desist from playing up the Northern Peace Process in the Brexit talks, as this was hurtful to Theresa May. A rare meeting of the British Irish Inter-Governmental Conference took place in late July; the meeting has been reported as marking a new low in Anglo Irish relations.

Two recently reported developments

that are only indirectly related to Brexit are worthy of comment: a US court case against Kerrygold for alleged false advertising may have implications for the post-Brexit re-organisation of Irish agriculture; and a statement from the European Commission that the plan for a Capital Market Union (CMU) faces delay may reflect a lack of appetite for EU integration at the present time.

THE CHEQUERS BACKLASH

An article in the British *Spectator* magazine describes how support for UKIP has jumped five points to 8 per cent in the few weeks since the Chequers White Paper was published. Author Matthew Goodwin explains how the trend is being supported through social media. Blogger Paul Joseph Watson, a critic of "political correctness, Islam, refugees, identity liberalism and what he and his audience argue is excessive virtue signalling across the West" is urging his 882,000 followers to join UKIP. Another tributary feeding into the UKIP surge is the—

"blue collar workers in more northern Labour seats who loathe the social liberalism and internationalism of their mainly middle-class MPs"

The significance of the UKIP revival is that it will steal votes from the Tories and tilt the balance in favour of Jeremy Corbyn

not amenable to resolution by wishing that the reality was otherwise or the making of grand declarations.

THE BRITISH IRISH INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

According to an *Irish Times* article from columnist Noel Whelan (3 August) the British/Irish Conference in late July did not go well; a photograph accompanying the article showed Ministers Coveney and Flannigan speaking to camera outside the Houses of Parliament at Westminster, the implication being that a joint press conference was deemed inappropriate and that the Irish had not been afforded the facility of a room to communicate with the media.

According to Denis Staunton (IT, 25 July) the British and Irish Governments agreed at the Conference to:

"establish a formal structure to facilitate high-level ministerial contacts after Brexit, when Ministers from the two countries will no longer meet regularly in European Union councils."

So the meeting may not have been as frosty as Noel Whelan implied. But what is the purpose of this East/West forum? Given the many years of endeavour the UK Foreign Office has devoted to attracting the Irish State back into its inner orbit, and given the no less arduous efforts expended by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs to ditching what is now described as "nationalist baggage", it is difficult to see its function as other than an invitation to the British to cause mischief for the EU.

KERRYGOLD'S US LAWSUIT

Kerrygold, Ireland's best-known food brand, is the defendant in a class action lawsuit in the US. The charge against the company is that Irish cows are not exclusively grass-fed, as is claimed in its advertising, but are routinely fed other materials such as grain and soya, and that these feeds can be genetically modified. The *Irish Times* report of the case (July 26) concludes by stating that Simon Coveney, when Minister for Agriculture in 2011, warned that "some imported fodder could introduce genetically-modified feeds into the food chain".

The case raises a question that needs to be asked as agricultural strategies are being reviewed in the context of Brexit. Ireland's reputation as a source of natural non-GM food products could be undermined by the careless importation of fodder. That the Government has advised against such malpractice is reassuring but how well is the official policy enforced? This case

will serve a useful purpose if it causes a critical examination of agricultural policy, post-Brexit.

CAPITAL MARKET UNION DEBATE

It is unfortunate that the advantages of creating a Capital Market Union (CMU) throughout the EU are not more widely understood. A recent study by the Brueghel think tank (*Making a reality of Europe's Capital Market Union*, 27 April 2018) describes the role of capital markets as follows:

"Sources of financing such as equity and bonds, securitisation, lending from insurance companies and asset managers or venture capital, complement lending by banks and help allocate financial resources to where they can be most efficiently deployed."


The CMU is an initiative of the Juncker Commission: it was launched in 2014 in response to the US financial crisis and the subsequent Euro-area debt crisis. The aim

is to end the existing fragmentation of European money markets along national lines and ensure that buying and selling capital in the EU is both supervised and regulated. Since at least 35 per cent of EU capital transactions are currently handled in the less regulated City of London, Brexit provides an opportunity to advance the CMU agenda.

According to Valdis Dombrovskis, the relevant European Commissioner, progress in achieving CMU is being delayed by National Governments lagging in approving the necessary laws (IT, 17 August). This testifies to a reluctance to advance European integration in a practical way and a failure to learn an important lesson of the crisis.

The need for a review of agricultural policies, and the economic benefits to Ireland of CMU, are both topics that I hope to describe in more detail in future issues of *Irish Political Review*.

Dave Alvey



A Curious Document

The document below is the signatory page of first version of the what is known as the "Treaty". It is the copy circulated in the press early on 6th December 1921. A curious element is the 'signature' of Eamonn Duggan. It is not his real signature: in fact, it is a 'cut and paste' of his signature from a menu he signed earlier. This means he did not sign the actual document. The reason for this is that he was not present at the signing. However, Whitehall was so adept, and prone to forgery, that his absence did not prevent his signature being used.

Jack Lane

Fenian Day

The 11th July used be celebrated by Ireland's Defence Forces as *Fenians' Day*, with a Holiday to commemorate the first Truce between Irish and British forces since the Treaty of Limerick. For, on 11th July 1921, the British sued for peace with the forces of the democratically-established Irish Republic. I don't know whether the Defence Forces still commemorate it.

But they should, because the national movement, its army and the citizens were united as they were not to be again for decades. The general public should also be involved. Ireland, unlike the "United Kingdom", is not a warfare state. Her President, his spouse and relations don't wear a uniform or have dozens of them to choose from. They don't wear uniforms for weddings, watch regiments Trooping a Colour or Beating Retreat. They don't have an Armed Forces Day, celebrity chefs competing to feed their heroes, nor veterans wearing their old Regimental Berets, barracking the Judiciary, or threatening a Taoiseach. Their TV stations don't have endless re-runs of Cock and Bull Heroes nor soundtracks of the Dumbasters' March.

Ireland is rather more exposed to the glorification of British Militarism than is healthy. Celebrating *Lána bhFiann* might be a good start at counter-balancing it. A film should be made based on "*Fremantle Mission*", the story of the Catalpa and the amazing rescue from Australia of Fenian Prisoners organised by John Devoy. The escape from the H-Blocks, about a Century later was equally brilliant and worthy of filmng.

There must be films made in Cuba and other countries struggling against foreign domination, which could be dubbed in Irish or English to counter Imperial brain-washing. A healthy internationalism would be a defence against the slavish of Brown-Nosing John Bull, and advance the day when Robert Emmet's Epitaph can be written.

Donal Kennedy

Problems

Issue 34:

Freedom as Misunderstood by Liberals

How Gorbachev
Wrecked the Soviet Union

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€10 (£8). Postal Euro-zone and World
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The following letter was not published by the *Irish News*
—the letter which sparked it appears below

Child Abuse And The Troubles

Paul Livingstone wrote about the death of his 14-year-old sister Julie, who was shot dead by the British Army with a plastic bullet in 1981 (July 31).

Paul mentioned the false allegation that the IRA used her as a 'human shield'. The allegation is reminiscent of widespread propaganda promoted in the early 1970s by Belfast hospital psychiatrist Dr Morris Fraser.

With another man Fraser abused two Belfast boys, one aged 10, the other 13, in London in August 1971—a fact the RUC knew about from October 1971. He appeared in May 1972 in Bow Street Magistrates' Court London, after 9 pm with no media present. The internationally known psychiatrist was convicted in secret and was conditionally discharged.

Fraser's employer was never informed by the RUC. He was medical manager in the psychiatric facility in Lissue Children's Hospital, where Fraser had charge of vulnerable institutionalised children. One week after his conviction, Fraser was reported in the *Irish Times* at an ISPPC conference in the University of Ulster. He warned of the danger to children caught up in the conflict.

Fraser was regularly in newspapers, on radio and on television, from 1971-73, in Ireland, Britain and the US. He pushed the line that West Belfast had a feral child population, made use of by the IRA. In reality, it was Fraser who posed a real and immediate threat to every child he met. It was he who was shielded, by the authorities.

The suspicion that Fraser was being used by the RUC, and possibly the British Army, is reinforced by RUC refusal to assist a General Medical Council (GMC) inquiry into Fraser's behaviour. I have seen letters from 1972-3 stating: a) that the RUC refused to make officers involved in the Fraser investigation available to the GMC; b) that the RUC refused to divulge to the GMC the address of the family of the boy Fraser abused.

Fraser was arrested in New York in May 1973 as part of an 8-man paedophile gang. That arrest was publicised. Afterwards, Fraser's May 1972 London conviction came to light.

Fraser continued to live a charmed life. His 1972 London conviction was not raised at his New York sentencing in June 1974. Again, Fraser was given a conditional discharge, when he should have been sent to jail. Equally astonishingly, he was not brought back in front of a UK court after this second, US, conviction, having broken the terms of his 1972 conditional discharge (reports by me on Fraser are available online (links below).

Surprisingly, the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIAI) refused to investigate Fraser, despite being in possession of the evidence above.

Fraser experienced a human shield against exposure, initially provided by the RUC, so that state killing of children could be explained away. In return, Fraser, an abuser, had access to hospitalised and institutionalised children. Given HIAI inaction, it appears Fraser or his protectors are still shielded.

Niall Meehan

[Fraser reports here: <https://www.academia.edu/23870062/>
<https://www.academia.edu/34499583/>
<https://www.academia.edu/35180284/>

British army used children as 'human shields' (*Irish News* 31 July 2018).]

Irish News letter

Kenny Donaldson, 'victims campaigner', was on The Nolan Show (July 24) to speak about IRA commemorations. During his contribution he stated "*children were brought out onto the streets in riotous situations to act as human shields*".

My 14-year-old sister was shot dead by the British army with a plastic bullet in 1981. The day my sister, Julie, was killed hunger striker Francis Hughes died. Just yards from the spot my sister was killed women were saying the rosary and banging bin lids—hardly a riot Mr Donaldson. Julie was crossing the road to fetch milk from the shop and was shot from an armoured personnel carrier. There was no rioting in the area. There was no shooting in the area. There were no active service units in the area.

Also it's a fact that British foot patrols, who were hunkered down at street corners, called little children over [myself included] to let them look down their telescope. They were not doing it to endear themselves to the local community, they were doing it to use the children as human shields.

Paul Livingstone

IRISH HISTORY LESSONS

Speaking at the West Cork History Festival on 18th July 2018, Micheál Martín, TD and leader of Fianna Fail—for the time being—seems to have put his foot in it again when he described changes in the Junior Cycle History Syllabus as “catastrophic”! This is because the new syllabus demotes History to being an optional subject for the students. Up to now, it was—together with Maths, Irish and English—a mandatory subject. History is after all part of our Heritage.

The change is indeed catastrophic. As Goethe said:

"He who cannot draw on three thousand years is living from hand to mouth."

But Micheál Martín's audience must surely have thought “here is the Leader of Fianna Fail, who supports the Fine Gael led Coalition Government in a 'Confidence and Supply Agreement' and he is drawing attention to the unpleasant fact of History being made optional on his watch! Why does he not do anything about it? He has the power, why does he not use it? Why make promises to do something about it in the future when he has failed to do it now? It just does not stack up!

History is part of the fibre of the Fianna Fail party, and all the other political parties, and the demotion of history in our schools will tend to undermine all their historical underpinnings surely? But then maybe this is Micheál Martín's long term objective? He is not stupid. There has been for many years an academic policy, sponsored by this State and other agents, to develop a revisionist history that allows us access to our “shared history” with the British State—a completely uncritical project that shows ‘our maturity’ by obliging us to go along with a British-centric view of our own history. A small example of this would be the Irish people's view of Oliver Cromwell as the Devil's Executioner while the English describe him as God's Englishman. How can that be reconciled into a ‘modern’ view of history?

The Breton province of France views a similar problem—in his *'History of Brittany: The Breton Point of View'*, Jean-Pierre Le Mat, the editor, writes:

"When I was a schoolboy, I was taught history. On the coloured charts of my textbook I discovered with childish pleasure that Brittany stood proudly to the west, independent of the Carolingian Empire. Then came disenchantment. Without any explanation Brittany disappeared. Two centuries later Brittany is part of France. Annexation? Conquest? Mystery...

During the Middle Ages the only noticeable Breton is du Gueselin, a crafty warrior, a joker, not really charismatic. Are the Bretons like that? ... Then comes the Duchess Anne and the teacher explained that Brittany became French thanks to her marriage with the King of France. What does that mean? If Brittany was already French, what is the meaning of this marriage? Or if not, I was misled...

It is easy to sneer at the little children of the West Indies reciting ‘our ancestors the Gallic ones... The little Bretons who learn ‘our good King St. Louis’ are in the same situation. It was not possible, at school, to learn my country's history. Why is it forbidden, why such mysteries, why such lies? The history of Brittany seen from Paris must be dangerous. Several facts confirmed it thereafter for me. In 1979, the commemoration of Jean IV's landing in Dinard was prohibited. Six hundred years afterwards! Those who wanted to defy this prohibition were prosecuted! In 2006, the Prefect of Finistere prohibited the representation of Sebastian ar Balp on a road panel financed by the town council of Carhaix. Three hundred years afterwards! From Paris, the history of Brittany seems to be subversive. A good reason to learn it."

So it would appear that the French Government in Paris is trying to flatten out the history of Brittany and make it appear to be homogeneous with French history. The end result of these policies is to discourage the study of history altogether and, since the study of history is enabled by old books and documents, then these old books and documents have to be destroyed or at least entombed in inaccessible archives.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

As I write this, I am reminded of a time in the late 1960's when I had a conversation with the then Catechetics Examiner for the Diocese of Cork, who told me that the school children no longer study *Catechism*. Instead they studied a thing called '*Christian Doctrine*'. It was explained to me that the outcome of Vatican 2 changed many of the teachings in the former Catechism

and, so that the faithful public would not notice the changes, the teaching of the Catechism was to be suspended for a generation of thirty years. And so it happened. And arguably the result is a huge loss of believing Catholics in the Universal Church of Rome.

Apart from their very important intrinsic value, both history and religion are important elements of our society and indeed identity. Is it the grand design of some people behind the scenes that both history and religion will together be forgotten?

We are being manipulated by those we elect as our leaders into an abyss of ignorance and poverty. Hopefully, society will turn back before we enter into another Dark Age.

RTE

At a time when every taxpayer—and that is everybody—knows that money is needed for building new homes for the homeless and building more hospital spaces... RTE wants an additional new studio costing one million euros! Truly, those that live in the ‘Dublin bubble’ have little idea of what real life consists for those of us who live outside the Pale. The former is a '*state of mind of the elite*' so in geographical terms those who live in poorer areas in Dublin itself are also outside the Pale!

What are the priorities of our politicians? More media for them to make more promises—like that gormless little man Simon Harris TD, the Fine Gael Minister for Health who ignores the huge trolley-waiting public and those who need operations that are on endless lists—some over two years for things like hip replacements, only to appear on our RTE News stating that the State (by that he means of course us taxpayers) will perform abortions for free for women from another jurisdiction. And the media eulogises him for his “*bravery and modernism*”!

'THE BRIMMING RIVER' BY RAYMOND F. BROOKE

This is an interesting book. The author, a Dublin-wine-merchant, writes:

"The time comes when a man, having travelled a goodly distance downstream on the river of life, rests his oars awhile to dwell on things seen and heard along the way".

This musing leads him to write: “*I think I may claim to be Irish—though I*

To page 27, col.1

HEALTH continued

or the control of essential industries by a few companies who could dominate supply, demand and transport. Modern economics is all about giant entities taking interests in a multitude of commercial activities and industries. Often this activity is disguised by captive companies or flags of convenience.

Production, drilling, mining etc. in secured or leased locations, may be carried out on behalf of parent companies or dominant partners. However, in the case of Monsanto and Bayer, the economic cornering of the market is more blatant. The latter seem to be able to push Governments and regulators about at ease. As has been pointed out by Professor Maurice Stuick of the University of Tennessee: Monsanto controls 70% of the cotton seeds grown in the United States, as well as having virtual monopolies on canola soybeans and corn.

Of course the farmers that operate in such conditions grow their crops in a model that requires a huge consumption

of chemicals. Stuick has tried unsuccessfully to block the super merger. He continues to highlight such issues with the greater public.

The continued ability of super corporations to get away with many abuses is facilitated by a complex matrix of banking and financial services, wealth investors, as well as many modern free trade deals. The crusade for more deregulation, the neo-liberal agenda and compliant opinion formers in the media, Economics Departments in the Universities and numerous think-tanks. However, at least in the Social Media (despite tons of dross), people are using a new opportunity to share knowledge and question the unsupportable facets of world power and money. For instance the World Labour Federation is highlighting social and economic abuses in Indonesia. Also World Watch Institute and worldwatch@worldwatch.org tells the story of indigenous people, who have survived on subsistence agriculture, being pushed off the land. Meanwhile, those now growing palm oil are effectively sharecroppers who have to pay back huge loans in order to be able to work the land.

Meanwhile, in the cities we learn of the case of Atra Narwanto, Indonesian Trade Union leader, who has been intimidated, thrown out of his workplace, and threatened with prison for organising workers independently. The workplace involved is ARNATIL corp; which holds the exclusive bottling contract for Coca Cola in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific.

Just to bring things together, Coca Cola is currently sponsoring the Winter Olympics in South Korea. They are broadcasting fluffy messages about young people attaining their dreams, and the games promoting friendship and positive values amongst nations and people.

Featured on *Euronews* on 29th January last, was a large farmers' protest in Brussels. They were concerned about cheap imports of food into Europe mostly from Latin America. Cattle raised there are fed to a large degree on soya. And, of course, Glyphosate was widely used in the reaping of the harvest with high chances of traces entering into the food chain.

Small world!

Seán Ó Riain

Stack

continued

know there are many who would not admit the claim in one of English descent."

How Raymond Brooke could logically claim to be Irish illustrates the blind prejudice of his colonial class. Yes, he was born in Ireland, but his family tree at the start of the book is sprinkled with Brigadier-Generals and Majors and Lancers in the British Army and he had governesses who instructed him and his siblings not to speak *"the Irish brogue"*. His father sent him at 10 years old, to a school at Laleham on the Thames in England—

"primarily in my father's view to get rid of such brogues as we had in permanent use; while my mother, approving of this desirable object, was really more interested in the cause of education".

After Laleham, Raymond Brooke went to school at Winchester, like many other Brookes whom he names. *"But as the years went by the machinery (of the ancestral home) was gradually grinding to a standstill"* and they had to leave the

house by February 1911.

"Then, with the Treaty obviously coming, bringing with it the departure of the British Army (whose officer's Messes were among our best customers) and also of many other good Irish customers, we wound up (the business) while the going was still fairly good".

On page 174, Raymond refers to himself working in Dublin as being in the *"home counties"* (a distinct reference to a part of England that would always seem to be forever quintessentially English).

Raymond's brother Arthur was in the British Army fighting the Turks and Raymond regularly sent to him two dozen bottles of Sherry. Such is the Empire looking after its own officer class. Life in Dublin's legal circles before the Great War is described in the book with great relish and detail—he was appointed train-bearer to his cousin Dunbar Barton, who was Justice of the Chancery Division in Dublin's Four Courts. He says his train-bearer job was the last of the sinecures. He was paid £100 a year for it (a fabulous sum in those days!) and at the same time his full time day job as an Insurance clerk paid him £45 a year. He recalls how he

met J.K. Mahaffy, Provost of Trinity College, who was one of his father's better clients. And then Raymond relates how he was taken into his father's business at which he worked for 48 years, and his membership of the Kildare Street Club about which he writes, with various interesting anecdotes.

In Appendix A, we are given information supplied by Raymond's brother, Basil G. Brooke, about his antecedents: they were part of the Williamite Plantation of 1690 when they were 'gifted' Donegal Castle. Basil Brooke was born in 1854 and served the English Crown in the 17th Lancers. They were the cousins of Viscount Brookeborough of Colebrook, Co. Fermanagh.

They very definitely were not Irish in the sense we—as natives—understood. The title of the book is from Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem: *"The Brook"*—the lines of which include the following:

"I chatter, chatter, as I flow
To join the brimming river,
For men may come and men may go,
But I go on for ever."

Michael Stack ©



Notes on Agriculture, Health and the Influence of the Chemical Giant Corporations

Key products components and ingredients, usually controlled by a small number of corporations, continue to wield a disproportionate influence on our lives. What do H.J. Heinz, (US), Campbell soup, (US), General Mills including Kellogg's, (US), Kraft Food Group (US), and Unilever (UK/Dutch) have in common?

They all benefit from the continued decimation of forests in Indonesia and Malaysia, which is part of the insatiable appetite for planting palm oil on exposed carbon rich peatlands. While the Indonesian Government called a moratorium on forest clearance for palm oil in June 2016, the company PT ABN has continued felling in its concession area.

PT ABN (Indonesia) is for the greater part a coal company supplying East Asia. Campaigners highlight Orangutans' loss of habitat but the dangerous spoiling of soil is a greater danger in human terms. Global financial markets, and the determination to continue policies in world foodstuff production and management, point towards soil crops and local population manipulation in the interests of the few.

Now the US drug administration has declared that foods based on palm oil extract are less good for the body in combatting LDLs or *low density lipoproteins*, exposing people to higher cholesterol risk. The American College of Nutrition is also dubious about several products produced by Monsanto. Monsanto (US), is a seedmaker that makes farmers dependent on them as their produce does not self-perpetuate. While much of the crop has a built-in resistance to pests, the creation of the strain in the first place, in the food and cotton plants, is completely reliant on the expertise and substances which are the stock in trade of the giant world wide chemical industry.

On 17th December 2017, in *The Sunday Business Post*, a surprising critic of palm oil emerged in the person of retired grocer and sometimes Senator, Fergal Quinn.

"Shrinkflation, I'm not sure that is a real word but it is a very real tactic being utilised by the producers of consumer goods. Shrinkflation refers to the practice of the weight or volume of a product being shrunk from its normal size to a slightly smaller scale".

Nestle were recently challenged on this tactic. Yet—as Quinn points out—what the huge producers inevitably cry out about is that the key ingredients they are using are becoming increasingly expensive. In a very good article, he goes on to point out that a product like 'Nutella' is now very high in palm oil extract content. Quinn points out that palm oil is disguised in labelling and its derivatives. It—

"Can appear under 30 or so alternative names including: vegetable oil, vegetable fat, palm kernel, palm kernel oil, palm fruit oil, palmate and so on".

Substitution of palm oil as an ingredient is now huge in sweets, chocolate, infant milk, pastries, margarine—and even frozen pizza. The article hammers many important nails on the head! Regarding world commodity prices, we can see that Cacao is selling for less than the 2008 levels while sugar is currently at 50% of the height of the peak it reached in 2011. Crucially rapeseed oil is going at about \$920 a ton. Sunflower is going at approximately \$845 a ton while, wait for it : palm oil comes on at \$800 a ton or lower.

And now we have the huge merger of Monsanto and the equally large chemical company Bayer (German). The latter has brought us such products as 'Round up'. The weed killer is about as deadly a substance as can be used, its by-products are considerable and very hard to manage, while the product itself makes it almost impossible for nutrients in the soil to recover naturally and frequently the fluid can seep into the ground water. The key ingredient is an old poison Glyphosate.

Recently 'Round Up' was given a five-year extension of its license for distribution by the European Union. It seems that Governments across the globe are treating their populations as a captive collection of consumers. Glyphosate was discussed in the European Parliament and at the same time legislators in Arkansas failed to restrict its continued use. A small number of companies continue to roll in the profits from Glyphosate: B.ASF. call their version 'Dicamba', while Du Pont (US), also have their own version.

In the United States, the *Clayton Act* of 1914 is part of the building blocks of anti-Trust Law: i.e the determination to protect citizens from the formation of cartels and

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1 Sutton Villas, Lower Dargle Road
Bray, Co. Wicklow or
33 Athol Street, Belfast BT12 4GX or
2 Newington Green Mansions, London N16 9BT
or *Labour Comment*, TEL: 021-4676029
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